The University of Hamburg has announced its second Call for Applications for the Lindemann Fellowship for Private International Law. Eligible are researchers based in Europe who recently completed or are close to completing their PhD studies, with a main research focus on conflict of laws and/or international civil procedure.
Becoming a Lindemann Fellow means having a 3-year grant within a vibrant European network, fully funded annual meetings to present and discuss your research, and publication in an open-access collected volume.
More information about the Fellowship is available at the webpage: https://www.jura.uni-hamburg.de/duden/60-fellowship-lindemann.html
Applications (combined into a single PDF) must be submitted by 1 November 2025 to lindemann-fellowship@uni-hamburg.de.
by Jean-Charles Jais, Guillaume Croisant, Canelle Etchegorry, and Alexia Kaztaridou (all Linklaters)
On 17 September 2025, the French Cour de cassation handed down its decision on the Lastre case. This followed a landmark preliminary ruling of February 2025 from the CJEU, which laid out the conditions for a valid asymmetric jurisdiction clause under article 25 of the Brussels I recast regulation.
Asymmetric jurisdiction clauses allow one party to initiate proceedings in multiple courts or any competent court, while the other party has fewer options or is restricted to a specific jurisdiction. Such clauses are common in financial agreements (read more in our previous blog post here).
In the latest development of the Lastre case in France, the French Supreme Court opted for a pro-contractual autonomy stance, favouring the validity of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses.
Background to the decision
A French company had entered into a contract for the supply of cladding panels for a construction project with an Italian supplier. The supplier’s general terms and conditions provided for the jurisdiction of the Italian court of Brescia but reserved its right to proceed against the buyer before “another competent court in Italy or abroad”.
Following defects in the works in late 2019, proceedings were initiated before French courts against all contractors, including the Italian supplier. The latter challenged the jurisdiction of the French courts, relying on the above-mentioned jurisdiction clause.
Consistent with previous precedents, the French First Instance Court and Court of Appeals dismissed the objection. These courts found that the clause granted the Italian supplier discretionary authority to select jurisdiction, rendering it invalid due to its failure to satisfy the foreseeability criterion outlined in article 25 of the Brussels I recast regulation.
The case was further appealed before the French Supreme Court, which referred preliminary questions to the CJEU. In its preliminary ruling, the CJEU clarified that the validity of asymmetric clauses was to be assessed using autonomous criteria derived from article 25 of the Regulation and set out the conditions for such clauses to be valid.
A pragmatic application of the CJEU’s three-fold approach to “any other competent court” clauses
In last week’s ruling, the French Supreme Court sought to follow the CJEU’s three-fold approach in examining the validity of asymmetric clauses and recalled that such clause must (i) designate courts competent under the Brussels I recast regulation and/or the Lugano Convention; (ii) identify sufficiently precise objective criteria to allow the court seized to determine its competence; and (iii) not conflict with special or exclusive jurisdiction rules set out in the Brussels I recast regulation or the Lugano Convention.
The French Supreme Court then held that the CJEU leaves it to national courts to interpret asymmetric clauses which allow one party to initiate proceedings before “any other competent court”, in accordance with the principles of party autonomy and practical effectiveness (effet utile).
On this basis, the French Supreme Court concluded that, in a case where the contractual relationship has no objective connecting factor with non-EU and non-Lugano States (i.e., third-party states), the jurisdiction clause designating “any other competent court” must be interpreted as referring to competent courts under the general rules of jurisdiction laid out in the Brussels I recast Regulation and the Lugano Convention. The clause thus complied with the first condition set by the CJEU, even if it did not expressly refer to these two instruments.
Accordingly, the French Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals’ decision and upheld the validity of the asymmetric jurisdiction clause.
Practical implications for asymmetric jurisdiction clauses
What does this ruling imply for parties wishing to rely or already relying on asymmetric jurisdiction clauses, particularly in cross-border contracts within the EU?
A more favourable treatment of asymmetric clauses
The French Supreme Court’s Lastre decision illustrates the Court’s pro-contractual autonomy approach to jurisdiction clauses. This will reassure parties seeking flexibility in drafting these clauses, particularly in light of certain earlier decisions which adopted a more cautious approach towards one-sided jurisdiction clauses.
The French Supreme Court’s contractual autonomy stance also appears in three decisions issued on the same day.
In one case, the Court followed its Lastre reasoning and upheld a bank’s clause granting exclusive jurisdiction to Luxembourg courts, while allowing the bank to bring proceedings at the client’s domicile or “other competent courts”.
