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Edoardo Rossi is the author of a monograph in Italian titled La Sharing economy nel diritto internazionale privato europeo (Sharing Economy – A European Private International Law Perspective), published by Giappichelli.

The author provided the editors of this blog with an abstract in English. The abstract reads as follows.

In the current economic and social context new and controversial sharing practices, offering anyone the opportunity to search for or make available goods or services on the market regardless of the professional or amateur nature of the persons involved, have emerged. These practices, very heterogeneous and concerning the most different areas of daily life, such as mobility, housing, business activities, communications, work, culture, communication, education and finance, have been linked  to the notion of “sharing economy”, which brings them together by virtue of temporary access to goods or services, facilitated by the large-scale intervention of digital platforms, through which requests and offers are coordinated online in order to share goods or services.

The legitimacy of schemes linked to this new economic models has been challenged in a number of aspects, including low quality of services, safety of consumers, authorisation and licensing, taxes and compliance with competition rules. The inadequacy of the existing rules to deal with the provision of services through the sharing economy models has consequently emerged.

In spite of these critical profiles, the legal relations established through sharing economy platforms are constantly increasing around the world, implying the emergence of elements of transnationality, from which derives the recourse to the rules of private international law, in order to determine the applicable law and the judge competent to rule on any disputes.

The monograph thus attempts to analyse some of the most important private international law issues, such as the inadequacy of the party autonomy in regulating the phenomenon, especially with reference to the general terms and conditions of contract unilaterally drawn up by platform operators, which state that the latter is totally unrelated to the legal relations between users, often in conflict with the minimum level of consumer protection guaranteed by EU law and by the national legislations. Critical profiles have also been identified in the online conclusion of contracts that bind the parties involved in sharing economy legal relations, in ascertaining the effectiveness of consent on the choice of forum and choice of law clauses, in cases of potential related actions and in the location of the “domicile” of the platform operators.

Further information can be found here.

The relationship between the conflict of laws and constitutional law is close in many legal systems, and Australia is no exception. Leading Australian conflict of laws cases, including, for example, John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, which adopted a lex loci delicti rule for intra-Australian torts, are premised on public law concepts essential to our federation. These cases illustrate how the conflict of laws bleeds into other disciplines.

Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 is a recent decision of the High Court of Australia that highlights the breadth and blurry edges of our discipline. Most legal commentators would characterise the case in terms of constitutional law and migration law. The Court considered a strange question: can an Aboriginal Australian be an ‘alien’?

Australia’s disposition to migration is controversial to say the least. Our government’s migration policies, which often enjoy bi-partisan support, are a source of embarrassment for many Australians. One controversial migration policy involves New Zealanders. Australia and New Zealand enjoy a very close relationship on several fronts, including with respect to private international law: see the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth). New Zealanders often enjoy privileges in Australia that are not afforded to persons of other nationality.

Yet recently, Australia began to deport New Zealanders who had committed crimes in Australia no matter how long they had lived in Australia. In February, New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said that the policy was ‘testing’ our countries’ friendship. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison replied, ‘[w]e deport non-citizens who have committed crimes in Australia against our community’. Sections of the Australian community are seeking to change Australia’s policy on point, which is effected by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The Court heard two special cases together. As Kiefel CJ explained: ‘[e]ach of the plaintiffs was born outside Australia – Mr Love in Papua New Guinea and Mr Thoms in New Zealand. They are citizens of those countries. They have both lived in Australia for substantial periods as holders of visas which permitted their residence but which were subject to revocation. They did not seek to become Australian citizens’.

Section 501(3A) of the Migration Act requires the Minister for Home Affairs to a cancel a person’s visa if they have been convicted of an offence for which a sentence of imprisonment of 12 months or more is provided. Each of the plaintiffs committed crimes and had their visas cancelled. The effect of which was that they became ‘unlawful non-citizens’ who could be removed from Australia.

The plaintiffs’ cases turned on s 51(xix) of the Commonwealth Constitution, which provides:

The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to… naturalization and aliens…

The plaintiffs contended that they were outside the purview of the Migration Act, the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) and s 51(xix) because they each had a special status as a ‘non-citizen, non-alien’. ‘They say that they have that status because although they are non-citizens they cannot be aliens because they are Aboriginal persons’: [3]. Each plaintiff arguably satisfied the tripartite test for Aboriginality recognised at common law and considered below. Thoms was even a native title holder.

The High Court was asked to consider whether each plaintiff was an ‘alien’ within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution. Kiefel CJ clarified that the question is better understood as follows: ‘whether it is open to the Commonwealth Parliament to treat persons having the characteristics of the plaintiffs as non?citizens for the purposes of the Migration Act’: [4].

The High Court’s seven justices departed from usual practice and each offered their own reasons. The majority of four (Bell, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ) answered as follows:

The majority considers that Aboriginal Australians (understood according to the tripartite test in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 70) are not within the reach of the “aliens” power conferred by s 51(xix) of the Constitution. The majority is unable, however, to agree as to whether the plaintiff is an Aboriginal Australian on the facts stated in the special case and, therefore, is unable to answer this question.

Arcioni and Thwaites explain: ‘The majority rested their reasoning on the connection of Aboriginal Australians with Australian land and waters. Aboriginal Australians were a unique, sui generis case, such that Aboriginality may generate a class of constitutional members (non-aliens) who are statutory non-citizens’. The minority of Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ dissented for different reasons. A common theme of those reasons was that ‘alien’ is the antonym of ‘citizen’.

The case is about constitutional law. It is also about status. ‘Alienage or citizenship is a status created by law’: [177] per Keane J. One understanding of the difference between the majority and minority is a difference in opinion as to the applicable law to determine status as ‘alien’ in this context.

