Flux des sites DIP

Over the past several months, three state appellate courts in the United States have examined whether a “talaq” divorce obtained in another country is entitled to recognition as a matter of comity. In this post, I first survey the rules relating to the recognition of foreign divorce judgments in the United States. I then explain the concept of a talaq divorce. Finally, I discuss the cases.

Foreign Divorce Judgments

U.S. courts are often asked to recognize divorce judgments rendered by courts in other countries. While the rules relating to foreign money judgments are set forth in the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, there is no uniform act that addresses when a U.S. court must recognize a foreign divorce judgment.

In the absence of statutory guidance, U.S. courts apply common law principles of comity to determine whether a foreign divorce judgment should be given effect. These principles were famously expounded by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot (1895), where the Court held that a foreign judgment should be recognized when:

there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it is sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment.

The Hilton Court also observed that a foreign judgment need not be recognized when contrary to the public policy of the enforcing state:

A judgment affecting the status of persons, such as a decree confirming or dissolving a marriage, is recognized as valid in every country unless contrary to the policy of its own law (emphasis added).

With these principles in mind, let us now turn to the type of divorce here at issue—a talaq divorce.

Talaq

Talaq is an Islamic form of divorce. It has been described by one U.S. court as follows:

Under Islamic law, a husband has the right to initiate a divorce (“talaq”) against his wife. All that is required to achieve talaq is for a husband to pronounce his intent to divorce his wife on three separate occasions, either verbally or in writing. The husband does not need to communicate his three pronouncements to his wife. She need not be present for them or even aware of them. A wife cannot object to a talaq.

In 2008, the Maryland Supreme Court was asked to recognize a talaq divorce in Aleem v. Aleem. In that case, the husband—a Muslim and a national of Pakistan—went to the Pakistan Embassy in Washington, D.C., and executed a written document stating three times that he was divorcing his wife. He argued that this act was sufficient to effectuate a divorce under the law of Pakistan even though he and his wife were residents of Maryland.

The Maryland Supreme Court held that, even if the talaq divorce was valid as a matter of Pakistani law, it was not entitled to recognition in Maryland because (1) it provided no due process protection for the wife; (2) only the husband (not the wife) had a right to invoke this process; and (3) the wife was not entitled to an equitable share of the marital property. On these facts, the Maryland Supreme Court held that recognizing such a divorce would be contrary to Maryland public policy.

The Aleem decision has cast a long shadow. It is cited by each of the more recent cases, to which we now turn.

Adewale v. Adewale

On June 22, 2026, the Pennsylvania Superior Court discussed a talaq divorce in Adewale v. Adewale. In that case, a man and woman were civilly married in Lagos, Nigeria, in 2011, and  subsequently moved to the United States. In 2020, the man filed for divorce in Pennsylvania. After the woman sought alimony, the court ordered the man to pay her a set sum of money each month.

In the course of the divorce proceedings, the man became aware that his putative wife may have been married to another person at the time of their “marriage.” Over the course of several years of evidentiary hearings, he discovered that she had, in fact, married someone else in 2001. The woman’s legal husband testified that the 2001 marriage had occurred and submitted a wedding certificate and photographs as proof. In light of this evidence, the trial court concluded that the parties’ marriage was void ab initio and terminated the man’s alimony obligations.

On appeal, the woman argued, among other things, that her 2001 marriage had been terminated by a talaq divorce in 2006, thereby paving the way for the court to conclude that the 2011 marriage was valid. The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected this argument. Even if her husband had, in fact, repeated “I divorce you” three times in front of witnesses in 2006, the court held, this act was of no legal consequence because talaq could “only be valid if uttered by a Muslim husband.” Since the husband had converted to Christianity in 1980, the court reasoned, he did not identify as Muslim and could not divorce his wife in this manner. The court also observed (citing Aleem) that other “U.S. states have declined to recognize talaq as a valid unilateral method of divorce on the grounds that it violates the right to due process, equal protection, and fundamental fairness.” It ultimately affirmed the trial court’s judgment and held that the parties’ 2011 marriage was void from the beginning.

Ali v. Osman

On August 6, 2026, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the issue of talaq in its opinion in Ali v. Osman. The couple in that case were married in Sudan in 2001 and moved to the United States soon afterwards. In 2024, the wife filed for divorce in North Dakota. The husband moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the grounds that he had, unbeknownst to his wife, obtained a talaq divorce when he was traveling in Sudan in 2022, as evidenced by an official certificate.

