EAPIL blog

Gilles Cuniberti (University of Luxembourg) and Sara Migliorini (University of Macau) have published a commentary in French on Regulation 655/2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order (EAPO).

The book offers a comprehensive article per article commentary of the EAPO Regulation with a focus on its implementation and operation in the three French speaking Members States of the EU, Belgium, France and Luxembourg. Some aspects of the implementation of the Regulation are addressed by implementing legislation, which the book reproduces and discusses.

On certain issues, the implementation of the Regulation has varied a great deal in these three countries (and more widely in the EU).

An interesting example is the information gathering remedy which Article 14 of the EAPO Regulation requires all Member States to establish. Each Member State is meant to offer a procedure for finding information on bank accounts that the debtor might hold in the relevant Member State. France already had such procedure that it simply made applicable in the context of the EAPO Regulation. In contrast, no such procedure existed in Luxembourg and Belgium. Luxembourg established one for the purpose of the Regulation. So did Belgium, but it did not limit the scope of the said procedure to request made under Article 14 and has introduced a new remedy in Belgian law available outside the scope of the EAPO Regulation.

More information on the book can be found here. The table of contents is available here.

Francesco Parisi (Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, Law School and a Professor of Economics at the University of Bologna), Daniel Pi (Assistant Professor at University of Maine School of Law) and Alice Guerra (Assistant Professor at the University of Bologna) wrote an interesting article using a law and economics approach to compare access to evidence in the US and EU. The article, entitled Access to Evidence in Private International Law, is forthcoming in 2022 in volume 23 of Theoretical Inquiries in Law.

The authors focus their analysis on how a misalignment of the burden of proof and evidentiary rules can frustrate the production of evidence and undermine care incentives when these are applied cross-border tort cases.

The abstract reads as follows:

This Article analyzes the interaction between the burden of proof and evidentiary discovery rules. Both sets of rules can affect incentives for prospective injurers to invest in evidence technology (i.e., ex ante investments that increase the quantity and quality of evidence in case an accident occurs). This interaction becomes acutely important in the private international law setting, where jurisdictions are split on the question whether the burden of proof should be treated as a substantive or procedural matter. When a tort occurs in Europe, but the case is litigated in American courts, treating the burden of proof as a procedural matter preserves the complementarity of incentives created by the burden of proof and evidentiary rules. Conversely, treating the burden of proof as a substantive matter creates a mismatch in incentives created by the burden of proof and evidentiary rules.

The article is structured in three parts. The first part of the article provides a theoretical insight into the interaction of presumptions and discovery rules using an economic approach. The second part offers a short overview of the way American and European law deal with the burden of proof and evidentiary discovery. In the third part the authors discuss how dissonant incentives can arise when tort cases are adjudicated in American courts using European legal rules. The various case law of American jurisdictions are split on the question whether the burden of proof should be regarded as substantive or procedural. The authors ultimately suggest that the US should treat presumption of negligence as a procedural rule to promote efficient incentives. They conclude that such a rule counterintuitively results in better outcomes in cases of private international law tort cases where, with a proper alignment of presumptions and discoverability rules, defendants would face incentives to invest in evidence technology even when knowing that the evidence could be used against them.

Jean-Sylvestre Bergé who is a law professor at Université Côte d’Azur (CNRS GREDEG) and a former member of the Institut Universitaire de France has recently published a new open access essay titled Rethinking Flow Beyond Control – An Outreach Legal Essay (ed. DICE, coll. Confluence des droits collection, 2021, 154 p., already announced here).

This work is the continuum of his previous legal essay titled “Situations in Motion and The Law – A Pragmatic Epistemology” (Les situations en mouvement et le droit – Essai d’une épistémologie pragmatique, Dalloz, 2021, announced here) which examines a number of legal constructs in national, international or European contexts and the way they respond each time they are faced with “situations in motion”. As explained by the author, “it was an attempt at deconstruction and reconstruction with the aim of offering a series of tools that could improve our understanding of both ordinary and complex circulation phenomena”.

Since the very inspiring work of Jean-Sylvestre Bergé is about circulation across territories, following a global approach, I have interviewed Jean-Sylvestre to know more about his new essay from a private international law perspective.

 — Can you share with us the central idea of your work? 

First of all, I would like to make it clear that this book is written for a wide audience, not just lawyers, and writing it in English allows me to capture all the exchanges I had during its preparation and now to share them as widely as possible.

The book is divided in two parts.

The first part is an epistemological analysis of circulation and law through the lens of circulation. The approach is therefore different from the one traditionally chosen, particularly by private international law scholars, who study the “law of circulation” (e.g. legal aspects of movement of goods or persons). I reverse the perspective: how does the phenomenon of circulation question the constructions of law and in particular those of private international law?

For example, when we study the cross-border circulation of judgments or civil status documents, there is a disciplinary pre-understanding. The analysis is made under the rules and methods of the subject. The book proposes to “decompartmentalize” knowledge and analysis, by taking various examples in several disciplinary fields.

The second part of the book aims at characterising circulation and pushing it to a point of paroxysm: this is the figure of “rupture” that I call the “total loss of control in circulation”. I think about flows produced by all of us in the everyday life and the loss of control of the stakeholders, such as a family, a company or even the whole world. This figure of loss of control is interesting because it is a “clash of the titans” with the law. Law is dominated by the control of situations and, for my part, I work on the loss of control of flows. This is not an unknown object of study, but lawyers find it difficult to accept! Think of the nuclear risk and its legal treatment. Control is certainly not total…

 — If we take the example of cross-border circulation of civil status documents, when do we reach a situation of “loss of control”? Can private international law regulate the situation “beyond control”?

Let’s take the specific case of children born of surrogate motherhood abroad (where it is legal), and then the request for transcription of the child’s birth certificate in the country where the parents live and which prohibits this method of procreation, such as France. In this context, the core issue could be the circulation of the child. There are mechanisms that allow for the circulation of the child; consequently, this infers all subsequent constructions, including those of private international law, which deal with and regulate the circulation of civil status records of these children born of surrogate motherhood.

In France, this circulation was liberated by the “Taubira” circular concerning travel documents allowing the child to leave his/her State of birth for France, even though surrogate motherhood is prohibited in France. If we want to fight surrogate motherhood (from the point of view of its opponents), we must attack the circulation, block it, prohibit it… Can we ban these children from circulation and how can we do it? There is a “reading template” to respect, starting with the respect of the fundamental rights of the child with regard to circulation or non-circulation.

This is another way of considering this topic, renewing the usual debate on the prohibition (or not) of this mode of procreation and the cross-border “recognition” of the parent-child relationship; it is the prism of circulation beyond control, following an epistemological approach of private international law.

 — What is the main contribution of your work to private international law theory and practice?

The book invites us to revisit the legal acquis (including private international law acquis) by using the language of an epistemology of circulation and of a total loss of control, such as internationality, extraneity, mobility or relocation (see the index of the book). There are well-known concepts in private international law that could allow the issue of circulation to be brought back to the center of the proposed analysis. For example, in France, the “Matter doctrine” according to which a contract is international if it involves the interests of international trade through the ebb and flow of financial values across borders.  In my opinion, this doctrine is not sufficient to consider that the issue of the international dimension of a situation is settled. It has not provided for a conceptual framework for circulation phenomena under private international law. It can usefully be rethought through the concept of flow in the context of situations in motion.

To this end, I propose new notions, such as a distinction between cases in which the law tackles situations in motion from a “consequential perspective” (i.e. looking at its causes and effects) or “in and of itself” (i.e. from end to end). This distinction is very interesting because it allows to study mechanisms of private international law to see whether they deal with mobility from beginning to end or, on the contrary, whether they only deal with its causes or effects. It is often the latter answer that prevails because it is the easiest way for the law in general. Let us think of the expulsion of an individual from a territory: it is a question of apprehending an incoming flow. There is a legal apparatus that deals with the issue only by its causes or effects in this case.

In contrast, the law can grasp the movement in its entirety, from start to finish: this is the case in extradition conventions, in the mechanism of the European arrest warrant, or in private international law of the legal regime for the return of illegally displaced children, in the Hague Convention on international child abduction. This text puts in place a very sophisticated mechanism based on a very high level of cooperation between public authorities, which makes it possible to apprehend the circulation and return of the child with immediate effect.

In this contrasting context, the question is which path the law chooses to take in its legal treatment of circulation? This is a legal policy choice with varying levels of construction. End-to-end mechanisms are fragile, often held in check and more complex to set up and implement because they require an understanding across territories of the complete mechanisms. The treatment of the subject by its causes or effects is easier, the law knows how to “receive” or “send” a situation in motion. It is a much more unilateral rationale and, whatever one may say, unilateralism is a key-component of private international law…

 — The book also develops a “modal analysis of circulations”, distinguishing between the forms of circulations that lead to different legal regimes.

Yes, this approach is well-known in transport law: depending on the type of transport by air, sea or road, there are adapted legal regimes. We can use this rationale to analyse some mechanisms of private international law.

For example, circulation in law is consubstantial with its subject. In private international law, is the person consubstantial with its object? People should be allowed to circulate without losing their status. This question has already been examined but the analysis can be renewed. We know that we cannot let everyone circulate freely. So as soon as we deal with movement, it is because we have the right to control it; if we deal with controlling movement, it is because movement is not free. In law, we do not talk about movement when it is free; if the law talks about it, it is because it controls it. Hence my counterpoint: loss of control!

 — The book proposes another concept, which could be very useful for international lawyers, that of the “normative space of flows”. Can you tell us more about it?

I start from the idea that it is the flow that designates the perimeter of actors in a field with cross-border implications, and brings them into contact (e.g. a buyer and a seller in an international contract). This flow is composed of a set of factual and legal data. Sometimes, this can give rise to collateral damage that is difficult to grasp and that draws new, global perspectives. In this context, my theoretical proposal is to say that the flow creates its own space and that this space is capable of producing its own law.

For example, a transatlantic air flight is a normative space of flow; it should be possible to study it as the ephemeral constitution of a legal order that federates around its object the movement of the plane from Paris to Toronto, a set of rules of private law, public law, soft law, hard law, requirements on corporate social responsibility, etc… All these rules have the flow as their object. If I put the flow back at the center of the legal order, I redraw the relationships between the legal norms at the start of the flow.

There are a large number of possible examples.

To return to the example of surrogate motherhood in an international context, the circulation of the child is a normative space of flows that disrupts the classic legal framework for understanding this phenomenon.

 — In this normative space of flows, where does control lie? Is the circulation always “beyond control”?

It depends! Circulation can be under control or beyond control for the law in a normative space of flows. In the hypothesis of a plane accident, its legal treatment can be analysed through the normative space of flows but the law will have difficulty in regaining control of the situation, given the complexity of the cross-border legal treatment of the situation (i.e. compensation for material and physical damage, search for the responsibilities of the parties involved, etc.).