In two other cases, the Court found that the clauses which designated a specific EU court and provided an objective criterion for determining the alternative jurisdiction available to one of the parties were sufficiently precise. These criteria were the location of the guarantor’s assets (case no. 23-18.785) and one of the parties’ registered office or that of its branch (case no. 23-16.150). This is in line with previous decisions validating asymmetric clauses, such as, for instance, the eBizcuss decision, which rely on objective criteria and generally supports the enforceability of asymmetric clauses.
Limitations for clauses with links to third-party states
While the French Supreme Court’s decision is a positive development for legal certainty and party autonomy, limitations and uncertainties remain.
First, the clause reviewed in the Lastre case conferred jurisdiction to the courts of a Member State (Brescia, in Italy), while reserving the possibility for one party to start proceedings before “any other competent courts”. As a result, the French Supreme Court did not address the validity of clauses that would also include the possibility for one party or both of them to start proceedings before one or several third-party state court(s), such as London or New York, a common feature in finance and banking contracts. The position on this remains uncertain.
Second, the ruling reinforces the material risk, stemming from the CJEU’s Lastre decision, that a clause designating “any competent court” could be deemed invalid where the contract has significant objective connecting factors with third-party states.
Third, the French Supreme Court’s interpretation is not binding on the courts of third-party states. However, in the scenario considered by the court (where there are no objective connecting factors to a third-party state), it is unlikely that a court in, for example, London or New York would accept jurisdiction. It would probably decline to hear the case under its own private international law rules.
Finally, this judgement does not guarantee a harmonised EU approach. It remains to be seen whether other Member State courts will adopt the same interpretation.
The White Paper on “Digital Product Passports and Critical Raw Materials for Batteries: Legal Conflicts and Principles for Cross-Border Cooperation” is now formally published on the UNECE website!
The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe White Paper identifies and analyses the critical legal challenges in implementing Digital Product Passports (DPPs) for Critical Raw Materials (CRMs), including cobalt, copper, lithium, and nickel. These materials are essential for Energy Transition, for example, electric vehicles.
Yet, tracing their journey from mines to markets to recycling is legally complex and globally inconsistent. This fragmentation hinders sustainability and transition to circular economy.
The White Paper provides policymakers and businesses with: An analysis of conflicting legal frameworks in implementing DPPs; Guiding principles for cross-border cooperation in CRM-Battery value chains.
Read the full White Paper here.
[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
In Gable Insurance AG v Dewsall & Ors [2025] EWHC 2280 (Ch) there was succinct pondering whether a claim based on knowing receipt falls within A4 or A10 of Rome II.
Parties do not seem to have pushed the issue and the debate it seems is quickly settled as being covered by English law. In coming to this conclusion Vos DJ does cut a few corners. Firstly despite it not having been intense, there does seem to have been debate and no agreement per A14 Rome II.
Further, the judge and parties discuss the issue of qualification of the claim and whether this should be done using lex fori or (putative) lex causae ([405] in the case at issue, Liechtenstein law would seem to qualify the underlying breach of duty by a director in a similar way to a contractual claim). Under Rome II of course the answer to that question is: neither. Qualification in areas covered by harmonising instruments takes place under an autonomous, EU law concept. Post Brexit of course a relevant question is whether this general principle of EU (PrivInt) law continue to apply when UK Courts apply the ‘assimilated’ Rome I and II instruments. In the case at issue seemingly the answer is ‘not at all’, for with reference to Kuwait Oil Tanker Co SAK v Al Bader (No3) [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 271) the conclusion is taken that a relationship which exists under foreign law should be examined to determine whether the duties which are owed would be characterised as fiduciary duties under English law, and that only if they are, a claim in knowing receipt can be brought in England.
[403] the judge holds that the application of A4 and 10 is likely to lead to the same result of English law being lex causae, and [404] that in any event, the circumstances are manifestly more closely connected with England than any other country, hence triggering the escape clause of A4(3) or (10)4. That as I have said before, is a topsy turvy way to go about a Rome II analysis. The ‘proper law of the tort’ exercise is only a narrow escape valve in Rome II (and I): not a general principle.
Geert.
Claim in knowing receipt. Most succinct ponder as to whether covered by A4 or 10 Rome II.Gable Insurance AG v Dewsall & Ors [2025] EWHC 2280 (Ch)www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH…
— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-09-09T06:34:10.507Z
Now I know I have a blog queue at times but this one is unforgivably late. See here the report by Kathleen Garnett and myself on essential use in key international, US (federal) and EU law.
