Agrégateur de flux

ZVglRWiss – Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 3/2025

A new issue of ZVglRWiss – Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft is now available and includes contributions on EU private law, comparative law, private international law, and individual European private law regimes.

The full table of content can be accessed here.

The new issue 3/2025 includes:

Jürgen Basedow’s Contribution to Comparative Law Methodology and Its Future Role

Katharina Boele-Woelki reflects Basedow’s contributions to comparative law and its future role, with a focus on his views on the methodological principles of comparative legal research. In the wider ongoing debate on methodology in comparative law, Basedow provides practical, concrete arguments. Key discussions include functional versus cultural approaches, and micro- versus macro-comparative research.

Der kollektive Prozessvergleich aus rechtsvergleichender Perspektive

Karl Wörle discusses the relevance of elaborate procedural mechanisms to protect the interests of represented consumers. The US class action with its strong tradition of private dispute resolution would offer valuable impulses, which have been strongly adopted in the Netherlands. The prolific international experience should be capitalized on for Germany and Austria – considering the peculiarities of collective redress procedures and national legal cultures – to derive impulses for future legislative policy.

Lawsuits as Weapons? The EU’s Anti-Slapp Directive Strikes Back

Madeleine Petersen Weiner investigates and discusses the EU’s Anti-Slapp provisions and compares the European Directive with the U.S. Anti-Slapp Legislation. Having originated in the U.S., SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) now increasingly also occur in the EU. SLAPPs are considered abusive lawsuits as plaintiffs use the civil court system to silence opponents. Due to their threat to public participation – and ultimately to protect and foster democratic debate – the EU has enacted the so-called Anti-SLAPP Directive.

Unechte Inlandsfälle unter der Brüssel Ia-VO

Salih Okur investigates the CJEU’s decision in Inkreal and in FTI. In Inkreal, the CJEU recently held that an international element in the sense of the Brussels Ia Regulation can be established by a jurisdiction agreement between parties domiciled in the same Member State in favour of another Member State. Not a year later, in FTI, the CJEU held that the international element could also be established by the foreign destination of a package travel arrangement between parties domiciled in the same Member State. This paper proposes to understand the “international element” as an “international conflict of jurisdiction”. Against this standard, the CJEU’s decision in Inkreal is convincing while the opinion on FTI is not.

As has become tradition, the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL) will be hosting a Winter School in Como, from 2 to 6 February 2026. The general topic of the upcoming edition is Values in Private International Law.

The teaching staff will consist of Laura Carpaneto (University of Genoa), Javier Carrascosa González (University of Murcia), Maria Asunción Cebrian Salvat (University of Murcia), Gilles Cuniberti (EAPIL President, University of Luxembourg), Sara De Vido (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice), Stefano Dominelli (University of Genova), Cristina González Beilfuss (University of Barcelona), Thomas Kadner Graziano (University of Geneva), Eva Maria Kieninger (University of Würzburg), Silvia Marino (University of Insubria and coordinator of the Winter School), Johan Meeusen (University of Antwerp), Nadia Rusinova (The Hague University, Attorney at law), Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm (University of Edinburgh), Erik Sinander (Stockholm University), Sara Tonolo (University of Padua), Geert van Calster (KU Leuven), Hans van Loon (HCCH Former Secretary General), and Anna Wysocka-Bar (Jagiellonian University in Kraków).

The University of Insubria will host the 2026 edition, as it did in 2024 and 2025 (see here and here), in cooperation with University of Murcia and the Jagiellonian University in Kraków.

Those interested in attending the Winter School must apply by 20 January 2026 by completing the online form available here.

More information is available here.

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

The CJEU this morning kicked open a door already so wide open in in Case C‑540/24 Cabris Investments v Revetas Capital Advisors, I hope no one was walking behind it for they would have been brutally knocked out.

On 6 May 2020, Cabris Investments and Revetas Capital Advisors, companies both established in the UK, entered into a consultancy contract, which was accompanied by a letter, both of which contained a jurisdiction clause worded

‘This contract and the relationship between the parties shall be governed by and construed in accordance with Austrian law. The Handelsgericht Wien [(Commercial Court, Vienna, Austria)] shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement or its enforcement or validity.’

On 30 June 2023, Cabris brought an action before the Commercial Court, Vienna) to seek fulfillment of a contractual payment obligation under that contract relating to the role of CFO. Revetas challenge the international jurisdiction of the referring court, arguing that, since BIA has not been applicable in respect of legal relationships involving the UK since the end of the transition period provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement, A25 BIa, as interpreted in Inkreal  is not applicable.

The referring court has doubts

first as to whether A25 BIa and the Inkreal principles remain applicable viz choice of court concluded during the transition period between two parties having their head offices in the UK, which designates a court of a Member State to hear their dispute, where that court has been seised after both UK withdrawal and the end of the transition period, and the contractual relationship underlying the dispute has no connection with that Member State.

Second, if the CJEU were to conclude that A25 does not apply in such a situation, whether the Brussels Convention, and in particular A17 and 18, or, failing that, the British-Austrian Convention, is applicable. According to the referring court, the answer to that question depends on whether A68 and 69 BIa definitively repealed those two conventions. That court is of the view that the principles of public international law governing the termination of treaties and the fact that those various legal instruments govern related matters support the interpretation that the applicability of those conventions, as regards legal relationships involving the UK, is precluded

Third, whether A50(3) TEU and A82(1)(b)(i) of Part 4 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 of 4 March 2019  preclude the Brussels Convention from applying in general.

These are scholarly exciting questions and the referring Austrian court referred to following long list of verbosely formulated questions, after having given the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement context: 

‘(1)      Is [A25 BIa to be interpreted as meaning that an agreement conferring jurisdiction in which the contracting parties, who are domiciled in the [UK] and therefore (now) in a third State, agree that the courts of a Member State of the [EU] are to have jurisdiction over disputes arising under that contract, falls within the scope of that provision, even if the underlying contract has no further connection with that Member State chosen as the place of jurisdiction? Do the underlying principles of [Inkreal] therefore also apply in the same way if the date of conclusion of a jurisdiction agreement between two parties domiciled in the UK still falls within the period before the end of the [Brexit transition period] on 31 December 2020, but the action was only brought after Brexit took effect? This is taking into account the fact that the contractual situation between these (now) third-country nationals has no further connection to the chosen [EU] Member State (see, however, Recitals 13 and 14 of [that regulation]) and, in addition, A50(3) TEU … generally excludes the applicability of the European treaties for the [UK] after Brexit.

If [the Court] rejects the application of [A25] in the third-country scenario in question, the following further questions arise:

(2)      Is [A68 BIa] to be interpreted as meaning that it has definitively repealed [the Brussels Convention] – including in proceedings relating to the [UK] (taking into account Brexit) – so that recourse to this Convention is currently no longer possible for a Member State of the [EU]?

(3)      Are [A69 BIa] in the version of [List 3] and [A55 Brussels Convention], 13th indent, to be interpreted as meaning that they have also definitively repealed the [British-Austrian Convention], so that in proceedings relating to the [UK] (taking into account Brexit), recourse to that international treaty … is no longer possible? This is also taking into account the fact that, pursuant to [A70(1) BIa], the conventions referred to in [A69] of [that regulation] retain their validity for those areas of law to which the regulation does not apply. Can [a] treaty concluded with [Austria] that has already been declared “superseded” by primary law in the past be declared retroactively applicable again between those states after Brexit (so-called “revival of an international treaty”) pursuant to Article 70(1) of [that regulation] with regard to the [UK]?

If so: Would such a “revival” also apply within the scope of application of [A56 Brussels Convention], which is similar in this respect?

(4)      Is [A50(3)] TEU to be interpreted as meaning that it also precludes the application or “revival” of [A 17 and 18 Brussels Convention] in relation to the [UK] (taking into account Brexit) if, in proceedings initiated in Austria, two litigants domiciled in the [UK] are facing each other who have agreed in their contract – concluded on 6 May 2020 – that the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court, Vienna) has exclusive jurisdiction? Does the provision in [A50(3)] TEU take precedence over [A66 Brussels Convention], according to which the Brussels Convention “[is concluded] for an unlimited period”?

(5)      [(a)]      Should [the Court] come to the conclusion that the Brussels Convention also takes precedence in the sense of [Q]uestions 2 to 4 above in relation to the [UK], the question arises: Does the fundamental primacy of the Brussels Convention preclude an arrangement in the [UK] according to which recourse to the Brussels Convention is also expressly excluded with regard to jurisdiction agreements that were concluded prior to Brexit taking effect (see the UK provision under Section 82(1)(b)(i) of the “Regulations 4-25 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019/479)”, which [was] valid until 29 February 2024 and is obviously still applicable here, as the action was brought on 30 June 2023)?

[(b)]      If not: When examining the validity of a jurisdiction agreement concluded on 6 May 2020 (i.e. before Brexit) between two British companies with the choice of an Austrian forum, is an Austrian court nevertheless bound by this exclusion of application of the Brussels Convention – standardised in the [UK] – pursuant to Section 82(1)(b)(i) of Regulations 4-25 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019/479), in particular due to the primacy of primary law, which would in principle prevent effective enforcement in the United Kingdom ([t]he last question assumes, for the purposes of [Q]uestion 3), the expiry of the [British-Austrian Convention]?’