The problem is that there is no “meta rule” of private international law to seize one single court with a unique applicable law at the global level. In the example of an air crash, there is inevitably a scattering of the procedure with victims who are culturally different, the evidence is spread over several territories, the area of the accident may even be a-national (on the high seas), etc.

Finally, we may wonder if the law – including private international law – is capable of dealing with the phenomenon of circulation. The answer is difficult. When it circulates, the answer is positive, but when the circulation is difficult or when there is no circulation at all, we wonder. This brings us to the limits of the legal treatment of situations in motion. Why is this so? Because the flow cannot produce its own normative space.

 — What about EU private international law? In what way does the unification of PIL rules in the European area contribute to the discourse on situations in motion and its legal treatment?

The European system of private international law is a normative space of flows. This may seem obvious, but it is no small thing to say! It is a legal system that modifies the reference system of private international law. This is huge! It was originally the (national) forum and sometimes we looked a little at the lex causae, but that remained rare. And now we have a supranational construction that anchors a space that is not a territory as a point of reference. This changes everything: it is a normative space of flows like a national forum.

In this context, the book proposes that lawyers and lawmakers take the flow as the object of normative construction. This could perhaps make it possible to overcome certain failures of the law to embrace situations in motion. But there is strong resistance because each legal order wants to keep its perimeter, its control and deal with the situation alone, even if it goes beyond its borders…

 

In conclusion, I would like to thank Jean-Sylvestre for this fascinating analysis of situations in motion, based on the concept of flow, and this invitation for lawyers, including experts in private international law, to rethink the “applicable law” (i.e. from its conception to its implementation).

In a judgment of 23 November 2021, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that the French provisions implementing the 1986 Agency Directive are not overriding mandatory provisions, and thus do not define French public policy.

It is hard to reconcile this judgment with the Ingmar case of the European Court of Justice.

Background

Swiss company Guess Europe entered into an agency contract with a French company to market its products in France. The agency contract provided for the application of Swiss law and, it seems, arbitration in Switzerland.

After the French agent did not meet its target, Guess terminated the contract without paying any indemnity for termination. It then initiated arbitration proceedings seeking, inter alia, that it did not owe anything under the agency contract. Guess partly prevailed: the arbitrator ordered Guess to pay certain commissions, but ruled that it did not owe anything else.

In parallel, the French agent initiated proceedings before French courts against the French subsidiary of Guess seeking payment of commissions and production of certain documents for the purpose of determining the amount of its indemnity after termination. The action was dismissed on an unknown ground. The parties debated whether Guess France could be characterised as principal before both fora, so it is possible that the agent lost on the ground that Guess France was not concerned with these claims.

Guess Europe obtained a declaration of enforceability of the arbitral award in France. The French agent appealed and argued that the award was contrary to French public policy.

Ingmar

The main argument of the French agent was obviously that the European Court of Justice held in Ingmar v. Eaton (C-381/98) that

Articles 17 and 18 of Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents, which guarantee certain rights to commercial agents after termination of agency contracts, must be applied where the commercial agent carried on his activity in a Member State although the principal is established in a non-member country and a clause of the contract stipulates that the contract is to be governed by the law of that country.

This strongly suggested that these provisions of the Agency Directive should be considered as overriding mandatory provisions by the Member States.

If so, it would also seem that these provisions should define the public policy of the Member States.

The Judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal

The Paris Court of Appeal, however, ruled that the French provisions implementing the Agency Directive (articles L. 134-1 et seq. of the French Commercial Code) do not define French international public policy. It held:

an internal mandatory rule, even if it is the result of the transposition of a European directive, the imperative nature of which has been recalled by the Court of Justice of the European Union, is only likely to come under the French concept of international public policy if, after having verified its applicability to the dispute, its disregard violates this concept, that is to say the set of rules and values whose disregard cannot be tolerated by the French legal order, even in international matters (§29).

The Court found, however, that the dispute fell within the scope of the Directive. But it then ruled that the purpose of the Directive is not to define the most essential values and principles which should trigger the public policy exception.

The Court ruled that the provisions of European Union law

even if they are described as mandatory, do not all pursue objectives aimed at guaranteeing essential principles or values whose disregard by the Member States cannot be tolerated in an international context (§ 39)

and that this was not the purpose of the aforementioned directive and its transposition, the objective of which

is essentially to harmonize and approximate the laws of the Member States with regard to the defence of the private interests of commercial agents without the protection of vital interests of those same Member States being at stake, or even if it is clear from such provisions that they are necessary for the implementation of a compelling policy of defending freedom of establishment or undistorted competition (§40).

Precedent

The Court of Appeal relied on two judgments of the Cour de cassation in support of its position. One is pretty unclear, but the other one had indeed ruled that the French implementing provision was a domestic mandatory rule and thus not an overriding mandatory provision.

The debate in this case, however, was not whether French law should be applied to displace the application of the law of a third State, but whether it should be applied to displace the application of German law.

Assessment

The Paris Court of Appeal certainly has a point. The reasons given by the ECJ to justify its decision show that its goal was not to assess whether the Directive serves the crucial interests of the Member States. Rather, the Court wanted to advance its own agenda of creating a single market, and used strategically private international law to that end.

This being said, there is a precedent, and it is binding on the Member States.

The CJEU has been very generous with airline passengers when it comes to applying the rules on jurisdiction in the Brussels I bis Regulation, especially with regard to indemnity for cancelled or delayed flights.

In Rehder v Air Baltic, it had famously ruled that the passenger can actually choose between the place of departure and the place of arrival when bringing a claim against the airline. Later decisions have extended this choice to cases of combined flights, with the CJEU ruling that the passenger can bring the claim against the airline at the place of departure of the first leg or the place of arrival of the last leg, provided that both legs of the flight have been booked together (see for instance Flightright v Iberia, Air Nostrum and my previous post on EAPIL).

The claim in JW et al. v LOT also concerned a combined flight. However, the passenger had brought the claim neither at the place of departure (in Warsaw) nor at the final destination (on the Maldives) but rather at the place of an infamous stopover (Frankfurt am Main). This choice seems surprising given that both the passenger as well as the operating airline were domiciled in Warsaw. The idea might have been that the delay at the root of the action occurred at this place, but it would still have been more practical to sue in Warsaw.

As it turned out, it was also legally unwise to sue at the stopover, since the CJEU actually rejects the jurisdiction of the courts there. The Court rules that the place of performance of service contracts in the sense of Article 7(1)(b) of the Brussels I bis Regulation is where the “the main provision of services is to be carried out”. In its previous case law, the CJEU had considered only the place of departure and the final destination as such points. While the Court acknowledges that this list is a “non-exhaustive illustration” (see para 23), it balks at including the stopover in it.

Exactly why is difficult to tell. Objectively, it can hardly be denied that many of the essential flight services are performed at the stopover. Among them are the boarding of the passengers, their reception by the crew and their disembarkation as well as the transport of luggage. Nevertheless, the Court had already mentioned in Rehder that “places where the aircraft may stop over also do not have a sufficient link to the essential nature of the services resulting from that contract” (Rehder para 40).

This obiter dictum has now been turned into a binding ruling in JW et al. v LOT.

Apparently, the Court wants to restrict the possible places where suits against airlines can be brought. It also invokes, to this effect, the objectives of proximity and of the sound administration of justice and the need for predictability of the competent tribunal (JW et al. v LOT, paras 25 and 26). However, a suit at the place of the stopover is not completely unforeseeable for the airline, especially where the delay occurred there, such as in the present case. Nor would it run against the objectives of proximity and the sound administration of justice if the court there were to hear the dispute.

It remains to be seen whether this case law will also be applied to flights with the place of departure and final destination in third countries and a mere stopover in the EU. It needs to be borne in mind that these flights also fall under the purview of the Passenger Regulation as long as they are operated by an EU airline (see Article 3(1) of the Flight Compensation Regulation). In such cases, the Court may find it convenient to offer the passenger a jurisdiction at the place of the stopover and not only at the airline’s headquarters or place of statutory seat, which could be in a different Member State.

— Thanks to Verena Wodniansky-Wildenfeld for her help in preparing this post.

The European Commission has launched a public consultation on the prospect of an EU-wide protection for vulnerable adults, i.e., persons aged 18 or more who are unable to protect their interests because of an impairment or insufficiency of their personal faculties.

In the document presenting the initiative, the Commission notes that vulnerable adults, together with their legal representatives, “currently face multiple barriers when they move abroad, buy or sell properties, or just manage their bank account in another Member State”. This is so, “because the rules governing cross-border cases (private international law rules) differ from one Member State to another”.

Actually, none of the legislative measures enacted  so far by the Union on the basis of Article 81 TFEU deals with the support that vulnerable needs may need to access to exercise their legal capacity.

The aim of the consultation is to “gather evidence on the problem and its consequences and to give all interested parties the opportunity to share their views on the possible policy options”.

The deadline for contributing to the consultation is 29 March 2022.

The Scientific Council of the European Association of Private International Law has approved a proposal for the creation of a Working Group charged with drafting a response to the consultation on behalf of the Association.

The members of the group are Pietro Franzina (co-chair), Estelle Gallant, Cristina González Beilfuss (co-chair), Katja Karjalainen, Thalia Kruger, Tamás Szabados and Jan von Hein.

The Working Group plans to hold a webinar in the coming weeks in order to publicly present a preliminary draft and collect the views of experts and stakeholders.

Further details will be made available in the Group’s dedicated page.

For information: pietro.franzina@unicatt.it.

Marc Schmitz, President of the International Union of Judicial Officers (UIHJ) and Patrick Gielen, Chairman of the joint appointment commissions of the Bailiffs, have edited a book, published by Bruylant, on service of judicial and extrajudicial documents in Europe (La signification des actes judiciaires et extrajudiciaires en Europe). It aims at preparing legal professionals to the recast of the Service Regulation (announced here).

The European Union of Judicial Officers (UEHJ) gathered a panel of experts to propose a first analysis of the main changes provided by the Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters and which will enter into force on 1 July 2022.

It is worth mentioning that the European Commission, through its e-Justice service, offers an unpublished analysis (in French and English) of the secure and reliable decentralised computer system, known as e-CODEX, which is to be set up to facilitate the electronic exchange of data between Member States (recently mentioned here).

Covered topics include: European Case Law on Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of 13 November 2007; Service Regulation: Implementation, Applications and Belgian Interpretations; The new Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 presented to practitioners; The e-Codex and the European platform for the transmission of documents.

Contributors include: Marc Schmitz, Patrick Gielen, Guillaume Payan, Léonard Maistriaux, Mathieau Chardon, Nicolau Cristian, Serba, Dragos, Koit Haldi

Full table of contents here and more information here.

This post was written by Johan Meeusen, who is a professor at the University of Antwerp and a Member of the Scientific Council of EAPIL. The post was posted first on the site of GEDIP.

