Conflictoflaws

by Dr Georgia Antonopoulou (University of Birmingham) and Dr Ekaterina Pannebakker (Leiden University)

On 14 May 2026, the roundtable Bridging Jurisdictions: Rethinking Commercial Conflicts of Laws 10 Years After Brexit will take place at the University of Birmingham, in the UK. This roundtable will focus on highlighting cooperation opportunities in commercial conflicts of laws between the United Kingdom and the EU in light of current developments including jurisdictional competition, digitisation, sustainability, and international sanctions. The roundtable will feature policymakers and internationally renowned scholars.

We invite submissions of draft articles from researchers and academics, especially at their early stages of their careers, on private international law in the aftermath of the Brexit. The applications should be in English. Kindly email your application to Dr E. Pannebakker (e.s.pannebakker@law.leidenuniv.nl) and Dr G. Antonopoulou (g.antonopoulou@bham.ac.uk). The submissions should include:

• an abstract (max. 200 words);
• a draft or a detailed outline of the contribution (max. 5,000 words);
• a bio/curriculum vitae of the author (max. 2 pages long).

The deadline for submission is 1 February 2026. The selected participants will be notified by the end of February 2026.

During the roundtable, the selected participants will give a presentation of their articles and then receive feedback. Accepted papers will be considered for publication in an edited special journal issue in an international review. The roundtable will cover reasonable costs of travel, accommodation, and meals for the selected participants.

Possible topics include:

• Jurisdictional competition including arbitration and international commercial courts;
• PIL in the United Kingdom post-Brexit;
• The impact of digitisation on private international law (applicable law and/or jurisdiction);
• Sustainability and private international law;
• The impact of trade sanctions on private international law.

We particularly welcome applications from underrepresented groups. Special consideration will be given to female participants vested with childcare and/or other domestic responsibilities.

This project has received funding from the Birmingham – Leiden universities Strategic Collaboration Fund.

We are looking forward to receiving your application!

         

The next session of the conference series European Dialogue on Civil Procedural Law will take place (online) on Thursday, 4 December 2025, from 13:00 to 17:00 (CET), under the theme “Recent Developments on Brussels Ibis”.

The event is organised by Dr. habil. Balázs Arató, PhD, Prof. Dr. Thomas Garber, Prof. Dr. Katharina Lugani and Prof. Dr. Matthias Neumayr.

The Brussels I bis Regulation, together with its parallel instrument, the Lugano Convention, forms the core of European civil procedure law. Events in this series serve to promote dialogue among Member States and with third countries, thereby strengthening and improving the integration and efficiency of European legal instruments. The interim online conference on 4 December 2025 will feature country reports from four legal systems and two presentations on current topics relating to the Brussels Ia Regulation. The event is aimed at academics and practitioners alike. We look forward to a lively exchange.

The speakers are :

• Dr. habil. Balázs Arató, PhD, Budapest, Hungary
• Dr. Caterina Benini, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy
• Assoc.-Prof. Dr. Eva Dobrovolná, Ph.D., LL.M., Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
• Prof. Dr. Étienne Farnoux, University of Strasbourg, France, seconded to the Saint Joseph University of Beirut, Lebanon
• Prof. Dr. Thomas Garber, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria
• Prof. Dr. Katharina Lugani, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Germany
• Prof. Dr. Robert Magnus, University of Bayreuth, Germany
• Assoc.-Prof. Dr. Martina Melcher, M.Jur, University of Graz, Austria
• Prof. Dr. Matthias Neumayr, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria
• Prof. Dr. Anna Nylund, University of Bergen, Norway

The flyer for the event can be found here.

Please register here.

Participation is free of charge.

HCCH Monthly Update: November 2025

 

Conventions & Instruments

On 5 November 2025, Algeria deposited its instrument of accession to the 1961 Apostille Convention. With the ratification of Argentina, the Convention now has 58 Contracting Parties. With the accession of Algeria, the 1961 Apostille Convention now has 128 Contracting Parties. It will enter into force for Algeria on 9 July 2026. More information is available here.

On 27 November 2025, Monaco deposited its instrument of accession to the 2005 Choice of Court Convention. With the accession of Monaco, 38 States and the European Union are bound by the 2005 Choice of Court Convention. The Convention will enter into force for Monaco on 1 March 2026. More information is available here.

 

Meetings & Events

From 10 to 14 November 2025, the Working Group (WG) on Parentage / Surrogacy met for the fifth time. Pursuant to its mandate, the WG continued its consideration of draft provisions for one new instrument on legal parentage generally, including legal parentage following an international surrogacy arrangement, and finalised its report for the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the HCCH. More information is available here.

From 11 to 14 November 2025, the Permanent Bureau (PB) of the HCCH organised a series of events at COP30 in Brazil, partnering with the Latin American Climate Lawyers Initiative for Mobilizing Action and the Ministério Público Federal of Brazil. More information is available here.

From 18 to 20 November 2025, the Experts’ Group (EG) on Digital Tokens met for the second time. Pursuant to its mandate, the EG made further progress on the study of the private international law issues raised by digital tokens. More information is available here.

On 20 November 2025, the PB of the HCCH hosted HCCH a|Bridged – Edition 2025, dedicated to the 2019 Judgments Convention. International experts convened to discuss the Convention’s potential impact and champion its wider adoption. More information is available here.

On 25 November 2025, the third meeting of the WG established to finalise the Model Forms pertaining to Chapter II of the 1970 Evidence Convention was held online, hosted by the PB of the HCCH. More information is available here.

On 26 November 2025, the Working Party on Cross-Border Family Mediation in the Context of the Malta Process met online. More information is available here.

 

Other Developments

The PB of the HCCH has launched a public consultation on the Draft Text of a possible new convention on parallel proceedings and related actions, to be held from 18 November 2025 to 26 January 2026. Experts, practitioners and judges from diverse legal traditions with experience in cross-border litigation and private international law more broadly are encouraged to participate in the consultation. More information is available here.

 

Upcoming Events

Registration is open for the book launch celebrating the publication of The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: A Commentary, to be held in hybrid format on 11 December 2025 from 1:30 p.m. to 4:45 p.m. (CET). More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

Bilkent University Faculty of Law and Jean Monnet Chair in Legal Aspects of Migration Management in the EU and in Türkiye cordially invite you to submit abstracts for the International Conference on Legal Aspects of Migration Management to be held at Bilkent University on 6-7 March 2026.

The Conference aims to give the opportunity to researchers who would like to present their theoretical or empirical research on the development of policy, legislative and administrative responses to key migration issues.

We particularly encourage submissions on the questions of evolution of the international legal regime relating to migration; the right of asylum and asylum procedures; border management; sustainability and migration; circular migration; protection of unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable groups; effects of digitalisation on migration; externalization of migration policies, recognition of personal status; migrants’ access to fundamental rights and durable solutions. Proposals involving comparative perspectives of international, European and national approaches are most welcome.

Abstracts (max. 500 words) (in English or in Turkish) should be sent to migration@bilkent.edu.tr by 5 January 2026.

Detailed information shall be provided upon request: migration@bilkent.edu.tr

 

Written by Dr. Zihao Fan (Peking University Law School)

On 14 November 2025, the annual survey Chronology of Practice: Chinese Practice in Private International Law in 2024 (“the 2024 Survey”) was published in the Chinese Journal of International Law (Oxford University Press, Vol. 24(4)). This survey continues the long-running series of yearly reports, now in its twelfth year since 2013, and it remains an indispensable resource documenting China’s development in private international law for an international audience. The Survey is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chinesejil/article/24/4/jmaf031/8321298?login=true

1. Content and Focus of the 2024 Survey

The 2024 Survey covers six areas: an overview, civil subjects, jurisdiction, choice of law, international judicial assistance, and international arbitration and judicial review. Its characteristics are as follows:

First, the Survey follows the structure of previous years, summarising original materials without providing commentary.

Second, it further streamlines case facts and extracts core viewpoints. It covers two revised laws, one treaty approved by the Chinese government, three new and three revised administrative regulations, three judicial interpretations, seven batches of Supreme People’s Court (SPC) case reports, forty-three directly relevant typical cases, one SPC Work Report, and other official information and media sources.

Third, it focuses on several key issues:

• Ascertainment of extraterritorial law. In recent years, China has not only established multiple ascertainment centres, but the SPC has also issued specialised judicial interpretations and typical cases. Local courts have introduced rules relating to the ascertainment of foreign law, and many local courts and foreign-law ascertainment centres have published dedicated reports. These achievements have placed China’s judicial practice in foreign-law ascertainment genuinely “at the forefront” internationally.
• Jurisdiction in anti-monopoly cases and the application of the appropriate-connection principle became focal points of Chinese private international law practice during the year.
• Choice of law in contracts. SPC Reply Regarding the Validity of an Agreement Entered into by a Hong Kong or Macao-Funded Enterprise Registered in the Mainland Part of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area to Choose the Law of Hong Kong or Macao as the Applicable Law for Contracts or to Designate Hong Kong or Macao as the Place of Arbitration represents a significant breakthrough: two Mainland parties may choose Hong Kong or Macau law and may designate Hong Kong or Macau as the place of arbitration.
• Judicial review of arbitration. The SPC selected fifteen typical cases concerning judicial review of arbitration, including cases supporting the further development of Hong Kong arbitration, which is of positive significance.

Fourth, the 2024 Survey also covers other matters, including representative offices of foreign enterprises and foreign law firms in China. Notably, provisions allowing for the extraterritorial application of Chinese law are becoming increasingly common, and the securities-law field witnessed the first case in which a court exercised jurisdiction based on such a provision.

