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The SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) Directive of the EU (2024/1069 of 11 April 2024) is transposed in Belgian law by the Act of 30 May 2026. The Act was published in the Belgian Official Journal on 12 June 2026 (see the French version and the Dutch version), and will enter into force on 22 June 2026.

The main features of the Act are:

• it inserts a new chapter in the Judicial Code on the “Protection of Persons involved in Public Debate against Manifestly Unfounded Claims or Abuse of Procure” (Part IV, Book IV, new Chapter XXVII);
• it allows the court to, upon request by the defendant or of its own motion, oblige the plaintiff to provide security for costs in the case of a SLAPP;
• it provides for early dismissal of a SLAPP (at any time during the procedure);
• it makes such early dismissal possible at the introductory session or at a speedy date;
• it places the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that the claim against public participation is not manifestly unfounded;
• it inserts an extra basis of jurisdiction in the Private International Law Code (echoed in the Judicial Code) to allow persons residing in Belgium who were subjected to a SLAPP outside the EU to bring a claim for damages and costs at the place of their residence in Belgium (new Art. 96/1);
• it adds a ground for refusal of judgments from States outside the EU if the judgment was based on a procedure that falls in the definition of a SLAPP (Art. 25 §1, 10°);
• it reaffirms the role of the Belgian Federal Institute for Human Rights (IFDH / FIRM) as the central contact point for SLAPP cases. This institute can intervene in cases by simple letter to the registrar of the court.

Despite earlier discussions about the matter, the Act is limited to civil proceedings, and not extended to criminal proceedings, which the IFDM / FIRM regrets.

The following announcement has kindly been shared with us by Silvia Marino

The new extensive Volume Status and Family Relationships in Private International Law was just published by Edward Elgar Publishing.

Edited by Silvia Marino (University of Insubria, Como), Anna Wysocka-Bar (Jagiellonian University, Kraków) and Javier Carrascosa González (University of Murcia), the volume, builds on the presentations delivered at the 2024 EAPIL Winter School, held in Como in February 2024. It is the second book in the European Association of Private International Law series.

The chapters discuss current and future challenges and issues in the field of personal and family status in European private international law.

Opened by a contribution by Camelia Toader and Ioan-Luca Vlad on the development of the competence of the European private international law in the field, the book includes two chapters on the relationships between human rights and cross-border families, considered also in the frame on the European Convention of Human Rights (written by Paula Poretti and Satu Heikkilä). The following contributions focus on specific sensitive status, whose recognition and circulation risk being impaired, such as reassignment of sex assigned at birth (Anna Wysocka-Bar) and vulnerable adults (Katja Karjalainen). A particular attention is devoted to the status of the children in cross-border situations, such as children born following an international surrogacy agreement (Laura Carpaneto), parenthood (Cristina González Beilfuss), adoption (Chiara Ragni), international child abduction (Nadia Rusinova). An overview on the methods of recognition and acceptance of civil status is also offered (Etienne Pataut). Finally, the volume focuses on cross-border divorces (Máire Ní Shúilleabháin) and on the relevance of tort in family life (Nadia Rusinova)

The blurb reads as follows:

This timely book examines the personal and family status of the natural person in cross-border situations, within the framework of the fundamental rights. Featuring eminent scholars in private international law and internationally known European judges and practitioners, the book includes critical analysis of key topics and case studies. Authors adopt both a theoretical and practical perspective to assess the emerging challenges facing transnational families, from evaluating human rights in cross-border family situations to detailing different kinds of status and their related challenges. They address topics including the recognition of rainbow families and gender identity, the parent–child relationship and cross-border recognition of international and foreign adoptions. Presenting an in-depth analysis of ongoing issues and developments, this book strengthens understanding and research of cross-border family status in Europe.

The table of contents can be accessed here. The book may be purchased or accessed online here.

As already noted on this blog, the Universitat Rovira i Virgili (Tarragona, Spain), in collaboration with the Institut Català Internacional per la Pau (ICIP) and the Centre d’Estudis de Dret Ambiental de Tarragona (CEDAT), will hold an international conference SLAPP, Activism and Human Rights: Legal and Social Challenges in the Defense of the Environment on […]

 

I. Introduction

Sometimes, reading court decisions leaves a strange sense of confusion, especially when the decision rendered not only contradicts a well-established line of case law, but also when the court, in the very same decision, reveals internal contradictions. Several months ago, I critically discussed on this blog a rather unusual decision of the Egyptian Supreme Court (محكمة النقض/maḥkamat an-naqḍ), in which the enforcement of a Canadian judgment was denied on the ground that reciprocity had not been established with Canada. In my comments on that decision, I expressed “significant concerns” regarding the incoherent manner in which reciprocity was addressed by the Supreme Court.

Well, surprises never end, and reciprocity strikes back in a new case, with an even more puzzling effect, as the shift signalled in the previous decision appears to be confirmed in the case commented on here. This new position of the Supreme Court is hardly reassuring. The manner in which the Court addressed such a controversial issue suggests a troubling move towards an increasingly stringent and confusing approach, which consists in affirming that the establishment of reciprocity does not depend on the existence of a treaty with the rendering State on the one hand, while nevertheless denying reciprocity on that very ground on the other.

