
The next webinar in the Crossroads in Private International Law webinar series will be given by Prof. Csongor Nagy (University of Galway) on the topic “EU Law and Sports Arbitration: When Global and Regional Regimes Meet“.
The webinar is scheduled for 22 April 2026, 14:00 – 15:00 UTC.
More information about the event and registration is available here, at the webpage of the organiser – the Centre for Private International Law & Transnational Governance of the University of Aberdeen.
This post has previously been published by PAX Moot (with minor changes). Photo: University of Ljubljana Team.
The PAX Moot 2026 — Vladimir Koutikov Round has come to an end, and what an incredible edition it has been. We hope it was an unforgettable experience for all participants — a unique opportunity to engage in high-level argumentation on Private International Law, grow advocacy skills, and forge lasting friendships along the way.
Without further ado, we are proud to announce the results of this year’s competition:
Best Written Submission (shared 1st place) University of Warsaw & University of Ljubljana
Honourable Mention for Written Submission: Singapore Management University | Universidad Autónoma de Madrid | University of Antwerp
Best Oralist Awards:
We extend our deepest gratitude to our hosts from Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, and to the European Commission for their generous funding, which makes this incredible event possible.
To every team, coach, judge, and volunteer who contributed to making PAX Moot 2026 a success: thank you.
Photo credit: Mayela Celis
The following Call for Contributions has been kindly shared with us by Sandrine Brachotte (UAntwerpen):
The organizers are pleased to invite you to contribute to a book and conference on the theme of decoloniality and legal methodology in Europe, given the political importance of methodology. This subject requires Europeans to draw inspiration from the knowledge and experience of the regions they colonised. Legal scholars must also learn from civil society and studies carried out in the social sciences. Editors/Organisers:Sandrine Brachotte, UAntwerpen
Christine Frison, ULiège
Lina Álvarez-Villarreal, Universidad de los Andes
Project DescriptionThis book aims to connect European legal methodology to decoloniality. It examines the compatibility of European legal methodologies for teaching, studying, writing about, elaborating on and applying law with the demands of decoloniality. It will also suggest ways to address areas of conflict, inadequacy and structural misalignment between the two. The book’s focus on legal methodology rather than law reflects the assumption that methods are not apolitical and constitute ways of viewing the world (Gordon, Escobar).
The decolonial perspective exposes how the dominant worldview at the global level continues to marginalise the sensitivities to the world (Mignolo) of people from former colonies and their identities, using not only race and ethnicity, but also gender and sexual orientation (Lugones, Segato). It includes the argument that coloniality has built on the “world-of-One”: one hegemonic – capitalist, anthropocentric, modern, patriarchal, etc. – way of being human (Escobar), shaped primarily by Europe in a history of continuous dispossession of non-European peoples, territories, and nature, and the imposition of modern European values, norms and conceptions of knowledge. Decoloniality further highlights the need to redress this power imbalance as a matter of justice and equality by compensating for the structural peripherality of these sensitivities and identities. To do so, the voices of the people concerned must be listened to in the first place.
In this respect, the law must be reconsidered, as it is one of the main instruments of the modernity/coloniality tandem (Quijano). Its association with state law in legal theory is a product of modernity (Liotta and Szpiga). State law was used by European colonial powers to legitimise the colonial enterprise (García-López and Winter-Pereira), and it remains in place in formerly colonised states. This means that European epistemologies and values, both past and present, continue to govern the lives of formerly colonised communities to some extent (Bazán Seminario). Because coloniality operates on a global scale (Quijano), the decolonial project speaks to the entire world, including Europe. Moreover, as former colonial powers, European states have a special responsibility to address decolonial demands, which requires them to acknowledge a darker truth about themselves and thus the negative impact of coloniality on Europe (du Bois, Césaire, Àlvarez-Villarreal). Furthermore, Europe has much to learn from the epistemologies and struggles of colonised peoples (Comaroff and Comaroff) in order to address the contemporary crises of our time, such as reorganising knowledge (Lander), politics (Walsh, Gutiérrez-Aguilar, Tzul-Tzul), economics (Àlvarez-Villarreal), and dealing with climate and ecological crises (Millán, Escobar).
Decolonial approaches are gaining traction, including within legal studies (eg Achiume, Al Attar & Abdelkarim, Barreto, Kapur, Moreno, Nesiah). In this context, a few scholars have highlighted the need to rethink legal education and research in European universities (Adébísí), as well as the foundations of law and the content of legal rules in European states and at the EU level (eg Ashiagbor, Solanke, Zenouvou, Salaymeh & Michaels, Eklund, Brachotte). International law must of course also be rethought from a decolonial perspective, including in European universities. Yet, the concrete methodological implications of decoloniality for law in Europe remain poorly defined. In this regard, the rich work of several decolonial social scientists (eg Bhambra, Diagne, Carneiro, Galcerán Huguet, Moosavi, Mbembe, Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Omodan, Ribeiro, Udah), scholars working in Indigenous studies (eg Borrows, Datta, Denscombe, Ewing, Krenak, Monchalin, Napoleon, Thambinathan & Kinsella, Smith, Tuhiwai Smith) and decolonial legal scholars from formerly colonised states (eg de Almeida, Diouf, Mosaka) must be built upon.
AudienceThe book is intended for legal students, researchers and practitioners, as well as for civil society organisations.
Scope and ThemesThe volume seeks contributions addressing, inter alia, the following questions:
We invite original and unpublished chapter proposals of approximately 8,000–10,000 words (including footnotes and references).
We welcome authors who have a social sciences or legal background or who claim undisciplinarity, and who are in academia, in legal practice, or in civil society organisations.