1. Abstract of the 2024 Survey

The Survey provides the following abstract:

The 2024 survey of the Chinese practices in private international law highlights five aspects: First, in terms of legislative developments, two revised laws, three new and three revised administrative regulations, three judicial interpretations, were adopted. The Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) also issued seven groups of 43 typical cases. Additionally, China ratified the Agreement on Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in Civil or Commercial Matters with Saudi Arabia. Second, Chinese courts concluded substantial numbers of international cases: 26,000 foreign-related civil and commercial cases, 34,000 maritime cases and 18,000 commercial arbitration judicial review cases. Third, regarding jurisdiction, Chinese courts for the first time applied the appropriate connection approach under Article 276(2) of the Civil Procedure Law. In civil monopoly cases, both the SPC’s new judicial interpretation and selected cases confirmed that jurisdiction follows tort and contract rules. Fourth, regarding choice of law, foreign law ascertainment remains prominent, with Chinese courts demonstrating increased efforts to research and apply foreign laws through numerous reports, cases and rules. Finally, regarding arbitration, the SPC released six typical cases supporting the arbitration in Hong Kong and a Report on Judicial Review of Commercial Arbitration. In the Report, the SPC identified three cases involving public policy to illustrate the application scope while maintaining strict application standards.

III. Core Rationale of the Survey Series

Since 2013, the English-language annual Survey of Chinese private international law practice has centred on developments in Chinese private international law, reviewing both institutional developments and judicial practice. It covers conflict of laws, uniform substantive law, international civil procedure, international commercial arbitration, and international commercial mediation. This structure is common to all editions, though specific emphases vary each year.

Between 2013 and 2024, the series has addressed twelve SPC Work Reports, twenty-nine laws, thirteen administrative regulations, seventy-six judicial-interpretation-type documents, and 307 cases.

It is noteworthy that Chinese courts adjudicate more than 45,000 foreign-related civil, commercial and maritime cases each year. Most cases included in the Survey are selected by the team after extensive review of large numbers of judgments available on China Judgments Online and Peking University’s legal database, with the intention of identifying representative examples.

By providing original materials—including legislative and regulatory developments and case law—the series traces the evolution of China’s foreign-related civil and commercial legal system and judicial practice. The author aims to “tell the story of China’s foreign-related rule of law in an international language”, using a documentary style that enables domestic and international readers to appreciate China’s progress in this field.

Originally posted here Current Research in Private International Law at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg

• Date: Dec 5, 2025
• Time: 11:00 AM (Local Time Germany)
• Location: online

About the speaker
Béligh Elbalti is a Professor at the Graduate School of Law and Politics, Osaka University. He is the author of numerous academic publications, primarily in the field of private international law, including blog posts on conflictoflaws.net. His research focuses on the development of private international law at both the national and international levels, with particular emphasis on Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

About the Topic
In its general discourse, private international law (conflict of laws) is often presented as a discipline grounded in principles such as sovereignty, the equality of states, and comity. Its defining traits are said to flow from this premise of equality between legal orders, including its claim to neutrality, its pursuit of international harmony in cross-border cases, and its role in coordinating diverse legal systems. However, it is striking that private international law developed in an international context marked by domination, inequality, and subordination, a context that challenged the very premises on which the discipline claimed to rest.

Within this broader context, private international law appears to have played a dual role. On the one hand, it served as an instrument of colonial domination, particularly by denying its foundational premises to legal systems not regarded as “civilized”. In these contexts, instead of applying the ordinary methods of private international law, alternative mechanisms were employed to manage foreignness, most notably through systems of extraterritoriality – whether in the form of consular jurisdiction, mixed courts, or foreign courts operating in colonized or semi-colonized territories. On the other hand, private international law also functioned as an instrument for restoring sovereignty and achieving independence. The abolition and dismantling of extraterritorial regimes required colonized and semi-colonized states to meet the substantive and institutional conditions considered necessary for recognition as a “civilized nation”. This included, among other reforms, the establishment of a functioning system of private international law, alongside the adoption of substantive and procedural legal frameworks that guaranteed equal rights and protection for foreigners.

About the Virtual Workshop Series
The virtual workshop series “Current Research in Private International Law” is organised by Ralf Michaels and Philomena Hindermann. The series features guest speakers and Institute staff members who present and discuss their work on current developments and research topics in private international law. The workshops are geared to scholars who are researching in the field of private international law, but attendance is open to all individuals having an academic interest (including doctoral candidates and students).

The virtual lecture will be held as a video conference via Zoom. Please register no later than Thursday, 4 December 2025 using this LINK.

You will receive the login details on Thursday afternoon. If you do not receive an email containing the login data, please check your spam folder as well.

This Thursday, the University of Augsburg will be hosting a talk

by Yuko Nishitani (University of Kyoto)

on Colonialism and (International) Family Law from a Japanese Perspektive
(Kolonialismus und Familienrecht aus japanischer Sicht)

27 November 2025, 12pm noon GMT
(= 1pm in Germany / 9pm in Japan)

The talk will be given in German, followed by a discussion.
Everyone interested is warmly invited to join via this Zoom link.

An international conference focusing on the EU Succession Regulation (“EU Succession Regulation: A Decade in Application”) will take place in Warsaw on December 9, 2025. Hosted by the Institute of Justice in Warsaw, the event will comprehensively assess the first decade of the Regulation’s application, highlighting its impact and future challenges.

Organised by Professor Piotr Rylski and Professor Bartosz Wolodkiewicz, the conference will bring together representative of legal professions and scholars from various parts of European Union, to discuss key aspects of the Regulation.

The morning session will feature a roundtable addressing the achievements and future challenges in the application of the EU Succession Regulation. Participants in the roundtable include, among others, Professor Andrea Bonomi (University of Lausanne), Professor Maciej Zachariasiewicz (Kozminski University, Poland), and Dr. iur. Marcin Margonski (Notary in Krapkowice, Poland).

The subsequent panels will feature Professor Anatol Dutta (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) and Professor Louis Perreau Saussine (Paris Dauphine University – PSL), who will discuss the scope and interplay of the EU Succession Regulation with other instruments and international conventions.

The application of jurisdiction rules will be discussed by, inter alia, Professor Jacopo Re and Professor Lenka Válková from the University of Milan.

The panel dedicated to applicable law will feature a presentation delivered by Professor Jens Kleinschmidt (Trier University), followed by a commentary by Dr. Anna Wysocka-Bar (Jagiellonian University in Kraków).

The conference will conclude with a panel on recognition, enforcement, and the European Certificate of Succession, featuring inter alia Alice Perscha (Civil Law Notary in Leoben, Austria) and Professor Bartosz Wolodkiewicz (University of Warsaw).

More information, including the conference program, can be found here.

Live broadcast of the event (without registration) will be available at the main page of the Institute.

Participation in person (free-of-charge) for a limited number of interested guests is also possible. Please register by contacting the Institute at: konferencje@iws.gov.pl

A new book Legal Challenges of China’s One Belt One Road Initative: Private International Law Considerations edited by Dr Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit and Dr Sai Ramani Garimella has now been released by Routledge.

This book is a sequel to the book China’s One Belt One Road Initiative and Private International Law which was published by Routledge in 2018.

Here is the publisher’s blurb:

“This book covers new legal developments of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) project and assesses how litigation may be organised to enforce and compensate for defaults for its related initiatives.

This book is structured into five themes, consisting of essays which assess the decade of BRI’s existence in the context of international economic engagement and the rule of law, private international law, dispute resolution mechanisms – including mediation and judgment mobility. The chapters in the book strike new ground and cover recent developments such as the establishment of China’s International Commercial Court, engagements in multiple Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) construction and investment projects.

The book will be of interest to researchers, academics, policymakers and students interested in private international law issues pertaining to the OBOR routes as well as private international law in general, Asian studies and the politics of international trade”.

The table of contents and contributors include:

Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit and Sai Ramani Garimella: Current Developments of the One Belt One Road Project and the Emerging Private International Law Issues

Dilini Pathirana: Sri Lanka’s Loan Agreements with China under the BRI: A Reflection of Selected Infrastructure Project-Related Loans

Atul Alexander: China and Foreign State Immunity Law: Legal Implications on State-Owned Entities

Mark McLaughlin: Global Standards, Local Realities: An Analysis of Singapore Convention on Mediation in the Context of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

Zhengxin Huo: China’s International Commercial Court and Their Operation

Beligh Elbalti: Choice of Law in Contracts and Foreign Law before MENA Arab Courts from the Perspective of Belt and Road Initiative

Anna Wysocka-Bar: Circulation of Judgments Between EU Member States and China: A Path Through Complicated Framework Examined on the Example of Poland

Nobumichi Teramura: Recognition and Enforcement of Chinese judgments in Cambodia: Uncertain Foundations of the Rigid Reciprocity Standard in Cambodian Law

Jie (Jeanne) Huang: Recognition and Enforcement of Chinese Judicially Confirmed Mediation Decisions Abroad: The Challenges of Finality

Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit: Private International Law Dimensions of Blockchain-Based Bills of Lading

Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit and Sai Ramani Garimella: Conclusion and Reflection

The book can be ordered directly from Routledge: https://www.routledge.com/Legal-Challenges-of-Chinas-One-Belt-One-Road-Initiative-Private-International-Law-Considerations/Sooksripaisarnkit-Garimella/p/book/9781032805733

Anyone can use the below discount code to obtain 20% discount (available until 31st March 2026:

The editors are in the process of planning a book launch event (online). Currently, it is scheduled on 26th January 2026 between 8:00 -9:00 p.m (Australian Eastern Daylight Time). Further details will be announced once the full programme of event is available.