The concept of essential and non-essential use has been gaining traction in the broader context for chemicals policy. The authors of this report have analysed the concepts of “essential” and “non-essential” use under selected parts of International law, EU law, and US federal law with particular focus given to derogations/exemptions to a general prohibition/restriction which are (i) granted based on essentiality (or equivalent concepts) or (ii) are not granted because of non-essentiality (or equivalent concepts).
In July 2021 we completed a thorough review of essential uses approaches in 9 legal sources: The Montreal Protocol; the US Clean Air Act 1977; the EU Regulation 517/2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases; the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants; the EU POPs Regulation 2019/1021; the EU Regulation 528/2012 on biocidal products; the EU Regulation 1107/2009 on plant protection products; the EU Directive 2011/65 on hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment; and the EU Regulation 1333/2008 on food additives.
The study concludes that deployment of an essential use justification in this complex area of the law is rare. The most common reasons for justifying a derogation and /or exemption, are:
The Montreal Protocol appears to be an outlier in the regulation of hazardous substances with an essential use approach, and our analysis of the 1978 US forerunner to that approach is a most relevant element, we submit, in the current discussions on essential uses.
Kathleen, Geert.
[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
Campeau v Gottex Real Asset Fund 1 (OE) Waste SARL [2025] EWHC 2322 (Comm) is worth a flag for the discussion of CPR r. 6.33(2B) which allows a claimant not to have to seek permission to serve out of the jurisdiction in the context of choice of court under the 2005 Hague Convention. It reads
‘(2B) The claimant may serve the claim form on a defendant outside the United Kingdom where, for each claim made against the defendant to be served and included in the claim form—
(a) the court has power to determine that claim under the 2005 Hague Convention and the defendant is a party to an exclusive choice of court agreement conferring jurisdiction on that court within the meaning of Article 3 of the 2005 Hague Convention;
(b) a contract contains a term to the effect that the court shall have jurisdiction to determine that claim; or
(c) the claim is in respect of a contract falling within sub-paragraph (b).’
OE Waste’s argument is that Mr Campeau was not a party to the SPA which contains the clause, and there is no other basis, whether pursuant to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (‘the 1999 Act’) or as a matter of construction of the SPA on which Mr Campeau is to be treated as a party to, or permitted to rely on, the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the SPA. Moreover, there is no alternative basis in CPR 6.33(2B)(b) or (c) that would entitle Mr Campeau to serve the Claim Form out of the jurisdiction without permission.
Butcher J signals [28] that Mr Campeau ought to have submitted a request for permission to serve out as a subsidiary means, for under CPR PD 6B paragraph 3.1(6)(c), contract governed by English law, permission could have been granted on that basis. As it is, he decides on the basis of contractual construction that there is a good arguable case that the contractual scope of the choice of court clause did extend to a dispute over the extent of a third party’s rights under the relevant clause; and that the parties were agreed between themselves that such a dispute should be subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts.
The judgment is not particularly exciting however I decided to post anyway, seeing as it is a good example of contractual construction in the context of choice of court..
Geert.
Interesting judgment discussing choice of court (Hague 2005) and impact on claims by third parties; privity, contractual constructionCampeau v Gottex Real Asset Fund 1 (OE) Waste SARL [2025] EWHC 2322 (Comm)www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH…
— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-09-18T07:12:34.343Z
The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on Thursday 25 September 2025 at 14:30 (Mexico City time – CST), 22:30 (CEST time). The topic of the webinar is: A radical change in German Private International Law, the example of the naming law, which will be presented by Prof. Dr. Karl August von Sachsen Gessaphe (in Spanish).
The details of the webinar are:
Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85043670569?pwd=jJJBWFanSEfm5RpHKwS61bXI6yoSQy.1
Meeting ID: 850 4367 0569
Password: AMEDIP
Participation is free of charge.
This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX
Can private actors utilize choice-of-law clauses selecting the laws of a foreign country to avoid laws enacted by the United States? In this post, I argue that the answer is a qualified yes. I first examine situations where the U.S. laws in question are not mandatory. I then consider scenarios where these laws are mandatory. Finally, the post looks at whether private parties may rely on foreign forum selection clauses and foreign choice-of-law clauses—operating in tandem—to avoid U.S. law altogether.
There are a handful of non-mandatory federal laws in the United States that may be avoided by selecting foreign law to govern a contract. Contracting parties may, for example, opt out of the CISG by choosing the law of a nation that has not ratified it. (The list of non-ratifying nations includes the United Kingdom, India, Ireland, South Africa, and—maybe—Taiwan.) Contracting parties may also avoid some parts of the Federal Arbitration Act via a choice-of-law clause selecting the law of a foreign country.
