Conflictoflaws

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts“ (IPRax) features the following articles:

 

L. Schwannecke: Challenging the European Certificate of Succession: Prerequisites and consequences after the CJEU decision in Albausy [German]

According to Art. 67 of the EU Succession Regulation, a European Certificate of Succession shall not be issued if the elements to be certified are being challenged. In Germany, it was disputed whether the provision included challenges presented during the process for issuing the Certificate itself, or whether it referred solely to challenges pending in other proceedings. In its decision in Albausy, the CJEU addressed this question and clarified that all challenges must prevent the competent authority from issuing a European Certificate of Succession. While this has been implemented in the German literature and jurisprudence, the Higher Regional Courts as competent courts for the redress procedure governed by Art. 72 continue to differ on whether they are allowed to decide on the merits of said challenges during the redress procedures. This article provides an overview of the discussion in the German academic literature prior to Albausy and the subsequent treatment and implementation of the CJEU’s decision in the German jurisprudence. It places a particular focus on the scope of competence of the higher regional courts in dealing with redress procedures under Art. 72 EU Succession Regulation.

 

A. Masser/Y. Chatard: Anti (anti) suit injunctions of German courts? [German]

Anti-suit injunctions carry the potential to produce effects that ripple across jurisdictions, to constrain the authority of foreign courts and to operate at the intersection of law and geopolitics. While neither the remedy nor its implications are novel, the recent wave of anti-arbitration injunctions issued by Russian Arbitrazh courts, arguably aimed at shielding Russian companies, has thrust anti-suit injunctions back into the spotlight. German procedural law does not recognize anti-suit injunctions as a remedy, yet substantive claims for injunctive relief may serve as their functional equivalent. This article examines the viability of such substantive claims as a response to the ongoing surge of Russian anti-arbitration injunctions.

 

W. Wurmnest: The economic unit doctrine and multiple defendants under Art. 8 Brussels I (Recast) Regulation [German]

In Athenian Brewery, the CJEU clarified that a parent company that was not directly involved in an antitrust law infringement of its subsidiary can serve as anchor defendant, so that the courts at the seat of the parent company have international jurisdiction for damages claims against both companies (Art. 8 (1) Brussels I (Recast) Regulation), even if the parent company was not the addressee of a prior decision of a competition authority. Basing jurisdiction on Article 8 (1) Brussels I (Recast) Regulation requires, however, that the two companies form an economic unit which can be assessed by applying the control presumption known from public enforcement. The convincing judgment strengthens the possibilities for plaintiffs to engage in forum shopping.

 

J. Richter: The limits of Article 8(3) Brussels Ibis: No application by analogy to non-EU defendants [German]

After several German courts had declined jurisdiction in a cross-border dispute (between Germany and Liechtenstein), the Bavarian Highest Regional Court (BayObLG) had to determine jurisdiction. The ruling on local jurisdiction – which lay at the heart of the conflict due to an exclusive choice of court agreement – was in line with established case law and was therefore hardly surprising. Of broader general interest and significance was the issue (only briefly addressed by the ruling) whether Article 8(3) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, concerning jurisdiction on counter-claims, applies to Non-EU Defendants. With regard to this contentious question the BayObLG has now articulated a rejecting position.

 

R. de Barros Fritz: The localization of the place of injury regarding claims to recover losses incurred in connection with participation in online games of chance under the Rome II Regulation and the application of the doctrine of double-relevant facts (“Lehre von den doppelrelevanten Tatsachen”) under the Brussels Ibis Regulation [German]

In Wunner, the CJEU had its first opportunity to rule on the law applicable to a claim to recover losses incurred in connection with participation in online games of chance offered by a Maltese gambling company not holding a gambling licence. The questions referred to the Court addressed the substantive scope of the Rome II Regulation and its general conflict-of-laws rule on torts. The importance of the preliminary ruling procedure in Wunner goes, however, well beyond the interpretation of Articles 1 and 4 of the Rome II Regulation. An analysis of the procedural history leading to the request for a preliminary ruling provides an opportunity to address one of the general principles of international civil procedure, namely the “Lehre von den doppelrelevanten Tatsachen”.

 

J. P. Schmidt: Habitual residence and applicability of the Hague Convention on child abduction in cases of shared custody [German]

In cases where, despite living in different countries, parents share the custody of their child and take turns in its exercise for extended periods of time, the determination of the child’s habitual residence poses difficulties. In court practice and legal writing, three different approaches have been adopted or proposed: according to the first, the child acquires two habitual residences simultaneously; according to the second, the habitual residence alternates each time the child moves to the other parent; according to the third view, the habitual residence remains where it was before the parents separated. The decision on this matter becomes particularly relevant if the child is removed or retained by one parent in breach of the custody agreement and the return of the child is requested by the other parent under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. In that situation, further disputes come to light, namely whether the Convention also applies in case of simultaneous habitual residences and whether conflicts of the above-mentioned kind should be covered at all by the Convention. A decision of the Court of Appeal Nuremberg from 2024 highlights the danger of creating unjustified asymmetries between the parents by “locking-in” the child’s habitual residence at the place where it was prior to the separation. Whereas this approach will usually lead to adequate results with regard to the law governing custody, simultaneous habitual residences should be admitted for the purposes of the 1980 Hague Convention in order to treat the parents equally.

 

D. Messner-Kreuzbauer: Jurisdiction for disclosure claims against platform operators [German]

Those affected by violations of personality rights on social media often require information from the platform operators regarding the identity of anonymous tortfeasors when pursuing their claims. The Austrian Supreme Court makes it easier for victims of online abuse to force disclosure of this information: it considers Austrian courts to be competent where claimants pursue substantive rights to information against platforms based in other EU jurisdictions, provided that the centre of interest of those seeking relief is located in Austria. The Austrian Supreme Court bases this special jurisdiction on Article 7(2) of the recast Brussels I Regulation, as interpreted by the CJEU. While the present case note criticises the Austrian Supreme Court’s reasoning for classifying substantive disclosure claims as tortious, it welcomes the result and offers an alternative doctrinal argument in its defence.

 

F. Niggemann: Concurring claims under the CISG and product liability – a decision of the French supreme court of 17.5.2023 [German]

The decision of the French Cour de Cassation of 23.5.2023 gives rise to analyse the question whether the application of the CISG excludes product liability claims. Whereas the French supreme court holds in favor of an exclusive application of the Convention and thus adopts an opinion so far only once expressed in international cases having applied the CISG, two decisions of the same court, rendered just a month earlier, come to the opposite result when applying national sales law and product liability. The exclusion of product liability claims under the CISG leads to a critical appraisal of the currently prevailing opinion. The legal situation created by the decision of the French Supreme Court additionally entails surprising possibilities for choice of law clauses of French law.

 

M. Uitz: Examining the validity of foreign forced child marriages in Austria – comparative remarks on the German and Austrian private international legal regimes [German]

Child marriages and forced marriages present multifarious challenges to the private international legal systems of many states. A recent decision by the Austrian Supreme Court of Justice on the potential validity of the forced marriage of a fifteen-year-old Afghan girl to her twenty-year-old cousin under Austrian private international law has generated new momentum in the ongoing discourse. First, this article analyzes the consequences of this decision for the adjudication of cases of forced child marriage brought before Austrian courts enjoying international jurisdiction. Second, this investigation compares the Austrian and German provisions of private international law on forced child marriage in order to illuminate the commonalities and discrepancies between both legal systems.

 

K. Bälz: Arbitration according to Sharia law? [German]

May an arbitral tribunal render an award on basis of the principles of Islamic law (Sharia), if the parties so agree? This is the subject matter of a decision of the Regional Court of Vienna of 2 May 2025. The court approved a respective choice of law and denied a violation of public order.

 

M. Gebauer/W. Hau: Statement by the Special Commission of the Second Commission of the German Council on Private International Law on the draft text of a future Hague Convention on parallel proceedings and related actions [English]

 

S. Grundmann: 100. Geburtstag International Academy of Comparative Law: Weltkongress 2026 in Berlin im Zeichen fundamentaler Pluralität [German]

 

On Tuesday, July 7, 2026, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 03:30 p.m. – 05:00 p.m. (CEST).

Christopher Whytock (University of California) will speak, in English, about the topic

“Conflict of Laws Through a Human Rights Lens”

The relationship between human rights and conflict of laws (private international law) is the subject of extensive scholarship in Europe, but almost entirely neglected in the United States. Inspired by European scholarship, this project attempts to extend human rights-oriented analysis to conflict of laws in the United States. It proposes a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between human rights and conflict of laws in the abstract, applies the framework to conflict of laws in the United States, and offers comparative insights.

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

 

This post was kindly prepared by Sai Ramani Garimella, Associate Professor, Faculty of Legal Studies, South Asian University.