Introduction

The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the Pancharevo case (CJEU 14 December 2021, V.M.A./Stolichna obshtina, rayon ‘Pancharevo’, C-490/20) was eagerly awaited. A few years ago, in Coman (judgment of 5 June 2018, C-673/16), the Court had obliged Romania on the basis of Article 21(1) TFEU to recognise, solely for residence purposes, the same-sex marriage that its national Coman and his American partner Hamilton had contracted in Belgium. In Pancharevo, the Court was confronted with the – perhaps even more sensitive – issue of same-sex parenthood, again in the context of the mobility rights that Union citizens derive from Article 21(1) TFEU, interpreted in the light of fundamental rights on the one hand, and considerations of national identity and public policy of the Member State concerned on the other.

Facts

V.M.A. is a Bulgarian national and K.D.K. is a United Kingdom national. Both women have lived in Spain since 2015 and were married in Gibraltar in 2018. In December 2019, V.M.A. and K.D.K. had a daughter, S.D.K.A., who was born and resides with both parents in Spain. Her birth certificate, issued by the Spanish authorities, refers to V.M.A. as ‘Mother A’ and to K.D.K. as ‘Mother’ of the child. V.М.А. applied to the Sofia municipality for a birth certificate for S.D.K.A. to be issued to her, the certificate being necessary, inter alia, for the issue of a Bulgarian identity document. However, the Sofia municipality instructed V.M.A. to provide evidence of the parentage of S.D.K.A., with respect to the identity of her biological mother, as the Bulgarian model birth certificate has only one box for the ‘mother’ and another for the ‘father’, and only one name may appear in each box. After V.М.А. replied that she was not required to provide the information requested, the Sofia municipality refused the application for a birth certificate. The reasons given for that refusal decision were: the lack of information concerning the identity of the child’s biological mother and the fact that a reference to two female parents on a birth certificate was contrary to the public policy of the Republic of Bulgaria, which does not permit marriage between two persons of the same sex.

V.M.A. brought an action against that refusal decision before the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (the Administrative Court of the City of Sofia, Bulgaria). That court states that, notwithstanding the fact that S.D.K.A. does not have a birth certificate issued by the Bulgarian authorities, she has the Bulgarian nationality under Bulgarian law. The court has doubts, however, as to whether the refusal by the Bulgarian authorities to register the birth of a Bulgarian national, which occurred in another Member State and has been attested by a birth certificate that mentions two mothers and was issued by the competent authorities of the latter Member State, infringes the rights conferred on such a national in the Treaty provisions on Union citizenship and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter: the Charter). The Bulgarian authorities’ refusal to issue a birth certificate is, after all, liable to make it more difficult for a Bulgarian identity document to be issued and, therefore, to hinder that child’s exercise of the right of free movement and thus full enjoyment of her rights as a Union citizen. The Bulgarian court therefore refers four questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. These questions seek to ascertain whether EU law obliges a Member State to issue a birth certificate – in order for an identity document to be obtained according to the legislation of that State – for a child, a national of that Member State, whose birth in another Member State is attested by a birth certificate that has been drawn up by the authorities of that other Member State in accordance with the national law of that other State, and which designates, as the mothers of that child, a national of the first of those Member States and her wife, without specifying which of the two women gave birth to that child. If the answer is in the affirmative, the referring court asks whether EU law requires such a certificate to state, in the same way as the certificate drawn up by the authorities of the Member State in which the child was born, the names of those two women in their capacity as mothers.

Judgment

The Court answers the questions referred for a preliminary ruling in a fairly short judgment which, in line with and with frequent reference to its earlier Coman judgment, is characterised by a functional approach designed to ensure that the Union citizens concerned can exercise their rights of free movement without requiring Bulgaria to recognise same-sex parenthood for wider purposes, let alone to incorporate it into its legislation, or to issue a birth certificate to that effect itself.

On basis of the findings of the referring court, which it says alone has jurisdiction in that regard, the Court considers that S.D.K.A. has Bulgarian nationality and hence is a Union citizen. It confirms that a Union citizen who has made use of his or her freedom to move and reside within a Member State other than his or her Member State of origin may rely on the rights pertaining to that status, including against his or her Member State of origin. This also applies to Union citizens who were born in the host Member State of their parents and who have never made use of their right to freedom of movement. Relevant in this regard is the right to move and reside provided for in Article 21(1) TFEU and Article 4(3) of Citizens’ Rights Directive 2004/38, which requires Member States to issue to their own nationals an identity card or passport stating their nationality in order to enable them to exercise this right. The Bulgarian authorities are therefore required to issue to S.D.K.A. an identity document, regardless of whether a Bulgarian birth certificate has been drawn up for her.

Next, the Court recalls its consideration in Coman that the rights which Union citizens enjoy under Article 21(1) TFEU include the right to lead a normal family life, together with their family members, both in their host Member State and in the Member State of which they are nationals when they return to the territory of that Member State. In more concrete terms, since the Spanish authorities lawfully established that there was a parent-child relationship, biological or legal, between S.D.K.A. and her two parents, V.M.A. and K.D.K., the latter must, therefore, be recognised by all Member States as having  the right to accompany that child when her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is being exercised. Accordingly, the Bulgarian authorities are required, as are the authorities of any other Member State, to recognise that parent-child relationship for the purposes of permitting S.D.K.A. to exercise without impediment, with each of her two parents, her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States as guaranteed in Article 21(1) TFEU. To that end, V.M.A. and K.D.K. must have a document which mentions them as being persons entitled to travel with that child. In this case, the authorities of the host Member State, Spain, are best placed to draw up such a document, which may consist in a birth certificate. The other Member States are obliged to recognise that document.

According to the Court, that does not detract from the competence of the Member States with regard to a person’s status. After all, it is established case law that each Member State must comply with EU law when exercising its competence. In addition, the obligation to issue an identity card or a passport to S.D.K.A. and to recognise the parent-child relationship between her and her two mothers does not undermine the national identity or pose a threat to the public policy of Bulgaria, since it does not require Bulgaria to provide, in its national law, for the parenthood of persons of the same sex, or to recognise, for purposes other than the exercise of the rights which S.D.K.A. derives from EU law, the parent-child relationship between herself and the persons mentioned on the birth certificate drawn up by the Spanish authorities.

Referring to the interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights of Article 8 of the ECHR and to the relevant provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Court considers lastly that it would be contrary to Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter to deprive S.D.K.A. of the relationship with one of her parents when exercising her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States or for her exercise of that right to be made impossible or excessively difficult in practice on the ground that her parents are of the same sex.

In the final paragraphs of the judgment, the Court examines the hypothesis that S.D.K.A. is not of Bulgarian nationality and sees in this no reason to rule otherwise. K.D.K. and S.D.K.A., irrespective of their nationality, must be regarded by all the Member States as being, respectively, the spouse and the direct descendant within the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) and (c) of Directive 2004/38 and, therefore, as being V.M.A.’s family members. They are thus ‘beneficiaries’ within the meaning of the Citizens’ Rights Directive (cf. Art.3(1)) with the derived right of free movement and residence attached to that status.

In the light of the foregoing, the Court rules that the provisions of EU law under examination must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a child, being a minor, who is a Union citizen and whose birth certificate, issued by the competent authorities of the host Member State (in this case, Spain), designates as that child’s parents two persons of the same sex, the Member State of which that child is a national (in this case, Bulgaria) is obliged (i) to issue to that child an identity card or a passport without requiring a birth certificate to be drawn up beforehand by its national authorities, and (ii) to recognise, as is any other Member State, the document from the host Member State that permits that child to exercise, with each of those two persons, the child’s right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.

Comments

In Pancharevo, the Court guarantees the freedom of movement and the fundamental rights of Union citizens in a way that, on the one hand, accommodates their personal and family interests and, on the other hand, respects both the competence of the Member States regarding the status of the person and the societal sensitivities – in this case, Bulgarian – involved. The judgment is remarkable for several reasons.

Firstly, this case provides an excellent illustration of the conflict between the claims of mobile Union citizens, who do not want to be restricted in their cross-border activities, and the different values and legislation of the Member States. Pancharevo is the logical next step after Coman and shows once more that the status and family law of the Member States, at least as regards its choice-of-law aspects, can no longer be seen as separate from the impact of EU law.

Secondly, the Court ensures continuity with its ruling in Coman. In the latter ruling, the Court did not oblige Romania in any way to introduce same-sex marriage or to give general recognition to the same-sex marriage contracted by a Romanian or a Union citizen in another Member State. On the contrary, the Court stressed several times that it was only a question of recognition ‘solely for the purpose of granting a derived right of residence to a third-country national’ (in that case, the American spouse of the Romanian Coman). The Court continues this strictly functional approach in Pancharevo. As such, the Court explicitly states that, since EU law does not affect the competence of the Member States regarding the status of persons, ‘the Member States are thus free to decide whether or not to allow marriage and parenthood for persons of the same sex under their national law’ (paragraph 52). Furthermore, the Court’s interpretation of the obligation of Member States to recognise the civil status of persons established in another Member State systematically relates to the right to freedom of movement and, precisely for that reason, does not pose a threat to the public policy or the national identity of Bulgaria: it is merely a question of recognising the filiation of the child ‘in the context of the child’s exercise of her rights under Article 21 TFEU and secondary legislation relating thereto’ (paragraph 56). Hence, as the Court adds, that does not mean that Bulgaria is required ‘to provide, in its national law, for the parenthood of persons of the same sex, or to recognise, for purposes other than the exercise of the rights which that child derives from EU law, the parent-child relationship between that child and the persons mentioned on the birth certificate drawn up by the authorities of the host Member State as being the child’s parents’ (paragraph 57).

Thirdly, it is also noteworthy that, in paragraph 57, the Court does not refer (solely) to the right of the Union citizen to move and reside freely, but more widely to ‘the exercise of the rights which that child derives from EU law’. The Court, which used similar wording in Coman, does not elaborate on this, and the question therefore remains to what extent the aforementioned ‘functional’ approach will remain tenable in the future. Will it really be possible for Romania, in the wake of Coman, to limit the effects of the recognition of the marriage to the residence status of Coman’s American husband Hamilton? Will this couple not want to (and be allowed to?) invoke their marriage status, which is recognised for the purposes of residence, for other legal purposes in Romania as well – tax, filiation, relational aspects of property, inheritance law, etc. – on the grounds that a refusal to do so also infringes the right to freedom of movement and residence and/or the right to private and family life guaranteed by the Charter? And can the same happen in the aftermath of Pancharevo, where, moreover, the rights of the child, protected by Article 24 of the Charter, are at stake? Will the impact of EU law on the recognition of parentage effectively be limited to the provision of an identity document and the recognition of the foreign birth certificate for the purpose of exercising the right to freedom of movement? In fact, even before Pancharevo, the Commission had already planned a legislative initiative in 2022, based on Article 81(3) TFEU, aimed at the mutual recognition of parenthood between Member States in accordance with the motto stated by Commission President von der Leyen in her ‘State of the Union’ of 16 September 2020: ‘If you are parent in one country, you are parent in every country’.

