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This post was contributed by Antonio Mariconda, who is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Naples Federico II. In cross-border legal relationships, it is not uncommon that individuals’ expectations about the legal treatment of their situations are not matched by reality. This has to do with the fact that parties to cross-border situations are […]

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

Like all my posts, this post is entirely AI free.

A quick note on CJEU Case C‑346/25, Fibo Markets (Fido Markets LTd v JP) which was held mid June. The judgment concerns Article 6(4)d Rome I. This Article in short carves out financial instruments from Rome I’s protective provisions for consumer contracts (essentially resurrecting therefore lex voluntatis under Article 3, and the cascade of Article 4 should parties not chose an applicable law . However the formulation of the provision, to use the words of Michael Wilderspin in the late professor Mankowski’s commentary (Rome I, Sellier, 2017, p.471) leads to a provision that is “utterly bewildering and in its meaning opaque” to the uninitiated (and I wonder how many of those initiated there truly are).

The provision reads in full

Article 6(4).      Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to:…

(d)      rights and obligations which constitute a financial instrument and rights and obligations constituting the terms and conditions governing the issuance or offer to the public and public take-over bids of transferable securities, and the subscription and redemption of units in collective investment undertakings in so far as these activities do not constitute provision of a financial service;

One learns from the wording that B2C ‘financial services’ are fully included in the protective provisions, and that ‘financial instruments’ might not be. The recitals (but not the actual statutory provisions) link this to a number of EU secondary laws, in particular Directive 2004/39 (see also the CJEU judgment for detail). Michael summarises the provisions by referring to financial derivatives, which do not consist of tangible money but rather are a set of promised that can be executed at a later stage (my late father in law would have called that ‘Fairy Money’). They tend to be transactioned (is that a verb?)  with investors in many different countries, and applying different sets of consumer rules to them, Michael Wilderspin explains, would be inappropriate.

The instrument at issue in current case is a financial contract for differences (‘CFD’), which FSMA tell me is a is a “derivative financial product that allows investors to take a long or a short position in an underlying asset.” They are highly speculative.

[34] the CJEU refers to the EC explanation to specify that CFS

are contractual in nature. They are cash settled derivative contracts, the purpose of which is to transfer to the investor the exposure to fluctuations in the value of an underlying asset. The transaction between the parties is based on the difference between the prevailing value of the underlying asset at the time of the conclusion of the contract and its value at the time of sale.

Referring to the use, in Article 6(4)d of the expression “rights and obligations which constitute a financial instrument” (emphasis added) in 22 of the 23 official language forms of the Regulation, in contrast with 1, the German one, which uses “in relation to” (im Zusammenhang mit einem Finanzinstrument), the Court notes [44] that that provision does not cover all the rights and obligations connected to a financial instrument, but  only those which form that instrument strictly speaking.

[46] by contrast

terms which stipulate how the professional is to receive, process, execute or modify the order placed by the consumer do not, in the light of the wording of Article 6(4)(d) of the Rome I Regulation alone, come within the scope of the rights and obligations constituting the financial instrument itself.

[51] limiting the expression “‘rights and obligations which constitute a financial instrument” to the rights and obligations that define the CFD strictly speaking is held to be consistent with the objective of consumer protection pursued by A6(4) Rome I.

In the case at issue this means that Clause 8.10 of the framework contract, which provided that FIBO reserved the right, in the event of a technical failure on that platform, not to execute the transaction as instructed by J.P, that is to say, not to conclude the corresponding CFD or, as the case may be, to execute it on different terms, in particular at a price other than that indicated in J.P.’s order, is NOT caught by the carve-out and fully subject to the protection of the laws of the consumer’s habitual residence.

In conclusion, only financial instruments strictly speaking are excluded from the consumer carve-out, and not contracts which govern their acquisition and related transactions.

Geert.

 

The publisher’s blurb, including a discount code, is as follows:

Private International Law and Children’s Rights Law  

Conflicts in International Child Abduction Cases

Tine Van Hof

This book examines the relationship between two legal fields when courts decide on cross-border child abduction. While private international law prioritises the child’s prompt return and applies the best interests principle in abstracto, children’s rights law demands an in concreto, individualised assessment of the child’s best interests. These differing approaches can lead to legal friction in practice.

Through a detailed analysis of legal instruments and supranational case law, the book explores how these conflicts arise and how they might be resolved.

Offering clear recommendations for lawmakers, international organisations, and courts, the book provides a roadmap for fostering constructive relationships between legal fields. It is an essential resource for scholars of private international law, judges and practitioners in cross-border family law, and policymakers working at the intersection of international law and children’s rights.

 

Tine Van Hof is a legal researcher at the University of Antwerp, Belgium.

 

Jun 2026   |   9781509977055   |   288pp   |   Hbk   |    RRP: £90

Discount Price: £72

Order online at www.hartpublishing.co.uk  – use the code GLR BD8 to get 20% off!

Sign up to our email list to receive updates about our new titles.

 

This post has kindly been provided by Markus Lieberknecht (University of Osnabrück).

It is our great pleasure to bring to readers’ attention the publication of the article “The Reasons Highest Courts Give: England, France, Germany; 1880–89 and 2007–16”, co-authored by Holger Spamann (Harvard Law School), Stefan Vogenauer and Jasper Kunstreich (MPI Hamburg), Heinrich Nemeczek (Scalable Capital) and Markus Lieberknecht (Osnabrück University), in The Journal of Legal Studies.

One of the core debates in comparative law concerns the characteristics, extent, and development of the common/civil law divide. In this context, it is a familiar trope that common and civil lawyers reason differently, but that the systems are converging. However, the empirical basis for such claims is thin to nonexistent. To address this paucity of data-backed research, we present the first systematic quantitative comparison of three paragon jurisdictions of common law (England) and civil law (France and Germany), and across two centuries (1880–89 vs. 2007–16). Specifically, we analyze the use of legal authorities (cases, statutes, and literature) in 40 representative opinions of each apex court in each of the two decades we surveyed.

Our findings challenge some conventional wisdoms. Take the claim of fundamental differences: Our findings suggest that England and Germany differ only in degree, not in kind. For instance, most German opinions were already citing and distinguishing precedent in the 1880s. There is nothing that one court does, that the other does not do at all. Nonetheless, English courts engage with prior cases more closely than the German courts. Overall, the odd one out in this trio is France, not England. The convergence thesis does not fare well in light of our data either: We observed no such development but instead noted the opening of a new chasm with regard to legal literature, which only the modern German court engages extensively.

Naturally, our study can only pose a challenge, not a refutation, of engrained beliefs that common and civil law systems are fundamentally different but that they have been converging.  It is, however, a rather strong challenge, relying on data from the three arguably central jurisdictions on the bread-and-butter object of legal studies (opinions of apex courts). We invite further research based on our sampling and coding scheme, which is scalable and can be applied to other jurisdictions and time periods.

The article – Spamann/Kunstreich/Lieberknecht/Nemeczek/Vogenauer, 55 J. Leg. Stud. 365 (2026) – can be accessed here or obtained from the author of this post.

The following announcement was kindly shared with us by Fabienne Jault-Seseke.

The 6th issue of Perspectives contentieuses internationales has been released and is online.

It contains seven articles related to the consolidation of cross-border litigation. These articles form the first part of the proceedings of a conference held in Toulouse in November 2025. The second part will be published in Volume 7. Volume 6 also includes two further articles, one on the law applicable to air transport and one of theclassification, and three short notes (focus).

Here is the list of papers, along with their abstracts.

Fabienne Jault-Seseke, The consolidation of cross-border litigation in the interests of consistency

The consolidation of cross-border litigation makes it possible to satisfy the requirement of consistency. It is mainly understood as the ability to bring claims and defendants before a single judge,but it also arises in the context of res judicata. Consolidation serves the proper administration of justice by avoiding fragmented decisions in the same case, and it must be seen together with the right of access to a court. Finding the right balance is difficult. It depends on the nature and subject matter of the dispute. The rules that make such concentration possible are varied (related actions, the most appropriate forum, lis pendens, transfer of jurisdiction, specialization of courts, and cooperation between judges).