According to Nettle J, ‘status [as a member of an Australian Aboriginal society] is inconsistent with alienage’: [272]. ‘Aboriginal Australians are not outsiders or foreigners – they are the descendants of the first peoples of this country, the original inhabitants, and they are recognised as such’: [335] per Gordon J. The majority appealed to the common law’s recognition of native title rights underpinned by traditional laws and customs in support of their analyses (see, eg, [339]).

The minority denied that status as Aboriginal could determine whether a person has the status of an ‘alien’ within the meaning of the Constitution.

Nettle J quoted (at [269]) the following passage from the native title case Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, 445 [49] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ):

Laws and customs do not exist in a vacuum. They are, in Professor Julius Stone’s words, ‘socially derivative and non-autonomous’. As Professor Honoré has pointed out, it is axiomatic that ‘all laws are laws of a society or group’. Or as was said earlier, in Paton’s Jurisprudence, ‘law is but a result of all the forces that go to make society’. Law and custom arise out of and, in important respects, go to define a particular society. In this context, ‘society’ is to be understood as a body of persons united in and by its acknowledgment and observance of a body of law and customs.

The status of the laws and customs of Australia’s Aboriginal peoples has been the subject of case consideration for decades. In Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141, 267, for example, Blackburn J said:

The evidence shows a subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the country in which the people led their lives, which provided a stable order of society and was remarkably free from the vagaries of personal whim or influence. If ever a system could be called “a government of laws, and not of men”, it is that shown in the evidence before me.

Later, in Mabo (No 2), the High Court finally recognised the significance of those laws to recognition of native title. In that case, the Court articulated a tripartite test for whether a person is an Aboriginal Australian: biological descent, self-identification, and recognition by the relevant Aboriginal community (see [291] per Gordon J). As explained further below, satisfaction of this test depends on application of traditional laws and customs. Arguably, satisfaction of the test requires recognition of the positive force of that non-state law.

Against that, Keane J held, ‘[t]he common law’s recognition of customary native title does not entail the recognition of an Aboriginal community’s laws’: [202]. Rather, it goes the other way: Aboriginal laws are necessary for recognition of native title. Kiefel J also explicitly rejected recognition of Aboriginal customary law: ‘[i]t is not the traditional laws and customs which are recognised by the common law. It is native title … which is the subject of recognition by the common law, and to which the common law will give effect. The common law cannot be said by extension to accept or recognise traditional laws and customs as having force or effect in Australia’: [37]. Arguably, this means that there is no choice of law at play in this case: there is just one law at issue, being the law of Australia.

Yet even in transnational cases within the traditional domain of the conflict of laws, Australian courts will only apply foreign laws via application of the lex fori: Pfeiffer, [40]–[41]; Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia, ch 12. For practical purposes, the majority approach does recognise Aboriginal non-state law as capable of application to resolve certain issues of (non-Aboriginal) Australian law.

Nettle J came close to articulation of a new intra-Australian choice of law rule at [271]:

for present purposes, the most significant of the traditional laws and customs of an Aboriginal society are those which allocate authority to elders and other persons to decide questions of membership. Acceptance by persons having that authority, together with descent (an objective criterion long familiar to the common law of status) and self-identification (a protection of individual autonomy), constitutes membership of an Aboriginal society: a status recognised at the “intersection of traditional laws and customs with the common law”.

If there is a choice of law rule in there, its significance might be expressed through this syllogism:

• P1. Whether a person is capable of being deported after committing a serious crime depends on whether they are an ‘alien’.
• P2. Whether a person is an ‘alien’ depends on whether they are ‘Aboriginal’.
• P3. Whether a person is ‘Aboriginal’ depends on whether they satisfy the tripartite test in Mabo [No 2] with respect to a particular Aboriginal society.
• P4. Whether a person satisfies the tripartite test turns on the customary law of the relevant Aboriginal society.

Like questions of foreign law, ‘[w]hether a person is an Aboriginal Australian is a question of fact’: [75] per Bell J. How does one prove the content of the relevant Aboriginal law? Proof of traditional laws and customs often occurs in native title cases. It was considered at [281] per Nettle J:

It was contended by the Commonwealth that it might often prove difficult to establish that an Aboriginal society has maintained continuity in the observance of its traditional laws and customs since the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over the Australian territory. No doubt, that is so. But difficulty of proof is not a legitimate basis to hold that a resident member of an Aboriginal society can be regarded as an alien in the ordinary sense of the term. It means only that some persons asserting that status may fail to establish their claims. There is nothing new about disputed questions of fact in claims made by non-citizens that they have an entitlement to remain in this country.

As a dissentient in the minority, Gageler J offered a compelling critique of what I construe to be the choice of law approach of the majority (at [137]):

To concede capacity to decide who is and who is not an alien from the perspective of the body politic of the Commonwealth of Australia to a traditional Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander society or to a contemporary Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander community, or to any other discrete segment of the people of Australia, would be to concede to a non?constitutional non?representative non?legally?accountable sub?national group a constitutional capacity greater than that conferred on any State Parliament. Yet that would be the practical effect of acceptance of either of the first and second variations of the plaintiffs’ argument.

The choice of non-state law is arguably made more controversial by the character of those laws’ content. Nettle J explained at [276]: ‘As is now understood, central to the traditional laws and customs of Aboriginal communities was, and is, an essentially spiritual connection with “country”, including a responsibility to live in the tracks of ancestral spirits and to care for land and waters to be handed on to future generations’. Gordon J held at [290], ‘[t]hat connection is spiritual or metaphysical’. Tacit in the majority’s mode of analysis, then, is that a person’s spiritual or religious views can have an impact on their status as an ‘alien’, or otherwise, within the Commonwealth Constitution. (A once-Aboriginal non-citizen who lacks those spiritual views and renounces their membership of their Aboriginal society may still be an ‘alien’ following this case: see [279], [372].) From a secular perspective within an increasingly secular nation, that is a striking proposition.