 

A judgment-creditor is often concerned about the enforcement of foreign court orders, and that concern is not completely misplaced in India. The Supreme Court’s decision in Messer Griesheim v Goyal MG Gases is a useful illustration of the law governing the enforcement of foreign court orders and of the discussion of their finality and binding nature. Twenty-three years after the underlying loan transaction, and after much litigation, the Court has finally closed the chapter, refusing to enforce a 2006 English court’s summary judgment for roughly USD 5.8 million. Along the way, it has also clarified two recurring questions that often come up whenever a foreign money decree is sought to be executed in India:

• (i) When does a summary or “leave to defend” judgment qualify as a judgment “on the merits” under Section 13(b) of the CPC, and
• (ii) What is the real effect of a conditional RBI/foreign-exchange approval on the enforceability of a decree?

A JV was contracted between a German company, Messer Griesheim GmbH (hereinafter, Messer Griesheim) and Goyal MG Gases (hereinafter, Goyal), an Indian company engaged in the industrial gases business, in 1995. To fund capital expenditure, Goyal arranged an External Commercial Borrowing (ECB) of USD 7 million from Citibank, London, with Messer Griesheim standing as guarantor. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA), required both the Government of India and the Reserve Bank of India (the Central Bank) to approve borrowing and guarantees. The RBI’s approval letter dated 3 September 1997 imposed conditions, amongst others, that “in case of invocation of guarantee, no liability whatsoever will extend to the Indian company.” When Goyal defaulted, Citibank invoked the guarantee in 2001, and Messer Greisheim paid USD 4.78 million. It then sought reimbursement from Goyal by way of contractual subrogation. Goyal refused, asserting that the payment had been adjusted against its own unrelated claims against Messer (arising from alleged breaches of the JV and non-compete arrangements), claims it said were worth roughly Rs. 500 crore. Unable to recover amicably, Messer Greisheim sued in England.

 

The English Court Proceedings

1. 2003: Messer Greisheim obtained an ex parte default judgment after Goyal failed to appear.
2. Ill-advised on the difficulty of enforcing such orders in India, Messer Greisheim applied to have it set aside and sought a summary judgment instead.
3. Goyal responded that it had genuine defences, including three alleged oral side-agreements under which Messer Greisheim had supposedly agreed not to seek recourse against Goyal or to absorb the loan liability as part of a settlement.
4. On 7 February 2006, the English Court rejected Goyal’s defences as lacking a “real prospect of success” and entered summary judgment for approximately USD 5.8 million, plus interest and costs. Goyal did not appeal.

 

The Indian Execution Proceedings

Messer Greisheim applied to the Indian court for execution of the said order under Section 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The journey through the Indian courts was itself convoluted:

1. The Single Judge of the Delhi High Court (2013) held the judgment enforceable.
2. The Division Bench (2014) of the DHC ruled against jurisdiction as per the requirements of Section 44A.
3. The judgment-creditor appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that the DHC possessed jurisdiction in its original civil capacity and sent the matter back for a decision on the merits.
4. On remand, the DHC’s Division Bench finally refused enforcement, holding that the English court’s order violated Section 13 of the CPC, both for failing to be a judgment “on the merits” and for disregarding the RBI’s conditional approval.

5. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the Division Bench of DHC (though for partly different reasons), bringing the saga to a close.

 

The Statutory Framework: Section 13 read with Section 44A, CPC

Under Section 44A CPC, an order from the competent court of a “reciprocating territory” (the UK is one such) can be applied for execution before a district court in India. However, such enforcement may be denied if it is hit by the exceptions listed in CPC, S 13: absence of jurisdiction, judgment not on merits, incorrect view of international law or refusal to recognise Indian law, violation of natural justice, fraud, or a claim founded on breach of Indian law.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that these exceptions must be construed narrowly, in keeping with the principle of comity of courts; such a narrow construction may not be interpreted as against scrutiny at all.

 

Issue I: Was the English Summary Judgment “On the Merits”?

Pivoting upon jurisprudence from the Privy Council (Daniel Thomas Keymer v P. Viswanatham Reddi (AIR 1916 PC 121) and L. Oppenheim and Co. v. Hajee Mahomed Haneef Sahib (AIR 1922 PC 120)) as well as Indian decisions such as International Woollen Mills v Standard Wool (UK) Ltd, Middle East Bank v Rajendra Singh Sethia (AIR 1991 CAL 335), and K.M. Abdul Jabbar v Indo-Singapore Traders Pvt Ltd. (1980 SCC OnLine Mad 186) the Supreme Court held that a judgment entered merely because a defendant was refused leave to defend, without any real investigation into the rival contentions, cannot be treated as a judgment “on the merits” within Section 13(b).

Significantly, the Court did not treat “summary judgment” as a dirty word. It referred to the English law on summary judgment (Civil Procedure Rules 24.2, and the decisions in Easyair v Opal Telecom and Swain v Hillman). The Court noted that the English law required the defence to lead evidence of only a “realistic,” not a “fanciful,” prospect of success, and that a court should hesitate to finally decide a case without trial wherever a fuller investigation of the facts could affect the outcome. The point of the analysis was not that English procedure is somehow defective, but that this very test, properly applied to Goyal’s defences, should have led to a trial rather than summary disposal.

The Court found that Goyal’s defences were not fanciful:

1. There were contemporaneous statutory documents, board-approved Balance Sheets for FY 2001-02 and FY 2002-03, and Minutes of Board Meetings recording that Goyal owed nothing to Messer and that the loan repayment had instead been adjusted against Goyal’s own claims. These were signed by Messer Greisheim’s own nominee director, Mr Winfrid Schmidt, who had also seconded the relevant resolutions. Under Sections 194, 210, 211, and 215 of the Companies Act, 1956, such board-approved financial statements carry presumptive evidentiary value.
2. An e-mail dated 20 February 2003, in which Goyal disputed the claimed liability, did not appear to have been placed before or weighed by the English Court at the summary stage.
3. Goyal’s defence rested on disputed oral agreements, exactly the kind of factual controversy that, in the Court’s view, calls for cross-examination and a full trial rather than summary adjudication.

Importantly, the Supreme Court was careful to state that it was not adjudicating the merits of these defences itself; it addressed only whether they crossed the threshold of being “triable.” Having found that they did, the Court held that denying Goyal leave to defend amounted to a denial of fair trial, attracting both Section 13(b) (not on merits) and Section 13(d) (violation of natural justice) of the CPC. This alone was sufficient to dismiss the appeal and refuse enforcement.

86. […] The adjudication by way of summary judgment in the presence of bona fide triable issues renders the judgment one not delivered on merits within the meaning of Section 13(b).

The Court also revisited the Indian “leave to defend” jurisprudence under CPC, Order XXXVII (IDBI Trusteeship v Hubtown; B.L. Kashyap v JMS Steels), reiterating that denial of leave to defend is meant to be the exception, reserved for cases where the defence is frivolous or vexatious — not the default response to a contested claim.

 

Issue II: The FERA Angle; Adjudication vs Enforcement

1. Section 47(1)/(2): A contract that evades FERA cannot be enforced, but a contract conditioned on obtaining RBI/Government permission is not itself invalid merely because permission is pending.
2. Section 47(3): This provision states that nothing prevents legal proceedings from being brought in India to recover sums otherwise due; however, “no steps shall be taken for the purpose of enforcing any judgment or order” except to the extent permitted by the RBI/Central Government.

The Court  interpreted Section 47 as creating a clear two-stage scheme:

1. Stage 1-Adjudication: Courts may determine liability and order a decree without any prior RBI clearance. There is no bar on access to justice at this stage.
2. Stage 2-Enforcement: Before the execution of such a decree under Order XXI CPC, the RBI/Government permission becomes a precondition.

The Court held that the 1997 RBI condition operated as a regulatory precondition to execution, not a substantive defence that extinguishes the underlying liability. To that limited extent, the Court reversed the Division Bench’s reasoning on this specific point of law.

 

The Takeaways from Messer Greisheim

1. Summary and default judgments travel poorly across borders. A foreign judgment valid in its home jurisdiction could fail the Section 13(b) “merits” test in India only if the foreign court did not substantively engage with a defendant’s documented, triable defences. Foreign claimants strategising for default-to-summary judgments (switching from default judgment to summary judgment to improve enforceability) are alerted to the risk of failure. However, Messer Greisheim rejected the idea of inherent suspicion against summary judgments, the Court held that a 13(b) hit applies only when the record of the case establishes an unfair truncation of a legitimate dispute.

40. At the same time, the jurisdiction to grant summary judgment is not intended to convert the proceeding into a “mini-trial”, but rather to enable cases where there is no real prospect of success to be disposed of summarily.

1. Contemporaneous corporate records can defeat a foreign decree at the enforcement stage, even years later.
2. Foreign exchange regulatory permissions regulate execution, not adjudication. The judgment offers welcome clarity that conditional RBI approvals do not operate as a permanent shield against liability. They instead govern the timing and quantum of actual remittance once a decree is to be executed, a sensible accommodation between access to justice and India’s exchange-control regime.

 

Conclusion

Does the Indian law appear to allow a merits examination, a revision au fond? Messer Greisheim answered that in the negative. It was observed that by relying strictly on a summary procedure to dismiss a genuinely triable defence, the English court bypassed a full trial on the merits. A reading of CPC, S 13, indicates that Indian courts are prohibited from conducting a revision au fond.

• The executing court cannot act as an appellate court.
• It cannot re-examine the substantive facts, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own view on the merits for that of the foreign judge.

Messer Griesheim is ultimately a cautionary tale about procedure trumping substance. Messer Greisheim may have had a sound claim under the loan agreement’s subrogation clause. But by obtaining a summary judgment that bypassed Goyal’s triable defences instead of testing them at trial, it ended up with a decree that, twenty years and several rounds of litigation later, wasn’t enforceable in India. For foreign judgment creditors eyeing Indian assets, the lesson is unambiguous: a decree obtained without the Indian defendant being allowed a genuine opportunity to contest disputed facts is a fragile asset in the Indian execution courts, however efficiently it may have been obtained abroad. Section 13(b) thus speaks loud and clear – such summary judgment becomes suspect when it appears to have been entered solely to bypass a highly contested matter. Courts in India can review the record, as Messer Greisheim observed, only to identify whether the decision related to a summary procedure was indeed based upon sound reasons and wasn’t aimed at truncating an otherwise triable dispute.

The following call for papers has kindly been shared with us by the editors of The Journal of Law, Market & Innovation (JLMI).

The Journal of Law, Market & Innovation (JLMI) welcomes submissions for its second issue of 2027.

The Call for Papers for this second issue is devoted to European Regulatory and Supervisory Bodies in the Digital Realm.

You can find the call with all the details at the following link:

A NEW CONSTELLATION OF EU STATE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY BODIES IN THE DIGITAL REALM

Prospective articles should be submitted in the form of full papers to submissions.jlmi@iuse.it within 1 December 2026. The publication of the issue is set for the end of July 2027.

For further information, or for consultation on a potential submission, you can contact us by email at editors.jlmi@iuse.it.

Visit our website to read the full announcement.

For those (like myself) who view private international law as we know it today as essentially a European invention of the 19th century it is fascinating to see examples of earlier and non-European regimes. One example is Article 48 (on ‘Infringements between peoples outside civilization’) of the Tang Code (653 CE) which reads:

For the people outside [our] civilisation, if infringements occur between those of the same kind, they will be judged by their customary law. If they are of different kinds, then the law [of our empire] shall be applied.
諸化外人, 同類自相犯者, 各依本俗法; 異類相犯者, 以法律論

There has long been a debate of whether this is a true conflicts rule, much of which rests on how broadly to define what conflict of laws actually is and presupposes (for earlier discussion see, e.g. Qingkun Xu, The Codification of Conflicts Law in China: A Long Way to Go, 65 Am. J. Comp. L. 919, 925-6 (2017) with references).  Thảo Anh Hoàng (Huế University, Vietnam), in a new article, sides with those who view this as a true conflict of laws rule and also discusses its reception and application in Vietnam and elsewhere in Asia. (Thảo Anh Hoàng, Early conflict-of-laws rules: Vietnam’s Lê Code (1483) in East Asian and global contexts, 14 Comp. Leg. Hist. 29–54(2026). In addition, she  provides a fascinating and enlightening discussion of the risks of applying modern concepts to ancient phenomena that is instructive to everyone interested in private international law beyond its black letters. Based on parts of her doctoral thesis currently being written at Montpellier under the supervision of Carine Becharef Jallamion, the article is a tribute to both the productive potential of comparison beyond Europe and North America, and the promising young researchers from Asia.

 

Thảo Anh Hoàng, Early conflict-of-laws rules: Vietnam’s Lê Code (1483) in East Asian and global contexts, 14 Comp. Leg. Hist. 29–54 (2026).

The Faculty of Laws of University College London is looking to appoint as Research Fellow in Law one or more outstanding candidates with research interests in law and related fields. This Post Doctoral Research Fellowship provides a development opportunity for early career researchers in law who have exceptional potential, for a fixed and non-renewable term of two years. While the Fellowship is not limited to any particular area of legal study, conflict of laws is one of the areas in which applications are particularly welcome. UCL Laws is a world-leading academic institution, with a long tradition of private international law research and teaching, which is currently led by Professor Alex Mills, Professor Ugljesa Grusic and Joshua Folkard. The deadline for applications is 1 July 2026. More information about the post is available here. If you have any specific questions about this post and/or the duties attached to it, please contact Professor Colm O’Cinneide, Vice-Dean (Research).

The proceedings of the 18th Jornadas ASADIP in Rio de Janeiro 2025 have been published. María Mercedes Albornoz César González, Jaime Moreno-Valle and Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm as editors have collected no less than 46 contributions (plus a prologue and a foreword) by authors from Latin America and elsewhere to the 800 page tome entitled “Imaginario regional – resonancia global. El derecho internacional privado interamericano y el escenario mundial”. Most  are in Spanish or Portuguese, a few in English. They cover a vast array of topics, doctrinal and/or theoretical, structured along seven themes: (i) foundations, (ii) normative structure, (iii) procedure, (iv) substantive protections, (v) digitization, (vi) human rights, (vii) teaching of private international law. The volume  once again demonstrates both the ambition and the  high quality of private international law reasoning on the continent. It can, as can many other excellent OAS publications, be downloaded  free of charge from the OAS website.

As announced previously, the next Journal of Private International Law Conference will take place in Zurich on 1–3 April 2027. With the deadline for submitting proposals for papers to present at the conference, 30 June 2026, approaching fast, the organizers would like to remind everyone of the opportunity to submit a proposal. The same deadline also applies for the travel grants offered by the University of Zurich.

More information can be found on the conference website.

Earlier today, the Court of Justice rendered its decision in Case C-232/25 Idzinski, essentially confirming its previous case law, combined with a restrictive reading of its infamous decision in Joint Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate.

The facts of the case (which was given the entirely fictitious name Idzinski) are eerily similar to those of the Court’s 2021 decision in Case C-800/19 Mittelbayrischer Verlag. Just like in that earlier case, they involved a claim by Polish claimants against a German media outlet regarding the correction of, and damages for, the publication of content that allegedly violated their personality rights, including their national dignity. Only two elements of the facts were different: first, the content complained of was broadcasted on television, in addition to being published online; second, the claimants were (1) a private person who was part of a Polish military unit during World War II, which the German broadcaster had allegedly portrayed as ‘anti-Semitic and nationalistic and as having collaborated with the Nazis in the Holocaust’, and (2) an association bringing together members of that unit.

After two decisions against the defendants (to varying degrees), the Polish Supreme Court had submitted two questions relating to the international jurisdiction of the Polish courts.

Centre-of-Interests Jurisdiction

First, the court wanted to know whether the claimants could rely on Art 7(2) Brussels Ia in the interpretation developed by the CJEU in eDate to establish the (full) jurisdiction of the Polish courts as the courts of the claimants’ centre of interests, even with regard to the content broadcasted on television and even though neither of the claimants had been named in the broadcast.

Dismissing the claimants’ argument that any distinction between online content and a TV broadcast would be largely meaningless given how much the lines between the two formats have blurred, the CJEU reaffirms the narrow scope of the centre of interests criterion (see already eDate, [48]), which remains only available with regard to online content:

[44] That said, the television broadcast of audiovisual content in several Member States must be distinguished from the dissemination of such content on the internet. The placing online of content on a website is to be distinguished, generally, from the regionalised distribution of media in that it is intended, in principle, to ensure the ubiquity of that content. That content may be consulted instantly by an unlimited number of users throughout the world, irrespective of any intention on the part of the person who placed it as regards its consultation beyond that person’s Member State of establishment and outside of that person’s control […].

[45] Those considerations do not apply to the broadcasting of audiovisual content on television. Such broadcasting is not, in principle, available instantly and worldwide, but is regionalised, limited to the geographical area in which the television signal is received.

Regarding the fact that neither of the two claimants had been mentioned by name in the broadcast in question, which could be seen as falling short of the requirement for centre-of-interests jurisdiction developed in Mittelbayrischer Verlag, namely that the content complained of must containt ‘objective and verifiable elements which make it possible to identify, directly or indirectly, [the claimant] as an individual’, the CJEU draws a distinction between the two claimants. The first claimant did not pass the threshold of identifiability as the broadcast

[54] […] does not make it possible to identify individually the applicants in the main proceedings inasmuch as it is a work of fiction which recounts the conduct of a group of soldiers – members of unit X – without it being possible to ascertain the true identity of the members depicted in the series.

The second claimant, however, whose members were all part of that group of soldiers, passed the test and could thus bring a claim at its centre of interests, as far as the online publication of the series is concerned.

Mosaic Jurisdiction

As a second question, the referring court also inquired (again – see also Cases C-194/16 Bolagsupplysningen and C-251/20 Gtflix Tv) about the extent to which jurisdiction could be based on the mosaic approach to Art. 7(2) Brussels Ia. Indeed, for all claims of the first claimant as well as for the claims of the second claimant regarding the TV broadcast, jurisdiction could only be based on the fact that the content had been made available in Poland, which traditionally only creates jurisdiction for a proportion of the overall harm. In Bolagsupplysningen, the CJEU had essentially restricted this type of jurisdiction to damage awards.

In Idzinski, the CJEU simply reiterates its earlier decisions (see [63]). In particular, it confirms that mosaic jurisdiction remains unavailable for any kind of injunction requiring the defendant to display specific information before the series (both online and on TV) – a remedy, of course, with limited chance of being enforced in Germany anyway (for reasons explained here).

Conclusion

Ultimately, the CJEU simply reaffirms its previous case law. While any revirement de justice in that area would have been highly surprising, especially after the decision in Gtflix Tv, the decision may well be seen as another indication that the area is ripe for legal reform.

International Symposium | 9–10 October 2026 | Faculty of Law, University of Coimbra (Portugal)

The University of Coimbra Institute for Legal Research (UCILeR), in collaboration with the Associação de Estudos Europeus de Coimbra (AEEC – Coimbra Association of European Studies), is organizing the International Symposium “Crossing Dialogues, Disciplines and Borders: How far can Private International Law go?”, to be held on 9 and 10 October 2026 at the Colégio da Trindade, Coimbra, Portugal.

Organised by Dulce Lopes and Afonso Patrão , the event brings together leading scholars, early-career researchers, and practitioners to debate the evolving role and limits of Private International Law (PIL) in novel situations that increasingly challenge its traditional scope.

About the Symposium

Private International Law is undergoing a period of deep transformation. The boundaries between substantive and procedural law have become more fluid and porous; fundamental rights and freedoms permeate classical conflict-of-laws reasoning; and adjacent disciplines — constitutional law, human rights law, immigration law, and register law — are reshaping the very foundations of PIL doctrine and methodology.

The symposium is structured around five thematic panels:

• Constitutional Law(s) and PIL — exploring the constitutionalisation of conflict-of-laws rules and comparative approaches to the interface between national constitutionalism and PIL;
• Human Rights Law(s) and PIL — examining the role of regional human rights frameworks, the recognition of same-sex unions, and the treatment of personal status in cross-border disputes;
• Immigration Law(s) and PIL — addressing unilateralist trends in migration regulation, the PIL status of migrants, and new developments in cross-border family relations;
• Procedural and Register Law(s) and PIL — covering matrimonial property regimes, gender identity and self-determination, and the human rights dimensions of cross-border litigation;
• Call for Papers session — open to contributions from scholars and researchers (see below).

Confirmed speakers include  Ilaria Viarengo (University of Milan), Stéphanie Francq (UCLouvain), Yuko Nishitani (Kyoto University), Laura Carballo Piñero (University of Vigo), Rosario Espinosa Callabuig(University of Valencia),  Guillermo Palao Moreno (University of Valencia), Gustavo Monaco (University of São Paulo), Antonia Duran Ayago (University of Salamanca), Dário Moura Vicente (University of Lisbon), Luís de Lima Pinheiro (University of Lisbon), Rui Moura Ramos (University of Coimbra), and many others.

The full program is accessible on-line: https://ucpages.uc.pt/fduc/ij/agenda-ij/crossing-dialogues-disciplines-and-borders-how-far-can-private-international-law-go/

Attendance, whether in person or online, is free of charge but subject to registration: https://ls.uc.pt/index.php/395373?lang=pt&

Call for Papers

The organising committee invites abstract submissions from scholars and practitioners wishing to present papers at the symposium. Contributions may address any of the following themes (non-exhaustive):

• The role of PIL in addressing emerging forms of personal and family status
• Intersections between PIL and Human Rights Law
• The impact of constitutionalisation on conflict-of-laws rules
• The interplay between procedural mechanisms and substantive outcomes
• The relationship between immigration law and PIL
• The relevance of register law in cross-border legal situations
• The limits of traditional PIL doctrines in atypical or innovative cases

Submission requirements:

• Abstract of no more than 250 words
• Short bio with contact details (max. 100 words)
• Submissions must be sent through the following link: https://ls.uc.pt/index.php/263595?lang=en&

Key dates:

Abstract submission deadline 18 July 2026 Notification of acceptance 31 July 2026 Draft papers due 9 October 2026

Presentations will take place in a hybrid format on 9 October 2026. A peer-reviewed publication of the proceedings is planned following the event.

We look forward to welcoming submissions from researchers working at the intersection of PIL and the many disciplines with which it increasingly dialogues.

This Call for Papers was shared with us by Procedural Law Unit of the University of Nicosia, Cyprus.

The Procedural Law Unit is a research unit within the School of Law at the University of Nicosia, focusing on civil procedure, private international law, and broader developments in judicial process and court reform. Each year, the Unit hosts its Annual Courts and Justice Conference, which brings together academics, practitioners, judges, and policymakers to discuss contemporary issues in procedural law and justice systems.

This year’s conference, the Annual Courts and Justice Conference 2026, is themed “The Algorithmic Courtroom: Trust, Accountability, and the Future of Justice”, and will examine the implications of artificial intelligence in adjudication and court processes.

The SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) Directive of the EU (2024/1069 of 11 April 2024) is transposed in Belgian law by the Act of 30 May 2026. The Act was published in the Belgian Official Journal on 12 June 2026 (see the French version and the Dutch version), and will enter into force on 22 June 2026.

The main features of the Act are:

• it inserts a new chapter in the Judicial Code on the “Protection of Persons involved in Public Debate against Manifestly Unfounded Claims or Abuse of Procure” (Part IV, Book IV, new Chapter XXVII);
• it allows the court to, upon request by the defendant or of its own motion, oblige the plaintiff to provide security for costs in the case of a SLAPP;
• it provides for early dismissal of a SLAPP (at any time during the procedure);
• it makes such early dismissal possible at the introductory session or at a speedy date;
• it places the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that the claim against public participation is not manifestly unfounded;
• it inserts an extra basis of jurisdiction in the Private International Law Code (echoed in the Judicial Code) to allow persons residing in Belgium who were subjected to a SLAPP outside the EU to bring a claim for damages and costs at the place of their residence in Belgium (new Art. 96/1);
• it adds a ground for refusal of judgments from States outside the EU if the judgment was based on a procedure that falls in the definition of a SLAPP (Art. 25 §1, 10°);
• it reaffirms the role of the Belgian Federal Institute for Human Rights (IFDH / FIRM) as the central contact point for SLAPP cases. This institute can intervene in cases by simple letter to the registrar of the court.

Despite earlier discussions about the matter, the Act is limited to civil proceedings, and not extended to criminal proceedings, which the IFDM / FIRM regrets.

The following announcement has kindly been shared with us by Silvia Marino

The new extensive Volume Status and Family Relationships in Private International Law was just published by Edward Elgar Publishing.

Edited by Silvia Marino (University of Insubria, Como), Anna Wysocka-Bar (Jagiellonian University, Kraków) and Javier Carrascosa González (University of Murcia), the volume, builds on the presentations delivered at the 2024 EAPIL Winter School, held in Como in February 2024. It is the second book in the European Association of Private International Law series.

The chapters discuss current and future challenges and issues in the field of personal and family status in European private international law.

Opened by a contribution by Camelia Toader and Ioan-Luca Vlad on the development of the competence of the European private international law in the field, the book includes two chapters on the relationships between human rights and cross-border families, considered also in the frame on the European Convention of Human Rights (written by Paula Poretti and Satu Heikkilä). The following contributions focus on specific sensitive status, whose recognition and circulation risk being impaired, such as reassignment of sex assigned at birth (Anna Wysocka-Bar) and vulnerable adults (Katja Karjalainen). A particular attention is devoted to the status of the children in cross-border situations, such as children born following an international surrogacy agreement (Laura Carpaneto), parenthood (Cristina González Beilfuss), adoption (Chiara Ragni), international child abduction (Nadia Rusinova). An overview on the methods of recognition and acceptance of civil status is also offered (Etienne Pataut). Finally, the volume focuses on cross-border divorces (Máire Ní Shúilleabháin) and on the relevance of tort in family life (Nadia Rusinova)

The blurb reads as follows:

This timely book examines the personal and family status of the natural person in cross-border situations, within the framework of the fundamental rights. Featuring eminent scholars in private international law and internationally known European judges and practitioners, the book includes critical analysis of key topics and case studies. Authors adopt both a theoretical and practical perspective to assess the emerging challenges facing transnational families, from evaluating human rights in cross-border family situations to detailing different kinds of status and their related challenges. They address topics including the recognition of rainbow families and gender identity, the parent–child relationship and cross-border recognition of international and foreign adoptions. Presenting an in-depth analysis of ongoing issues and developments, this book strengthens understanding and research of cross-border family status in Europe.

The table of contents can be accessed here. The book may be purchased or accessed online here.

 

I. Introduction

Sometimes, reading court decisions leaves a strange sense of confusion, especially when the decision rendered not only contradicts a well-established line of case law, but also when the court, in the very same decision, reveals internal contradictions. Several months ago, I critically discussed on this blog a rather unusual decision of the Egyptian Supreme Court (محكمة النقض/maḥkamat an-naqḍ), in which the enforcement of a Canadian judgment was denied on the ground that reciprocity had not been established with Canada. In my comments on that decision, I expressed “significant concerns” regarding the incoherent manner in which reciprocity was addressed by the Supreme Court.

Well, surprises never end, and reciprocity strikes back in a new case, with an even more puzzling effect, as the shift signalled in the previous decision appears to be confirmed in the case commented on here. This new position of the Supreme Court is hardly reassuring. The manner in which the Court addressed such a controversial issue suggests a troubling move towards an increasingly stringent and confusing approach, which consists in affirming that the establishment of reciprocity does not depend on the existence of a treaty with the rendering State on the one hand, while nevertheless denying reciprocity on that very ground on the other.

 

II. The Case

The case concerns an action brought by X (the judgment creditor) seeking the enforcement in Egypt of an American judgment rendered in its favor by a California court, ordering Y (the judgment debtor) to pay a certain sum of money, together with interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. The court of first instance granted the application and declared the Californian judgment enforceable in Egypt, with the exception of the portion awarding interest at a rate of 10%. That decision was subsequently upheld on appeal.

Dissatisfied with the outcome, Y lodged an appeal before the Egyptian Supreme Court arguing that the Californian judgment had been declared enforceable without establishing the existence of legislation in the rendering State allowing the enforcement of Egyptian judgments, as required by the principle of legislative reciprocity (مبدأ التبادل التشريعي/mabdaʾ at-tabādul at-tashrīʿī) and actual reciprocal treatment (المعاملة الفعلية بالمثل/al-muʿāmala al-mithliyya bil-mithl) between the two States with respect to the enforcement of judgments, in accordance with to Article 296 of the Egyptian Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (ECCCP)(*).

(*) Article 296 reads as follows:

Foreign judgments and decisions may be declared enforceable under the same conditions as those laid down by the law of the rendering State for the enforcement therein of Egyptian judgments and decisions.

 

III. The Ruling

In its decision of 20 January 2026, the Court admitted the appeal, ruling as follows (a detailed summary with modifications):

First, the Court recalled – as is usually the case – the general applicable framework.

It noted that, pursuant to Article 296 of the ECCCP, the legislature has adopted the principle of reciprocity or mutual treatment (مبدأ المعاملة بالمثل أو التبادل / mabdaʾ al-muʿāmala bil-mithl aw at-tabādul), meaning that foreign judgments shall be treated in Egypt in the same way as Egyptian judgments are treated in the rendering State. In this respect, the legislature has only required legislative reciprocity (التبادل التشريعي / at-tabādul at-tashrīʿī), as opposed to diplomatic reciprocity (التبادل الدبلوماسي / at-tabādul ad-diblūmāsī), which is established by a treaty or convention (emphasis added).

The Court further recalled that it is required, courts are required to verify ex officio that the condition of legislative reciprocity is satisfied […].

Notwithstanding this premise, the Court went on to censure the lower court’s reasoning, considering that, in the present case, the court of the appealed decision had declared enforceable the Californian judgment after finding,  – by reference to Articles 1713 and 1714 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, that mutual legislative treatment [legislative reciprocity (التبادل التشريعي / at-tabādul at-tashrīʿī)] was sufficiently established to satisfy the reciprocity requirement (شرط المعاملة بالمثل / sharṭ al-mu‘āmala bil-mithl) between Egypt and the State of California.

However, according to the Supreme Court, by deciding as it did without determining whether any convention exists between Egypt and the United States of America concerning the enforcement of judgments providing for reciprocity or mutual treatment, the lower court failed to provide a legal basis for its decision under Article 296 of the ECCCP (emphasis added).

 

IV. Comments

To my knowledge, this is the second decision in which a foreign judgment was refused enforcement in Egypt solely on the basis of a lack of reciprocity (on the earlier case, see my comments here). In both cases, the Supreme Court ruled almost exactly in the same manner and quashed the lower courts’ decisions admitting reciprocity with the rendering State on the ground that the judges failed to show whether there exists a convention between Egypt and the rendering State dealing with the enforcement of judgments that embodies the principle of reciprocity. This position is hardly consistent with the principle affirmed by the Court according to which what matters is legislative reciprocity, not diplomatic reciprocity established by treaty or convention. The comments made on the previous case regarding this aspect are therefore fully applicable here.

What is particularly remarkable, however, is the position taken by the lower courts, which appears to be fully in line with the traditional approach of the Egyptian Supreme Court. Adhering to the principle of legislative reciprocity as traditionally developed (on this practice, see my comments here), the lower courts seem to have concluded that reciprocity existed with the State of California after comparing the enforcement requirements applicable there with those applicable in Egypt. This point is important, as it also shows that, in the view of the lower courts, where judgments emanate from federal States such as the United States, reciprocity should be assessed by reference to the particular State in which the judgment was rendered. The Supreme Court, by contrast, appears to have rejected this approach, placing decisive weight on the existence of a convention between Egypt and the United States.

In any event, the recent developments concerning reciprocity in two successive cases rendered by different panels of the Supreme Court in Egypt are indicative of a shift away from a principle of reciprocity that requires a comparative analysis of the enforcement requirements under the law of the State of origin and under Egyptian law (legislative reciprocity), towards an approach that makes the existence of an international convention a prerequisite for its establishment. This new approach raises the threshold against the enforcement of foreign judgments to a considerable degree, as it would be sufficient for the judgment debtor to argue that reciprocity is not established whenever there is no treaty with the rendering State, bearing in mind that Egypt has concluded a little over 20 conventions, mostly with Arab countries with which it has already concluded regional conventions, and only around 10 with non-Arab countries, including some EU Member States (Germany, Romania, Italy, France, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland) as well as Turkey, Russia, and China. Should such a development be confirmed in future cases, this would mean that judgments rendered in roughly 88% of countries worldwide would be denied enforcement in Egypt.

This backward development stands in striking contrast to recent trends in comparative law, notably in China, where a considered shift has taken place from a traditionally restrictive approach (on this traditional approach, see my comments here), towards a more moderate approach that places emphasis on de jure reciprocity, presumptive reciprocity, and other forms that do not necessarily depend on the existence of a formally concluded treaty between China and the rendering State (see the illustrative cases discussed on this blog here and here). A comparatively more liberal approach has also been followed in Tunisia, where Tunisian courts now consider that, in the absence of an international convention, reciprocity must be presumed and that it is for the party contesting this presumption to provide evidence of its non-existence. (for details, see  Béligh Elbalti, “La réciprocité en matière d’exequatur: Quoi de nouveau? Observations sous l’arrêt de la Cour de cassation n° 6608 du 13 mars 2014” Arab Law Quarterly (2025) online-first publication).

The Egyptian Supreme Court would do well to draw lessons from such comparative developments and reconsider both its position and the negative signal this sends; otherwise, the consequences may prove drastic for holders of Egyptian judgments, which may be denied recognition and enforcement in States requiring reciprocity.

 

(※) Related posts on this blog on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Egypt:

• Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Egypt – A Critical Assessment of a Recent Supreme Court Decision
• Enforcing Foreign Judgments in Egypt: A Critical Examination of Two Recent Egyptian Supreme Court Cases
• Egyptian Supreme Court on the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments – Special Focus on the Service Requirement

 

This post was kindly prepared by Dr. Meng Yu, lecturer at China University of Political Science and Law, and co-founder of China Justice Observer.

 

[ABSTRACT]

Recent Australian case law clarifies that the “double interest” mechanism in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter ‘PRC’) monetary judgments functions as a compensatory post-judgment interest framework rather than an unenforceable penalty. This consolidates Australia’s position as a highly attractive and creditor-friendly forum for enforcing Chinese judgments. See Zhengzhou Lvdu Real Estate Group Co v Shu [2024] NSWSC 58 (6 February 2024), Fu v Pang [2025] VSC 597 (16 September 2025), and Shanghai Chenggong Industrial Co Ltd v Zhihua Chen [2025] NSWSC 1112 (27 October 2025).

 

Key takeaways:

• Australian courts have astutely recognized that PRC “double interest” does not actually double the contractual rate, but operates as an additional statutory post-judgment rate (0.0175% per day) to compensate for delayed performance.
• Across three recent decisions, Australian courts in New South Wales and Victoria firmly ruled that Article 264 interest under China’s Civil Procedure Law is not penal, as it aims to compensate rather than punish, and it vindicates a private right and lacks a state-enforced punitive purpose.
• The willingness to enforce this Article 264 interest mechanism was significantly enhanced by its functional equivalence to Australia’s own post-judgment interest rules under the UCPR.

