Agrégateur de flux

As announced previously, the next Journal of Private International Law Conference will take place in Zurich on 1–3 April 2027. With the deadline for submitting proposals for papers to present at the conference, 30 June 2026, approaching fast, the organizers would like to remind everyone of the opportunity to submit a proposal. The same deadline also applies for the travel grants offered by the University of Zurich.

More information can be found on the conference website.

Earlier today, the Court of Justice rendered its decision in Case C-232/25 Idzinski, essentially confirming its previous case law, combined with a restrictive reading of its infamous decision in Joint Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate.

The facts of the case (which was given the entirely fictitious name Idzinski) are eerily similar to those of the Court’s 2021 decision in Case C-800/19 Mittelbayrischer Verlag. Just like in that earlier case, they involved a claim by Polish claimants against a German media outlet regarding the correction of, and damages for, the publication of content that allegedly violated their personality rights, including their national dignity. Only two elements of the facts were different: first, the content complained of was broadcasted on television, in addition to being published online; second, the claimants were (1) a private person who was part of a Polish military unit during World War II, which the German broadcaster had allegedly portrayed as ‘anti-Semitic and nationalistic and as having collaborated with the Nazis in the Holocaust’, and (2) an association bringing together members of that unit.

After two decisions against the defendants (to varying degrees), the Polish Supreme Court had submitted two questions relating to the international jurisdiction of the Polish courts.

Centre-of-Interests Jurisdiction

First, the court wanted to know whether the claimants could rely on Art 7(2) Brussels Ia in the interpretation developed by the CJEU in eDate to establish the (full) jurisdiction of the Polish courts as the courts of the claimants’ centre of interests, even with regard to the content broadcasted on television and even though neither of the claimants had been named in the broadcast.

Dismissing the claimants’ argument that any distinction between online content and a TV broadcast would be largely meaningless given how much the lines between the two formats have blurred, the CJEU reaffirms the narrow scope of the centre of interests criterion (see already eDate, [48]), which remains only available with regard to online content:

[44] That said, the television broadcast of audiovisual content in several Member States must be distinguished from the dissemination of such content on the internet. The placing online of content on a website is to be distinguished, generally, from the regionalised distribution of media in that it is intended, in principle, to ensure the ubiquity of that content. That content may be consulted instantly by an unlimited number of users throughout the world, irrespective of any intention on the part of the person who placed it as regards its consultation beyond that person’s Member State of establishment and outside of that person’s control […].

[45] Those considerations do not apply to the broadcasting of audiovisual content on television. Such broadcasting is not, in principle, available instantly and worldwide, but is regionalised, limited to the geographical area in which the television signal is received.

Regarding the fact that neither of the two claimants had been mentioned by name in the broadcast in question, which could be seen as falling short of the requirement for centre-of-interests jurisdiction developed in Mittelbayrischer Verlag, namely that the content complained of must containt ‘objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to identify, directly or indirectly, [the claimant] as an individual’, the CJEU draws a distinction between the two claimants. The first claimant did not pass the threshold of identifiability as the broadcast

[54] […] does not make it possible to identify individually the applicants in the main proceedings inasmuch as it is a work of fiction which recounts the conduct of a group of soldiers – members of unit X – without it being possible to ascertain the true identity of the members depicted in the series.

The second claimant, however, whose members were all part of that group of soldiers, passed the test and could thus bring a claim at its centre of interests, as far as the online publication of the series is concerned.

Mosaic Jurisdiction

As a second question, the referring court also inquired (again – see also Cases C-194/16 Bolagsupplysningen and C-251/20 Gtflix Tv) about the extent to which jurisdiction could be based on the mosaic approach to Art. 7(2) Brussels Ia. Indeed, for all claims of the first claimant as well as for the claims of the second claimant regarding the TV broadcast, jurisdiction could only be based on the fact that the content had been made available in Poland, which traditionally only creates jurisdiction for a proportion of the overall harm. In Bolagsupplysningen, the CJEU had essentially restricted this type of jurisdiction to damage awards.

In Idzinski, the CJEU simply reiterates its earlier decisions (see [63]). In particular, it confirms that mosaic jurisdiction remains unavailable for any kind of injunction requiring the defendant to display specific information before the series (both online and on TV) – a remedy, of course, with limited chance of being enforced in Germany anyway (for reasons explained here).

Conclusion

Ultimately, the CJEU simply reaffirms its previous case law. While any revirement de justice in that area would have been highly surprising, especially after the decision in Gtflix Tv, the decision may well be seen as another indication that the area is ripe for legal reform.

Par un arrêt du 4 juin 2026, la grande chambre de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne précise les conditions dans lesquelles l’autorité judiciaire d’un État membre, ayant refusé d’exécuter un MAE émis aux fins d’exécution d’une peine privative de liberté au motif d’un risque avéré d’atteinte aux droits fondamentaux de la personne recherchée, peut, afin d’éviter qu’elle reste impunie, poursuivre l’exécution de cette peine sur son propre territoire.

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International Symposium | 9–10 October 2026 | Faculty of Law, University of Coimbra (Portugal)

The University of Coimbra Institute for Legal Research (UCILeR), in collaboration with the Associação de Estudos Europeus de Coimbra (AEEC – Coimbra Association of European Studies), is organizing the International Symposium “Crossing Dialogues, Disciplines and Borders: How far can Private International Law go?”, to be held on 9 and 10 October 2026 at the Colégio da Trindade, Coimbra, Portugal.

Organised by Dulce Lopes and Afonso Patrão , the event brings together leading scholars, early-career researchers, and practitioners to debate the evolving role and limits of Private International Law (PIL) in novel situations that increasingly challenge its traditional scope.

About the Symposium

Private International Law is undergoing a period of deep transformation. The boundaries between substantive and procedural law have become more fluid and porous; fundamental rights and freedoms permeate classical conflict-of-laws reasoning; and adjacent disciplines — constitutional law, human rights law, immigration law, and register law — are reshaping the very foundations of PIL doctrine and methodology.

The symposium is structured around five thematic panels:

• Constitutional Law(s) and PIL — exploring the constitutionalisation of conflict-of-laws rules and comparative approaches to the interface between national constitutionalism and PIL;
• Human Rights Law(s) and PIL — examining the role of regional human rights frameworks, the recognition of same-sex unions, and the treatment of personal status in cross-border disputes;
• Immigration Law(s) and PIL — addressing unilateralist trends in migration regulation, the PIL status of migrants, and new developments in cross-border family relations;
• Procedural and Register Law(s) and PIL — covering matrimonial property regimes, gender identity and self-determination, and the human rights dimensions of cross-border litigation;
• Call for Papers session — open to contributions from scholars and researchers (see below).

Confirmed speakers include  Ilaria Viarengo (University of Milan), Stéphanie Francq (UCLouvain), Yuko Nishitani (Kyoto University), Laura Carballo Piñero (University of Vigo), Rosario Espinosa Callabuig(University of Valencia),  Guillermo Palao Moreno (University of Valencia), Gustavo Monaco (University of São Paulo), Antonia Duran Ayago (University of Salamanca), Dário Moura Vicente (University of Lisbon), Luís de Lima Pinheiro (University of Lisbon), Rui Moura Ramos (University of Coimbra), and many others.

The full program is accessible on-line: https://ucpages.uc.pt/fduc/ij/agenda-ij/crossing-dialogues-disciplines-and-borders-how-far-can-private-international-law-go/

Attendance, whether in person or online, is free of charge but subject to registration: https://ls.uc.pt/index.php/395373?lang=pt&

Call for Papers

The organising committee invites abstract submissions from scholars and practitioners wishing to present papers at the symposium. Contributions may address any of the following themes (non-exhaustive):

• The role of PIL in addressing emerging forms of personal and family status
• Intersections between PIL and Human Rights Law
• The impact of constitutionalisation on conflict-of-laws rules
• The interplay between procedural mechanisms and substantive outcomes
• The relationship between immigration law and PIL
• The relevance of register law in cross-border legal situations
• The limits of traditional PIL doctrines in atypical or innovative cases

Submission requirements:

• Abstract of no more than 250 words
• Short bio with contact details (max. 100 words)
• Submissions must be sent through the following link: https://ls.uc.pt/index.php/263595?lang=en&

Key dates:

Abstract submission deadline 18 July 2026 Notification of acceptance 31 July 2026 Draft papers due 9 October 2026

Presentations will take place in a hybrid format on 9 October 2026. A peer-reviewed publication of the proceedings is planned following the event.

We look forward to welcoming submissions from researchers working at the intersection of PIL and the many disciplines with which it increasingly dialogues.

This Call for Papers was shared with us by Procedural Law Unit of the University of Nicosia, Cyprus.

The Procedural Law Unit is a research unit within the School of Law at the University of Nicosia, focusing on civil procedure, private international law, and broader developments in judicial process and court reform. Each year, the Unit hosts its Annual Courts and Justice Conference, which brings together academics, practitioners, judges, and policymakers to discuss contemporary issues in procedural law and justice systems.

This year’s conference, the Annual Courts and Justice Conference 2026, is themed “The Algorithmic Courtroom: Trust, Accountability, and the Future of Justice”, and will examine the implications of artificial intelligence in adjudication and court processes.

From 1 July to 31 December 2026, Ireland will hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Beyond its broader political and institutional priorities, the programme of the Irish Presidency also addresses aspects of private international law. Operating under the motto Ní neart go cur le chéile – Strength with unity, the Irish […]

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

Like all my posts, this post is entirely AI free.

Marion Ho-Dac reported a short while back on the French Supreme Court’s decisions 24-21.790 and 24-21.422 ECLI:FR:CCASS:2026:C100235. The facts of the case involve the Lebanese banking crisis, the jurisdictional implications of which have been reported on the blog before. The lower courts had held (and the SC does not second-guess that finding) that the activities of the bank where not directed at France and that the consumer title of Brussels Ia did also not otherwise apply.

In the absence of other jurisdictional anchors in Brussels Ia, jurisdiction therefore was left to be decided under residual French rules. As Marion reports, the SC has now extended its rule in employment contracts (jurisdictional arrangements pointing away from France, cannot deprive employees employed in France of the international and territorial jurisdiction of the French labour courts) to consumer contracts: French substantive consumer law ringfences jurisdiction for French courts. Marion cites the relevant provisions:

According to Article R. 631-3 of the French Consumer Code, “the consumer may bring proceedings either before one of the courts having territorial jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, or before the court of the place where he was resident at the time the contract was concluded or the harmful event occurred”. Furthermore, according to Article R. 632-1 of the same Code, “the court may, of its own motion, apply all the provisions of this Code in disputes arising from its application”.

In essence, the French SC dropped the direction of activities criterion of BIa and CJEU Pammer Alpenhof, leading to a more universal jurisdiction for French courts for parties qualifying as consumers and with habitual residence in France.

Now, I am not going to repeat professor Ho-Dac’s analysis, which is excellent both viz its French and EU PrivIntLaw angles. What I wanted to add (over and above emphasising Marion’s point that the issue needs to, and will be addressed in the review of Brussels Ia), is the difference between these cases and CJEU Roi Land Investments. In that case the CJEU held inter alia that more protective national rules (in Roi Land: a direct right to sue the “successor in title” of the employer) cannot trump Brussels Ia’s jurisdictional provisions for the  protected categories. However that is ‘more protective’ in cases where Brussels Ia’s protected categories title is engaged. In current case, the protective title is not engaged at all, neither are other parts of Brussels Ia, hence giving Member States free range in their jurisdictional space (subject to any relevant Hague or bilateral instruments, of course).

Geert.

 

 

 

 

The Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan invites young scholars to present the outcome of their doctoral research on any topic within the field of private international law, transnational law or the law of international arbitration, at a dedicated seminar to be held in Milan (the MECSI Seminar). Each MECSI Seminar will revolve […]

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

Like all my posts, this one is entirely AI free.

In Case C‑43/25 SML Maschinengesellschaft mbH v AK, the CJEU reminded us end of March of the narrow opportunity which Article 16 of the European Insolvency Regulation – EIR offers to escape claw-back by the insolvency practitioner with use of an insulating lex contractus. Yet its ruling leaves open an important question on the lex cause for shareholder loans.

I realise that for the uninitiated, the intro above is a bit puzzling. Readers may want to refer to my post on CJEU Lutz or Nike to appreciate the context.

The Court essentially held that Article 16’s insulation mechanism does not extend to actions related to the relative ranking of claims in the collectivity.

Context is [31] “whether the Article may be relied on by a person who has received repayments in respect of a shareholder loan, which are regarded as detrimental to all of the creditors, in response to a request for restitution submitted by the insolvency administrator of the company that is the debtor of the loan where that request seeks to ensure compliance with the ranking of claims that is laid down in the legislation of the State of the opening of the insolvency proceedings.”

In other words the kind of debt at issue is a shareholder loan. These are commonly used as  way to finance a business. Arie van Hoe and Melissa Vanmeenen flagged some of the issues already in 2011 .

[33] the CJEU effectively handles the question of insulation with the use of Article 16 EIR, by simply referring to the need to apply Article 16 restrictively, as an exception to (now) Article 7 EIR, and [35] it concludes from that restrictive angle that “[Article 16’s] scope is limited to the situation envisaged in the latter provision, namely where what is at issue are the rules relating to the voidness, voidability or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all the creditors, and not the rules relating to the claims to be lodged against the debtor’s estate or their ranking.”

This is a pretty sec statement, made without AG Opinion. Sec, because while the shareholder’s action at issue did not indeed directly see to a pauliana scenario, the context of ranking is evidently one of (escaping) clawback.

As Arie notes in his review (in Dutch) of the judgment, the affirmative reply to the first question (the ranking request does not fall under A16), cancelled out an opportunity to respond to the second and further questions, These included the issue of determination of lex causae for shareholder loans: are these subject to Rome I’s lex voluntatis; or are they necessarily covered by lex incorporationis.

More questions are therefore to be expected…..

Geert.

EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024 (5th ed forthcoming 2027), Chapter 5.

 

 

 

 

In this post, Jòan Gondolo presents the key findings from his doctoral thesis on the private international law aspects of personal data protection (Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2024). The research examines how private international law can effectively serve the protection of personal data in international contexts, with particular attention to the territorial scope of the GDPR and the tools available […]

Dans un arrêt du 21 mai 2026, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne juge contraire au droit de l’Union un dispositif permettant la suspension d’une procédure d’exécution fiscale visant à récupérer une aide d’État incompatible avec le marché intérieur et illégale. La solution est justifiée par l’exigence d’effectivité qui implique la suppression des aides illégales et l’exécution immédiate et effective des décisions ordonnant leur récupération. Le principe d’autonomie procédurale des États membres dans la récupération des aides d’État illégales en ressort corrélativement affaibli, au détriment de la garantie des droits reconnus aux bénéficiaires des aides.

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The SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) Directive of the EU (2024/1069 of 11 April 2024) is transposed in Belgian law by the Act of 30 May 2026. The Act was published in the Belgian Official Journal on 12 June 2026 (see the French version and the Dutch version), and will enter into force on 22 June 2026.

The main features of the Act are:

• it inserts a new chapter in the Judicial Code on the “Protection of Persons involved in Public Debate against Manifestly Unfounded Claims or Abuse of Procure” (Part IV, Book IV, new Chapter XXVII);
• it allows the court to, upon request by the defendant or of its own motion, oblige the plaintiff to provide security for costs in the case of a SLAPP;
• it provides for early dismissal of a SLAPP (at any time during the procedure);
• it makes such early dismissal possible at the introductory session or at a speedy date;
• it places the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that the claim against public participation is not manifestly unfounded;
• it inserts an extra basis of jurisdiction in the Private International Law Code (echoed in the Judicial Code) to allow persons residing in Belgium who were subjected to a SLAPP outside the EU to bring a claim for damages and costs at the place of their residence in Belgium (new Art. 96/1);
• it adds a ground for refusal of judgments from States outside the EU if the judgment was based on a procedure that falls in the definition of a SLAPP (Art. 25 §1, 10°);
• it reaffirms the role of the Belgian Federal Institute for Human Rights (IFDH / FIRM) as the central contact point for SLAPP cases. This institute can intervene in cases by simple letter to the registrar of the court.

Despite earlier discussions about the matter, the Act is limited to civil proceedings, and not extended to criminal proceedings, which the IFDM / FIRM regrets.

The following announcement has kindly been shared with us by Silvia Marino

The new extensive Volume Status and Family Relationships in Private International Law was just published by Edward Elgar Publishing.

Edited by Silvia Marino (University of Insubria, Como), Anna Wysocka-Bar (Jagiellonian University, Kraków) and Javier Carrascosa González (University of Murcia), the volume, builds on the presentations delivered at the 2024 EAPIL Winter School, held in Como in February 2024. It is the second book in the European Association of Private International Law series.

The chapters discuss current and future challenges and issues in the field of personal and family status in European private international law.

Opened by a contribution by Camelia Toader and Ioan-Luca Vlad on the development of the competence of the European private international law in the field, the book includes two chapters on the relationships between human rights and cross-border families, considered also in the frame on the European Convention of Human Rights (written by Paula Poretti and Satu Heikkilä). The following contributions focus on specific sensitive status, whose recognition and circulation risk being impaired, such as reassignment of sex assigned at birth (Anna Wysocka-Bar) and vulnerable adults (Katja Karjalainen). A particular attention is devoted to the status of the children in cross-border situations, such as children born following an international surrogacy agreement (Laura Carpaneto), parenthood (Cristina González Beilfuss), adoption (Chiara Ragni), international child abduction (Nadia Rusinova). An overview on the methods of recognition and acceptance of civil status is also offered (Etienne Pataut). Finally, the volume focuses on cross-border divorces (Máire Ní Shúilleabháin) and on the relevance of tort in family life (Nadia Rusinova)

The blurb reads as follows:

This timely book examines the personal and family status of the natural person in cross-border situations, within the framework of the fundamental rights. Featuring eminent scholars in private international law and internationally known European judges and practitioners, the book includes critical analysis of key topics and case studies. Authors adopt both a theoretical and practical perspective to assess the emerging challenges facing transnational families, from evaluating human rights in cross-border family situations to detailing different kinds of status and their related challenges. They address topics including the recognition of rainbow families and gender identity, the parent–child relationship and cross-border recognition of international and foreign adoptions. Presenting an in-depth analysis of ongoing issues and developments, this book strengthens understanding and research of cross-border family status in Europe.

The table of contents can be accessed here. The book may be purchased or accessed online here.

As already noted on this blog, the Universitat Rovira i Virgili (Tarragona, Spain), in collaboration with the Institut Català Internacional per la Pau (ICIP) and the Centre d’Estudis de Dret Ambiental de Tarragona (CEDAT), will hold an international conference SLAPP, Activism and Human Rights: Legal and Social Challenges in the Defense of the Environment on […]

 

I. Introduction

Sometimes, reading court decisions leaves a strange sense of confusion, especially when the decision rendered not only contradicts a well-established line of case law, but also when the court, in the very same decision, reveals internal contradictions. Several months ago, I critically discussed on this blog a rather unusual decision of the Egyptian Supreme Court (محكمة النقض/maḥkamat an-naqḍ), in which the enforcement of a Canadian judgment was denied on the ground that reciprocity had not been established with Canada. In my comments on that decision, I expressed “significant concerns” regarding the incoherent manner in which reciprocity was addressed by the Supreme Court.

Well, surprises never end, and reciprocity strikes back in a new case, with an even more puzzling effect, as the shift signalled in the previous decision appears to be confirmed in the case commented on here. This new position of the Supreme Court is hardly reassuring. The manner in which the Court addressed such a controversial issue suggests a troubling move towards an increasingly stringent and confusing approach, which consists in affirming that the establishment of reciprocity does not depend on the existence of a treaty with the rendering State on the one hand, while nevertheless denying reciprocity on that very ground on the other.

 

II. The Case

The case concerns an action brought by X (the judgment creditor) seeking the enforcement in Egypt of an American judgment rendered in its favor by a California court, ordering Y (the judgment debtor) to pay a certain sum of money, together with interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. The court of first instance granted the application and declared the Californian judgment enforceable in Egypt, with the exception of the portion awarding interest at a rate of 10%. That decision was subsequently upheld on appeal.

Dissatisfied with the outcome, Y lodged an appeal before the Egyptian Supreme Court arguing that the Californian judgment had been declared enforceable without establishing the existence of legislation in the rendering State allowing the enforcement of Egyptian judgments, as required by the principle of legislative reciprocity (مبدأ التبادل التشريعي/mabdaʾ at-tabādul at-tashrīʿī) and actual reciprocal treatment (المعاملة الفعلية بالمثل/al-muʿāmala al-mithliyya bil-mithl) between the two States with respect to the enforcement of judgments, in accordance with to Article 296 of the Egyptian Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (ECCCP)(*).

(*) Article 296 reads as follows:

Foreign judgments and decisions may be declared enforceable under the same conditions as those laid down by the law of the rendering State for the enforcement therein of Egyptian judgments and decisions.

 

III. The Ruling

In its decision of 20 January 2026, the Court admitted the appeal, ruling as follows (a detailed summary with modifications):

First, the Court recalled – as is usually the case – the general applicable framework.

It noted that, pursuant to Article 296 of the ECCCP, the legislature has adopted the principle of reciprocity or mutual treatment (مبدأ المعاملة بالمثل أو التبادل / mabdaʾ al-muʿāmala bil-mithl aw at-tabādul), meaning that foreign judgments shall be treated in Egypt in the same way as Egyptian judgments are treated in the rendering State. In this respect, the legislature has only required legislative reciprocity (التبادل التشريعي / at-tabādul at-tashrīʿī), as opposed to diplomatic reciprocity (التبادل الدبلوماسي / at-tabādul ad-diblūmāsī), which is established by a treaty or convention (emphasis added).

The Court further recalled that it is required, courts are required to verify ex officio that the condition of legislative reciprocity is satisfied […].

Notwithstanding this premise, the Court went on to censure the lower court’s reasoning, considering that, in the present case, the court of the appealed decision had declared enforceable the Californian judgment after finding,  – by reference to Articles 1713 and 1714 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, that mutual legislative treatment [legislative reciprocity (التبادل التشريعي / at-tabādul at-tashrīʿī)] was sufficiently established to satisfy the reciprocity requirement (شرط المعاملة بالمثل / sharṭ al-mu‘āmala bil-mithl) between Egypt and the State of California.

However, according to the Supreme Court, by deciding as it did without determining whether any convention exists between Egypt and the United States of America concerning the enforcement of judgments providing for reciprocity or mutual treatment, the lower court failed to provide a legal basis for its decision under Article 296 of the ECCCP (emphasis added).

 

IV. Comments

To my knowledge, this is the second decision in which a foreign judgment was refused enforcement in Egypt solely on the basis of a lack of reciprocity (on the earlier case, see my comments here). In both cases, the Supreme Court ruled almost exactly in the same manner and quashed the lower courts’ decisions admitting reciprocity with the rendering State on the ground that the judges failed to show whether there exists a convention between Egypt and the rendering State dealing with the enforcement of judgments that embodies the principle of reciprocity. This position is hardly consistent with the principle affirmed by the Court according to which what matters is legislative reciprocity, not diplomatic reciprocity established by treaty or convention. The comments made on the previous case regarding this aspect are therefore fully applicable here.

What is particularly remarkable, however, is the position taken by the lower courts, which appears to be fully in line with the traditional approach of the Egyptian Supreme Court. Adhering to the principle of legislative reciprocity as traditionally developed (on this practice, see my comments here), the lower courts seem to have concluded that reciprocity existed with the State of California after comparing the enforcement requirements applicable there with those applicable in Egypt. This point is important, as it also shows that, in the view of the lower courts, where judgments emanate from federal States such as the United States, reciprocity should be assessed by reference to the particular State in which the judgment was rendered. The Supreme Court, by contrast, appears to have rejected this approach, placing decisive weight on the existence of a convention between Egypt and the United States.