We strongly encourage authors who do not feel comfortable in English to submit an abstract in their own language.
Abstracts will be selected on the basis of academic quality, with due regard to representativity and inclusiveness, including diversity in geographical backgrounds, gender, and career stages, in order to ensure a pluralistic discussion.
ConferenceThe conference will take place at UAntwerp (Belgium) on 25, 26 and 27 January 2027, starting after lunchtime on the first day and finishing before lunchtime on the last day. We are delighted to be able to already announce that Dr. Leon Moosavi will act as a keynote speaker.
Participants will be expected to cover their own travel and accommodation expenses. However, the organisers are firmly committed to ensuring that financial constraints do not constitute an obstacle to participation. Scholars who may face difficulties in covering travel or accommodation costs are warmly encouraged to contact the organisers in confidence to discuss possible arrangements.
In addition, where travel is not possible (for example, due to visa restrictions, institutional limitations, or personal circumstances), remote participation will be facilitated, including participation in the conference discussions via online means.
The organisers aim to ensure an inclusive and accessible academic exchange, irrespective of geographic or financial constraints.
Submission GuidelinesInterested contributors are invited to submit:
Deadline: 30 April 2026
Timeline
Proposals should be sent to: dlmsineurope@gmail.com
The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts“ (IPRax) features the following articles:
B. Heiderhoff/C. Rüsing: Dealing with parallel proceedings in Third Countries – from Germany via Brussels to The Hague? [German]
The extent to which civil proceedings pending in a third country preclude proceedings before domestic courts varies considerably across jurisdictions. Autonomous German law with its quite strict first-seized rule accords substantial deference to proceedings initiated earlier in third countries. Other legal systems have adopted a more cautious approach, most notably common law jurisdictions, which rely on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation reacts to these differences. At least for some grounds of jurisdiction, it allows the Member State courts to exercise discretion and suspend proceedings if a foreign court has been seized earlier. Ultimately, both autonomous German law and European law attach great importance to priority and to international jurisdiction.
Against this background, the Hague Conference on Private International Law has published a draft convention on parallel proceedings. It seeks to combine jurisdiction- and priority-based approaches with elements of the forum non conveniens doctrine. This article therefore reconsiders, at a more fundamental level, the appropriate response to parallel proceedings. It first compares the German and European approaches and demonstrates why, de lege lata, Article 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation cannot be applied by analogy under autonomous German law. On this basis, the article evaluates the draft Hague Convention and critically assesses its underlying orientation.
L. d´Avout: Trojan following Coman, Pancharevo and Mirin: Another step forward or an editorial misstep? [German]
According to Trojan, under EU law and despite constitutional prohibitions, a Member State is obliged to directly recognise a same-sex marriage validly concluded in another Member State, without any restrictions on the purposes and scope of direct recognition (free enjoyment of EU citizens’ rights). Here, the CJEU appears to be going one step further. The motivation behind the recognition order is innovative; however, in reality, the court ruling acts as a mere echo of the ECtHR’s case law on defective national personal and family law. Omnis interpretatio sub lege europae periculosa est.
K. A. Prinz von Sachsen Gessaphe: No jurisdiction of German courts to determine the heirs of Pope Benedict XVI. [German]
In this decision, the Munich Court of Appeal (“OLG München”) deals with the international jurisdiction for the appointment of a curator of the estate for the purpose of determining unknown heirs of Pope Emeritus Benedict XIV, who died in 2022. Since he had his habitual residence in the Vatican City State, where he also died, at least since his election as Pope in 2005, the jurisdiction of German courts under Art. 4 EU Succession Regulation was ruled out. The OLG also denied subsidiary jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 10 EU Succession Regulation, as none of the deceased’s estate assets were located in Germany. It also considered that the requirements for emergency jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 11 EU Succession Regulation were not met, as neither the impossibility nor the unreasonableness of initiating or conducting proceedings before the courts of the Vatican City State could be assumed. The court did not, however, address the obvious question of whether the measure could be based on Art. 19 EU Succession Regulation. Ultimately, the OLG can be agreed with, even though the reasoning should have been more detailed in some respects; in particular, it should have addressed the jurisdiction under Art. 19 EU Succession Regulation, which was, however, also to be rejected here because there is no genuine link between the requested measure and the territorial jurisdiction of German courts.
M. Gebauer: Renvoi under the European Succession Regulation and its consequences: characterisation in foreign choice-of-law rules; substitution; preliminary questions; adaptation; parallel proceedings [German]
The underlying constellation of the decision proves to be a prototype for the more complex follow-up questions that arise after a renvoi under the European Succession Regulation. These include the characterisation of the third state’s choice-of-law rules according to its own criteria; partial renvoi; the secondary characterisation of the substantive rules of the lex fori, to which the third state’s choice-of-law rules refer; preliminary questions of matrimonial property law within the substantive succession rules; substitution and adaptation. A typical procedural challenge arises when the deceased had the last habitual residence in a third state because the extensive subsidiary jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States according to the European Succession Regulation often leads to parallel proceedings in the respective third states.
B. Heiderhoff: Change of applicable law and adjustment of an Islamic mahr to German post-marital claims [German]
The OLG Düsseldorf decided that the agreed amount of an Islamic mahr (dower) may be reduced if the basis of the transaction ceases to exist as a consequence of a change of the applicable law. While the contract was originally concluded under Iranian Law, the court held that due to the acquisition of German citizenship German law became applicable. The court applied section 313 of the German Civil Code (BGB) (“Interference with the basis of the transaction”) because – unlike under Iranian law – the wife can claim division of pension rights under German law. The author first shows that under the Matrimonial Property Regulation (Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103) the law applicable to the mahr will no longer change when Iranian citizens are naturalised in Germany. However, even if one followed the court in assuming a change of the applicable law, section 313 of the BGB cannot be applied as easily as the OLG Düsseldorf held.