This is not the first time that the relationship between the conflict of laws and issues affecting indigenous peoples has been considered. More generally, whether non-state law may be the subject of choice of law is a topic that has been considered many times before. One of the factors that makes Love v Commonwealth unique, from an Australian legal perspective, is the majority’s effective choice of Aboriginal customary law to determine an important issue of status without really disturbing the common law proposition that Aboriginal groups lack political sovereignty within the Australian federation (see [37], [102], [199]). COVID-19 may have stalled sought after changes to the Australian Constitution with respect to recognition of indigenous peoples (see (2019) 93 Australian Law Journal 929), yet it remains on the national agenda. In any event, Australia’s very white judiciary may not be the best forum for recognition of the sovereignty of Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

Le délai d’un an dont dispose le titulaire d’un permis de conduire étranger pour demander son échange contre un permis de conduire français a pour point de départ la date d’établissement effectif résultant du premier titre de séjour délivré à l’intéressé. 

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Written by Sophie Hunter

With more than 200 countries affected to date, the current crisis presents far reaching implications for competition law and policy on a global scale. This crisis is affecting developed and developing countries alike, especially by putting young competition authorities under a stress test of the resilience of their competition rules.  As the pandemic of COVID19 spreads to every parts of the world, most recently the African continent, competition authorities are looking at whether relaxing their competition rules to allow for cooperation between key actors of the health sector and other essential economic sectors, like the airline industry. However, full or partial relaxation of competition rules may have adverse effects on industries, business and consumers by resulting in anti-competitive practices such as price fixing, excessive pricing and collusion between competitors.

Competition authorities have responded to this crisis in a piecemeal approach. While the European Commission was quick to a temporary framework[1] and relied on measures implemented during the 2008 financial crisis[2] , in the US, the FTC and DOJ only recently issued a guidance note based on previous emergency situations (Harvey and Irma hurricanes) to allow cooperation of competitors in the health sector, especially in the development of vaccines.[3] The UK has granted temporary exemptions from anti collusion rules to supermarkets. An approach also adopted by the German competition authority to ensure continuity of food supplies. South Africa promptly enacted an overall sector wide block exemption for the health sector.[4] Some countries like France and China have toughened up their price regulations.[5]

With a surge in excessive pricing of health-related products such as masks and hand sanitizers, competition authorities are currently dealing with ongoing investigations in a wide range of jurisdictions, namely the UK, France, Brazil, Russia, Spain and Italy. Some have announced price controls over high demand items. This has already been done in France through a decree regulating the price of hand sanitizers to prevent retailers and pharmacists engaging in abusive price increases.[6] Enforcement of sanctions against anti-competitive conducts toughened up, especially from competition authorities in Kenya and China, which have already heavily put sanctions on retailers engaged in excessive pricing of health-related products.

In times of crisis, governments can allow specific exceptions for joint research projects because they understand the need for collaborative efforts between firms to, for instance, develop a vaccine. Such exceptions have already been granted during other pandemics such as Swine Flu in 2009, MERS in 2015 and influenza in 2019. Those exceptions may be exempted from competition rules. For instance, the European Commission has called for an increase effort in research and development at the European level to develop a vaccine against COVID 19 within an exceptional regulatory framework (as it already did in 2009). [7] In South Korea, similarly, the government encouraged the main pharmaceutical companies to work together on a vaccine through an emergency use authorisation that was established post MERS in 2015.[8]

Apart from exceptions, certain countries granted exemptions from anti collusion rules to businesses in specific economic sectors. The most far reaching measures were taken by South Africa with the COVID-19 Block Exemption for the Healthcare Sector 2020. It established price controls on everyday goods as well as a list which exempts hospitals, medical suppliers, laboratories and pathologists, pharmacies, and healthcare funders from engaging in anti-competitive collaboration.[9]Other temporary exemptions have been granted to the airline industry by Norway, the retail sector in Germany, banking in Australia, the distilled spirit industry in the US, education in Denmark and tourisms in Italy and Kazakhstan.

Competition authorities must enforce strict compliance to competition rules, even during this time of pandemic. Despite this, some leverage and legal leeway enacted by certain competition authorities demonstrates a willingness to allow for a temporary flexibility to mitigate the economic impact. This can be achieved through sector specific block exemptions, strict guidance on collaboration in times of emergency or enhanced legislation on price controls. This time of crisis creates a great opportunity for competition authorities around the world to engage in international cooperation to share best practices. Prompt responses to the crisis in developing countries demonstrates the ambition and dynamism of such agencies (Peru, South Africa, Kenya). Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how competition authorities will cope during the crisis with sustaining investigation, enforcement and compliance with competition rules.

[1] François-Charles Laprévote, Theodora Zagoriti, Giulio Cesare Rizza, The EU Commission adopts a Temporary Framework to support the economy in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak, 19 March 2020, e-Competitions Bulletin Preview, Art. N° 93837

[2] https://www.concurrences.com/fr/bulletin/special-issues/competition-law-covid-19/competition-policy-covid-19-an-overview-of-antitrust-agencies-responses

[3] https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/ftc-and-doj-announce-expedited-antitrust-procedure-for-coronavirus-public-health-efforts/

[4] Minister of Trade and Industry of South Africa, ‘Covid-19 Block Exemption for the Health Care Sector, 2020 – South Africa’ (2020) 657 Government Gazette 12.

[5] State Administration of Market Supervision (SAMR) of People’s Republic of China, ‘Urgent Notice of the General Administration of Market Supervision on Severely Cracking down on Price Violations in the Production of Preventive and Control Materials during the Epidemic Prevention and Control Period’ (5 February 2020) <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-02/06/content_5475223.htm> accessed 22 March 2020.