 

The CJEU, without AG Opinion, cut the conversation short:

[31] a choice of court clause must be assessed as at the date on which the legal proceedings are brought (reference ia to CJEU Tilman);

[35] A25 BIa clearly applies regardless of the domicile of the parties;

[37] despite BIa serving internal market objectives, BIa emphasises in recital 14 that ‘to respect the autonomy of the parties, certain rules of jurisdiction in this Regulation should apply regardless of the defendant’s domicile’ – ditto [43] another clear support by the CJEU of party autonomy as a strong driving principle of EU PrivIntLaw.

[40] the ‘international element required to trigger BIa is very widely interpreted (reference ex multi to Inkreal);

[47-48] that choice of court was concluded during the transition period and that that court is seised of a dispute after the end of that period, is not capable of altering the answer to be given to the present question: the Withdrawal Agreement does not govern such a situation, and notwithstanding ex-EU domicile of the parties to a dispute, A25 explicitly covers such situation.

The remainder of the questions therefore, are not entertained……

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.311 ff.

 

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

What is the forum contractus in an action for recovery of a consumer’s claim arising from a contract of carriage by air, acquired by a trader by way of assignment? Contracts solely for transport famously are excluded from the consumer title of the Regulation, and cases like C‑913/19 CNP and C‑393/20 T.B. and D. have not brought much clarification on forum contractus in cases of assignment. Choice of court on the basis of A25 (such as was at issue in in Ryanair v DelayFix) would not seem to have been on the horizon oddly (the referral decision does not specify why not) and of course the European Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims might have been able to have helped however as Marco Pasque reports on this very day, it has been withdrawn!

In De Bloos [13[ the CJEU held that

‘for the purpose of determining the place of performance within the meaning of Article 5 (now A7(1) Brussels Ia, GAVC] … the obligation to be taken into account is that which corresponds to the contractual right on which the plaintiff’s action is based’.

The question which arises in Case C‑551/24 Deutsche Lufthansa AG v AirHelp Germany GmbH in which the Court held this morning, is whether the dispute at issue concerns the recovery of a claim arising from the assignment agreement  which assigned the claim to claimant, or the contract for the provision of services: in the present case, a contract of carriage by air. (An additional question on A7(5) branch jurisdiction was [30] declared inadmissible for lack of detail given by the referring court).

The confusion among the Polish courts (and they are far from alone!) is a result of the confusion following De Bloos. As I already noted in my review of CJEU Bosworth, it would be good for the Court to clarify whether De Bloos is still good authority, given the many textual changes and case-law considerations of (now) Article 7(1).

[36] the core question is

whether the fact that a claim, arising from the performance of a contract of carriage by air concluded between a consumer and a trader, has been transferred by that consumer to a company specialising in the recovery of air passengers’ claims is such as to preclude the application of the second indent of [A7(1)(b) BIa] in order to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear a claim for compensation brought by the assignee against the air carrier.

[37] (unlike in the case of protected categories), the rule of special jurisdiction laid down A7(1)(b) is not intended to protect the weaker party in a contractual relationship. That that rule was not established in the light of the status of the contracting parties, but is based on the existence of a close connection between the court seised and the contract concerned. In those circumstances, the Court holds that the fact that the consumer’s claim for compensation has been transferred to a trader has no bearing on the application of that rule.

[38]: see similarly in CJEU Ofab and CDC: in the context of a dispute concerning claims relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, the transfer of claims by the initial creditor cannot, by itself, have an impact on the determination of the court having jurisdiction. [40] A dispute concerning the recovery of a claim arising from the performance of a contract for the provision of services continues to have a close connection (which the court points out is the raison d’être of A7(1)) with the place of performance of the obligation in question, namely the place in a Member State where, under that contract, the services were provided or should have been provided, within the meaning of the second indent of A7(1)(b), even though that claim has been transferred to a third party.

Therefore C-20/21 LOT Airlines comes into play: the place of departure of a flight corresponds to one of the main places of provision of the services which are the subject of that contract and therefore ensures the close connection required by the rules of special jurisdiction set out in A7(1) between that contract and the court which has territorial jurisdiction over that place. The Polish courts appear to have jurisdiction to hear the action in the main proceedings [42] and [44-45}neither the particular features of the assignment agreement at issue nor the absence of a contractual link between the parties to the dispute are such as to call that jurisdiction into question:

First, the fact that, as is apparent from the order for reference, under the terms of the assignment agreement at issue, the assigning consumer does not transfer, under Polish law, his or her procedural rights to the assignee trader is not relevant for the application of the rule of jurisdiction laid down in the second indent of [A7(1)(b)]. That rule is based on the obligation in question, that is to say, the subject matter of the dispute, determined by that of the contract concerned, since the assignment agreement confers standing to bring proceedings solely on the assignee.

Second, as regards the fact that the parties in the main proceedings are not directly bound by a contract, … it should be observed that, in so far as the assignment agreement confers on the assignee the rights enjoyed by the assignor in relation to the carrier and therefore the right to bring proceedings for the recovery of the claim arising from the contract of carriage by air, that fact is also not such as to preclude the application of the rule of jurisdiction laid down in that provision.

The judgment makes much sense. Assignment does not change the nature of the claim nor its forum contractus. This assists the defendant with predictability and it would serve no Brussels Ia-relevant purpose to change the equation for claimant and defendant alike simply because the claim has been assigned.

Geert.

 

Commission / Grèce (Exécution de l’arrêt sur la décharge de Zakynthos)
Manquement d’État : n’ayant pas exécuté un arrêt de la Cour de 2014, la Grèce est condamnée à des sanctions pécuniaires

The European Commission has formally withdrawn two legislative proposals related to judicial cooperation in civil matters, namely the Proposal for a Regulation on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims, as well as the Proposal for a Directive on adapting non-contractual civil liability rules to artificial intelligence (AI Liability Directive). A notice of […]

The Japan Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA), one of the oldest international arbitration institutions in the world founded in 1950, has published the 6th Volume of its annual journal on commercial arbitration: Japan Commercial Arbitration Journal.

The journal features articles on international commercial arbitration, mediation, and litigation related to Japan. These articles are authored by prominent scholars and experienced practitioners who are well-versed in the resolution and prevention of international commercial disputes.

The Japan Commercial Arbitration Journal is particularly valuable for non-Japanese readers, including foreign researchers and practitioners, as it provides insights into Japan’s approach to international dispute resolution. By offering comprehensive analysis and updates on arbitration, mediation and litigation practices in Japan, the journal helps bridge the knowledge gap for those working in international commercial law. Access to this information is essential for professionals seeking to understand the nuances of Japanese legal procedures and effectively engage with Japan in cross-border commercial matters.

 

The new volume features the following articles:

 

Shinji Ogawa

JCAA in Action: Recent Developments and Its Global Engagement

 

Kenya Suzuki

Management of Arbitration-Related Cases in the Tokyo District Court (Business Court)

 

Fumiyasu Miyazaki, Chloé Terraube, Lederer Nadine, Itai Apter, Jinah Park, Carlos Esplugues

Evolving Landscape Surrounding International Arbitration and Mediation ? Comparative Approach ?

 

Luke Nottage

The Prospects and Challenges for International Commercial Arbitration

 

Hiroyuki Tezuka

Impact of the Amendments to the Arbitration Act in 2023 and the Enactment of the Act to Implement the Singapore Convention on Mediation on Practice

 

Kazuhiro Kobayashi

Case Study: Petition for a Ruling on Arbitral Tribunal Jurisdiction under Article 23, Paragraph 5 of the Arbitration Act of Japan

 

Miriam Rose Ivan L. Pereira, Mami Kadono

Unlocking the Potential of Third-Party Funding in Arbitration in Japan ?Legal Landscape, Practical Considerations, and Arbitral Rules?

 

Colin Trehearne, Daniel Allen

“Reasonable” Costs in Japan-Seated Arbitrations in the light of Macroeconomic Trends

 

Takayuki Matsuo, Yui Takahashi

Generative AI and International Arbitration

 

Shunsuke Domon, Ryan Leon, Riko Ishimaru

Recent Discussions on the Scope of the Parties to Arbitration Agreements

Approaches toward the “Group of Companies” Doctrine in Various Jurisdictions

 

Shinichiro Abe

When Arbitration and Insolvency Intersect: Developments from Common Law Jurisdictions and Key Takeaways for Japan

 

Peter Harris, Owain Cooke

Filling the Void – Issues That Arise When an Arbitrator Dies

 

Yoshie Midorikawa

The Transformation of Dispute Resolution in Japan: Group Claims by Japanese Investors in Investment Treaty Arbitration

 

Naoki Idei

The Japan International Dispute Resolution Center – Its Achievements and Challenges – Its Achievements and Challenges –

 

Masafumi Kodama, Aoi Inoue

Know-how regarding the logistics of international arbitration hearings

  

Satoshi Kawai

ODR Demonstration Project conducted by Japan Federation of Bar Associations (“JFBA”)

 

Haruo Okada

Japan’s Potential in International Mediation and Japan’s Role in Global Dissemination and Promotion thereof

 

All volumes can also be freely consulted and downloaded here.

 

Guest post by Gustavo Ferraz de Campos Monaco, Full Professor of Private Internacional Law – University of São Paulo

In Brazilian law, the regulation of conflicts of laws is still based on a legislation from 1942, during a dictatorial regime, which explains its inspiration from the Italian fascist regime. The values prevailing in Brazilian society back then were quite different from those we hold today, especially in matters concerning family relationships. At that time, the family unit was viewed as having a single domicile, and questions related to the definition of parenthood were unthinkable outside traditional presumptions.

On at least two occasions over the past 83 years, attempts to draft new regulations were undertaken by leading figures in the field – Haroldo Valladão, Jacob Dolinger, and João Grandino Rodas – but both initiatives failed during the process, without the Plenary of the Legislative Houses having expressed an opinion on the merits of the projects.