Fourthly, it is noteworthy that the Court briefly discusses the situation where, if checks so should reveal, it would appear that S.D.K.A. does not have Bulgarian nationality. In this case, it relies on V.M.A.’s Bulgarian nationality and categorizes her partner K.D.K. and daughter S.D.K.A. as, respectively, spouse and direct descendant within the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) and (c) of the Citizens’ Rights Directive 2004/38. The latter are then ‘beneficiaries’ within the meaning of the Directive and enjoy derived rights of movement and residence. The Court adds to this that ‘a child, being a minor, whose status as a Union citizen is not established and whose birth certificate, issued by the competent authorities of a Member State, designates as her parents two persons of the same sex, one of whom is a Union citizen, must be considered, by all Member States, a direct descendant of that Union citizen within the meaning of Directive 2004/38 for the purposes of the exercise of the rights conferred in Article 21(1) TFEU and the secondary legislation relating thereto’ (paragraph 68). In this respect, the Court follows the line taken in Coman, which combined recognition of the competence of the Member States in relation to personal status with a (partially) autonomous interpretation of the concept of ‘spouse’ used in Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38, in the sense that it refers to a person who is a person joined to another person by the bonds of marriage regardless of their sex. Pancharevo also recognises, on the one hand, the substantive competence of the Member States, but, on the other, gives a specific Union law interpretation to the concept of ‘direct descendant’ used in the same directive: the relationship referred to in Article 2(2)(c) of the directive is not necessarily based on a biological relationship. Thus, if parentage has been validly established in an official birth certificate of a Member State, more traditional conceptions of biological kinship between parent and child in the host Member State cannot preclude the status of the latter as ‘direct descendant’. On this last point, the Court follows the path it had already set in SM (judgment of 26 March 2019, C-129/18).

Last but not least, Pancharevo will undoubtedly stimulate the debate among conflicts scholars on the precise significance of the so-called ‘recognition method’ as an alternative choice-of-law method. As was the case with Coman as well, the Court in Pancharevo interprets EU law but its judgment profoundly impacts the recognition of personal status from the perspective of conflict of laws as well. While the Court’s approach is characterized by a functional, hence cautious approach, an essential question is whether this restraint is really tenable, given the far-reaching impact of both EU free movement and fundamental rights law… The significance of Pancharevo for EU conflict of laws in particular will be further examined by GEDIP. The group currently discusses a European codification of the general part of private international law, working inter alia in that context on the recognition of situations validly established abroad. The sub-group which examines the latter issue obviously will take into account the CJEU’s judgment in Pancharevo when preparing its report for the next GEDIP meeting, scheduled to take place in Oslo in September.

Conclusion

With its purposive interpretation of Union citizenship, invariably described as ‘destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’, the Court of Justice ensures the mobility of Union citizens. In a diverse European Union based on the protection of fundamental rights, in which the personal status of the individual still is a competence of the Member States, this implies openness to diversity. With its balanced and well-founded Pancharevo judgment, in which the functional recognition of the parentage relationship and the broad interpretation of the concept of ‘direct descendant’ stand out, the Court ensures both the effectiveness of the rights of Union citizens, including the protection of fundamental rights, and respect for the competence and national identity of the Member States. Nevertheless, it is clear that with its judgments in Coman, SM and now Pancharevo, the CJEU has embarked on a progressive path, with openness to diversity and new family forms, for the benefit of mobile Union citizens.

Due to the ‘semaine blanche’, February is usually a short month at the Court of Justice. However, several PIL-related activities are worth noting this particular February. They start this Thursday with the judgment in C-20/21, LOT Polish Airlines. A chamber of three judges (Rodin, Bonichot, Spineanu-Matei) will decide on the request by the Regional Court, Frankfurt am Main, addressing jurisdiction under Article 7(1), of the Brussels I bis Regulation:

Must Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters be interpreted as meaning that the place of performance, within the meaning of that provision, in respect of a flight consisting of a confirmed single booking for the entire journey and divided into two or more legs, can also be the place of arrival of the first leg of the journey where transport on those legs of the journey is performed by two separate air carriers and the claim for compensation brought on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 arises from the delay of the first leg of the journey and is brought against the operating air carrier of that first leg?

An advocate general’s opinion was deemed not necessary.

A public hearing in case C-646/20, Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport, will take place on Tuesday 8th. The request focuses on Regulation Brussels II bis. The main proceedings concern the question of whether a private divorce granted in Italy further to concurring statements by the spouses before the civil registrar can be recorded in the German register of marriages without any additional recognition procedure.

The Bundesgerichtshof is asking the Court of Justice two short, straight-forward questions:

1. Is the dissolution of a marriage on the basis of Article 12 of Decreto Legge (Italian Decree-Law) No 132 of 12 September 2014 (‘DL No 132/2014’) a divorce within the meaning of the Brussels IIa Regulation?
2. If Question 1 is answered in the negative: Is the dissolution of a marriage on the basis of Article 12 of DL No 132/2014 to be treated in accordance with the rule in Article 46 of the Brussels IIa Regulation on authentic instruments and agreements?

The reporting judge is M. Safjan, for the Grand Chamber (Lenaerts, Bay Larsen, Arabadjiev, Prechal, Regan, Rodin, Jarukaitis, Ilešič, Bonichot, Safjan, Kumin, Arastey Sahún, Gavalec, Csehi, Spineanu-Matei). After the hearing, Advocate General Collins will announce the date of publication of his opinion.

Two days later (10 February), the Court will hand down the judgment in the case of C-595/20, ShareWood Switzerland, on the interpretation of the Rome I Regulation. The requesting court is the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof:

Is Article 6(4)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations to be interpreted as meaning that a contract for the purchase of teak and balsa trees between an undertaking and a consumer, which is intended to confer ownership of the trees, which are then managed, harvested and sold for profit, and which includes for that purpose a lease agreement and a service agreement, is to be regarded as ‘a contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of immovable property’ within the meaning of that provision?

Once again M. Safjian is the reporting judge, sitting with judges Jääskinen and Gavalec. The preliminary ruling will be taken without opinion.

On the same day, a chamber composed by judges Prechal, Passer, Biltgen, Wahl and Rossi (reporting), will rule on C-522/20, OE. The referring court – the Oberster Gerichtshof, Austria, acting as Court of Cassation in a matter of divorce- has asked the following to the Court in Luxembourg:

1. Does the sixth indent of Article 3[(1)](a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 infringe the prohibition of discrimination in Article 18 TFEU on the ground that it provides, as a precondition to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of residence, depending on the nationality of the applicant, for a shorter period of residence than the fifth indent of Article 3[(1)](a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003?
2. If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: Does that infringement of the prohibition of discrimination mean that, based on the fundamental rule laid down in the fifth indent of Article 3[(1)](a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003, a period of residence of 12 months is required for all applicants, irrespective of their nationality, in order to rely upon the jurisdiction of the courts in the place of residence or is it to be assumed that a period of 6 months’ residence is the precondition for all applicants?

Among other, the applicant submits that under fifth and sixth indents of Article 3[(1)](a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 (Brussels II bis), jurisdiction for divorce proceedings is established for nationals of the forum State after just 6 months’ residence in that State, whereas nationals of other Member States must have been resident for at least 1 year; that this is unequal treatment solely on grounds of nationality and therefore infringes Article 18 TFEU.

No advocate general’s opinion has been asked for.

Finally, on 24 February Advocate General Szpunar will deliver his opinion in the case of C-501/20, M P A, giving us his views on habitual residence, forum necessitatiss and denial of justice in family matters. The request to the Court comes from the Audiencia Provincial of Barcelona; it relates to divorce proceedings of spouses who happen to be employees of the European Commission in its delegation in Togo. At stake are as well the dissolution of the matrimonial property regime, the determination of the regime and procedures for exercising custody and parental responsibility over the minor children, the grant of a maintenance allowance for the children and rules for the use of the family home in Togo. The interpretation requested affect the Brussels II bis Regulation, Regulation No 4/2009, and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The questions are:

1. How is the term ‘habitual residence’ in Article 3 of Regulation No 2201/2003 and Article 3 of Regulation No 4/2009 to be interpreted in the case of the nationals of a Member State who are staying in a non-Member State by reason of the duties conferred on them as members of the contract staff of the European Union and who, in the non-Member State, are recognised as members of the diplomatic staff of the European Union, when their stay in that State is linked to the performance of their duties for the European Union?
2. If, for the purposes of Article 3 of Regulation No 2201/2003 and Article 3 of Regulation No 4/2009, the determination of the habitual residence of the spouses depended on their status as EU contract staff in a non-Member State, how would this affect the determination of the habitual residence of the minor children in accordance with Article 8 of Regulation No 2201/2003?
3. In the event that the children are not regarded as habitually resident in the non-Member State, can the connecting factor of the mother’s nationality, her residence in Spain prior to the marriage, the Spanish nationality of the minor children and their birth in Spain be taken into account for the purposes of determining habitual residence in accordance with Article 8 of Regulation No 2201/2003?
4. If it is established that the parents and children are not habitually resident in a Member State, given that, under Regulation No 2201/2003 there is no other Member State with jurisdiction to decide on the applications, does the fact that the defendant is a national of a Member State preclude the application of the residual clause contained in Articles 7 and 14 of Regulation No 2201/2003?
5. If it is established that the parents and children are not habitually resident in a Member State for the purpose of determining child maintenance, how is the forum necessitatis in Article 7 of Regulation No 4/2009 to be interpreted and, in particular, what are the requirements for considering that proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or enforced or prove impossible in a non-Member State with which the dispute is closely connected (in this case, Togo)? Must the party have initiated or attempted to initiate proceedings in that State with a negative result and does the nationality of one of the parties to the dispute constitute a sufficient connection with the Member State?
6. In a case like this, where the spouses have strong links with Member States (nationality, former residence), is it contrary to Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights if no Member State is considered to have jurisdiction under the provisions of the Regulations?

The case has been entrusted to Judges Prechal, Passer, Biltgen, Wahl, and Rossi (reporting).

The new issue of International & Comparative Law Quarterly (Volume 71, Issue 1) is out. Some of articles concern directly or indirectly questions of private international law. Their abstracts are provided below.

The whole issue is available here. Some of articles are published in open access.

F. Rielaender, Aligning the Brussels Regime with the Representative Actions Directive

European private international law has long been recognised as improperly set up to deal with cross-border collective redress. In light of this shortcoming, it seems unfortunate that the private international law implications of the Representative Actions Directive (Directive (EU) No 2020/1828) have not yet been addressed coherently by the European legislator. This article examines to what extent the policy of promoting collective redress can be supported, even if only partially, through a reinterpretation of the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Furthermore, it discusses which legislative measures need to be adopted to better accommodate collective redress mechanisms within the Brussels regime.