Sandrine Clavel, Global litigation strategy and consolidation

An analysis of the procedural strategies likely to be employed by the main parties involved in civil and commercial litigation—particularly businesses and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—reveals that they hold an ambivalent stance toward the goal of consolidating litigation. These strategies are, in fact, primarily driven by the desire to achieve the most favorable outcome for the party concerned; however, this fundamental objective is sometimes best served by consolidating the litigation and at other times by splitting it up. This analysis also highlights that the fragmentation of litigation is a natural tendency in transnational disputes, due to the multiplicity of parties and the dispersion of the elements of the dispute across multiple legal systems, but also, at times, due to the nature of the applicable legal rules. It is therefore relatively easy for the parties to capitalise on this trend by devising procedural strategies based on multiple proceedings, whereas it may prove more complex for those who, for very legitimate reasons, wish to effectively consolidate their litigation. The overview of litigation strategies presented in this article therefore leads to the conclusion that what matters is not so much deciding, in abstracto, on the respective merits of consolidating or fragmenting international litigation — this must be decided on a case-by-case basis by the parties involved, depending on the nature of the dispute and the applicable rules — but rather to provide litigants with effective tools to achieve the objective of consolidating litigation when they deem it desirable, and to provide judges with effective tools to sanction any abuses that might be committed by those litigants in defining their litigation strategies.

Estelle Gallant (dir.), The consolidation of litigation in family matters

Although the concentration of litigation in international family matters could undoubtedly be favored, it nevertheless appears that the European regulation of international family conflicts offers litigants a broad range of rules on judicial jurisdiction and thus establishes a deliberate form of forum shopping. This notably enables the better-informed parties to bring proceedings before the court whose applicable law will provide them with the greatest advantages. Mechanisms for consolidating proceedings do exist, but they clearly do not reflect any general objective pursued by the legislature. The autonomy of the will, increasingly valued in private international family law, may therefore prove valuable for parties wishing to anticipate outcomes in the event of a dispute; however, it may also appear as a discriminatory tool serving only a certain category of litigants and thus fail to satisfy all the objectives of justice in private international law. Finally, the fragmentation of international litigation sometimes comes into conflict with national rules requiring the indivisibility of certain proceedings, raising the question of how such rules should be reconciled with European regulations.

Marie Nioche, Provisional justice and consolidation of cross-border disputes

Provisional justice tends to fragment proceedings in cross-border disputes. The analysis is based on the Brussels I bis Regulation. The author first addresses the causes of this fragmentation. She then considers possible solutions for improving the concentration of cross-border provisional litigation. Under current law, the options are limited, as traditional tools are ill-suited to provisional litigation. De lege ferenda, however, it is possible to effectively tackle fragmentation by recognizing the central role of the judge who has jurisdiction on the merits, both ex ante – to prevent coordination difficulties and conflicts of provisional proceedings or decisions – and ex post – to resolve them. 

Philippine Blajan, Consolidation of cross-border disputes litigation through the optimal use of choice-of-court agreements

Choice-of-court agreements have become key instruments for managing cross-border disputes in an increasingly complex international commercial environment. Beyond ensuring predictability, they enable parties to concentrate litigation before a single forum and reduce the risks of parallel proceedings and inconsistent judgments. Their effectiveness, however, depends on their ability to bind third parties involved in complex contractual networks and to withstand competing jurisdictional claims. At the same time, excessive concentration may undermine procedural fairness where vulnerable or weaker parties are compelled to litigate before a distant or burdensome forum. The article analyses the tensions between party autonomy, procedural efficiency, and access to justice under European and French private international law. It concludes by suggesting a new “jurisdictional concentration clause” designed to centralize disputes arising from interconnected contractual relationships while preserving fairness and legal certainty, and binding force of contracts.

Julie Esquenazi, Hélène Georgelin, Choice-of-court agreements, primacy at any cost comes at a price

In the last few months, case law has been particularly notable in relation to jurisdiction clauses. Notably, the scope of such clauses is becoming increasingly broader, particularly with regard to their primacy over other jurisdictional rules as well as their enforceability against interested third parties. This approach in case law, justified by the objective of predictability, may conflict with other principles, such as the proper administration of justice or the relative effect of agreements.

 

Laurence Idot Consolidation of litigation: the contributions of public enforcement to private enforcement

Public enforcement in cross-border matters has developed considerably. Competition law is a prime testing ground. But financial and digital matters, among others, are also concerned. The mechanisms for concentrating litigation found there cannot simply be transposed to private enforcement. They are nevertheless a source of inspiration, whether in identifying the most suitable authority, putting in place cross-border information mechanisms, or identifying rules that help ensure coherence.

Caroline Derache, Constance Plouchart, The law applicable to disputes relating to air transport

Although international air transport is governed by uniform substantive rules laid down among others in long-standing international treaties, there are still many situations where, in case of litigation, the court may have to determine the law applicable to the claims brought before it. This is the case, for example, when parties other than the carrier are involved. Determining the relevant text and subsequently applying the appropriate conflict of laws rule can, then, give rise to debates that have led to decisions that are worth examining. However, some issues have not yet been resolved.   

Sophie Duparc, Elie Lenglard, Maud Minois, Noela Picari, What role does the ‘lege fori’ classification play in the age of independent classification ?

What role remains for lege fori characterization in a private international law increasingly shaped by the European Union and by autonomous concepts developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union ? Using the landmark Caraslanis decision as its starting point, the article argues that the opposition between domestic and autonomous characterization is less radical than commonly assumed. Although European harmonization has shifted the interpretation of connecting-factor categories to the legal order of the Union, it has neither eliminated the relevance of national legal concepts nor resolved the difficulties surrounding the identification of the object of characterization. The article highlights the continuing methodological value of lege fori characterization through three contemporary case studies: the fiducie and the trust, the direct action mechanism, and claims based on the abrupt termination of established commercial relationships. These examples reveal the persistent tension between European uniformity and the diversity of national private law systems. The authors contend that autonomous characterization can operate coherently only through renewed reliance on comparative analysis and a careful understanding of national legal institutions. The challenge today is therefore not to replace lege fori characterization with autonomous concepts, but to articulate both approaches in a manner that safeguards the unity of EU private international law while preserving the coherence of domestic legal systems.

The focus are the following :

Summary report on the inaugural conference of the GLAS Forum, by Daniela de Avilez Demoro and Yannick Vincent

A first step towards a revision of the Brussels I bis Regulation, by Sandrine Clavel

The transposition of the anti-SLAPP Directive, by Fabienne Jault-Seseke

The latest issue of the French journal dedicated to international dispute resolution, Perspectives Contentieuses internationales (PCI), has been released. It is an open access publication and can be freely read here. Concentration of Cross-Border Disputes (Part 1) This new issue features the first part of a special dossier on the concentration of cross-border disputes edited […]

 

This post was kindly prepared by Véronique Carole Ngono, Professor of Private Law (agrégée), University of Douala, Cameroon.

 

I. Introduction

The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa has not been the subject of many studies. Although a few such studies do exist, this is in contrast to the field of conflict of laws and personal status law in particular. Consequently, the two rulings issued by the Supreme Court of Senegal on August 12, 2020, in connected disputes went practically unnoticed, even though they offer valuable insights into determining the jurisdiction of Senegalese courts in international disputes and the enforcement of foreign judgments.

The purpose of this note is therefore to shed light on the law and practice of conflict jurisdictions in Senegal.

 

II. Facts and proceedings

The dispute involves a Senegalese couple, X (the husband) and Y (the wife), who married in Senegal in 1996. They lived there for some time before Y moved to Montreal, Canada, where she settled in 2015.

In 2017, X filed a petition for divorce in Senegal. Y challenged the jurisdiction of the Senegalese courts. The lower court rejected Y’s objection and assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Dissatisfied with the decision, Y appealed to the Supreme Court [Case 1].

Meanwhile, in 2019, Y successfully obtained an interim order from a court in Montreal, Quebec, in the divorce proceedings between the parties. The order, among other things, granted Y the exclusive right to occupy a residence located in Senegal, to the exclusion of X.

The lower court declared the Canadian judgment enforceable in Senegal. Dissatisfied with that decision, X appealed to the Supreme Court [Case 2].

 

III. Rulings

Case 1 (Ruling No 73 of 12 August 2020)

In the first case, the Supreme Court ruled that when disputes involve spouses of Senegalese nationality, the wife resides abroad, the rule governing the international jurisdiction of Senegalese courts set forth in Article 853 of the Family Code (CF) apply to the exclusion of domestic provisions contained in Article 167 of the same Code, which are confined to matters of territorial jurisdiction. Second, the Court held that, by virtue of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 853, the Senegalese Court are not required, in the event of international lis pendens, to decline jurisdiction in favor of a foreign court hearing the same dispute between the same parties. Consequently, the lower court dismissed the lis pendens noting that the – both Senegalese national married in Senegal – had lived there before Y moved to Canada in 2015, properly justified its decision.