Mandatory Federal LawsForeign choice-of-law clauses are sometimes deployed in an attempt to evade mandatory state laws. In these cases, the courts will generally apply Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine whether the choice-of-law clause should be given effect.
When a foreign choice-of-law clause is deployed in an attempt to avoid mandatory federal laws, the courts have taken a very different approach. In such cases, the courts will not apply Section 187 because state choice-of-law rules do not apply to federal statutes. Instead, the courts will typically look at the foreign choice-of-law clause, shrug, and apply the federal statute. A foreign choice-of-law clause—standing alone—cannot be used to avoid a mandatory rule contained in a federal statute. In such cases, the only question is whether the statute applies extraterritorially.
There is, however, an important exception. When the federal courts are applying federal common law—rather than a federal statute or a federal treaty—they will sometimes engage in a traditional choice-of-law analysis. They may look to Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, for example, to determine whether it is appropriate to apply foreign law to the exclusion of federal common law in cases involving international transportation contracts or airplane crashes occurring outside the United States. When the case arises under federal maritime law—a species of federal common law—the courts will apply the test for determining whether a choice-of-law clause is enforceable articulated the Supreme Court in Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Company, LLC. Even in maritime cases, however, a foreign choice-of-law clause will not be enforced when applying the chosen law would “contravene a controlling federal statute” or “conflict with an established federal maritime policy.” This restriction means that, in practice, foreign choice-of-law clauses will rarely prove effective at avoiding mandatory federal laws even in the maritime context.
Finally, it is worth noting that U.S. courts generally will not apply the public laws of other countries due to the public law taboo. Even if a U.S. court were to conclude that a foreign choice-of-law clause was enforceable, that court is unlikely to apply the criminal, tax, antitrust, anti-discrimination, or securities laws of another nation.
Choice-of-Law Clauses + Forum Selection ClausesAlthough mandatory federal laws cannot be evaded by foreign choice-of-law clauses in isolation, they may be avoided—at least sometimes—by adding a foreign forum selection clause to the agreement. If the defendant can persuade a U.S. court to enforce the forum selection clause, the question of whether the choice-of-law clause is enforceable will be decided by a court in a foreign country. In cases where the choice-of-law clause selects the law of that country, the chosen court is likely to enforce the clause regardless of whether enforcement will lead to the non-application of mandatory federal laws.
The U.S. Supreme Court, to its credit, has long been aware of the possibility that foreign forum selection clauses might be used as a backdoor way of enforcing foreign choice-of-law clauses. As early as 1985, it noted that “in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue [federal] statutory remedies . . . we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.” The Court has never, however, held that a foreign forum selection clause was unenforceable for this reason.
The lower federal courts have been similarly chary of invalidating foreign forum selection clauses on this basis. In a series of cases involving Lloyd’s of London in the 1990s, several circuit courts of appeal enforced English forum selection clauses notwithstanding the argument that this would lead to the enforcement of English choice-of-law clauses and, consequently, to the waiver of non-waivable rights conferred by federal securities laws. In each instance, the court held that no waiver of rights would occur because the securities laws of England offered protections that were equivalent to their U.S. counterparts.
In a similar line of cases involving cruise ship contracts, the Eleventh Circuit has enforced forum selection clauses choosing the courts of Italy even when it seems clear that this will lead to the enforcement of Italian choice-of-law clauses and, ultimately, to the waiver of mandatory federal laws constraining the ability of cruise ships to limit their liability for their passengers’ personal injury or death. The Second Circuit has also enforced an English forum selection clause over the plaintiff’s objection, first, that the anti-discrimination laws of England were less protective than those in the United States, and, second, that the English court would apply English laws because the agreement contained an English choice-of-law clause.
ConclusionIf the goal is to evade mandatory federal laws in the United States, a foreign choice-of-law clause is not enough to get the job done. A foreign choice-of-law clause and a foreign forum selection clause operating in tandem, by contrast, stand a fair chance of realizing this goal. While the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that foreign forum selection clauses should not be enforced when this will lead to the waiver of non-waivable federal rights, the lower federal courts have been reluctant to find a waiver even in the face of compelling evidence that the foreign laws are less protective than federal laws enacted by Congress. The foreign forum selection clause, as it turns out, may the most powerful choice-of-law tool in the toolbox.
The first issue of 2025 of Giustizia consensuale (published by Editoriale Scientifica) has been released, and it features:
Cesare Cavallini (Professor at Bocconi University, Milan), L’arbitrato come processo e giustizia consensuale (Arbitration as a Process and Consensual Justice; in Italian).
The essay aims to analyze the phenomenon of private autonomy and consensual justice in arbitration as it has evolved through various reforms. The goal is to highlight arbitration as a process and a form of consensual justice that is alternative yet distinct from ordinary judicial proceedings and fully aligned with constitutional principles. This objective becomes even more significant when compared to the very different and controversial issues discussed in American legal doctrine, which instead point to an unceasing erosion of rights through a blending of public interferences in arbitration and private ones in ordinary justice, raising concerns about the legitimacy of private autonomy within the framework of civil protections under constitutional scrutiny.
Orsola Razzolini (Professor at the University of Milan) and Ivana Sechi (Head of the Institutional Affairs Service of the Guarantee Commission on the Implementation of the Law on Strikes in Essential Public Services), Sciopero nei servizi pubblici essenziali e giustizia consensuale. ruolo della commissione di garanzia e ricerca del consenso nel governo del conflitto (Strikes in Essential Public Services and Consensual Justice: The Role of the Guarantee Commission and the Pursuit of Consensus in Conflict Governance; in Italian).
This paper examines the Italian law regulating strike in essential services from a consensual justice perspective. In particular, the law is mainly focused on the agreement between the social parties about the rules of the conflict while the strike independent authority — a technical and impartial body — is tasked with supplementary duties, particularly following the 2000 reform. The paper focuses on the independent authority’s provisional regulation and considers recent case law, referendums, and the authority’s rulings on interpretive or enforcement issues. The increase in the number of provisional regulations adopted in recent years raises several research questions. Is the social parties’ consensus still the core of the regulation? There has been a shift in the last years from social parties to the independent authority mainly due to transformations of the productive organizations as well as to the crisis of collective bargaining and the increasing fragmentation of both unions and employers’ associations.
Observatory on Legislation and Regulations
Charlotte Teuwens (Ph.D. Researcher at KU Leuven), Stien Dethier (Ph.D. Researcher and FWO fellow at KU Leuven) and Stefaan Voet (Professor at KU Leuven and UHasselt), The Venice Principles: Strengthening the Independence of Ombudsmen, and Beyond.
This article critically analyses the 25 ‘Principles on the Protection and Promotion of the Ombudsman Institution’, or in short, the ‘Venice Principles’. It gives a comprehensive overview of the different Principles, organised along four essential themes: legal basis, appointment and selection, competences and powers, and immunity, independence and the relationship with other authorities. In addition, it takes a more holistic view on the framework created by the Venice Commission. While the implementation of the Venice Principle does not come without its challenges, not unlike other instances where international instruments have to be implemented, the Principles primarily present Ombudsman institutions withimmense opportunities. With the Principles in hand, Ombudsmen are well-equipped to reflect on and reimagine their core value of independence.
Luca Dal Pubel (Faculty Lecturer at San Diego State University), ADR and ODR in North America: Evolution, Regulation, and Future Prospects.
This article provides a comparative analysis of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) in the United States (U.S.), Canada, and Mexico, three countries that share geographic proximity and strong economic ties but differ in legal traditions and cultural approaches to dispute resolution. While the U.S. has fostered a decentralized, business-driven ADR and ODR landscape, Canada has nstitutionalized ADR within its judicial system and embraced ODR as a means to enhance access to justice. In contrast, Mexico has pursued a more state-led approach, constitutionally recognizing ADR as a fundamental right while expanding consumer-focused ODR initiatives. By examining the legal frameworks, regulatory developments, and real-world applications of ADR and ODR in these three nations, this article applies the functional method of comparative law to explore how each legal system addresses common dispute resolution challenges, emphasizing the practical effects and societal outcomes of different approaches.
Observatory on Jurisprudence
Silvana Dalla Bontà (Professor at the University of Trento), La giustizia consensuale ‘presa sul serio’. la disciplina dei costi della mediazione al vaglio del giudice amministrativo (Consensual Justice ‘Taken Seriously’: Mediation Costs Under Review by the Administrative Judge; in Italian).
This paper draws on Judgment No. 5489, issued by the Administrative Tribunal of Lazio on 17 March 2025, which upheld the reasonableness and constitutionality of mediation costs introduced by Italy’s recent civil justice reform through Legislative Decree No. 149/2022. The judgment affirms that the increased fees provide fair and adequate compensation to both the mediation provider and the mediator. At the same time, they encourage parties and their counsel to engage in mediation with seriousness, as mandated by Article 8 of the reformed Italian Mediation Act. This provision requires parties and their lawyers to cooperate in good faith, discuss the core issues, and work toward a mutually acceptable resolution. Recognising the rationale behind the judgment, the paper argues that the revised fee scale enhances the effectiveness of mediation—both by elevating the professionalism of mediators and by increasing parties’ awareness of the value of the mediation process.
Observatory on Practices
Francesca Locatelli (Associate Professor at the University of Bergamo), Il procedimento negoziale nel sistema giuridico (Negotiated Procedure within the Legal System; in Italian).
The paper offers a critical reflection on the role of negotiated ADR within today’s civil justice system, framing the discussion around the need to move beyond a purely deflationary logic toward a perspective that recognizes their systemic dignity. The analysis begins by examining the cultural barriers and cognitive dissonances that continue to hinder the reception of these mechanisms, both in legal practice and in legal education. Within this framework, the paper advocates for a procedural – rather than merely processual – approach to the study and teaching of negotiated ADR, one that acknowledges their nature as structured proceedings governed by distinct phases and principles. The contribution further argues in favour of a technical-procedural model for negotiation, highlighting the importance of its structured and methodological dimension, and calling for a more active role of legal scholars in legitimizing it both theoretically and pedagogically. Finally, it stresses how the integration of negotiation into legal training is not only a practical necessity, but also a clear sign of a paradigm shift in the very conception of the legal profession.
Filippo Noceto (Ph.D. at the University of Genova), Consulenza tecnica in mediazione. Profili sistematici e criticità applicative (Expert Evidence in Mediation: Systematic Framework and Application Challenges; in Italian).
This paper aims to provide a critical analysis of the recent developments concerning the expert witness testimony in mediation, highlighting its potential practical implications and outlining possible directions for reform of the current regulatory framework.
Conference Proceedings
Marina Caporale (Associate Professor at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia), Risoluzione alternativa delle controversie: (ri)conciliarsi con la Pubblica Amministrazione (Alternative Dispute Resolution: (Re)Conciliation with the Public Administration; in Italian).
Considering the many facets of ADR, ‘public’ ADRs, here intended in the broadest sense, meaning those involving a public administration in any capacity, are increasingly gaining ground. Identifying the characteristics of these ADRs and the hallmarks of alternatives – today interpreted more as diversity, consensuality, and integration with the jurisdiction that ADRs embody – challenges the categories of administrative law and administrative justice. However, before delving into the now numerous public ADRs, it is necessary to first examine those institutions that, while involving a public administration, do not, as in the case of ombudsman.
Marina Evangelisti (Associate Professor at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia), Per un breve profilo dell’arbitrato in diritto romano (An Outline of Arbitration in Roman Law).
This article describes the main features of arbitration in Roman law. It is a legal institution that offers an alternative method to prevent and resolve disputes without going to trial, and it was widely used by the Roman people over the centuries. This legal figure demonstrates the possibility of a useful dialogue between our history and the needs of the present.
Chiara Spaccapelo (Researcher at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia), L’arbitrato e la giustizia civile. Un modello per la Pubblica Amministrazione? (Arbitration and Civil Justice: A Model for the Public Administration?; in Italian).
The paper examines the relationship between arbitration and public administration, questioning whether arbitration may also serve as an effective model for resolving administrative disputes. After reconstructing the systematic framework of ADR and the role of arbitration within civil jurisdiction, the author focuses on the specific features that characterize arbitration involving public entities, addressing key theoretical and practical issues such as the arbitrability of legitimate interests, the relationship between subjective rights and administrative powers, and the admissibility of ‘arbitrato irrituale’. Particular attention is devoted to arbitration in public procurement, whose use is currently severely restricted due to an overly cautious regulatory framework. The concluding remarks call for overcoming judicial and legislative mistrust and for a broader enhancement of arbitration within the administrative domain, in line with the principles of efficiency, subsidiarity, and reasonable duration of proceedings.
Chronicles
Cristina M. Mariottini (European Institute of Public Administration, Luxembourg), Bridging Borders Through Dialogue: The Establishment of the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed).
The Convention on the Establishment of the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed), adopted in Hong Kong on 30 May 2025, marks a significant step in the institutionalisation of mediation as a means of settling international disputes. The Convention applies to three categories of disputes: inter-State disputes; disputes between States and nationals of other States, including investor-State matters; and international commercial disputes between private parties. It affirms mediation as a voluntary, non-adjudicative process grounded in consent, neutrality, and procedural fairness, while also establishing a rule-based framework for the conduct of proceedings, the legal status of mediated settlements, and their potential enforcement through domestic legal systems. This article examines the normative foundations, institutional design, and procedural architecture of the IOMed Convention. It situates the Organisation within the wider system of international dispute resolution, noting its conceptual links to the Singapore Convention on Mediation, the ICSID Convention, and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Particular attention is given to issues of legitimacy, enforceability, and inclusivity, as well as to the Convention’s capacity-building mandate and its potential to expand access to mediation across diverse legal and geopolitical contexts. The analysis highlights IOMed’s role in advancing a more coherent, structured, and institutionally anchored model of international mediation.
Finally, this issue features the following Book Reviews:
A book review by Mauro Grondona (Professor at the University of Genoa): Tommaso DALLA MASSARA, Gaetano RAMETTA (a cura di), Il volere che si fa norma – Quaderno primo. Dialoghi tra giuristi e filosofi, Bologna, il Mulino, 2024, 5-158.
A book review by Davide Castagno (Researcher at the University of Turin): Loïc CADIET, Thomas CLAY, Les modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits, 4a ed., Lefebvre Dalloz, Paris, 2025, 1-201.
A book review by Francesco Ciccolo (Ph.D. candidate at the University of Messina) and Claudio Orlando (Ph.D. candidate at the University of Messina): Antonio CAPPUCCIO, Stefano RUGGERI (a cura di), Antichi e nuovi modelli di giustizia partecipata e cultura della giurisdizione. Verso una tutela penale più umana ed egualitaria, Wolters Kluwer/CEDAM, Milano, 2024, I-XII, 1-645.
[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
In Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v Kingdom of Spain [2025] FCA 1028 the Federal Court of Australia has confirmed the enforceability of 4 ETC awards against Spain viz its long-suffering renewable energy support schemes. The judgment has already been leaned upon in support in proceedings before the US Supreme Court and approaches the issues with similar lucidity as Fraser J in Infrastructure Services.
Current post is by Claudia Wortmann, for which many thanks!! Geert.
*****
Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v Kingdom of Spain [2025] FCA 1028
In a single-judge decision in the Federal Court of Australia delivered on 29 August, Justice Stewart held four ICSID awards issued against Spain under the Energy Charter Treaty to be recognisable and enforceable. Each of the awards in 9REN, NextEra, RREEF and Watkins, brought by 9REN and NextEra, and by the assignee to the RREEF and Watkins matters were found to be enforceable pursuant to section 35(4) of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), federal legislation in Australia which provides for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
Spain objected to the proceedings on a number of grounds, being:
The Court found that Spain did in fact waive its rights to immunity, the Court had jurisdiction to recognise and enforce the awards pursuant to s 35(4) of the IAA, and dismissed the EC’s application to intervene.
Non-waiver of immunity
As may be recalled, the High Court of Australia in Spain HCA had already found ([150] citing Spain HCA at [29]) that Spain had implicitly waived its foreign State immunity rights. The closed nature of the ICSID system was confirmed in Spain HCA and in Micula v Romania [2020] 1 WLR 1033 at [68]-[69] by the UK domestic courts. There was no reason to find that the award was not binding, as the ICSID system was a closed system, and that apparent conflicts with EU law were not relevant for the enforcement proceedings, as the awards were [174] ‘genuine, certified and authenticated awards’.
Spain’s argument, that ‘waiver of immunity in enforcement proceedings is limited to proceedings to enforce awards that are valid and binding’, had not been raised specifically in Spain HCA, however, the Court found [180] that
On the premise that the awards are binding on Spain, the proceedings are not outside the territory of what the parties accept was decided by the High Court. It follows that Spain’s contention of non-waiver of immunity to jurisdiction must be rejected.
Primacy of EU law
Spain argued that where there is a conflict between Spain’s obligations owed to other EU Member States under the EU foundational treaties, the primacy of EU law must prevail, and therefore, under public international law Spain owed no obligation to comply with the ICSID awards, and Australia owed no obligation to recognise or enforce them. Spain relied on the CJEU’s findings in Achmea and Komstroy in arguing that EU law prevents the application of the ECT between Member States, and it also argued that the public international law obligations would constitute illegal State aid between EU Member States. The Court found [118] that:
European law has undeniable domestic effect including through lower-level instruments of European law sourced in the authority of the foundational treaties… It suffices to say that while international treaties and subordinate EU instruments could be regarded as a form of international law, for the purposes of proof it would not be a form of international law incorporated into or picked up by Australian law in the sense contemplated in the authorities.
On this point, the Court [210] accepted expert evidence supplied by Professor Eeckhout on behalf of the Applicants, in the event of a conflict between international law and EU law,
the Member States must take the appropriate steps under international law to remove the conflicting international law obligation. In the meantime the conflicting clause remains valid and operative’.
Therefore, international law is applicable until withdrawal of the relevant treaty takes effect, which includes the ECT and the ICSID Convention, and [213]
it is no answer for Spain to say that it has some or other defence available to it under EU law, for it is not Australia which is under any supervening requirement of essentially foreign domestic public law to not comply
Spain was allowed to reopen the case for the purpose of submitting the Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of the Energy Charter Treaty between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States (COM(2024) 257 final) (26 June 2024) (‘EU Inter Se Agreement’); and Declaration on the Legal Consequences of the Judgment of the Court of Justice in Komstroy and Common Understanding on the Non-Applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a Basis for Intra-EU Arbitration Proceedings [2024] OJ L 2024/2121 (26 June 2024) (‘EU Inter Se Declaration’).
The Court found that neither document materially added to Spain’s case, as
a) both came into existence long after the matters in dispute arose;
b) that removal of intra-EU disputes would be subject to future amendment of the ECT in accordance with the VCLT (in line with a separate declaration from Hungary, both an EU and ECT member);
c) neither the Agreement nor Declaration sought to amend the ICSID Convention; and
d) the substance of the Agreement and Declaration were not relevant to the enforcement proceedings as they both went to the interpretation and application of the ECT which is a question for ICSID tribunals, and not the enforcing Court.
The Court acknowledged that although there was a conflict between international law and EU law, it had no bearing on Spain’s public international law obligations or that it meant the ICSID awards were not binding.
Modification argument
Spain argued that the Treaty of Lisbon modified Art 43 ICSID Convention between EU Member States, meaning that tribunals have no jurisdiction over intra-EU disputes, and the Court lacked the power to enforce them, relying on customary international law to support its claim, because the ICSID Convention preceded the VCLT so the VCLT rules on successive treaties would not apply.
Spain argued that there are three requirements for custom to modify a treaty:
a) modification is not expressly prohibited by the treaty;
b) that modification does not affect the enjoyment of, and rights and obligations under the treaty by other parties;
c) the modification does not relate to a derogation provision which is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
The Court held:
Assignment
The Court made quick work dismissing Spain’s objection that the assignment of rights from RREEF and Watkins to Blasket was invalid. The Applicant argued successfully that the duty arose under s 35(4) IAA as Australia’s dualist system requires domestic enshrinement of international law obligations to make them enforceable. Under domestic law, in Australia the rights of enforcement for an arbitral award are also capable of being assigned. So in either case, Spain’s argued failed. Justice Stewart was not convinced by Spain’s argument that allowing enforcement by an assignee would allow for double recovery.
EU status of Jersey and Constitutional argument
This argument relating to only the RREEF enforcement proceedings, as an alternative argument by the Applicant in respect of the EU nationality of the investors. Blasket argued that, in the event that Spain’s intra-EU objections were upheld, that the investor in RREEF, being domiciled in the Bailiwick of Jersey, a British Crown Dependency and one of the Channel Islands, should not be prevented from enforcing that award. Justice Stewart agreed, finding the investor in RREEF was not a national of an EU Member State.
Constitutional argument
The Court held that although Art 54 ICSID Convention as implemented by s 35(4) IAA, requires the Court to recognise and enforce any ICSID award as binding within Australia as judgment of that court, this does not ‘impermissibly vest constitutional powers in either the ICSID tribunal or the Secretary-General, nor does it substantially impair the institutional integrity of the Court as a constitutional court by requiring it to find a waiver of foreign state immunity or by recognising or enforcing an award.
EC application to intervene
The European Commission sought leave to intervene in the proceedings, supported by Spain, which was denied by the Court. The EC application sought to make two submissions: a) Spain’s submissions are an accurate description of EU law, and EU law prevents any payment under the awards as illegal State aid; and b) any payment made by Spain under the ECT awards would being subject to significant ongoing fines until such payment were recovered. The Court accepted that Spain’s submission on EU law may indeed be accurate, but as the ‘crux’ of the proceedings were on (at [361]) ’ the effect of EU law on public international law binding Australia’, such accuracy had no impact on the Court’s findings. On the second point Stewart J stated at [362]:
while the questions raised are no doubt interesting, as explained above, they are irrelevant on an application for recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award in circumstances where I have concluded, notwithstanding the identified consequences extant in and arising from EU public law, the Court is bound to give effect to the award in accordance with public international law and Australian domestic law.
In sum, Stewart J dismissed Spain’s arguments from the outset, finding that most of them were similar enough to those put forward in Spain HCA to warrant the application of precedence. Even so, His Honour considered and dismissed each of Spain’s alternative arguments in succession, reaffirming that ICSID awards can and will be enforced in Australia, and that the influence of EU law principles remains minimal in this context.
Claudia.
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