Droit international général

20th Regional Private International Law Conference will be held in Istanbul on 6-8 November 2025 in collaboration with Erdem&Erdem Law Office and Istanbul Arbitration Center (ISTAC). This year’s conference topics are focusing on choice of court/arbitration agreements and the enforcement of decisions rendered by chosen courts or arbitral tribunals. The conference programme can be viewed in here.

Participation is available via Zoom, through the link provided: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/84302415223?pwd=JdVlMzX7dzabawYUF6TnjKnjp8xKhf.1 (Meeting ID: 843 0241 5223 Password: 786753)

For further questions you may contact the organizers Prof. Dr. Zeynep Derya Tarman (Koç University Faculty of Law, Dean) and Prof. Dr. Ceyda Süral Efeçinar (Piri Reis University Faculty of Law, Dean) at meoba@ku.edu.tr (M. Ece Oba, Research Assistant at Koç University Faculty of Law).

The Permanent Bureau of the HCCH welcomes applications for the position of Legal Officer, based at its headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands.

The successful candidate will work in the field of international commercial, digital and financial law, under the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary General. In addition to work in relation to the operation of the 1985 Trusts Convention, the 2006 Securities Convention, and the 2015 Choice of Law Principles, duties will include general assistance in relation to the projects on Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), Carbon Markets, Digital Tokens, and the Digital Economy. Depending on the work programme established by CGAP, the successful candidate may be called upon to carry out work in other areas, and will respond to requests for information, assist with comparative law research, the preparation of research papers and other documentation, the organisation and preparation of materials for publication, the preparation of, and participation in, conferences, seminars and training programmes.

The successful candidate will also support the work of the office of the Deputy Secretary General, and may be called to take on such other work as may be required by the Secretary General from time to time.

Applications should be submitted by 1 November 2025 (5.00 p.m. CET). For more information, please visit the Recruitment section of the HCCH website.

This post is published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law (HCCH). 

 

The use of videoconferencing in cross-border civil and commercial court proceedings has its challenges in the EU, although the use of videoconferencing is supported by a number of regulations such as the Taking of Evidence Recast Regulation, the European Small Claims Procedure Regulation, the European Account Preservation Order Regulation, the Digitalisation of Judicial Cooperation Regulation. […]

After Indonesia, China, Japan, India and recently Hong Kong, the prestigious Hart series “Studies in Private International Law – Asia” has released a new volume on Cambodian Private International Law, authored by Nobumichi Teramura (Associate Professor, Keio University Law School; Affiliate, Centre for Asian and Pacific Law in the University of Sydney).

This book is the 14th volume in this outstanding series, which, in only six years of existence, has successfully manages to transform the “little attention” once paid to developments in private international law in Asia into an explosion of Asian scholarship and a growing and dynamic field of study.

This new volume, however, is somewhat different from the other abovementioned volumes that comprehensively cover private international law in a specific jurisdiction. As rightfully stated in the Series Editors’ Preface, “[o]f those six volumes, this is possibly the most challenging.” This is because, as the author points out, Cambodia “still does not have a comprehensive legal framework that addresses conflict of laws issues, and research on Cambodian private international law is still in its infancy.” Cambodian law “does not yet contain rules on international jurisdiction,” nor does it have “any special statutory body of law dealing specifically with the conflict of laws.” Moreover, Cambodian courts “have never recognised and enforced judgments issued abroad.”

In this regard, the Series Editors posed in their preface the question of whether, under such circumstances, “it is too early to speak of, much less write about, a coherent body of Cambodian private international law.” But this is precisely what makes this volume particularly interesting and unique. It proposes a striking approach: the development of principles of Cambodian private international law by reference to Japanese legal principles and experiences. This is explained by the long-standing involvement of Japanese scholars and agencies in Cambodia’s legal development through technical assistance, and by the fact that Cambodian law “borrow[s] heavily from Japanese law.”

In pursuing this undertaking, the author has relied “mostly…on English and Japanese literature on Cambodian law and society,” given the “significant volume” of materials available in those languages, particularly in Japanese, on Cambodian law. The author himself acknowledges that his “research approach to Cambodian private international law is experimental and will inevitably attract criticism.” Nevertheless, while engaging in this Sisyphus-like endeavor, he humbly “hopes that the discussion in this book can serve as a starting point for a dialogue among legal experts in Cambodian law for considering the next reform of Cambodian private international law, regardless of whether the experts agree or disagree with the suggestions made” therein.

One thing is certain: as the first (and so far the only) comprehensive contribution on Cambodian private international law in English, and probably in any language, it provides valuable access to the first sustained and systematic reflection on this subject. By doing so, the book fills a significant gap in the literature, opens new avenues for scholarly debate, and lays a foundation not only for discussion and critical reflection but also for future reforms in this field. From this perspective, the book’s objective can be said to have been fully achieved.

 

The description of the book reads as follows:

This book is the leading reference on Cambodian private international law in English.

The chapters systematically cover the whole of Cambodian private international law, including commercial matters, family law, succession, intellectual property, competition (antitrust), and environmental disputes.

The chapters do not merely cover the traditional conflict of law areas of jurisdiction, applicable law (choice of law) and enforcement. They also look into conflict of law questions arising in arbitration and assess Cambodia’s involvement in the harmonisation of private international law globally and regionally within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Similarly to the other volumes in the Studies in Private International Law – Asia series, this book presents the Cambodian conflict of laws through a combination of common and civil law analytical techniques and perspectives, providing readers worldwide with a more profound and comprehensive understanding of the subject.

 

Table of Contents includes the following:

1. Introduction

Part I: Foundations of Cambodian Private International Law

2. Status of Private International Law in Cambodia and Preliminary Matters

3. Treatment of Foreign Law

Part II: Jurisdiction

4. Direct Jurisdiction

Part III: Choice of Law

5. Choice of Law for Contractual Obligations

6. Choice of Law for Non-Contractual Obligations

7. Choice of Law for Property Issues

8. Family Law

9. Law of Corporations, Insolvency, Antitrust and Unfair Competition

Part IV: Recognition and Enforcement

10. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

Part V: Arbitration

11. International Arbitration

12. The Harmonisation of Private International Law

Written by Mayela Celis, Maastricht University

In June 2025, the US Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. et al. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexico) 605 U.S. 280 (2025). The Opinion is available here. We have previously reported on this case here,  here and here (on the hearing).

As previously indicated, this is a much-politicized case brought by Mexico against US gun manufacturers, alleging inter alia negligence, public nuisance and defective condition. The basic theory laid out was that defendants failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the trafficking of guns to Mexico causing harm and grievances to this country. In this regard, the complaint focuses on aiding and abetting of gun manufacturers (rather than of independent commission).

In a brilliant judgment, Justice Kagan ruled that PLCAA bars the lawsuit filed by Mexico. Accordingly, PLCAAS’s predicate exception did not apply to this case.

This case has attracted wide media attention and a great number of amici curiae briefs was filed urging both reversal and affirmance or being neutral. Those urging reversal far outnumbered the other two categories, some of which were filed by Attorney Generals of numerous US states, American Constitutional Rights Union, American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Firearms Regulatory Accountability Coalition, Inc., National Association for Gun Rights, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Product Liability Advisory Council, Second Amendment Foundation, Sen. Ted Cruz and others, Gun Owners of America, Inc., etc.

Primary holding

Held: Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, PLCAA bars the lawsuit.

Main federal statutes applicable and case law cited

The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), 119 Stat. 2095, 15 U. S. C. §§ 7901–7903

18 U. S. C. § 2(a) – Principals

Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 703 (1943)

Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471 (2023)

Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014)

United States v. Peoni, 100 F. 2d 401, 402 (CA2 1938)

For further information (incl. PLCAA’s predicate exception), please refer to the previous post on the hearing, here.

A few takeaways from the judgment are the following:

Plausibility

The Court clarified that plausibly “does not mean ‘probably,’ but ‘it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’” And Mexico did not meet that threshold (p. 291). Indeed, the Court goes even further and speaks of mere speculation as regards some of Mexico’s allegations (p. 296).

Aiding and Abetting

The Court stated the requirements of aiding and abetting derived from criminal law (as coined by Learned Hand): “an aider and abettor must ‘participate in’ a crime ‘as in something that he wishes to bring about’ and ‘seek by his action to make it succeed.’” The Court said that Mexico failed to properly plead this to the level required (p. 294).

Considering that Mexico based its claims on aiding and abetting liability, the Supreme Court begins by setting forth the three ancillary principles: 1) Citing Twitter, the Court notes that aiding and abetting is a rule of secondary liability for specific wrongful acts. In the case of a broad category of misconduct, the participation must be pervasive, systematic and culpable; 2) Aiding and abetting usually requires misfeasance rather than nonfeasance (such as failure to act or an omission when there is no independent duty to act); 3) Incidental activity is unlikely to count as aiding and abetting (p. 292).

In this regard, the Supreme Court ruled that Mexico’s allegations only refer to nonfeasance (or indifference) (p. 297). The Court also noted that contrary to normal practice in this type of cases, Mexico does not pinpoint any specific criminal transactions that the defendants allegedly assisted. And at the same time, Mexico sets the bar very high by alleging that all manufacturers assist a number of identified rogue dealers in their illegal pursuits (p. 294).

Importantly, the Court notes that “Mexico never confronts that the manufacturers do not directly supply any dealers, bad-apple or otherwise.” (p. 295) Indeed, they supply to middleman distributors that are independent. It is the conduct of rogue dealers, two levels down, that causes Mexico’s grievance and Mexico does not name them (there is only a reference to a Washington Post article, see our previous post).

A note to the reader: Mexico did identify a distributor in its complaint (Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc., which does business as Interstate Arms), however its complaint barely mentioned it, that is why the Court decided for simplicity’s sake to focus only on manufacturers (see footnotes 1 and 4 of the judgment).

The Supreme Court also dismissed Mexico’s allegations that the industry had failed to impose constraints on their distribution chains to reduce unlawful actions (e.g. bulk sales or sales from homes), which the court considers as “passive nonfeasance” in the light of Twitter. Nor were the allegations regarding the design and marketing decisions of guns accepted as these products may also appeal to law-abiding citizens.

History of PLCAA

The Court ends with some analysis of PLCAA’s purpose and the kind of suits it intended to prevent. The Court concludes that Mexico’s suit closely resembles those suits and if it were to fall in the predicate exception, it would swallow the entire rule.

Comments

At the outset, please note that the comments already made regarding the hearing of this case apply to a large extent to the final judgment.

The Supreme Court rendered a judgment that is clear, logical and addresses key matters of the litigation, without testing the troubled waters of proximate cause. In particular, it avoids departing from previous precedents such as Direct Sales and Twitter, which in my view set clear standards with regard to aiding and abetting liability. It also helpfully stated the requirements of aiding and abetting derived from criminal law (as coined by Learned Hand) and applicable to the case at hand.

During the hearing of this case, there was much uncertainty regarding the different federal statutes applicable, as well as the relationship between the different actors in the distribution chain of weapons. None of that confusion is seen in this judgment, which is extremely clear and well-thought through.

As regards, the liability of merchants and their products (as referred to in my previous post, such as baseball bats and knives), the Supreme Court helpfully clarified that: “So, for example, an “ordinary merchant[ ]” does not “become liable” for all criminal “misuse[s] of [his] goods,” even if he knows that in some fraction of cases misuse will occur. Twitter, 598 U. S., at 489; see id., at 499. The merchant becomes liable only if, beyond providing the good on the open market, he takes steps to “promote” the resulting crime and “make it his own.” United States v. Falcone, 109 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 311 U. S. 205 (1940).” (p. 292)

Justices Thomas and Jackson (coincidentally the two black justices of the Court, a conservative and a liberal justice, respectively) filed Concurrent Opinions, which blurs the line between the two camps. In my view, these Opinions are more restrictive than the unanimous decision and make it more difficult to file a suit, requiring an earlier finding of guilt or liability in an adjudication regarding the violation (Thomas) or making non-conclusory allegations about a particular statutory violation under PLCAA (Jackson). In my view, the majority decision does not require either.

In sum, the majority Opinion greatly clarifies this area of law. A positive development, amid the tumultuous docket of the Court in this era of great uncertainty.

 

Photo by Thinkstock on Freeimages.com

 

 

 

An e-mail has been sent to the members of the European Association of Private International Law, to invite them to attend invitation the a meeting of the General Assembly, due to take place via Zoom on Friday, 28 November 2025, at 5 pm CET. The Assembly will discuss, inter alia, about possible amendments to the […]

In October 2025, the Court will deliver several opinions and decisions on the interpretation of private international law instruments. AG R. Norkus’ opinion in case C-516/24, Winderwill, is scheduled for Thursday, 2 October. The request for a preliminary ruling originates from the Amtsgericht Schleswig (Germany). It focuses on the Maintenance Regulation: Is an application for […]

HCCH Monthly Update: September 2025

 

Conventions & Instruments

On 18 September 2025, Argentina deposited its instrument of ratification of the 1996 Child Protection Convention. With the ratification of Argentina, the Convention now has 58 Contracting Parties. It will enter into force for Argentina on 1 January 2026.More information is available here.

 

Meetings & Events

On 11 and 12 September 2025, the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH hosted a Roundtable and Training on the application of the 1980 Child Abduction and 1996 Child Protection Conventions, in particular concerning the children of Ukraine. More information is available here.

From 17 to 19 September 2025, the Experts’ Group (EG) on Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) held its fourth working meeting. Pursuant to its mandate, the EG made further progress on the study of the applicable law and jurisdiction issues raised by the cross-border use and transfers of CBDCs. More information is available here.

On 25 and 26 September, the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH hosted training on the HCCH’s core family law Conventions and projects for a group of judges and court officials from 16 States. The training was organised in cooperation with the European Judicial Training Network. More information is available here.

On 26 September 2025, the second meeting of the Working Group (WG) established to finalise the Model Forms pertaining to Chapter II of the 1970 Evidence Convention was held online.

 

Upcoming Events

Registration is now open to the public for online participation in the “HCCH-IDLO Dialogue on Digitalisation of Public Services and Justice”. The event will be held on Friday 10 October 2025, from 10.00 to 11.30 a.m. (CEST). Interested persons should register no later than Tuesday 7?October 2025 via this registration form. More information is available here.

 

Vacancies

Applications are now open for the position of Legal Officer. The deadline for the submission of applications is 1 November 2025. More information is available here.

Applications are now open for the position of Finance / Human Resources Assistant. The deadline for the submission of applications is 11 October 2025. More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

The author of this post is Francesca Maoli, a researcher in international law at the University of Genova. The handling of international child abduction cases raises human rights concerns. The solutions introduced by the 1980 Hague Convention and, in the EU, by the Brussels II-ter Regulation, have been interpreted in the light of children’s rights. […]

The University of Hamburg has announced its second Call for Applications for the Lindemann Fellowship for Private International Law. Eligible are researchers based in Europe who recently completed or are close to completing their PhD studies, with a main research focus on conflict of laws and/or international civil procedure.

Becoming a Lindemann Fellow means having a 3-year grant within a vibrant European network, fully funded annual meetings to present and discuss your research, and publication in an open-access collected volume.

More information about the Fellowship is available at the webpage: https://www.jura.uni-hamburg.de/duden/60-fellowship-lindemann.html

Applications (combined into a single PDF) must be submitted by 1 November 2025 to lindemann-fellowship@uni-hamburg.de.

The editors of the European Yearbook of International Economic Law (EYIEL) invite abstract submissions from scholars and practitioners at all stages of their careers for the 2026 edition. This year’s Focus Section will explore the theme: Reconstruction of International and European Economic Law. It proceeds from the observation that the international legal-economic order is undergoing […]

by Jean-Charles Jais, Guillaume Croisant, Canelle Etchegorry, and Alexia Kaztaridou (all Linklaters)

On 17 September 2025, the French Cour de cassation handed down its decision on the Lastre case. This followed a landmark preliminary ruling of February 2025 from the CJEU, which laid out the conditions for a valid asymmetric jurisdiction clause under article 25 of the Brussels I recast regulation.

Asymmetric jurisdiction clauses allow one party to initiate proceedings in multiple courts or any competent court, while the other party has fewer options or is restricted to a specific jurisdiction. Such clauses are common in financial agreements (read more in our previous blog post here).

In the latest development of the Lastre case in France, the French Supreme Court opted for a pro-contractual autonomy stance, favouring the validity of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses.

Background to the decision

A French company had entered into a contract for the supply of cladding panels for a construction project with an Italian supplier. The supplier’s general terms and conditions provided for the jurisdiction of the Italian court of Brescia but reserved its right to proceed against the buyer before “another competent court in Italy or abroad”.

Following defects in the works in late 2019, proceedings were initiated before French courts against all contractors, including the Italian supplier. The latter challenged the jurisdiction of the French courts, relying on the above-mentioned jurisdiction clause.

Consistent with previous precedents, the French First Instance Court and Court of Appeals dismissed the objection. These courts found that the clause granted the Italian supplier discretionary authority to select jurisdiction, rendering it invalid due to its failure to satisfy the foreseeability criterion outlined in article 25 of the Brussels I recast regulation.

The case was further appealed before the French Supreme Court, which referred preliminary questions to the CJEU. In its preliminary ruling, the CJEU clarified that the validity of asymmetric clauses was to be assessed using autonomous criteria derived from article 25 of the Regulation and set out the conditions for such clauses to be valid.

A pragmatic application of the CJEU’s three-fold approach to “any other competent court” clauses

In last week’s ruling, the French Supreme Court sought to follow the CJEU’s three-fold approach in examining the validity of asymmetric clauses and recalled that such clause must (i) designate courts competent under the Brussels I recast regulation and/or the  Lugano Convention; (ii) identify sufficiently precise objective criteria to allow the court seized to determine its competence; and (iii) not conflict with special or exclusive jurisdiction rules set out in the Brussels I recast regulation or the Lugano Convention.

The French Supreme Court then held that the CJEU leaves it to national courts to interpret asymmetric clauses which allow one party to initiate proceedings before “any other competent court”, in accordance with the principles of party autonomy and practical effectiveness (effet utile).

On this basis, the French Supreme Court concluded that, in a case where the contractual relationship has no objective connecting factor with non-EU and non-Lugano States (i.e., third-party states), the jurisdiction clause designating “any other competent court” must be interpreted as referring to competent courts under the general rules of jurisdiction laid out in the Brussels I recast Regulation and the Lugano Convention. The clause thus complied with the first condition set by the CJEU, even if it did not expressly refer to these two instruments.

Accordingly, the French Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals’ decision and upheld the validity of the asymmetric jurisdiction clause.

Practical implications for asymmetric jurisdiction clauses

What does this ruling imply for parties wishing to rely or already relying on asymmetric jurisdiction clauses, particularly in cross-border contracts within the EU?

A more favourable treatment of asymmetric clauses

The French Supreme Court’s Lastre decision illustrates the Court’s pro-contractual autonomy approach to jurisdiction clauses. This will reassure parties seeking flexibility in drafting these clauses, particularly in light of certain earlier decisions which adopted a more cautious approach towards one-sided jurisdiction clauses.

The French Supreme Court’s contractual autonomy stance also appears in three decisions issued on the same day.

In one case, the Court followed its Lastre reasoning and upheld a bank’s clause granting exclusive jurisdiction to Luxembourg courts, while allowing the bank to bring proceedings at the client’s domicile or “other competent courts”.

In two other cases, the Court found that the clauses which designated a specific EU court and provided an objective criterion for determining the alternative jurisdiction available to one of the parties were sufficiently precise. These criteria were the location of the guarantor’s assets (case no. 23-18.785) and one of the parties’ registered office or that of its branch (case no. 23-16.150). This is in line with previous decisions validating asymmetric clauses, such as, for instance, the eBizcuss decision, which rely on objective criteria and generally supports the enforceability of asymmetric clauses.

Limitations for clauses with links to third-party states

While the French Supreme Court’s decision is a positive development for legal certainty and party autonomy, limitations and uncertainties remain.

First, the clause reviewed in the Lastre case conferred jurisdiction to the courts of a Member State (Brescia, in Italy), while reserving the possibility for one party to start proceedings before “any other competent courts”. As a result, the French Supreme Court did not address the validity of clauses that would also include the possibility for one party or both of them to start proceedings before one or several third-party state court(s), such as London or New York, a common feature in finance and banking contracts. The position on this remains uncertain.

Second, the ruling reinforces the material risk, stemming from the CJEU’s Lastre decision, that a clause designating “any competent court” could be deemed invalid where the contract has significant objective connecting factors with third-party states.

Third, the French Supreme Court’s interpretation is not binding on the courts of third-party states. However, in the scenario considered by the court (where there are no objective connecting factors to a third-party state), it is unlikely that a court in, for example, London or New York would accept jurisdiction. It would probably decline to hear the case under its own private international law rules.

Finally, this judgement does not guarantee a harmonised EU approach. It remains to be seen whether other Member State courts will adopt the same interpretation.

The White Paper on “Digital Product Passports and Critical Raw Materials for Batteries: Legal Conflicts and Principles for Cross-Border Cooperation” is now formally published on the UNECE website!

The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe White Paper identifies and analyses the critical legal challenges in implementing Digital Product Passports (DPPs) for Critical Raw Materials (CRMs), including cobalt, copper, lithium, and nickel. These materials are essential for Energy Transition, for example, electric vehicles.

Yet, tracing their journey from mines to markets to recycling is legally complex and globally inconsistent. This fragmentation hinders sustainability and transition to circular economy.

The White Paper provides policymakers and businesses with:  An analysis of conflicting legal frameworks in implementing DPPs; Guiding principles for cross-border cooperation in CRM-Battery value chains.

Read the full White Paper here.

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

In Gable Insurance AG v Dewsall & Ors [2025] EWHC 2280 (Ch) there was succinct pondering whether a claim based on knowing receipt falls within A4 or A10 of Rome II.

Parties do not seem to have pushed the issue and the debate it seems is quickly settled as being covered by English law. In coming to this conclusion Vos DJ does cut a few corners. Firstly despite it not having been intense, there does seem to have been debate and no agreement per A14  Rome II.

Further, the judge and parties discuss the issue of qualification of the claim and whether this should be done using lex fori or (putative) lex causae ([405] in the case at issue, Liechtenstein law would seem to qualify the underlying breach of duty by a director in a similar way to a contractual claim). Under Rome II of course the answer to that question is: neither. Qualification in areas covered by harmonising instruments takes place under an autonomous, EU law concept. Post Brexit of course a relevant question is whether this general principle of EU (PrivInt) law continue to apply when UK Courts apply the ‘assimilated’ Rome I and II instruments. In the case at issue seemingly the answer is ‘not at all’, for with reference to Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v Al Bader (No3) [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271) the conclusion is taken that a relationship which exists under foreign law should be examined to determine whether the duties which are owed would be characterised as fiduciary duties under English law, and that only if they are, a claim in knowing receipt can be brought in England.

[403] the judge holds that the application of A4 and 10 is likely to lead to the same result of English law being lex causae, and [404] that in any event, the circumstances are manifestly more closely connected with England than any other country, hence triggering the escape clause of A4(3) or (10)4. That as I have said before, is a topsy turvy way to go about a Rome II analysis. The ‘proper law of the tort’ exercise is only a narrow escape valve in Rome II (and I): not a general principle.

Geert.

Claim in knowing receipt. Most succinct ponder as to whether covered by A4 or 10 Rome II.Gable Insurance AG v Dewsall & Ors [2025] EWHC 2280 (Ch)www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH…

— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-09-09T06:34:10.507Z

The Lindemann Fellowship was established in 2024 to support promising academics in the field of private international law. Fellows are accepted for a three-year period, with new Fellows joining each year, as existing Fellows complete their tenure.  The core of the Fellowship is an annual, fully funded meeting of the Fellows and coordinators, lasting two […]

Now I know I have a blog queue at times but this one is unforgivably late. See here the report by Kathleen Garnett and myself on essential use in key international, US (federal) and EU law.

The concept of essential and non-essential use has been gaining traction in the broader context for chemicals policy. The authors of this report have analysed the concepts of “essential” and “non-essential” use under selected parts of International law, EU law, and US federal law with particular focus given to derogations/exemptions to a general prohibition/restriction which are (i) granted based on essentiality (or equivalent concepts) or (ii) are not granted because of non-essentiality (or equivalent concepts).