The question presented was whether this divorce was entitled to recognition in North Dakota. The trial court held that it was not. It noted that neither the husband nor the wife was a resident of Sudan when the husband obtained the talaq divorce. It pointed out that the wife was given no notice that the husband was seeking a talaq divorce and did not learn of it until after it had occurred. It concluded that these proceedings had failed to provide the most “basic rudiments” of due process to the wife.

This decision was affirmed by the North Dakota Supreme Court, which observed (citing Aleem) that a number of other U.S. courts had declined to recognize talaq divorces in similar situations. It held that the trial court had not “abused its discretion by declining to recognize the Sudanese divorce certificate as a matter of comity.”

Azhar v. Choudhri

On September 25, 2026, the Texas Supreme Court declined to recognize a talaq divorce in Azhar v. Choudhri. In this case, the husband had lived in Houston, Texas, since he was a child. In 2008, he traveled to Pakistan and married a Pakistani woman. The wife moved to Houston to join her husband in 2010. In 2012, the husband sent his wife back to Pakistan under the guise of renewing her visa. He subsequently obtained a talaq divorce against her, in Pakistan, in 2013, without her knowledge:

According to Wife, Husband did not inform Wife before or afterwards that they would be divorced. No one notified Wife of the proceedings or served her with process. Instead, Husband purported to effectuate service by publishing a notice in a small local Pakistani newspaper a mere five days in advance. Wife did not happen to come across that publication.

The wife did not learn of the talaq divorce until 2015.

In that year, the wife filed for divorce in Texas, seeking an equitable division of the substantial marital estate. The husband moved to dismiss on the grounds that the couple was already divorced under Pakistani law and that, accordingly, there was no marriage to dissolve. The trial court held that the Pakistani talaq divorce judgment was entitled to recognition and rendered a take-nothing judgment against the wife. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Texas.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that the talaq divorce was not entitled to recognition because the wife was never provided with notice “reasonably calculated to apprise her of the action.” The notice provided was, in the court’s view, so far short of what Texas law required that the divorce judgment was not entitled to recognition. Although the court acknowledged that the husband had published a notice in a Pakistani newspaper five days before he initiated the talaq divorce, it viewed this as insufficient:

[W]e have cautioned that citation by publication or posting violates due process when the address of a known defendant is readily ascertainable . . . This record forecloses the conclusion that Husband really wanted to find Wife and notify her of the divorce proceeding. Husband put on no evidence that the typical channels of spousal communication—telephone, text messages, email, social media messaging, in-person communication, mutual friends, and so on—were unavailable. Under these circumstances, the trial court should have heeded the default rule that when a defendant’s identity is known, service by publication is generally inadequate.

In light of these issues with respect to notice, the Texas Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded the case.

On 24 September 2026, the CJEU ruled in Case C‑176/25 [Steizer] on the respective scopes of the lex loci delicti and the lex contractus in a claim of infringement of copyrights where the validity of the assignment of the copyright the plaintiff was challenged on a formal validity ground. The most interesting part of the […]

This post was prepared as part of the activities of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions. Directive (EU) 2024/1069 on the protection of persons engaging in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims and abusive court proceedings (hereinafter, ‘Directive’) was adopted on 11 April 2024 and had to be transposed by 7 May 2026. […]

 

 

The publication of the open-access Festschrift in honour of Professor Christopher F Forsyth KC, Commercial Private International Law in Southern Africa: Comparative and International Perspectives, has previously been announced on this blog.

Edited by Professor Jan L. Neels and Professor Eesa A. Fredericks, with the assistance of Dr Solomon Okorley, the volume brings together comparative and international perspectives on commercial private international law in Southern Africa.

To celebrate its publication, UJ Press, in collaboration with the editors and the Research Centre for Private International Law in Emerging Countries (RCPILEC), University of Johannesburg, is organising an online book launch, bringing together the editors, the dedicatee himself, and other distinguished guests.

The programme will include addresses by the University of Johannesburg’s leadership, contributions by the editors, and a reply by Professor Christopher F Forsyth and/or Mrs Gillian Charles.

The book launch will take place online. The details are as follows:

Date: 19 October 2026

Time: 13:00–14:00 SAST

Venue: Online

RSVP: https://events.teams.microsoft.com/event/eba8581c-5659-42fe-b8a7-a41027425328@fa785acd-36ef-41bc-8a94-89841327e045?source=copyLinkLegacyShareEventDialog

Queries: ujpress@uj.ac.za

The following announcement has kindly been provided by Silvia Marino

The new extensive Volume Multistate Torts in European Private International Law was just published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book is the outcome of the second edition of the EAPIL Winter School in Private International Law. The contributions are based on the lectures given during the course, which took place at the Department of Law, Economics and Cultures, University of Insubria, Como, Italy, from 10 to 15 February 2025. It is edited by Silvia Marino (University of Insubria, Como), Anna Wysocka-Bar (Jagiellonian University, Kraków) and Javier Carrascosa González (University of Murcia).