 

II. The Case

The case concerns an action brought by X (the judgment creditor) seeking the enforcement in Egypt of an American judgment rendered in its favor by a California court, ordering Y (the judgment debtor) to pay a certain sum of money, together with interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. The court of first instance granted the application and declared the Californian judgment enforceable in Egypt, with the exception of the portion awarding interest at a rate of 10%. That decision was subsequently upheld on appeal.

Dissatisfied with the outcome, Y lodged an appeal before the Egyptian Supreme Court arguing that the Californian judgment had been declared enforceable without establishing the existence of legislation in the rendering State allowing the enforcement of Egyptian judgments, as required by the principle of legislative reciprocity (مبدأ التبادل التشريعي/mabdaʾ at-tabādul at-tashrīʿī) and actual reciprocal treatment (المعاملة الفعلية بالمثل/al-muʿāmala al-mithliyya bil-mithl) between the two States with respect to the enforcement of judgments, in accordance with to Article 296 of the Egyptian Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (ECCCP)(*).

(*) Article 296 reads as follows:

Foreign judgments and decisions may be declared enforceable under the same conditions as those laid down by the law of the rendering State for the enforcement therein of Egyptian judgments and decisions.

 

III. The Ruling

In its decision of 20 January 2026, the Court admitted the appeal, ruling as follows (a detailed summary with modifications):

First, the Court recalled – as is usually the case – the general applicable framework.

It noted that, pursuant to Article 296 of the ECCCP, the legislature has adopted the principle of reciprocity or mutual treatment (مبدأ المعاملة بالمثل أو التبادل / mabdaʾ al-muʿāmala bil-mithl aw at-tabādul), meaning that foreign judgments shall be treated in Egypt in the same way as Egyptian judgments are treated in the rendering State. In this respect, the legislature has only required legislative reciprocity (التبادل التشريعي / at-tabādul at-tashrīʿī), as opposed to diplomatic reciprocity (التبادل الدبلوماسي / at-tabādul ad-diblūmāsī), which is established by a treaty or convention (emphasis added).

The Court further recalled that it is required, courts are required to verify ex officio that the condition of legislative reciprocity is satisfied […].

Notwithstanding this premise, the Court went on to censure the lower court’s reasoning, considering that, in the present case, the court of the appealed decision had declared enforceable the Californian judgment after finding,  – by reference to Articles 1713 and 1714 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, that mutual legislative treatment [legislative reciprocity (التبادل التشريعي / at-tabādul at-tashrīʿī)] was sufficiently established to satisfy the reciprocity requirement (شرط المعاملة بالمثل / sharṭ al-mu‘āmala bil-mithl) between Egypt and the State of California.

However, according to the Supreme Court, by deciding as it did without determining whether any convention exists between Egypt and the United States of America concerning the enforcement of judgments providing for reciprocity or mutual treatment, the lower court failed to provide a legal basis for its decision under Article 296 of the ECCCP (emphasis added).

 

IV. Comments

To my knowledge, this is the second decision in which a foreign judgment was refused enforcement in Egypt solely on the basis of a lack of reciprocity (on the earlier case, see my comments here). In both cases, the Supreme Court ruled almost exactly in the same manner and quashed the lower courts’ decisions admitting reciprocity with the rendering State on the ground that the judges failed to show whether there exists a convention between Egypt and the rendering State dealing with the enforcement of judgments that embodies the principle of reciprocity. This position is hardly consistent with the principle affirmed by the Court according to which what matters is legislative reciprocity, not diplomatic reciprocity established by treaty or convention. The comments made on the previous case regarding this aspect are therefore fully applicable here.

What is particularly remarkable, however, is the position taken by the lower courts, which appears to be fully in line with the traditional approach of the Egyptian Supreme Court. Adhering to the principle of legislative reciprocity as traditionally developed (on this practice, see my comments here), the lower courts seem to have concluded that reciprocity existed with the State of California after comparing the enforcement requirements applicable there with those applicable in Egypt. This point is important, as it also shows that, in the view of the lower courts, where judgments emanate from federal States such as the United States, reciprocity should be assessed by reference to the particular State in which the judgment was rendered. The Supreme Court, by contrast, appears to have rejected this approach, placing decisive weight on the existence of a convention between Egypt and the United States.

In any event, the recent developments concerning reciprocity in two successive cases rendered by different panels of the Supreme Court in Egypt are indicative of a shift away from a principle of reciprocity that requires a comparative analysis of the enforcement requirements under the law of the State of origin and under Egyptian law (legislative reciprocity), towards an approach that makes the existence of an international convention a prerequisite for its establishment. This new approach raises the threshold against the enforcement of foreign judgments to a considerable degree, as it would be sufficient for the judgment debtor to argue that reciprocity is not established whenever there is no treaty with the rendering State, bearing in mind that Egypt has concluded a little over 20 conventions, mostly with Arab countries with which it has already concluded regional conventions, and only around 10 with non-Arab countries, including some EU Member States (Germany, Romania, Italy, France, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland) as well as Turkey, Russia, and China. Should such a development be confirmed in future cases, this would mean that judgments rendered in roughly 88% of countries worldwide would be denied enforcement in Egypt.