M. Risvas, International Law as the Basis for Extending Arbitration Agreements Concluded by States or State Entities to Non-Signatories

This article explores the role of international law in relation to the extension of arbitration agreements contained in contracts concluded by States (or State entities) with non-signatory State entities (or States). As contract-based arbitrations involving States or State entities are on the rise, identifying the legal framework governing which parties are covered by the relevant arbitration agreements is of practical importance. The analysis demonstrates that international law forms part of the relevant law, alongside other applicable laws including law of contract, law of the seat and transnational law, concerning the extension of arbitration agreements concluded by States or State entities to non-signatories. Previous analyses have neglected the role of international law by not distinguishing contract-based arbitrations involving private parties from contract-based arbitrations involving States or State entities. Public international law recognises that arbitration agreements can be extended to non-signatories on the basis of implied consent, or abuse of separate legal personality and estoppel. Therefore, foreign investors can rely on international law to extend arbitration agreements to non-signatories in arbitrations conducted under investment contracts concluded by States or State entities, even if the relevant domestic law is agnostic or hostile to this. This has significant legal, and practical, importance.

T. Hartley, Basic Principles of Jurisdiction in Private International Law: The European Union, the United States and England

This article consists of a comparative study of the basic principles underlying the rules of jurisdiction in private international law in commercial cases in the law of the European Union, the United States and England. It considers the objectives which these rules seek to achieve (protection of the rights of the parties and respect for the interests of foreign States) and the extent to which these objectives are attained. It takes tort claims, especially in the field of products-liability, as an example and considers which system has the most exorbitant rules. It suggests explanations for the differences found.

Giovanni Zarra (University of Naples) authored a book titled Imperativeness in Private International Law – A View from Europe, with Springer/T.M.C. Asser Press.

This book centres on the ways in which the concept of imperativeness has found expression in private international law (PIL) and discusses “imperative norms”, and “imperativeness” as their intrinsic quality, examining the rules or principles that protect fundamental interests and/or the values of a state so as to require their application at any cost and without exceptions.

Discussing imperative norms in PIL means referring to international public policy and overriding mandatory rules: in this book the origins, content, scope and effects of both these forms of imperativeness are analyzed in depth. This is a subject deserving further study, considering that very divergent opinions are still emerging within academia and case law regarding the differences between international public policy and overriding mandatory rules as well as with regard to their way of functioning.

By using an approach mainly based on an analysis of the case law of the CJEU and of the courts of the various European countries, the book delves into the origin of imperativeness since Roman law, explains how imperative norms have evolved in the different conceptions of private international law, and clarifies the foundation of the differences between international public policy and overriding mandatory rules and how these concepts are used in EU Regulations on PIL (and in the practice related to these sources of law).

Finally, the work discusses the influence of EU and public international law sources on the concept of imperativeness within the legal systems of European countries and whether a minimum content of imperativeness – mainly aimed at ensuring the protection of fundamental human rights in transnational relationships – between these countries has emerged.

The book will prove an essential tool for academics with an interest in the analysis of these general concepts and practitioners having to deal with the functioning of imperative norms in litigation cases and in the drafting of international contracts.

The table of contents can be accessed here.

Annexes A and B to the insolvency Regulation list, respectively, the national insolvency proceedings and national insolvency practitioners (as notified by Member States) to which that Regulation applies. They have been replaced by Regulation (EU) 2021/2260 of 15 December 2021.

The new Annexes are operative as of 9 January 2022

The reasons for the amendment are explained given in Recital 2 of the Regulation:

In October 2020, the Netherlands notified the Commission of recent changes in its national insolvency law which introduced a new preventive insolvency scheme, as well as new types of insolvency practitioners. That notification was followed in December 2020 by notifications from Italy, Lithuania, Cyprus and Poland relating to recent changes in their national law which introduced new types of insolvency proceedings or insolvency practitioners. Following the submission by the Commission of its proposal for an amending Regulation, further notifications were received from Germany, Hungary and Austria relating to recent changes in their national law which introduced new types of insolvency proceedings or insolvency practitioners. Subsequently, Italy clarified the date of entry into force of its new provisions on insolvency and restructuring which it had notified to the Commission in December 2020, and notified an amendment to a previous notification. Those new types of insolvency proceedings and insolvency practitioners comply with.

Neither Ireland nor Denmark are taking part in the adoption of the Regulation. Accordingly, they are not bound by it or subject to its application.

The new issue of the Revue Critique de Droit International Privé (4/2021) is out. It contains four articles and numerous case notes.

The editorial by Horatia Muir Watt (Sciences Po), Dominique Bureau (University of Paris II) and Sabine Corneloup (University of Paris II) will soon be available in English on Dalloz website (Autour de l’enfant. Interpréter les signes : retour au calme ou déraison du monde ?).

In the first article, Etienne Pataut (University of Paris 1, Sorbonne Law School) discusses the (changing) role of effectiveness in nationality matter (Contrôle de l’État ou protection de l’individu ? Remarques sur l’effectivité de la nationalité).

Effectiveness of nationality seems to be changing. Its traditional role, in the matter of conflicts of nationalities and the international opposability of nationality, seems indeed contested and effectiveness does not seem in a position to oppose the more attentive consideration of the subjective rights of individuals. Conversely, this concern could reinforce the consideration of effectiveness when it makes it possible to demonstrate the existence of a link between the individual and the State which could lead to a challenge to a measure of deprivation of nationality. This development could bear witness to a profound change in the nationality itself.

In the second article, Sabine Corneloup (University of Paris II) analyses the parallel application of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention in the context of a recent decision of the UK Supreme Court (Demande de retour d’un enfant enlevé et principe de non-refoulement des réfugiés : lorsque la Convention de La Haye de 1980 rencontre la Convention de Genève de 1951).

Over the past years, there has been an increase in the number of applications for a return of abducted children within families applying for asylum. The parallel application of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention may prove to be problematic. Whereas the objective of the former is to ensure the child’s prompt return, the latter establishes the fundamental principle of non-refoulement to the State from which the refugee fled. In France, no case law has emerged so far, making the decision rendered by the UK Supreme Court on 19 March 2021 in G v. G even more interesting, not only as a source of inspiration, but also for the parts raising strong concern. In summary, the Supreme Court ruled that a child named as a dependant on her parent’s asylum request has protection from refoulement pending the determination of that application so that until then a return order in the 1980 Hague Convention proceedings cannot be implemented. In the relationships between two EU Member States, the conflict of the rationales underpinning the regulations Brussels II and Dublin III appears less acute as, in principle, the asylum applicant has no fear of persecution in any of these countries, but difficulties of articulation exist nevertheless, as the recent decision of the Court of Justice of 2 August 2021 in A v. B demonstrates.

In the third article, Rachel Pougnet (Bristol & Manchester Universities) examines a recent decision of the UK Supreme Court in the field of deprivation of nationality (La déchéance de nationalité devant la Cour suprême du Royaume-Uni : déférence judiciaire et sécurité nationale).

For the third time in ten years, the UK Supreme Court has been confronted with a deprivation of nationality order issued by the UK government. In this “Begum” decision of February 2021, the Supreme Court decided that Shamima Begum should not be allowed back into the country to conduct her appeal against the deprivation of her citizenship. The Court enshrined wide deference to the executive on national security grounds. Indeed, the court granted a wide margin of appreciation to the government when exercising its discretion to implement a deprivation order, due to the proximity of the measure with national security interests. In “Begum”, the Supreme Court also put the right to a fair trial on balance with security arguments.

In the fourth article, Christelle Chalas (University of Lille) analyses several rulings of the French Cour de Cassation in the specific context of international child abductions within Franco-Japanese families (La convention de La Haye du 25 octobre 1980 à l’épreuve de l’enlèvement international d’enfants franco-japonais).

This post was contributed by François Mailhé, who is Professor at the University of Picardy – Jules Verne.

On 17 November 2021, the French Cour de cassation rendered a decision making a reference for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice on the regime of res judicata under the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Readers of the blog will recall that the Cour de cassation had already made a reference on the same issue a few months ago (see the report of this decision of 8 September 2021 of Fabienne Jault Seseke here). The purpose of this post is to share some views on the various methods the Court may follow in its answer, as illustrated by but not limited to this November reference (and possibly for a joined cases decision), and what is at stake behind them.

Background

The case is simple. A decade ago already, a Luxembourger company, Recamier, sued for tort a former member of the board, Mr “Z”, based on an alleged misappropriation of assets. The claim was eventually rejected on appeal, in January 2012. Whatever the reality of the facts, Luxembourg law knows the principle of non additionality and this claim could only be based on contractual liability, not on tort.

One month later, Recamier followed up with the suit by seizing a French court, where Mr Z was domiciled. It was based, in line with that Luxembourger decision, on a contract claim. Still, before that court and in a long series of five decisions afterwards (the Cour de cassation was first seized after the first appeal decision for a problem of motivation), the dispute focused on the preclusive effect, the res judicata of that Luxembourger decision. For the defendant, claimant was barred to act in France for the same claim, even changing the legal basis. This is what this 17 November 2021 Cour de cassation decision was concerned with.

How come res judicata could be opposed to the contractual claim, when only an action in tort was decided in Luxembourg? This has to do with the Cesareo decision of the Cour de cassation (Plenary Assembly) of 7 July 2006. Under French law, the res judicata effect is indeed conditioned to the identity of the claims, an identity verified in the three classical elements : parties, cause and subject-matter, with the “cause” being understood as the arguments raised by the claimant in support of his claim. But, where before 2006 these arguments were both arguments of facts and law, the Cesareo decision restricted them to factual arguments only. In other words, a claimant may not bring a new suit on the same facts for the same purpose even if he changes the legal basis for it. Recamier was therefore, under this case-law, barred from claiming liability from Mr Z on the basis of contract law if it had already tried it before, even if only in tort.

The problem now unfolds : why applying French law, the law of the State where recognition is sought, to the effect of a Luxembourger decision? Should not one apply Luxembourg law, the law of the State of origin? Or, as its effect is here based on Article 33 Brussels I (Article 36 Brussels I bis), a European notion of res judicata? This is what the Cour de cassation wondered, and what it forwarded to the ECJ.

But the preliminary question could not be avoided : the precedents on the issue are not conclusive, and the issue actually begs for more than one, or rather more than one layer of questions, because before choosing the solution, the ECJ will have first to choose the method for finding it: conflict rule, autonomous notion or something else?

Precedents

This is not the first time the ECJ will have to characterize the elements of res judicata.

We should start by excluding as precedents those cases dealing with the identity of the claims in lis pendens situations. This case-law has been made to anticipate conflicts of decisions precisely in a context of diversity of national res judicata regimes. Its understanding of an identity of claims therefore embraces more than it specifies.

Instead, it seems more fruitful to turn towards those case where the Court had to handle the regime of the foreign judgment. It was the issue in Hoffmann (ECJ, 4 February 1988, Case 145/86), Apostolides (ECJ, 28 April 2009, Case C-420/07) and Gothaer (15 November 2012, Case C-456/11) with different perspectives.