In a context like this, embarking on a new attempt could easily seem discouraging from the start. However, the Secretariat for Institutional Relations, through the Council for Sustainable Economic and Social Development, linked to the Presidency of the Republic, decided in December 2024 to appoint a large commission composed of representatives from the Executive, the Judiciary, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, public and private legal professions, and the Academy. Through its Drafting Committee, this commission was entrusted with the task of preparing a new proposal.

After two public hearings, and the collection of around one hundred suggestions for improving the proposed articles, the Preliminary Draft, prepared by the appointed general rapporteurs, is now ready for analysis by the Executive Branch, which is responsible for transforming it into a Project to be submitted to the Legislative.

The proposal aims to address Private International Law in its essence, covering procedural and conflicts of laws issues. Regarding procedural matters, the Committee chose to make only minimal changes, since these provisions are already contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, enacted by Congress in 2015 and in force since 2016, less than a decade ago. In this regard, much of the proposed legislation refers back to the 2015 Code.

It is, therefore, in the field of conflicts of laws that the proposed amendments are truly innovative. With a focus on legal certainty, the text clarifies the function and scope of the main institutions of Private International Law, while updating the selected choice-of-law elements and connecting factors. It also strengthens the principle of party autonomy, giving individuals and entities greater freedom to determine the applicable law in contractual, family, and inheritance matters.

As the saying goes” self-praise is no recommendation”. Thus, the reader may wish to take any enthusiasm in this assessment with a grain of salt, as I had the honor of serving on the Drafting Committee and sharing the role of General Rapporteur with Professor Carmen Tiburcio. Still, I am convinced that one of the project’s greatest merits, should it become law, will be to bring Brazil, long anchored in 19th-century values, decisively into the 21st century. It will ensure the inclusion of Brazil’s many private actors, both in the global economic arena and within the complex web of transnational relationships, on equal terms and with wide autonomy.

As to the contents of the draft general law, there are three main chapters (after introductory and final provisions), dealing with jurisdiction and evidence, applicable law, and international cooperation in civil and commercial matters.

The longer Chapter (III) deals with conflict of laws. It starts by addressing general questions such as characterization or public policy, also adding a rule invested rights and a general escape clause. Then, special conflicts rules are to be found namely on personal and family law, including maintenance and successions, as well as rights in rem, intellectual property, and companies. Contracts are dealt with in several rules, where – unlike in the previous law, currently in force – it is made clear that choice of law by the parties is accepted, “except in cases of abuse”. Special contracts, such as the ones concluded with consumers and workers, benefit from rules favorable to the weaker party.

Readers may find below the full content of the draft (in Portuguese).

 

***

PROJETO DE LEI

Dispõe sobre as relações e as situações jurídicas com elementos estrangeiros.

O CONGRESSO NACIONAL decreta:

CAPÍTULO I

DO ÂMBITO DE INCIDÊNCIA

 

Objeto e âmbito de aplicação

Art. 1º  Esta Lei dispõe sobre as relações e as situações jurídicas com elementos estrangeiros.

Prevalência dos tratados

Art. 2º  As relações e as situações jurídicas que apresentem vínculos com mais de um ordenamento jurídico serão regidas pelo disposto nesta Lei e pelas demais normas de direito internacional privado de fonte nacional, observada a prevalência das disposições contidas em tratados de que a República Federativa do Brasil seja parte.

Parágrafo único.  Para fins do disposto no caput, as autoridades brasileiras competentes poderão considerar, como meio de sua interpretação e integração, instrumentos normativos não vinculantes, como princípios compilados ou guias de boas práticas, elaborados por organismos internacionais.

 

CAPÍTULO II

DA JURISDIÇÃO E DA PROVA EM MATÉRIA INTERNACIONAL

Limites da jurisdição

Art. 3º  A autoridade judiciária brasileira terá jurisdição nas hipóteses previstas na lei processual e nos tratados de que a República Federativa do Brasil seja parte.

• 1º As autoridades judiciárias brasileiras terão jurisdição para conhecer e julgar medidas de urgência quando tiverem jurisdição para a ação principal ou quando tais medidas forem necessárias à preservação de situações ou direitos a serem exercidos no País, ainda que a ação principal tenha sido ou venha a ser proposta perante jurisdição estrangeira.
• 2º As autoridades brasileiras, nas hipóteses em que detenham jurisdição, estarão autorizadas, mediante requerimento da parte, a decidir sobre questões relativas a bens móveis ou imóveis situados no exterior e a proceder à partilha de bens do casal ou do autor da sucessão hereditária desses bens, desde que inexista jurisdição exclusiva das autoridades estrangeiras.
• 3º Caso a autoridade judiciária brasileira não possua jurisdição nos termos da lei processual ou dos tratados de que a República Federativa do Brasil seja parte, a demanda poderá ser excepcionalmente proposta, desde que:

I – a situação tenha conexão suficiente com a jurisdição brasileira; e

II – a propositura ou a condução da demanda perante autoridade estrangeira com a qual possua vínculos estreitos revele-se impossível.

Escolha de jurisdição

Art. 4º  A escolha inequívoca de jurisdição nacional ou estrangeira em contratos internacionais não dependerá de vinculação prévia com a jurisdição eleita, nem exigirá a indicação das razões que a justifiquem.

• 1º O direito do local de celebração do contrato ou do domicílio de quaisquer das partes, ou, ainda, da jurisdição eleita, será aplicado à validade formal da escolha, e o direito da jurisdição eleita será aplicado à validade substancial.
• 2º A escolha de jurisdição estrangeira será inválida quando a disputa se enquadrar em hipótese de jurisdição exclusiva da autoridade judiciária brasileira, observado o disposto na lei processual e nos tratados de que a República Federativa do Brasil seja parte.
• 3º A invalidade do negócio jurídico principal não comprometerá, necessariamente, a validade da escolha de jurisdição nele contida.
• 4º A cláusula atributiva de jurisdição não será oponível a terceiros.
• 5º A escolha de jurisdição será transferida conjuntamente com os direitos na hipótese de cessão de crédito, sub-rogação, transmissão patrimonial ou cessão da posição contratual.
• 6º Em contratos internacionais de consumo, a escolha de jurisdição será ineficaz, exceto se o consumidor for o autor da demanda ou se suscitar, como réu, a ausência de jurisdição da autoridade judiciária brasileira.

Produção de provas

Art. 5º  A forma de produção de provas, judiciais ou extrajudiciais, observará o direito do foro responsável por sua colheita.

• 1º As provas colhidas no País obedecerão ao direito brasileiro, admitida a observância às formalidades e aos procedimentos especiais adicionais a pedido da autoridade judiciária estrangeira, desde que compatíveis com a ordem pública internacional brasileira.
• 2º As provas colhidas no exterior por meios não admitidos no direito brasileiro poderão ser utilizadas em processos em trâmite no País, desde que compatíveis com a ordem pública internacional brasileira.
• 3º A admissibilidade da prova e o ônus de sua produção serão regidos pelo direito aplicável ao mérito da demanda.
• 4º A valoração da prova será efetuada de acordo com as regras vigentes no foro competente para a análise do mérito.
• 5º Serão admissíveis, no País, as provas emprestadas de natureza civil e comercial produzidas em processos judiciais ou extrajudiciais em trâmite perante foro estrangeiro, observados os princípios do contraditório e da ampla defesa.
• 6º Poderão ser utilizados recursos compatíveis para a compreensão de documentos em língua estrangeira, se:

I – o documento for produzido por pessoa beneficiária de assistência judiciária gratuita; e

II – a demora na apresentação da versão juramentada comprometer a efetividade da prestação jurisdicional.

• 7º A testemunha a ser ouvida no País poderá recusar-se a depor quando amparada por prerrogativa legal prevista no direito brasileiro, no direito do Estado requerente ou no direito aplicável ao mérito da causa.

CAPÍTULO III

DA DETERMINAÇÃO DO DIREITO APLICÁVEL

Seção I

Dos princípios e da aplicação do direito estrangeiro

Qualificação

Art. 6º  A qualificação destinada à determinação do direito aplicável será feita de acordo com o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro.

Parágrafo único.  Estabelecido o direito aplicável, este determinará a natureza jurídica da relação ou situação jurídica para fins de aplicação das normas aos fatos.

Questões prévias e questões incidentais

Art. 7º  As questões prévias e as questões incidentais serão reguladas pelo direito aplicável a cada uma delas, observadas as normas de direito internacional privado brasileiro.

Reenvio

Art. 8º  Quando o direito internacional privado brasileiro determinar a aplicação do direito estrangeiro, será considerado apenas o direito material estrangeiro, exceto se as partes determinarem em sentido contrário, expressamente, por escrito.

Fraude à lei

Art. 9º  Para fins de aplicação das regras de conflito, são ineficazes as situações de fato ou de direito simuladas com o intuito de evitar a aplicação do direito que seria aplicável caso não tivesse havido a simulação.

Instituição desconhecida

Art. 10.  Caso o direito estrangeiro indicado pelas regras de direito internacional privado brasileiro contiver instituição que não encontre correspondência direta no direito brasileiro, a autoridade judiciária, ainda assim, aplicará o direito estrangeiro, desde que sua incidência não contrarie a ordem pública internacional brasileira.

• 1º Caso o direito estrangeiro desconheça a instituição pretendida pelas partes, a autoridade judiciária brasileira deverá identificar instituição análoga naquele direito.
• 2º Na hipótese de impossibilidade de aplicação por analogia, a autoridade judiciária brasileira deverá aplicar o direito nacional.