This backward development stands in striking contrast to recent trends in comparative law, notably in China, where a considered shift has taken place from a traditionally restrictive approach (on this traditional approach, see my comments here), towards a more moderate approach that places emphasis on de jure reciprocity, presumptive reciprocity, and other forms that do not necessarily depend on the existence of a formally concluded treaty between China and the rendering State (see the illustrative cases discussed on this blog here and here). A comparatively more liberal approach has also been followed in Tunisia, where Tunisian courts now consider that, in the absence of an international convention, reciprocity must be presumed and that it is for the party contesting this presumption to provide evidence of its non-existence. (for details, see  Béligh Elbalti, “La réciprocité en matière d’exequatur: Quoi de nouveau? Observations sous l’arrêt de la Cour de cassation n° 6608 du 13 mars 2014” Arab Law Quarterly (2025) online-first publication).

The Egyptian Supreme Court would do well to draw lessons from such comparative developments and reconsider both its position and the negative signal this sends; otherwise, the consequences may prove drastic for holders of Egyptian judgments, which may be denied recognition and enforcement in States requiring reciprocity.

 

(※) Related posts on this blog on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Egypt:

• Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Egypt – A Critical Assessment of a Recent Supreme Court Decision
• Enforcing Foreign Judgments in Egypt: A Critical Examination of Two Recent Egyptian Supreme Court Cases
• Egyptian Supreme Court on the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments – Special Focus on the Service Requirement

This post was contributed by Dr Fabian Schinerl, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Vienna and Co-Coordinator of the EBI Young Researchers Group. He is also affiliated with the EBI Associate Researchers Group, the Centre for Comparative Corporate Finance Law (C3FL), and the Junior Network of the AEDBF. This is the sixth contribution to […]

This post was prepared by Birgit van Houtert (Assistant Professor, Maastricht University), co-chair of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions and member for The Netherlands, and Marco Pasqua (Examiner, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan), co-chair of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions. Marco Pasqua is the author of paragraphs […]

This post was prepared by Birgit van Houtert (Assistant Professor, Maastricht University), co-chair of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions and member for The Netherlands, and Marco Pasqua (Examiner, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan), co-chair of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions. Marco Pasqua is the author of paragraphs […]

Recurrently, we learn of people connected with EAPIL who receive e-mails from senders who pretend to be the President of the Association, Gilles Cuniberti. These scammer e-mails come from accounts that look like our President’s e-mail account. The sender typically asks, first, for an urgent reply, and then asks for money… Regrettably, there’s no way […]

By Eva-Maria Kieninger, University of Wuerzburg. Despite its undeniable commercial importance, international property law has not been subject so far to European unification. Superficially, one might attribute this gap to the universal acceptance of the lex situs rule. But underneath this seemingly harmonious surface, many differences in detail appear. Moreover, the lex situs rule in […]

 

This post was kindly prepared by Dr. Meng Yu, lecturer at China University of Political Science and Law, and co-founder of China Justice Observer.

 

[ABSTRACT]

Recent Australian case law clarifies that the “double interest” mechanism in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter ‘PRC’) monetary judgments functions as a compensatory post-judgment interest framework rather than an unenforceable penalty. This consolidates Australia’s position as a highly attractive and creditor-friendly forum for enforcing Chinese judgments. See Zhengzhou Lvdu Real Estate Group Co v Shu [2024] NSWSC 58 (6 February 2024), Fu v Pang [2025] VSC 597 (16 September 2025), and Shanghai Chenggong Industrial Co Ltd v Zhihua Chen [2025] NSWSC 1112 (27 October 2025).

 

Key takeaways:

• Australian courts have astutely recognized that PRC “double interest” does not actually double the contractual rate, but operates as an additional statutory post-judgment rate (0.0175% per day) to compensate for delayed performance.
• Across three recent decisions, Australian courts in New South Wales and Victoria firmly ruled that Article 264 interest under China’s Civil Procedure Law is not penal, as it aims to compensate rather than punish, and it vindicates a private right and lacks a state-enforced punitive purpose.
• The willingness to enforce this Article 264 interest mechanism was significantly enhanced by its functional equivalence to Australia’s own post-judgment interest rules under the UCPR.

 

In recent decades, Australia has increasingly become a top creditor-friendly jurisdiction for PRC judgment creditors. In just two years (2024-2025), six Chinese judgments have been recognized and enforced by Australian courts,[i] mainly in two states – New South Wales and Victoria.

Like in other common jurisdictions, as previously reported, the grounds that judgment debtors frequently use in challenging such recognition and enforcement in Australia are denial of procedural fairness and natural justice, often arising from the service of process in Chinese court proceedings. See Zhou v Jing [2023] NSWSC 214 (procedural fairness); Yin v Wu [2023] VSCA 130 (natural justice).