The chapters discuss the current and future challenges related to the resolution of complex cases of cross-border torts and related damages. Globalisation and digitalisation are particularly crucial in these areas, where the lack of a truly common regulatory fragmentation could leave victims in a situation of helplessness. New challenges, such as distance delicts and the rise of modern social sensibilities, risk affecting the traditional goals of private international law, such as predictability and legal certainty, but especially substantive targets, as the protection of the victim and the enhancement of human rights. The Chapters of this book address these newest challenges with particular regard.

Silvia Marino sets the scenario, analysing the causes that lead to a potential multiplicity of courts granted with jurisdiction multiplicity of applicable law. The immediate reaction is the transnational treatment of lis pendens and related actions (Bartosz Trocha). In the EU, one of the torts that gave rise to the most heated debates is the violation of personality rights, especially online. Javier Carrascosa González deals with the delicate issue of jurisdiction and, after an analysis of the general rule of Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation, examines the consequences of libel tourism. The specific problems derived from the SLAPPs are specifically analysed in the light of the new EU Directive (Caterina D’Osualdo). In a vertical approach, climate change litigation, private enforcement of EU competition law, AI-related harm are separately examined, signaling characterisation difficulties and the potential globality of losses (Magdalena Ličková, Silvia Marino, Olivera Boskovic, Benedetta Cappiello). The clear risk of rendering potentially conflicting judgments by different courts makes it essential to deal with the cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments (Francisco José Garcimartín Alférez, Sara Sánchez Fernández) also in the framework of the human rights protected by the ECHR (Satu Heikkilä). Anna Wysocka-Bar stresses in the last chapter how coordination problem can arise in other subject matters, such as cross-border succession.

The blurb reads as follows:

This book provides theoretical and practical insights into emerging problems concerning multistate torts in private international law. Prominent authors analyse the issue of multistate torts in the context of the core of the European legal system and its classic coordination tools.

The book highlights how cross-border torts can cause difficulties of localisation, including the complexities associated with the involvement of a high number of national courts with full or partial jurisdiction. It examines how this can lead to simultaneously pending proceedings, conflicting judgments and a multiplicity of applicable laws for the same claim. Chapters evaluate the main areas in which tort cases can arise, including cases of online defamation with a focus on Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP), the violation of competition law, climate change litigation, AI-related harm and product liability and succession matters. The book will also address the problem of inconsistent judgments that limit the circulation of enforcement proceedings in human rights cases.

Multistate Torts in European Private International Law is an essential reference for students and scholars of private international law and comparative law. With an in-depth analysis of contemporary issues, it is also relevant to legal practitioners facing related cases.

The table of contents can be accessed here. The book may be purchased or accessed online here.

 

Choice of forum clauses are an important means of managing litigation risk in international commercial contracts. Their effectiveness, however, depends on how courts understand and enforce the parties’ agreement. This well-researched book offers a substantial comparative examination of that problem across seven Asian jurisdictions: Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, China, Indonesia and Japan. Presented as the first work devoted to this particular comparative inquiry, it makes a valuable contribution to Asian private international law and offers insights that will interest readers working on choice of forum agreements elsewhere.

The selection of jurisdictions gives the study considerable comparative breadth. Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia represent common law systems strongly influenced by English law. The Philippines provides a mixed legal tradition shaped by American and Spanish influences, while China, Indonesia and Japan represent civil law traditions, with Dutch law having exerted a particularly significant influence on Indonesia. By bringing these systems together, the author examines how shared problems are addressed through different legal concepts and procedural arrangements.

The book’s analytical framework, introduced at the outset, comprises six connected questions: the characterisation of choice of forum clauses; party autonomy; the procedures available for enforcement; judicial discretion in granting relief; the applicable law; and the overriding effect of forum state and international interests (p 1). This framework is one of the book’s principal strengths. It connects questions that are often examined separately and demonstrates why the practical effectiveness of a clause cannot be assessed solely by reference to its contractual wording. The central argument is persuasive: choice of forum clauses can help manage the risks associated with international commercial transactions, but their effectiveness requires careful drafting and coherent judicial treatment.

Chapter 2 provides the conceptual foundation by examining competing understandings of the nature of choice of forum clauses. It explores the tension between their contractual or substantive character, commonly associated with traditional common law approaches, and their procedural or public character, associated with civil law approaches. The author appears to favour an approach that recognises both dimensions. I agree with this position. A choice of forum agreement records a private commitment, but its enforcement also affects the exercise of judicial authority. An account that accommodates both features provides a convincing basis for understanding the questions addressed throughout the book.