F. Berner: Cross-border favours [German]
The decision of the Munich Court of Appeal (OLG München) deals with a cross-border favour. Although the OLG correctly concludes that German substantive law applies in the individual case, the decision raises the question of how claims arising from the breach of a duty of care in the context of favours should actually be characterised. For example, it is not entirely clear whether substantive tortious claims in this context always fall under the Rome II Regulation or whether they do not fall – at least partially – under the Rome I Regulation. Equally problematic is the characterisation of the “relationship of favour” (“Gefälligkeitsverhältnis”) – a category between contract and tort. Finally, the decision is also of interest because of its treatment of a comparative law argument within substantive law.
M. Stürner: Between lex fori and lex causae: The claim for reduction in price in the event of defective work under Italian law [German]
The Court of Appeal Dresden had to deal with a warranty claim to which Italian law applied as the defendant contractor had its seat in Italy. The claimant’s request was interpreted by the Senate as a declaration of a reduction in price by applying the lex fori, although, pursuant to Article 12 (1) lit. c) Rome I Regulation, the law applicable to the contractual obligation (i.e. Italian law) also determines the consequences of the (partial) non-fulfilment of the contractual obligation. Even if the diverging approaches did not produce different results in the end, it once again shows the difficulties in distinguishing between the fundamental categories of lex fori and lex causae.
C. Thole: Judicial Review of fair trial and public policy in exequatur proceedings regarding foreign arbitral awards [German]
The Bavarian Court of Appeal (BayObLG) had to decide upon the enforceability of a Danish arbitral award, against which the respondent, among other things, objected on the grounds of a violation of the right to be heard. The judgment is largely based on the specific circumstances of the individual case and the respondent’s failure to sufficiently substantiate his objections. However, the court decision also points to still unresolved legal questions reaching beyond the case at hand.
G. Freise/L. Vollert: Choice of court agreements and overriding mandatory provisions: Does Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation allow for lois de police? [German]
Several EU regulations allow for overriding mandatory provisions. The French Cour de cassation had to decide whether Article 25 of the Brussels I bis Regulation likewise allows for such a reservation in favour of lois de police. The Cour de cassation, however, held that Article 25 Brussels I bis Regulation does not allow the application of overriding mandatory provisions. According to the view taken here, the ruling should be seen in connection with the recent case law of the CJEU. The CJEU has, in its more recent decisions, significantly limited the scope for review of jurisdiction agreements falling under Article 25 Brussels I bis Regulation. From this perspective, the Cour de cassation’s decision is convincing. Nevertheless, some concerns regarding the right to a fair trial remain.
A. Spickhoff: Medical device liability in international jurisdiction and conflict of laws [German]
Medical device liability in international jurisdiction and conflict of laws exhibits certain peculiarities due to various actors being involved on the production side. This necessitates a closer examination, particularly in private international law, of the group of parties entitled to be sued under Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation. Before this examination, however, the place of the tort establishing jurisdiction, meaning the place of injury or the place at which the tortious act occurred, must be specified in a ubiquitous manner. From the Austrian perspective, in case of a remote tort, only the place of conduct is relevant.
S. Vuattoux-Bock: The law applicable to the last purchaser’s direct action [German]
In cross-border supply chains, defects may only become apparent after goods have been resold, giving rise to complex liability issues across multiple links in the chain. Under French law, subsequent purchasers have a direct contractual claim (“action directe”) against all prior sellers, including the manufacturer. However, the applicable law for such claims in international chains has been uncertain. In two landmark rulings on 28 May 2025, the French Cour de Cassation ruled that the “action directe” is governed by the Rome II Regulation. This rejected its previous contractual classification in favour of a tort-based approach for private international law purposes. These decisions have significant implications, particularly for German manufacturers, as they greatly reduce the predictability of liability exposure in the supply chain. Ultimately, the rulings strengthen the position of French, Belgian or Luxembourgish end buyers in international supply chains, but raise substantial concerns regarding legal certainty and risk assessment for manufacturers and intermediaries. This article critically examines these rulings, highlighting the tension between EU-wide coherence and legal certainty. It also discusses possible alternative approaches, including the application of Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation, to better balance the foreseeability of liability for suppliers with the protection of end buyers.
M. Weller: Governmental interest analysis and Nazi-looted art [German]
The judgment to be discussed here implements the previous decision of the U.S. Supreme Court: In actions against states and their instrumentalities, e.g. for the restitution of Nazi-looted art based on the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), the conflict-of-laws rules of the state in which the federal court seised with the matter is located (here California) are to be applied, rather than federal choice of law rules. However, in accordance with this requirement, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit again applied Spanish law on acquisitive prescription under the governmental interest analysis as practiced in California and thus dismissed the action in favor of the state-owned Museo Thyssen-Bornemisza in Madrid, as it had done before under federal choice of law. California took this as an opportunity to enact legislation in direct response to the ruling in cases like the present one, ordering the application of California substantive law. This prompted the plaintiff to pursue his claim with further legal remedies aimed at rehearing the case, currently with a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The decision on this petition is still pending. The judgment presented here illustrates the functioning and weaknesses of governmental interest analysis in an exemplary manner. At the same time, the decision is equally exemplary in revealing that – after more than 20 years of proceedings – the processing of historical injustice before state courts under applicable law has its limits. The U.S. should follow its own international plea for “just and fair solutions” and provide alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, as Germany, for example, has been doing since 2003.