Related Posts:

• A Chinese Judgment Denied Enforcement by Court of NSW Australia, Due to Defective Service by Post?
• A Chinese Judgment Denied Enforcement in Australia, As “Public Announcement” against Natural Justice?

 

More interestingly, Australian courts have been dealing with a newish defense in a series of three recent cases – Zhengzhou Lvdu Real Estate Group Co v Shu [2024] NSWSC 58 (6 February 2024), Fu v Pang [2025] VSC 597 (16 September 2025), and Shanghai Chenggong Industrial Co Ltd v Zhihua Chen [2025] NSWSC 1112 (27 October 2025). The common issue at heart is whether the “double interest”, an element commonly seen in PRC monetary judgments, is penal, and hence renders the judgments wholly or partially unenforceable in Australia.

As misleading as the term “double interest” (/ chiyan lvxing lixi de jiabei bufen zhaiwu liyi) may appear, the way Australian courts endeavor to understand a term absolutely unique in a foreign country is admirable. The courts not only correctly pointed out that “double interest” is a misnomer, as it has nothing to do with “double”, but also concluded that such “double interest” is not penal in nature.

For the avoidance of doubt, the so-called “double interest” refers to the double part debt interest of the “Article 264 interest” (also known as “double part debt interest of delayed performance interest”, chiyan lvxing lixi de jiabei bufen zhaiwu liyi), the interests payable under Article 264 of China’s 2023 Civil Procedure Law (CPL) (formerly numbered Article 253 of 2017 CPL, Article 260 of 2021 CPL), which applies in in circumstances where a judgment debtor fails to pay the judgment debt within the period as specified in a judgment.

The method to calculate the Article 264 interest is governed by the 2014 Interpretation by China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) on Several Issues concerning the Applicable Law for Calculating the Interest of Debt on Delayed Performance in Enforcement Procedures” (hereinafter the “SPC Interpretation”).[ii] Article 1 of the SPC Interpretation provides that Article 264 interest – delayed performance interest (the debt interest during the period of delayed performance)- is composed of the ‘general debt interest’ and the ‘double part debt interest’, the former (if any) is specified by the judgment, and the latter is calculated via the formula as follows: Double part of debt interest = the outstanding monetary debt of the debtor other than general debt interest specified by effective legal document x 0.00175 per day x delayed performance period.

 

“Double Interest” Not Double

The term “double interest” is “something of a misnomer”, indicated the Supreme Court of New South Wales (the “NSW Supreme Court”) in Zhengzhou Lvdu Real Estate Group Co v Shu, a case where a judgment of Zhengzhou Intermediate People’s Court of Henan Province (hereinafter the “Zhengzhou Judgment”) for RMB 318,827,295.13 was ruled enforceable.

Like a koala bear is not a bear, the double interest is not double. By nature, it is an “additional” interest, in addition to general debt interest specified by judgment (if any), when the judgment debt was not paid within the period specified in the judgment.

In the Zhengzhou Judgment, the judgment debtors – both the borrower and the guarantor- were found liable for the all the payment obligations, i.e. 1) to repay to the lender (judgment creditor) the principal of the loan in the amount of CNY 170 million and its interest (based on principal of CNY 170 million, calculated on an annual interest rate of 12% for the period between 12 June 2019 and 11 May 2020; and calculated on an annual interest of 18% for the period from 12 May 2020 until the date when the debt is fully repaid) within ten days after this judgment takes effect; and 2) to pay the Article 264 interest, if the payment obligation is not performed within the period specified in this judgment, which is “within ten days after this judgment took effect on 20 September, 2020” (at [42]-[43]).

Clearly, Article 264 (formerly Article 253 of 2017 CPL) does not double the interest rate provided for under the Loan Agreement (which was 12% per annum from the date of the advance until the date of maturity, and then 18% per annum from the date of default until repayment). Instead, there is “double” interest only in the sense that, from the date when the judgment debt was required to be paid until the date of actual payment, there is a second interest rate applicable, in addition to the contractual interest rate of 18% which was found to apply in the Zhengzhou Judgment (at [65]).

Given the calculation method above, Article 264 Interest is calculated based on “the “outstanding monetary debt of the debtor other than general debt interest specified by effective legal document” is, in this case, the amount of the principal (CNY 170 million). The rate of Article 264 interest is a statutory rate, set at 0.0175% per day (around 6.3875% per annum). The “delayed performance period” starts from 29 September 2020 (ten days after this judgment took effect on 9 September) until repayment.

 

“Double Interest” Not Penal

In Zhengzhou Lvdu Real Estate Group Co v Shu, the NSW Supreme Court considered whether “Double Interest” could be regarded penal in nature, but did not reach any determination, given that “it is the Defendant who bears the burden of showing that any element of the Zhengzhou Judgment is penal in nature and that “no evidence and no submissions have been advanced to this effect” (at [68]).

Similarly, in Fu v Pang, the Victoria Supreme Court reviewed an application to enforce a Chinese judgment of Qingxiu District People’s Court of Nanning City, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and this time, the defendant did seek to persuade the court that the double interest was penal in nature.