In Hoffman and Apostolides, the Court quoted the Jenard Report, considering judgments must be acknowledged the “authority and effectiveness accorded to them in the state in which they were given”. But both decisions also added to that quote by allowing the law of the State of enforcement to reframe or even refuse these effects according to its own standards. The solution is even less certain that the two decisions did not exactly phrase any general solution, but rather specific exceptions. What is more, or rather less helpful for Recamier is that those decisions were concerned with the substance of a foreign judgment, an issue quite different from res judicata which deals with a procedural effect of the judgment, independently from its substance.

Gothaer is more interesting, since it precisely intends to create such an effect. Asked whether a Belgian judgment on competence (more exactly on the effect of the validity of a forum selection clause) could prevent the issue to be discussed anew in Germany, the Court answered it should, considering that “[the] requirement of the uniform application of European Union law means that the specific scope of that restriction must be defined at European Union level rather than vary according to different national rules on res judicata”. The Court even went further than AG Bot’s opinion in providing a regime for such an effect, aligning it to that of the decisions of the General Court of the ECJ. It justified the solution by considering it defines the “concept of res judicata under European Union law”. But the scope of that case may limit its interest, as it seems related to competence decisions alone.

Overall, those precedents do not definitely choose between conflict rules and autonomous notions of substantive rules. It will be one of the issues the ECJ will therefore have to decide upon.

First Method: A Conflict of Laws Rule

It must be noticed that the Cour de cassation actually asks the ECJ if it wants to create an ad hoc European conflict of laws rule. This is, by itself, an interesting opportunity. Seldom has the ECJ taken the chance to forge a new conflict rule (see e.g., though, and very implicitly, CJEU, Civil service tribunal, 14 oct. 2010, Mandt), since most conflict of laws issues it has encountered were submitted to conflict rules of the forum (now generally covered by a European rule, Rome I and II especially). Creating such an ad hoc conflict rule would be a very interesting move by the ECJ, both as it would be a sound solution and as it would give another dimension to the court’s case-law (in line with the EU favour for this kind of legislation those two last decades).

But, as often, the problem would lie in the choice of the connecting factor. Both those proposed by the Cour de cassation have serious claims to be applied. The law of the country of origin is probably the law the claimant (who is the one primarily concerned by res judicata) contemplated during the proceedings there since the possibility to restart proceedings in another country later on was simply not in his interest. Reciprocally, it is as true to say that res judicata is an effect that concerns the legal system, more than individual decisions. This is actually the usual solution given in common PIL by French case-law. The legislation on res judicata aims at preventing litigation to restart before a new court, so that it is this second court, and second judicial system, which is most concerned with it (it actually only mirrors the variety of rationale for the recognition of a foreign judgment, see Cuniberti, Le fondement de l’effet des jugements étrangers, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, vol. 394). Some even offer to distinguish the issues within the res judicata regime to have each governed by one of those laws or by the law of the claim (in French again, see Peroz, La réception des jugements étrangers dans l’ordre juridique français, LGDJ 2005).

The exact analysis could therefore be that, somehow, the effect should be governed by both law of origin and law of recognition (by analogy, this is the approach followed by both Hoffman and Apostolides).

As a consequence, accepting the idea that both laws should have a say in the matter, the question differs. It is not so much about defining a correct conflict rule than, quite simply, a matter of deciding on the relevance of the limits imposed upon the effects of a foreign decision. Here, the obvious question is whether the very specific French solution may be applied to a Luxembourger decision. This is where uniform European substantive rules have more relevance.

Second Method: An Autonomous Notion of res judicata

The general phrasing of the decision in Gothaer, together with the generality of the regime of the General Court decisions it is referring to, could be considered as offering all national court decisions a res judicata effect similar to that of the decisions of the General Court of the ECJ.

This would clearly be disastrous. As developed elsewhere (“Entre Icare et Minotaure. Les notions autonomes de droit international privé de l’Union », in Le droit à l’épreuve des siècles et des frontières, Mélanges en l’honneur du professeur Bertrand Ancel, LGDJ/Iprolex 2018, p. 1137), creating European autonomous notions is not innocuous. Words in European texts may refer to situations of facts which definition can be given autonomously at the European level, but it is an entirely different thing when such a word actually relates to a notion which is itself governed by a whole regime. A good example is the Coman case (ECJ, 5 June 2018, C-673/16). In this famous case on the notion of “spouse”, it was proposed that the Court develop an autonomous notion of “marriage” to have all spouses (same-sex or not) benefit the same rights of free movement within the EU despite prohibiting national laws. But such a “autonomous” notion would have actually been very fragile, since it would not have masked that the validity and otherwise general effects of marriages must be verified according to national laws, and that any such notion of “autonomous marriages” would risk offering dual situations to the spouses: they could be married “autonomously” and unmarried nationally. Marriage is a national notion because it covers national regimes ; creating an autonomous “marriage” would be like tailoring a jacket for a ghost.

Instead, in Coman, the ECJ wisely decided to refrain from doing so, and only refused to member State the possibility to prevent recognizing foreign marriages on the basis of gender of the spouses. It is therefore not the notion of marriage itself which is autonomous, but only, for purposes of EU law, that part of its regime relating to the condition of gender. The Court decided to limit the freedom of the States to impose their views for the necessities of free movement ; the same, actually, that is done for public policy or overriding mandatory provisions exceptions.

Res judicata, while it is not as sensitive as a person status, poses the same problem : it is not limited to characterizing a situation but also opens legal effects. Behind the universally admitted principle, it meets practice with a variety of regimes adapting to different situations and (national) political choices : the origin, type, content, wording, status of the decision may vary its effect, not even mentioning, of course, its procedural status as means of defence (Barnett, Res judicata, estoppel, and foreign judgments : the preclusive effects of foreign judgments in private international law, OUP 2001).

If the court doesn’t want to engage into tailoring a conflict of laws rule, it is therefore safer in this Recamier case to keep to a minimalist approach such as in Coman (and actually, also such as in Hoffman again): deciding whether, under Article 33, the French Cesareo case-law may be attached to a foreign judgment which law does not know any equivalent.

Third Method: Evaluating the Conformity of the French Cesareo Case-law with the objectives of Article 33 of the Regulation

It is customary for the Court to rephrase questions for them to be more abstract, so let’s try it : may a State consider inadmissible claims already brought before another member State court when those claims would be admissible in that other State because they were based on another legal ground?

To that very specific question, no overarching EU principle seems, prima facie, at stake. It may therefore be of help to understand the aim of that case-law. Its very purpose, according to a common opinion in France, is to reduce the influx of cases brought before the French courts, already struggling with a very heavy caseload. It could therefore be considered a legitimate objective for a country regularly sanctioned for the length of its procedures.

But the argument brought forth by the decisions themselves is, on a free translation, that “it is incumbent on the claimant to present, at the time of the first application, all the pleas in law which he considers to be relevant to the claim”. This stresses out that, according to French law, the claimant has some kind of a duty to gather all the legal grounds for his claim in the first instance. How may such an obligation be justified when the law of that first instance didn’t provide it? This is especially true of a situation where that first decision may also have an impact on competence, forbidding to go back to this first State to pursue an otherwise perfectly legitimate claim and pushing claimant in a catch 22 situation.

In the case the Court of Justice would decide to narrow the issue down to that very specific point, it should probably lean, therefore, towards a negative answer.

Conclusion

As a conclusion, one may say a stable conflict of laws rule would be preferable for predictability (and from the perspective of the policy of the Court). Perhaps a bold Court could pose a conflict rule (probably in favour of the law of origin, as the Jenard report seems to call for) with some limitations (in favour of the law of the country of recognition, as Hoffman had already announced on another issue). It calls for longer discussions elsewhere, but the ECJ’s decision is its own and the core issue may be dealt with at lower cost. At least Gothaer seems a precedent not to follow on this issue.

This has been a long post, with more issues than answers probably. I confess this is work in progress and here were only some thoughts about it, but I hope they will provide food for those of the readers of the blog.

Samuel P. Baumgartner (University of Zürich) and Christopher A. Whytock (University of Irvine) have posted Enforcement of Judgments, Systematic Calibration, and the Global Law Market on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

There are important reasons for states to recognize and enforce the judgments of other states’ courts. There are also reasons that may militate against recognition or enforcement of certain foreign judgments, making it appropriate to calibrate or “fine tune” the presumption favoring recognition and enforcement so it is not applied too broadly. Most calibration principles, such as the principle that a judgment from a court lacking jurisdiction should not be recognized, are case-specific. However, one calibration principle that is, to our knowledge, unique to the law of the United States stands out: the principle of systemic calibration, according to which U.S. courts must not recognize or enforce foreign judgments “rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law.”

In this Article, we aim to shed empirical light on how U.S.-style systemic calibration operates in practice. We find that state-of-origin indicator scores related to systemic adequacy are on average higher when U.S. courts recognize or enforce foreign judgments than when they refuse to do so. Moreover, the probability of recognition and enforcement increases as these indicator scores increase. However, in only six of the 587 opinions in our dataset did a court refuse recognition or enforcement based explicitly on the systemic inadequacy ground. Thus, while the level of systemic calibration in U.S. courts is high, it is mostly achieved implicitly. Finally, even judgments from states with low systemic adequacy scores are sometimes recognized or enforced by U.S. courts. These findings lead us to question the need for the systemic inadequacy ground for refusal and conclude that the time is ripe for reconsidering it.

The paper is forthcoming in Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Vol. 23, No.1, 2022.

The author of this post is Zhen Chen, PhD researcher of Private International Law at the University of Groningen.

Consumer contracts are subject to protective choice of law rules both in China and in the EU.

Under Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation, such consumer protective rules apply under the condition that the business pursues commercial or professional activities in, or directs such activities to the consumer’s home country. The same targeting test is adopted in Article 17(1)(c) of the Brussels I bis Regulation on jurisdiction rules over consumer contracts.

By contrast, in Chinese private international law, there is no specific jurisdiction rule over consumer contracts, consumers are subject to general jurisdiction rules. However, consumers are protected with favorable choice of law rules in China. Under Article 42 of the Chinese Conflicts Act, the law of the consumer’s habitual residence applies unless the business operator does not engage in relevant commercial or soliciting activities in the consumer’s home country.

The European approach focuses on the positive criterion by examining what constitutes a targeting activity (targeting test), whereas the Chinese approach puts more weight on the negative criterion of not applying consumer choice of law rules by examining what does not constitute a targeting activity (dis-targeting test).

Criteria of Targeting and Dis-targeting Tests

The targeting test is crucial to determining whether a business is an active business, whilst the dis-targeting test allows to determine whether a business is a passive business. From the consumer’s perspective, the targeting test ensures that only passive consumers targeted by the active business is protected. By contrast, the dis-targeting test makes sure that active consumers not targeted by passive businesses are not protected by favorable consumer choice of law rule. The targeting and dis-targeting tests are two sides of a coin. Essentially, the targeting and dis-targeting tests are examined to decide whether a business’ commercial activities have a close connection with the consumer’s country of habitual residence. In the context of globalization and digitalization, it is insufficient to rely on merely targeting test or dis-targeting test in order to protect electronic consumers. Rather, the targeting test in Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation should be supplemented by dis-targeting test, while the dis-targeting test in Article 42 of the Chinese Conflicts Act should be complemented by the targeting test.