GEDIP: The law applicable to rights in rem in corporeal assets [English]
GEDIP: Guidelines on the Influence of European Union Law on Member States Law on Nationality [English]
GEDIP: Guidelines on the treatment of renvoi in European Union instruments on applicable law in civil matters [English]
C. Kohler: The renvoi in European conflict of laws – Meeting of the European Group of Private International Law 2025 [German]
Issue 1 of RabelsZ 90 (2026) has just been released. It contains the following articles which are all available Open Access: CC BY 4.0:
Holger Fleischer, Felix Bassier, Samuel Insull und Ivar Kreuger: Finanzskandale als Katalysatoren der US-amerikanischen Wertpapiergesetze von 1933/34 [Samuel Insull and Ivar Kreuger: Financial Scandals as Catalysts of US Securities Law from 1933 and 1934], pp. 1–57, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2026-0008
The US securities laws from 1933 and 1934 remain to this day the international benchmark for modern capital market regulation. Like many other regulations in this area, the legislation was preceded by major scandals. This article reconstructs the two leading scandals surrounding electricity magnate Samuel Insull and »Match King« Ivar Kreuger. After situating them within the spectrum of scandals occurring in the Roaring Twenties, the article considers these incidents in the larger context of research on corporate law scandals.
Bero Gebhard, Julian Greth, Dispositive Organhaftung: Perspektiven aus Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsökonomik [Contracting Around Director Liability: Perspectives from Comparative Law and Law & Economics], pp. 58–91, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsz-2025-0070
The business judgment rule is intended to protect managers and board members from personal liability in connection with business decisions, thereby enabling risk-optimized decision-making. However, the requirements of an adequate information base and reasonableness preserve incentives for risk-averse behaviour, and the possibility of erroneous evaluations of business decisions by courts creates further incentives for board members to shy away from risk, yet such risk aversity is inefficient in a diversified shareholder structure. This article examines mechanisms for excluding the personal liability of board members in Delaware (USA) and Switzerland. The policy reference point is the ex ante dispositive liability regime under § 102(b)(7) Delaware General Corporation Law, whereas Swiss corporate law relies on less effective ex post mechanisms. The authors call for the implementation of an opt-out model for liability due to breaches of duty of care, similar – but not identical – to the legal framework in Delaware; such a model could be especially beneficial to high-growth companies. To this end, a policy proposal is developed that should also allow for exemption from liability for gross negligence.
Julia Kraft, Pflichtprüfung und Anschlusszwang im Kontext grenzüberschreitender Genossenschaftsmobilität. Wie viel Zwang verträgt die Freiheit? [Mandatory Audits, Membership in Umbrella Organizations, and the Cross-border Mobility of Cooperatives.
How Much Constraint Is Still Freedom?], pp. 92–119, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2026-0003
The cross-border mobility of companies is an expression of the freedom of establishment, which also applies to cooperatives, as emphasized in Art. 54(2) of the TFEU. But German cooperative law doubly constrains the freedom of establishment. First, every registered cooperative (eingetragene Genossenschaft, eG) under German law is subject to mandatory periodic audits. Second, cooperatives must belong to an umbrella organization that the state has authorized to perform the audits. Both obligations – core elements of the German act on cooperatives – may conflict with the freedom of establishment. Considering the German government’s 25 June 2025 draft of an act to »Strengthen the Legal Form of the Cooperative«, this article explores the tension between regulatory constraints and the freedom of establishment and assesses whether the requirements imposed by German cooperative law are compatible with it.
Christian Rüsing, Zum Verhältnis von Internationalem Privat- und Verwaltungsrecht.
Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel von Eingriffsnormen im Europäischen Kollisionsrecht [The Relationship between Private International Law and Administrative International Law. The Example of Overriding Mandatory Provisions in EU Conflict of Laws]m pp. 120–156, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2026-0005
The relationship between private international law and administrative international law is rarely examined in detail. Yet both areas would benefit from considering the other. In the context of private international law, this is particularly pertinent in relation to overriding mandatory provisions. In the HUK-Coburg II case, the CJEU recently established two unwritten requirements for the enforcement of these provisions: Courts may enforce such provisions only if, first, the legal situation in question has sufficiently close links with the Member State of the forum and, second, the public interest cannot be achieved through the application of the lex causae. This article demonstrates that the criterion of a sufficiently close link with the Member State of the forum is viewed differently when considered alongside the principles of administrative international law. The second requirement, the necessity test, has – among other things – a significant influence on approaches to coordinating administrative and private international law through the instrument of overriding mandatory provisions. The article therefore examines how both areas can be better coordinated, at least within the internal market.
Mary-Rose McGuire, Das auf Datennutzungsverträge anwendbare Recht.
Eine kritische Analyse der Einordnung von Art. 3 DSGVO und Art. 1 Abs. 3 Data Act als international-privatrechtliche Kollisionsnormen [The Law Applicable to Data Sharing Agreements. A Critical Analysis of the Classification of Article 3 GDPR and Article 1(3) Data Act as Conflict-of-law Rules under Private International Law], pp. 157–190, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2026-0007
The European legislature has issued a series of legal acts aimed at creating a European data space. Common to these instruments is that they establish a regulatory framework for this data space but leave it to be filled by the relevant actors through a network of contracts. The acts include only isolated requirements for these contracts, and their conclusion, validity, and termination is otherwise governed by national law. With regard to such data use contracts, harmonized private international law does not yet provide any specific rules. The two central legal acts – the GDPR and the Data Act – contain provisions only on the territorial scope of application. Against this background, it is subject to debate whether the general conflict-of-law rules of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations apply or are superseded by conflict-of-law rules “hidden” in the rule on the scope of application. Practical differences arise particularly with regard to the admissibility of choice of law and the applicability of European data law in relation to third countries. The analysis shows that a reliable determination of the applicable law requires distinguishing between the existence of rights to data, contracts relating to data, and breaches of obligations relating to data. The article advocates application of the Rome Regulations on determining the law applicable to contracts and torts with adaptation to the specific characteristics of the digital space.