With detailed reasoning, however, the Victoria Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s submission and concluded it is not penal, ruling that

“there is no public interest element. The double part interest arises out of the exercise of a private right and it has no connection with the state, nor is the plaintiff here acting as a common informer. There is no basis on which it can be concluded that the payment of the extra interest component is imposed for public purposes to punish the defendant for non-compliance with the judgment, rather than being an additional compensation for the plaintiff for the detriment of being kept out of the judgment sum.” (at [30])

Just one month later, in Shanghai Chenggong Industrial Co Ltd v Zhihua Chen, where two PRC judgments were enforced, the NSW Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. In this case, the double interest is the only issue that the defendant disputed, and the court held firmly that Article 264 interest is not penal.

As the NSW Supreme Court revealed, the question at heart is the purpose and nature of Article 264 interest: “does it punish for non-compliance with Court orders, or is it more appropriately considered a legislated post-judgment interest rate?” (at [18]) The court opined the correct answer is the latter.

To start with, it is not akin to a contractual penalty by any comparison. There are also no authorities decided after Schnable v Lui [2002] NSWSC 15 that punitive damages will always be considered penal in Australian law. In other words, punitive damages are not necessarily penal.

More importantly, Article 264 interest aims “to compensate, and not to punish”, because Article 264 is triggered where there is late or deferred payment, and it is “appropriate to compensate a plaintiff for being held out of money, just the way the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) provides for post-judgment interest on judgment debts”. (at [31])

 

Comments

Not long after, by following the same stance on the “non-penal” nature of Article 264 interest in Shanghai Chenggong Industrial Co Ltd v Zhihua Chen, the same court, the NSW Supreme Court, enforced a PRC judgment of Zhangjiagang People’s Court of Jiangsu Province for RMB 24,256,223.86 and interest in Kai Yuan v Jian Hua Zhou [2025] NSWSC 1469 (5 December 2025).

By clearing the name of “double interest”, the series of recent Australian court decisions have pointed out that the double interest is not double, but additional; and its purpose is to compensate, rather than to punish.

At the end of the day, it is practically difficult to ascertain the purpose behind remedies ordered in foreign judgments. The “compensate or punish” question matters so much that taking on one side over the other can render the part containing such interest either enforceable or unenforceable. There seems to be no room for a mixed purpose, which might as well be a third way of interpretation (if taking into account the views of China’s legislature and judiciary).[iii]

Moreover, behind the “compensate or punish” question lies a further question that has yet to be fully tested: what ‘penal’ actually means in the rule against enforcement of a foreign penal law, when discussing the relevant jurisprudence regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

One thing is clear though: when evaluating a foreign concept like PRC “double interest”, the existence of a similar domestic mechanism—such as Australia’s statutory post-judgment interest under the UCPR—makes the concept far easier for local courts to understand and accept. Conversely, courts in jurisdictions like Hong Kong, which lack such a domestic equivalent, may find it much more challenging to conceptualize and enforce.[iv]

 

————————————————————————-

[i] See Zhengzhou Lvdu Real Estate Group Co v Shu [2024] NSWSC 58, Fujian Rongtaiyuan Industrial Co Ltd v Zhan [2024] NSWSC 1318, Yangpu Huigu Pharmaceutical Corporation Limited v He [2025] NSWSC 28, Fu v Pang [2025] VSC 597, Shanghai Chenggong Industrial Co Ltd v Zhihua Chen [2025] NSWSC 1112, Kai Yuan v Jian Hua Zhou [2025] NSWSC 1469.

[ii] Interpretation by China’s Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Applicable Law for Calculating the Interest of Debt on Delayed Performance in Enforcement Procedures, Fa Shi (2014) No. 8, 7 July 2014.

[iii] See Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (ed.), Explanation of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Law Press China, 2nd edition, 2012), p. 590; Civil Law Office of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (ed.), Explanations of Articles, Legislative Rationale, and Relevant Provisions of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2nd edition, 2012), p. 398; and the Official from the Enforcement Bureau of the Supreme People’s Court Answers Reporters’ Questions, People’s Court Daily, 31 July 2014, available at https://www.chinacourt.cn/article/detail/2014/07/id/1354917.shtml.

[iv] See Hung Fung Enterprises Holdings Ltd v The Agricultural Bank of China [2012] HKCA 251, Foshan Nanhai Branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd v Foshan Ruifeng Petroleum and Chemical Fuel Co Ltd [2019] 2 HKLRD 478, Tianjin Financial Investment Services Group v Jinan Muhe Enterprise Management Co Ltd & Ors [2025] HKCFI 6182, Industrial Bank Co., Ltd., Ningbo Branch v Ningbo Baifeng Mineral Processing Co., Ltd. & Ors [2026] HKCFI 2455, and Letui (Shanghai) Cultural Communication Co., Ltd. v. Shenzhen Mega Combine Technology Co.,Ltd & Ors [2026] HKCFI 3204.

Between 3 and 18 June 2026, the Members of the European Association of Private International Law are invited to cast a vote, on-line, to decide who should sit in the Board of Administration and in the Scientific Council of the Association. An e-mail has been sent on 1 June 2026 by the Secretary General to […]

 

Many thanks to Boris Awa (Kigali Independent University ULK, Kigali, Rwanda) for the tip-off 

The birth of a new academic journal is always good news, especially when its stated aim is “to become one of the leading scientific publications on international law” and when it is “primarily intended as a forum for African international lawyers’ reflection and research on issues of interest to Africa.” This is precisely the ambition pursued by the newly launched African Review of International Law (ARIL) / Revue africaine de droit international (RADI), published by the African Society of International Law (AfSIL).

The inaugural issue features several very interesting contributions, not only on the practice of international law in Africa and Africa’s contribution to international law, but also on private international law. Notable contributions include:

• Giuditta Cordero-Moss, “The Legal Framework for Arbitration in Africa: Issues of Applicable Law”;
• Yuko Nishitani, “Private International Law and Child Protection from the Perspective of Africa”;
• Grégoire Jiogue, “La réception des règles de droit international privé français en Afrique noire francophone”.

Another contribution of particular relevance from a private international law perspective is by August Reinisch and Maria José Escobar Gil, “The Wealth of Regional Courts in Africa: An Outsider’s Perspective”. This piece is especially timely in light of ongoing discussions concerning the recognition and enforcement of decisions rendered by regional and international courts in Africa, and the adaptability of domestic regimes on foreign judgments to such decisions.

The full table of contents also includes contributions by Maurice Kamto, Makane Moïse Mbengue, Yves Daudet, Bing Bing Jia, Mario J. A. Oyarzábal, Namira Negm, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Nilüfer Oral, Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, and Dire Tladi, covering a wide range of themes in contemporary international law.

The inaugural issue concludes with a call for papers inviting submissions, in both English and French, in the fields of public international law, private international law, and comparative law.

These contributions are intended for publication in the first regular issue, scheduled for release in the second half of 2026.

Proposed articles, case notes, and book reviews must be submitted by September 2026 via the Review’s email address: aril.info25@gmail.com.

The full table of contents, detailed information on the call for contributions (in English and French), as well as the Review’s stylistic guide (in English and French), are available in the inaugural issue.

Needless to say, African private international law scholars, as well as scholars interested in African private international law, are very warmly encouraged to take advantage of this new forum and to contribute to making it a successful one, for the benefit of all.

The European Civil Justice Centre is pleased to announce a European Civil Procedure Seminar, which will take place on 25 and 26 June 2026 at the Faculty of Law and Criminology of KU Leuven.

The seminar is organised on the occasion of the publication of European Civil Procedure, edited by Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet and Adriani Dori, and published by de Gruyter in 2026. The book offers a comprehensive overview of the main developments shaping civil justice, including EU instruments on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement, service of documents, taking of evidence, and collective redress.

The seminar will be held at KU Leuven, Faculty of Law and Criminology, Tiensestraat 41, Leuven, Facultaire Raadzaal. Participation is free. Registration for in-person attendance is available by email at anne-marie.cuypers@kuleuven.be. Registration to attend online is available via Eventbrite: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/online-european-civil-procedure-seminar-tickets-1991345046640

The seminar will bring together a number of the book’s authors to reflect on and discuss various topics within the field of European civil procedure.

Programme

Thursday 25 June 2026

12.45
Welcome
Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet, Adriani Dori

13.00
Innovations in EU Civil Procedure: Novel Concepts, Regulatory Mechanisms and Technology
Anna Nylund [online]

13.40
Mariana after Magnitsky: How Global Sanctions and Litigation Funding Politicize Private International Law
Eduardo Silva de Freitas

14.20
Three to Tango: Lawyers Ethics in Collective Litigation with Third Party Funding
Jos Hoevenaars

15.00
Coffee break

15.30
“No Mini-Trials at the Jurisdictional Stage”: Brussels Ia and Engagement with the Merits
Geert Van Calster

16.10
CJEU Case Law on Delineating the Scope of Application Between the Insolvency and Brussels Ibis Regulations: Challenges of Uniform Interpretation
Vesna Lazic

17.00
Taking of Evidence: Cross-Border Aspects and EU Influence
Wannes Vandenbussche and Jachin Van Doninck

17.40
End of day one

 

Friday 26 June 2026

9.00
Simplicity is the Ultimate Sophistication
Willem Visser

9.40
Judicial Cooperation in Civil Enforcement
Patrick Gielen

10.20
The Revision of the ADR Directive 2013/11 and the Amendments in the ADR Directive 2025/2647: The use of Evidence
Emma van Gelder

11.00
Coffee break

11.20
EU law and National Civil Procedure: A Slightly Larger Area Than It First Appears.
Bart Krans

12.00
Elusive DigitalJustice@2030: Can the Promise Be Fulfilled?
Alan Uzelac [online]

12.30
Closing
Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet, Adriani Dori

End of day two

For further information, please contact kramer@law.eur.nl and stefaan.voet@kuleuven.be.

 

The second book in the European Association of Private International Law series is out. Edited by Silvia Marino (University of Insubria, Como), Anna Wysocka-Bar (Jagiellonian University, Kraków) and Javier Carrascosa González (University of Murcia), the volume, published by Edward Elgar, builds on the presentations delivered at the 2024 EAPIL Winter School, held in Como in February […]

A recent article in the latest issue of the Asian Journal of Comparative Law revisits a feature of Indian private international law that often sits in the background of transactional and disputes practice but can decisively shape outcomes: the continued presence of révision au fond in India’s law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (REFJ).

For practitioners, the issue is not merely doctrinal. It concerns the enforceability of outcomes and, therefore, how disputes should be structured at the drafting stage.

Under Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, Indian courts are formally empowered to refuse enforcement where a foreign judgment is not “on the merits.” Read literally, this suggests a willingness to reassess the correctness of the decision. In most jurisdictions today, that approach has been abandoned. Refusal of enforcement is typically confined to procedural defects: jurisdiction, fraud, natural justice, or public policy, not the substance of the decision.

In practice, Indian courts have taken a far more restrained approach. They do not reopen the correctness of the foreign judgment. Instead, they ask whether the decision reflects a genuine adjudication: was there evidence, was there a real opportunity to be heard, and is the decision reasoned? In effect, what appears to be révision au fond operates as a proxy for natural justice.

The difficulty lies in how this framework is perceived externally. Courts in jurisdictions that condition enforcement on reciprocity or substantially similar standards, such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and, increasingly, China, do not necessarily engage with the nuances of Indian case law. The statutory text continues to signal that India permits merits review. That signal alone may be sufficient to deny enforcement of Indian judgments abroad.

This gap between doctrine and practice creates a set of risks that practitioners should factor into both litigation strategy and transactional drafting.

First, forum selection cannot be approached in isolation from enforcement.
Where assets are likely to be located outside India, the portability of an Indian judgment becomes a central concern. If enforcement is anticipated in reciprocity-based jurisdictions, the choice of an Indian court may introduce avoidable uncertainty.

Second, arbitration retains a structural advantage in this context.
India’s alignment with the New York Convention and the prohibition on merits review in the enforcement of arbitral awards offers a level of predictability that litigation currently does not. Where enforcement abroad is critical, arbitration may continue to be the safer route.

Third, dispute resolution clauses should be drafted with enforcement geography in mind.
This may involve:

• Selecting a forum whose judgments are more readily enforceable in the jurisdictions where assets are located
• Considering hybrid approaches, such as arbitration with carefully chosen seats
• Avoiding assumptions that a favourable judgment in one jurisdiction will translate into effective recovery elsewhere

Fourth, expectations around default and summary judgments should be managed carefully.
Indian courts place emphasis on whether the judgment reflects a substantive evaluation of the dispute. Orders that appear purely formal or insufficiently reasoned may face resistance in India, and this in turn feeds into how Indian judgments are assessed abroad.

The broader point is that India’s REFJ framework is not out of step in practice, but it appears to be so in form. Until that dissonance is addressed, whether through legislative clarification or greater international alignment, the enforceability of Indian judgments will continue to depend as much on perception as on doctrine. The article is available open-access here.

This post is written by Dr. Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar LLM(LSE) PhD(Navarra), Associate Professor School of Law KIMEP

Introduction

In May 2026, the Court of First Instance of the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) recognised and enforced a Swiss ICC arbitral award rendered in favour of Naftogaz against Gazprom. The award arose out of the disputes between the parties concerning the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine after the start of the war.

The decision was followed by public comments from Kazakhstan’s Minister of Justice. According to press reports, the Minister stated that the award would not be enforced in Kazakhstan because neither Gazprom nor Naftogaz were participants in the AIFC and because the dispute had no connection to the Centre. He further suggested that the AIFC should not become a “transit platform” for the enforcement of foreign decisions unrelated to its activities.

The controversy raises an interesting private international law question that extends well beyond the particular dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz. Can the AIFC Court function as a conduit jurisdiction for the recognition of foreign arbitral awards and their subsequent enforcement in Kazakhstan, i.e. outside the AIFC?

The Jurisdictional Problem

The AIFC occupies a unique constitutional position. Established in 2018, it operates under a separate common-law framework within Kazakhstan and possesses its own court system staffed by international judges. Article 13(2) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute on the AIFC expressly provides that the AIFC Court is not part of the judicial system of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The difficulty is that the Constitutional Statute does not expressly address whether the AIFC Court may recognise foreign arbitral awards that have no connection to the Centre.

The Court relied principally on Article 45(1) of the AIFC Arbitration Regulations, which provides that: “An arbitral award, irrespective of the State or jurisdiction in which it was made, shall be recognised as binding within the AIFC.” The Court also relied on Article 40(3) of the AIFC Court Regulations, which refers to the enforcement of “other judgments and arbitration awards”.

Whether these provisions actually confer jurisdiction to recognise foreign arbitral awards remains debatable. The AIFC Constitutional Statute itself is largely silent on the matter. The dispute therefore raises a classic question of institutional competence: can jurisdiction be inferred from subordinate regulations where the constitutional instrument neither expressly grants nor expressly excludes it?

The New York Convention Argument

One possible justification for the Court’s approach lies in Kazakhstan’s obligations under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958.

The AIFC is located within the territory of Kazakhstan. Under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties bind the entire territory of a state unless a contrary intention appears. Nothing in Kazakhstan’s ratification of the New York Convention suggests that the Convention does not apply within the territory of the AIFC.

Article III of the Convention requires contracting states to recognise foreign arbitral awards. However, the Convention itself does not allocate jurisdiction among domestic courts. It does not specify whether recognition must be sought before an ordinary state court, a specialised commercial court or a court located within a financial centre. It may therefore be argued that once Kazakhstan created the AIFC Court and granted it powers relating to arbitration, the Court became one of the institutions through which Kazakhstan fulfils its Convention obligations.

The contrary argument is equally plausible. Kazakhstan may comply fully with the Convention while reserving recognition proceedings to its ordinary courts. The Convention requires recognition; it does not dictate which court must provide it.

An Exequatur of an Exequatur?

The dispute also raises a more traditional private international law concern.

If a Swiss arbitral award is recognised by the AIFC Court and the resulting AIFC judgment is then enforced elsewhere in Kazakhstan, one might ask whether this effectively amounts to an “exequatur of an exequatur”. Scholars have long expressed reservations about attempts to circulate recognition judgments relating to arbitral awards. Such practices may circumvent the grounds for refusal contained in Article V of the New York Convention by converting an arbitral award into a court judgment before seeking enforcement elsewhere.

Whether that objection applies here depends in part on how one characterises the relationship between the AIFC and Kazakhstan. Although the AIFC forms part of Kazakhstan’s territory, it possesses a distinct legal system and separate courts. Therefore it is, properly speaking “another jurisdiction”, if not another state.

Lessons from Dubai and Abu Dhabi

The most illuminating comparison comes from the Gulf financial centres, which the AIFC openly tries to emulate.

The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts have long been associated with the concept of a conduit jurisdiction. Under the DIFC framework, parties have sought recognition of foreign judgments and arbitral awards before the DIFC Courts even where neither the parties nor the dispute had any connection to the DIFC. Once recognised, the resulting DIFC judgment could potentially be enforced through the ordinary Dubai courts.

The leading authorities include X1 and X2 v Y1 and Y2 and Banyan Tree Corporate Pte Ltd v Meydan Group LLC. In both cases, the DIFC Courts adopted a broad understanding of their recognition jurisdiction.

The Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) followed a different path. Following legislative reforms in 2020, it became clear that the ADGM Courts could not be used as a conduit jurisdiction for the recognition of foreign judgments and arbitral awards. Abu Dhabi thus deliberately rejected a model that Dubai had largely embraced.

The AIFC now appears to stand somewhere between these two approaches. Unlike the DIFC legislation, the AIFC framework contains no clear statement granting recognition jurisdiction over foreign arbitral awards irrespective of any connection to the Centre. Unlike the ADGM legislation, however, it contains no express prohibition.

Conclusions

The Minister’s remarks announcing that the AIFC Court judgement would not be enforced in Kazakhstan may be understood as reflecting a legitimate policy concern: whether an international financial-centre court should be used to bypass ordinary domestic recognition procedures. Yet, they also concern a matter that is arguably for the courts themselves to determine. The Constitutional Statute repeatedly emphasises the independence of the AIFC Court and grants it exclusive authority to interpret AIFC law.

The broader issue therefore concerns institutional design rather than merely arbitration enforcement. If Kazakhstan does not wish the AIFC Court to function as a conduit jurisdiction, the appropriate solution may be legislative clarification. Conversely, if the AIFC is intended to replicate aspects of the DIFC model, greater certainty regarding its recognition jurisdiction would be desirable.

The CJEU judgment in TQ v Mr Green Limited (C‑198/24) follows an approach that the Court accustomed us to in relation to European uniform procedures requests for a preliminary ruling. In this area, over the years, the Court methodically adopted an autonomous and strict interpretation of the requirements that must be fulfilled for the creditor […]

On 16 June 2026, Stockholm University will host a release seminar for Scandinavian Studies in Law, Volume 72: ThePoliticisation of Private International Law. As previously reported on the blog, Stockholm University hosted a Nordic conference last June on the politicisation of private international law. The conference presentations, together with several additional contributions, have now been […]

This post, which is cross posted on EU Law Live, was contributed by Dr Johannes Ungerer, who is a Senior Research Lecturer in the Faculty of Law, a Deputy Director of the Institute of European and Comparative Law, and an Associate Research Fellow of St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford. The CJEU’s judgment in Crédit […]

On May 19, the CJEU (Grand Chamber, judge F. Biltgen as rapporteur), made public its judgment in case C-350/24, Crédit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank SA, upon referral by the French Cour de Cassation. The importance of the decision for PIL cannot be ignored, thus this post reproducing the main points of the reasoning of […]