[6] ‘Encadrement Des Prix Pour Les Gels Hydroalcooliques’ (Economie.gouv.fr, 2020) <https://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/encadrement-des-prix-pour-les-gels-hydroalcooliques-voir-la-faq> accessed 22 March 2020.

[7] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Pandemic (H1N1) 2009’ (15 September 2009) 1 <http://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/9ec8052e-c269-4b57-9be9-4b40c5101d15/language-en> accessed 22 March 2020.

[8] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-testing-specialrep/special-report-how-korea-trounced-u-s-in-race-to-test-people-for-coronavirus-idUSKBN2153BW

[9] South African Government, ‘Guidelines – Coronavirus Covid-19 in South Africa’ (23 March 2020) <https://www.gov.za/coronavirus/guidelines> accessed 23 March 2020.

The latest issue of Journal of Private International Law is out. It features the following articles:

Matthias Lehmann – Regulation, global governance and private international law: squaring the triangle

Abstract
Regulatory rules are omnipresent today. Increasingly, they also influence private rights and obligations, from employment contracts to competition law and data protection. Private international law traditionally treats them with a certain reserve because they do not fit its paradigms of “neutral” and “interchangeable” rules of law. This article argues that it is time to change this attitude. Regulatory rules often protect global public goods, such as the environment, or shield against global bads, such as pandemics. Others serve aims shared between different countries, like the fight against money laundering and tax evasion. For these reasons, administrative authorities around the world cooperate in the enforcement of regulation. Private international law should open up its methodology to this new reality. After exploring the traditional ways in which regulation has been dealt with, this article makes concrete proposals for changes. Besides overcoming the “public law taboo”, these include the more liberal application of foreign public law and foreign overriding mandatory rules, the development of multilateral conflicts rules for areas permeated by regulation, the recognition of foreign administrative decisions, and the development of a global public policy.

Adeline Chong – Moving towards harmonisation in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment rules in Asia

Abstract
This paper provides a comparative overview of the laws on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in ASEAN and Australia, China, India, Japan and South Korea. It considers the principles which are shared in common and the significant differences in the laws on foreign judgments in the region. This paper argues that the laws which are canvassed here share many principles, albeit the interpretation on certain aspects may differ. Though differences exist, the differences are becoming less sharp. Further, there is a practical need for harmonisation given the plans for closer economic integration in the region. This paper argues that harmonisation is possible and should be pursued.

Maisie Ooi – Re-enfranchising the investor of intermediated securities

Abstract
Efforts to devise a choice-of-law rule for intermediated securities in the last two decades have almost entirely been centred on issues of property and title. Intermediation of securities does not, however, give rise to issues of property alone, even as they are mostly represented as such. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG (hereinafter referred to as “Secure Capital”) signals a possibly larger problem of the disenfranchisement of the investor of intermediated securities. Consideration of Secure Capital and its implications on choice-of-law have however been curiously sparse. This article seeks to bring the debate which still continues for issues of property to the issues of disenfranchisement, and to demonstrate why they are no less problematic, complex and in urgent need of a viable solution.

Mekuria Tsegaye Setegn – Legislative inaction and judicial legislation under the Ethiopian private international law regime: an analysis of selected decisions of the Federal Supreme Court’s Cassation Division

Abstract
The Cassation Division of the Ethiopian Federal Supreme Court has the power to review any court decision containing a basic error of law. The interpretations of the Division reviewing such decisions are binding on all other courts. So far, the Division has rendered a handful of binding precedents pertaining to private international law. Nevertheless, the appropriateness of the Division’s decisions in some private international law cases is questionable, let alone correcting errors committed by other courts. In two employment cases, the Division utterly invalidated choice of law agreements concluded by the parties. In another case, it characterized a dispute involving a foreigner as a purely domestic case. Through a critical analysis of the case laws, this Article strives to answer the question of whether the Division’s decisions are consonant to the foundational principles of private international law such as party autonomy. It also examines the validity of the precedents in light of the doctrine of separation of powers. The absence of a dedicated private international law statute and the bindingness of the Division’s decisions make the second question worthwhile. The Article will argue that the Division’s decisions undermine some generally accepted principles such as party autonomy: the decisions involve a judicial invention of eccentric norms. Hence, they also encroach on the lawmaking power of the Legislature.

Sharon Shakargy – Choice of law for surrogacy agreements: in the in-between of status and contract

Abstract

Surrogacy agreements regulate various matters, including parentage, consent to medical procedures, the performance of a very personal service, and monetary compensation. All these questions, which jointly structure the surrogacy, are bundled up together, separated only by extremely fine lines. Collectively, they comprise the basis upon which local and transnational surrogacies are executed. Legislators world-wide hold different positions on the matter of surrogacy in general and on the regulation of each sub-issue in particular; thus, the enforceability and possible outcomes of the procedure vary, depending on the law governing it. As such, it is crucial for the parties to know which law will apply to the surrogacy they are planning. Application of law is usually made by each country’s choice-of-law rules, which at this time are generally non-existent. This paper suggests guidelines for drafting rules to regulate these special agreements and adequately balance the different interests involved.

Felix M. Wilke – Dimensions of coherence in EU conflict-of-law rules

Abstract
EU conflict-of-law rules are contained mainly in six separate Regulations, with several others flanking them. This complex picture raises the questions of how easy access to this area of law is and to what extent it promotes legal certainty and predictability of results. Both issues link to the idea of coherence. Against this background, this article employs several different perspectives to examine the current level of coherence in EU conflict-of-laws rules analytically, also taking into account the recent Commission Proposal for a further Regulation. The article shows that, in particular, many structural and topical parallels exist, and argues that many remaining inconsistencies can easily (and should) be corrected because they are obvious and in part nearly inexplicable outliers.