Ordem pública

Art. 11.  As leis, os atos públicos e os privados, e as decisões judiciais ou extrajudiciais de outro Estado não terão eficácia na República Federativa do Brasil quando sua incidência produzir resultados potencialmente contrários à ordem pública internacional brasileira.

Parágrafo único.  Será considerada contrária à ordem pública internacional brasileira, sem prejuízo de outras situações assemelhadas, a norma estrangeira que importe violação grave a princípios fundamentais consagrados pela Constituição ou por tratados internacionais de direitos humanos ratificados pela República Federativa do Brasil, especialmente em situações de discriminação baseada em raça, gênero, etnia, orientação sexual, nacionalidade, deficiência ou pertencimento a povos e comunidades tradicionais.

Direitos adquiridos em outras ordens jurídicas

Art. 12.  Os direitos adquiridos no exterior em conformidade com direito estrangeiro terão eficácia na República Federativa do Brasil, exceto se produzirem resultado gravemente contrário à ordem pública internacional brasileira.

Aplicação do direito estrangeiro

Art. 13.  O direito estrangeiro indicado pelo direito internacional privado brasileiro será aplicado de ofício pelas autoridades judiciais ou extrajudiciais brasileiras.

• 1º A aplicação e a interpretação do direito estrangeiro serão feitas em conformidade com o ordenamento a que pertencem.
• 2º A autoridade judiciária poderá determinar à parte interessada na aplicação do direito estrangeiro que comprove seu teor, sua vigência e seu sentido.
• 3º A autoridade judiciária deverá facultar à parte contrária, em prazo idêntico ao da parte interessada, a possibilidade de colaborar na formação de seu convencimento quanto ao sentido do direito estrangeiro aplicável.
• 4º Em matéria de cooperação jurídica internacional, as informações sobre o direito estrangeiro poderão ser obtidas por meio da atuação das autoridades administrativas ou das autoridades judiciais brasileiras com seus congêneres.

Meio de prova do direito estrangeiro

Art. 14.  A prova ou a contraprova do teor, da vigência e do sentido do direito estrangeiro será feita por qualquer meio idôneo, preferencialmente por mecanismos públicos oficiais disponibilizados pelo Estado de cujo direito se trata.

Parágrafo único.  Se o Estado estrangeiro não dispuser de mecanismos públicos oficiais para a comprovação do teor, da vigência e do sentido da norma a ser aplicada, a prova poderá ser feita pela juntada de opinião legal firmada por advogado habilitado naquele Estado.

Ordenamento jurídico plurilegislativo

Art. 15.  Caso o direito internacional privado brasileiro determine a incidência de ordenamento jurídico plurilegislativo, serão observadas as disposições estabelecidas pelo direito desse Estado quanto à definição da legislação aplicável.

Parágrafo único.  Se não houver, no ordenamento jurídico do Estado a que se refere o caput, disposição quanto à definição da legislação aplicável, o juiz brasileiro deverá aplicar aquela que possuir conexão mais estreita com o caso concreto.

Cláusula de exceção

Art. 16.  Em situações excepcionais, o direito indicado por esta Lei não será aplicável se, considerado o conjunto das circunstâncias, for evidente que o caso concreto possui conexão frágil com esse direito e manifestamente mais estreita com o direito de outro Estado.

Parágrafo único.  O disposto no caput não se aplica na hipótese de o direito a ser aplicado ter sido indicado pelas partes.

 

Seção II

Das regras de conflito

Estatuto pessoal

Art. 17.  A capacidade e os direitos da personalidade serão regidos pelo direito do domicílio da pessoa física.

• 1º Na ausência de domicílio estabelecido ou na impossibilidade de sua identificação, serão aplicados, sucessivamente, o direito da residência habitual e o direito da residência atual.
• 2º Na hipótese de múltiplos domicílios, a autoridade brasileira competente deverá aplicar o direito do domicílio com maiores vínculos com a questão em julgamento.
• 3º As crianças, os adolescentes e as demais pessoas com incapacidade civil serão regidos pelo direito do domicílio de seus pais ou responsáveis.
• 4º Na hipótese de a criança, o adolescente ou a pessoa incapaz ter domicílio diverso de seus pais ou responsáveis, regerá o direito que resulte em seu melhor interesse, dentre os direitos da nacionalidade, do domicílio ou da residência habitual de quaisquer dos envolvidos.

Relações familiares

Art. 18.  As relações familiares serão regidas pelo direito do domicílio comum dos membros da família.

• 1º Na hipótese de inexistência de domicílio comum, será aplicado o direito estabelecido previamente pelas partes em documento escrito.
• 2º Na hipótese de inexistência de documento escrito, será aplicado o direito do último domicílio comum das partes.
• 3º Caso nunca tenha existido domicílio comum ou seja impossível a sua identificação, será aplicado o direito brasileiro.

Casamento

Art. 19.  A forma, a existência e a validade do casamento serão regidas pelo direito do local em que for celebrado.

• 1º A capacidade matrimonial de cada um dos nubentes será regida pelo direito do local do seu domicílio, nos termos do disposto no art. 17.
• 2º Os casamentos de brasileiros ou estrangeiros celebrados perante autoridade estrangeira poderão ser levados a registro no País, hipótese em que será expedida a certidão de casamento para fins eminentemente probatórios.
• 3º O casamento entre brasileiros no exterior poderá ser celebrado perante a autoridade consular brasileira.
• 4º O casamento entre estrangeiros da mesma nacionalidade poderá ser celebrado no País perante a autoridade diplomática ou consular respectiva.

Regime matrimonial de bens

Art. 20.  O regime de bens entre os cônjuges será determinado pelo regime indicado no registro de casamento, cuja certidão será emitida pela autoridade competente do local em que for celebrado.

• 1º Na ausência de indicação do regime na certidão, este será determinado por convenção das partes por meio de pacto antenupcial válido, celebrado de acordo com os requisitos de forma e de substância do local em que for celebrado.
• 2º Na ausência de indicação do regime na certidão e de convenção das partes, o regime será determinado pelo direito do domicílio dos nubentes no momento da celebração do casamento.
• 3º Na hipótese de o domicílio dos nubentes ser distinto, o regime será determinado pelo direito do primeiro domicílio conjugal.
• 4º Os cônjuges que transferirem seu domicílio para a República Federativa do Brasil poderão adotar, na forma e nas condições da lei civil brasileira, resguardados os interesses de terceiros, quaisquer dos regimes de bens admitidos no País.

Uniões estáveis ou entidades equivalentes de direito estrangeiro

Art. 21.  O disposto nos art. 18 a 20 aplica-se às uniões estáveis ou às entidades equivalentes de direito estrangeiro, com as devidas adaptações à natureza das convivências.

Filiação

Art. 22.  Nas ações referentes à constituição ou desconstituição de relações de filiação, o juiz aplicará, dentre os direitos dos domicílios das partes, aquele que se mostrar mais favorável à parte vulnerável.

Obrigações alimentares

Art. 23.  As obrigações alimentares, a qualidade de credor e a qualidade de devedor de alimentos serão reguladas pelo direito mais favorável ao credor, dentre os direitos da nacionalidade, do domicílio ou da residência habitual de quaisquer dos envolvidos.

Sucessões

Art. 24.  A sucessão por morte ou ausência será regida pelo direito do Estado do domicílio do falecido à data do óbito ou do ausente à data da ausência, independentemente da natureza e da situação dos bens.

• 1º O autor da sucessão hereditária poderá optar para regência de sua sucessão, em testamento ou termo declaratório firmado diretamente no registro civil e averbado, pelo direito de quaisquer de seus domicílios ou de quaisquer de suas nacionalidades.
• 2º A sucessão de bens de pessoas domiciliadas no exterior será regulada pela lei brasileira em benefício do herdeiro necessário brasileiro ou domiciliado no País, sempre que não lhes seja mais favorável a lei pessoal do de cujus.
• 3º Os testamentos serão válidos quando observarem as formalidades previstas no direito do local de sua celebração ou do domicílio do testador, ou, ainda, de sua nacionalidade.
• 4º Será aplicado o direito que rege a sucessão quanto ao conteúdo material das disposições testamentárias.

Bens e direitos reais

Art. 25.  Os bens imóveis, os bens móveis corpóreos, os direitos reais a eles relativos e a posse serão regidos pelo direito do local em que estiverem situados.

Parágrafo único.  Os bens móveis que o proprietário trouxer consigo e os direitos reais a eles relativos serão regidos pelo direito do domicílio de seu proprietário.

Embarcações, aeronaves e carregamentos

Art. 26.  As embarcações e as aeronaves que estejam em águas ou espaços não jurisdicionais reputam-se situadas no local de matrícula, enquanto o carregamento que nelas se encontre reputa-se situado no local de destino efetivo das mercadorias, exceto se as partes escolherem de forma diversa.

Direitos de propriedade intelectual

Art. 27.  Os direitos patrimoniais de autor serão determinados pelo direito do local de sua publicação ou veiculação.

• 1º Os direitos de propriedade industrial registrados no País ou, quando ainda não registrados, cujo registro tenha sido solicitado perante as autoridades brasileiras, serão regidos pela lei brasileira, ressalvadas as hipóteses previstas em lei especial.
• 2º As obrigações decorrentes da prática da concorrência desleal ou da violação do segredo industrial serão regidas pelo direito do local em que o dano for verificado.

Forma de atos e negócios jurídicos

Art. 28.  Os atos e os negócios jurídicos respeitarão as formalidades previstas no direito do local de sua celebração, ou do domicílio de quaisquer das partes ou do local de sua execução, ou, ainda, do direito aplicável ao mérito da situação ou da relação jurídica.