BOOK REVIEWS
This issue also contains several reviews of literature in the fields of comparative private and private international law and on related topics (pp. 191–221).
You are invited to the next Migration Talk organized by the Jean Monnet Chair in Legal Aspects of Migration Management in the European Union and in Türkiye.
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Diego Acosta, University of Bristol
Title: An Analysis of Free Movement Regimes Globally
Date and Time: Monday, April 20, 2026 – 12:30 PM – 1:20 PM (Turkish Time)
Event Location: via Zoom (The Zoom link shall be provided upon request: migration@bilkent.edu.tr)
GE 250/251 will be given for full attendance.
The event will be held in English.
About Guest
Dr. Diego Acosta is a Law Professor at the University of Bristol in the UK. He has authored over 80 academic works and has consulted for various governments and international organisations worldwide. As a prominent speaker, he has presented his research at academic conferences and workshops in more than 40 countries. He has been interviewed by several media outlets, most recently by The New York Times. You can visit his professional website at: www.diegoacosta.eu
Abstract
Governments worldwide engage in a variety of treaties to regulate the movement of people, which either impose restrictions or make mobility easier. However, the treaties facilitating movement are not properly categorized. Instead, scholars and policymakers often pile them up under the wider umbrella of free movement. The Freemove project, supported in part through a grant from the Open Society Foundations, is the first one ever to comprehensively map, analyze, and compare all bilateral and multilateral free movement of people regimes at the global level. Users can access information about each regime, see how they have evolved over the last 30 years, compare them with others, and assess trends in this crucial area which affects the rights of millions of people in situations of human mobility. The website is available here: www.freemovehub.com
I. Introduction
Finally out: the new Moroccan Code of Civil Procedure (Law No. 58.25), the preparation of which was previously announced on this blog, has been promulgated by Dahir (Royal Decree) No. 1.26.07 of 11 February 2026 and published in the Official Journal (Al-Jarida Ar-Rasmiyya) No. 7485 of 23 February 2026. The legislative process was fraught with difficulties, and the draft went back and forth several times before its final adoption earlier this year. The Code will enter into force six months after its publication, i.e. on 24 August 2026.
As previously introduced on this blog, the preparatory work for the new Code dates back to 2023, when a first draft was submitted to the Moroccan House of Representatives (Draft No. 02.23). One of the main innovations of the new Code is the introduction, for the first time in Moroccan history, of a catalogue of rules on international jurisdiction. The Code also amends the existing rules governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Apart from a few minor exceptions, the provisions contained in the new Code, both on international jurisdiction and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, remain largely unchanged compared with those previously presented, save for limited linguistic and stylistic adjustments that do not entail any substantive legal implications.
What follows is a brief outline of the main solutions adopted in the Code, followed by a short assessment.
II. International Judicial Jurisdiction
The rules governing international jurisdiction are now expressly set out in Articles 72 to 75 of the new Code, contained in Chapter IV, entitled “International Judicial Jurisdiction” (al-Ikhtisas al-Qada’i ad-Duwali). The new rules may be summarized as follows:
1. General jurisdiction based on the defendant’s Moroccan nationality and the domicile or residence of a foreign defendant in Morocco (Articles 72 and 73)
Article 72 confers general jurisdiction on Moroccan courts on the basis of the Moroccan nationality of the defendant, even where the latter has neither domicile nor residence in Morocco. Article 73, by contrast, adopts the classical principle of actor sequitur forum rei when proceedings are brought against a foreign defendant. In both cases, jurisdiction is excluded where the action concerns an immovable property located abroad (last sentence of Articles 72 and 73).
2. Special jurisdiction in cases where the action is brought against foreign defendants with no domicile or residence in Morocco (Article 74)
Article 74 lays down an additional set of rules on special international jurisdiction applicable where proceedings are brought against foreign defendants who have neither domicile nor residence in Morocco. In such cases, Moroccan courts may assume jurisdiction when the action concerns:
1) assets located in Morocco, or obligations formed, performed, or to be performed in Morocco (Article 74(1));
2) tortious liability where the act giving rise to liability or the damage occurred in Morocco (Article 74(2));
3) the protection of intellectual property rights in Morocco (Article 74(3));
4) proceedings relating to businesses in difficulty instituted in Morocco (Article 74(4));
5) cases involving multiple defendants, provided that at least one of them is domiciled in Morocco (Article 74(5));
6) maintenance obligations where the maintenance beneficiary resides in Morocco (Article 74(6));
7) matters relating to the filiation of a minor residing in Morocco, or to guardianship over a person or property (Article 74(7));
8) matters of personal status where
9) dissolution of the marital bond where
In addition, article 74 in fine further clarifies the ancillary heads of international jurisdiction. In particular, Moroccan courts to hear an original action are also empowered can assume jurisdiction to adjudicate any counterclaims and related claims arising from the same legal relationship. Finally, Moroccan courts are granted jurisdiction to order conservative and provisional measures intended to be executed in Morocco, even where they lack jurisdiction over the merits of the principal dispute.
3. Jurisdiction based on the agreement of the parties (Art. 75)
The new Code also recognises party autonomy as an independent basis of international jurisdiction. Under Article 75 para. 1, even where a dispute would not otherwise fall within the ordinary heads of jurisdiction set out above, Moroccan courts may assume jurisdiction where the defendant expressly or implicitly consents to, or submits to, their jurisdiction. This jurisdiction by consent is, however, excluded where the action concerns immovable property situated abroad.
4. Ex officio declining jurisdiction in the event of non-appearance
The Code further introduces a rule aimed at preventing the exercise of jurisdiction by default (Article 75 in fine). Where the defendant fails to enter an appearance, the court is required, ex officio, to decline jurisdiction and to declare itself incompetent.
III. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
The new rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are now set out in Articles 451 to 456 of the new Code. While they largely reproduce existing solutions, they nonetheless introduce several important innovations.
1. Necessity of exequatur
Article 451 establishes the principle that foreign judgments cannot be enforced in Morocco as such. Their enforcement is subject to a prior declaration of enforceability (exequatur) by the competent Moroccan court, granted in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Code. Article 452 sets out the procedural framework governing applications for exequatur, while article 454 specifies the documentary requirements and the avenues of appeal applicable to exequatur proceedings.
2. Enforcement requirements
Article 453 sets out the substantive conditions that must be satisfied before a foreign judgment may be declared enforceable in Morocco. These requirements may be grouped as follows.
a) Requirements relating to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. First, the foreign court must not have ruled on a matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of Moroccan courts (Article 453(i)). In addition, the choice of the foreign forum must not have been tainted by fraud (Article 453(ii)).
b) Requirement relating to due process. Due process guarantees must have been respected, in particular insofar as the parties were duly summoned and properly represented in the proceedings before the foreign court (Article 453(iii)).
c) Requirements relating to finality and the absence of conflicting judgments. The judgment must be final and conclusive under the law of the court of origin (Article 453(iv)). Moreover, it must not be incompatible with a judgment previously rendered by Moroccan courts (Article 453(v)).
d) Requirement relating to public policy. The foreign judgment must not violate Moroccan public policy (Article 453(vi)).
e) Requirement relating to the contravention of international conventions ratified by Morocco. Finally, the content of the enforcement judgment must not contravene the provisions of any international convention ratified by Morocco and published in the Official Gazette (Article 453(vii)).
3. The reciprocity requirement
In addition to the foregoing conditions, Article 456 introduces the requirement of reciprocity as a condition for the enforcement of foreign judgments. While the application of the above requirements remains subject to international conventions binding on Morocco, the new Code now expressly requires that the existence of reciprocal treatment between Morocco and the State of origin be taken into account when ruling on an application for exequatur.
4. Instruments eligible to enforcement
Article 455 extends the exequatur mechanism beyond foreign judgments to cover titles and authentic instruments drawn up abroad. Such instruments may be enforced in Morocco provided that they were established by competent public officers or public servants and that they qualify as enforceable titles under the law of the State of origin. Their enforcement in Morocco is subject to a prior declaration of enforceability and is conditional upon the instrument being enforceable in its State of origin and not being contrary to Moroccan public policy.
IV. Comments
The introduction of new rules on international jurisdiction and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is, in itself, a welcome development. It reflects a growing awareness among the Moroccan authorities of the practical importance of private international law and an intention to provide legal practitioners and courts with a clearer and more structured framework. This development is consistent with Morocco’s increasing engagement at the international level, notably through the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), an engagement that has recently culminated in the establishment of an HCCH Regional Office for Africa in Morocco.
However, from a substantive point of view, the newly adopted rules may leave a certain sense of dissatisfaction. This is due to a number of issues, most of which were already pointed out in a previous post on this blog.
1. International jurisdiction
First, as regards the legal framework governing international jurisdiction, a reading of the adopted provisions gives the impression that the legislature has remained attached to an outdated conception of private international law, and has failed to take account of more recent developments, even with respect to some fundamental issues. In particular, the new rules do not distinguish between exclusive and concurrent heads of jurisdiction, despite the practical importance of such a distinction for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Nor do they introduce specific regimes for situations requiring enhanced protection, such as disputes involving weaker parties (notably consumers and employees), or provide more detailed rules for parallel proceedings, including lis pendens and connexity.
More importantly, the new Code introduces a number of questionable grounds of jurisdiction. These include, in particular, the nationality of the defendant, the place of conclusion of the contract, and the mere location of property in Morocco, irrespective of its value. Finally, although the Code introduces a new rule based on party autonomy in matters of jurisdiction, it fails to provide a clear and coherent regime governing choice-of-court agreements, in particular as regards whether the parties may oust the jurisdiction of Moroccan courts that would otherwise be competent under the newly adopted rules.
2. Enforcement of foreign judgments
While the new provisions clarify the formal requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments, they fail to take sufficient account of existing judicial practice and introduce rules that lack precision and are open to divergent interpretations.
For instance, Moroccan law does not, as a general rule, clearly distinguish between recognition and enforcement, as foreign judgments are in principle subject to a prior declaration of exequatur. Nevertheless, the case law of the Moroccan Supreme Court has, to some extent, developed a pragmatic approach that de facto allows the recognition of certain effects of foreign judgments even in the absence of a prior exequatur declaration. However, the new Code does not take these developments into account and instead adopts rules focusing exclusively on the enforcement of foreign judgments, thereby leaving the status quo on this issue largely unchanged.
In addition, the new rules clarify the control exercised over the jurisdiction of the foreign court by introducing a twofold examination. First, the matter decided by the foreign court must not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Moroccan courts. However, as noted above, the new provisions on international jurisdiction fail to identify or define the matters that are to be regarded as falling within such exclusive jurisdiction. Secondly, the rules require that the choice of the court of origin must not have been fraudulent. In this respect, it should be noted that an additional requirement concerning the existence of a characteristic connection between the dispute and the State of the rendering court had initially been envisaged. This requirement, which echoed the approach adopted by the French Cour de cassation in the well-known Simitch case, was ultimately removed from the final version of the Code, arguably because of the practical difficulties it would have entailed for judges in assessing the existence of such a connection.