The chapter also considers the relationship between choice of forum clauses and arbitration agreements, their effects on non-parties, and their interaction with other contractual provisions. The comparison with arbitration is useful because both mechanisms enable parties to organise the resolution of future disputes. The author distinguishes the dual public and private character of choice of forum clauses from the contractual nature of arbitration agreements, thereby clarifying the conceptual basis of the book’s subsequent analysis.

Chapter 3 develops the discussion of party autonomy by distinguishing the parties’ freedom to determine the contents of their clause from their freedom to control the conduct of litigation. This distinction is helpful: agreement on a forum does not necessarily give parties unrestricted control over the court’s response. The treatment of the ouster rule illustrates the tension between private agreement and judicial authority. The book describes the movement away from the traditional objection that parties cannot oust the jurisdiction of common law courts, while showing the continuing influence of that objection in the Philippines. Its discussion of the Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005 places these domestic approaches within a broader framework for giving effect to party autonomy.

Chapter 4 examines the relief and remedies available in Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and the Philippines. The comparative account reveals important differences within jurisdictions influenced by the common law. Singapore emerges as particularly receptive to contractual enforcement and party autonomy, whereas the Philippine treatment of choice of forum agreements as venue stipulations, together with the continuing influence of the ouster rule, limits their effect. Malaysia places greater emphasis on judicial discretion. The chapter also examines anti-suit injunctions and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments associated with the enforcement or breach of choice of forum agreements.

The Singapore discussion is especially instructive. The Singapore International Commercial Court and the operation of the Hague Choice of Court Convention demonstrate the jurisdiction’s commitment to facilitating international commercial dispute resolution. Yet the coexistence of different enforcement regimes also creates complexity. Parties may encounter different approaches depending on the court concerned, the applicability of the Convention, the exclusive or non-exclusive character of the clause, and the involvement of third parties. Singapore’s experience therefore illustrates a recurring theme of the book: strong support for party autonomy must be accompanied by rules whose practical operation parties can understand and predict.

Chapter 5 considers judicial discretion, including England’s judicial influence of The Eleftheria and Spiliada on the treatment of exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses in Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia. Its examination of whether those clauses should be subjected to similar tests raises an important question about the relationship between contractual commitment and the assessment of the appropriate forum. The discussion helps explain why a court’s stated commitment to party autonomy does not, by itself, determine the outcome of an enforcement application.

Chapter 6 examines the relationship between choice of forum clauses and choice of law, focusing on existence, validity and interpretation. The account of Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia shows the influence of English common law approaches, including reliance on the law governing the main contract and the reservation of certain questions to the law of the forum. The operation of the Hague Choice of Court Convention in Singapore introduces a different reference to the law of the chosen court for substantive validity.

The discussion of exclusivity is also valuable. The cases examined suggest that, outside the relevant Convention framework, courts in Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia approach exclusivity principally as a question of contractual interpretation rather than through a general presumption. This finding reinforces the practical importance of clear drafting. Parties who intend to confer exclusive jurisdiction should express that intention in terms that minimise uncertainty about the scope and effect of their agreement.

Chapter 7 broadens the analysis by considering forum state and international community interests. Mandatory rules, public policy, comity and related concepts may affect the existence, validity and interpretation of clauses, the availability of relief, and the recognition and enforcement of resulting judgments. The attention given to weaker parties is particularly welcome. Asymmetric agreements, standard-form contracts and consumer transactions reveal why formal consent may not provide a sufficient justification for enforcement in every case. This chapter strengthens the book’s account of party autonomy by examining the interests that may legitimately qualify its operation.

Chapter 8 applies the preceding framework to China, Indonesia and Japan. Its discussion demonstrates both the usefulness and the limits of broad classifications into common law and civil law traditions. The Chinese treatment of disputes involving Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan introduces distinctive questions concerning conflicts between legal systems. The discussion of forum non conveniens, anti-suit injunctions and asymmetric jurisdiction agreements further reveals how familiar mechanisms may acquire different functions within a particular legal system. In particular, the book contrasts the emphasis on efficiency in the Chinese approach to forum non conveniens with the attention to justice in the English approach.

The Indonesian analysis identifies difficulties arising from the conflation of choice of law and choice of court, including reliance on a foreign choice of law clause as a basis for declining jurisdiction. This is a useful illustration of the practical consequences of failing to distinguish two different exercises of party autonomy. The Japanese discussion addresses the special circumstances test, the presumption of exclusivity, the treatment of asymmetric clauses, and rules protecting consumers and employees. Together, these accounts show that support for choice of forum agreements operates within procedural and regulatory arrangements that vary considerably across the jurisdictions examined.