Parágrafo único.  Os atos e os negócios jurídicos entre ausentes poderão ser firmados isoladamente, hipótese em que poderão ser utilizados meios eletrônicos para sua comprovação.

Obrigações contratuais

Art. 29.  Exceto se houver abuso, as obrigações decorrentes de contratos internacionais serão regidas pelo direito escolhido pelas partes.

• 1º A escolha do direito poderá ser:

I – expressa ou tácita, desde que inequívoca; e

II – alterada a qualquer tempo, respeitados os direitos de terceiros.

• 2º A escolha do direito pelas partes não afasta a incidência de normas de aplicação necessária e imediata do direito brasileiro.
• 3º Consideram-se normas de aplicação necessária e imediata aquelas cujo respeito é considerado tão fundamental para a salvaguarda do interesse público nacional, incluída a organização política, social ou econômica nacional, e cuja observância é exigida em qualquer situação abrangida por seu âmbito de incidência, independentemente do direito que, de outro modo, seria aplicável ao contrato por força do disposto nesta Lei.
• 4º As autoridades brasileiras competentes poderão aplicar os usos e os princípios do comércio internacional compilados por organismos internacionais intergovernamentais ou entidades privadas, quando incorporados ao contrato por vontade das partes, desde que não contrariem normas cogentes do direito escolhido pelas partes ou, em sua ausência, do direito indicado nesta Lei.
• 5º A escolha de jurisdição não implicará, por si só, a escolha de direito aplicável coincidente.
• 6º Na hipótese de não haver escolha, as obrigações contratuais e os atos jurídicos em geral serão regidos pelo direito do local em que forem celebrados.
• 7º Os contratos celebrados a distância serão regidos pelo direito do domicílio do proponente da oferta aceita, exceto se as partes escolherem de modo diverso.
• 8º O disposto no § 7º aplica-se aos contratos celebrados, de modo síncrono, por meio eletrônico.
• 9º As partes poderão escolher o direito aplicável à totalidade ou apenas à parte do contrato, hipótese em que será permitida a designação de diferentes direitos para a regência de partes específicas do contrato.

Contratos de trabalho

Art. 30.  Exceto se houver abuso, os contratos individuais de trabalho serão regidos pelo direito escolhido pelas partes.

• 1º Na hipótese de não haver escolha, aplica-se o direito mais favorável ao trabalhador, dentre os referentes ao:

I – local de prestação de sua atividade laboral;

II – domicílio do trabalhador;

III – domicílio ou do estabelecimento do empregador, conforme o caso; ou

IV – local de celebração do pré-contrato, quando houver.

• 2º Caberá ao trabalhador indicar, na petição inicial da ação trabalhista proposta perante a jurisdição brasileira, o ordenamento que pretende que seja aplicado pelo juízo; em caso de omissão, o juiz poderá presumir que a legislação brasileira é a mais favorável.
• 3º Em qualquer hipótese, o direito aplicável regerá todos os aspectos do contrato de trabalho.

Contratos de consumo

Art. 31.  Os contratos internacionais de consumo, entendidos como aqueles realizados entre consumidor, pessoa física, com fornecedor de produtos e serviços, cujo domicílio ou estabelecimento envolvido na contratação esteja situado em Estado distinto do domicílio do consumidor, serão regidos pelo direito do domicílio do consumidor ou do local em que forem celebrados, desde que mais favorável ao consumidor.

• 1º Nas contratações a distância realizadas por meios eletrônicos ou similares pelos consumidores domiciliados no País, sem sair do território nacional, será aplicado o direito brasileiro ou o direito escolhido pelas partes em contrato, desde que seja mais favorável ao consumidor.
• 2º Aos contratos de fornecimento de produtos e serviços que forem celebrados pelo consumidor que estiver fora de seu Estado de domicílio ou de residência habitual e forem executados integralmente no exterior, será aplicado o direito do local em que forem celebrados ou o direito escolhido pelas partes, dentre o do local da execução ou do domicílio do consumidor.
• 3º Os contratos de pacotes de viagens internacionais, com grupos turísticos ou com serviços de hotelaria e turismo, ou de viagens combinadas com transporte e mais de um serviço, com cumprimento fora do País, que forem contratados com agências de turismo e operadoras situadas no País, serão regidos pelo direito brasileiro.
• 4º Aos contratos celebrados no País, em especial se forem precedidos de qualquer atividade negocial ou de propaganda, do fornecedor ou de seus representantes, dirigida ao ou realizada no território brasileiro, notadamente envio de publicidade, correspondência, e-mails, mensagens comerciais, convites, prêmios ou ofertas, serão aplicadas as disposições do direito brasileiro quando revestirem caráter imperativo, sempre que forem mais favoráveis ao consumidor.

Obrigações por atos ilícitos

Art. 32.  As obrigações resultantes de atos ilícitos serão regidas pelo direito do local em que o dano for verificado.

Parágrafo único.  Na hipótese de o dano ocorrer em múltiplos locais, o juiz brasileiro poderá, no exercício de sua jurisdição, aferir os danos verificados em outros Estados e determinar a sua reparação integral, hipótese em que se aplicam os direitos de cada Estado para quantificar o montante devido.

Pessoas jurídicas

Art. 33.  As pessoas jurídicas serão regidas pelo direito do Estado em que tiverem sido constituídas.

• 1º Para funcionar no País, por meio de quaisquer estabelecimentos, as pessoas jurídicas estrangeiras deverão obter a autorização que se fizer necessária, e ficarão sujeitas ao direito e à jurisdição brasileiros.
• 2º O disposto no § 1º não se aplica à prática de atos esporádicos ou sem a intenção de habitualidade.
• 3º Os acordos de acionistas e os acordos parassociais referentes a empresas brasileiras serão regidos pelo ordenamento jurídico brasileiro.

Ações e valores mobiliários

Art. 34.  As ações e os valores mobiliários serão regidos pelo direito do local de constituição da pessoa jurídica que os tiver emitido.

Parágrafo único.  As obrigações pecuniárias constantes de debêntures ou outros valores mobiliários representativos de dívida emitidos no exterior, caso tenha havido escolha pelas partes, poderão ser regidas pelo direito do local da emissão, respeitados os requisitos de registro previstos no local de constituição da pessoa jurídica que os tiver emitido.

Prescrição e decadência

Art. 35.  A prescrição e a decadência serão regidas pelo direito aplicável ao mérito do litígio.

Aquisição de imóveis por pessoas jurídicas de direito público externo

Art. 36.  As pessoas jurídicas de direito público externo e as entidades de qualquer natureza por elas constituídas ou dirigidas não poderão adquirir no País bens suscetíveis de desapropriação ou direitos reais a eles relativos.

• 1º Com base no princípio da reciprocidade e mediante concordância prévia e expressa do Governo brasileiro, os Estados estrangeiros poderão adquirir os prédios urbanos destinados às chancelarias de suas missões diplomáticas e repartições consulares de carreira, além daqueles que servirem como residências oficiais de seus representantes diplomáticos e agentes consulares nas cidades das respectivas sedes.
• 2º As organizações internacionais intergovernamentais sediadas no País ou nele representadas poderão adquirir, mediante concordância prévia e expressa do Governo brasileiro, os prédios destinados aos seus escritórios e às residências de seus representantes e funcionários nas cidades das respectivas sedes, nos termos estabelecidos nos acordos pertinentes.

 

CAPÍTULO IV

DA COOPERAÇÃO JURÍDICA INTERNACIONAL EM MATÉRIA CIVIL E COMERCIAL

 

Cooperação jurídica internacional

Art. 37.  A cooperação jurídica internacional em matéria civil e comercial deverá ser prestigiada e poderá se valer de qualquer meio em direito admitido, nos termos dos tratados em vigor na República Federativa do Brasil e dos direitos dos Estados envolvidos, inclusive quanto ao uso de mecanismos tecnológicos e comunicação direta entre as autoridades, desde que não ofendam a ordem pública internacional brasileira.

Homologação de decisão estrangeira

Art. 38.  As decisões oriundas de Estado estrangeiro que, no País, demandem a intervenção indispensável do Poder Judiciário, observarão, para sua homologação, o disposto na legislação brasileira, nos tratados em vigor na República Federativa do Brasil e, quando aplicáveis, no regimento interno do Superior Tribunal de Justiça.

• 1º As decisões estrangeiras de natureza meramente declaratória produzirão efeitos no País independentemente de homologação, desde que não contrariem gravemente a ordem pública internacional brasileira.
• 2º O disposto no § 1º não se aplica às decisões que impliquem no cumprimento de obrigação de dar, fazer ou não fazer.

Medidas de urgência em homologação

Art. 39.  A autoridade judiciária brasileira poderá deferir pedidos de urgência e realizar atos de execução provisória no processo de homologação de decisão estrangeira, observadas as disposições da legislação brasileira, dos tratados em vigor na República Federativa do Brasil e, quando aplicáveis, do regimento interno do Superior Tribunal de Justiça.

Demais atos de cooperação

Art. 40.  Os demais atos de cooperação jurídica internacional, tais como as cartas rogatórias e os pedidos de auxílio direto, obedecerão às disposições da legislação brasileira, dos tratados em vigor na República Federativa do Brasil e, quando aplicáveis, do regimento interno do Superior Tribunal de Justiça.

CAPÍTULO V

DISPOSIÇÕES FINAIS

 

Revogação

Art. 41.  Ficam revogados os art. 7º a art. 19 do Decreto-Lei nº 4.657, de 4 de setembro de 1942.