 

 

This week, the Australasian Association of Private International Law (AAPrIL) is co-hosting a free online seminar on ‘Jurisdiction Agreements in International Family Litigation’, to be presented by Professor Mary Keyes of Griffith University.

The seminar will be held online and in-person at UniSQ, Toowoomba, Queensland.  The details are:

Online (Zoom): Wednesday 26 November 2025, 12.30 to 1.30pm AEST.* 

In-person: Wednesday 26 November 2025, 12.30 to 1.30pm AEST, Wonderley & Hall Moot Court, Room Q420, Toowoomba Campus, University of Southern Queensland.

Please register by the details in the attached flyer:

Flyer_UniSQ and AAPrIL Seminar 2025-4

*Note the times given are in Australian Eastern Standard Time (UTC+10).

This note was kindly prepared by Dr. Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit.

 

A new book Legal Challenges of China’s One Belt One Road Initative: Private International Law Considerations edited by Dr Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit and Dr Sai Ramani Garimella has now been released by Routledge.

This book is a sequel to the book China’s One Belt One Road Initiative and Private International Law which was published by Routledge in 2018.

Here is the publisher’s blurb:

“This book covers new legal developments of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) project and assesses how litigation may be organised to enforce and compensate for defaults for its related initiatives.

This book is structured into five themes, consisting of essays which assess the decade of BRI’s existence in the context of international economic engagement and the rule of law, private international law, dispute resolution mechanisms – including mediation and judgment mobility. The chapters in the book strike new ground and cover recent developments such as the establishment of China’s International Commercial Court, engagements in multiple Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) construction and investment projects.

The book will be of interest to researchers, academics, policymakers and students interested in private international law issues pertaining to the OBOR routes as well as private international law in general, Asian studies and the politics of international trade”.

 

The table of contents and contributors include:

 

Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit and Sai Ramani Garimella: Current Developments of the One Belt One Road Project and the Emerging Private International Law Issues

Dilini Pathirana: Sri Lanka’s Loan Agreements with China under the BRI: A Reflection of Selected Infrastructure Project-Related Loans

Atul Alexander: China and Foreign State Immunity Law: Legal Implications on State-Owned Entities

Mark McLaughlin: Global Standards, Local Realities: An Analysis of Singapore Convention on Mediation in the Context of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

Zhengxin Huo: China’s International Commercial Court and Their Operation

Beligh Elbalti: Choice of Law in Contracts and Foreign Law before MENA Arab Courts from the Perspective of Belt and Road Initiative

Anna Wysocka-Bar: Circulation of Judgments Between EU Member States and China: A Path Through Complicated Framework Examined on the Example of Poland

Nobumichi Teramura: Recognition and Enforcement of Chinese judgments in Cambodia: Uncertain Foundations of the Rigid Reciprocity Standard in Cambodian Law

Jie (Jeanne) Huang: Recognition and Enforcement of Chinese Judicially Confirmed Mediation Decisions Abroad: The Challenges of Finality

Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit: Private International Law Dimensions of Blockchain-Based Bills of Lading

Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit and Sai Ramani Garimella: Conclusion and Reflection

 

The book can be ordered directly from Routledge: https://www.routledge.com/Legal-Challenges-of-Chinas-One-Belt-One-Road-Initiative-Private-International-Law-Considerations/Sooksripaisarnkit-Garimella/p/book/9781032805733

 

Anyone can use the below discount code to obtain 20% discount (available until 31st March 2026:

The editors are in the process of planning a book launch event (online). Currently, it is scheduled on 26th January 2026 between 8:00 -9:00 p.m (Australian Eastern Daylight Time). Further details will be announced once the full programme of event is available.

Written by Nicolás Preus Miranda, student at Universidad Carlos III in Getafe, Spain, specializing in maritime, international law and international commercial arbitration

The decision in Kairos Shipping II LLC v Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS [2025] EWCA Civ 1227 represents a pivotal clarification in the interpretation of repossession clauses within standard-form bareboat charterparties, particularly under the BIMCO Barecon 2001 framework. Arising from a dispute over the early termination of a charter for a 49,708 DeadWeight Tonnage (DWT) chemical/oil tanker, the case underscores the English courts’ commitment to contextual and purposive contract interpretation, balancing textual fidelity with commercial practicality. This analysis expands on the case’s significance, the interpretive principles it embodies, and its ultimate resolution, drawing from judicial reasoning and industry commentary.[1]

Why This Case Matters

In the realm of maritime law, where standard-form contracts like BIMCO Barecon 2001 are ubiquitous, this ruling matters profoundly because it clarifies how courts interpret seemingly simple phrases such as “port or place convenient to them” in clause 29, which governs vessel repossession following early termination. Bareboat charters, by their nature, grant charterers full operational control akin to ownership during the charter period, but termination (often due to events like insolvency under clause 28(d)) shifts the dynamic dramatically.

 

 

Upon termination, the vessel becomes uninsured and unmaintained by the charterers, who assume the role of gratuitous bailees, bearing risks and costs until repossession. The case arose when charterers terminated the agreement in May 2021 after the owners’ guarantor’s insolvency, offering repossession at the vessel’s current port in Stockton, California. The owners’ insistence on sailing to Trogir, Croatia (a 37–45-day voyage costing around US$500,000) highlighted the potential for abuse if such phrases were read broadly.[2][3][4]

This interpretation dispute illustrates broader implications for the shipping industry. Standard forms like Barecon 2001 are designed for efficiency and predictability in global trade, yet ambiguous language can lead to costly litigation. The decision reinforces that courts will not permit interpretations that impose unrecoupable burdens on charterers, especially in insolvency contexts where recovery from owners may be impossible. Commentators note that it aligns with principles from cases like China Pacific on unrecoupable costs and Capital Finance Co v Bray on minimal bailee duties, emphasizing that gratuitous bailees are not obligated to undertake extensive actions like long voyages unless explicitly required. For owners, it strengthens their repossession rights but tempers them with timeliness obligations, per BIMCO’s explanatory notes.

Practically, the case could influence future drafting by encouraging more precise language around repossession locations and obligations, potentially prompting BIMCO to amend forms for greater clarity. In an industry reliant on international arbitration and English law, this precedent promotes fairness, reduces standoffs like the one leading to the vessel’s arrest in Gibraltar, and minimizes economic disruptions in termination scenarios. It also serves as a cautionary tale on the risks of over-relying on “convenience” clauses without considering commercial imperatives, potentially affecting negotiations in bareboat, time, and voyage charters alike.

 

 

Principle of Contract Interpretation Illustrated

At its core, this case illustrates the orthodox principles of English contract interpretation as articulated in Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36 and Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24, which advocate an iterative process starting with the natural and ordinary meaning of words but integrating the full documentary, factual, and commercial context. The Court of Appeal, led by Lord Justice Phillips, emphasized that ambiguous or opaque provisions (like clause 29’s reference to “a port or place convenient to them“) must be construed holistically to avoid textual absurdities, such as rendering “current or next port of call” superfluous. This approach rejects isolated literalism, instead checking interpretations against the contract’s purpose and commercial consequences.[5]

In applying these principles, the courts treated clauses 28 and 29 as a self-contained regime for termination and repossession, applicable neutrally to defaults by either party. The obligation to board “as soon as reasonably practicable” was seen as integral, curtailing the owners’ repossession right to ensure prompt relief for charterers from their bailee burdens. Commercial common sense played a key role: an unfettered owner choice could prolong charterer exposure to risks and costs, especially unrecoverable in insolvency, which was deemed contrary to reasonable party intentions. The High Court and Court of Appeal avoided rewriting the contract but departed from the tribunal’s broader reading, which ignored these contextual imperatives.[6]

This method echoes Arnold’s warning against departing from natural meaning without justification and Wood’s call to balance text with context. It demonstrates how courts resolve ambiguity by favoring constructions that promote business efficacy, such as swift repossession, over those creating “highly prejudicial” outcomes. For standard forms, it highlights that even industry-drafted clauses are subject to rigorous scrutiny, encouraging drafters to anticipate contextual applications.[7]

 

 

Bottom-Line Outcome

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the owners’ appeal on 7 October 2025[8], endorsing the High Court’s reversal of the arbitral tribunal’s award and holding that owners must repossess at the vessel’s current port unless impracticable or impossible. Specifically, clause 29 requires owners to arrange boarding “as soon as reasonably practicable,” making the current port (Stockton) the default, with “convenient to them” as a contingency only if needed for prompt action[9], e.g., diverting a vessel at sea to a nearby port. The owners’ demand for Trogir breached this, as Stockton was accessible, safer, and cheaper, per uncontested facts. No broad implied duty was placed on charterers to sail distant voyages, limiting their bailee role to minimal care. The award was remitted for reconsideration, with charterers entitled to expenses from the standoff, affirming the need for efficiency in maritime terminations.[10]

This outcome not only resolved the US$2.19 million claim but sets a benchmark for interpreting repossession clauses, prioritizing practicality over unilateral convenience.

 

 

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arose under a bareboat charter dated 11 February 2013 (BIMCO Barecon 2001)[11] between Brodotrogir DOO (“BDOO”), as original owner, and Songa Shipping Pte Ltd (charterer) for a chemical/oil tanker (49,708 DWT) to be built. By novation on 17 December 2013, Kairos Shipping II LLC (a Marshall Islands SPV of BDOO) became owner and Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS (affiliated with Songa Group) became charterer, with BDOO guaranteeing Kairos’s obligations. The vessel was delivered on 23 December 2016[12][13].