A non-exhaustive list of indicative factors that may be relevant to the targeting test and dis-targeting test is provided by the CJEU in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof judgment (paras 83, 93). It does not mean that all criteria have to be fulfilled nor each factor is decisive or conditional. The absence of one factor can be substituted by another factor. A business should have expected to sue and being sued in a State it directs to unless it expressly declares that it will not conclude contracts with consumers domiciled in that State (Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, EU:C:2010:273, opinion of advocate general, para. 25).

For instance, in Lokman Emrek v. Vlado Sabranovic (paras 10-12), a German consumer who was looking for a second-hand motor vehicle learned from his acquaintances, instead of the Internet site, of a French business and went to the business premises France. The German consumer concluded a written sale contract with the French business at the premises in France. Although the business claimed that the consumer was an active consumer and thus should be deprived of the protection of consumer jurisdiction rules, the CJEU held that the geological factor acts as a strong evidence to indicate that the French business has not taken measures to dis-target German consumers living near the borders. The risk of being sued in the courts of the neighbouring State does not seem to be an excessive burden which might act as a disincentive to the defendant’s commercial activity (para. 37). Rather, the trader or service provider must be fully aware that a significant proportion, or even the majority, of his clientele will have their domicile in the neighbouring State. Since the French trader did not take any measures to exclude consumers from Germany, the exercise of jurisdiction by German courts should be entirely foreseeable for the French trader. This means that even of the consumer is an active consumer, the business should be subject to consumer jurisdiction and choice of law rules if the business is an active business.

Given that an indicative factor may act as a facilitating or inhibiting factor in different circumstances, it is not accurate to state that ‘the language or currency which a website uses does not constitute a relevant factor’ in Recital 24 of the Rome I Regulation. For instance, the Washington-based American e-commerce company Amazon has a country-neutral domain name ‘amazon.com’ and many country-specific domain names, such as ‘amazon.nl’, ‘amazon.it’, ‘amazon.de’ and  ‘amazon.fr’. These domain names, together with the languages used on the website (Dutch, Italian, German, French), indicate that Amazon has directed its commercial activities to European countries such as the Netherlands, Italy, Germany and France. If an Italian consumer buys products via any of these websites, the targeting test is fulfilled. In this context, the commercial activities of Amazon have directed to several counties including the consumer’s home country, and it is not necessary that the website targets only or specifically to the consumer’s home country (GP Calliess and M Renner, Rome Regulations, Wolters Kluwer, 2020, 124, para.51). Therefore, the inaccurate statement in Recital 24 of the Rome I Regulation needs to be rephrased, since the language or currency may act as a relevant factor in certain circumstances.

Geo-location and Geo-blocking Technologies

Moreover, with the development of the geo-location and geo-blocking technologies, the weight has shifted partly from the targeting test to the dis-targeting test. Geolocation technologies allow the identification of the geographical location of a user accessing the Internet, whereas geo-blocking technologies disallow a user’s access to certain internet applications. Such technologies re-territorialize the internet by creating border lines in global internet applications such as websites, social media platforms, search engines and other applications(J Hörnle, Internet Jurisdiction Law and Practice, OUP, 2021, 448). Although these technologies represent a threat to the Internet’s borderlessness, it also means that it is possible for a business advertising via websites to restrict its products and services to consumers from particular countries. Nevertheless, if the consumer misrepresent himself or herself about the domicile deliberately, and the business is in good faith, jurisdiction and choice of law rules over consumer contracts in Articles 17-19 of the Brussels I bis Regulation and in Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation cannot be invoked to protect the consumer. It is noticeable that traveling in cyberspace, or cyber-travel, allows Internet users to view the Internet as if they were in a location other than where they are physically present. Many cyber-travel tools for the evasion of geo-location have become sufficiently user-friendly to allow even average Internet users to utilize them(M Trimble, ‘The Future of Cyber-travel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation’, 22 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 2012, 569.). If a consumer domiciled in one country claims living in another country, and deliberately covers its whereabouts by using anti-geolocation tools, in particular VPNs, or by giving a false address, such proactive consumers should not be protected by the favorable jurisdiction and choice of law rules, as the protection of the businesses’ reasonable expectation should also be taken into consideration.     

To sum up, the dis-targeting test focuses on whether a business has taken active measures to dis-target consumers from a particular country and avoid concluding contracts with unsolicited or unintended consumers from that country. This means that instead of asking the difficult question of whether a business has targeted a particular jurisdiction, it may rather examine whether the business has taken steps to dis-target consumers (D Svantesson, ‘Time for the Law to Take Internet Geolocation Technologies Seriously’, 8 JPIL 2012, 485). The adoption of a combination of the targeting test and dis-targeting test may enhance legal certainty, while allowing space for legal flexibility to adapt to fast-changing technology and marketing strategies.

For a more elaborate discussion of the criteria employed in the framework of the targeting and dis-targeting tests, see ‘Internet, Consumer Contracts and Private International Law: What Constitutes Targeting Activity Test?’, by the author of this post, published on Information and Communications Technology Law, freely accessible here. 

The editors of the European Yearbook for International Economic Law (EYIEL) welcome abstracts from scholars and practitioners at all stages of their career for the focus section of the EYIEL 2022. This year’s focus will be on the impact of climate change on international economic law.

Abstracts may cover any topic relating to dispute settlement in the field of international economic law, though preference is given to topics focusing on the perspective from public and private international or EU law. Contributions addressing the following aspects are particularly welcome:

• Climate change in WTO and international trade law
• Impact of investment protection treaties on energy transformation
• Reform of the Energy Charter Treaty
• Financial and monetary law aspects of climate change
• Relationship between UNFCCC and Glasgow Climate Pact and international economic law
• Climate change litigation in domestic and international courts
• Liability for climate change in private (international) law

Abstracts should not exceed 500 words. They should be concise and clearly outline the significance of the proposed contribution. Abstracts may be submitted until 28 February 2022 via e-mail to eyiel@leuphana.de.

Successful applicants will be notified by 1 April 2022 that their proposal has been accepted. They are expected to send in their final contribution by 30 June 2021.

Final submissions will undergo peer review prior to publication. Given that submissions are to be developed on the basis of the proposal, that review will focus on the development of the paper’s central argument.

Submissions addressing particular regional and institutional developments should be analytical and not descriptive. Due to its character as a yearbook, EYIEL will not publish articles which will lose their relevance quickly. Submissions should not exceed 12,000 words (including footnotes and references), though preference may be given to shorter submissions. They should include an abstract and a biographical note. Submissions need to be in conformity with the EYIEL style guidelines.

The editors of the EYIEL welcome informal enquiries about any other relevant topic in the field of international and European economic law. In case you have an idea or proposal, please submit your enquiry via e-mail to eyiel@leuphana.de.

The Radboud University in the Netherlands is organising a two-day symposium on 9-10 June 2022 dedicated to The role of courts in the digital era and access to justice.

As underlined by the organisers:

Digitalisation is often viewed as a key condition to ensuring effective justice in the modern era, enhancing “resilience” of justice systems. It presumably helps tackle delays, enhance legal certainty, and make justice cheaper and more accessible for all. At the same time, challenges associated with digitalisation are highlighted, such as ensuring access for disadvantaged groups to digital technologies, the impact of digital technologies on fundamental rights and procedural justice, and ensuring security and privacy of digital solutions. The emergence of new technology brings with it the need for ongoing assessment of its impact.

For this reason the event seeks to provide a forum for researchers and practitioners to critically assess the process of digitalisation of justice systems and the evolving role of courts in the digital era in Europe and beyond.

A call for abstracts is ongoing until 1 February. The organisers are looking for submission of conference papers related to the following questions:

1. How does digitalisation of justice, and particularly, an increased use of remote justice and AI affect the role of courts as institutions upholding the rule of law?
2. To what extent do the different elements of ‘digital justice’, such as remote justice and AI, comply with fundamental rights and procedural justice values?
3. How and to what extent does digitalisation of justice affect individuals’ access to justice? How does it affect the role of the court as an institution providing a public service of ensuring access to justice (‘having a day in court’)?
4. How does digitalisation impact the legitimacy of the court and its symbolic role as an arena for public participation? What are the obstacles and opportunities created by the (different elements of) digitalisation of justice towards democratisation of justice and increased public participation in legal processes?
5. How does digitalisation affect the working processes and professional autonomy of judges and other court professionals?
6. Which judicial interpretation techniques are used when facing the phenomenon of digitalisation? For instance, do they also rely on soft law instruments in addition to hard law; do they use examples from international, European and foreign case-law; and how much do they rely on technical experts or amicus curiae?
7. How, if at all, does digitalisation affect the distribution of competences between the different courts and other (non-judicial) conflict-solving bodies within the judicial system? Does digitalization open new opportunities for non-judicial dispute resolution, or for enriching the toolbox available to prevent disputes from happening at all?
8. How, if at all, does digitalization facilitate (non-judicial) dispute resolution in a transnational context?
9. What is the current status of digitalisation of justice systems in practice in the various EU Member States, and how does it compare with the underlying goals and assumptions behind EU/national policies on the digitalisation of justice?
10. Do the priority areas for the digitalisation of EU justice systems identified by the European Commission in its Communication on Digitalisation of Justice in the EU, namely: digitalising public justice services; promoting the use of videoconferencing; facilitating the interconnection of national databases and registers; and promoting the use of secure digital transmission between authorities, reflect the actual priorities or needs for (further) digitalisation of justice systems?
11. What is the exact scope of challenges to the ‘digitalisation of justice’ in Europe identified by the Commission, namely: equal access to disadvantage groups; digital security concerns; ensuring respect for fundamental rights? Is the list of challenges identified by the Commission adequate and comprehensive?

Together with paper abstracts the organisers are interested to receive proposals for interactive panels or workshops on the above themes as well as proposals for pitches (‘Soapbox’) on relevant topics for the symposium.

More information on the submission and selection procedure is available here.

The latest issue of the RabelsZ (Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht) has been published.

It contains a number of insightful articles and case comments, whose abstracts are provided below.

Johannes Ungerer, Nudging in Private International Law: The Design of Connecting Factors in Light of Behavioural Economics

Amending the traditional economic analysis of law and its assumption of rationality, this paper suggests that behavioural economics can inform a more realistic understanding of private international law, which has been missing to date. Acknowledging the psychological biases which private parties are facing when dealing with complex cross-border cases, the paper introduces a new perspective on the design of connecting factors in EU private international law which are to be conceived as nudges that steer the applicable law and international jurisdiction to counteract bounded rationality. Objective connecting factors can be perceived as default rules, whereas the framework for exercising party autonomy can be construed as choice architecture of subjective connecting factors. Revealing the underlying libertarian paternalism of connecting factors requires addressing existing concerns about nudging, which is insightful for establishing the requirements of a transparent and choice-preserving design. Behavioural economics prove to be particularly suitable for explaining the restriction of choice and other connecting factor modifications for consumer protection in private international law.