 

Case 2 (Ruling No 74 of 12 August 2020)

In the second case, the supreme Court ruled as follows:

First, the Supreme Court recalled the applicable legal framework for granting exequatur, notably Articles 787-790 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) dealing with the exequatur requirements, and Articles 853 [op. cit.] as well as 843 and 846 of the FC dealing with the law applicable to the extra-patrimonial effects of marriage and divorce or legal separation, as well as matrimonial property regimes. The Court then observed that the lower court had declared the Canadian judgment enforceable in Senegal on the ground that it satisfied the requirements for recognition and enforcement.

However, the Supreme Court disagreed and held that, by declaring the Canadian judgment enforceable, the lower court had misapplied the law. First, the Canadian court lacked jurisdiction to order provisional measures in divorce proceedings between Senegalese spouses, since some of those measures were to be enforced in Senegal and the Canadian court had failed to apply Senegalese law, which was designated as the applicable law under the Senegalese conflict-of-laws rules. Second, nothing in the order established that the judgment had been rendered in proceedings in which the parties had been duly served, properly represented, or declared in default.

 

IV. Comments

An analysis of the two rulings sheds light on how Senegalese Courts deal with parallel proceedings in international disputes (1) and the requirements of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (2).

 

1. The treatment of parallel proceedings by Senegalese Court

The first ruling in case 1 by the Supreme Court of Senegal provides some useful insights. First according to the supreme court, where one of the defendants is resident abroad, rules on international jurisdiction should apply even when the dispute is between two Senegalese nationals. Second, rules on international jurisdiction do not recognize international lis pendens. This is because according to the Court, Article 853 of the FC confers exclusive jurisdiction to Senegalese court whenever either plaintiff or the defendant is Senegalese national.

Accordingly, while Article 853 of the FC does not explicitly refer to the exclusive nature of the ground of jurisdiction based on the Senegalese nationality, the Court interpreted the “privilege of jurisdiction” referred to in the provision as conferring Senegalese courts exclusive jurisdiction. This exclusive nature of the jurisdiction of Senegalese courts precludes the recognition of international lis pendens, unless the parties have waived the jurisdictional privilege conferred to them or the judgment resulting from proceedings initiated in Senegal is intended to be enforced abroad.

Consequently, a judgment rendered abroad in a dispute between Senegalese nationals or between a Senegalese national and a foreign national in violation of this exclusive jurisdiction may not be enforced in Senegal. Paragraph 2 of this article further provides that Senegalese courts also have jurisdiction over disputes between foreign nationals when the defendant is domiciled in Senegal or when one of the jurisdictional grounds referred to in article 34 through 36 o the CPC dealing with territorial jurisdiction is located in Senegal.

 

2. The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment

 

a) Applicable legal framework

Under Article 787 of the CCP, in civil, commercial and administrative matters, contentious and non-contentious decisions rendered by foreign courts have de plano the force of res judicata in Senegal territory if they meet the following conditions:

a) The decision was rendered by a court having jurisdiction in accordance with the rules on conflicts of jurisdiction recognized in Senegal;

b) The decision applied the law governing the dispute in accordance with the conflict-of-laws rules recognized in Senegal

c) The decision is, under the law of the State in which it was made, final, binding and enforceable under the law of the rendering State;

d) The parties were duly summoned, represented or declared in default;

e) The judgment is not contrary to Senegalese public policy and does not conflict with a Senegalese court judgment having the force of res judicata.

The application of Article 787 must also be read in conjunction with Article 790 of the CCP, and Articles 843, 846 et 853 of the FC. Article 790 of the CCP determines the scope of the exequatur court’s review by providing that, the President of the Regional Court of the place where enforcement is limited to verifying whether the decision for which a declaration of enforceability is sought meets the conditions laid down in Article 787.

Articles 843 and 846 of the FC lay down the rules on conflicts of law relating to personal status in Senegal, particularly in matters of marriage and divorce. These provisions are relevant for determining whether the foreign court had applied the law governing the dispute according to the Senegalese choice of law rules, as required by Article 787(b). Finally, as noted above, Article 853 establishes the rules governing international direct jurisdiction o the Senegalese courts and is relevant to determining whether the foreign court exercised jurisdiction in accordance with the jurisdictional rules recognized in Senegal, as required by Article 787(a).

 

b) The practice of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements in Senegal

According to the Supreme Court the conditions laid down in Article 787 were not satisfied. First the Canadian court lacked jurisdiction to order provisional measures to be enforced in Senegal. Second, the Canadian court failed to apply Senegalese law, which was applicable in accordance with the conflict-of-laws rules Articles 843 and 846 of the FC. Those provisions provide that the extra patrimonial effects of marriage as well as divorce and legal separation, are governed by the spouses’ common national law where they share same nationality or where they are of different nationalities, by the law of the country where they have their common domicile at the time the proceedings are instituted. In the absence of proof of the existence of a common domicile the lex fori applies. Furthermore, the Court noted that nothing in the finding of the appealed order that the foreign judgment was rendered in proceedings which the parties had been duly summoned, represented or declared in default.

A new volume coming out of the Programme in European Private Law for Postgraduates (PEPP) has just been published as part of the Scritti di diritto privato europeo ed internazionale series.

The book, available in open access here, focuses on the emergence of new legal personality for environmental features; protection of children; alternative dispute resolution; protection of the internal market and access to justice; SLAPPs; onlice activities and private international law; jurisdiction and choice of court agreements, and tax arbitrability.

Contributions include:

Michał Kućka: Rivers and Other Elements of Nature as Legal Persons: On the Use of Private Law Instruments in Environmental Protection (Polish Perspective)

María González Marimón: Mediation in International Child Abduction Cases in the Brussels II ter Regulation

Francesca Maoli: The EU Legislation on SLAPPs and its First “Stress-Tests” in Lawsuits Between Environmental NGOs and Corporations

Simone Carrea: Arbitrability of Tax Matters in the Context of Inter-private Dis-putes

Stefano Dominelli: Lex fori prorogati and Brussels I bis

Luana Matoso: Choice of Court Agreements and Service Out of the Jurisdiction: The Influence of the Brussels I bis Regulation on English Law After Brexit

Rosa Pla Almendros: The Relevant and Complex Role of Private International Law in the Private Enforcement of the DSA

Felix D. Pollmann, Jonathan L. T. Chu: Standard Terms in Business-to-Business Contracts under English and German Law: Comparative Assessment and Strategies for Avoiding the Application of §§ 305-310 BGB

Kai Hüning: The Hearing of the Child in Child Abduction Cases under the 1980 Hague Convention

Amber Boes: Judicial Powers in Promoting Mediation: A Paper Tiger or a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?

Lise Van den Eynde, Ruth Sander: Conflict of Interest in Representation: Belgian ‘Novelty’ versus German Tradition

Jonathan L. T. Chu, Felix D. Pollmann: Debt, Judgment, and Security: English and German Approaches to Preclusion

Sofia Caruso: Access to Justice for Consumers and SMEs: A Competition Law Problem?

Eden Smith: Origins and Aspects of Mitigation in the Law of Damages in England and Germany

Paula Granell: Transfer Pricing and the Role of Contractual Terms in the Post-BEPS Era

Monika Chmielowiec: Towards a Framework of Tort Liability for AI: Insights from Legal Scholarship

Monika Naumovski: Consumer Safety in the Internal Market: The Harmonisation of EU Product Liability

This post was contributed by Vytautas Vaicekauskas who is a PhD candidate at Vilnius University. On 16 July 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) delivered a judgment in case No C-196/24 (“Aucrinde”) for the first time concerning the Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 on cross-border taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters […]

This post was contributed by Dr. Vincent Richard, who is a practising lawyer in Luxembourg. As announced by Marta Requejo on this blog, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the case Aucrinde (C-196/24) on 16 July 2026. This is the first case on the recast of the Evidence Regulation (Reg. 2020/1783) and, more […]

This post was contributed by Pauline Ernste & Jeroen van Hezewijk, who are respectively professor of civil law, in particular civil procedural law, and doctoral researcher at the Radboud Business Law Institute (OO&R) of the Radboud University in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. The post is based on a more in-depth analysis published (in Dutch) here. On […]

Written by Hadrien Pauchard (assistant researcher and doctoral student at Sciences Po Law School)

The second issue of the Revue Critique de droit international privé of 2026 was just released and is accessible online. It contains two articles, eight case notes, as well as five book reviews. In line with the Revue Critique’s recent policy, the doctrinal part will soon be made available in English on the editor’s website (for registered users and institutions).

The first article by Prof. Étienne Farnoux (Université de Strasbourg/Université Saint-Joseph de Beyrouth) scrutinizes the French Supreme Court’s recent case law pertaining to the Localisation du préjudice financier sur le compte bancaire de l’investisseur en France, une nouvelle doctrine de la Cour de cassation pour la compétence juridictionnelle et la loi applicable ? (The Localisation of Financial Losses on the Investor’s Bank Account in France: A New Doctrine from the Cour de Cassation Regarding Jurisdiction and Applicable Law?). Beyond the innovative solution in the particular cases (outlining a unitary connection of the financial loss centred on the investor’s bank account), this series of six rulings tackles some fundamental questions raised by the localisation of purely immaterial damages, which materialize broader concerns in contemporary private international law scholarship and judicial practice. The author identifies these trends as follows:

In four judgments delivered on October 1st and two further judgments on 26 November 2025, the Cour de cassation located the financial loss suffered by an investor at that investor’s domicile, within the framework of a unitary approach common to both the determination of jurisdiction and the identification of the applicable law. Beyond the outcome – favourable to the investor – the methodology adopted is noteworthy: the Cour de cassation applies a sophisticated connecting-factor, based on a multifactorial and case-by-case analysis, thereby rationalising the complex case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning financial loss in the context of the European forum delicti. This article analyses these rulings, emphasising three significant methodological developments: the alignment of forum and jus, the disaggregation of the connecting rule, and the personalization of the connecting factor.

In the second article, Prof. Véronique Carole Ngono (Université de Douala) ponders over Les Principes africains sur la loi applicable aux contrats commerciaux internationaux : un modèle pour l’Afrique ? (The African Principles on the Law Applicable to International Commercial Contracts: A Model for Africa?). Informed by a large survey of legislative practices in numerous African jurisdictions and regional bodies, the author’s critical appraisal of the 2024 African Principles provides an informed glimpse into the main issues and challenges of modern codification within the field. Her inquiry is summarized as follows:

African private international law has been enriched by a flexible legal text: the African Principles on the Law Applicable to International Commercial Contracts, which were officially launched in 2024. While the objective of harmonising solutions for the choice of law in international commercial contracts in Africa is commendable, despite the fact that they are, in principle, an extension of the 2008 Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations and the Hague Principles on the choice of law applicable to international commercial contracts, the question of their impact arises. The answer is nuanced: while these principles constitute a necessary model given the unsatisfactory state of African legislation on the issue, their impact could be hampered by certain shortcomings.

The full table of contents is available here.

Previous issues of the Revue Critique (from 2010 to 2025) are available on Cairn.

This post was written by Aukje Mens, Jurist at INEA, the Dutch expertise centre on intercountry adoption. She wrote in her own name. 

Recently, an article I wrote about adoption in the proposal for a European Parenthood Regulation was published in the Dutch Journal of Family and Youth Law (Tijdschrift voor Familie- en Jeugdrecht, 2026/3). This article examines the uncertainties and gaps in the regulation of adoption and argues for an autonomous European Adoption Regulation to adequately govern international adoptions. Below is a summary in English of the article.

 

Introduction

On 7 December 2022, the European Commission submitted a Proposal for a European Parenthood Regulation to govern jurisdiction, applicable law, and the recognition of decisions and authentic instruments relating to parenthood (COM(2022) 695 final). Although adoption is mentioned in the proposal, it remains to a significant extent unclear which types of adoption are covered by the proposal and how these adoptions are regulated. The proposal refers to adoption in three provisions—articles 1(2), 3(2)(e) and 66(3)—while explicitly excluding international (Dutch version) or intercountry (English version) adoption from its scope (article 3(2)(e)). This raises questions concerning the proposal’s formal scope, since the terms ‘international adoption’ and ‘intercountry adoption’ are not synonymous.

Furthermore, it is initially unclear which substantive forms of adoption are governed by the proposal, since this is not explicitly stated in the provisions. The explanatory memorandum and recitals provide some guidance, but in certain cases it is necessary to consult additional documents to fully understand the material scope, and even then, some aspects remain ambiguous.

The unclear formal and material scope in relation to adoptions is indicative of the inadequate regulation of international adoption law in the proposal. The proposal also remains unclear, incomplete, or even entirely silent on several other essential points. The article addresses the scope of the proposal, and then three questions: whether the proposed international jurisdiction rules and conflict-of-laws rules also apply to adoptions (point 2 below), what the legal consequences are of recognising a foreign adoption (point 3 below), and whether the proposal also governs the (recognition of) conversion of a “simple” or “weak” adoption, i.e., an adoption which does not cut off the legal family ties between the child and the family of origin, into a “strong” or “full” adoption, i.e. an adoption which does cut off these ties (point 4 below).

 

1 Scope of the proposal with respect to adoption

 1.1 Formal scope

a) Domestic adoptions (non-intercountry adoptions)

The proposal distinguishes between domestic adoptions (non-intercountry adoptions), and intercountry adoptions. Domestic adoptions, where the child and the adoptive parent(s) reside in the same Member State, fall implicitly within the scope, whereas intercountry adoptions—where the child is transferred across borders due to or with the purpose of the adoption—are excluded (article 3(2)(e)). This creates uncertainties, for example, in situations where one adoptive parent resides in another Member State. It is therefore recommended that the regulation explicitly apply to non-intercountry adoptions, after which this term should be clearly defined. In my view, this definition should include situations where one adoptive parent resides in another Member State, as long as there is no cross-border transfer of the child. Furthermore, for the sake of clarity, the regulation should also define precisely what is meant by an excluded ‘intercountry adoption’.[1] However, the proposal is criticised for excluding intercountry adoptions that fall outside the 1993 Hague Adoption Convention, which could lead to “limping adoptions’ within the EU, i.e. adoptions that are valid in one Member State, but not in another.

b) Adoptions from a Member State

Furthermore, the proposal is limited to the recognition of non-intercountry adoptions from a Member State and excludes adoptions from third countries (article 3(3)). However, I argue that it is conceivable that a European regulation could include recognition rules for decisions from third countries, as the EU appears to have the competence to do so.[2] A uniform recognition policy would increase legal certainty within the Union by providing a clear framework for when (adoption) decisions from outside the EU should or should not be recognised. This would eliminate the need for Member States to rely on national recognition rules and would generally prevent “limping” third-country adoptions.[3] However, the political feasibility of such rules remains questionable.

The article questions whether the proposal requires Member States to recognise a decision from another Member State that recognise a third-country adoption. The proposal does not explicitly address this issue. However, expert group reports suggest that such recognitions would not automatically circulate between Member States.[4] Since the proposal does not clearly regulate this matter, it is recommended that the Regulation specify whether it applies to these cases. Several authors, including Barth,[5] and Kohler and Pintens,[6] oppose the application of European recognition rules to recognition decisions made by Member States. In principle I oppose them too, as this could make the public policy of one Member State decisive for the others.[7] For this reason, a common European recognition policy for third-country adoptions is preferable,[8] although its political feasibility is questionable.

 

1.2 Material scope

a) Legal parent-child relationship

Only adoptions that establish a legal parent–child relationship are implicitly included in the proposal, so it does not seem to cover forms of care such as kafala or foster care.

Recital 26 refers to adoptions that establish a permanent parent-child relationship. This raises the question of whether the proposal only covers irrevocable adoptions, meaning adoptions that cannot be undone in the Member State where they were established. However, I believe this is not the case; rather, the intention seems to be that a genuine legal filiation bond must have been created. It is preferable that this be explicitly clarified in the proposal, as is done in het Hague Adoption Convention of 1993 (Article 2(2)), to avoid any misunderstandings.

Recital 26 further indicates that the proposal covers both “full” adoptions—which sever legal ties with the biological family—and “simple” adoptions, where those ties remain. However, this is not expressly regulated. The recitals refer to whether the “legal relationship” between the child and the family of origin is ended or maintained, but since the term “legal relationship” can be interpreted more broadly than “family-law relationship,” it would be preferable to use the latter term.

The proposal is silent on whether family-law relationships are created between the child and the legal relatives of the adoptive parent(s), even though this is essential given the distinct legal consequences of adoption compared with regular parentage. The absence of any mention regarding these relevant forms of establishment might suggest that, for the purposes of the proposed regulation, it is immaterial whether they are used. However, this is not certain, and an explicit provision on this point would be preferable.

b) Judgments and authentic instruments with binding effect

According to Article 1, the proposal covers the recognition of both judicial decisions (Article 24 et seq.) and authentic instruments with binding legal effects (Article 36 et seq.). However, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the distinction between these two types of instruments, particularly as authentic instruments with binding effects presumably do not exist within the European Union.[9] With respect to adoptions, the proposal does not apply to purely contractual adoptions or those established automatically by law. However, such forms do not occur in the European Union.

c) Minor and adult adoptions

Article 4(2) indicates that the proposal covers both minor and adult adoptions, as the term ‘child’ is defined as ‘a person of any age whose parentage must be established, recognised or proved’. While the provision primarily focuses on regular parent-child relationships, if it is accepted that the proposal also applies to adoptions, then the age of the child at the time of adoption appears to be irrelevant.[10]

d) No requirements regarding the adoptive parent(s)

Finally, the proposal does not impose specific requirements regarding the status of adoptive parents. Article 4 refers to “a particular parent or parents” and “any parent”. This indicates that the proposal covers single-parent adoptions—including stepparent or partner-of-parent adoptions—as well as adoptions by two persons jointly, without setting requirements relating to the marital status or sexual orientation of the adoptive parent(s). The European Commission has thus opted for the broadest possible material scope of application in this regard.[11]

 

2. International jurisdiction and applicable law

Although the proposal clearly provides for the recognition of domestic adoptions from Member States, it remains unclear whether the rules on international jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws are applicable to adoption.

The explanatory memorandum and Recital 25 indicate that the proposal does not apply to parentage in purely domestic situations without cross-border elements, such as a domestic adoption that takes place entirely within a single Member State. In this respect, the European Commission appears to assume that non-intercountry adoptions are, by definition, domestic cases without any cross-border aspect. However, this assumption is demonstrably incorrect. In fact, a non-intercountry adoption may well have an international character, for example, where the adopted child and/or the adoptive parent(s), though habitually resident in the same Member State, hold the nationality of another Member State or a third country.  In such cases, there is in fact an international non-intercountry adoption, which raises questions about whether the court addressed has international jurisdiction to decide on the adoption request and which law should be applied. These questions of jurisdiction and applicable law seem to be left out, however.

Nevertheless, scholars suggest that the proposed international jurisdiction and conflict-of-law rules do apply to adoptions.[12] However, some of them argue that these rules are unsuitable for adoptions, as they are not primarily designed to prioritise the best interests of the child or to grant jurisdiction to the court best placed to assess those interests.[13]

The prevailing opinion in the literature thus seems to be that the proposed international jurisdiction and conflict-of-law rules do indeed apply to adoptions but are nevertheless unsuitable. In my view, however, this position cannot be reconciled with the wording of the regulation, its explanatory memorandum and the recitals. My conclusion is therefore that these rules are not applicable to adoptions. They are clearly drafted solely for regular parentage relationships. Although the European Commission sought to regulate the recognition of non-intercountry adoptions from a Member State under the regulation, it has otherwise left international adoption law untouched. Since there appears to be differing views on this matter, clarity is needed on this point.[14] There should be specific private international law rules on adoption.

 

3. Legal effects of recognising foreign adoptions

The proposal does not explicitly address the legal effects of recognising a foreign adoption, leaving unclear what exactly is recognised. Case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union suggests that a recognised decision must be granted the same authority and effect as in the Member State of origin (Hoffman/Krieg; Apostolides/Orams; Prism Investments/v/d Meer; Gothaer Allgemeine Versichering/Samskip; BNP Paribas SA/TR). But what does this mean for the recognition of an adoption?

It goes without saying that recognition should at the very least include the legal parent-child relationship between the child and the adoptive parent(s), since establishing such legal relationships is the fundamental aim of the proposal. Nevertheless, it seems desirable that this be explicitly clarified, so that there can be no doubt—especially in the case of simple adoption.

But does it end there? Should the creation of new family-law ties between the child and the legal relatives of the adoptive parent(s), as well as the possible severance of the original family-law relationships, also be recognised under the proposal, or are these legal consequences left to the ordinary law of the Member States? Perhaps the previously mentioned principle of the Court of Justice can or should be interpreted broadly, so that these legal consequences must also be recognised when they have arisen in the Member State where the adoption was pronounced. However, whether this is the case remains uncertain.

The foregoing leads me to conclude that an explicit provision is necessary, clearly stating the legal consequences of recognising either a full or simple adoption for the legal parentage of the individuals concerned. This is essential to prevent Member States from taking divergent approaches, which could result in inconsistent or limping family law relationships across borders. In my view, it should simply be stipulated that the recognition of a foreign adoption means that all legal consequences for the lineage of those concerned are recognised—no more, no less. Such a provision is not only essential for achieving the objectives of the proposal, namely legal certainty and predictability—but is also dogmatically necessary.[15] By its very nature, adoption concerns both the creation of new family-law relationships and the possible dissolution of existing ones, and, consequently, the recognition of a foreign adoption also pertains to these aspects.[16] In short, if new family-law ties have been established between the child and the legal relatives of the adoptive parent(s) in the Member State where the adoption took place, or if the original family-law relationships have been severed there, then not only should the legal parent-child relationship between the child and the adoptive parent(s) be recognised, but these additional legal consequences should be recognised as well. Other possible legal consequences, such as those relating to parental authority, maintenance, name and inheritance, do not fall within the scope of the concept of adoption and therefore remain governed by their own private international law rules. This aligns with Article 3(2) of the proposal, which states, among other things, that the regulation does not apply to parental responsibility (subsection b), maintenance obligations (subsection f) and succession (subsection g).

 

4. Conversion of simple adoptions into full adoptions

The proposal does not explicitly address the conversion of simple adoptions into full adoptions, an important issue in adoption law whereby original family-law ties are severed. Although the EU lacks competence to regulate substantive family law, it may be able to adopt at least recognition rules for conversion decisions. The absence of such rules may lead to legal uncertainty about a child’s legal parentage across Member States, which may also affect the child’s identity development. Greater clarity and regulation in this area are therefore necessary.

 

By way of conclusion: argument for an autonomous European Adoption Regulation

In the article I argue that the current proposal insufficiently accounts for the special nature and legal consequences of adoption. International adoptions merit an autonomous and clear regulation within European private international family law. A separate European Adoption Regulation would provide space to address adoption-specific issues such as recognition, conversion, jurisdiction, and conflict-of-law rules. Common recognition rules are necessary to prevent “limping adoptions” and to enhance legal certainty for all parties involved. Although political feasibility poses challenges, a separate regulation is seen as the most effective way to regulate international adoptions within the EU.

In sum, the proposed European Parenthood Regulation insufficiently regulates adoption and fails to acknowledge the unique legal consequences associated with it. International adoptions require an autonomous European Adoption Regulation that offers room for careful and effective governance, with the aim of ensuring legal certainty and predictability for all involved, in particular the children.

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[1] See also European Group for Private International Law (EGPIL), Observations on the Proposal for a Council Regulation in matters of Parenthood, 2023, https://gedip- egpil.eu/, p. 2, no 7, and C. Budzikiewicz e.a., The Marburg Group’s Comments on the European Commission’s Parenthood Proposal, Cambridge: Intersentia 2024, https://epub.ub.uni- muenchen.de/, pp. 10- 11.

[2] See also A. Bonomi, ‘European private international law and third states’, IPRax 2017, pp. 190- 191; D. Martiny, ‘The recognition and enforcement of court decisions between the EU and third states’, in: A. Trunk & N. Hatzimihail (red.), EU civil procedure law and third countries. Which way forward?, Baden- Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2021, pp. 129- 130 en 138.

[3] Compare Bonomi 2017, pp. 190- 191, and Martiny 2021, p. 132 (note 3). See also S.M. Carbone, ‘What about recognition of third states’ foreign judgments?’, in: F. Pocar, I. Viarengo & F.C. Villata (red.), Recasting Brussels I, Milaan: Cedam 2012, p. 301 en W. Hau, ‘Unified European rules on the recognition and enforceability of third- country judgments’, Law & Criminology Journal 2025, par. 3.

[4]  Minutes of 7 February 2022, of the 5th Meeting of the Expert Group on the recognition of parenthood between Member States, 2 December 2021, and Minutes of 20 February 2022, of the 6th Meeting of the Expert Group on the recognition of parenthood between Member States, 9 February 2022.

[5] M. Barth, ‘Parent in every country? – Der Kommissionsvorschlag einer EU Abstammungs- VO mit Europäischem Elternschaftszertifikat’, Studentische Zeitschrift fur Rechtswissenschaft Heidelberg Wissenschaft online 2023, p. 26.

[6] C. Kohler & W. Pintens, ‘Entwicklungen im europäischen Personen-, Familien- und Erbrecht 2022- 2023’, FamRZ 2023, p. 13, note 15.

[7] Compare C.G. van der Plas, A.F. Veldhuis & B.H.B. Verheul, ‘Automatische erkenning en tenuitvoerlegging van vonnissen in het Europa van nu: de noodzaak van een nieuwe blik op wederzijds vertrouwen na J/H Limited’, NIPR 2024, p. 263.

[8] See also C. González Beilfuss & I. Pretelli, ‘The proposal for a European Regulation on Filiation Matters – Overview and Analysis’, Yearbook of Private International Law 2022/2023, p. 292.

[9] Marburg Group 2024, p. 77 (note 1); C. Mayer, ‘Keine verfahrensrechtliche Anerkennung von beurkundeten oder registrierten familienrechtlichen Rechtsgeschäften innerhalb der EU’, RabelsZ 2025, p. 753 et seq.

[10] See also P. Twardoch, ‘Regulating international filiation law at the EU- level. Comments on applicable law under the European Commission’s Proposal’, European Review of Private Law 2024, p. 276.

[11] See also D. Danieli, ‘“Third- state connections” in the proposal for an EU Regulation on parenthood: More than a regime of circulation of status between member states?’, Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 2023, p. 1392- 1393.

[12] González Beilfuss & Pretelli 2022/2023, p. 291 en 296 (note 8); A. Fillers, ‘Proposal for the Regulation in matters of Parenthood: A critical overview of jurisdiction and conflict- of- laws rules’, in: Revisiting the limits of freedom while living under threat. I, Collection of research papers in conjunction with the 9th International Scientific Conference of the Faculty of Law of the University of Latvia, 2024, p. 227; Marburg Group 2024, p. 50-51 (note 1); Twardoch 2024, p. 275- 276 (note 10); I. Queirolo, ‘The proposed EU Regulation on Parenthood: A critical overview of the rules on jurisdiction’, The European Legal Forum 2024, p. 3.

[13] Beilfuss & Pretelli 2022/2023, p. 291 (note 8); Observations EGPIL 2023, p. 1, No 4 (note 1); Fillers 2024, p. 228 et seq. (see note 12); Marburg Group 2024, p. 50-51 (note 1).

[14] See also Twardoch 2024, p. 289 (see note 10).

[15] A. Mens, Erkenning en omzetting van buitenlandse adopties in Nederland. Over de betekenis van beide fenomenen in het Nederlandse internationaal privaatrecht’, diss. 2024, par. II.3.2.2.1.

[16] Ibid, par. II.1.3.2, II.3.2.2.1, III.1.3.2, III.4.3.2, and III.6.3.2.

On 9 July 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its judgment in Case C‑768/24 Hortis GRC SA v JA, France Travail Île-de-France ECLI:EU:C:2026:566. The judgment concerns the interpretation of Article 6 of the Rome Convention, the predecessor of Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation. More specifically, it concerns the relationship […]

The latest issue of the International and Comparative Law Quarterly (Volume 75, Issue 2) features one article of relevance to private international law. Marcus Teo, Strong Cause, 285 – 313 Common law courts will enforce jurisdiction agreements unless they find ‘strong cause’ or ‘strong reasons’ not to. This article argues that the strong cause test is the […]

The second issue of 2026 of ZEuP – Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht contains the following articles which may be of interest to the readers of the EAPIL blog: Burkhard Hess, Justizpräsenz im Internet: ein neues Forschungsfeld der Prozessrechtsvergleichung The editorial examines the digitalisation of court communication across different jurisdictions, identifying it as an emerging field […]

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

Like all my posts, this post is entirely AI free

Convrgnt Value Engineering LLC v Kennedys Dubai LLP [2026] EWHC 1754 (Ch)  raised an interesting choice of law issue under the UK’s Unfair Contracts Act 1977, in combination with the ‘assimilated’ EU Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations.

Context is a retainer on legal services provided by the UAE office of an English law firm.

s27(1) UCTA reads

“Where the law applicable to a contract is the law of any part of the United Kingdom only by choice of the parties (and apart from that choice would be the law of some country outside the United Kingdom) sections 2 to 7 and 16 to 21 of this Act do not operate as part of the law applicable to the contract.”

Choice of law was made for English law. The issue, so as to determine whether UCTA may apply at all, is what law would have applied had no choice been made.

Issues for determination in current judgment are whether Kennedys Dubai is a “branch” within the meaning of A19(2) Rome I, displacing England as habitual residence under A4(1) Rome I; alternatively, whether A4(3) Rome I’s escape clause applies.

Article 19 Rome I reads

Article 19 – Habitual residence

1.   For the purposes of this Regulation, the habitual residence of companies and other bodies, corporate or unincorporated, shall be the place of central administration.

The habitual residence of a natural person acting in the course of his business activity shall be his principal place of business.

2.   Where the contract is concluded in the course of the operations of a branch, agency or any other establishment, or if, under the contract, performance is the responsibility of such a branch, agency or establishment, the place where the branch, agency or any other establishment is located shall be treated as the place of habitual residence.

3.   For the purposes of determining the habitual residence, the relevant point in time shall be the time of the conclusion of the contract.

Article 4 Rome I contains the general regime for determining the applicable law, outside the specific regimes for protected categories such as employees and consumers, when parties have not made choice of law themselves. The relevant entry under A4 Rome I for the case at issue is A4(1)b :

a contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the law of the country where the service provider has his habitual residence

and the escape clause of A4(3) reads

Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply.

Kennedys Dubai’s argument is this [36].

The TOB included a choice of law clause, whereby the parties agreed that the Retainer would be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of England and Wales. Without that clause, by application of [A4 Rome I]… the relevant place of habitual residence was the UAE; pursuant to [A4(1)] (read together with [A19 Rome I] it is that which dictates that the applicable law is that of the UAE. Alternatively, it is said that the Retainer was manifestly more closely connected with the UAE than any other country, and, pursuant to Article 4(3), it is that which dictates the applicable law. If either of those contentions is made out, section 27 will operate to disapply the provisions of UCTA on which CVE relies.

[42] Parties agree that Kennedys Dubai’s habitual residence is the UK, that being the “place of central administration” for the purposes of A19(1). Kennedys Dubai relies on paragraph (2) of A19 to displace that result, contending that the Retainer was concluded in the course of the operations of a branch and/or that under the Retainer performance was the responsibility of such a branch. If that is correct, then since the branch is located in Dubai, Dubai is to be treated as the place of habitual residence and, had parties not chosen the law of England and Wales as lex voluntatis, it would be the law of Dubai which governs the Retainer pursuant to A4(1)(b).

Noting that there is no authority on ‘branch’ within Rome I, and only a little within the Brussels Ia Regulation, Shea DJ [46] gives an important “health warning” viz the consistency of interpretation between the Brussels Ia and the Rome Regulations:

The editors of Chitty on Contracts (36th Ed, at para 34-062) suggest that it is likely that the expression will be interpreted consistently with the same expression as found in Brussels Recast. However the editors of Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (16th Ed), at para 32-020 warn that the desire for consistency expressed in Rome I and Brussels Recast must be understood in the context of the fact that Rome I and Brussels I are pursuing differing objectives.

Regular readers of the blog will be aware that I very much stand with the editors on Dicey on this one, see eg here.

The judge again [46] refers to the Dicey editors also noting

“as the United Kingdom is no longer bound by the Brussels I Regulation or Brussels Convention, it is possible that the gravitational pull of those instruments will fade somewhat over time as the jurisprudence of the English courts develops”.

This of course is a complicating factor for litigation in the UK.

On habitual residence, the judge discusses the relevant authorities including Gefion (but not Rynair, which was not put before her it seems). She emphasises, per Gefion, the need for restrictive interpretation.

Kennedys Dubai is a limited liability partnership under the law of England and Wales, incorporated in England and Wales on 1 March 2010. It has always been regulated by the UK Solicitors Regulatory Authority which treated is as “an overseas practice” pursuant to the SRA Code of Conduct, on the basis that the Dubai Office was “a practice from an office outside England and Wales”.

Kennedys Dubai is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kennedys Law LLP (“KL”) which was incorporated in England and Wales on 15 March 2010 and was one of two designated members of Kennedys Dubai, the second being Kennedys Management Holdings Limited. Kennedys Dubai’s registered office was at London, which was also the physical office of Kennedys Law. Kennedys Dubai’s only physical office was at Dubai. KL’s financial statements at the relevant time state that Kennedys Dubai had “its place of business” in Dubai.

The people who have been carrying on the former partnership, Kennedys Legal Consultants, have agreed to transfer that business to Kennedys Dubai under the terms of a transfer agreement.

[61] the judge points to the obvious challenge: [Kennedys Dubai] “is not, as contemplated under the Ets A de Bloos formulation, subjected to the direction and control of any parent body. That very formulation requires the existence of two bodies. One will not suffice….Kennedys Dubai is not a branch of any entity or undertaking other than itself. More is needed.” In other words [63]: there is no ‘parent body’ and therefore there cannot be a ‘branch’.

In oral argument counsel for Kennedys argued that the Dubai office “appeared to third parties as being an easily discernible extension of the parent organisation, the defendant in London” (judge’s emphasis). The judge however holds [66]

The only sense in which Kennedys Dubai was “in London” was by way of its registered office. It is for that reason that the parties agree that England is “the place of central administration” for the purpose of determining Kennedys Dubai’s habitual residence under Article 19(1) (a conclusion which Kennedys Dubai says is overturned by the application of Article 19(2)). However I reject the proposition that the fact that London is Kennedys Dubai’s place of central administration entails that Kennedys Dubai is “in London” in any form in relation to which the Dubai office can sensibly be said to be an extension.

She is also right [67] to dismiss, for Article 19 purposes, any relevance for the Dubai office being “branded” (by reference to, by way of example, the footer of the paper on which correspondence was sent) as being part of “Kennedys Law worldwide”.  This ‘Kennedys Law Worldwide’ simply does not exist.

One feels the stronger avenue for A19 purposes would have been to argue that England was not the place of central administration of Kennedys Dubai – I am not privy to the reason why that point was conceded by Kennedys.

By a combination of A4(1)(b) and A19(1) therefore, the law governing the Retainer will be that of England and Wales, unless Kennedys Dubai can bring itself within A4(3) – a high bar as I have posted repeatedly on the blog – see eg Winrow v Hemphill (a Rome II case however Rome I and II are materially identical on this point) or Enka v Chubb at the UKSC.

[80] The factors are listed which Kennedys Dubai says bring the Retainer within the scope of A4(3):

The Retainer was concluded in the course of the operations of the Dubai Office. Responsibility for performance of the Retainer lay exclusively with the Dubai Office. The lawyers providing the services were physically located in Dubai. The dispute in respect of which Kennedys Dubai was retained was a Dubai dispute. The provision of the services was dependent on the fact that the Dubai Office and the fee earners were appropriately registered and licenced in Dubai. The client was based in the UAE. The services related to the Emaar Claim which (a) arose in respect of a construction project in the UAE; (b) concerned a contract itself governed by UAE law; (c) involved parties which were both incorporated and had licenses to trade in the UAE; and (d) was to be pursued in the UAE. The Retainer expressly addressed the fact that the Emaar Claim would require the services of local advocates to appear in the Dubai Courts, thus strengthening the connection to Dubai, not weakening it. The Retainer was drafted on the letterhead of the Dubai Offices, and provided for payment in local currency, payment which as understood by both parties would be made to the Dubai Office’s local bank account (as the evidence shows occurred).

The judge correctly holds [81] that this is not a numbers game:

“This issue must not be determined on the basis of which party can list the greater number of factors tending to support its view. I must look at the substance of those factors, in the context of the Retainer, to determine whether it is manifestly more connected to Dubai than it is to England and Wales.”

She concludes “with little hesitation” that it is: [82] ff:

the substantive elements of the Retainer are almost entirely connected to Dubai. The Emaar Claim was to be commenced in either the Dubai Courts, or in the DIAC Courts, or by way of arbitration in the event that agreement was reached with Emaar to this effect. The Retainer concerned a claim to be brought concerning a contract between two UAE entities involving a development which took place in the UAE. All the evidence in that claim would concern matters which occurred in the UAE. England and Wales had nothing to do with the Emaar Claim, whether as to law or evidence….

The fact that local advocates would have to be used if court appearances were required illustrates rather than detracts from the close connection of the Retainer with Dubai. Monies were to be paid in UAE currency, into a Dubai bank account. Further, the Dubai Office was physically located in Dubai. The fact that Mr Carnell also spent time in London is of little significance in times of easy global travel. Mr Sharma himself spent a lot of time in Switzerland during his mother’s illness, providing an apposite example of the irrelevance of the physical whereabouts of the principals of the contracting parties. Mr Carnell at paragraph 31 of his draft witness statement says that he anticipated that “the services under the Retainer would be provided solely by and from the Dubai office”, and that the dispute “was clearly only ever suitable for lawyers from the Dubai office”. He also states at paragraph 32: “everyone who acted on the case both lived and worked permanently in Dubai at all times”.

“The substance of the Retainer – its operative parts, its subject matter, its performance – spoke of Dubai or the UAE. The TOB contained the provisions that would be triggered in the event any one of a number of unlikely situations arose, and provided details of applicable statutory and regulatory regimes. They were connected to the law of England and Wales, but were nowhere near sufficient to displace the fact that the substance of the Retainer was manifestly connected with Dubai/UAE.”

In conclusion therefore if “the parties had not chosen the law of England and Wales, the law of Dubai would apply. Accordingly, section 27(1) of UCTA is triggered and the UCTA provisions regarding the reasonableness or otherwise of terms in contracts for the supply of services do not apply to the Retainer.”

The remainder of the judgment deals with the issues under the liability cap.

A judgment of illustration note for both A19 and A4 Rome I.

Geert.

 

 

On 15 July 2026, the European Commission decided to open infringement proceedings against 14 Member States for failing to communicate the complete transposition of Directive (EU) 2024/1069 on the protection of persons engaging in public participation against manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (the ‘Anti-SLAPP Directive’). Letters of formal notice have been addressed to […]

By Graham Smith, Of Counsel, Bird & Bird LLP, London, UK

The CJEU’s recent copyright decision in Anne Frank endorses state of the art geo-blocking as an effective way of shielding a website from the different copyright laws of another EU Member State. Although the result on the facts is welcome, the potential implications of the Court’s underlying reasoning are less so. At a principled level, the judgment creates post-Brexit divergence with the UK courts’ targeting approach to cross-border online copyright infringement.

The EU Position

The Anne Frank case concerns a scholarly digital edition of the Anne Frank diaries made available free of charge on a website in Belgium, a country in which copyright in the full diaries has expired. The website owner geo-blocked countries, including the Netherlands, in which parts of the diaries are still in copyright.

Geo-block notwithstanding, the owner of copyright in the diaries (the Anne Frank Fund) sued those involved in the Belgian website project (the Anne Frank Foundation, the Dutch Royal Academy and a Belgian association) in the Dutch courts for infringement of Dutch copyright (specifically, the communication to the public right). The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) referred three questions about cross-border copyright infringement to the CJEU.

The Hoge Raad’s first question raised the issue of whether a targeting test, familiar from CJEU caselaw on other territorial intellectual property rights, should be applied to the copyright communication to the public right:

“Is Article 3(1) of [Directive 2001/29] to be interpreted as meaning that the publication of a work on the internet is only to be regarded as a communication to the public in a particular country if the publication is addressed to the public in that country? If so, what factors must be considered in assessing that?”

(The unfamiliar term ‘addressed’ in the first question looks like a quirk of translation. The Dutch language originals use ‘gericht’, which appears to translate readily into the familiar ‘directed’ or ‘targeted’.)

The CJEU, however, did not give a direct answer to that question. By dint of the time-honoured device of reframing and combining the referring court’s questions, it rolled the territoriality question into the labyrinth of its previous substantive jurisprudence on communication to the public. None of that case law was concerned with a cross-border question.

The operative part of its judgment concluded that where a work is in the public domain in some EU Member States but is still in copyright in another, and is published free of charge on a website that implements state of the art geo-blocking designed to prevent access by users from that other Member State, there is no communication to the public under the copyright law of that other Member State. That is the case even if internet users can circumvent the geo-blocking by means of a VPN or similar service.

That is a highly fact-specific formulation. What of the corollary? Does it follow that a website that does not implement geo-blocking necessarily engages the communication to the public right in another Member State? That would imply that mere accessibility of a website on the internet is sufficient to engage the communication to public right of another country; or, which comes to the same thing, that targeting is to be inferred from not geo-blocking.

The CJEU addresses the fact-specific corollary at para 42:

“Indeed, where a work is protected by copyright in only one Member State but is in the public domain in other Member States, any person who knows or ought reasonably to have known that to be the case … and who publishes the work on a website must ensure that that work is made accessible only to internet users who are liable to access that website from Member States in which the work is in the public domain, so as not to infringe the exclusive and inexhaustible [communication to the public] right of the copyright holder … in the Member State in which the work is still protected.”

It goes on:

“It follows that such a person is under an obligation to adopt effective technological measures to restrict access to the website solely to those internet users, failing which, given the freely accessible nature of websites, that person would be giving access to the work concerned to all internet users and would thus be infringing that right.”

That starts from either mere accessibility or targeting inferred from lack of geo-blocking, but with the added condition of actual or constructive knowledge of continuing copyright protection in the other Member State. The Court borrowed the knowledge requirement from its CTP jurisprudence on hyperlinks to infringing material on the internet (G S Media).

It is unclear whether an equivalent knowledge condition (or indeed some other condition or factor plucked from the CJEU’s voluminous CTP caselaw) would apply in other cross-border factual situations. Nor is it clear whether the CJEU’s approach would apply to websites located in countries outside the EU.

What can be said is that the Court did not apply the conventional targeting test. Targeting requires evidence of positive conduct directed towards the country in question before its local law can be engaged. To the extent that mere accessibility, or targeting inferred from lack of geo-blocking, underlies the CJEU’s reasoning, that either rejects or inverts the targeting test.

The UK position

The Anne Frank judgment opens up a post-Brexit divergence of principle with the UK. Five years ago the Court of Appeal in TuneIn [2021] EWCA Civ 441 applied the CJEU’s well known intellectual property targeting caselaw to the copyright CTP right:

“…the internet is global and users in the UK can, in the absence of geo-restriction, access websites hosted, and content posted on or streamed from such websites, from anywhere in the world. Intellectual property rights, however, are territorial. At least in the case of copyright and similar rights and trade marks, the CJEU has held that accessibility of a website from a Member State is not sufficient to give rise to an infringement of rights conferred by the law of that State, and that the relevant act must be targeted at that State: see [L’Oréal v eBay [2011] (trade marks), Donner [EU:C:2012:370] (copyright) and Football Dataco v Sportradar [EU:C:2012:642] (database right)]. This case law has been applied in this jurisdiction to communication to the public: EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch).

The principle is clear: mere accessibility is not sufficient. Nor, it follows, can a website be inferred to be targeting a country by reason of not geo-restricting. That would be mere accessibility in a different guise. (The Donner case, to be clear, concerned the copyright distribution right, which is separate from the communication to the public right.)

The status of targeting as a prior threshold condition is well illustrated in Birss J’s (as he then was) first instance judgment in TuneIn:

“I will address [targeting] first because if TuneIn does not target the UK then UK copyright is not engaged at all.” [15]

That fundamental territoriality point (subsequently endorsed by the Court of Appeal) is obscured in the CJEU’s approach of combining the Hoge Raad’s first question with consideration of substantive CTP law. None of the CJEU caselaw on targeting and the territoriality of IP rights relied on by the Court of Appeal is mentioned in the Anne Frank judgment.

In the context of trade marks, the UK Supreme Court in Lifestyle Equities v Amazon [2024] UKSC 8 summarised the rationale for the targeting test:

“Led by the CJEU, EU jurisprudence has sought to chart a safe course between the Scylla of watching trade mark protection become entirely illusory in the context of internet marketing and sale, and the Charybdis of creating an exorbitant and unprincipled extension into the international sphere of the territorial jurisdiction to protect trade marks. It has done so by reference to two separate concepts. The first is by treating the advertisement and offering for sale of branded goods in a way which is targeted at a protected territory as a use of the mark in the targeted territory. …”

The CJEU in Anne Frank justified its conclusion in para 50:

“a [state of the art geo-blocking] measure serves to ensure a fair balance between, on the one hand, the interest of the rightholder in his or her work not being freely accessible in the Member States in which he or she still has an exclusive and inexhaustible right to authorise or prohibit any communication of the work to the public under Article 3(1) and (3) of Directive 2001/29 and, on the other hand, the interest of any third party in making the work freely accessible online free of charge in the Member States in which the work is in the public domain as well as the public’s interest in enjoying such access in those Member States, in accordance with both the freedom of expression and the freedom of information.”

However, that recitation of balancing factors appears to assume the conclusion that the legitimate interest of the rightholder is in restraining mere accessibility cross-border. In any event it does not explain why an approach that the CJEU has applied to other territorial intellectual property rights is not appropriate for the copyright CTP right.

Whatever the precise reasoning that may underlie it, the CJEU judgment in Anne Frank is for the moment the leading authority on the cross-border aspects of the communication to the public right within the EU. As for the UK courts, as a general matter they are not bound to follow new CJEU judgments although they may have regard to them. However, in any event the formal precedential status of the Court of Appeal judgment in TuneIn applying targeting is not altered by the CJEU judgment.

Graham Smith is writing in his personal capacity and opinions expressed are his personal opinions.

This post follows up on our earlier observations on the public consultation responses to the HCCH Draft Text of a future Convention on Parallel Proceedings and Related Actions. At the time our overview was prepared, the response of the German Judges Association was not yet available to us among the consultation materials on the HCCH website and could therefore not be included. It has since been made available, and we would like to take this opportunity to briefly add its key points to the discussion, notwithstanding that there are still coming up new responses such as the ones by Jonathan Mance (UK) – „Former Deputy President of UK Supreme Court, Co-Chair of the LC Advisory Committee”, the International Association of Consumer Law (IACL) or the Philippine Women Judges Association. We will leave it to others to comment on these.

I.    Support in principle

The German Judges Association supports, in principle, the idea of an international instrument on parallel proceedings. This corresponds to the broad overall support for the project identified in our earlier overview. A uniform framework could promote legal certainty and predictability in cross-border litigation beyond the Brussels Ia Regulation.[1]

At the same time, the response is cautious as to whether the current Draft Text can actually meet these expectations, not least in view of constitutional and European standards of access to justice and the right to be heard before the competent court.[2] Its concern is therefore not directed against international coordination as such, but against a coordination mechanism that may rely too heavily on discretion.

II. The core concern: discretion instead of predictability

The central point of the response concerns the relationship between predictability and discretion. From the perspective of German judicial practice, the Draft Text risks replacing the predictability of jurisdiction with judicial discretion. The Association stresses that German and European civil procedure have traditionally relied on clearly defined jurisdictional rules. These rules allow the parties to know in advance which court is competent. According to the Association, this predictability is closely linked to legal certainty, litigation costs, time efficiency and the parties’ right to be heard before the court determined by law.[3]

Against this background, the Association views the proposed mechanism of Articles 9 and 10 of the Draft Text with particular scepticism. The “more appropriate court” test is seen as introducing a forum non conveniens-type assessment into a legal environment in which such a discretionary displacement of jurisdiction is not familiar.[4] From this perspective, the concern is also constitutional in nature: jurisdiction should be sufficiently determined by law and should not depend too heavily on a later judicial balancing exercise.[5]

The Association therefore points out that the assessment of the more appropriate forum could establish a time- and cost-consuming preliminary procedure and significantly slow down proceedings, since several examination steps would precede the court’s review of the merits.[6] This concern is reinforced by the practical uncertainty surrounding the connecting factors, which are new to German judicial practice and whose application would first have to be developed by the courts.[7] The Association also warns that the connecting factors in Article 10 may lead to an inequality of arms between natural and legal persons, especially in light of changing business relations, complex corporate structures and increasingly globalised transnational operations.[8] Against this background, the Association sees a risk that the mere possibility of another forum being considered more convenient could lead to more satellite litigation and forum shopping than today.[9]

III. What should be done instead?

The German Judges Association therefore pleads for a more rule-based solution. The Draft Text should not replace jurisdictional rules with a broad assessment of the “better” forum, but should preserve the predictability of clear jurisdictional criteria.[10]

In particular, the Association welcomes the idea that the court first seised should generally be the court to proceed where Articles 6 to 8 of the Draft Text do not resolve the conflict.[11] More specifically, it suggests examining whether the court first seised could be treated as a clearly appropriate forum where its jurisdiction is based on established jurisdictional rules.[12] This would come closer to the Brussels Ia model, which combines priority with foreseeability.

At the same time, if connecting factors are retained, they should be framed narrowly and precisely. The suspension of proceedings under Article 9 should also not be mandatory.[13] Connecting factors should guide the allocation of proceedings, not open the door to a general forum non conveniens-style balancing exercise.

In short: legal certainty should remain the rule; discretionary correction should be limited and exceptional.

IV.  Concluding remark

The response of the German Judges Association usefully complements our earlier overview. It confirms support in principle for an international instrument on parallel proceedings, but adds a note of caution from the perspective of German judicial practice. Its central concern is that coordination should not come at the expense of legal certainty and foreseeability. This is particularly relevant for Articles 9 and 10 of the Draft Text, which should remain sufficiently rule-based and compatible with constitutional and European procedural standards.

[1] See Submission by the German Judges Association, Response to Question 1.1.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., Response to Question 8.1.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., Response to Question 7.2 and 8.1.

[7] Ibid., Response to Question 1.1 and 8.2.

[8] Ibid., Response to Question 7.3.

[9] Ibid., Response to Question 13.3.

[10] Ibid., Response to Question 1.1 and 8.3.

[11] Ibid., Responses to Questions 7.1.

[12] Ibid., Responses to Questions 8.1.

[13] Ibid., Responses to Questions 8.1 and 8.3.