Agrégateur de flux

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

My review of Skatteforvaltningen v MCML Ltd (Rev1) [2025] EWCA Civ 371 is a touch overdue, seeing as I promptly reported its outcome, immediately read the judgment (it is a majority one, which perhaps explains the lengthy discussion by Nugee LJ (who found himself in the minority), and wrote up on outline on the same day. But then I got distracted.

Good summary is available from MCML’s successful counsel here.

The Court of Appeal (who as I predicted granted permission to appeal after the judge initially refused PTA) has in essence overturned the attempt at resurrecting the relevant claim with a different qualification, applying issue estoppel (arising from a principle of law). This outcome IMO is right: see my critical comments of the attempt at resurrecting the claim here.

Nugee LJ would have allowed the appeal on the ground of issue estoppel save for a very small number of claims which are based on transactions not pleaded in the 2018 proceedings; but would dismiss the appeal so far as based on abuse of process. Newey and Popplewell LJJ agree with him on abuse of process, but on issue estoppel they allowed the appeal in relation to all the claims.

All three reject the arguments based on abuse of process. Henderson v Henderson abuse essentially precludes a party from raising in subsequent proceedings matters which were not, but could and should have been raised in the earlier ones. It is now seemingly accepted that SKAT’s requalification of a tax claim to a fraud claim was justified essentially due to its not being able to be properly aware of the fraud element due to the sheer size of the relevant discovery material which contained the indication of fraud.

However Newey J and Popplewell LJJ held (all three LJJ nb referring to Indian and Australian authorities) that issue estoppel provides MCML with a complete defence to the proceedings, and that issue estoppel can arise from determinations on points of law as well as points of fact.

As Casemine neatly summarise here,

the determination made by Andrew Baker J – that SKAT’s private law claims were in substance aimed at enforcing the Danish state’s sovereign right to tax (and thus fell under the foreign revenue rule) – was fundamental and should bind the parties in subsequent litigation.

Geert.

https://x.com/GAVClaw/status/1909167174263914789

Written by Mayela Celis, Maastricht University

The hearing in the case of Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. et al. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexico) No. 23-1141 took place in March 2025 before the US Supreme Court. We have previously reported on this case here and here. The transcript and the audio files can be found here.

As previously indicated, this is a much-politicized case brought by Mexico against US gun manufacturers. Mexico alleges inter alia that defendants actively assist and facilitate trafficking of their guns to drug cartels in Mexico. Among the claims for relief are: Negligence, public nuisance, defective condition – unreasonably dangerous, negligence per se, gross negligence, unjust enrichment and restitution, violation of CUTPA [Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act], Violation of Mass. G.L. c. 93A [Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act] and punitive damages.

From the perspective of Mexico, this case is of crucial importance because it has a direct impact on its access to US courts to seek justice for all the mayhem that cartels have inflicted using American-made weapons smuggled into Mexico. However, from an American perspective, this case seems to raise many questions and confusion as to how legal standards of proximate cause / aiding and abetting could actually apply, and all of this against the backdrop of the immunity conferred by congress to weapon manufacturers.

Perhaps controversially, counsel for Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. et al. contended as part of his opening argument that (our summary): no case in American history supports Mexico’s theory. And if Mexico is right then every law enforcement organization in America has missed the largest criminal conspiracy in America, and a large beer company is liable for every accident caused by every underage drinker since it knows that teenagers will buy beer, drive drunk and crash. More on this further down.

The proceedings

This case before the US Supreme Court is about overcoming a motion to dismiss. Consequently, it is not about determining which aspects of Mexico’s allegations would survive during the litigation (and some are controversial), as indicated by one of the counsels, but whether they pass this legal hurdle.

The US District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA). But the First Circuit reversed, holding that the PLCAA does not bar this suit as Mexico adequately alleged that defendants have “aided and abetted the knowingly unlawful downstream trafficking  of their guns into Mexico”.

Unsatisfied with the decision, defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before the US Supreme Court, which was granted. The hearing before the US Supreme Court took place on 4 March 2025. No judgment has yet been rendered.

The hearing

Some prominent statutes and case law mentioned

The applicable statute is the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms (PLCAA), which is codified in 15 U.S. Code Chapter 105, sections: §?7901. Findings; purposes; §?7902. Prohibition on bringing of qualified civil liability actions in Federal or State court; §?7903. Definitions – 15 U.S. Code § 7903 (5)(A)(iii)).

As its title suggests, section §?7902 sets forth a prohibition on bringing of qualified civil liability actions in Federal or State court, the purpose of which is to protect the Second Amendment.

The predicate exception / aiding and abetting is contained in 15 U.S. Code § 7903 (5)(A)(iii), which states the following:

(5) Qualified civil liability action

(A) In general
The term “qualified civil liability action” means a civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade association, for damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party, but shall not include— […]

(iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought, including—

(I)any case in which the manufacturer or seller knowingly made any false entry in, or failed to make appropriate entry in, any record required to be kept under Federal or State law with respect to the qualified product, or aided, abetted, or conspired with any person in making any false or fictitious oral or written statement with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of a qualified product; or

(II)any case in which the manufacturer or seller aided, abetted, or conspired with any other person to sell or otherwise dispose of a qualified product, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the actual buyer of the qualified product was prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm or ammunition under subsection (g) or (n) of section 922 of title 18; (our emphasis)

However, other statutes were also alleged to be applicable but the extent to which they were was the subject of controversy. Mention was made to 18 U.S.C. 922, 923, 924 and 18  U.S.C. Section 2 (and other state statutes in the complaint).

Throughout the argument, the Twitter case was mentioned (Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471 (2023)). This case is relevant because it deals with aiding and abetting. In its ruling, the Supreme Court held that “Plaintiffs’ allegations that these social-media companies aided and abetted ISIS in its terrorist attack on the Reina nightclub fail to state a claim under 18 U. S. C. §2333(d)(2).”  However, this case deals with a different statute as will be pointed out later in this post.

Among other decisions mentioned are:

• Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U. S. 1 (2010). This case is significant because it deals with proximate cause. It concerns the filing of tax reports with respect to the sale of cigarettes online.
• Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 703 (1943) concerns a manufacturer selling narcotics/morphine to a specific doctor in great quantities, offering them at significant discounts.

Key concepts and some allegations

The hearing revolved around some key concepts: proximate cause, foreseeability, aiding and abetting, knowingly violated, statutory interpretation, predicate exception and immunity.

With regard to the relationship between manufacturers, distributors and retailers, it was pointed out that the licensed manufacturers sell weapons to licensed distributors who then sell them to licensed retailers, a small percentage of whom sell those weapons to straw purchasers, some of whom sell them to other purchasers who transfer them to smugglers, who then transfer them to cartels that in turn do mayhem in Mexico. In the US, there is a tier-distribution chain.

One of the key allegations put forth by Mexico was that manufacturers aided and abetted the retailers because manufacturers knew that they would sell the weapons to straw purchasers. Some retailers were identified in a Washington Post article. However, a comment was made to the effect that if the government ignores which retailers are committing such actions how are the manufacturers supposed to know this fact.

A discussion ensued whether proximate cause related to the violation of the manufacturers and Mexico’s injury or to the retail sellers and Mexico’s injury. However, under the theory that aid and abetting is a form of vicarious liability then it would point to the retail sellers and Mexico’s injury. Interestingly, Justice Sotomayor noticed that the proximate cases are a mess and going into that would be like opening Pandora’s box.

Several cases were discussed including Twitter and Direct Sales and the fact that they relate to a specific violation. While counsel contended that this case is much easier, in many different respects, than the Twitter case, a justice said that Twitter dealt with a different statute. While discussing case law, and in particular a case from 1876 (St Paul Railway), there was a fleeting exchange (a telling jest) between counsel and two justices (Sotomayor and Gorsuch) about the role of the court as a collective body operating across time.

To the question whether the PLCAA’s objective was to bar lawsuits such as this one by foreseeing immunity, it was contended by the counsel for Mexico that this was not the case. Allegations were also made that Mexico is a direct victim and that the actions were foreseeable. Importantly, serial numbers could be erased for some weapons.

Finally, it was noted that 2% of the guns manufactured in the US (about 300,000 -600,000 guns) are likely trafficked into Mexico each year and end up in the cartels. Three models of guns made by the manufacturer seem to target Mexican cartels: the Super El Jefe, the Super El Grito, and the Emiliano Zapata 1911. These are smuggled to Mexico in volume. Whether this mere fact was enough for aiding and abetting was qualified as absurd by the opposite counsel.

Comments

This is a very complex case. Not only are the civil and criminal aspects intertwined but the allegations also concern independent crimes or actions committed by multiple parties before the weapons cross the border and reach Mexico. In addition, very few retailers have been named, and allegedly on the basis of a newspaper article published in the Washington post. Importantly, unlike Twitter and Direct Sales, there is no specific violation identified.

In my view, there is certain hesitancy with regard to this case. In particular, the consequences of this case can be far-reaching. Think for example of the production of baseball bats, knives, prescription medicines and unavoidably, selling beer to teenagers, all of which were mentioned during the hearing.

Having said that, this case has been politicized and emotions run high on both sides of the border. The need for justice is clear and compelling. There is also a growing sympathy for Mexico and for the need to remedy the wrongs committed in its territory.

From a legal perspective, however, we must recall that this case falls within the confines of PLCAA  (and perhaps other statutes) and thus it is a matter of statutory interpretation. With regard to the PLCAA’s predicate exception, it would seem very hard to prove that there are substantial allegations regarding a violation and that manufacturers “knowingly violated” a state or federal statute and that the violation was the “proximate cause of the harm” of Mexico’s injury. Equally difficult is to prove that there are substantial allegations of “aiding and abetting”, which is an example of the predicate exception and should be read as such. Accordingly, the court could rule that there is no prima facie violation (or substantial allegations of a violation) and thus the immunity foreseen by Congress applies. If the court favors this approach, it may not need to go into the analysis of complex concepts such as proximate cause, and in this way, avoid opening Pandora’s box.

 

Photo by Thinkstock on Freeimages.com

A webinar is being jointly organized by the Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI) and the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) to be held on 10 July 2025 from 5:00 to 6:10 PM (Singapore time) / 11:00 AM to 12:10 PM (CEST). The session will focus on two crucial and […]

Commission / Slovénie (Décharge de Bukovžlak)
Environnement et consommateurs
Gestion des déchets : la Cour impose une sanction financière à la Slovénie pour n’avoir pas respecté ses obligations en matière de mise en décharge des déchets

How are overriding mandatory rules to be defined, in particular, how can they be distinguished from other mandatory rules? When shall a court apply overriding mandatory rules of a third country (other than the lex fori and the lex causae)? When should an international arbitral tribunal apply such rules? These questions have been struggled with […]

The second issue of the Journal du droit international for 2025 has been released. It contains two articles and several case notes relating to private international law issues. It is also worth mentioning the 2024-2025 edition of the column dedicated to judicial cooperation in civil, criminal and arbitral matters authored by Kamalia Mehtiyeva (University Paris-Est […]

La loi du 30 avril 2025 (Loi DDADUE 5) adapte les dispositions du code de la santé publique au règlement (UE) 2024/1860 instaurant une obligation déclarative à la charge des opérateurs économiques en cas de rupture d’approvisionnement de dispositifs médicaux et de dispositifs médicaux de diagnostic in vitro.

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By Guillaume Croisant (Linklaters LLP)

The United Kingdom deposited an instrument of accession to the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (the “Convention”) on 28 September 2020. This instrument of accession became effective after the Brexit’s transition period, on 1 January 2021, and gained binding force within the UK legal order following the adoption of the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020.

As many readers will be aware, a controversy exists regarding the temporal scope of the Convention. It applies to exclusive choice of court agreements concluded after its entry into force for the State of the chosen court and to disputes initiated after its entry into force for the State of the seized court. EU Member States have been bound by the Hague Convention since its approval by the European Union on 1 October 2015, but what about the UK after its withdrawal from the EU?

According to a first viewpoint, reflected in the UK’s instrument of accession, ” In accordance with Article 30 of the 2005 Hague Convention, the United Kingdom became bound by the Convention on 1 October 2015 by virtue of its membership of the European Union, which approved the Convention on that date.”

Conversely, under a second viewpoint (apparently shared by the European Commission in its ‘Notice to stakeholders – Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU rules in the field of civil justice and private international law’ dated 27 August 2020, p. 9), the Convention could only apply after the United Kingdom’s ‘independent’ ratification, which occurred on 1 January 2021. If this second perspective were accepted, jurisdiction agreements concluded before this date would not benefit from the mutual recognition system established by the Convention.

In a judgment (in French) dated 27 March 2025 (C.24.0012.F), the Belgian Supreme Court (Court de Cassation/Hof van Cassatie) ruled in favour of the first viewpoint, holding that “The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 has been applicable to the United Kingdom as a bound State, owing to the European Union’s approval of the Convention, from 1 October 2015 until 31 December 2020, and as a contracting party from 1 January 2021. The argument, in this regard, that the United Kingdom ceased to be bound by the Convention following its withdrawal from the European Union on 1 February 2020, is without legal basis.”

Regarding Private International Law, May 2025 will be a quiet month at the Court of Justice. Subject to updates, there is just one opinion scheduled, to be published on Thursday 22. In case C-279/24, Liechtensteinische Landesbank, AG R. Norkus has been asked to support the Court acting in a chamber of five judges (I. Jarukaitis, […]

La Cour de justice confirme son approche plutôt large du risque de déni de justice, condition nécessaire à la mise en œuvre du forum necessitatis. 

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Registration has now opened to participate in the XVIII ASADIP Conference – Regional Imaginaries, Global Resonance: Inter-American Private International Law and the World Stage, to be held in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil from 7 to 9 August 2025. This year, ASADIP is organising the Conference in collaboration with the Organisation of American States, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Inter-American Conference on Private International Law and the OAS Course on International Law. Preliminary programme, registration link and further info.

Engagement solennel de Mme Kaja Kallas, haute représentante de l’Union européenne pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité et vice-présidente de la Commission européenne

In a judgment of 12 March 2025, the French supreme court for civil and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) decided that it would not align characterisation for the purpose of its national rules of international jurisdictional with the EU characterisation adopted in Granarolo. As already reported on this blog, a few weeks later, the Court […]

Dans un arrêt du 2 avril 2025, la première chambre civile de la Cour de cassation confirme l’incompétence des juridictions françaises, saisies en méconnaissance d’une clause attributive de juridiction contenue dans un contrat entre une entrepreneure française et la société Meta Platform, pour l’utilisation d’un compte professionnel sur la plateforme Instagram. Pour la Cour, la validité de la clause ne peut être examinée qu’au regard du droit irlandais, en tant que droit du for du juge élu, de sorte que le moyen tiré de son invalidité au regard de l’éventuel déséquilibre significatif qu’elle causerait, en application de l’article 1171 du code civil, doit être écarté. 

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By Livia Solaro, PhD candidate at Maastricht University, working on the transnational restitution of Nazi-looted art

On 21 February 2025, the US Supreme Court issued a ruling in Republic of Hungary v. Simon,[1] a Holocaust restitution case with a lengthy procedural history. Delivering this unanimous decision, Justice Sotomayor confirmed the restrictive approach to cases involving foreign states inaugurated in 2021 by Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp.[2] In light of the importance of US practice for the development of customary law around sovereign immunity,[3] and its impact on questions of historical justice and transnational accountability, the Simon development deserves  particular attention.

The Jurisdictional Treatment of Foreign States as an “American Anomaly”[4]

In 2010, a group of Holocaust survivors filed a suit before the US District Court for the District of Columbia against the Republic of Hungary, the Hungarian State-owned national railway (Magyar Államvasutak Zrt., or MÁV) and its successor-in-interest Rail Cargo Hungaria Zrt. (RCH), seeking compensation for the Hungarian government’s treatment of its Jewish population during World War II.[5] The survivors claimed that, in connection to their deportation, their properties had been expropriated and subsequently liquidated by defendants.

As the case repeatedly moved through federal courts (in fact, this was not the first time it reached the Supreme Court),[6] the possibility for the US judge to extend its adjudicative jurisdiction over the Hungarian State remained controversial. Claimants based their action on the so-called “expropriation exception” to sovereign immunity, codified by §1605(a)(3) of the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).[7] This provision  excludes immunity in all cases revolving around rights in property taken in violation of international law, at the condition that  that property, or any property exchanged for such property: 1) is present in the US in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the US by the foreign state, or 2) is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the US.

This exception represents an unicum within the law of sovereign immunity, as it allows courts to extend their jurisdiction over a state’s acta iure imperii (expropriations are indeed quintessential sovereign acts).[8] In recent years, this provision has often been invoked in claims of restitution of Nazi-looted art owned by European states (see, for example, Altmann v. Republic of Austria,[9] Toren v. Federal Republic of Germany,[10] Berg v. Kingdom of Netherlands,[11] Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain).[12] Crucially, this exception also requires a commercial nexus between the initial expropriation and the US. In its Simon decision, the US Supreme Court addressed the standard that plaintiffs need to meet to establish this commercial nexus in cases where the expropriated property was subsequently liquidated. The Court read a “tracing requirement” in the text of the provision, thus establishing a very high threshold.

Property Taken in Violation of International Law

The Court had recently addressed the interpretation of §1605(a)(3 in Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, where the heirs of German Jewish art dealers sought the restitution of a collection of medieval reliquaries known as the Guelph Treasure (Welfenschatz), In that case, the Supreme Court focused on the opening line of the expropriation exception, which requires that the rights in property at issue were “taken in violation of international law”. By explicitly recognizing that this language incorporates the domestic takings rule,[13] the Court set in motion a trend of increasingly restrictive interpretations of the expropriation exception that is still developing today.

To reach this result, the Supreme Court interpreted the expropriation exception as referring specifically to the international law of expropriation. This narrow reading of §1605(a)(3) allowed the Court to assert that the domestic takings rule had “survived the advent of modern human rights law”, as the two remained insulated from one another. Accordingly, even if the Nazi plunder were considered as an act of genocide, in violation of human rights law and the Genocide Convention,[14] it would not fall under §1605(a)(3), as this provision only applies to property takings against aliens (reflecting the traditional opinion that international law is concerned solely with the relations between states). From this perspective, the Philipp decision adhered to the International Court of Justice’s highly criticized conclusion in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v.  Italy) that immunity is not excluded by serious violations of ius cogens.[15]

The impact of this restrictive turn has already emerged in a couple of cases adjudicated after Philipp. In order to circumvent the domestic takings rule, claimants have tried to argue that the persecutory treatment of Jewish individuals by several states during the Holocaust deprived them of their nationality, rendering them either de iure or de facto stateless. In the wake of Philipp, courts have been sceptical of this statelessness theory – although they appear to have left the door ajar for stronger arguments in its support.[16] A recent decision by the District Court for the District of Columbia  has gone so far as to exclude the expropriation exception in cases involving a states’ taking of property from nationals of an enemy state in times of war.[17] The District Court followed the same reasoning as in Philipp: if §1605(a)(3) refers to the international law of expropriation, not only human rights law but also international humanitarian law are excluded by its scope of application. As I noted elsewhere,[18] post-Philipp court practice now excludes the expropriation exception in the vast majority of takings by sovereign actors, regardless of whether they targeted their own nationals, the nationals of an enemy state or stateless individuals.

The Commercial Nexus and the Commingling Theory

The recent Simon decision adopts the same restrictive approach as Philipp, but shifts focus to the expropriation exception’s second requirement: the commercial nexus with the US. Under §1605(a)(3), the property that was taken in violation of international law, or any property exchanged for such property (emphasis added), needs to have a connection with a commercial activity carried by the foreign state, or one of its agencies or instrumentalities, in the US. Crucially, the Hungarian government liquidated the assets allegedly expropriated from defendants. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the claimants’ allegation that Hungary used the proceedings to issue bonds in the US met the commercial nexus requirement. Complicating matters further, the proceeds were absorbed into the national treasury where, over the years, they had mingled with billions in other revenues.

The Simon question concerns an important portion of expropriation cases, since property is often taken for its monetary rather than intrinsic value. Therefore, with some specific exceptions (such as takings of artworks or land), expropriated properties are likely going to be liquidated, and the proceeds are bound to be commingled with other funds. Years after the initial liquidation, proving the location of the money originally exchanged for those properties is extremely challenging, if not impossible. In 2023, the Circuit Court had indeed concluded that “[r]equiring plaintiffs whose property was liquidated to allege and prove that they have traced funds in the foreign state’s or instrumentality’s possession to proceeds of the sale of their property would render the FSIA’s expropriation exception a nullity for virtually all claims involving liquidation”.[19]

The Simon claimants thus proposed a “commingling theory”, arguing that instead of tracing the initial proceeds, it is enough to show that they eventually mixed with funds later used in commercial activity in the US. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Sotomayor rejected this theory, reading a specific tracing requirement into the wording of the expropriation exception. In order to meet this requirement, claimants can identify a US account holding proceeds from expropriated property, or allege that a foreign sovereign spent all funds from a commingled account in the United States. As clarified by the Justice, these are but some examples of how a claimant might chose to proceed. Rather than examining various common law tracing principles, however, the Court here simply ruled that alleging that a foreign sovereign liquidated the expropriated property, commingled the proceeds with general funds, and later used some portion of those funds for commercial activities in the US does not establish a plausible commercial nexus. Although this ruling imposes a high bar for claimants seeking to invoke the expropriation exception, the Court found this outcome less detrimental to the FSIA’s rationale than accepting the “attenuated fiction” that commingled accounts still contain funds from the original property’s liquidation. In Simon, for example, while the initial commingling of funds occurred in the 1940s, the suit was only brought in the 2010s, after “several institutional collapses and regime changes”.

A Restrictive Parable

The Supreme Court based its Simon decision on a textual interpretation of the expropriation exception, which identifies “that property or any property exchanged for such property”, without providing a specific alternative criterion for property exchanged for money. The Court also looked at the legislative history of the FSIA, rooted in the 1964 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino decision.[20] The Sabbatino case prompted US Congress to pass the FSIA’s predecessor, the Second Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964,  “to permit adjudication of claims the Sabbatino decision had avoided”.[21] In Simon, the Court read its Sabbatino precedent as part of the FSIA’s history, and as such relevant to its interpretation – especially considering that Sabbatino also revolved around property that had been liquidated. Crucially in Sabbatino “the proceeds . . . in controversy” could be clearly traced to a New York account, aligning the case with the tracing requirement identified in Simon.

The Simon Court also echoed the foreign relations concerns that it already discussed in Philipp, justifying its restrictive interpretation of the FSIA on the Act’s potential to cause international friction, and trigger reciprocity among other states’ courts. In this regard, the Philipp and Simon decisions seem particularly keen to do some “damage control” on the effects of the expropriation exception, reducing its scope from a “radical” to a “limited” departure from the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.

This restrictive turn mirrors the trajectory of human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).[22] Starting with the Second Circuit’s decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,[23] the 1789 ATS was used by US courts to extend their jurisdiction on human rights claims brought by aliens. In 2004 (the same year as the seminal Altmann decision on the FSIA’s retroactive application),[24] the Supreme Court rejected the interpretation of the ATS as a gateway for “foreign-cubed” human rights cases.[25] Warning against the risk of “adverse foreign policy consequences”, the Court provided a narrow interpretation of the ATS. This conservative approach has been framed as part of the shift in attitudes that marked the passage from the Third to the Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.[26] The decision to restrict the reach of the ATS was in fact rooted in political considerations, as testified by the pressure exercised by the Bush administration to hear the case.[27] The new geopolitical landscape had diminished the strategic importance of vindicating international human rights law, and the use of domestic courts to advance public rights agendas had faced severe criticism, with US courts being accused of acting as judges of world history.[28] The Philipp and Simon interpretations of the FSIA reproduce this passage from an offensive to a defensive approach within the law of foreign sovereign immunity.

Conclusion

Since Philipp, the expropriation exception has been limited to property takings by foreign sovereigns against aliens during peacetime. This development has arguably returned the FSIA to its original intent: to protect the property of US citizens abroad, as an expression of “America’s free enterprise system”. With Simon, this provision’s application has been further restricted where the expropriated property was liquidated. This approach explicitly aims at aligning US law with international law. In this process, however, the US judiciary’s controversial yet proactive contribution to human rights litigation, with its potential to influence the development of customary law, is taking a more conservative and isolationist stance.

[1] Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 604 U. S. ___ (2025).

[2] Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U. S. 169 (2021).

[3] Thomas Giegerich, ‘The Holy See, a Former Somalian Prime Minister, and a Confiscated Pissarro Painting: Recent Us Case Law on Foreign Sovereign Immunity’ in Anne Peters and others (eds), Immunities in the Age of Global Constitutionalism (Brill | Nijhoff 2014) 52. <https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004251632/B9789004251632_006.xml> accessed 11 December 2024. An important conference on the state of the art on the international law of foreign sovereign immunity recently took place at Villa Vigoni (Italy), under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. The full program of the event can be found here: https://www.mpil.de/en/pub/news/conferences-workshops/the-future-of-remedies-against.cfm.

[4] As described by Riccardo Pavoni, ‘An American Anomaly? On the ICJ’s Selective Reading of United States Practice in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State’ (2011) 21 The Italian Yearbook of International Law Online 143.

[5] For an historical contextualization, see Szabolcs Szita, ‘It Happened Seventy Years Ago, in Hungary’ [2014] Témoigner. Entre histoire et mémoire. Revue pluridisciplinaire de la Fondation Auschwitz 146.

[6] See Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 592 U. S. 207 (2021) (per curiam) (Supreme Court of the United States).

[7] The FSIA, enacted through Public Law 94-583 on October 21 on 1976, is codified in Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 97, Part IV – Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States.

[8] Charlene Sun and Aloysius Llamzon, ‘Acta Iure Gestionis and Acta Iure Imperii’ (Oxford Constitutions – Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law [MPECCoL]) <https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law-mpeccol/law-mpeccol-e188> accessed 30 April 2025.

[9] Altmann v Republic of Austria [2001] 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (United States District Court, CD California).

[10] Toren v Federal Republic of Germany 2023 WL 7103263 (United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit) (unreported).

[11] Berg v Kingdom of the Netherlands 2020 WL 2829757 (United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division) (unreported).

[12] Cassirer v Kingdom of Spain [2006] 461 F.Supp.2d 1157 (United States District Court, CD California).

[13] Mayer Brown, ‘“Domestic Takings” Rule Bars Suit Against Foreign Nations in U.S. Court’ (Lexology, 3 February 2021) <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1d4af991-a497-47be-80f2-dd78c184baa1> accessed 30 April 2025.

[14] UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 277, 9 December 1948, https://www.refworld.org/legal/agreements/unga/1948/en/13495 [accessed 29 April 2025].

[15] Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment,  I.C.J. Reports 2012. For a critical discussion of this judgment, see Benedetto Conforti, ‘The Judgment of the International Court of Justice on the Immunity of Foreign States: A Missed Opportunity’ (2011) 21 The Italian Yearbook of International Law Online 133.

[16] See Simon v Republic of Hungary [2023] 77 F4th 1077 (United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit). The court here clarified that its decision did not “foreclose the possibility that such support exists in sources of international law not before us in this case or based on arguments not advanced here”> Ibid,  para 1098.

[17] de Csepel v Republic of Hungary 2024 WL 4345811 (United States District Court, District of Columbia).

[18] Livia Solaro, ‘US Case Further Restricts Holocaust-Related Art Claims’ (The Institute of Art & Law, 11 November 2024) <https://ial.uk.com/author/livia-solaro/> accessed 30 April 2025.

[19] Simon v Republic of Hungary (n 16) para 1118.

[20]  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964) (Supreme Court of the United States).This case revolved around the expropriation of sugar by Cuba against a private company in protest for the reduction of the US sugar quota for this country. After the sugar in question was delivered to a customer in Morocco, both the Cuban state and the private company claimed the payment of the price, which in the meantime had been transferred to a New York commodity broker. The case eventually was adjudicated in favour of the National Bank of Cuba, based on the Act of State doctrine.

[21] As noted by the Court in  Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 604 U. S. ___ (2025) (Supreme Court of the United States) 15–16.

[22] 28 U.S. Code § 1350.

[23] Filartiga v Pena-Irala [1980] 630 F.2d 876 (United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit).

[24]  Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677 (2004) (Supreme Court of the United States).

[25]  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692 (2004) (Supreme Court of the United States); for a definition of ‘foreign-cubed’ claims, see Robert S Wiener, ‘Foreign Jurisdictional Algebra and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: Foreign Cubed And Foreign Squared Cases’ (2014) 32 North East Journal of Legal Studies 156, 157.

[26] See Thomas H Lee, ‘Customary International Law and U.S. Judicial Power: From the Third to the Fourth Restatements’, SSRN Electronic Journal (2020) <https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3629791> accessed 14 March 2025.

[27] Naomi Norberg, ‘The US Supreme Court Affirms the Filartiga Paradigm’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 387, 390.

[28] Ugo Mattei, ‘A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance’ (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 67, 420.

This post was written by Rose Wijeyesekera, Professor of Private and Comparative Law, Chair / Department of Private and Comparative Law – Faculty of Law, University of Colombo

Introduction

Sri Lanka (formerly known as ‘Ceylon’) is an island in the Indian Ocean, and is home to a total population of 21,763,170, consisting of Sinhalese 74.9%, Tamils 15.4%, Muslims 9.3%, and 0.5% consisting of others such as Veddhas, Burghers, and gypsies.The legal system of this island nation is a unique blend of native laws and the laws that were placed by the colonial powers from 1505 to 1947, when the country gained independence. Since then, Sri Lanka has been a democratic republic and a Unitary State governed by a constitution. The Sri Lankan legal system is primarily based on Roman-Dutch law, inherited from its colonial past under the Dutch, and English common law introduced by the British colonial rulers. Apart from these two, the legal system incorporates elements of Kandyan law (representing indigenous customs of the Sinhalese), Tesawalamai(customary laws of the Tamils of the Northern province of the country) and Muslim law. These personal laws apply in matters of personal law, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, depending on the community to which an individual belongs. All Muslims including the sub-categories such as Moors and Malays, are governed by Muslim Law in their personal matters, while Kandyan Sinhalese (a minority of the Sinhalese who hail from “Kandyan Provinces” / the hill country, are governed by Kandyan Law. These customary laws bear a territorial and/or a religious nature. Most of these laws are enacted, but some remain open leaving room for judicial interpretation. The court system in Sri Lanka is structured hierarchically and is designed to ensure justice through a combination of traditional and modern legal principles. The system comprises the Supreme Court at the apex, the Court of Appeal, Provincial High Courts, District Courts, Magistrate Courts, and tribunals such as Labour Tribunals, Quazi Courts, and Mediation Boards.

The legislative sources of private international law are derived from multiple frameworks in Sri Lanka including the Civil Procedure Code (1889), Companies Act, No. 7 of 2007, Arbitration Act No. 11 of 1995 and Intellectual Property Act, No. 36 of 2003. The Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Ordinance No. 41 of 1921 (REJO) and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgements Ordinance No. 3 of 1937 (EFJO) were the most relevant in the sphere of reciprocal recognition, registration and enforcement of foreign judgments. Yet, these statutes, which were enacted during the British colonial era, were limited in their application as they applied only in judgments relating to commercial matters. The lacunae created by the absence of legal direction with regard to the recognition of foreign judgments in matters relating to divorce, annulment and separation of spouses, was huge in a socio-economic context where outward migration has become unprecedently large in recent times.

 

Pre-legislative judicial activism  

In December 2023, the Court of Appeal had to face this lacuna, where Champika Harendra Silva v. M.B. Weerasekara Registrar General and Others. The case concerned a Sri Lankan-born couple who had registered their marriage in Sri Lanka and migrated thereafter to England, had obtained a divorce decree from a competent court in England. The divorcee man applied to the Registrar General (RG) of Sri Lanka to register the divorce, but it was rejected on the basis that the divorce was obtained from a British court, which according to the RG, was not a ‘competent court’ under the Marriage Registration Ordinance of Sri Lanka. Upon rejection by the RG, the divorcee filed for a writ of certiorari pleading the court to quash the RG’s rejection, and a writ of Mandamus recognizing the decree of divorce granted by the English court. The court made headlines when, through judicial interpretation, it granted both writs declaring that a foreign decree of dissolution of a marriage contracted in Sri Lanka is valid and effectual in Sri Lanka subject to three guidelines. (a) Such Court must be in law vested with the jurisdiction in respect of the dissolution of a marriage and be the ‘Competent Court’ in the foreign country; (b) the Parties must have been residents of the foreign country for a reasonable period of time; and (c) the parties must have been properly represented and participated in the legal proceedings according to the laws and procedures of the foreign country. The decision was progressive and timely, and reiterated the necessity and urgency of legislative intervention in addressing this issue of recognizing foreign judgments especially with regard to matrimonial matters.

The legislature intervened promptly to address this legal lacuna by introducing the Reciprocal Recognition, Registration, and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, No. 49 of 2024 (RRREFJ). The Act is effective from March 26, 2025, in respect of 53 countries listed in the Schedule. It repeals both REJO and EFJO.

 

Limited application of Private International law through REJO, EFJO, and Hague Conventions

REJO and EFJO, which were introduced to facilitate the cross-enforcement of foreign and Ceylonese (Sri Lanka as it was known then) judgments, had proved woefully inadequate to cater to the country’s ever increasing cross-border transactions in both commercial and personal matters. One of the main reasons was REJO’s limited scope, as it catered to rather uncomplicated monetary matters arose during the colonial times. It did not address matrimonial matters, perhaps because of limited overseas travel and limited marriages between Sri Lankans and foreigners. It has also been subjected to criticism due to stringent rules and procedural complexities, and understandably, they catered to procedural requirements of a far-less technologically facilitated financial world. Another deficiency was the absence of clear provisions for appeals. This hindered the enforcement process, and created legal uncertainty.

 

The RRREFJ Act of 2024

The 2024 Act comes in to bridge the gap between global realities and the local legal framework. Its scope is much wider than REJO, as it applies to the reciprocal recognition, registration and enforcement of foreign judgments regarding matrimonial matters, i.e. divorce, annulment and separation, as well as monetary obligations. It recognizes final and conclusive judgments of Scheduled jurisdictions. As at present, they are the 53 Commonwealth countries. An application for recognition, registration and enforcement of a foreign judgment can be made within a period of ten years from the final judgment, and by way of summary procedure as provided for in the Civil Procedure Code.

In terms of commercial transactions, its application extends to natural persons as well as companies, including Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) companies, which are increasing in the country. The Act does not apply to tax, charge, fine or other penalty payable under a judgment of a foreign court.

However, the Act is restrictive in terms of the application of matrimonial matters of persons whose marriages have been contracted under special personal laws, which are very much a part of the Sri Lankan law relating to marriage and family.

Section 3(1)(b) of the new Act of 2024 states that the Act applies to a foreign judgment for the dissolution or annulment of a marriage or separation of the parties to a marriage only if such judgment is obtained in respect of marriages entered under the General Marriages Ordinance No. 19 of 1907 (GMO) and where such judgment shall be deemed final and conclusive as long as either party to the marriage was domiciled in such country at the date of the judgement; habitual resident in such country for a period not less than one year before the date of  the judgment; was a national of such country at the time of the judgment; or both parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of such country. This leaves out Muslims who, under Sri Lankan law, are compelled to marry under the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act 13 of 1951 (MMDA), and the Knadyan Sinhalese who may choose to register their marriages under the Kandyan Marriage and Divorce Act 44 of 1952 (KMDA). While the majority of the population are governed by the General Law and are required to follow the GMO in matters relating to their marriages, a considerable percentage of the Sinhalese population who are recognized as ‘Kandyans’ still opt to marry under the KMDA. The Muslims who constitute 9.7% of the total population of the country have no choice but to contract their marriages under the MMDA. The exclusion of their marriages from the 2024 Act raises multiple concerns including their right to equality before the law, which is a fundamental right guaranteed under the national constitution.

 

Way forward

The RRREFJ of 2024 is a timely legislative intervention in the sphere of private international law in Sri Lanka as it addresses a socially relevant legal lacuna in the country. The legislative effort was well-recognized by the apex court of the country when the constitutionality of the RRREFJ Bill was challenged in S.C.(SD) No.80/2024 and S.C.(SD) 81/2024. However, the Act has room to be more democratic in terms of its application, especially in the current social context in which the nation is struggling to overcome socio-economic devastations caused by multiple reasons including ethnicity, race, and religion. With necessary amendments to avoid these obvious racial and religious exclusions, the Act can strengthen the countries ties with the global village more fully.

In preparation of the University of Bologna (Ravenna Campus) Summer School on Transnational Litigation, already noted on this blog, a warm-up webinar will take place on 6 May 2025, from 5 to 6 pm CET. The session will feature Ekaterina Aristova (Institute of Human Rights, Faculty of Law of the University of Oxford), who will […]

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

I flagged the Amsterdam courts’ reference to the CJEU in Case C-34/24 Stichting Right to Consumer Justice v Apple here. Sánchez-Bordona AG opined late March.

The application software (apps) for Apple devices which use iOS can be purchased from Apple’s ‘App Store’. Where a user whose Apple ID indicates the Netherlands as the country or region attempts to purchase a product in the App Store, that user will normally be redirected to the Netherlands online shop (‘App Store NL’). To change the country associated with their Apple account, users must accept new terms and conditions, and must also have a valid payment method in that new country. 

Applicant foundations are acting in the interests of all users (consumers and professional users) of Apple products and services who have been offered or have purchased products and services from App Store NL. They claim that Apple holds a dominant position in the market for distribution of apps which run on iOS, and in the payment system for those apps (IAP); that Apple is abusing its dominant position, within the meaning of A102 TFEU; and that     the abuse of a dominant position involves the receipt of excessive commission on the sale price received, through the IAP payment system, for apps in the App Store and that this is an unlawful act against users.

Apple argue that jurisdiction for the Amsterdam courts cannot be based on A7(2) BIa because the alleged harmful event did not occur in the Netherlands. That event cannot be located in Amsterdam (Netherlands) since no specific event took place exclusively or in particular in Amsterdam or in the Netherlands.  In the alternative, Apple maintains that the referring court has jurisdiction only as regards users who live in Amsterdam or who make purchases in Amsterdam via App Store NL.

The AG first of all recalls the principles of A7(2) forum delicti jurisdiction. Readers of the blog and /or Handbook will be very familiar with those.

Place of the event giving rise to the damage /Handlungsort /Locus delicti commissi

The AG (50) opines that “the principle that the decisive causal event, for the purposes of [A7(2) BIa] is synonymous with acts which implement the abuse of a dominant position is, to my mind, generally valid: its specific expression varies from case to case.” Reference in the main is made to C-27/17 flyLAL.

As I discussed at the time, this conclusion is not clear from the judgment in flyLAL itself. The AG also concedes that the CJEU’s approach is not clear, as also results from ia AMS Neve or Wintersteiger. I would most definitely applaud a CJEU confirmation of a rule I proposed earlier, that any and all places of implementation of abuse, are loci delici commissi /Handlungsorten.

In the case at issue, the AG sees identification of locu delicti commissi as follows (footnote 28):

treating the abuse of a dominant position as the sale to the end user in App Store NL may be an oversimplification. While the harmful effects claimed are, certainly, on the users’ side, the (alleged) abuse of the dominant position occurs, on the developers’ side, in the form of the unilateral imposition of conditions on those wishing to provide services that are executable on iOS. Those conditions include use of the IAP and the commission which Apple deducts from the price which iOS users pay developers (and which developers pass on to users). In my view, the imposition of those conditions is the event giving rise to the damage for the purposes of determining jurisdiction.

However (53) “as a working hypothesis, I shall proceed on the basis of the referring court’s choice of that event.” (‘that’ being the sales to the end user). This is a bit odd for surely the AG could have cut to the chase and directly put forward his own view on the ldc, seeing as ldc questions are being referred.

At any rate, taking the ‘place of the sale’ as ldc creates its own difficulties. The referring court believes that ‘the sale’ occurred in the Netherlands. Geolocation of consumers in The Netherlands via their Apple ID, and territorial  ‘targeting’ by Apple (57; echoes here of the consumer title’s direction of activities) suggest a ‘Dutch’ territory however that does not help us for the territorial allocation required for A7(2) locus damni determination. (62) One could pinpoint he conferral of jurisdiction to where in the Netherlands the device used to access App Store NL was located at the time of the sale. However that (63) creates issues of evidence, and multiplicity of proceedings.

(72) the AG, having referred to a number of CJEU authority both confirming the territorial identification of a court by A7(2), and the difficulties in identifying such a court, settles for

for a user who, by virtue of his or her Apple ID, is directed to App Store NL, all sales through that App Store occur at that user’s place of residence or establishment in the Netherlands, disregarding his or her actual physical location in that country at the time of each sale. (emphasis added)

(74) “That approach involves acceptance of a forum actoris which, in my view, is justified in the light of Apple’s commercial strategy.” : that strategy further explained as one where a specific audience is territorially ‘sought’: in other words (my words) if the seller uses geolocation and other territorial distinctions, it should not be surprised to be sued there. (This again echoes the consumer title).

Place where the damage occurred /Erfolgort /locus damni

This discussion is even more challenging than the Handlungsort. The referring court asks whether, in order to identify the competent court on the basis of the place where the damage occurred, ‘where the place where [the] purchases took place cannot be determined’, the user’s domicile may be used as a connecting factor. With reference to a number of authorities the AG believes it could, again supporting that conclusion by reference to Apple’s commercial strategy: (83)

the connecting factor based on the user’s domicile is, a fortiori, especially appropriate where, as here, the defendant (Apple) structures its business through the fragmentation, by country, of the market concerned and links end users to that market.

(84) Apple’s GTCs (not applicable here seeing as the claims are non-contractual) referring to the consumer’s place of habitual residence for both choice of court and -law is also referred to in support; of course those terms are an acknowledgment of the consumer title of Brussels Ia and informed by the consumer title of Rome I – yet they at any rate indeed support the conclusion that Apple can hardly be surprised to be sued in The Netherlands.

The impact of the representative action

This section has ruffled feathers: see ia Cécile Rouméas and Miguel Soussa Ferro. (92) The AG in my view justifiably insists on A7(2) forum possibilities being determined by reference to the original ldc and /or ld: “the assignment of a claim or the collective nature of an action do not preclude reliance on [A7)2], [however] international and territorial jurisdiction thereunder will continue to be set, in any event, by reference to the act which gave rise to the damage or the place where the damage occurred.”

(94) “A claim for damages does not lose its connection to the place where the harmful event occurred as a result of the transfer of the claim or because a third party takes over the claim pursuant to a legal provision. The event giving rise to the damage is also the same, and the evidence continues to be where it has always been.” : he is right, given the very origin of the ldc /ld distinction in CJEU Bier, and the territorial links between the court with special jurisdiction, and the events that led to the claim.

(96) “Compliance with the ‘predictability’ criterion precludes the court having jurisdiction, in respect of the same event giving rise to the damage, from changing according to whether the applicant is the holder of the interests, his or her successor, or a representative (of that holder or those interests).”

The AG acknowledges (97) “that, within a Member State, that requirement reduces the usefulness of the representative action mechanism where the national legislature has chosen [unlike eg in Austria, and see also CJEU Volvo, GAVC] not to designate a court having sole jurisdiction for the whole territory which hears that type of action.” (101) the AG equally justifiably points to the representative action having been discussed in the run up to Brussels I’a amendments, 2012 onwards. However no change in A7(2) was made.

This is exactly the type of amendment the EC may wish to put forward in its proposal for amendment, if any, of Brussels Ia and I do not see a de lege lata way to change it now. (For instance as I argue in a forthcoming chapter in a Kramer /Voet /Dori volume, ‘access to justice’ or ‘sound administration of justice’ de lege lata are not principles of Brussels Ia].

Member States may in the meantime find solace indeed in CJEU Volvo and the possibility for them to concentrate proceedings ex ante. The AG adds to this in conclusion of his Opinion, the possibility to concentrate those proceedings ex post, specifically via national lis pendens rules: this however requires ad hoc assessment which is not a risk funders etc of actions of this kind may be prepared to take.

Geert.

HCCH Monthly Update: April 2025

 

Membership

On 10 April 2025, Qatar applied to become a Member of the HCCH. On the same day, the Secretary General of the HCCH opened the six-month voting period during which all current Members of the HCCH may cast their vote on the proposal. Following this voting period, and provided a majority of votes are cast in favour, Qatar will be invited to become a Member by depositing an instrument of acceptance of the Statute of the HCCH. More information is available here.

 

Meetings & Events

From 2 to 4 April 2025, the conference “15 Years of the HCCH Washington Declaration: Progress and Perspectives on International Family Relocation” was held at the Embassy of Canada in Washington, D.C., United States of America. The conference was jointly organised by the Embassy of Canada, the International Academy of Family Lawyers (IAFL), and the HCCH. More information is available here.

From 7 to 11 April 2025, the Working Group on Parentage / Surrogacy met for the fourth time. Pursuant to its mandate, the Working Group continued its consideration of draft provisions for one new instrument on legal parentage generally, including legal parentage resulting from an international surrogacy agreement. More information is available here.

On 30 April 2025, the seventh meeting of the Working Group established to complete the Country Profile and work on the draft Cooperation Request Recommended Model Form for the 1996 Child Protection Convention was held online, hosted by the Permanent Bureau. More information is available here.

 

Upcoming Events

The webinar “HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention: Bridging Global Justice” will be held via Zoom on Tuesday 6 May 2025 from 4.00 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. (Hong Kong time), hosted by the HCCH’s Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. Interested persons should register no later than this Friday, 2 May 2025, at 5.00 p.m. (Hong Kong time). More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

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