Under clause 28(d) of the charter (insolvency of a party), the charterers were entitled to terminate with immediate effect.[14] On 16 October 2020 a Restructuring Plan in respect of BDOO was confirmed in Croatia. In May 2021 the charterers purported to terminate the charter under cl.28(d), notifying the owners they would repossess the vessel, then in Stockton, California, “as soon as…practicable” (the vessel’s current port of call). The owners refused to take repossession in Stockton, insisting instead that the vessel be sailed to Trogir, Croatia (their yard and home port). After a standoff, the charterers began the voyage under protest on 16 August 2021. The vessel was arrested in Gibraltar after 37 days at sea (20 September 2021), and the owners ultimately took physical possession on 7 January 2022[15], providing security as required by the Gibraltar court.

 

 

The charterers then commenced LMAA (London Maritime Arbitrators Association) arbitration on 13 January 2022, claiming USD 2,190,277.81 in expenses for crewing and operating the vessel from 14 May 2021 (Stockton) until the repossession, on the basis that the owners breached clause 29 by not taking possession “as soon as reasonably practicable” at Stockton.

The owners denied the termination and counterclaimed lost hire but admitted for present purposes that if terminated by cl.28(d) then charterers were entitled to expenses incurred in sailing to Gibraltar (and therefore downplayed costs of anchoring in Mexico). A 26 March 2024 Partial Final Award[16] held that the charterparty was validly terminated on 14 May 2021[17] and that clause 29 entitled the owners to insist on repossession in Trogir as a “place…convenient to them”.

The charterers challenged that award in the Commercial Court as a point of law under s.69 Arbitration Act 1996[18]. On 13 December 2024 HHJ Pelling KC (Commercial Court, QBD)[19] allowed the charterers’ appeal, holding that clause 29 required the owners to repossess “as soon as reasonably practicable” – meaning at Stockton (the vessel’s current port) unless impracticable. The owners (Kairos) obtained permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. On 7 October 2025[20] the Court of Appeal (Phillips LJ, Nugee and King LJJ)[21] dismissed the appeal, endorsing the High Court’s interpretation.

 

 

Clause 29 and the Interpretative Dispute

Clause 29 of the Barecon 2001[22] charter governs the process of repossession after early termination. In the events of clauses 28(a)–(d)[23] (default or insolvency) it provides (emphasis added):

“…the Owners shall have the right to repossess the Vessel from the Charterers at her current or next port of call, or at a port or place convenient to them without hindrance or interference by the Charterers… Pending physical repossession…the Charterers shall hold the vessel as gratuitous bailee only to the Owners. The Owners shall arrange for an authorised representative to board the vessel as soon as reasonably practicable following the termination… The Vessel shall be deemed to be repossessed… upon [boarding] by the Owners’ representative… All …wages, disembarkation and repatriation of the charterers’ Master, officers and crew shall be the sole responsibility of the Charterers.”.

The dispute centred on the words “a port or place convenient to them.” The charterers argued that clause 29 requires owners to repossess at the first opportunity (the vessel’s current port, or if at sea its next scheduled port) unless those are unsuitable, in which event the vessel can be diverted only to a convenient port to facilitate immediate repossession. The owners contended that the clause expressly allows them to elect any port that is “convenient to them” (i.e. objectively convenient), so long as the choice is not irrational, even if this means a long voyage. Under the owners’ interpretation, they could require the charterers (as unpaid bailees) to take the vessel to any distant port convenient to the owners (subject only to reasonableness) and then repossess. In this case, they asserted that Trogir (their yard in Croatia) was “convenient”, whereas the charterers said the trip to Trogir (37–45 days, ~$500,000) made Stockton the only practicable repossession point, therefore by the interpretation of the clause 29[24] by the charterer, Croatia is not a reasonable point to repossess the vessel.

 

 

The Arbitral Award

The LMAA tribunal sided with the owners on construction. The Tribunal held that clause 29 gave owners a right (but not a duty) to repossess at the vessel’s current port, the next port, or at a place convenient to them. It treated “convenient” in its natural and ordinary sense, meaning any location that objectively suited the owners’ purpose of repossession. An owner’s choice would be set aside only if irrational or arbitrary. The tribunal read clause 29 as granting owners a menu of locations, and “convenient to them” was a distinct option chosen by owners for their purposes.[25]

Critically, the tribunal held that the owners’ obligation to board “as soon as reasonably practicable” did not override the choice of location. It rejected the notion that the immediate repossession duty confined owners to the current port. Convenience of a place was to be judged “objectively against the parties’ express intention that the vessel be repossessed as soon as reasonably practicable”. The tribunal emphasised that timing (the period to arrange boarding) is relevant to whether a place is “convenient” for prompt repossession, but it did not make practicability a separate obligation overriding location choice.

In short, the owners had the option of choosing Trogir and still had to board “as soon as practicable” once there; it was not that they had to repossess at Stockton just because it was closer.[26]

Applying this to the facts, the Tribunal found that while the transatlantic voyage to Trogir would cost ~$500,000 and take about 45 days, owners (using a ship-management company) could probably have taken longer even to crew and board at Stockton. In the absence of evidence on how quickly a crew or representative could be flown to Stockton and given that the owners had a yard and personnel in Trogir (where their principal was insolvent), the tribunal found Trogir was nonetheless “objectively convenient”. It concluded it would not have been reasonably practicable to repossess at Stockton on 14 May 2021, and so clause 29 entitled owners to insist on Trogir. The owners’ choice was therefore upheld in the award.[27]

 

 

Commercial Court (HHJ Pelling KC) Judgment [2024] EWHC 3452 (Comm)

The High Court reversed the tribunal. HHJ Pelling analysed clause 29 against the commercial background of a bareboat charter.[28] He noted that on termination under cl.28 the vessel becomes uninsured and without crew support from charterers, placing charterers in the position of gratuitous bailees to owners. It is therefore critical that the owners take physical repossession promptly to relieve charterers of this risk and cost. Repossession at the vessel’s current port achieves that imperative[29]; requiring a longer unpaid voyage would prolong the charterers’ burden, possibly unrecoverable if the owner is insolvent (citing China Pacific) [30] [31].

Pelling J held that the natural reading of clause 29 must be considered in context. He observed that if owners had an unfettered right to choose any convenient port, the words “current or next port” would be superfluous[32]. Those phrases must be read as referring to the vessel’s actual location (in port at termination, or its next port if at sea).

The judge rejected the owners’ argument that the first sentence of cl.29 purely allocates location and the third sentence addresses timing (board as soon as practicable).[33] Instead, he read the clause holistically: the first sentence gives a right to repossess and the third imposes the corresponding obligation to board promptly. He explained: “the right to repossess… in the first sentence should be read in the light of… the obligation… to place a representative on board as soon as reasonably practicable”. [34]

 

 

Crucially, Pelling J found that if the owners’ representative could have boarded the vessel at Stockton, then the owners could not nonetheless demand an additional prolonged voyage.[35] He wrote:

“If the owners’ representative was able to board the vessel at her “current port of call”, then it would not follow that the owner was entitled nonetheless to insist that the vessel be taken… to a place… where the voyage time… would take materially longer than if the owners’ representative had boarded at its original port… Concluding that an owner was entitled to act in this manner would mean ignoring the owner’s obligation to repossess… as soon as reasonably practicable.”.[36]

Pelling J saw that point as decisive. He concluded that the vessel had to be repossessed at Stockton (the current port) unless it was impossible or impractical to board there. The tribunal had in fact found it reasonably practicable to board at Stockton. The judge held as a matter of fact (uncontested on appeal) that boarding at Stockton would have been faster and cheaper than sailing to Trogir.[37] Because the owners insisted on Trogir for their own convenience (yard and crew there, or personal financial motives) rather than out of necessity, the owners had breached their obligation. On true construction, clause 29 “requires the [owners] to repossess the vessel by causing [their] representative to board… as soon as reasonably practicable”, and that duty could be performed in Stockton without unreasonable delay.[38]

 

 

Pelling J also explicitly applied established interpretation principles.[39] He noted that the meaning of clause 29 was “neither clear nor precise” in isolation, so he gave weight to context and purpose.[40] [41] The judge stressed that clause 29 was part of a self-contained code for termination under clause 28, and must be read to protect each party fairly in all default scenarios.[42] He cautioned against imposing any broad, implied obligation on charterers (as unpaid bailees) to sail the vessel to a far port absent necessity. Noting that a gratuitous bailee’s duty is generally only to make the bailed item available, he held that any duty to sail must be “strictly confined” to what is needed for repossession.[43] Imposing a broad duty on charterers to sail the vessel at their own cost to a distant port, where owners’ insolvent, was unnecessary and commercially problematic.[44] [45]

In summary, the High Court found in favour of the charterers (Songa). The owners’ wide interpretation was deemed to subvert the clause’s purpose: “it cannot have been the parties’ intention that the owner would [have] an unqualified entitlement to choose where to repossess”. Instead, the obligation to board “as soon as reasonably practicable” curtailed the owners’ rights to effectively the vessel’s current location. The claim was thus allowed, and the arbitral award set aside.[46]

 

 

Court of Appeal [2025] EWCA Civ 1227

The owners appealed to the Court of Appeal, but the judgment of Lord Justice Phillips (with King and Nugee LJJ concurring) largely affirmed HHJ Pelling’s reasoning. Phillips LJ reiterated that clause 29 must be read as a coherent scheme: owners get the right to repossess and simultaneously have a strict duty to repossess promptly, and charterers’ only role thereafter is unpaid caretakers. In context, a port convenient to the owners is a fallback if the vessel’s current or next port is not suitable for immediate repossession. [47] [48]

Phillips LJ held (para.45–50) that the clause was not drafted so as to give owners an unfettered right to nominate any port. The reference to “her current or next port” shows that the immediate repossession point is normally where the vessel actually is (or is about to be). He agreed with the judge that if the vessel is in port at termination, the phrase “current or next port” cannot sensibly be read as giving the owners the right to require sailing to the next port – on termination there is no “next” port and owners would have no say in where that was. Instead, it is consistent with repossession at the port where the vessel is (or if at sea its next port of call). [49] [50]

Reading the whole clause together, the Court held that the “convenient to them” provision was meant as a contingency: if the vessel’s current/next port is impractical for repossession, then the owners may choose a different port convenient for carrying out repossession as soon as practicable. The Court gave the example that if the vessel were at sea on a long voyage, it might be diverted to a convenient port to facilitate immediate boarding. But if the vessel is already safely in port, the owners’ right and obligation coincide in directing repossession there. [51] [52]

Critically, Phillips LJ found no basis to imply a sweeping obligation on charterers. The clause expressly imposes no duty on charterers to sail the vessel to a far port. To imply one, the Court said, would impose on charterers an onerous unpaid voyage at their own risk – an outcome for which there is no express provision or necessity. At most, charterers may have to sail only so far as strictly needed to permit repossession.