In any event, the recent developments concerning reciprocity in two successive cases rendered by different panels of the Supreme Court in Egypt are indicative of a shift away from a principle of reciprocity that requires a comparative analysis of the enforcement requirements under the law of the State of origin and under Egyptian law (legislative reciprocity), towards an approach that makes the existence of an international convention a prerequisite for its establishment. This new approach raises the threshold against the enforcement of foreign judgments to a considerable degree, as it would be sufficient for the judgment debtor to argue that reciprocity is not established whenever there is no treaty with the rendering State, bearing in mind that Egypt has concluded a little over 20 conventions, mostly with Arab countries with which it has already concluded regional conventions, and only around 10 with non-Arab countries, including some EU Member States (Germany, Romania, Italy, France, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland) as well as Turkey, Russia, and China. Should such a development be confirmed in future cases, this would mean that judgments rendered in roughly 88% of countries worldwide would be denied enforcement in Egypt.

This backward development stands in striking contrast to recent trends in comparative law, notably in China, where a considered shift has taken place from a traditionally restrictive approach (on this traditional approach, see my comments here), towards a more moderate approach that places emphasis on de jure reciprocity, presumptive reciprocity, and other forms that do not necessarily depend on the existence of a formally concluded treaty between China and the rendering State (see the illustrative cases discussed on this blog here and here). A comparatively more liberal approach has also been followed in Tunisia, where Tunisian courts now consider that, in the absence of an international convention, reciprocity must be presumed and that it is for the party contesting this presumption to provide evidence of its non-existence. (for details, see  Béligh Elbalti, “La réciprocité en matière d’exequatur: Quoi de nouveau? Observations sous l’arrêt de la Cour de cassation n° 6608 du 13 mars 2014” Arab Law Quarterly (2025) online-first publication).

The Egyptian Supreme Court would do well to draw lessons from such comparative developments and reconsider both its position and the negative signal this sends; otherwise, the consequences may prove drastic for holders of Egyptian judgments, which may be denied recognition and enforcement in States requiring reciprocity.

 

(※) Related posts on this blog on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Egypt:

• Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Egypt – A Critical Assessment of a Recent Supreme Court Decision
• Enforcing Foreign Judgments in Egypt: A Critical Examination of Two Recent Egyptian Supreme Court Cases
• Egyptian Supreme Court on the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments – Special Focus on the Service Requirement

This post was contributed by Dr Fabian Schinerl, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Vienna and Co-Coordinator of the EBI Young Researchers Group. He is also affiliated with the EBI Associate Researchers Group, the Centre for Comparative Corporate Finance Law (C3FL), and the Junior Network of the AEDBF. This is the sixth contribution to […]

This post was prepared by Birgit van Houtert (Assistant Professor, Maastricht University), co-chair of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions and member for The Netherlands, and Marco Pasqua (Examiner, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan), co-chair of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions. Marco Pasqua is the author of paragraphs […]

This post was prepared by Birgit van Houtert (Assistant Professor, Maastricht University), co-chair of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions and member for The Netherlands, and Marco Pasqua (Examiner, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan), co-chair of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions. Marco Pasqua is the author of paragraphs […]

Recurrently, we learn of people connected with EAPIL who receive e-mails from senders who pretend to be the President of the Association, Gilles Cuniberti. These scammer e-mails come from accounts that look like our President’s e-mail account. The sender typically asks, first, for an urgent reply, and then asks for money… Regrettably, there’s no way […]

By Eva-Maria Kieninger, University of Wuerzburg. Despite its undeniable commercial importance, international property law has not been subject so far to European unification. Superficially, one might attribute this gap to the universal acceptance of the lex situs rule. But underneath this seemingly harmonious surface, many differences in detail appear. Moreover, the lex situs rule in […]