Vigência

Art. 42.  Esta Lei entra em vigor cento e oitenta dias após a data de sua publicação.

***

La condamnation d’un individu en France pour association de malfaiteurs à caractère terroriste s’oppose à ce qu’il soit également condamné pour acte de terrorisme en Espagne. 

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I have reported before on the jurisdictional issues of collective action under Dutch law, viz both the GPDR (Article 79; 80) and Brussels Ia. See in particular my post on the claim against TIKTOK and various references there. In an update to that post over the summer I also refer to the Rotterdam courts’ reference to the CJEU on the application of Article 80 GPDR: Stichting Data Bescherming Nederland v Amazon ECLI:NL:RBROT:2025:9088.

Yesterday the Amsterdam courts [Stichting Massaschade en Consument t Tiktok Technology LTd et al ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2025:2666] published their partial appeal finding in the case that led to my orginal post [the first instance jurisdictional finding ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2022:6488].

The appeals court first of all holds [4.16] to continue its discussion of the non-GDPR claims seeing as, it argues, WAMCA (the Dutch collective action  procedure) encourages swift outcome of claims, and give that success in these might render the GDPR-based claims without purpose. The non-GDPR claims include unjust enrichment, economic law (acts of unfair competition: eg hidden prices of in-app purchases of “digitale items”) and consumer law claims.

Viz the Irish TikTok entitity, Brussels Ia determines jurisdiction (as TikTok note, leading also to territorial not just national jurisdiciton). Viz the non-EU defendants, Dutch residual private international law does (with CPR rules allocating territorial jurisdiction), however [4.18] those are applied as the EU rules would.

Like the first instance judgment, the appeals judgment IMO too readily assumes application of A7(2) BIa (non-contractual obligations) rather than A7(1) (contractual. The collective organisations are said [4.19] to act using their own representative interest, which it is said is non-contractual. CJEU C-167/00 VKI v Henkel in my view is not entirely relevant authority: in Henkel the relevant organisation was Verein für Konsumenteninformation, a consumer protection organisation created purely to uphold statutory consumer law, and in the case at issue seeking an injunction to prevent a trader from using unfair terms in consumer contracts; see similarly also CJEU VKI v Amazon, where VKI sought a similar injunction. In a WAMCA action, the often ad hoc collective organisations seek financial damages for and on behalf of enlisted consumers, but often also for their own financial benefit and usually indeed, as here, financed by third party litigation funding. Claimants arguably are purely procedural vehicles. Their claim in my opinion is so intimately bound up with the contracts of the consumers that it can hardly qualify as a non-contractual claim.

Having identified A7(2) BIa als the jurisdictional gateway (again: I am not convinced), in 4.21.2 the court identifies The Netherlands as forum damni /Erfolgort. 4.1.1 and elsewhere the court supports the use of centre of interests as a relevant jurisdictional trigger which again I find awkward: that criterion per CJEU eDate etc only applies to the infringement of personality rights and quite a few of the claims are related to issues such as financial interest for which centre of interest has no calling. Hence I also find the court’s finding unconvincing [4.21.2]

Voor zover SMC bedoelt op te komen voor personen die de TikTok Dienst gebruiken of hebben gebruikt ”op een moment” dat zij in Nederland waren terwijl zij hun gewone verblijf elders hebben (zie hiervoor rov. 4.1.1.), heeft de Nederlandse rechter geen rechtsmacht.

: Dutch court’s have no jurisdiction for those who used TikTok ‘at a time they were in The Netherlands whilst having their habitual residence elsewhere”. That is not just an unorthodox use of locus damni; it also conflates the relevance of habitual residence, which earlier in the judgment the court used to refer to GDPR-based jurisdiction.

[4.22.2] the court summarily dismisses TikTok’s argument that A7(2) determines territorial jurisdiction, hence that the claims cannot be centralised in Amsterdam. That Dutch civil procedure rules may trump A7(2)’s clear instruction to this effect, cannot in my view be right.

The remainder of the judgment then discusses the merits of the issues and largely upholds the first instance court’s findings.

I think it is clear from the above that I am far from convinced the jurisdictional analysis here is right.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12.2

On 3 July 2025, Advocate General Norkus delivered an opinion in Case C‑485/24 Locatrans Sarl v ES ECLI:EU:C:2025:528. The case concerns the determination of the habitual place of work under Article 6(2)(a) of the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations of a driver who, under a single employment contract, worked for […]

La chambre criminelle refuse de transmettre au Conseil constitutionnel trois questions prioritaires de constitutionnalité concernant la compétence du procureur européen délégué. Elle saisit toutefois l’occasion de se prononcer sur l’impartialité et l’indépendance du procureur européen délégué ainsi que sur les garanties offertes aux justiciables dans le cadre des procédures qu’il conduit.

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Applications are now open for three- to six-month legal internships at the headquarters of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) in The Hague, for the period from January to June 2026!

Interns work with our legal teams in the Family and Child Protection Law Division, the Transnational Litigation and Apostille Division, and the Commercial, Digital and Financial Law Division. Duties may include carrying out research on particular points of private international law and/or comparative law, taking part in the preparation of HCCH meetings, and contributing to the promotion of the HCCH and its work.

Applications should be submitted by Friday, 31 October 2025 at 18.00 (CET). For more information, please visit the Internships Section of the HCCH website.

 

This post is published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law (HCCH).

 

In a judgment of 20 September 2025 (Case BS-19161/2025-HJR), the Danish Supreme Court clarified that the 2007 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters governs the time limit for appealing exequatur decisions. National procedural rules, the Court added, cannot be applied to issues for which the […]

Par son arrêt rendu en grande chambre le 1er août dernier, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne apporte des précisions intéressantes concernant la directive « Procédures ». Elle réaffirme l’importance de la protection juridictionnelle effective des demandeurs dans la mise en œuvre du texte par les autorités nationales, et confirme l’impossibilité d’assortir l’application de ses articles 36 et 37, relatif au concept de pays d’origine sûr, d’exceptions.

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La compétence du procureur européen délégué en matière de maintien et de modification du contrôle judiciaire ne porte atteinte ni au principe d’impartialité, ni à la présomption d’innocence, ni aux principes d’égalité devant la loi et devant la justice. Elle ne porte pas non plus atteinte aux droits à la liberté individuelle et à un recours juridictionnel effectif, sous réserve que la décision du procureur ne consiste pas à imposer à l’intéressé de rester à son domicile ou dans son lieu de résidence pendant plus de douze heures par jour et puisse être contestée devant le juge des libertés et de la détention. 

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Si les règles de procédure relatives à l’obtention de l’autorisation de saisir conservatoirement un navire sont régies par la loi de l’État contractant dans lequel la saisie a été demandée, la simple allégation par le saisissant de l’existence, à son profit, de l’une des créances maritimes visées à l’article 1er de la Convention de Bruxelles du 10 mai 1952, suffit à fonder son droit de saisir le navire auquel cette créance se rapporte.

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Guest post by Janaína Albuquerque, International Family Lawyer; Research Associate at the NOVA Centre for the Study of Gender, Family and the Law; Legal Coordinator at Revibra Europa. Janaína represented Revibra, Instituto Maria da Penha and Instituto Superação da Violência Doméstica as amici curiae in the cases discussed below.

The Brazilian Supreme Court has recently delivered a landmark judgment in two Direct Actions of Unconstitutionality (Ações Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade, or ADIs), namely ADI 4245 and ADI 7686, concerning the application of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction(1980HC). Despite their denomination, these actions did not aim to invalidate the Convention, but rather to harmonize its interpretation with the principles enshrined in the Brazilian Federal Constitution.[1]

The full written judgment has not yet been published. What follows is the official summary, which consolidates the main points reached by the Justices:[2]

“The Court unanimously ruled partially in favor of the requests made in ADI 4.245 and, by majority vote, ruled partially in favor of the requests made in ADI 7.686, on the following grounds:

1. To interpret Art. 13(1)(b) of the 1980 Hague Convention in conformity with the Constitution, recognizing that the exception to the immediate return of the child due to grave risk to his or her physical or psychological integrity or intolerable situation applies in cases of domestic violence, even if the child is not a direct victim, provided that objective and concrete indications of the risk situation are demonstrated, in accordance with the principle of the best interests of the child (Art. 227, CF/1988) and under a gender-based perspective (Arts. 1, III, and 226, § 8, CF/1988);
2. To determine that the National Council of Justice (CNJ) should establish an inter-institutional working group to prepare, within 60 (sixty) days, a proposed resolution aimed at increasing the speed and efficiency of international child abduction return proceedings, ensuring, through adversarial proceedings and full defense, that the final decision on the return of the child is made within a period not exceeding 1 (one) year;
3. The resolution, which will bring CNJ Resolution No. 449/2022 into line with the terms of this decision, will establish the duty of the respondent to report the existence of any ongoing child custody proceedings in the national territory and will assign the management of such proceedings in the country to the CNJ’s National Forum for Children and Youth (Foninj). The requirement for adversarial proceedings and full defense applies both in the cases of Art. 1 and Art. 12 of the Convention. Public and notorious facts and rules of experience (Civil Procedure Code, Arts. 374 and 375) will also serve as elements of conviction;
4. To determine that the Federal Regional Courts issue normative acts to promote the concentration of jurisdiction to process and judge actions related to the 1980 Hague Convention, with regard to restitution proceedings, in one or more courts in the capital and judging chambers, based on Art. 96, I, “d,” CF/1988, aiming at procedural uniformity and celerity;
5. To determine the establishment of specialized support centers within the Federal Regional Courts to encourage conciliation, the adoption of restorative practices and methodologies, to qualify and coordinate the performance of psychosocial assessments, and to act as a source of technical and methodological support for judges;
6. To determine that the bodies of the Judiciary Branch, with the support of the CNJ, adjust the electronic case management systems to enable the inclusion of preferential processing tags for all cases that receive the subject code “10921 Child Restitution, 1980 Hague Convention,” as established in Art. 27 of CNJ Resolution No. 449/2022;
7. To determine that the Executive Branch adopt structural and administrative measures to strengthen the work of the Federal Central Administrative Authority (ACAF), with the definition of goals, timelines, and performance indicators;
8. To determine that the Executive Branch evaluates the convenience of Brazil’s accession to the 1996 Hague Convention (on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement, and cooperation in matters of parental responsibility and protection measures for children), with the preparation of a technical report to be forwarded to the heads of the three branches of the government;
9. To determine that the Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shall prepare, within six months, a protocol for assisting women and children who are victims of domestic violence, to be adopted in all Brazilian consular units abroad, taking as a reference the pilot project developed by the Consulate General of Brazil in Rome;
10. To call on the Legislative Branch, in dialogue with the Executive Branch, to assess the need for specific legislation to regulate the 1980 Hague Convention, particularly with regard to the procedural and evidentiary aspects of its application;
11. To determine that Federal Regional Courts and Courts of Justice enter into judicial cooperation agreements to establish protocols for coordinated action in cases of international child abduction, including, among other measures, the sharing of information relating to custody actions and actions based on the 1980 Hague Convention and the joint use of multidisciplinary structures and teams, especially for the production of expert reports;
12. Once it is recognized that the conditions set forth in the Convention for determining return are not met, that the Brazilian courts’ jurisdiction, as the forum of the taking parent’s domicile, is established to decide on the substantive issues involved in the case, including the custody of the child.

Finally, the following judgment thesis[3] was established:

1. The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is compatible with the Federal Constitution and has supra-legal status in the Brazilian legal system due to its nature as an international treaty for the protection of children’s rights.
2. The application of the Convention in Brazil, in light of the principle of the best interests of the child (Art. 227, CF), requires the adoption of structural and procedural measures to ensure the swift and effective processing of actions for the international restitution of children.
3. The exception of grave risk to the child, provided for in Art. 13 (1)(b) of the 1980 Hague Convention, must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the principle of the best interests of the child (Art. 227, CF) and under a gender-based perspective, so as to allow its application when there are objective and concrete indications of domestic violence, even if the child is not a direct victim.

All in accordance with the vote of Justice Luís Roberto Barroso (President and Rapporteur). Justice Dias Toffoli was partially defeated in ADI 7.686, as he considered the action to be entirely well founded. Plenary session, August 27, 2025.”

The judgment introduced three important innovations that will standardize and shape the interpretation of the Convention going forward. First, by recognizing domestic violence as an arguable exception under Art. 13(1)(b), the Court established that this ground can no longer be dismissed on the basis that it is not expressly mentioned in the Convention. Second, the clarification that children need not be the primary victims ensures that courts cannot disregard evidence showing that they merely witnessed the violence, since such exposure also constitutes harm. Third, the instruction to evaluate abduction cases through a gender-based lens acknowledges the multiple and intersecting vulnerabilities faced by migrant women and requires a contextual assessment of each situation.

Nevertheless, the central unresolved issue concerns the evidentiary threshold. While the Court established that proof is required, it also indicated that the standard should be lower, without clarifying what qualifies as objective and concrete indications of violence sufficient to configure grave risk. Given the repeated acknowledgment of the obstacles faced by migrant mothers, it seems evident that demanding criminal convictions would set the bar far too high. What remains uncertain is whether police complaints, medical records, social service evaluations, psychological reports, or even documented but unsuccessful attempts to obtain assistance in the State of origin will suffice. This definition can only be built with time and through the practical application by domestic federal courts.

The timing of the judgment coincides with the organization of the Second Forum on Domestic Violence and the 1980 Child Abduction Convention, scheduled for October 2025 in Fortaleza, Brazil. Building on the discussions initiated at the first meeting in Sandton, South Africa, in 2024, the Forum will once again convene experts from around the world to reflect on the persistent challenges posed by cases involving allegations of domestic and family violence. In this setting, the recent decision of the Brazilian Supreme Court will likely serve as a point of reference for its methodological contribution to advancing a gender-sensitive and human rights-based approach.

 

Background of the Actions

ADIs are a special kind of proceedings that may only be introduced by the President of the Republic; the President of the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, or state legislative assemblies; the Brazilian Bar Association; the Attorney General; political parties; or national unions. Unlike ordinary judicial proceedings, whose effects only extend to the parties, ADI rulings have erga omnes effect and are endowed with binding force, compelling compliance by the Judiciary, the Legislature, and the Executive at all levels.

The first ADI (4245) was filed in 2009 by the now-dissolved Democratas party (DEM), less than a decade after Brazil’s ratification of the Convention and against the backdrop of the Sean Goldman case.[4] The dispute concerned the wrongful retention in Brazil of a 4 year-old child habitually resident in the United States, leading to lengthy proceedings under the 1980HC. Although lower courts initially concluded that Sean had become settled in the new environment, the Supreme Court ultimately ordered his return 5 years later following the death of the taking parent. The litigation attracted intense media scrutiny and sustained significant political and diplomatic pressure. Its repercussions also contributed to the enactment of the Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2014[5] in the United States, a statute designed to strengthen governmental responses to abduction cases and to oversee compliance by other Contracting States.

Prompted by these circumstances, the DEM party brought the matter before the Supreme Court to assess whether the manner in which the Convention was being applied was compatible with the constitutional framework. Their concern was that, following the damaging repercussions of the Goldman case, domestic authorities had adopted an automatic-return approach without sufficient consideration of the specific circumstances of each case, thereby infringing fundamental principles such as human dignity and the best interests of the child.

The initiating application requested that return orders and urgent measures be issued only after due process and a case-specific assessment; that the one-year time limit not prevail over the best interests of the child; and that the grave risk exception be interpreted broadly. It further sought to limit the Attorney General’s Office’s legitimacy to initiate return proceedings, to condition the effectiveness of foreign custody decisions on recognition by the Superior Court of Justice, and to preserve the validity of domestic custody rulings. The main legal basis invoked was Art. 227 of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle of ‘integral protection’ and imposes on the family, society, and the State the duty to ensure, as an absolute priority, children’s rights to life, health, education, dignity, and protection against neglect, exploitation, and violence.

ADI 4245 remained without significant developments for 15 years, until a hearing was scheduled for the presentation of oral arguments in May 2024. The judgment was set to take place in August 2024, yet, the Socialism and Liberty party (PSOL) filed another ADI (7686) in July of the same year, which led to the suspension of the first so that both could eventually be judged together.

The circumstances surrounding the second ADI differed, despite being similarly propelled by not one, but numerous widely covered cases, which were further amplified through social media. Most involved mothers who had fled to Brazil after experiencing discrimination and domestic violence abroad, yet, whose children were nevertheless ordered to return. Public pressure and social mobilization were decisive in bringing these issues to the forefront and making them the central focus of the proceedings.

As regards the merits, ADI 7686 contained only one request: that suspicion or indications of domestic violence in the foreign country be taken into account when assessing the grave risk standard and the applicability of the exception under Art. 13(1)(b) of the 1980HC, so that children would not have to be returned  The legal basis rested primarily on Art. 226 (8) of the Constitution, which explicitly establishes the State’s positive obligation to ‘ensure assistance to the family in the person of each of its members, creating mechanisms to suppress violence within the family’.

Oral arguments in ADI 7686 were presented in February 2025, but the rendering of the Justices’ votes only began in August. The case was considered by the Plenary of the Supreme Federal Court, composed of eleven Justices, of whom a single member is a woman. Three sessions were needed to conclude, and a decision was finally reached on 27 August 2025.  Although the written judgment has not yet been released, the hearings were televised, and each Justice presented at least a summary of their vote. For clarity, the following account is organized thematically rather than chronologically, highlighting the main strands of reasoning that emerged.

(i) Gender, domestic violence and the reframing of the best interests principle

The deliberations revealed a broad consensus that gender inequalities are central to the evaluation of return requests under the Convention, particularly where domestic violence is raised. Justice Barroso, rapporteur of the case, underscored that most taking parents are mothers fleeing from abandonment or abuse, cautioning that automatic returns in such circumstances risk perpetuating cycles of violence. Justices Mendonça and Cármen Lúcia echoed this concern, stressing that intimate-partner violence destabilizes the family environment and thereby places the child in danger.

Justice Moraes added that the prevalence of taking mothers reflects structural patriarchy, requiring an interpretation of the Convention consistent not only with the standards inscribed in domestic law but also with international human rights instruments such as the UNCRC and the Convention of Belém do Pará. Justice Dias Toffoli supported this approach by grounding it in the Convention’s own architecture, highlighting a combined interpretation of Arts. 13(1)(b) and 20, insofar as the latter provides that courts may refuse the return when such an order would conflict with the fundamental principles and freedoms of the requested State.

Taken together, these positions signalled a jurisprudential shift: the Convention’s effectiveness in Brazil will henceforth be measured not solely by the speed of returns but by its capacity to reconcile international cooperation with the substantive protection of women and children.

(ii) Procedural and evidentiary standards

A central aspect of the debate revolved around the difficulties faced by migrant women and their intersecting vulnerabilities. Justice Barroso argued that imposing a standard of irrefutable proof in cases involving domestic violence is both inconsistent with the Convention’s requirement of urgency and detrimental to the best interests of the child. He stressed that migrant mothers are frequently cut off from institutional resources and isolated from their support networks, which, compounded by linguistic and cultural obstacles, place them at a significant disadvantage in producing evidence. Justice Toffoli further developed this argument, insisting that courts must apply a gender-based perspective and give decisive weight to victims’ testimonies, precisely because these structural barriers cannot be overcome through procedural formalities.

Alongside evidentiary issues, the Justices devoted close attention to procedural safeguards. Justice Flávio Dino criticised the privileged role of the Attorney General’s Office, noting that its authority to initiate proceedings produces inequality of arms. While the interests of left-behind parents are defended, even if representation is for the State, taking parents are not ensured access to legal aid. Building on this concern, Justice Cristiano Zanin drew attention to the absence of a specific law governing Hague cases in Brazil. In his view, this vacuum not only generates procedural uncertainty but also creates room for jurisdictional conflicts, especially when custody proceedings are initiated domestically in parallel with return requests.

Other votes highlighted the persistent tension between efficiency and fairness. Justice Nunes Marques stressed that the Convention’s effectiveness depends on swift decisions and suggested technology and mediation as tools to accelerate outcomes. Justice Barroso, however, set this pursuit for speed against the structural reality of Brazil’s civil procedure, which, though intended to protect due process, is overly complex and has become a recurrent source of delay. Justice Dino noted that, as a result, courts frequently resort to urgent measures, granting return orders without analysing the case in depth and even without hearing the taking parents, a practice he considered incompatible with constitutional guarantees. Justice Luiz Fux disagreed with Dino on this point, resisting the view that judicial discretion should be in any way limited.

(iii) Measures to strengthen the application of the Convention

Apart from the interpretative parameters and procedural elucidations, a series of proposals were advanced to reinforce the Convention’s operation through systemic measures and reforms. Consensus emerged around the need for standardized protocols in embassies and consulates to ensure consistent assistance and reliable mechanisms for processing reports of abuse. In addition, the Justices addressed the domestic judicial structure, calling for stronger coordination between federal and family courts and for the use of liaison judges to improve communication with foreign authorities. The Court also encouraged studies to support legislative initiatives, including the prospect of Brazil’s accession to the 1996 HCCH Child Protection Convention as part of a broader effort to align institutional practice with international standards.

A final strand of discussion was dedicated to the participation of children. Justice Cármen Lúcia stressed that they must be recognised as rights-bearing subjects and that procedural mechanisms should be developed to secure their direct involvement in return proceedings. At present, the law provides only for the hearing of children from the age of 12 and contains no guidance on the manner in which their statements are to be obtained. Ensuring that children’s perspectives are effectively taken into account was thus deemed essential to aligning the Convention’s operation with the principle of integral protection enshrined in the Constitution.

[1] Available in English at: <https://www.oas.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/acceso_informacion_base_dc_leyes_pais_b_1_en.pdf>.

[2] Available, only in Portuguese, at: <https://portal.stf.jus.br/processos/detalhe.asp?incidente=2679600>.

[3] In the context of Direct Actions for the Declaration of Unconstitutionality (ADIs) before the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court, the term ‘thesis’ refers to the authoritative interpretative statement of the Constitution that distills the complex reasoning into a concise and binding formula. Arising from the abstract constitutional review of statutes, such theses clarify the constitutional meaning of contested provisions and ensure that the decision extends beyond the specific case at hand. By consolidating the practice of formulating theses at the end of landmark rulings, the Court provides clarity, consistency, and general applicability, thereby guiding judges, public administration, and society as a whole while establishing constitutional standards for future cases.

[4] Brazilian Supreme Federal Court, 2009 Activities Report. Available in Portuguese at: <https://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/principaldestaque/anexo/relatorio_stf_2009__18032010__qualidade_web__orcamento.pdf>.

[5] Available at: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3212>.

IE Law School in Madrid, Spain, is again advertising four tenure-track assistant professorships, preferably in private law, commercial & corporate law, and IP law among others. Scholars of private international law are also invited to apply.

The deadline is 31 October 2025.

More information can be found here.

By Alexia Kaztaridou (Linklaters)

On 25 September 2025, the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) of the European Parliament approved the text of the political agreement on the Alternative Disputes Resolution for Consumer Disputes Directive. This Directive establishes a framework for resolving through ADR procedures contractual domestic and cross-border consumer disputes arising from the sale of goods or provision of services between consumers and traders within an EU context. The amendments to the prior Directive aim to modernise the existing framework in light of new consumer trends, such as the growth of e-commerce, and bring significant changes across several areas, enhancing the protection for consumers and clarifying obligations for traders and ADR entities. The Directive maintains its minimum harmonisation approach, allowing Member States to provide for stronger consumer protection.

Key changes introduced

Enhanced obligations for traders

• Geographical scope: The Directive’s scope is extended to traders established in third countries who are willing to participate in an ADR procedure and direct their activities towards consumers in one or more Member States, within the meaning of the  Rome I Regulation and the Brussels I bis Regulation (recast). To determine if a trader’s activities are directed to a Member State, factors such as the language or currency used, the ability to order products, or the availability of an application in a national app store may be considered. Member States can also set conditions for the participation of these traders in ADR procedures, such as requiring the trader’s consent for the dispute to be resolved based on the law of the Member State where the consumer resides.
• Duty to reply: Traders established in the Union will have a duty to reply within, in principle, 20 working days when contacted by an ADR entity, stating whether they will participate in a procedure. This is not required where participation is mandatory by law, to fulfil a contractual obligation or when the ADR entity is entitled to reach an outcome even if the trader did not participate in the procedure. This period may be extended to a maximum of 30 working days for complex disputes, provided the consumer is informed of the extension. If a trader fails to reply within the prescribed deadline, the ADR entity may consider the non-reply as a refusal of the trader to participate and should inform the consumer accordingly.
• Information and transparency: To improve consumer awareness, traders must provide clear information about ADR, including on their websites.

Expanded material scope

• Pre-contractual and post-contractual phases: The Directive’s material scope is extended to cover disputes arising from obligations in the pre-contractual and post-contractual phases. Examples include disputes related to misleading advertising, a failure to provide compulsory pre-contractual information required by the Consumer Rights Directive, or issues concerning the use of consumer-provided digital content after a contract has terminated.
• Contracts paid for with personal data: The scope now includes contracts for the supply of digital content or services where the consumer provides or undertakes to provide personal data instead of making a payment.
• Member State discretion: Member States are authorised to make trader participation in ADR procedures mandatory in sectors they deem fit, such as transport and tourism. They can also extend ADR procedures to other types of disputes under Union and national law, for instance in relation to competition law.

New requirements for ADR entities

• Accessibility and fairness: ADR procedures must be made accessible to all, including vulnerable consumers, through ‘easily accessible and inclusive tools’. If a procedure uses automated means, both parties have the right to have the process reviewed by a natural person. Furthermore, ADR entities should not refuse to deal with a dispute where a trader has established disproportionate rules for their own internal complaint handling systems that must be completed before the case can be referred to the ADR entity.
• Bundling of cases: To promote efficiency, Member States are to allow ADR entities to bundle similar cases into a single procedure where it may lead to a faster or more coherent resolution. Member States may require explicit consumer consent for this.
• Training and transparency: ADR entities must ensure that the natural persons in charge of dispute resolution have the necessary expertise, including a general understanding of private international law. They must also inform consumers in advance if non-high-risk automated means are used in the decision-making process.
• Publication of reports: ADR entities are required to publish activity reports to enhance transparency at least every two years. Therein, ADR entities must include information about traders who systematically refuse to comply with the outcomes of ADR procedures.

Promoting participation to the procedures

In principle, the Directive provides that the ADR procedures should be free of charge for consumers. In the event that costs are applied, those costs should not exceed a nominal fee. Member States should encourage ADR entities to reimburse consumers the nominal fee paid where and to the extent that their complaint is justified.

In that context, the Directive requires Member States to implement measures that promote participation in ADR procedures from both traders and consumers. These measures can be either financial or non-financial in nature.

A new role for ADR contact points

Following the discontinuation of the Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) platform, the tasks previously handled by ODR contact points will be taken over by newly established ADR contact points. These contact points will be, inter alia, responsible for:

• Providing assistance and guidance to consumers and traders on accessing the competent ADR entity, particularly in cross-border disputes.
• Explaining the procedural rules of relevant ADR entities.

The ADR contact point is to be determined by the consumer’s place of residence. Member States can choose to extend the mandate of these contact points to cover domestic disputes as well.

Consumer assistance and new digital tools

Consumers will have the right to be assisted by third parties, such as consumer organisations or businesses that specialise in claims management, though transparency must be ensured.

In addition, the Commission is mandated to develop a digital interactive tool to guide consumers to the correct ADR entity.

Next steps and national transposition

The next step is the formal adoption of the text by the European Parliament’s plenary, which is expected to take place between 15 and 18 December. Following this, the text must also be formally adopted by the Council. Once the Council has formally adopted the text, it will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Directive will then enter into force 20 days after its publication.

The timeline for the Directive’s implementation is set out in Article 5. Specifically, Member States are required to adopt and publish the national laws necessary to comply with the Directive by 26 months after its entry into force. These new national measures must then be applied starting from 32 months after the Directive’s entry into force.

Given this is a minimum harmonisation Directive, Member States retain discretion to introduce measures that empower consumers even further. For example, they may make ADR mandatory for certain disputes or further extend the material scope. It will therefore be crucial to monitor the national transposition of the Directive to understand how the legal framework will evolve in each Member State.