Chukwuma Samuel Adesina Okoli – International commercial litigation in English-speaking Africa: a critical review (Review Article)

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:

H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner: European Conflict of Law 2019: Consolidation and multilateralisation

This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters from January/February 2019 until November 2019. It provides an overview of newly adopted legal instruments and summarizes current projects that are presently making their way through the EU legislative process. It also refers to the laws enacted at the national level in Germany as a result of new European instruments. Furthermore, the authors look at areas of law where the EU has made use of its external competence. They discuss important decisions of the CJEU. In addition, the article looks at current projects and the latest developments at the Hague Conference of Private International Law.

B. Hess: The Abysmal Depths of the German and European Law of the Service of Documents

The article discusses a judgment of the Higher Regional Court Frankfurt on the plaintiff’s obligations under the European Service Regulation in order to bring about the suspension of the statute of limitations under § 167 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO). The court held that the plaintiff should first have arranged for service of the German statement of claim in France pursuant to Art. 5 Service Regulation because, pursuant to Art. 8(1) Service Regulation, a translation is not required. However, the article argues that, in order to comply with § 167 ZPO, the translation must not be omitted regularly. The service of the translated lawsuit shall guarantee the defendant’s rights of defense in case he or she does not understand the language of the proceedings.

H. Roth: The international jurisdiction for enforcement concerning the right of access between Art. 8 et seq. Brussel IIbis and §§ 88 et. seq., 99 FamFG

According to § 99 para. 1 s. 1 No. 1 German Act on Procedure in Family Matters and Non-Contentious Matters (FamFG), German courts have international jurisdiction for the enforcement of a German decision on the right of access concerning a German child even if the child’s place of habitual residence lies in another Member State of the Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 (EuEheVO) (in this case: Ireland). Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 does not take priority according to § 97 para. 1 s. 2 FamFG because it does not regulate the international jurisdiction for enforcement. This applies equivalently to the Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (KSÜ).

J. Rapp: Attachment of a share in a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) by German courts

Attachment of a share in a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) by German courts: Despite Brexit, the LLP still enjoys great popularity in Germany, especially among international law and consulting firms. Besides its high acceptance in international business transactions, it is also a preferred legal structure due to the (alleged) flexibility of English company law. In a recent judgement, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) had the opportunity to examine the LLP’s legal nature in connection with the attachment of a share in a Limited Liability Partnership. The court decided that German courts have jurisdiction for an attachment order if the company has a branch and its members have a residence in Germany. By applying § 859 Code of Civil Procedure, it furthermore ruled that not the membership as such but the share of a partner in the company’s assets is liable to attachment.

U. Spellenberg: How to ascertain foreign law – Unaccompanied minors from Guinea

The Federal Court’s decision of 20 December 2017 is the first of four practically identical ones on the age of majority in Guinean law. It is contested between several Courts of Appeal whether that is 18 or 21 years. As of now, there are nine published decisions by the Court of Appeal at Hamm/Westf. and five by other Courts of Appeal. For some years now, young men from Guinea have been arriving in considerable numbers unaccompanied by parents or relatives. On arrival, these young men are assigned guardians ex officio until they come of age. In the cases mentioned above, the guardians or young men themselves seized the court to ascertain that the age of majority had not yet been reached. The Federal Court follows its unlucky theory that it must not state the foreign law itself but may verify the methods and ways by which the inferior courts ascertained what the foreign law is. Thus, the Federal court quashed the decisions of the CA Hamm inter alia for not having ordered an expert opinion on the Guinean law. The CA justified, especially in later judgments, that an expert would not have had access to more information. With regards to the rest of the judgment, the Federal Court’s arguments concerning German jurisdiction are not satisfying. However, one may approve its arguments and criticism of the CA on the questions of choice of law.

D. Martiny: Information and right to information in German-Austrian reimbursement proceedings concerning maintenance obligations of children towards their parents

A German public entity sought information regarding the income of the Austrian son-in-law of a woman living in a German home for the elderly, the entity having initially made a claim for information against the woman’s daughter under German family law (§ 1605 Civil Code; § 94 para. 1 Social Security Act [Sozialgesetzbuch] XII). German law was applicable to the reimbursement claim pursuant to Article 10 of the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations. Pursuant to § 102 of the Austrian Act on Non-Contentious Proceedings (Außerstreitverfahrensgesetz), and in accord with the inquisitorial principle, third persons like a son-in-law are also obligated to give information. The court applied this procedural rule and declared possible restrictions under Austrian or German substantive law inapplicable.

In the reverse case of an Austrian recovery claim filed in Germany, the outcome would be doubtful. While true that under German law an adjustment (Anpassung) might allow the establishment of an otherwise non-existing duty to inform, restrictions on the duty to disclose information pursuant to Austrian and German law make it difficult to justify such a claim.

M. Gernert: Effects of the Helms-Burton Act and the EU Blocking Regulation on European proceedings

For more than 20 years, each US president had made use of the possibility of suspending the application of the extraterritorial sanctions of the Helms-Burton Act, thus preventing American plaintiffs from bringing actions against foreigners before American courts for the „trafficking“ of property expropriated to Cuba. This changed as President Trump tightened economic sanctions against the Caribbean state. The first effects of this decision are instantly noticeable, but it also has an indirect influence on European court proceedings. In this article, the first proceeding of this kind will be presented, focusing on international aspects in relation to the Helms-Burton Act and the EU-Blocking-Regulation.

K. Thorn/M. Cremer: Recourse actions among third-party vehicle insurance companies and limited liability in cases of joint and several liability from a conflict of laws perspective

In two recent cases, the OGH had to engage in a conflict of laws analysis regarding recourse actions among third-party vehicle insurance companies concerning harm suffered in traffic accidents which involved multiple parties from different countries. The ECJ addressed this problem in its ERGO decision in 2016, but the solution remains far from clear. The situation is further complicated because Austria, like many European states, has ratified the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents. This causes considerable differences in how the law applicable to civil non-contractual liability arising from traffic accidents is determined.