In this case the vessel was available in Stockton and could safely be boarded there. Requiring it to sail across the Atlantic was not strictly necessary to effect repossession, so clause 29[53] did not entitle the owners to insist on Trogir. [54] [55]

Phillips LJ therefore concluded (paras.50–51): if the vessel is in port at termination, clause 29 means the owners “must repossess at that port unless it is impracticable or impossible”. In the present case, Stockton was safe and accessible, and the tribunal had found it reasonably practicable to board there. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that owners must repossess as soon as practicable at Stockton and cannot require the charterers to undertake the long Trogir voyage. [56] [57]

Application of Contract Interpretation Principles

Both courts applied the modern canon of construction articulated in Arnold v Britton and Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd.[58] The Court of Appeal in particular set out (at para.25) the orthodox approach: courts start with the natural and ordinary meaning of the contractual words, consider them in documentary, factual and commercial context, and give effect to clear language.[59] [60] If the clause is unambiguous, it must be applied; if there is ambiguity or absurdity, the court may depart from literal meaning to avoid a result unreasonable to the parties. Commercial common sense may choose between reasonable constructions, but the court will not rescue a party from a bad bargain or rewrite clear terms. [61] [62]

 

 

HHJ Pelling expressly identified these principles in his judgment.[63] He found clause 29’s language “opaque” and unclear, so he heavily weighted context and purpose.[64] Citing Lord Hodge in Wood v Capita, the judge recognized the need to check any interpretation against the contract as a whole and its commercial consequences.[65] In this vein, he considered the consequence of owners’ reading – that charterers would bear great cost as unpaid bailee for potentially months with little recourse – and found it pointed against the owners’ construction.[66] He applied Arnold’s rule against crafting a solution to a bad bargain, refusing to allow literal emphasis on “convenient” to override the parties’ likely intent of prompt repossession.

The Court of Appeal similarly observed that the clause must be read as a coherent regime.[67] It emphasized the imperative that owners repossess quickly to relieve charterers of their gratuitous bailee burden. Phillips LJ noted that to accept the owners’ interpretation would ignore the obligation to act quickly and would render the references to “current or next port” superfluous – a textual absurdity to be avoided.[68]  In doing so, the court was not rewriting the clause from a bad bargain but giving effect to what a reasonable contracting party would have understood: that owners’ right to pick a convenient port is subordinated to the duty to repossess as soon as practicable.[69] The judges thus balanced the words of cl.29 with its commercial context, consistent with Arnold’s and Wood’s guidance.[70]

 

 

Commentators have noted this alignment with interpretative canons.[71] As Nail and Khodabandehloo (Burges Salmon) explain, the “ordinary natural meaning” rule requires looking beyond isolated words to the contract, including purpose and context. Here the court zoomed out to see clauses 28–29 as a self-contained code: cl.28 triggers repossession due to termination, and cl.29 governs where and how that occurs.[72] The “convenient to them” option was therefore a mechanism to achieve the owners’ prompt repossession obligation, not an unrestricted location choice.[73] This method echoes established authority that ambiguous provisions may yield to context and common sense.[74]

Neither court fell into the trap warned by Arnold of imposing a departure from natural meaning without clear justification.[75] Instead, they found the owners’ literal reading led to commercial absurdity or a “highly prejudicial” consequence for charterers, which justified a contextual construction. In particular, the courts treated the terms “current or next port” as evidence that immediate repossession location was the intended norm.[76] In short, the decisions manifest a textbook application of current contract interpretation law: respecting clear language but giving it realistic effect when plain meaning would contradict the contract’s evident purpose.

 

 

Implications and Comparison with Case Law on Charterparties

The result reinforces that courts will not lightly allow a charter clause to impose onerous unrecoupable costs on charterers. It aligns with the general rule that a gratuitous bailee has only minimal duties – notably the duty to make the vessel available for repossession – unless the contract explicitly requires more.[77] [78] The judges declined to imply a broad obligation on charterers to sail the ship to a distant port at their expense.[79] Instead, charterers’ obligations remain as stated: hold the vessel as unpaid caretakers, disembark crew at own cost, and permit owners to board.

On the owners’ side, the decision confirms that clause 29 indeed strengthens their position (as noted in BIMCO’s Explanatory Notes) by giving them an explicit repossession right, but it also emphasizes the built-in limit that repossession must occur “as soon as reasonably practicable”.[80] In that sense, this case highlights that even in standard form charters drafted by industry bodies, ordinary words will be tempered by logic and context.[81]

In existing charterparty jurisprudence, this case is notable for its careful line-drawing. It does not depart from precedent so much as apply longstanding rules to the novel clause. English law has long held (e.g. Capital Finance Co v Bray) that without contractual obligation a bailee is not responsible for actively returning goods, and that principle underpinned the analysis.[82] Nor does it upset the general liberty of parties to bargain – here owners did bargain for the right to repossess and for charterers to pay crew costs – but the bargain was judged not to include an open-ended repossession location right.[83]

 

 

In broader terms, the outcome serves as a reminder of the risk of vague drafting in charterparties. If owners had truly wanted unqualified location choice, they could have omitted the words “current or next port” or phrased an express voyage obligation. Courts will enforce the bargain the parties actually made.[84] As one commentator observes, though the clause’s wording appears unambiguous, focusing too narrowly on “convenient to them” without context “may lead to error”.[85] The decision thus arguably encourages parties to draft repatriation and repossession clauses with precision.

Finally, the case underscores that interpretation doctrines are applied rigorously even in commercial shipping contexts. The judges made clear that receiving a “bad bargain” due to poorly chosen words is not a ground for relief.[86] This reflects Arnold v Britton and Wood v Capita’s insistence that courts will not “rewrite” a contract under the guise of construction.[87] It also highlights that standard form clauses will be read against their commercial purpose: here, to get owners back into possession swiftly after default, rather than to give owners a windfall location choice.[88]

 

[1] Hill Dickinson, ‘Court of Appeal Considers Scope of Owners’ Rights to Repossess Vessel Following Early Termination of Bareboat Charter’ (Hill Dickinson, 9 October 2025) < https://www.hilldickinson.com/insights/articles/court-appeal-considers-scope-owners-rights-repossess-vessel-following-early > accessed 10 October 2025.

 

[2]Hill Dickinson, ‘Court of Appeal Considers Scope of Owners’ Rights to Repossess Vessel Following Early Termination of Bareboat Charter’ (Hill Dickinson, 9 October 2025) < https://www.hilldickinson.com/insights/articles/court-appeal-considers-scope-owners-rights-repossess-vessel-following-early > accessed 10 October 2025.

[3] ‘Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 1227 – Court of Appeal (Lady Justice King, Lord Justice Phillips and Lord Justice Nugee) – 7 October 2025 –
Lloyd’s Maritime Law Newsletter’ (<i>Lloyd’s Maritime Law Newsletter</i>) &#60; https://www.lmln.com/charterparty/songa-product-and-chemical-tankers-iii-as-v-kairos-shipping-ii-llc-2025-ewca-civ-1227–court-of-appeal-lady-justice-king-lord-justice-phillips-and-lord-justice-nugee–7-october-2025-160310.htm ; accessed 10 October 2025.

[4] ‘Kairos Shipping II LLC (Appellant) v Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III as (Respondent)’ (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary) < https://www.judiciary.uk/live-hearings/kairos-shipping-ii-llc-appellant-v-songa-product-and-chemical-tankers-iii-as-respondent/ > accessed 3 November 2025

 

[5] Hill Dickinson, ‘Court of Appeal Considers Scope of Owners’ Rights to Repossess Vessel Following Early Termination of Bareboat Charter’ (Hill Dickinson, 9 October 2025) < https://www.hilldickinson.com/insights/articles/court-appeal-considers-scope-owners-rights-repossess-vessel-following-early > accessed 10 October 2025.

[6] L Nail and A Khodabandehloo, ‘Contract Interpretation: The “Ordinary Natural Meaning” Is Perhaps Wider Than You Think (Songa Tankers v Kairos Shipping)’ (Burges Salmon, 9 October 2025) < https://www.burges-salmon.com/articles/102lpa3/contract-interpretation-the-ordinary-natural-meaning-is-perhaps-wider-than-you/  > accessed 9 October 2025.

[7] Ibid.

 

[8] Factual chronology: 17 December 2013 (novations); 23 December 2016 (delivery); 16 October 2020 (BDOO insolvency plan); 14 May 2021 (termination, repossession available at Stockton); August–September 2021 (voyage to Trogir, Gibraltar arrest); January 2022 (owners repossess at Gibraltar); January 2022 (arbitration commenced); March 2024 (partial award); 13 December 2024 (High Court judgment); 7 October 2025 (Court of Appeal judgment).

[9] ‘Kairos Shipping II LLC (Appellant) v Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III as (Respondent)’ (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary) < https://www.judiciary.uk/live-hearings/kairos-shipping-ii-llc-appellant-v-songa-product-and-chemical-tankers-iii-as-respondent/ > accessed 3 November 2025

[10] Hill Dickinson, ‘Court of Appeal Considers Scope of Owners’ Rights to Repossess Vessel Following Early Termination of Bareboat Charter’ (Hill Dickinson, 9 October 2025) < https://www.hilldickinson.com/insights/articles/court-appeal-considers-scope-owners-rights-repossess-vessel-following-early > accessed 10 October 2025.

[11] Baltic and International Maritime Council, BARECON 2001 (BIMCO 2001) cl 29.

[12] Factual chronology: 17 December 2013 (novations); 23 December 2016 (delivery); 16 October 2020 (BDOO insolvency plan); 14 May 2021 (termination, repossession available at Stockton); August–September 2021 (voyage to Trogir, Gibraltar arrest); January 2022 (owners repossess at Gibraltar); January 2022 (arbitration commenced); March 2024 (partial award); 13 December 2024 (High Court judgment); 7 October 2025 (Court of Appeal judgment).

[13] Factual chronology: 17 December 2013 (novations); 23 December 2016 (delivery); 16 October 2020 (BDOO insolvency plan); 14 May 2021 (termination, repossession available at Stockton); August–September 2021 (voyage to Trogir, Gibraltar arrest); January 2022 (owners repossess at Gibraltar); January 2022 (arbitration commenced); March 2024 (partial award); 13 December 2024 (High Court judgment); 7 October 2025 (Court of Appeal judgment).

[14] Clause 28(d) refers to termination on insolvency. Clause 29 (quoted) sets out repossession rights upon any Clause 28 termination.

[15] Factual chronology: 17 December 2013 (novations); 23 December 2016 (delivery); 16 October 2020 (BDOO insolvency plan); 14 May 2021 (termination, repossession available at Stockton); August–September 2021 (voyage to Trogir, Gibraltar arrest); January 2022 (owners repossess at Gibraltar); January 2022 (arbitration commenced); March 2024 (partial award); 13 December 2024 (High Court judgment); 7 October 2025 (Court of Appeal judgment).

[16] Arbitral tribunal reasoning in Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC (Partial Final Award, LMAA, March 2024) paras 124–129 (owners have right to choose “convenient” location; convenience assessed objectively). See also ibid paras 128–129 (ordinary meaning of “convenient” and owners’ priority; critique of charterers’ proposed construction).

[17] Factual chronology: 17 December 2013 (novations); 23 December 2016 (delivery); 16 October 2020 (BDOO insolvency plan); 14 May 2021 (termination, repossession available at Stockton); August–September 2021 (voyage to Trogir, Gibraltar arrest); January 2022 (owners repossess at Gibraltar); January 2022 (arbitration commenced); March 2024 (partial award); 13 December 2024 (High Court judgment); 7 October 2025 (Court of Appeal judgment).

[18]  Arbitration Act 1996, s 69.

[19] Kairos Shipping II LLC v Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS [2024] EWHC 3452 (Comm).

[20]  Factual chronology (18)

[21] Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 1227 [45]–[52] (Phillips LJ).

[22] Baltic and International Maritime Council, BARECON 2001 (BIMCO 2001) cl 29.

[23] Clause 28(d) refers to termination on insolvency. Clause 29 (quoted) sets out repossession rights upon any Clause 28 termination.

[24] Under cl 29, owners’ rights include selecting a convenient location for repossession, but their timing obligation limits that right. The charterers’ obligations are limited: they become unpaid bailees caring for the vessel until repossession, owed only minimal duties by law. The court refused to imply any unstated duty on charterers to sail beyond what was necessary to allow repossession.

[25] Arbitral tribunal reasoning in Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC (Partial Final Award, LMAA, March 2024) paras 124–129 (owners have right to choose “convenient” location; convenience assessed objectively). See also ibid paras 128–129 (ordinary meaning of “convenient” and owners’ priority; critique of charterers’ proposed construction).

[26] Arbitral tribunal reasoning in Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC (Partial Final Award, LMAA, March 2024) paras 124–129 (owners have right to choose “convenient” location; convenience assessed objectively). See also ibid paras 128–129 (ordinary meaning of “convenient” and owners’ priority; critique of charterers’ proposed construction).

[27] Ibid.

[28] Kairos Shipping II LLC v Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS [2024] EWHC 3452 (Comm).

[29] Songa (EWHC) (n 2) [28]–[31] (charterers board at “current port” unless impracticable; owners cannot force longer route at charterers’ cost). See also ibid [29]–[30] (Stockton practicable; insisting on Trogir was for owners’ convenience, not clause intention).

[30] China Pacific SA v Food Corporation of India (The Winson) [1982] AC 939, 958 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale).

[31] Capital Finance Co Ltd v Bray [1964] 1 WLR 323, 329 (Lord Denning MR).

[32] Kairos Shipping II LLC v Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS [2024] EWHC 3452 (Comm).

[33] Songa (EWHC) (n 2) [27] (quoting Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912–13 (Lord Hoffmann)).

[34] Songa (EWHC) (n 2) [28]–[31] (charterers board at “current port” unless impracticable; owners cannot force longer route at charterers’ cost). See also ibid [29]–[30] (Stockton practicable; insisting on Trogir was for owners’ convenience, not clause intention).

[35] Kairos Shipping II LLC v Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS [2024] EWHC 3452 (Comm).

[36] Songa (EWHC) (n 2) [28]–[31] (charterers board at “current port” unless impracticable; owners cannot force longer route at charterers’ cost). See also ibid [29]–[30] (Stockton practicable; insisting on Trogir was for owners’ convenience, not clause intention). (Reference 22)

[37] Kairos Shipping II LLC v Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS [2024] EWHC 3452 (Comm). (Reference 23)

[38] Songa (EWHC) (n 2) [28]–[31] (charterers board at “current port” unless impracticable; owners cannot force longer route at charterers’ cost). See also ibid [29]–[30] (Stockton practicable; insisting on Trogir was for owners’ convenience, not clause intention). (Reference 22)

[39] Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619 [15], [18]–[20] (Lord Neuberger PSC); Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24, [2017] AC 1173 [10]–[13] (Lord Hodge JSC).

[40] Kairos Shipping II LLC v Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS [2024] EWHC 3452 (Comm).

[41] Songa (EWHC) (n 2) [27] (quoting Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912–13 (Lord Hoffmann)).

[42] Songa (EWHC) (n 2) [22]–[30]; Songa (EWCA) (n 1) [25] (note: [850]–[909] appears to be a typographical error, as the judgment extends only to [52]; no such paragraphs exist).

[43] Capital Finance Co Ltd v Bray [1964] 1 WLR 323, 329 (Lord Denning MR).

[44] Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900 [23] (Lord Clarke JSC).

[45] On contractual construction, see Nail and Khodabandehloo (n 5) (applying Arnold v Britton principles of context and purpose). The Court of Appeal reiterated that Arnold v Britton allows no relief from bad bargains and Wood v Capita emphasises drafting quality. The judge echoed Lord Hodge: owners’ proposed reading “divorces” cl 29 from its commercial context. Both courts adhered to the rule that “ordinary meaning” yields to context where necessary.

[46] Kairos Shipping II LLC v Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS [2024] EWHC 3452 (Comm).

[47] Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 1227 [45]–[52] (Phillips LJ).

[48] Songa (EWCA) (n 1) [45]–[51] (CA confirms Stockton as repossession point unless impracticable; “convenient” is a fallback; no broad duty to sail far).

[49] Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 1227 [45]–[52] (Phillips LJ). (Reference 35)

[50] Songa (EWCA) (n 1) [45]–[51] (CA confirms Stockton as repossession point unless impracticable; “convenient” is a fallback; no broad duty to sail far). (Reference 36)

[51] Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 1227 [45]–[52] (Phillips LJ). (Reference 35)

[52] Songa (EWCA) (n 1) [45]–[51] (CA confirms Stockton as repossession point unless impracticable; “convenient” is a fallback; no broad duty to sail far). (Reference 36)

[53] Under cl 29, owners’ rights include selecting a convenient location for repossession, but their timing obligation limits that right. The charterers’ obligations are limited: they become unpaid bailees caring for the vessel until repossession, owed only minimal duties by law. The court refused to imply any unstated duty on charterers to sail beyond what was necessary to allow repossession.

[54] Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 1227 [45]–[52] (Phillips LJ). (Reference 35)

[55] Songa (EWCA) (n 1) [45]–[51] (CA confirms Stockton as repossession point unless impracticable; “convenient” is a fallback; no broad duty to sail far). (Reference 36)

[56] Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 1227 [45]–[52] (Phillips LJ). (Reference 35)

[57] Songa (EWCA) (n 1) [45]–[51] (CA confirms Stockton as repossession point unless impracticable; “convenient” is a fallback; no broad duty to sail far). (Reference 36)

[58] Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619 [15], [18]–[20] (Lord Neuberger PSC); Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24, [2017] AC 1173 [10]–[13] (Lord Hodge JSC).

[59]Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 1227 [45]–[52] (Phillips LJ).

[60] Songa (EWHC) (n 2) [22]–[30]; Songa (EWCA) (n 1) [25] (note: [850]–[909] appears to be a typographical error, as the judgment extends only to [52]; no such paragraphs exist).

[61] Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619 [15], [18]–[20] (Lord Neuberger PSC); Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24, [2017] AC 1173 [10]–[13] (Lord Hodge JSC).

[62] On contractual construction, see Nail and Khodabandehloo (n 5) (applying Arnold v Britton principles of context and purpose). The Court of Appeal reiterated that Arnold v Britton allows no relief from bad bargains and Wood v Capita emphasises drafting quality. The judge echoed Lord Hodge: owners’ proposed reading “divorces” cl 29 from its commercial context. Both courts adhered to the rule that “ordinary meaning” yields to context where necessary.

[63] Kairos Shipping II LLC v Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS [2024] EWHC 3452 (Comm).

[64] Songa (EWHC) (n 2) [22]–[30]; Songa (EWCA) (n 1) [25] (note: [850]–[909] appears to be a typographical error, as the judgment extends only to [52]; no such paragraphs exist).

[65] Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619 [15], [18]–[20] (Lord Neuberger PSC); Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24, [2017] AC 1173 [10]–[13] (Lord Hodge JSC).

[66] On contractual construction, see Nail and Khodabandehloo (n 5) (applying Arnold v Britton principles of context and purpose). The Court of Appeal reiterated that Arnold v Britton allows no relief from bad bargains and Wood v Capita emphasises drafting quality. The judge echoed Lord Hodge: owners’ proposed reading “divorces” cl 29 from its commercial context. Both courts adhered to the rule that “ordinary meaning” yields to context where necessary.

[67] Songa Product and Chemical Tankers III AS v Kairos Shipping II LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 1227 [45]–[52] (Phillips LJ).

[68] Songa (EWHC) (n 2) [22]–[30]; Songa (EWCA) (n 1) [25] (note: [850]–[909] appears to be a typographical error, as the judgment extends only to [52]; no such paragraphs exist).

[69] On contractual construction, see Nail and Khodabandehloo (n 5) (applying Arnold v Britton principles of context and purpose). The Court of Appeal reiterated that Arnold v Britton allows no relief from bad bargains and Wood v Capita emphasises drafting quality. The judge echoed Lord Hodge: owners’ proposed reading “divorces” cl 29 from its commercial context. Both courts adhered to the rule that “ordinary meaning” yields to context where necessary.

[70] Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619 [15], [18]–[20] (Lord Neuberger PSC); Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24, [2017] AC 1173 [10]–[13] (Lord Hodge JSC).

[71] L Nail and A Khodabandehloo, ‘Contract Interpretation: The “Ordinary Natural Meaning” Is Perhaps Wider Than You Think (Songa Tankers v Kairos Shipping)’ (Burges Salmon, 9 October 2025) < https://www.burges-salmon.com/articles/102lpa3/contract-interpretation-the-ordinary-natural-meaning-is-perhaps-wider-than-you/  > accessed 9 October 2025.

[72] On contractual construction, see Nail and Khodabandehloo (n 5) (applying Arnold v Britton principles of context and purpose). The Court of Appeal reiterated that Arnold v Britton allows no relief from bad bargains and Wood v Capita emphasises drafting quality. The judge echoed Lord Hodge: owners’ proposed reading “divorces” cl 29 from its commercial context. Both courts adhered to the rule that “ordinary meaning” yields to context where necessary.

[73] Songa (EWHC) (n 2) [27] (quoting Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912–13 (Lord Hoffmann)).

[74] Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900 [23] (Lord Clarke JSC).

[75] Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619 [15], [18]–[20] (Lord Neuberger PSC); Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24, [2017] AC 1173 [10]–[13] (Lord Hodge JSC).

[76] On contractual construction, see Nail and Khodabandehloo (n 5) (applying Arnold v Britton principles of context and purpose). The Court of Appeal reiterated that Arnold v Britton allows no relief from bad bargains and Wood v Capita emphasises drafting quality. The judge echoed Lord Hodge: owners’ proposed reading “divorces” cl 29 from its commercial context. Both courts adhered to the rule that “ordinary meaning” yields to context where necessary.

[77] China Pacific SA v Food Corporation of India (The Winson) [1982] AC 939, 958 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale).

[78] Capital Finance Co Ltd v Bray [1964] 1 WLR 323, 329 (Lord Denning MR).

[79] Under cl 29, owners’ rights include selecting a convenient location for repossession, but their timing obligation limits that right. The charterers’ obligations are limited: they become unpaid bailees caring for the vessel until repossession, owed only minimal duties by law. The court refused to imply any unstated duty on charterers to sail beyond what was necessary to allow repossession.

[80] Baltic and International Maritime Council, BARECON 2001 (BIMCO 2001) cl 29.

[81] Hill Dickinson, ‘Court of Appeal Considers Scope of Owners’ Rights to Repossess Vessel Following Early Termination of Bareboat Charter’ (Hill Dickinson, 9 October 2025) < https://www.hilldickinson.com/insights/articles/court-appeal-considers-scope-owners-rights-repossess-vessel-following-early  > accessed 10 October 2025.

[82] Capital Finance Co Ltd v Bray [1964] 1 WLR 323, 329 (Lord Denning MR).

[83] cf OCM Maritime Nile LLC v Courage Shipping Co [2022] EWCA Civ 1091, [2022] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 93 (allowing owners repossession on default, emphasising contractual rights); The Jotunheim [2004] EWHC 671 (Comm), [2005] QB 234 (similar repossession context); Swiss law cases applying Arnold v Britton on literal meaning and bad bargains.

[84]  Hill Dickinson, ‘Court of Appeal Considers Scope of Owners’ Rights to Repossess Vessel Following Early Termination of Bareboat Charter’ (Hill Dickinson, 9 October 2025) < https://www.hilldickinson.com/insights/articles/court-appeal-considers-scope-owners-rights-repossess-vessel-following-early  > accessed 10 October 2025.

[85] L Nail and A Khodabandehloo, ‘Contract Interpretation: The “Ordinary Natural Meaning” Is Perhaps Wider Than You Think (Songa Tankers v Kairos Shipping)’ (Burges Salmon, 9 October 2025) < https://www.burges-salmon.com/articles/102lpa3/contract-interpretation-the-ordinary-natural-meaning-is-perhaps-wider-than-you/  > accessed 9 October 2025.

[86] Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619 [15], [18]–[20] (Lord Neuberger PSC); Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24, [2017] AC 1173 [10]–[13] (Lord Hodge JSC).

[87] On contractual construction, see Nail and Khodabandehloo (n 5) (applying Arnold v Britton principles of context and purpose). The Court of Appeal reiterated that Arnold v Britton allows no relief from bad bargains and Wood v Capita emphasises drafting quality. The judge echoed Lord Hodge: owners’ proposed reading “divorces” cl 29 from its commercial context. Both courts adhered to the rule that “ordinary meaning” yields to context where necessary.

[88] Hill Dickinson, ‘Court of Appeal Considers Scope of Owners’ Rights to Repossess Vessel Following Early Termination of Bareboat Charter’ (Hill Dickinson, 9 October 2025) < https://www.hilldickinson.com/insights/articles/court-appeal-considers-scope-owners-rights-repossess-vessel-following-early > accessed 10 October 2025.

The Centre for Private International Law & Transnational Governance of the University of Aberdeen is continuing its Crossroads in Private International Law webinar series with a talk by Birgit van Houtert (Maastricht University) and Francesca Farrington (Groningen University) titled ‘The EU Anti-SLAPP Directive – Comparative Perspectives on Implementation’:

The Centre for Private International Law & Transnational Governance invites you to our next Crossroads in PIL webinar. This session brings together experts on Anti-SLAPP legislation from the UK and the Netherlands to discuss the Anti-SLAPP Directive. With 6 months to go before the Directive’s implementation deadline, this webinar will take stock of emerging best practices and challenges in implementing the directive and flesh out some unresolved questions.

Dr Francesca Farrington (University of Liverpool) will introduce the challenges posed by cross-border SLAPPs, before discussing how the Directive’s provisions on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments respond to these challenges. While these provisions represent a positive development, they also leave a number of issues unresolved and raise concerns about the fragmentation of European private international law.

Dr Birgit van Houtert (Maastricht University) will address the Dutch draft act regarding the transposition of the Anti SLAPP Directive. She will focus in particular on the challenges concerning the implementation of Articles 16 and 17 of the Directive. These core private international law provisions aim to provide protection for SLAPP targets against third country proceedings and judgments.

The webinar will be chaired by Prof Justin Borg-Barthet (University of Aberdeen).

Additional information and the link to register can be found here.

The Permanent Bureau of the HCCH is pleased to announce the launch of a public consultation on the Draft Text of a possible new convention on parallel proceedings and related actions, to be held from 18 November 2025 to 26 January 2026.

Experts, practitioners and judges from diverse legal traditions with experience in cross-border litigation and private international law more broadly are encouraged to participate in the consultation.

In 2021, the HCCH established a Working Group on matters related to jurisdiction in transnational civil or commercial litigation (WG), comprised of over 60 subject-matter experts from across the globe. The WG, after nine meetings, has developed a Draft Text containing provisions aimed at addressing parallel proceedings and related actions taking place in multiple States, acknowledging the primary roles of both jurisdictional rules and the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The objective of this future instrument would be to enhance legal certainty, predictability, and access to justice by reducing litigation costs and mitigating inconsistent judgments in transnational litigation in civil or commercial matters.

The public consultation seeks feedback on whether the Draft Text would, in practice, assist in addressing such matters and how the provisions in the Draft Text could be improved. The consultation is supported by a Consultation Paper comprising an Executive Summary, a detailed explanation of the key provisions and the operation of the Draft Text, and specific questions. Responses received from this consultation will be submitted to all HCCH Members for consideration in advance of the next meeting of the Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP), the governing body of the HCCH, in March 2026, at which the Members of the HCCH will decide on the next steps for the project.

For more information on the public consultation, please visit: https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/jurisdiction/public-consultation

 

This post is published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law (HCCH).

By Juliano Alves Pinto, Brazilian tech diplomat; former Deputy Consul of Brazil in San Francisco (2013–2016); State Undersecretary of Science, Technology, and Innovation (2019–2021); HCCH expert on digital economy (2023–2024); and Government Affairs Director at the Digital Cooperation Organization (DCO) (2024–2025)

Could Private International Law be an answer to digital governance? Though this idea has already been debated among PIL scholars, it must be said that it has not yet broken the bubble of the PIL niche. Diplomats usually overlook PIL as a small part of the larger International Law realm, which embraces Public International Law as the standard bearer of the multilateral framework that has been established ever since the Westphalia Peace in 1648.

However, the uniqueness of digital platforms architecture and its asymmetric relationship with individuals all around the world has made PIL emerge as a relevant normative toolbox to tackle the numerous situations in which the user needs to protect themselves from the leonine contracts and the frequent algorithmic abuses on data extraction, data privacy and, even more often, IA misleading guidance.

A digital platform is usually comprised of a number of layers, which may reflect different jurisdictions according to the territory in which a specific component of the platform architecture is localized. That said, an individual can access a platform in a country A and the platform could be hosted in a country B. Their personal data -collected by the platform- could be stored on a cloud-based server in a country C, not to mention third-party applications used by the platform that could be placed in different jurisdictions. If a lawsuit is set, which law is applicable? Is it the place of business the usual connecting factor?

Instead of long-lasting negotiations to approve an international treaty on a specific emerging technology governance, which usually turns out to be time and resource consuming, a simplified PIL convention that offers an applicable law methodology, defining connecting factors in typical conflict of law situations, as well as the ubiquity of specific platform layers, might be more effective. The current world order on digital governance is a highly fragmented reality, with a number of multilateral initiatives being launched within or without the UN System, from the traditional International Telecommunications Union to the emerging Digital Cooperation Organization, sponsored by Saudi Arabia.

Domestic regulatory frameworks on new technologies are becoming the standard approach in an array of jurisdictions. An example is the digital tokens realm, which has already been regulated in different countries, from Switzerland (2018) to Brazil (2022) and the EU (2023). Even though it might be difficult for lawmakers to cope with technology change, even a provisional regulation is better than self-regulation alone.

From an International Relations perspective, the International Regimes Theory is often regarded as the go-to approach among diplomats and multilateralism experts, as it deals with the idea that cooperation among countries, regardless of self-interest, should be done by a minimal normative system, not necessarily formalized by treaties or an international organization framework.  Stephen Krasner defined international regimes in 1982 as sets of “principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors converge in a given issue-area of the international relations.” [1] Normally these principles, norms, and rules are established by the actors themselves to make sure goals through cooperation are achieved. From a digital multilateralism point of view, it is no wonder that the very definition of internet governance included in the WSIS Tunis Agenda in 2005 coincides with Krasner’s classic approach:

34. A working definition of Internet governance is the development and application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.[2]

It is worth noting that the WSIS approach embraces multiple actors, beyond the typical state-centered approach, as innovation requires a triple-helix perspective, alongside the private sector and Academia. Still, governance itself cannot be achieved without a minimal rule-based system. The main difficulty of multilateralism and Public International Law is the time needed to reach the necessary consensus to build up international rules by which countries need to abide.

Technology develops in a much faster pace, which means that the already-late-coming domestic norms ­are often approved quicker than any multilateral framework. In this sense, treaty-based multilateralism might not be the only solution to provide the necessary protection to individuals and digital platforms all around the world.

The other side of the coin is that domestic frameworks alone fail to provide individual protection when cross-border relationships are established through digital platforms and their multiple layers localized in different jurisdictions. PIL in this sense could be the right answer to law efficacy, not only from a multilateral perspective but also from a domestic regulatory system approach.

Interestingly, flexibility and adaptation became one of the main features of International Regimes Theory, not only by embracing new actors but also through the construction of unorthodox multilateral arrangements.[3] That said, PIL institutes, such as applicable law, jurisdiction and judgment recognition, could be included as components of any regime building methodology, whereas domestic regulatory frameworks could become the main normative sources of newly PIL-based regimes of digital governance. The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) has been tackling this issue since 2022, having successfully established two groups of experts on digital tokens and CBDC’s. Though unfamiliar to most tech diplomats and multilateralism specialists, both initiatives might be fundamental to change the current fragile digital governance landscape, as the definition of the law applicable to platforms might shed some light onto a rather obscure international reality.

Hence, it is about time for tech diplomats, scholars, and policy makers to embrace PIL as a relevant digital governance mechanism. At the end of the day, we just need to make sure individuals receive the necessary protection across the globe, regardless of the jurisdiction concerning the multiple layers of a platform’s architecture.

—

This contribution is a summarized version of a PhD thesis originally written in Portuguese that will soon be included on: https://www3.ufmg.br/pesquisa-e-inovacao/teses-e-dissertacoes

[1] KRASNER, Stephen (1982) Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables

[2] WSIS: Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (2005)

[3] SNIDAL, ABBOTT (2009) The governance triangle: Regulatory standards institutions and the shadow of the state

The sweeping pace of technological advancement and the accelerated transition to the digital realm are generating novel and complex challenges for the law. Established legal frameworks are increasingly being tested within the digital environment, where cutting-edge technologies — such as digital platforms and artificial intelligence — have come to play a decisive role in both social and economic activity.

Although the European Union may not yet have attained its full technological maturity, it stands at the forefront of confronting the legal implications of the digital era. The Union’s legislative agenda seeks to maintain a delicate equilibrium between, on the one hand, promoting innovation and technological development, and, on the other, safeguarding the fundamental rights of individuals while ensuring transparency and accountability among digital service providers.

The areas most profoundly affected by the digital transformation of European law include data protection — governed primarily by Regulation (EU) 2016/679, commonly known as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR); electronic commerce and digital platforms facilitating cross-border transactions — regulated by Directive 2000/31/EC; cybersecurity; electronic governance; and digital markets — significantly shaped by Regulation (EU) 2022/1925. Within these domains, a dense and intricate body of Regulations, Directives, and legislative Acts has redefined the structure and operation of the online marketplace.

Prominent among these legislative instruments are the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), both designed to counter disinformation and enhance transparency in the operation of digital platforms; the Digital Governance Act (DGA), which seeks to reinforce the effective and trustworthy governance of digital services; the Data Act (DA), aimed at facilitating data access, management, and reuse in innovative applications; and the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA), which establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework to ensure the safe, lawful, and ethical deployment of artificial intelligence systems. Collectively, these instruments have come to dominate contemporary European legal discourse concerning the digital transformation.

The 17th online conference of Lex&Forum, held on 27 February 2025, was devoted to issues of particular interest and considerable complexity within the field of law. This session was organized, on this occasion, in collaboration with Frederick University of the Republic of Cyprus.
The conference was chaired by Professor Panagiotis Degleris of the co-organizing University, within the framework of which the following presentations of the invited speakers were delivered: Theodoros Galanis, PhD, ‘The Digital Markets Act: Brief Overview and Implementation Challenges’; Efrosyni Siougle, PhD, Head of Advisory and Compliance at the Data Protection Authority, ‘The interaction of the GDPR with recent EU legislative developments (DSA, DMA, DGA, DA, AIA)’, Ioannis Revolidis, Lecturer in Media, Communication & Technology Law, Law School, University of Malta, ‘The Strengthened 2022 Code of Practice on Disinformation: Continuities and Innovations in EU Digital Regulation’; Anastasia Kalantzi, PhD, Lawyer, ‘The General Data Protection Regulation as court evidence in the digital age’, Maria Stylianidou, Assistant Professor, Law School, Frederick University,
‘The Protection of Whistleblowers in the Digital Age / The Contemporary Face of Governance’.

As the Praefatio of the first issue of the year, we have the great honor of presenting the speech-reflection of an unrivaled scientific career and academic ethos of the world-renowned international law Professor, Mr. Symeon Symeonides at the scientific symposium organized in his honor as an academic farewell by the Willamette University School of Law, in collaboration with the ‘Association of American Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws’, in May 2024, on the topic of “Reflections from Fifty Years in the Conflicts Vineyard: An Immigrant’s Story”.

In the case-law section, we present (a) The CJEU, 27.2.2025, Società Italiana Lastre/Agora, on asymmetrical choice of court agreements (commented by Prof. D. Stamatiadis), (b) the domestic rulings: Piraeus Court of Appeal 398/2024, on service to a company with a registered office in Singapore (commented by A. Anthimos), Athens Court of First Instance cases 3150/2024 and 269/2025, on recognition of a final (non-appealable) divorce judgment issued by a Swiss court (connected with the legal opinion by Ass. Prof. K. Rokas), and Athens Court of First Instance 244/2025, on recognition of the res judicata effect of foreign court orders issued by a U.S. court placing a legally incapacitated adult under guardianship and appointing a conservator of the adult’s estate (commented by Ass. Prof. G.-A. Georgiades), and (c) the foreign National Court Caselaw, Cour de Cassation, 2.4.2025, Pourvoi n. 23-11.456, on submission of a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU regarding whether a claim for damages arising from the abrupt termination of a commercial relationship is contractual or non-contractual in nature. (commented by E. Tsikrika), and Cassazione Civile, 10.7.2024, ??. 18445/2024, on determination of the child’s ‘habitual residence’ in cases of international child abduction involving a child of tender age. (commented by Judge I. Valmantonis).

The scientific section includes a study by Prof. Efie Kinini (Univeristy of Athens) on “The limitation period for a damages claim in cases of infringement of competition rules. