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This post is written by Dr. Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar LLM(LSE) PhD(Navarra), Associate Professor School of Law KIMEP

Introduction

In May 2026, the Court of First Instance of the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) recognised and enforced a Swiss ICC arbitral award rendered in favour of Naftogaz against Gazprom. The award arose out of the disputes between the parties concerning the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine after the start of the war.

The decision was followed by public comments from Kazakhstan’s Minister of Justice. According to press reports, the Minister stated that the award would not be enforced in Kazakhstan because neither Gazprom nor Naftogaz were participants in the AIFC and because the dispute had no connection to the Centre. He further suggested that the AIFC should not become a “transit platform” for the enforcement of foreign decisions unrelated to its activities.

The controversy raises an interesting private international law question that extends well beyond the particular dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz. Can the AIFC Court function as a conduit jurisdiction for the recognition of foreign arbitral awards and their subsequent enforcement in Kazakhstan, i.e. outside the AIFC?

The Jurisdictional Problem

The AIFC occupies a unique constitutional position. Established in 2018, it operates under a separate common-law framework within Kazakhstan and possesses its own court system staffed by international judges. Article 13(2) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute on the AIFC expressly provides that the AIFC Court is not part of the judicial system of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The difficulty is that the Constitutional Statute does not expressly address whether the AIFC Court may recognise foreign arbitral awards that have no connection to the Centre.

The Court relied principally on Article 45(1) of the AIFC Arbitration Regulations, which provides that: “An arbitral award, irrespective of the State or jurisdiction in which it was made, shall be recognised as binding within the AIFC.” The Court also relied on Article 40(3) of the AIFC Court Regulations, which refers to the enforcement of “other judgments and arbitration awards”.

Whether these provisions actually confer jurisdiction to recognise foreign arbitral awards remains debatable. The AIFC Constitutional Statute itself is largely silent on the matter. The dispute therefore raises a classic question of institutional competence: can jurisdiction be inferred from subordinate regulations where the constitutional instrument neither expressly grants nor expressly excludes it?

The New York Convention Argument

One possible justification for the Court’s approach lies in Kazakhstan’s obligations under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958.

The AIFC is located within the territory of Kazakhstan. Under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties bind the entire territory of a state unless a contrary intention appears. Nothing in Kazakhstan’s ratification of the New York Convention suggests that the Convention does not apply within the territory of the AIFC.

Article III of the Convention requires contracting states to recognise foreign arbitral awards. However, the Convention itself does not allocate jurisdiction among domestic courts. It does not specify whether recognition must be sought before an ordinary state court, a specialised commercial court or a court located within a financial centre. It may therefore be argued that once Kazakhstan created the AIFC Court and granted it powers relating to arbitration, the Court became one of the institutions through which Kazakhstan fulfils its Convention obligations.

The contrary argument is equally plausible. Kazakhstan may comply fully with the Convention while reserving recognition proceedings to its ordinary courts. The Convention requires recognition; it does not dictate which court must provide it.

An Exequatur of an Exequatur?

The dispute also raises a more traditional private international law concern.

If a Swiss arbitral award is recognised by the AIFC Court and the resulting AIFC judgment is then enforced elsewhere in Kazakhstan, one might ask whether this effectively amounts to an “exequatur of an exequatur”. Scholars have long expressed reservations about attempts to circulate recognition judgments relating to arbitral awards. Such practices may circumvent the grounds for refusal contained in Article V of the New York Convention by converting an arbitral award into a court judgment before seeking enforcement elsewhere.

Whether that objection applies here depends in part on how one characterises the relationship between the AIFC and Kazakhstan. Although the AIFC forms part of Kazakhstan’s territory, it possesses a distinct legal system and separate courts. Therefore it is, properly speaking “another jurisdiction”, if not another state.

Lessons from Dubai and Abu Dhabi

The most illuminating comparison comes from the Gulf financial centres, which the AIFC openly tries to emulate.

The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts have long been associated with the concept of a conduit jurisdiction. Under the DIFC framework, parties have sought recognition of foreign judgments and arbitral awards before the DIFC Courts even where neither the parties nor the dispute had any connection to the DIFC. Once recognised, the resulting DIFC judgment could potentially be enforced through the ordinary Dubai courts.

The leading authorities include X1 and X2 v Y1 and Y2 and Banyan Tree Corporate Pte Ltd v Meydan Group LLC. In both cases, the DIFC Courts adopted a broad understanding of their recognition jurisdiction.

The Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) followed a different path. Following legislative reforms in 2020, it became clear that the ADGM Courts could not be used as a conduit jurisdiction for the recognition of foreign judgments and arbitral awards. Abu Dhabi thus deliberately rejected a model that Dubai had largely embraced.

The AIFC now appears to stand somewhere between these two approaches. Unlike the DIFC legislation, the AIFC framework contains no clear statement granting recognition jurisdiction over foreign arbitral awards irrespective of any connection to the Centre. Unlike the ADGM legislation, however, it contains no express prohibition.

Conclusions

The Minister’s remarks announcing that the AIFC Court judgement would not be enforced in Kazakhstan may be understood as reflecting a legitimate policy concern: whether an international financial-centre court should be used to bypass ordinary domestic recognition procedures. Yet, they also concern a matter that is arguably for the courts themselves to determine. The Constitutional Statute repeatedly emphasises the independence of the AIFC Court and grants it exclusive authority to interpret AIFC law.

The broader issue therefore concerns institutional design rather than merely arbitration enforcement. If Kazakhstan does not wish the AIFC Court to function as a conduit jurisdiction, the appropriate solution may be legislative clarification. Conversely, if the AIFC is intended to replicate aspects of the DIFC model, greater certainty regarding its recognition jurisdiction would be desirable.

The CJEU judgment in TQ v Mr Green Limited (C‑198/24) follows an approach that the Court accustomed us to in relation to European uniform procedures requests for a preliminary ruling. In this area, over the years, the Court methodically adopted an autonomous and strict interpretation of the requirements that must be fulfilled for the creditor […]

On 16 June 2026, Stockholm University will host a release seminar for Scandinavian Studies in Law, Volume 72: ThePoliticisation of Private International Law. As previously reported on the blog, Stockholm University hosted a Nordic conference last June on the politicisation of private international law. The conference presentations, together with several additional contributions, have now been […]

This post, which is cross posted on EU Law Live, was contributed by Dr Johannes Ungerer, who is a Senior Research Lecturer in the Faculty of Law, a Deputy Director of the Institute of European and Comparative Law, and an Associate Research Fellow of St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford. The CJEU’s judgment in Crédit […]

On May 19, the CJEU (Grand Chamber, judge F. Biltgen as rapporteur), made public its judgment in case C-350/24, Crédit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank SA, upon referral by the French Cour de Cassation. The importance of the decision for PIL cannot be ignored, thus this post reproducing the main points of the reasoning of […]

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, which has been enacted by every U.S. state, discourages forum shopping in child custody disputes by assigning subject-matter jurisdiction to the court located in the “home state” of the child. In Allen v. Allen, decided on April 21, 2026, the Montana Supreme Court had to determine whether the child’s “home state” was Montana or the Netherlands. This case shines an important spotlight on the importance of timing in international child custody disputes. The left-behind parent’s likelihood of success is strongly correlated with how quickly her or she acts to vindicate their legal rights.

Facts

Jonathan Edward Allen (Father) and Petronella Gerline (Van Oosterom) Allen (Mother) were married in Colorado in 2009. Father is a United States citizen. Mother is a dual citizen of the United States and the Netherlands. Their child (R.A.A.) was born in 2015. In 2020, the family moved from Colorado to Montana.

In August 2023, after Father and Mother began having marital difficulties, Mother and R.A.A. relocated to the Netherlands. In February 2024, Mother filed a petition for divorce and custody with the District Court of Central Netherlands (Netherlands District Court).

In January 2025, Father filed a petition with the District Court of The Hague seeking the return of R.A.A. pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. This petition was denied. Although the court held that R.A.A. had been wrongfully removed from the United States, the court reasoned that the one-year automatic return period had passed and that R.A.A. had become settled in her new environment in the Netherlands. This decision was affirmed on appeal.

In September 2025, Father filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Custody and Petition for Permanent Parenting Plan in Montana state court. That court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, it held that it lacked the power to adjudicate the dispute because Montana was no longer the “home state” of R.A.A. Father, acting pro se, appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.

Analysis

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) assigns exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to courts located in the child’s “home state” when it comes to matters relating to child custody. The “home state” is “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” The UCCJEA specifically provides that courts “shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States” for purposes of resolving these disputes.

On the facts presented in Allen v. Allen, the Montana Supreme Court correctly held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Father’s emergency motion. Mother and R.A.A. relocated to the Netherlands in August 2023. Six months later—in February 2024—R.A.A.’s home state shifted to the Netherlands. The Dutch courts—not the Montana courts—now had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve custody disputes involving R.A.A. Father did not file his motion in Montana until September 2025, which was nineteen months too late.

Conclusion

If Father had filed his suit in Montana before February 2024, he could have shown that Montana was R.A.A.’s “home state” because she had not yet resided in the Netherlands for six months. The suit was, however, not filed until September 2025.

If Father had filed suit in the Netherlands before August 2024, he could have argued that R.A.A. should be returned to the United States pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction because R.A.A. had not yet resided in the Netherlands for a year. The suit was, however, not filed until January 2025.

The takeaway of Allen v. Allen is the need for speed in international child custody cases. The timelines baked into the relevant laws and treaties mandate that the left-behind parent move quickly to assert their rights. If they are slow off the mark, they be forced to litigate in foreign courts under less favorable legal rules.

This post was contributed by Denise Wiedemann, a Professor for Private Law with Focus on Family and Succession Law at the University of Kiel. This is the fourth contribution to the online symposium on Mr Green Ltd. The circumstances and background of case C-198/24 have already been described by Daryna Shykeriava, Emilia Sandri and Carlos Santaló […]

This post was contributed by Carlos Santalo Goris, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Luxembourg and the author of The Application of the European Account Preservation Order in Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. A Comparative-Empirical Analysis (Nomos, 2025). This is the third contribution to the online symposium on Mr Green Ltd. The main prerequisite to […]

This post was written by Emilia Sandri, who is a doctoral candidate at the University of Antwerp. This is the second contribution to the online symposium on Mr Green LTD. On 21 May 2026, the ECJ delivered its ruling in Mr Green, providing the first authoritative guidance on the conditions for issuing a preservation order […]

This post was contributed by Daryna Shykeriava, who is a PhD researcher at Mykolas Romeris University (Vilnius, Lithuania). It is the first contribution to the online symposium on Mr Green Ltd. On 21 May 2026 the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter – CJEU) rendered the judgment in the case C-198/24 (TQ v […]

On 21 May 2026 the Court of Justice of the European Union rendered its judgment in case C-198/24 TQ v Mr Green Limited on the interpretation of Article 7(1) of the Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 on the conditions for the issuance of European Account Preservation Orders. In the coming days, the EAPIL blog will hold […]

On Tuesday, June 2, 2026, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CEST).

Thalia Kruger (University of Antwerp) will speak, in English, about the topic

“The Problem with Legal Certainty in Private International Law”

Legal certainty is often considered foundational in private international law.  It is used as justification for some of our connecting factors, and their application in time, as well as for our standards on recognition of foreign authentic instruments and judgments. However, if understood in a positivistic and precise manner, legal certainty can impede or complicate legal changes. The paper investigates where legal certainty has undesired consequences, especially in a context of righting past wrongs.

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

This month begins with the publication, on Thursday 4, of Advocate General Norkus’s opinion in the Grand Chamber case C-41/25, Orsay, on the interpretation of Regulation 2015/848, on insolvency proceedings. The dispute pending before the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) concern avoidance proceedings brought in Germany by a German insolvency practitioner against the Treasury of the Republic of […]

As part of the DFG- and AHRC-funded Fashion’s PLACE project, a workshop on Private International Law, Sustainability and Fashion will be hosted at the Geneva Graduate Institute on 18 June 2026, from 11:00 to 13:00 CEST. The event will bring together perspectives from law, sustainability and the fashion industry, with short presentations and space for […]

The Centre for Private Governance of the Faculty of Law of the University of Copenhagen and UNIDROIT Nordic Law Centre will host a conference on Direct claims, forum and choice of law on 11-12 June 2026 in Copenhagen. Direct claims have for long been recognised in Nordic law and also in other jurisdictions. The concept […]

From 8 to 10 June 2026, the Faculty of Law at Stockholm University will host a conference entitled Cross-border Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Africa. The conference brings together leading scholars and practitioners to explore the challenges and opportunities of cross-border enforcement of intellectual property rights (IP) in Africa, focusing on regional frameworks, private […]

Written by Jeremy MEI Ziyang

LLM student at Wuhan University

Visiting student at Singapore Management University

I. Background

On 15 May this year, Ministry of Justice (MOJ) of China issued its Official Notice No 5 of 2026 (‘the MOJ Notice’), announcing that the relevant extraterritorial investigation carried out by EU on Chinese entities Nuctech constitutes improper extraterritorial jurisdiction measures under China’s Regulation on Countering Improper Foreign Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (ROCIFEJ, State Council Decree No 835).[1] This Regulation was promulgated and entered into force on 7 April 2026. As a nationwide regulation promulgated by State Council, although it cannot be called an ‘Act’ that should be passed by the National People’s Congress, its legal hierarchical force directly follows an ‘Act’, higher than the previous Blocking Rules issued by Ministry of Commerce (MOC).[2]

The MOJ Notice arises from an information request issued by the European Commission to Nuctech’s EU entities. Nuctech is a multinational threat-detection systems manufacturer and seller headquartered in China. The Commission started investigation under Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) and sought access to emails of employees of Nuctech’s EU entities. Although those entities are registered and operate within the EU, their email  are stored on their parent company’s servers in China.

II. Legal basis and effects under Chinese law

The legal basis for this declaration is Articles 3 and 6 of ROCIFEJ. Article 3 empowers Chinese government to take measures countering foreign improper extraterritorial jurisdiction. Article 6 mandates MOJ to issue official notices identifying a foreign measure constitutes improper extraterritorial jurisdiction, taking into account (1) violation of international law and basic norms governing international relations; (2) inappropriate jurisdictional nexus with that foreign state; (3) danger to China’s national sovereignty, security and development interests, or damage to lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens and organisations; and (4) other factors that shall be taken into consideration.

According to the press releases of MOJ and MOC (which also participated in the investigation), the Notice is issued on these grounds: (1) the scope of requested data is broad that ‘obviously violates international law and basic norms governing international relations’; and (2) EU has also compelled Chinese banking institutions to provide vast and unrelated information located in China, adversely affecting the normal investment and business operations of Chinese enterprises.[3] Although the factor of inappropriate jurisdictional nexus is not mentioned, it can be impliedly conveyed that the Chinese authorities find it inappropriate for EU to unilaterally acquire data stored in China.

The MOJ Notice states that ‘any organisation or individual shall not enforce or assist in enforcing such improper extraterritorial jurisdiction measures.’ It is immaterial whether the provider or assistant is a Chinese entity. The MOJ Notice creates a direct conflict between EU law and Chinese law. Nuctech EU entities will face the dilemma of either violating EU law or violating Chinese law. There is also no doctrine like ‘foreign sovereign compulsion’ in either EU or China.[4] Under EU law, entities choosing to carry out commercial activities in the EU internal market cannot, in principle, rely on the rules of a non-EU state to violate mandatory regulations of the EU.[5] If the European Commission insists acquisition of those data, Nuctech cannot use the Chinese prohibition as an effective defence.

III. The Deepening Jurisdictional Conflict and the Limits of Existing Frameworks

The Nuctech case is not an isolated incident but a manifestation of a systemic problem: the escalating horizontal conflict between states’ assertions of data jurisdiction. This conflict is not new. The Microsoft v. United States (2016) litigation already demonstrated the core tension. However, The Nuctech situation under the ROCIFEJ represents a qualitative escalation for three reasons.

First, it involves a direct, public, and legally binding prohibition by China against compliance with an EU measure. Unlike the US where the Microsoft litigation ultimately turned on statutory interpretation, China has now issued a formal notice under a newly enacted regulation (ROCIFEJ), declaring the EU’s FSR investigation ab initio improper and imposing a positive legal duty on “any organisation or individual” not to comply. This is a blocking statute in its most potent form. It transforms a conflict of jurisdiction between states into a direct legal dilemma for the corporate entity: comply with the EU and violate Chinese law with potential sanctions under ROCIFEJ, or comply with Chinese order and risk penalties from the EU including fines or a negative inference under the FSR. The only possible way out is Art 5 of the ROCIFEJ which allows the affected company to apply for an exemption from MOJ.

Second, the conflict is now hardwired into the enforcement actions of two major economies without a mutual legal assistance or data-sharing framework. The EU and China have no equivalent of the US-EU Data Privacy Framework, no bilateral judicial assistance treaty specifically tailored to data, and no CLOUD Act-style agreement. The EU’s FSR allows it to demand broad access to information, including electronically stored data, from any entity receiving EU subsidies. China’s ROCIFEJ allows it to block precisely such demands if they are deemed to violate international law or threaten national interests. Neither legal order contains a doctrine of “foreign sovereign compulsion” that would excuse non-compliance. From an EU law perspective, the Nuctech EU entities are established in the EU, operate within the EU internal market, and are subject to EU law. The CJEU has consistently held  that EU mandatory rules can follow EU entities even in their extra-EU activities. A Chinese blocking notice is unlikely to be recognised as a valid defence.

Third, the underlying jurisdictional nexus is fundamentally contested. The EU’s FSR investigation targets Nuctech’s EU entities, which are legally incorporated in EU member states. The Commission’s information request is directed at those EU entities. The fact that those emails are stored on parent company servers in China is, from an EU perspective, a matter of corporate organisation, not a jurisdictional bar. The Chinese government, however, views the request as an improper extraterritorial measure because it seeks data physically located in China, effectively compelling production from the Chinese parent company via its EU subsidiaries. This is the classic “data controller” (EU) versus “data location” (China) jurisdictional conflict, now weaponised by two comprehensive legal regimes.

The MOJ Notice declares that the EU measure shall not be enforced or assisted in enforcement. But what are the practical consequences, given the EU’s likely disregard for the Chinese notice? Under Chinese law, the ROCIFEJ provides for enforcement mechanisms. Article 7 allows the Chinese government to “take necessary measures” against any person who complies with a foreign improper extraterritorial measure, including prohibiting them from doing business with Chinese entities, restricting or denying them certain rights, and imposing fines. More significantly, Article 8 allows Chinese citizens or organisations that have suffered losses due to another person’s compliance with such foreign measures to sue for damages in Chinese courts. Nuctech’s EU entities or any third parties, such as lawyers, service providers, etc., if they comply with the EU’s data demand, could theoretically face legal action in China. However, enforcement against EU-based entities with no assets in China is largely symbolic.

Under EU law, as noted, there is no “foreign sovereign compulsion” defence. The European Commission can and likely will ignore the MOJ Notice. The FSR empowers the Commission to impose fines for non-compliance with information requests (Article 26). The Commission could also draw adverse inferences about Nuctech’s subsidy status from the refusal. Thus, if Nuctech’s EU entities cannot receive exemption from China, the MOJ Notice creates a classic compliance dilemma.

[1] Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Notice on the Constitution of Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as regards Relevant Measures Taken by EU in Foreign Subsidies Investigation’ (Gov.cn 15 May 2026) <https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/zwxxgk/fdzdgknr/fdzdgknrtzwj/202605/t20260515_535049.html> accessed 21 May 2026.

[2] Rules on Blocking Improper Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Laws and Measures (Decree [2021] No 1 of Ministry of Commerce) (China).

[3] Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Spokesperson for the Ministry of Justice Answers Questions from the Press about the Constitution of Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction as regards Relevant Measures Taken by EU in Foreign Subsidies Investigation’ (Gov.cn 15 May 2026) <https://www.moj.gov.cn/pub/sfbgw/gwxw/xwyw/202605/t20260515_535048.html> accessed 21 May 2026; Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce Answers Questions from the Press about the Determination that Relevant Measures Taken by EU in Foreign Subsidies Investigation Constitute Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Measures’ (Gov.cn 16 May 2026) <https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/xwfb/xwfyrth/art/2026/art_df1b7dd65f014ea29f7de59bb04e2ebf.html> accessed 21 May 2026.

[4] Re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation 8 F 4th 136 (2d Cir US 2021); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 442 (2018) (US).

[5] Nuctech (n 3) [80]–[81].

The first issue of 2026 of the Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (RDIPP) is out. In addition to recent case law and other materials, it features two contributions. Ilaria Queirolo, Il diritto internazionale privato della famiglia come strumento di pace (Private International Family Law as an Instrument of Peace) The aim of this […]

A commercial dispute between a Cypriot and a Greek company led to a series of judgments concerning the application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation on matters of enforceability, which demonstrate the problems of mixing EU with domestic enforcement procedures. A recent judgment refused enforcement of a Cypriot decision on the grounds of lacking subjective enforceability, […]

Building on the success of the three previous editions (here; here and here), the third edition of the EAPIL Winter School is currently being organised by the European Association of Private International Law and the Department of Law, Economics and Cultures of the University of Insubria in Como, in cooperation with the Law Faculty of the University […]