In the first decision discussed, the OGH endorsed the decision of the ECJ without presenting its own reasoning. The authors criticizes this lack of reasoning and outline the basic conflict of laws principles for the recourse actions among third-party vehicle insurance companies. The second decision discussed provides a rare example for limited liability in the case of joint and several liability. However, given that the accident in question occurred almost 20 years ago, the OGH was able to solve the problem applying merely the Convention and autonomous Austrian conflict of laws rules. The authors examine how the problem would have been solved under the Rome II Regulation.

A. Hiller: Reform of exequatur in the United Arab Emirates

In the United Arab Emirates, an extensive reform of the Code of Civil Procedure entered into force on 2 February 2019. The reform covers half of the Code’s provisions, among them the law regulating the enforcement of foreign judgments, arbitral awards and official deeds. This article provides an overview of the amendments made on the enforcement of foreign decisions and puts them into the context of the existing law. The article also sheds light on the procedure applying to appeals against decisions on the enforcement. The reform does away with the requirement of an action to declare the foreign decision enforceable. Instead, a simple ex parte application is sufficient, putting the creditor at a strategic advantage. However, with a view to arbitral awards in particular, important issues remain unadressed due to the somewhat inconsistent application of the New York Convention by Emirati courts.

In Islandsbanki & Ors v Stanford [2020] EWCA Civ 480, upon appeal from Fancourt J in [2019] EWHC 1818 (Ch), Asplin LJ discussed whether purported execution of a foreign judgment registered in the High Court pursuant to the Lugano Convention, can be execution issued in respect of the judgment debt (for the purposes of section 268(1)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986), if the execution occurred before the period for appealing the registration of the judgment has expired and, if not, whether the defect can be cured.

An unpaid Icelandic judgment debt from 2013 which together with interest, is now in excess of £1.5 million sterling equivalent. The judgment was given against Mr Stanford in the Reykjanes District Court in Iceland on 26 June 2013. A certificate was issued by the Icelandic court on 16 October 2013, pursuant to Articles 54 – 58 Lugano. IB applied to register the Icelandic judgment in England and Wales on 16 March 2016. A registration order was sealed on 23 March 2016 (the “Registration Order”).

Some of the issues in the Appeal (and before Fancourt J) concern purely English procedural rules however their effect is of course to facilitate, or obstruct, recognition and enforcement under the Lugano Convention. The confusion to a great degree results from the UK, despite Lugano’s direct effect, having implemented the Convention in the CPR rules anyway (at 24). The submission made by appellant (the Bank) before the Court is essentially that a narrow interpretation of the English CPR rules which would not allow remedying an error in the procedure, would run counter Lugano’s objective of facilitating recognition and enforcement (reference is made to the Pocar report and the recitals of Lugano itself).

Asplin LJ at 38 points to the language of Lugano itself: ‘during the time specified for an appeal pursuant to Article 43(5) against the declaration of enforceability and until any such appeal has been determined, no (emphasis in the original) measures of enforcement may be taken other than protective measures against the property of the party against whom enforcement is sought. The ordinary and natural meaning of those provisions is quite clear.’ She also at 37 points to the Convention’s objectives not being restricted to ease of enforcement: ‘the underlying policy of Articles 43(5) and 47(3) is that a fair and proportionate balance must be struck between the interests of the party which applies for a registration order having obtained a judgment in a foreign jurisdiction to which the Convention applies, and the defendant/debtor whose rights of appeal are prescribed by law and should not be undermined by allowing irreversible measures of enforcement.’

Conclusion, at 40: ‘It is for that reason that CPR 74.6(3) provides that a registration order must contain reference to the period in which an appeal against registration can be lodged and that no measures of enforcement can be taken before the end of that period and the reason why that prohibition was repeated in the Registration Order itself at paragraph 2. Accordingly, any attempt to remedy the premature issue and execution under the Writ of Control by means of an exercise of the discretion under CPR r3.10(b) or the use of CPR r3.1(2)(m) or 3.1(7) (or the inherent jurisdiction of the court, for that matter) would fundamentally undermine Article 47(3) and section 4A(3) in a way which is impermissible.’

at 62 ‘The defect in the execution in this case, if it can be called a defect, was fundamental….It was not a mere technicality or a formal defect which might be rectified pursuant to what is now Rule 12.64 of the Insolvency Rules 2016. It went to the heart of the execution process’.

Appeal dismissed following an interesting and clear application of both Lugano’s provisions and its spirit.

Geert.

Recognition and enforcement, Lugano.
Whether purported execution of foreign judgment can be issued in respect of the judgment debt, for purposes of Insolvency Act, if execution occurred before the period for appealing the registration of the judgment has expired. https://t.co/bPt9U1IaHt

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 2, 2020

The author of this post is Giulio Monga, a PhD student at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan.

On 8 July 2019, Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) ruled on the jurisdiction of Italian courts over passengers’ claims for compensation against air carriers established in non-EU countries (order No 18257 of 2019).

D.M. and R.G., two Italian citizens residing in Italy, purchased tickets to fly from Copenhagen to Havana, and back. The flights were operated by the Russian airline Aeroflot. The tickets were purchased through the Aeroflot website.

The flight to Havana was first cancelled and only replaced with a longer flight the day after. On the return flight, the two passengers’ luggage was mishandled only to be delivered ten days later.

The two sued the Italian subsidiary of Aeroflot for damages before the Justice of Peace of Rome.