 

In recent decades, Australia has increasingly become a top creditor-friendly jurisdiction for PRC judgment creditors. In just two years (2024-2025), six Chinese judgments have been recognized and enforced by Australian courts,[i] mainly in two states – New South Wales and Victoria.

Like in other common jurisdictions, as previously reported, the grounds that judgment debtors frequently use in challenging such recognition and enforcement in Australia are denial of procedural fairness and natural justice, often arising from the service of process in Chinese court proceedings. See Zhou v Jing [2023] NSWSC 214 (procedural fairness); Yin v Wu [2023] VSCA 130 (natural justice).

Related Posts:

• A Chinese Judgment Denied Enforcement by Court of NSW Australia, Due to Defective Service by Post?
• A Chinese Judgment Denied Enforcement in Australia, As “Public Announcement” against Natural Justice?

 

More interestingly, Australian courts have been dealing with a newish defense in a series of three recent cases – Zhengzhou Lvdu Real Estate Group Co v Shu [2024] NSWSC 58 (6 February 2024), Fu v Pang [2025] VSC 597 (16 September 2025), and Shanghai Chenggong Industrial Co Ltd v Zhihua Chen [2025] NSWSC 1112 (27 October 2025). The common issue at heart is whether the “double interest”, an element commonly seen in PRC monetary judgments, is penal, and hence renders the judgments wholly or partially unenforceable in Australia.

As misleading as the term “double interest” (/ chiyan lvxing lixi de jiabei bufen zhaiwu liyi) may appear, the way Australian courts endeavor to understand a term absolutely unique in a foreign country is admirable. The courts not only correctly pointed out that “double interest” is a misnomer, as it has nothing to do with “double”, but also concluded that such “double interest” is not penal in nature.

For the avoidance of doubt, the so-called “double interest” refers to the double part debt interest of the “Article 264 interest” (also known as “double part debt interest of delayed performance interest”, chiyan lvxing lixi de jiabei bufen zhaiwu liyi), the interests payable under Article 264 of China’s 2023 Civil Procedure Law (CPL) (formerly numbered Article 253 of 2017 CPL, Article 260 of 2021 CPL), which applies in in circumstances where a judgment debtor fails to pay the judgment debt within the period as specified in a judgment.

The method to calculate the Article 264 interest is governed by the 2014 Interpretation by China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) on Several Issues concerning the Applicable Law for Calculating the Interest of Debt on Delayed Performance in Enforcement Procedures” (hereinafter the “SPC Interpretation”).[ii] Article 1 of the SPC Interpretation provides that Article 264 interest – delayed performance interest (the debt interest during the period of delayed performance)- is composed of the ‘general debt interest’ and the ‘double part debt interest’, the former (if any) is specified by the judgment, and the latter is calculated via the formula as follows: Double part of debt interest = the outstanding monetary debt of the debtor other than general debt interest specified by effective legal document x 0.00175 per day x delayed performance period.

 

“Double Interest” Not Double

The term “double interest” is “something of a misnomer”, indicated the Supreme Court of New South Wales (the “NSW Supreme Court”) in Zhengzhou Lvdu Real Estate Group Co v Shu, a case where a judgment of Zhengzhou Intermediate People’s Court of Henan Province (hereinafter the “Zhengzhou Judgment”) for RMB 318,827,295.13 was ruled enforceable.

Like a koala bear is not a bear, the double interest is not double. By nature, it is an “additional” interest, in addition to general debt interest specified by judgment (if any), when the judgment debt was not paid within the period specified in the judgment.

In the Zhengzhou Judgment, the judgment debtors – both the borrower and the guarantor- were found liable for the all the payment obligations, i.e. 1) to repay to the lender (judgment creditor) the principal of the loan in the amount of CNY 170 million and its interest (based on principal of CNY 170 million, calculated on an annual interest rate of 12% for the period between 12 June 2019 and 11 May 2020; and calculated on an annual interest of 18% for the period from 12 May 2020 until the date when the debt is fully repaid) within ten days after this judgment takes effect; and 2) to pay the Article 264 interest, if the payment obligation is not performed within the period specified in this judgment, which is “within ten days after this judgment took effect on 20 September, 2020” (at [42]-[43]).

Clearly, Article 264 (formerly Article 253 of 2017 CPL) does not double the interest rate provided for under the Loan Agreement (which was 12% per annum from the date of the advance until the date of maturity, and then 18% per annum from the date of default until repayment). Instead, there is “double” interest only in the sense that, from the date when the judgment debt was required to be paid until the date of actual payment, there is a second interest rate applicable, in addition to the contractual interest rate of 18% which was found to apply in the Zhengzhou Judgment (at [65]).

Given the calculation method above, Article 264 Interest is calculated based on “the “outstanding monetary debt of the debtor other than general debt interest specified by effective legal document” is, in this case, the amount of the principal (CNY 170 million). The rate of Article 264 interest is a statutory rate, set at 0.0175% per day (around 6.3875% per annum). The “delayed performance period” starts from 29 September 2020 (ten days after this judgment took effect on 9 September) until repayment.

 

“Double Interest” Not Penal

In Zhengzhou Lvdu Real Estate Group Co v Shu, the NSW Supreme Court considered whether “Double Interest” could be regarded penal in nature, but did not reach any determination, given that “it is the Defendant who bears the burden of showing that any element of the Zhengzhou Judgment is penal in nature and that “no evidence and no submissions have been advanced to this effect” (at [68]).

Similarly, in Fu v Pang, the Victoria Supreme Court reviewed an application to enforce a Chinese judgment of Qingxiu District People’s Court of Nanning City, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and this time, the defendant did seek to persuade the court that the double interest was penal in nature.

With detailed reasoning, however, the Victoria Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s submission and concluded it is not penal, ruling that

“there is no public interest element. The double part interest arises out of the exercise of a private right and it has no connection with the state, nor is the plaintiff here acting as a common informer. There is no basis on which it can be concluded that the payment of the extra interest component is imposed for public purposes to punish the defendant for non-compliance with the judgment, rather than being an additional compensation for the plaintiff for the detriment of being kept out of the judgment sum.” (at [30])

Just one month later, in Shanghai Chenggong Industrial Co Ltd v Zhihua Chen, where two PRC judgments were enforced, the NSW Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. In this case, the double interest is the only issue that the defendant disputed, and the court held firmly that Article 264 interest is not penal.

As the NSW Supreme Court revealed, the question at heart is the purpose and nature of Article 264 interest: “does it punish for non-compliance with Court orders, or is it more appropriately considered a legislated post-judgment interest rate?” (at [18]) The court opined the correct answer is the latter.

To start with, it is not akin to a contractual penalty by any comparison. There are also no authorities decided after Schnable v Lui [2002] NSWSC 15 that punitive damages will always be considered penal in Australian law. In other words, punitive damages are not necessarily penal.

More importantly, Article 264 interest aims “to compensate, and not to punish”, because Article 264 is triggered where there is late or deferred payment, and it is “appropriate to compensate a plaintiff for being held out of money, just the way the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) provides for post-judgment interest on judgment debts”. (at [31])

 

Comments

Not long after, by following the same stance on the “non-penal” nature of Article 264 interest in Shanghai Chenggong Industrial Co Ltd v Zhihua Chen, the same court, the NSW Supreme Court, enforced a PRC judgment of Zhangjiagang People’s Court of Jiangsu Province for RMB 24,256,223.86 and interest in Kai Yuan v Jian Hua Zhou [2025] NSWSC 1469 (5 December 2025).

By clearing the name of “double interest”, the series of recent Australian court decisions have pointed out that the double interest is not double, but additional; and its purpose is to compensate, rather than to punish.

At the end of the day, it is practically difficult to ascertain the purpose behind remedies ordered in foreign judgments. The “compensate or punish” question matters so much that taking on one side over the other can render the part containing such interest either enforceable or unenforceable. There seems to be no room for a mixed purpose, which might as well be a third way of interpretation (if taking into account the views of China’s legislature and judiciary).[iii]

Moreover, behind the “compensate or punish” question lies a further question that has yet to be fully tested: what ‘penal’ actually means in the rule against enforcement of a foreign penal law, when discussing the relevant jurisprudence regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

One thing is clear though: when evaluating a foreign concept like PRC “double interest”, the existence of a similar domestic mechanism—such as Australia’s statutory post-judgment interest under the UCPR—makes the concept far easier for local courts to understand and accept. Conversely, courts in jurisdictions like Hong Kong, which lack such a domestic equivalent, may find it much more challenging to conceptualize and enforce.[iv]

 

————————————————————————-

[i] See Zhengzhou Lvdu Real Estate Group Co v Shu [2024] NSWSC 58, Fujian Rongtaiyuan Industrial Co Ltd v Zhan [2024] NSWSC 1318, Yangpu Huigu Pharmaceutical Corporation Limited v He [2025] NSWSC 28, Fu v Pang [2025] VSC 597, Shanghai Chenggong Industrial Co Ltd v Zhihua Chen [2025] NSWSC 1112, Kai Yuan v Jian Hua Zhou [2025] NSWSC 1469.

[ii] Interpretation by China’s Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Applicable Law for Calculating the Interest of Debt on Delayed Performance in Enforcement Procedures, Fa Shi (2014) No. 8, 7 July 2014.

[iii] See Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (ed.), Explanation of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Law Press China, 2nd edition, 2012), p. 590; Civil Law Office of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (ed.), Explanations of Articles, Legislative Rationale, and Relevant Provisions of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2nd edition, 2012), p. 398; and the Official from the Enforcement Bureau of the Supreme People’s Court Answers Reporters’ Questions, People’s Court Daily, 31 July 2014, available at https://www.chinacourt.cn/article/detail/2014/07/id/1354917.shtml.

[iv] See Hung Fung Enterprises Holdings Ltd v The Agricultural Bank of China [2012] HKCA 251, Foshan Nanhai Branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd v Foshan Ruifeng Petroleum and Chemical Fuel Co Ltd [2019] 2 HKLRD 478, Tianjin Financial Investment Services Group v Jinan Muhe Enterprise Management Co Ltd & Ors [2025] HKCFI 6182, Industrial Bank Co., Ltd., Ningbo Branch v Ningbo Baifeng Mineral Processing Co., Ltd. & Ors [2026] HKCFI 2455, and Letui (Shanghai) Cultural Communication Co., Ltd. v. Shenzhen Mega Combine Technology Co.,Ltd & Ors [2026] HKCFI 3204.

 

Many thanks to Boris Awa (Kigali Independent University ULK, Kigali, Rwanda) for the tip-off 

The birth of a new academic journal is always good news, especially when its stated aim is “to become one of the leading scientific publications on international law” and when it is “primarily intended as a forum for African international lawyers’ reflection and research on issues of interest to Africa.” This is precisely the ambition pursued by the newly launched African Review of International Law (ARIL) / Revue africaine de droit international (RADI), published by the African Society of International Law (AfSIL).

The inaugural issue features several very interesting contributions, not only on the practice of international law in Africa and Africa’s contribution to international law, but also on private international law. Notable contributions include:

• Giuditta Cordero-Moss, “The Legal Framework for Arbitration in Africa: Issues of Applicable Law”;
• Yuko Nishitani, “Private International Law and Child Protection from the Perspective of Africa”;
• Grégoire Jiogue, “La réception des règles de droit international privé français en Afrique noire francophone”.

Another contribution of particular relevance from a private international law perspective is by August Reinisch and Maria José Escobar Gil, “The Wealth of Regional Courts in Africa: An Outsider’s Perspective”. This piece is especially timely in light of ongoing discussions concerning the recognition and enforcement of decisions rendered by regional and international courts in Africa, and the adaptability of domestic regimes on foreign judgments to such decisions.

The full table of contents also includes contributions by Maurice Kamto, Makane Moïse Mbengue, Yves Daudet, Bing Bing Jia, Mario J. A. Oyarzábal, Namira Negm, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Nilüfer Oral, Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, and Dire Tladi, covering a wide range of themes in contemporary international law.

The inaugural issue concludes with a call for papers inviting submissions, in both English and French, in the fields of public international law, private international law, and comparative law.

These contributions are intended for publication in the first regular issue, scheduled for release in the second half of 2026.

Proposed articles, case notes, and book reviews must be submitted by September 2026 via the Review’s email address: aril.info25@gmail.com.

The full table of contents, detailed information on the call for contributions (in English and French), as well as the Review’s stylistic guide (in English and French), are available in the inaugural issue.

Needless to say, African private international law scholars, as well as scholars interested in African private international law, are very warmly encouraged to take advantage of this new forum and to contribute to making it a successful one, for the benefit of all.

The European Civil Justice Centre is pleased to announce a European Civil Procedure Seminar, which will take place on 25 and 26 June 2026 at the Faculty of Law and Criminology of KU Leuven.

The seminar is organised on the occasion of the publication of European Civil Procedure, edited by Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet and Adriani Dori, and published by de Gruyter in 2026. The book offers a comprehensive overview of the main developments shaping civil justice, including EU instruments on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement, service of documents, taking of evidence, and collective redress.

The seminar will be held at KU Leuven, Faculty of Law and Criminology, Tiensestraat 41, Leuven, Facultaire Raadzaal. Participation is free. Registration for in-person attendance is available by email at anne-marie.cuypers@kuleuven.be. Registration to attend online is available via Eventbrite: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/online-european-civil-procedure-seminar-tickets-1991345046640

The seminar will bring together a number of the book’s authors to reflect on and discuss various topics within the field of European civil procedure.

Programme

Thursday 25 June 2026

12.45
Welcome
Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet, Adriani Dori

13.00
Innovations in EU Civil Procedure: Novel Concepts, Regulatory Mechanisms and Technology
Anna Nylund [online]

13.40
Mariana after Magnitsky: How Global Sanctions and Litigation Funding Politicize Private International Law
Eduardo Silva de Freitas

14.20
Three to Tango: Lawyers Ethics in Collective Litigation with Third Party Funding
Jos Hoevenaars

15.00
Coffee break

15.30
“No Mini-Trials at the Jurisdictional Stage”: Brussels Ia and Engagement with the Merits
Geert Van Calster

16.10
CJEU Case Law on Delineating the Scope of Application Between the Insolvency and Brussels Ibis Regulations: Challenges of Uniform Interpretation
Vesna Lazic

17.00
Taking of Evidence: Cross-Border Aspects and EU Influence
Wannes Vandenbussche and Jachin Van Doninck

17.40
End of day one

 

Friday 26 June 2026

9.00
Simplicity is the Ultimate Sophistication
Willem Visser

9.40
Judicial Cooperation in Civil Enforcement
Patrick Gielen

10.20
The Revision of the ADR Directive 2013/11 and the Amendments in the ADR Directive 2025/2647: The use of Evidence
Emma van Gelder

11.00
Coffee break

11.20
EU law and National Civil Procedure: A Slightly Larger Area Than It First Appears.
Bart Krans

12.00
Elusive DigitalJustice@2030: Can the Promise Be Fulfilled?
Alan Uzelac [online]

12.30
Closing
Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet, Adriani Dori

End of day two

For further information, please contact kramer@law.eur.nl and stefaan.voet@kuleuven.be.

 

A recent article in the latest issue of the Asian Journal of Comparative Law revisits a feature of Indian private international law that often sits in the background of transactional and disputes practice but can decisively shape outcomes: the continued presence of révision au fond in India’s law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (REFJ).

For practitioners, the issue is not merely doctrinal. It concerns the enforceability of outcomes and, therefore, how disputes should be structured at the drafting stage.

Under Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, Indian courts are formally empowered to refuse enforcement where a foreign judgment is not “on the merits.” Read literally, this suggests a willingness to reassess the correctness of the decision. In most jurisdictions today, that approach has been abandoned. Refusal of enforcement is typically confined to procedural defects: jurisdiction, fraud, natural justice, or public policy, not the substance of the decision.

In practice, Indian courts have taken a far more restrained approach. They do not reopen the correctness of the foreign judgment. Instead, they ask whether the decision reflects a genuine adjudication: was there evidence, was there a real opportunity to be heard, and is the decision reasoned? In effect, what appears to be révision au fond operates as a proxy for natural justice.

The difficulty lies in how this framework is perceived externally. Courts in jurisdictions that condition enforcement on reciprocity or substantially similar standards, such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and, increasingly, China, do not necessarily engage with the nuances of Indian case law. The statutory text continues to signal that India permits merits review. That signal alone may be sufficient to deny enforcement of Indian judgments abroad.

This gap between doctrine and practice creates a set of risks that practitioners should factor into both litigation strategy and transactional drafting.

First, forum selection cannot be approached in isolation from enforcement.
Where assets are likely to be located outside India, the portability of an Indian judgment becomes a central concern. If enforcement is anticipated in reciprocity-based jurisdictions, the choice of an Indian court may introduce avoidable uncertainty.

Second, arbitration retains a structural advantage in this context.
India’s alignment with the New York Convention and the prohibition on merits review in the enforcement of arbitral awards offers a level of predictability that litigation currently does not. Where enforcement abroad is critical, arbitration may continue to be the safer route.

Third, dispute resolution clauses should be drafted with enforcement geography in mind.
This may involve:

• Selecting a forum whose judgments are more readily enforceable in the jurisdictions where assets are located
• Considering hybrid approaches, such as arbitration with carefully chosen seats
• Avoiding assumptions that a favourable judgment in one jurisdiction will translate into effective recovery elsewhere

Fourth, expectations around default and summary judgments should be managed carefully.
Indian courts place emphasis on whether the judgment reflects a substantive evaluation of the dispute. Orders that appear purely formal or insufficiently reasoned may face resistance in India, and this in turn feeds into how Indian judgments are assessed abroad.

The broader point is that India’s REFJ framework is not out of step in practice, but it appears to be so in form. Until that dissonance is addressed, whether through legislative clarification or greater international alignment, the enforceability of Indian judgments will continue to depend as much on perception as on doctrine. The article is available open-access here.

This post is written by Dr. Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar LLM(LSE) PhD(Navarra), Associate Professor School of Law KIMEP

Introduction

In May 2026, the Court of First Instance of the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) recognised and enforced a Swiss ICC arbitral award rendered in favour of Naftogaz against Gazprom. The award arose out of the disputes between the parties concerning the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine after the start of the war.

The decision was followed by public comments from Kazakhstan’s Minister of Justice. According to press reports, the Minister stated that the award would not be enforced in Kazakhstan because neither Gazprom nor Naftogaz were participants in the AIFC and because the dispute had no connection to the Centre. He further suggested that the AIFC should not become a “transit platform” for the enforcement of foreign decisions unrelated to its activities.

The controversy raises an interesting private international law question that extends well beyond the particular dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz. Can the AIFC Court function as a conduit jurisdiction for the recognition of foreign arbitral awards and their subsequent enforcement in Kazakhstan, i.e. outside the AIFC?

The Jurisdictional Problem

The AIFC occupies a unique constitutional position. Established in 2018, it operates under a separate common-law framework within Kazakhstan and possesses its own court system staffed by international judges. Article 13(2) of the AIFC Constitutional Statute on the AIFC expressly provides that the AIFC Court is not part of the judicial system of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The difficulty is that the Constitutional Statute does not expressly address whether the AIFC Court may recognise foreign arbitral awards that have no connection to the Centre.

The Court relied principally on Article 45(1) of the AIFC Arbitration Regulations, which provides that: “An arbitral award, irrespective of the State or jurisdiction in which it was made, shall be recognised as binding within the AIFC.” The Court also relied on Article 40(3) of the AIFC Court Regulations, which refers to the enforcement of “other judgments and arbitration awards”.

Whether these provisions actually confer jurisdiction to recognise foreign arbitral awards remains debatable. The AIFC Constitutional Statute itself is largely silent on the matter. The dispute therefore raises a classic question of institutional competence: can jurisdiction be inferred from subordinate regulations where the constitutional instrument neither expressly grants nor expressly excludes it?

The New York Convention Argument

One possible justification for the Court’s approach lies in Kazakhstan’s obligations under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958.

The AIFC is located within the territory of Kazakhstan. Under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties bind the entire territory of a state unless a contrary intention appears. Nothing in Kazakhstan’s ratification of the New York Convention suggests that the Convention does not apply within the territory of the AIFC.

Article III of the Convention requires contracting states to recognise foreign arbitral awards. However, the Convention itself does not allocate jurisdiction among domestic courts. It does not specify whether recognition must be sought before an ordinary state court, a specialised commercial court or a court located within a financial centre. It may therefore be argued that once Kazakhstan created the AIFC Court and granted it powers relating to arbitration, the Court became one of the institutions through which Kazakhstan fulfils its Convention obligations.

The contrary argument is equally plausible. Kazakhstan may comply fully with the Convention while reserving recognition proceedings to its ordinary courts. The Convention requires recognition; it does not dictate which court must provide it.

An Exequatur of an Exequatur?

The dispute also raises a more traditional private international law concern.

If a Swiss arbitral award is recognised by the AIFC Court and the resulting AIFC judgment is then enforced elsewhere in Kazakhstan, one might ask whether this effectively amounts to an “exequatur of an exequatur”. Scholars have long expressed reservations about attempts to circulate recognition judgments relating to arbitral awards. Such practices may circumvent the grounds for refusal contained in Article V of the New York Convention by converting an arbitral award into a court judgment before seeking enforcement elsewhere.

Whether that objection applies here depends in part on how one characterises the relationship between the AIFC and Kazakhstan. Although the AIFC forms part of Kazakhstan’s territory, it possesses a distinct legal system and separate courts. Therefore it is, properly speaking “another jurisdiction”, if not another state.

Lessons from Dubai and Abu Dhabi

The most illuminating comparison comes from the Gulf financial centres, which the AIFC openly tries to emulate.

The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts have long been associated with the concept of a conduit jurisdiction. Under the DIFC framework, parties have sought recognition of foreign judgments and arbitral awards before the DIFC Courts even where neither the parties nor the dispute had any connection to the DIFC. Once recognised, the resulting DIFC judgment could potentially be enforced through the ordinary Dubai courts.

The leading authorities include X1 and X2 v Y1 and Y2 and Banyan Tree Corporate Pte Ltd v Meydan Group LLC. In both cases, the DIFC Courts adopted a broad understanding of their recognition jurisdiction.

The Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) followed a different path. Following legislative reforms in 2020, it became clear that the ADGM Courts could not be used as a conduit jurisdiction for the recognition of foreign judgments and arbitral awards. Abu Dhabi thus deliberately rejected a model that Dubai had largely embraced.

The AIFC now appears to stand somewhere between these two approaches. Unlike the DIFC legislation, the AIFC framework contains no clear statement granting recognition jurisdiction over foreign arbitral awards irrespective of any connection to the Centre. Unlike the ADGM legislation, however, it contains no express prohibition.

Conclusions

The Minister’s remarks announcing that the AIFC Court judgement would not be enforced in Kazakhstan may be understood as reflecting a legitimate policy concern: whether an international financial-centre court should be used to bypass ordinary domestic recognition procedures. Yet, they also concern a matter that is arguably for the courts themselves to determine. The Constitutional Statute repeatedly emphasises the independence of the AIFC Court and grants it exclusive authority to interpret AIFC law.

The broader issue therefore concerns institutional design rather than merely arbitration enforcement. If Kazakhstan does not wish the AIFC Court to function as a conduit jurisdiction, the appropriate solution may be legislative clarification. Conversely, if the AIFC is intended to replicate aspects of the DIFC model, greater certainty regarding its recognition jurisdiction would be desirable.

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, which has been enacted by every U.S. state, discourages forum shopping in child custody disputes by assigning subject-matter jurisdiction to the court located in the “home state” of the child. In Allen v. Allen, decided on April 21, 2026, the Montana Supreme Court had to determine whether the child’s “home state” was Montana or the Netherlands. This case shines an important spotlight on the importance of timing in international child custody disputes. The left-behind parent’s likelihood of success is strongly correlated with how quickly her or she acts to vindicate their legal rights.

Facts

Jonathan Edward Allen (Father) and Petronella Gerline (Van Oosterom) Allen (Mother) were married in Colorado in 2009. Father is a United States citizen. Mother is a dual citizen of the United States and the Netherlands. Their child (R.A.A.) was born in 2015. In 2020, the family moved from Colorado to Montana.

In August 2023, after Father and Mother began having marital difficulties, Mother and R.A.A. relocated to the Netherlands. In February 2024, Mother filed a petition for divorce and custody with the District Court of Central Netherlands (Netherlands District Court).

In January 2025, Father filed a petition with the District Court of The Hague seeking the return of R.A.A. pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. This petition was denied. Although the court held that R.A.A. had been wrongfully removed from the United States, the court reasoned that the one-year automatic return period had passed and that R.A.A. had become settled in her new environment in the Netherlands. This decision was affirmed on appeal.

In September 2025, Father filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Custody and Petition for Permanent Parenting Plan in Montana state court. That court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, it held that it lacked the power to adjudicate the dispute because Montana was no longer the “home state” of R.A.A. Father, acting pro se, appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.

Analysis

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) assigns exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to courts located in the child’s “home state” when it comes to matters relating to child custody. The “home state” is “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” The UCCJEA specifically provides that courts “shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States” for purposes of resolving these disputes.

On the facts presented in Allen v. Allen, the Montana Supreme Court correctly held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Father’s emergency motion. Mother and R.A.A. relocated to the Netherlands in August 2023. Six months later—in February 2024—R.A.A.’s home state shifted to the Netherlands. The Dutch courts—not the Montana courts—now had exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve custody disputes involving R.A.A. Father did not file his motion in Montana until September 2025, which was nineteen months too late.

Conclusion

If Father had filed his suit in Montana before February 2024, he could have shown that Montana was R.A.A.’s “home state” because she had not yet resided in the Netherlands for six months. The suit was, however, not filed until September 2025.

If Father had filed suit in the Netherlands before August 2024, he could have argued that R.A.A. should be returned to the United States pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction because R.A.A. had not yet resided in the Netherlands for a year. The suit was, however, not filed until January 2025.

The takeaway of Allen v. Allen is the need for speed in international child custody cases. The timelines baked into the relevant laws and treaties mandate that the left-behind parent move quickly to assert their rights. If they are slow off the mark, they be forced to litigate in foreign courts under less favorable legal rules.