Johanna Croon-Gestefeld, Der Einfluss der Unionsbürgerschaft auf das Internationale Familienrecht (The Influence of EU Citizenship on International Family Law)

European Union citizenship is a multifaceted concept. It vests a formal status in the citizens of member states and grants them individual rights. In addition, it symbolically affirms the ideal of integration. The different facets of EU citizenship are mirrored in the various ways in which the concept influences international family law. First, the rights connected to the status of EU citizenship shape the outcome of international family law cases. Second, art. 21 para. 2 TFEU bestows a competence on EU legislators to harmonize international family law. Third, EU citizenship is invoked to support the ideal of mobile citizens roaming freely within the EU, an ideal which for its part legitimizes habitual residence as a central connecting factor in EU international family law regulations.

Jochen Hoffmann and Simon Horn, Die Neuordnung des internationalen Personengesellschaftsrechts (Reshaping Germany’s Private International Law on Partnerships)

The recent German act on the modernization of partnership law (MoPeG) reforms not only the substantive law but also the determination of connecting factors for conflict-of-law purposes. A newly created provision introducing a “registered seat” in § 706 of the German Civil Code (BGB) is relevant to conflict-of-law considerations as it abandons the “real seat” as a connecting factor for registered partnerships. Since the law applicable to a partnership now depends on the partnership’s place of registration, substantive provisions such as the prohibition of voluntary deregistration (§ 707a BGB para. 4) will now have a considerable impact on questions of private international law. Conversely, those interpreting the substantive law must take conflict-of-law issues into account, especially to avoid unintentionally changing the law to which an entity will be subject. Moreover, the eligibility of the registered partnership (eGbR) for domestic conversions, mergers, and divisions considerably expands the range of possibilities for cross-border transactions of that kind.

Francesco Giglio, Roman dominium and the Common-Law Concept of Ownership

On the basis of a comparison between common law and Roman law, it is argued in this paper that, despite the common-law focus on title, the common-law and civil-law concepts of ownership are not as far apart as often thought. Title and ownership right are not logically incompatible, and the common law has room for both: ownership is a substantive right; title is an operative, procedural tool that supplies the essential dynamism to the static right of ownership. Nor are relative and absolute ownership systemically incompatible in the civil law, as evidenced by Roman law. A study of the works of Blackstone, Austin and Honoré – three influential authors with expertise in Roman law – suggests that Roman law provides helpful elements for a comparison with the common law, but only if it is used to understand the common law, as opposed to forcing inadequate structures upon it. Austin’s and Honoré’s attempts to read common-law ownership through the lenses of Roman law offer two instances of the risks linked to such an approach.

Jing Zhang, Functional Reform of the Chinese Law of Secured Transactions in Movables from a Comparative Perspective

The Chinese law of secured transactions concerning movables was reformed through a partial implementation of a functional approach. But by mixing formalism and functionalism, this functional reform, carried out first by the legislature through a codification and then by the Supreme People’s Court through a judicial interpretation, leads to a modular system with links between the various modules. Different modules are linked in the sense that the rules concerning property rights of security are extended to title-based security devices through the making of several “connection points”. After introducing the old law, this article focuses on issues of publicity, priority and enforcement under the new law. The functional reform establishes a unified notice-filing register for movables, which is accompanied by several specialist registers. Moreover, it provides a set of predictable priority rules that dispense with the factor of good faith in most circumstances. It also provides a flexible but complicated and somewhat uncertain system of enforcement and remedies for reservations of ownership and financial leases. In general, the new law is more modern and internationally oriented than the old law, but it still lacks systematic completeness and coherence and needs to be improved.

Lena Salaymeh and Ralf Michaels, Decolonial Comparative Law: A Conceptual Beginning

This article introduces the intellectual motivations behind the establishment of the Decolonial Comparative Law research project. Beginning with an overview of the discipline of comparative law, we identify several methodological impasses that have not been resolved by previous critical approaches. We then introduce decolonial theory, generally, and decolonial legal studies, specifically, and argue for a decolonial approach to comparative law. We explain that decoloniality’s emphasis on delinking from coloniality and on recognizing pluriversality can improve on some problematic and embedded assumptions in mainstream comparative law. We also provide an outline of a conceptual beginning for decolonial approaches to comparative law.

Emile Zitzke, Decolonial Comparative Law: Thoughts from South Africa

In this article, I problematise a popular approach to comparative law in South Africa that invariably seeks answers to legal problems in European law. This approach could potentially have neo-colonial effects. I propose that one version of a decolonial approach to comparative law could involve comparing South Africa’s European legal tradition (today called the South African common law) and its African legal tradition (today called the South African customary law). Utilising postcolonial, decolonial, and legal-pluralism theory, coupled with recent developments in the South African law of delict (torts), I suggest that the common/customary law interface ought to involve acts of both resistance and activism. There ought to be a resistance to the paradigms of “separatism”, “mimicry”, and “universality”. Simultaneously, there ought to be an embrace of “actively subversive hybridity”, “pluri-versality” and “delinking”. I contend that it is in this matrix of resistance and activism where at least one version of decolonial comparative law might be found.

Roger Merino, Constitution-Making in the Andes – A Decolonial Approach to Comparative Constitutional Change

How might the field of comparative constitutional change account for constitution- making processes and outcomes forged by historically subordinated and racialized social movements? Inspired by critical comparative approaches to constitutional change and engaging decolonial theory, this article explores how in the Andes of South America the “colonial question” shaped constitution-making struggles and was the rationale behind the enactment of the new plurinational constitutions of Bolivia (2009) and Ecuador (2008). This study focuses on the political aspirations of subaltern actors that have promoted constitutional changes in these settings and localizes their struggles and the historical and social context of continuous colonial grievances. Thus, the article provides a deeper understanding of the process of constitution-making in the Andes and reveals the colonial patterns that persist in current frameworks, such as the constitutional provisions that legitimate and perpetuate extractivism.

The table of contents of the issue is available here.

La Ley – Unión Europea is a Spanish journal published monthly by Wolters Kluwer under the editorship of Professor Fernández Rozas (University Complutense, Madrid). It comprises several sections; contributions are classified depending on their length and nature – whether analytical or descriptive. Although not exclusively devoted to private international law, every issue contains at least an in-depth comment to a decision of the Court of Justice related to judicial cooperation on civil and commercial matters. An English abstract is attached to all of them.

A personal selection of five (random number) articles published in 2021, in chronological order:

Rafael Arenas García (University Autónoma of Barcelona), Jurisdiction over rights in rem in immovable property and jurisdiction in contractual matters in the case law of the Court of Luxembourg, La Ley-Unión Europea February 2021 – commenting C-433/19, Ellmes Property service Limited.

The judgment of November 11, 2020 interprets both the exclusive ground of jurisdiction in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property and the ground of jurisdiction in matter relating to a contract of art. 7.1 of Regulation 1215/2012. Regarding the first of these forums, the Court considers that an action must be regarded as constituting an action «which has as its object rights in rem in immovable property, provided that the action may be relied erga omnes. With regard to the contractual forum, it is especially significant that the Court determines directly the place of fulfilment of the obligation without considering the governing law of the obligation according with the conflict rules of the court seised.

Ángel Espiniella Menéndez (University of Oviedo), Cross-Border Payments by Subrogation after the Insolvency, La Ley – Unión Europea September 2021, commenting (very critically) on C- 73/20, ZM.

The Judgment analyses the case of a cross-border payment made by the debtor by subrogation
and after the opening of the insolvency proceeding. The Court considers that this payment shall be governed by the law of the contract and not by the law of the insolvency proceeding. A very doubtful conclusion which is contrary to the equal treatment of creditors.

Santiago Álvarez González (University of Santiago de Compostela), A new, provisional and debatable delimitation of international jurisdiction over violations of personality rights, La Ley – Unión Europea September 2021, commenting (again, very critically) on C-800/19, Mittelbayerischer Verlag.

On 17 June 2021 the Court of Justice of the EU pronounced a judgment in case C-800/19,
Mittelbayerischer Verlag KG v. SM. The ECJ held that «Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) n.o 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that the courts of the place in which the centre of interests of a person claiming that his or her personality rights have been infringed by content published online on a website is situated have jurisdiction to hear, in respect of the entirety of the alleged damage, an action for damages brought by that person only if that content contains objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to identify, directly or indirectly, that person as an individual».The author does not consider that the new ECJ judgement is justified by the predictability of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by Regulation no 1215/2012, the legal certainty which that regulation seeks to guarantee, or the sound administration of justice as the ECJ does. Furthermore, he thinks that all these objectives should lead down to an entire reconsideration of the ECJ doctrine on «centre of interests» and the «mosaic approach» in the framework of art. 7.2 Regulation no. 1215/2012.

(Follow up: a note by Pedro de Miguel on C-251/20, Gtflix tv is expected in La Ley, in January 2022)

Pilar Jiménez Blanco (University of Oviedo), The procedural risks of changing the consumer’s domicile: do the Brussels I bis Regulation and the Lugano convention need a reform?, La Ley-Unión Europea November 2021, on C-296/20, Commerzbank.

The Commerzbank Judgment shows the risks derived from the change of domicile of the consumer
after the conclusion of the contract in the cases of passive consumer of art. 17.1.c) of the Brussels I bis
Regulation [art. 15.1.c) of the Lugano Convention]. Such risks must be assumed when the consumer is the defendant, considering only the domicile at the time of filing the claim. However, these risks break with the predictability of the competence when the consumer is the plaintiff and the professional has not pursued or directed his commercial or professional activities to the State of the new domicile. Here is a reflection on the opportunity to adapt the Brussels Ia Regulation and the Lugano Convention to this situation.

Francisco Manuel Mariño Pardo (Notary), European Certificate of Succession. Temporary effectiveness of authentic copies and effectiveness with respect to the persons designated therein, La Ley-Unión Europea December 2021, on C-301/20, UE, HC y Vorarlberger Landes-und Hypothekenbank, with the added value of the author’s reflections on the impact on the Spanish notarial practice.

On its judgment of 1st. July 2021, the ECJ held that article 70(3) of Regulation (EU) n.o 650/2012
must be interpreted as meaning that a certified copy of the European Certificate of Succession, bearing the words «unlimited duration», is valid for a period of six months from the date of issue and produces its effects, within the meaning of Article 69 of that regulation, if it was valid when it was presented to the competent authority; and that article 65(1) of the same Regulation, read in conjunction with its Article 69(3), must be interpreted as meaning that the effects of the European Certificate of Succession are produced with respect to all persons who are named therein, even if they have not themselves requested that it be issued.This paper analyzes the ECJ judgment and add some thoughts on its effects on the Spanish notary activity.