Aeroflot challenged the jurisdiction of Italian courts and asked the Supreme Court to give a ‘preliminary’ ruling on jurisdiction, as provided for in Article 41 of Italian code of civil procedure (this is a ruling on jurisdiction alone, which either party may request for as long as the case is not decided at first instance).

Specifically, Aeroflot submitted that the action had no connection with Italy, apart from the nationality and the residence of the plaintiffs. It stressed that the tickets had been purchased through the Moscow-based website of the company and that Italy was neither the country where the contract ought to take place nor the country where the alleged non-performance had occurred.

In its ruling, the Supreme Court began by pointing out that the matter came with the purview of the Montreal Convention of 1999 for the unification of certain rules for international carriage by air.

The Convention, to which Italy is a party, applies to all international carriage performed by aircraft for reward (Article 1(1)). A carriage is ‘international’ for the purposes of the Convention where, among other situations, the place of departure and the place of destination are situated in the territories of two States parties. The latter condition was met in the circumstances, given that the Convention is also in force for Cuba and Denmark.

The Montreal Convention deals with jurisdiction over passengers’ claims for damages in Article 33. Specifically, Article 33(1) provides that an action for damages may be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, before the courts of the following contracting States: the State of the carrier’s domicile, the State of the carrier’s principal place of business, the State where the carrier has a place of business through which the contract was made, or the State of the place of destination of the flight.

In the instant case, the Court noted, the question was whether the defendant, Aeroflot, could be regarded to have a ‘place of business’ in Italy, and whether such place could be considered to be the place of business through which the contracts between Aeroflot and the plaintiffs had been made.

The Court observed that, where tickets are purchased on-line, the place of business through which the contract was made must be identified regardless of the physical location of the agencies, subsidiaries or branches of the carrier concerned.

Air carriers, the Court remarked, present themselves on the web as commercial operators interacting with users based anywhere in the world. Neither the carrier’s nor the website users’ location or geographical origin are relevant to the transaction, since no physically identifiable intermediation occurs between the passenger and the carrier for the purposes of the purchase.

According to the Supreme Court, the online purchase of tickets challenge the traditional methods of localisation of a contract for jurisdictional purposes.

Against this background, the ‘place of business through which the contract has been made’, as referred to in Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention, cannot be determined based on the location of the server used for completing the purchase. It would be unreasonable, the Court added, to burden the passenger with the task of assessing the location of the relevant server. Moreover, an inquiry to that effect would lead to uncertain results, and would hardly be consistent as such with the goals of predictability that the rules on jurisdiction, including Article 33(1) of the Montreal Convention, are expected to pursue.

Having stressed that the Montreal Convention must be given an autonomous interpretation, the Court observed that Article 33(1) should be read in light of other provisions in the Convention concerning jurisdiction. By this statement, if the understanding of the author of this post is correct, the Court meant to refer, in particular, to Article 33(2).

The latter provision applies, alongside Article 33(1), to actions for damages ‘resulting from the death or injury of a passenger’. It provides that those actions may also be brought before the courts of the State Party ‘in which at the time of the accident the passenger has his or her principal and permanent residence and to or from which the carrier operates services for the carriage of passengers by air, either on its own aircraft, or on another carrier’s aircraft pursuant to a commercial agreement, and in which that carrier conducts its business of carriage of passengers by air from premises leased or owned by the carrier itself or by another carrier with which it has a commercial agreement’.

While Article 33(2) was inapplicable as such to the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court apparently relied on the latter provision to construe, consistent with the principles of the Convention, the expression ‘place of business through which the contract was made’ as used in Article 33(1), in particular as regards on-line purchases. The Court argued that in on-line purchases, that place should be understood to correspond to the place where the purchase order is made and the payment is likely to take place: in the Court’s view, that place should in fact be identified with the domicile of the passenger, a connecting factor that complies with the requirements of certainty and foreseeability.

In the Court’s view, one of the general goals underlying the Montreal Convention, as it arises from an overall analysis of the above provisions, is in fact to enhance the protect of the passenger, namely by facilitating access to justice. To corroborate its findings, the Court also referred to the rules of the Brussels I bis Regulation on contracts concluded by consumers, as an example of the kind of protection that jurisdictional rules may want to afford to weaker parties.

In light of all of the foregoing, the Supreme Court concluded that, in the event of tickets purchased online by the passenger himself, the expression ‘place … through which the contract has been made’ in Article 33(1) should be deemed to refer to the place where the passenger becomes aware of conclusion of the contract, that is, in fact, the domicile of the passenger himself. This interpretation, the Court finally contended, complies with the goal of giving adequate protection to the passenger as a weaker party, while ensuring predictability and protecting air carrier against forum shopping.

Dans une communication n° 2020/C 108I/01, la Commission européenne publie des orientations sur l’utilisation des marchés publics dans le contexte du coronavirus (JOUE du 1er avr. 2020). Ce document fournit des lignes directrices à l’ensemble des acheteurs publics des États membres sur le cadre juridique applicable durant les prochaines semaines. 

en lire plus

The second 2020 issue of RabelsZ is now available online. It features two essays as well as the contributions to a Symposium on career paths into legal academia held at the Max Institute in June 2019:

Lord Hodge, The Scope of Judicial Law-Making in the Common Law Tradition, pp. 211 et seq

Judge-made law is an independent source of law in common law systems. To jurists brought up in legal systemswhich have codified law, this is one of the striking features of the common law tradition. Instead of interpreting a code to develop the law, common law judges develop the law which their predecessors have made. While statute law nowimpinges on many areas of private law, large tracts of our private law remain predominantly the product of judicialdecisions. [In this contribution] I wish to discuss some of the areas of private law which have been and remainpredominantly judge-made and the limits in the common law tradition on judicial law-making.