Furthermore, the version finally adopted introduces a new requirement that was absent from earlier drafts and appears to have been added during the legislative process. This concerns the condition that the content of the enforcement judgment must not contravene an international convention duly ratified by Morocco. The rationale for the introduction of this requirement is not only unclear, but the provision itself is largely redundant. Indeed, Articles 454 and 456 of the new Code already give priority to the application of international conventions ratified by Morocco. The provision appears also to be difficult to apply in practice, given that the manner in which this provision is formulated, particularly in the Arabic version of the text, is awkward and makes its precise scope and operation difficult to ascertain.
Finally, the introduction of reciprocity as a condition for the enforcement of foreign judgments comes as something of a surprise and is arguably problematic. The former Code of Civil Procedure contained no reference to reciprocity, and Moroccan practice had long evolved without treating it as a relevant requirement. It is true that Article 19 of the Dahir (Royal Decree) of 12 August 1913 on the civil status of French nationals and foreigners in Morocco refers to reciprocity. However, although that provision has never been formally repealed, the prevailing view among Moroccan scholars is that it is no longer applicable, a position reflected in judicial practice, as Moroccan courts do not rely on it in their decisions. More importantly, the inclusion of reciprocity appears at odds with the general tendency in comparative law, which is either to abandon this requirement or to significantly limit its effect. Its (re?)introduction sends a negative signal to jurisdictions where reciprocity remains a condition for recognition and enforcement and is likely to unnecessarily complicate both the recognition of foreign judgments in Morocco and, consequently, the circulation of Moroccan judgments abroad.
V. Concluding Remarks
The general impression that emerges from a reading of the new rules is, on the whole, one of disappointment. The newly adopted provisions appear to be based on an outdated model and fail to take account of recent developments, including those observed in neighbouring jurisdictions. The content of a number of provisions gives the impression of a step backwards in time. For instance, some of the newly adopted rules, notably in matters of international jurisdiction, are comparable to those formerly found, for example, in Tunisia under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1959, which were later repealed and replaced by more modern provisions now contained in the Code of Private International Law of 1998. The new rules also do not fully reflect existing Moroccan practice, whether at the diplomatic level, where Morocco has been actively engaged with the work of the HCCH – an engagement that contributed to the establishment of its Regional Office for Africa in Morocco – or at the judicial level, particularly in the field of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Available records relating to the drafting process suggest that these issues did not receive the level of attention they deserved, nor did they benefit from sufficient expert consultation or discussion that might have allowed the legislature to draw on both recent international developments and established domestic practice. One hope nevertheless remains: that the Code will already be subject to early reform.
If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.
In Re Tesla, Inc. Derivative Litigation C.A. No. 2024-0631-BWD, the Delaware Court of Chancery the day before yesterday essentially held that a shareholder (majority) move of seat, with coinciding amendment of the corporation’s bylaws re choice of court for derivative action, implies that the newly mandated venue applies even to claims filed prior to the move taking effect.
The ratione temporis and conflit mobile question was at issue in Tesla’s successful motion to dismiss a number derivative shareholder claims, based on an (amended) forum selection clause.
As the FT Reports, “At stake were a series of investors’ lawsuits that had accused Musk of breaching his duties to Tesla’s shareholders. [Claimants] argued he had diverted resources from the EV maker to other companies in his universe, and that he had sold stock while in possession of negative information about Tesla.”
The Texas Forum Bylaw was publicly proposed with the Redomestication [change of seat, GAVC] on 17 April 2024; the derivative actions were filed on 24 May, 10 June, and 13 June, respectively. The Texas Forum Bylaw was adopted on 13 June, so by the time Defendants appeared in the Actions on 25 June and 16 September, the Texas Forum Bylaw was in effect.
The relevant Civil Procedure Rule is the US Federal Rule 12(b)(3), improper venue. Relevant authority is Ingres Corp v CA Inc: Forum selection provisions, including those contained in corporate bylaws, “are ‘presumptively valid’ and should be ‘specifically’ enforced unless the resisting party ‘[] clearly show[s] that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause [is] invalid for such reasons as fraud and overreaching.’”
The judge rejected arguments that venue be determined at the time a complaint is filed, arguments which were based on federal precedent found not to apply to the case, but she also generally referred to Tesla not having exercised a unilateral right to alter its forum selection bylaw, nor having done so months after the claims were filed. The judgment concedes that Delaware courts sometimes do look to later points in time when determining venue, such as when the defendant appears or at the time a movant seeks transfer.
Vice Chancellor David emphasised however that
A stockholder does not have a vested right to litigate in a particular forum, even for claims arising from past conduct, because the contractual relationship “among the directors, officers, and stockholders formed within the statutory framework of the DGCL [Delaware General Corporation Law, GAVC]” is, “by design, flexible and subject to change in the manner that the DGCL spells out and that investors know about when they purchase stock in a Delaware corporation.”
and in essence
I am loath to second-guess Tesla stockholders’ chosen forum by purporting to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of Texas law and procedure relative to our own.
All in all an interesting comparative conflicts judgment.
Geert.
If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.
I fear this post is fairly anorak, meant for the die hard conflicts nerd. In X v Y ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2026:1482 (the usual anonymisation nonsense), essentially a claim by a Dutch consumer against a set of BVI companies, the Rechtbank Midden-Nederland, in interlocutory proceedings, ordered the BVI companies to surrender relevant data on the holder of a wallet in their crypto exchange. The wallet allegedly holds ia the crypto currencies financed by X, following a ‘boiler room’ fraud.
My reason for flagging it lies in the interesting approach of the court towards using, or not, Brussels I authority in its application of the residual space: national private international law that fills the gap where EU law does not apply. Of course whether or not to do so is the prerogative of the Member States: EU law has no bearing on it.
Here, the court [3.7] generally holds that seeing as what was A5(3) of the Brussels Convention and the Brussels Ia Regulation, served as a model for the Dutch residual rule of Article 6e CPR, CJEU authority may be used as guidance for the interpretation of the Dutch rules.
However it then [3.9] holds that the very qualification of a claim as in in tort, must not so use CJEU authorities, instead relying on lex fori: “It is not obvious that the definition of the term ‘tort’ should be aligned with the much broader interpretation given to this term by [the CJEU]”: one assumes it is thinking here of the CJEU Kalfelis formula, where the Court of Justice held [17] that ‘matters relating to tort, delict and quasi-delict’ “covers all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a ‘contract’ within the meaning of Article [7](1).”
[3.11] the court refers to Dutch substantive lex fori to qualify the claim as one in tort.
Article 6e CPR allocates jurisdiction to the Dutch courts insofar as the “place where the harmful event occurred” took place in The Netherlands. Here the court [3.13] holds that CJEU authority can fully play, subsequently referring to CJEI Bier’s locus delicti commissi /locus damni distinction, and placing the locus damni in The Netherlands (in particular the loss of the opportunity, were the data not surrendered, of claiming compensation etc from the fraudsters.
I m not sure whether there is a PhD in the application of BIa to residual PrivIntLAw in the Member States. But there most certainly is a good paper in it.
Geert.
A new extensive handbook on European Civil Procedure (eds. Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet and Adriani Dori) was just published by De Gruyter Brill. This book offers a comprehensive overview of the overarching themes shaping civil justice in Europe, an overview of key instruments and a broader outlook on the future of European civil procedure.
The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the general themes regarding the development of European civil procedure, including the EU competence, historical perspectives, the principles of mutual trust and access to justice as foundational principles, the interaction between European and national civil procedure and innovation and the role of digitalisation in civil procedure. Part II deals with key topics of litigation and other means of dispute resolution. It starts with the service of documents as this is usually the first step in initiating litigation, and following the sequence of the procedure discusses the international jurisdiction, taking of evidence and the recognition and enforcement based on the general EU instruments. Two chapters address international jurisdiction and enforcement in family matters, maintenance, matrimonial property and succession. Uniform debt collection procedures, asset preservation, insolvency proceedings and specialised courts are discussed in separate chapters. The last three chapters focus on ADR and ODR as alternative pathways, collective redress and legal aid, costs and funding of civil litigation. Part III is dedicated to general and future outlooks on European civil procedure, including harmonisation through soft law, the EU enlargement process (Albania, Serbia and Ukraine) and perspectives from non-European jurisdictions (China, South Africa, the United States and Brazil) and wider challenges of European civil procedure. A hybrid launch event, organised by the European Civil Justice Centre, will be held at Leuven University on 25-26 June (information to follow). More information available at the publisher’s website here.
Part I: Introduction and General Perspectives on European Civil Procedure
Chapter 1 Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet, and Adriani Dori – Introduction to European Civil Procedure
Chapter 2 Eva Storskrubb – Civil Justice and EU Competence
Chapter 3 Cornelis Hendrik van Rhee – The History of Civil Procedure in Europe
Chapter 4 Matthias Weller – Mutual Trust
Chapter 5 Burkhard Hess – Access to Justice as a Fundamental Principle of European Union Procedural Law
Chapter 6 Alain Ancery and Bart Krans – EU Law and National Civil Procedural Law: A Much Greater Area than at First Glance
Chapter 7 Anna Nylund – Innovation and Digitalisation
Part II: Litigating and Other Means of Dispute Resolution in Europe
Chapter 8 Wendy Kennett – Getting Started: Service of Documents
Chapter 9 Geert van Calster – International Jurisdiction: Fundamental Issues and ‘Principles’ of EU Private International Law
Chapter 10 Pietro Franzina – International Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters
Chapter 11 Jachin Van Doninck and Wannes Vandenbussche – Taking of Evidence
Chapter 12 Fernando Gascón Inchausti – Recognition and Enforcement: Fundamental Issues
Chapter 13 Wolfgang Hau – Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments
Chapter 14 Apostolos Anthimos – International Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement in Family Matters and Maintenance
Chapter 15 Anna Wysocka-Bar – International Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement in Matters of Property Regimes and Succession
Chapter 16 Elena D’Alessandro – Debt Collection and Special Procedures: Small Claims and Orders for Payment
Chapter 17 Carlos Santaló Goris – Asset Preservation and Provisional Measures
Chapter 18 Vesna Lazic – Insolvency Proceedings
Chapter 19 Georgia Antonopoulou – Specialised Courts: The Unified Patent Court and International Commercial Courts
Chapter 20 Emma van Gelder – Alternative Pathways: ADR/ODR
Chapter 21 Eva Lein – Collective Redress
Chapter 22 John Sorabji – Legal Aid, Costs and Funding
Part III: Outlooks on European Harmonisation and Beyond
Chapter 23 Emmanuel Jeuland – Harmonisation Through Soft Law, Common Standards, and Best Practices
Chapter 24 Monika Canco, Ana Harvey, and Iryna Izarova – European Civil Procedure and the EU Enlargement Process
Chapter 25 Magdalena Tulibacka, Peter C.H. Chan, Mohamed Paleker and Eduardo Silva de Freitas – European Civil Procedure From a Non-European Perspective
Chapter 26 Alan Uzelac – Wider Challenges: The EU, Europe, and the World
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