Interestingly, the book reveals differing approaches to asymmetric jurisdiction agreements in the civil law jurisdictions examined. Chinese courts enforce such agreements, while a Japanese court has treated an asymmetric jurisdiction clause as exclusive. The Japanese approach nevertheless operates within a framework that includes the special circumstances test and protections for weaker parties, particularly consumers and employees. These findings suggest that asymmetry does not, by itself, necessarily prevent enforcement in China or Japan.

The final chapter draws the comparative findings together effectively. Characterisation shapes the legal tools available; party autonomy guides judicial approaches; forum procedure determines the means of enforcement; and discretion remains an important element of the court’s response. The applicable law also matters, although the allocation of questions of existence, validity and interpretation differs between systems. Finally, forum state and international interests may override both private agreement and the otherwise applicable law. These findings support the book’s emphasis on careful drafting, predictable judicial analysis and procedural reform. They also provide a basis for considering wider participation in the Hague Choice of Court Convention and the Hague Judgments Convention 2019.

A modest criticism concerns the presentation of the findings. The chapters generally begin with clear and helpful introductions, but more consistent concluding sections would have made it easier to identify and compare their principal lessons. In a study of this breadth, short chapter conclusions could also have helped readers retain the relationship between the detailed national analysis and the book’s overarching framework. The strong final chapter substantially compensates for this omission.

Overall, this is an impressive and richly analysed comparative study. Its contribution lies in bringing contractual commitment, procedural rules, judicial discretion and public interests into a sustained examination of choice of forum clauses across diverse Asian legal systems. It will be valuable to scholars and practitioners of Asian private international law, while also providing a useful framework for comparative work beyond the region. I will certainly return to it, particularly when examining choice of forum agreements in African jurisdictions.

This post was written by Dr. Emeric Prévost, Research fellow at the University of Vienna (Austria) and currently visiting scholar at the University of Kyushu (Japan). As it has been already reported on this blog (here and here), the European Commission (EC) is currently consulting the public by means of a general and targeted consultations […]

As the readers of this blog will recall, the Lindemann Fellowship for Private International Law was established in 2024 to provide early-career researchers with the opportunity to build a network with academics from all over Europe. Fellows are accepted for a three-year period, with new Fellows joining each year, as existing Fellows complete their tenure. […]

Sandrine Brachotte (University of Antwerp, UCLouvain, UCLouvain Saint-Louis Bruxelles)’s Conflicts of Worldviews and Private International Law is out. This book develops a decolonial theory of European private international law. To do so, it begins with Western court cases involving what the author terms a ‘conflict of worldviews’: a clash between the legal frameworks governing the […]

Professor Ulla Liukkunen, a distinguished scholar of private international law, comparative law, and labour law at the University of Helsinki, celebrated her 60th birthday on 12 September. The collected volume Navigating Interconnected Social Justice: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Ulla Liukkunen pays tribute to Professor Liukkunen. Edited by Katja Karjalainen and Iina Tornberg and published […]

Private international law in Egypt has often been described as being in a state of stagnation. After enormous efforts by the government since the end of the 19th century, and particularly during the beginning of the 20th century, Egypt succeeded in developing a relatively comprehensive PIL framework, covering choice of law (Arts 10–28 of the 1948 Civil Code), international jurisdiction (Arts 28–35 of the 1968 Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure), and the enforcement of foreign judgments (Arts 296–301 the 1968 Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure), alongside other rules scattered across various pieces of legislation. While these rules could be considered relatively modern and well developed, and broadly in line with the general tendencies of comparative law at the time, they have since become quite outdated and, in many respects, old-fashioned. This, however, has not prevented Egyptian law from exerting considerable influence throughout the region, with more recent codifications often reproducing or adapting Egyptian solutions.

The influence of Egyptian law is due not only to its legislation, but also to the role played by Egyptian scholars in laying the foundations of a genuine Egyptian PIL scholarship. Early treatises were, more often than not, encyclopedic in scope, deeply engaged with comparative law and attentive to judicial practice. In this respect, one may cite the seminal work of Ezzeddine Abdallah, Al-qānūn ad-Duwalī al-Khāṣ [القانون الدولي الخاص – Private International Law], which consists of two volumes: Volume I, dealing with Nationality, Domicile and the Status of Aliens (1986), and Volume II, dealing with Conflict of Laws and Conflict of Jurisdictions (1986). This work remains, in my view, one of the leading and most authoritative scholarly works in the field.

Slowly, however, the golden age of Egyptian scholarship in private international law entered a period of decline. Much recent scholarship has, more often than not, contented itself with reproducing the work of the great early scholars, while often neglecting the comparative-law dimension from primary sources that was so prominent in those earlier works. Indeed, it is not uncommon for recent publications to refer to existing descriptions of old French case law, to engage in detailed discussions of issues with little practical relevance for Egypt, such as renvoi, or to refer to private international law systems that no longer exist, such as those of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Some also continue to cite, without any particular relevance to the issues under discussion, rather outdated French scholarly works.

More importantly, recent scholarship has generally paid insufficient attention to developments in case law. Rather than systematically examining the more recent decisions of the Egyptian Court of Cassation, despite their relative accessibility, many works continue to rely heavily on older French decisions or on relatively old Egyptian Court of Cassation judgments. This is particularly unfortunate in a field such as private international law, where the practical meaning and development of legal rules can often be understood only by looking closely at how courts actually apply them.

In this regard, the publication of Professor Abdel Moneem Zamzam‘s book on Egyptian private international law provides a useful opportunity to examine the current state and development of Egyptian law and legal scholarship in this field. Professor Zamzam, who is also Head of the Department of Private International Law at the Faculty of Law, Cairo University, is an outstanding scholar of private international law and international civil procedure, including international insolvency and arbitration, as well as international investment law. He obtained his PhD from the University of Dijon in 2003 with a thesis entitled “Overriding Mandatory Rules in State Courts and International Arbitration: A Comparative Franco-Egyptian Study” (Les lois de police dans la jurisprudence étatique et arbitrale : étude comparée franco-égyptienne). The thesis was first published in 2004 by the Atelier national de reproduction des thèses and was republished in 2021 by Éditions universitaires européennes. Professor Zamzam has also published several works in English, notably an article published in 2010 in the Journal of Private International Law, entitled “Bankruptcy Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign Bankruptcy Judgments in Egypt”.

The book, entitled Al-muṭawwal fī al-Qānūn al-Duwalī al-Khāṣ [المطول في القانون الدولي الخاص – The Treatise on Private International Law] (Dar al-Nahḍa al-ʿArabiyya, 2027), revives an old Egyptian tradition of lengthy legal treatises, running to approximately 1,100 pages. It covers the core areas of private international law, namely choice of law, international jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, with particular reference to the case law of the Egyptian Court of Cassation (Maḥkamat al-Naqḍ / محكمة النقض).

The book, kindly made available by the author here for the benefit of Arab PIL scholars and other Arabic-speaking readers, consists of three main parts, preceded by a general introduction.

Part I deals with the general theory of private international law, notably the nature and scope of private international law and its branches (Chap. I), the nature of the conflict-of-laws rule (Chap. II), the application of the conflict-of-laws rule (Chap. III), and disregarding the conflict-of-laws rule and correcting its application (Chap. IV).

Part II deals with the substantive rules of the conflict of laws, notably conflict of laws in personal status matters, or The Principle of the Personal Law (Chap. I), conflict of laws in immovable and movable property, or The Principle of the Territorial Law (Chap. II), conflict of laws in international contractual obligations, or The Principle of Party Autonomy (Chap. III), and conflict of laws in international non-contractual obligations, or The Principle of the Local Law (Chap. IV).

Part III deals with procedural private international law and is divided into two main sections: the first concerns conflicts of international adjudicatory jurisdiction and the international jurisdiction of Egyptian courts (Chap. I), while the second deals with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (Chap. II).

The book has several notable strengths. First, it builds on the existing literature while proposing a broader treatment of private international law in Egypt, often advancing positions that are original, or at least distinct from those prevailing in Egyptian scholarship. Second, it gives an important place to the case law of Egyptian courts, particularly that of the Egyptian Court of Cassation. Finally, in keeping with the tradition of Egyptian scholarly works, it adopts a comparative-law approach, presenting different approaches in major legal systems.

Despite these strong points, there are also some aspects that could, in my view, be taken into account by the author in future editions.

First, I found it particularly unfortunate that the book pays relatively little attention to private international law in other Arab countries. For instance, when discussing the trend towards comprehensive codifications of private international law, the author refers, inter alia, to the Swiss codification of 1984 and the Italian codification of 1995. Surprisingly, however, he also refers to a number of outdated codifications that have since been repealed and replaced by new legislation, such as the Turkish codification of 1982, which was replaced by new legislation in 2007, the Hungarian PIL Law-Decree of 1979, replaced in 2017, and the Romanian PIL Act of 1992, whose substantive provisions were subsequently incorporated into Book VII of the Civil Code, adopted in 2009 and in force since 2011. He also refers to instruments that, although bearing the title “private international law”, deal essentially with choice of law and therefore cannot properly be regarded as comprehensive codifications, such as the Polish Act of 1965, which was replaced by a new Act in 2011.

Surprisingly, the author does not refer to the Tunisian Code of Private International Law of 1998, despite its being available in both Arabic and French. This could have provided a particularly relevant point of reference for a comparative examination of Arab private international law systems. More generally, this reflects a second aspect that, in my view, deserves closer attention: a more systematic comparative-law approach would have benefited from references to the EU regulations, recent developments in US conflict of laws, and, importantly, the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), including the more recent conventions and other instruments adopted in areas such as international jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, choice of court agreements, and international family law. It would also have been useful to consider contemporary developments observable in other Arab jurisdictions. These developments are largely overlooked, with the author relying instead on classical references found in classical Egyptian legal literature, together with citations to older French textbooks that have since been substantially revised, updated or, in some cases, ceased to be regarded as authoritative references, except in relation to the historical issues that were relevant at the time of their publication.

Another aspect that deserves attention is the use of the case law of the Egyptian Court of Cassation. The author’s effort to identify and discuss relevant cases is certainly to be appreciated. At times, however, the references to the case law appear to be more illustrative than substantive. The treatment of derogative choice-of-court agreements provides a good example. The author cites only two decisions in which the Court of Cassation appears to uphold the validity of such agreements. A closer examination of the available case law on the issue, however, reveals a considerably more complex picture, and one that does not necessarily support the author’s position in favour of derogative choice-of-court agreements. It is also unfortunate that some recent decisions, including cases reported on this blog (here, here, here, here, and here) together with the relevant references to the case law, as well as other useful and more recent sources, have not found their way into this latest contribution to Egyptian private international law.

A third point, and in my view the most important one, concerns the history of Egyptian private international law, which is almost entirely overlooked in the book, as if its development had begun only in 1948 with the adoption of the Egyptian Civil Code and the set of private international law rules contained therein. A historical approach to Egyptian private international law, however, would reveal the broader context in which the present rules were developed, the tensions surrounding their adoption, the extraordinary work undertaken by the early scholars, and, above all, the important role played by the case law of the Mixed Courts in shaping the Egyptian private international law that we know today.

These comments may appear critical, but my intention is simply to express the hope that the tradition of the classical authors, who through meticulous comparative research combined with close attention to judicial practice succeeded in bringing Egyptian private international law to a remarkably advanced level for its time, can be revived. In this sense, the challenge today is not merely to describe the current state of Egyptian private international law by largely reproducing the prevailing literature, but to build on the foundations laid by earlier generations while engaging seriously with contemporary comparative developments and the evolving case law of Egyptian courts. If Egyptian private international law is to regain the dynamism and intellectual ambition that characterised what might be described as its golden age, future editions could benefit from a broader comparative perspective, more systematic and substantive engagement with the case law of Egyptian courts, including the Court of Cassation, and greater attention to the historical experiences that have shaped the present system. Such an approach would not simply document the current state of Egyptian private international law; it could also contribute to reviving the golden age of Egyptian private international law and laying the foundations for its further development.

Despite the above comments, the book remains an important contribution to the field and a valuable addition to the literature on Egyptian private international law. It provides a comprehensive account of the current state of Egyptian PIL and, importantly, brings together the relevant statutory provisions, doctrinal debates and judicial developments in a single work. I hope that it will stimulate further discussion and research and, in future editions, contribute even further to the renewal and development of Egyptian private international law.

Judgment by the CJEU in Case C-320/24 Soledil engages with two long-standing principles of EU law.

Firstly, the need for courts motu proprio to raise arguments that contractual terms in B2C contracts may not stand the test of the EU’s Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive 93/13/EEC (‘UCTD’).

Next, the principle that claims between parties must not be allowed to be infinitely pursued and relitigated (named here by the CJEU under the broad term ‘res judicata’). In Soledil the CJEU engaged in essence, and not for the first time, with the balance that needs to be struck between consumer protection and sound administration of justice. It came down firmly in favour of the former.

My note on the case in the  Journal of European Consumer and Market Law is here.

Geert.

The coming weeks will bring two developments in the case law of the Court of Justice in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters.  The Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona in case C-697/25, Appenzell, is scheduled to be delivered on 1 October. In September 2024, the Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Office of Appenzell […]

The latest issue of the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (Volume 46, Issue 3) features two articles of relevance to private international law. Roxana Banu, Constructing Imperial Authority: The Intersection of British Imperial Constitutional Law and Private International Law, 597–623 Historians and constitutional law scholars are starting to uncover the imperial dimensions of the British […]

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, and of course for practice purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

Like all my posts, this post is entirely AI free.

I reviewed the Opinion of Emiliou AG (as he then was; meanwhile he has been appointed judge in the ECtHR) in Case C-176/25 [Steizer], IU v BT, here. The CJEU held last week, confirming the AG’s view.

As I suspected, the CJEU replied on point, in 20 succinct paras. The judgment does not as such settle the ‘proprietary rights’ issue viz Rome I that I flag in my review of the Opinion.

[40], having recalled the core definitions of ‘contract’ and ‘non-contractual’ with reference to the usual Handte and Kalfelis authorities (the Court refers to recentish core applications, Ergo and Kerr) and to the need for consistency between Rome I, II and Brussels Ia, the Court confirms “‘non-contractual obligation’, within the meaning of the Rome II Regulation, must be understood as meaning an obligation which derives from one of the events listed in Article 2 of that regulation.”

[41-42] BT’s claim against IU, allegedly the infringer of the (allegedly established) copyright, clearly is a non-contractual one, covered by A8(1) Rome II’s lex loci protectionis provision.

However [46] the Vorfrage, the formal validity of the contract assigning the exclusive rights of use allegedly infringed, is held instead to be subject to Rome I. This also leads to legal certainty (reference here to Liechtensteinse Landesbank):

“Treating that formal validity as a contractual matter thus provides legal certainty and a degree of predictability which it would not be possible to achieve were that aspect treated as a non-contractual matter.” (For in the latter case it would be subject to a patchwork of leges causae, linked to each of the Member States of infringement).

[53] The CJEU seeks additional support in A12 Rome I (the lex contractus governs, inter alia, the consequences of nullity of the contract):

“it is the law applicable to the contract which determines whether or not the assignee of a formally invalid contract must be considered to be the holder of the rights concerned, since that question is a consequence of the primary issue of the formal validity of the contract.”

[55] The infringement of the exclusive rights of use (were the national court to hold that formal validity is established), need to be assessed in the light of the law established by A8(1) Rome II.

The Court refers [48] to the European Commission’s professed split between proprietary rights and those capable of being the subject of Rome I, and [49] it refers to the AG’s implicit deference to that distinction, but it does not in so many words itself make that distinction, and of course intellectual property rights, and their limited territorial scope, may make one or two things in the judgment distinguishable.

As things stand therefore, in the words of Vlas AG in Tavrida Central Museum (at the Dutch SC), a different view IMO is still possible on the issue of proprietary rights and Rome I.

Geert.

 

 

 

The transatlantic debate over the European Union’s corporate sustainability framework has entered a new phase. Following the substantial amendments introduced through the EU’s recent simplification agenda, in August 2026 the Government of the United States has submitted detailed comments on the forthcoming implementation guidance for Directive (EU) 2024/1760 (the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive – […]

Ulla Liukkunen (University of Helsinki) has kindly shared the attached programme for the Second Seminar of the Global Network on Private International Law, Employment, and Labour Relations (GNPILE).

The event is open to all, but registration is required.

On Tuesday, October 6 2026, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CEST).

Sandrine Brachotte (University of Antwerp) and María Julia Ochoa Jiménez (Comillas Pontifical University) will speak, in English, about the book

“Conflicts of Worldviews and Private International Law” (Hart Publishing, 2026).

This book brings together European private international law and decolonial thinking. It examines how European courts deal with conflicts between legal frameworks and postcolonised worldviews. Through three case studies—religious arbitration, Indigenous sacred land, and sexual minorities in the Global South—it shows that these conflicts are often overlooked. This results in the inadequate protection of the claims and identities of formerly colonised peoples. The book therefore proposes a more pluralist approach to jurisdiction, choice of court, and foreign law, giving greater weight to postcolonised worldviews. Prof. Ochoa Jiménez will comment on it, while focusing on private international law.

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

This post was written by Laima Vaigė, Associate Professor and Senior Lecturer in Private International Law at Uppsala University. On 8 September 2026, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in A.A. v the Netherlands (Application no. 7481/23), concerning a refusal of family reunification between a refugee father living in the Netherlands […]

Luis de Lima Pinheiro (University of Lisbon) has posted Law Applicable to International AI Torts – A Note on a Forthcoming Contribution on SSRN. The abstract reads: This note summarizes the analysis, key insights and proposals advanced in the contribution “Law Applicable to International AI Torts: An Introduction”, forthcoming in Memorial Publication in Honour of Prof. […]