Markus G. Puder, Law and Language in Action. Transformative Experiences Associated with Translating the Louisiana Civil Code into German, pp. 228 et seq

In the course of translating the Louisiana Civil Code into German I had to overcome the unique challenges posed bythe source text and the receptor text. Beyond the translation issues stemming from its own bilingual origins, theLouisiana Civil Code codifies mixed law in unprecedented ways. Different but no less challenging conditionssurrounded the destination text, as distinct species of legal German exist. In addition to the legal German of Germany, these include the legal German of Austria and Switzerland. Resolving these challenges required tailored translationapproaches within the spectrum of source text and receptor text orientation. My article discusses the challenges I encountered and the decisions taken in response. It concludes with final thoughts on my experiences as legal translator and legal comparativist.

SYMPOSIUM: Career Paths into Legal Academia

Reinhard Zimmermann, Akademische Karrierewege für Juristen im Vergleich. Einführung in das Symposium (Career Paths into Legal Academia Compared. Introduction to the Symposium), pp. 264 et seq.

By highlighting characteristic aspects of an academic career in the United States, the present contribution attempts toprovide an interesting contrast to the career paths into legal academia available in the countries on which thesymposium, held in the Hamburg Max Planck Institute in June 2019, focuses. The countries considered in thesymposium are Germany and Austria, France, Italy, England and Scotland, and Japan. Here, too, we find considerable differences which both shape different legal cultures and are shaped by them.

Walter Doralt, Akademische Karrierewege für Juristen in Deutschland und Österreich (Career Paths into Legal Academia in Germany and Austria), pp. 268 et seq.

Seen from a distance, it is often presumed that career paths in law and legal education in Austria and Germany arevery similar. This assumption is also widely held in Germany (with regards to Austria). Some similarities do indeedexist. However, many aspects during the university education are surprisingly different in both countries. Equally, thisis true for subsequent career stages in academia. This article analyses the common points and differences.

Dorothée Perrouin-Verbe & Samuel Fulli-Lemaire, Career Paths into Legal Academia in France, pp. 299 et seq.

It is likely that a description of the way university careers unfold in France, at least as far as law is concerned, will surprise even seasoned observers of the academic world. Not everything, naturally, will appear outlandish: that the single most important precondition is having a PhD thesis is perhaps to be expected for a civilian jurisdiction; that the overall system is centralized will not astonish those that have come into even superficial contact with the country. But the extent of that centralization, the sheer number of unwritten rules, the relative lack of importance attributed to publications and the specificities of the agrégation, the competitive exam which serves as the main point of entry into the body of law professors, as well as the acceleration it is designed to provide to young academics’ careers, may surprise some readers.

Francesco Paolo Patti, Career Paths into Legal Academia in Italy, pp. 324-350 (27)

The present contribution aims to explain the relevant steps in the Italian academic career path and its most relevant traits. It is divided in three parts. The first contains a brief outline of the Italian legal framework on universityrecruitment and its evolution over the last forty years. The various structures are presented in a synthesised and simplified way, with the purpose of indicating the rationales underlying the different reforms. After having sketched out the playing field, the article describes a typical Italian academic career and points out the unique aspects of each stepon the long path of academia, from university graduation to the call as full professor. Finally, the paper outlinesfundamental features of the Italian academic social environment, which are essential to understand how the rules on university recruitment actually work in practice. Needless to say, the last part is the most important one. In addressingthe subject matter, it is not possible to limit the treatment to a description of the rules and their rationales as there areseveral non-written rules belonging to the Italian academic tradition that need to be presented in order to understanduniversity recruitment in actual practice. Aspects discussed in the present contribution concern especially the field of private law.

Andrew Sweeney. Career Paths into Legal Academia in Scotland, pp. 351 et seq.

This contribution deals with the smallest country represented at the symposium. Its size, however, is not the solefeature that distinguishes Scotland from the others. As a legal system, Scotland sits exactly neither with theContinental systems (represented here by Germany, France and Italy), nor with England. It is, instead, often describedas a mixed legal system, sharing features with both Civilian and Common-law systems. […] This [contribution] focusesprimarily on the position in Scotland. But much of what is discussed will be equally applicable to an English academic, and it is easy to overstate the differences between the two jurisdictions. Where interesting differences exist betweenthe two jurisdictions, an attempt has been made to point them out. […] Space constraints restrict the assessment to a select few of the myriad of subjects which the topic of academic career paths could include, and some of thoseselected are permitted only a cursory glance. Particular focus is given to a career in private law, and it must be bornein mind that differences – sometimes significant ones – exist in other areas such as criminology, legal theory and legal history.

Harald Baum, Akademische Karrierewege für Juristen in Japan (Career Paths into Legal Academia in Japan), pp. 374 et seq.

The landscape for an academic legal career in Japan shows some striking differences from its German counterpart. While in Germany a large number of qualified young academics struggle to secure a university posting, Japanese lawfaculties presently face difficulties in filling free positions. A second major difference is the way in which an academiccareer is achieved. In Japan, in-house, tenure-track careers are the norm whereas, at least up until now, they are a rare exception in Germany, where it is highly unusual to be appointed by the university where one has obtained his orher academic qualification. Accordingly, a change of universities in the course of an academic career is rare in Japan while in Germany the opposite is true. Japanese law faculties are entirely free to determine the qualificationsnecessary for an academic promotion. A second monograph, like the German »Habilitation«, is unknown in Japan. A PhD thesis, however, is increasingly common. The typical academic career starts after four years of undergraduatestudies, followed by a two-year period of study at graduate level or, alternatively, two years of training at a law school. Thereafter, a three-year doctoral programme has nowadays become the norm. This is followed by employment as an assistant, and in the event that the candidate’s qualifications are seen as sufficient, by a promotion to the position of associate professor. The latter is a member of the faculty and employment is no longerlimited in terms of duration. The final step is promotion to full professorship at the average age of 36 to 40.