In July 2021 we completed a thorough review of essential uses approaches in 9 legal sources: The Montreal Protocol; the US Clean Air Act 1977; the EU Regulation 517/2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases; the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants; the EU POPs Regulation 2019/1021; the EU Regulation 528/2012 on biocidal products; the EU Regulation 1107/2009 on plant protection products; the EU Directive 2011/65 on hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment; and the EU Regulation 1333/2008 on food additives.

The study concludes that deployment of an essential use justification in this complex area of the law is rare. The most common reasons for justifying a derogation and /or exemption, are:

• the hazard can be controlled through risk management; and/or
• there are no suitable alternatives; and/or
• the cost of not allowing a derogations to proceed would be too high; or
• an emergency situation necessitates a derogation/exemption.

The Montreal Protocol appears to be an outlier in the regulation of hazardous substances with an essential use approach, and our analysis of the 1978 US forerunner to that approach is a most relevant element, we submit, in the current discussions on essential uses.

Kathleen, Geert.

 

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

Campeau v Gottex Real Asset Fund 1 (OE) Waste SARL [2025] EWHC 2322 (Comm) is worth a flag for the discussion of CPR r. 6.33(2B) which allows a claimant not to have to seek permission to serve out of the jurisdiction in the context of choice of court under the 2005 Hague Convention. It reads 

‘(2B) The claimant may serve the claim form on a defendant outside the United Kingdom where, for each claim made against the defendant to be served and included in the claim form—

(a) the court has power to determine that claim under the 2005 Hague Convention and the defendant is a party to an exclusive choice of court agreement conferring jurisdiction on that court within the meaning of Article 3 of the 2005 Hague Convention;

(b) a contract contains a term to the effect that the court shall have jurisdiction to determine that claim; or

(c) the claim is in respect of a contract falling within sub-paragraph (b).’

OE Waste’s argument is that Mr Campeau was not a party to the SPA which contains the clause, and there is no other basis, whether pursuant to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (‘the 1999 Act’) or as a matter of construction of the SPA on which Mr Campeau is to be treated as a party to, or permitted to rely on, the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the SPA. Moreover, there is no alternative basis in CPR 6.33(2B)(b) or (c) that would entitle Mr Campeau to serve the Claim Form out of the jurisdiction without permission.

Butcher J signals [28] that Mr Campeau ought to have submitted a request for permission to serve out as a subsidiary means, for under CPR PD 6B paragraph 3.1(6)(c), contract governed by English law, permission could have been granted on that basis. As it is, he decides on the basis of contractual construction that there is a good arguable case that the contractual scope of the choice of court clause did extend to a dispute over the extent of a third party’s rights under the relevant clause; and that the parties were agreed between themselves that such a dispute should be subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts.

The judgment is not particularly exciting however I decided to post anyway, seeing as it is a good example of contractual construction in the context of choice of court..

Geert.

 

 

Interesting judgment discussing choice of court (Hague 2005) and impact on claims by third parties; privity, contractual constructionCampeau v Gottex Real Asset Fund 1 (OE) Waste SARL [2025] EWHC 2322 (Comm)www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH…

— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-09-18T07:12:34.343Z

On various occasions in the past we have warned the readers of this blog of fraudulent e-mails sent to EAPIL members by persons impersonating Gilles Cuniberti, the President of the Association. As customary with this kind of scams, the scammers ask for money, and insist to have it urgently. Just don’t let them fool you. […]

The Hague Academy of International Law has made known the programme of the summer course of Private International Law of 2026. The course will be opened by Maria Chiara Malaguti (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore) with a lecture on Unification of Law: Overcoming Geography without Overcoming Diversity. The general course, titled Unity and Diversity in […]

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on Thursday 25 September 2025 at 14:30 (Mexico City time – CST), 22:30 (CEST time). The topic of the webinar is: A radical change in German Private International Law, the example of the naming law, which will be presented by Prof. Dr. Karl August von Sachsen Gessaphe (in Spanish).

The details of the webinar are:

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85043670569?pwd=jJJBWFanSEfm5RpHKwS61bXI6yoSQy.1

Meeting ID: 850 4367 0569

Password: AMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX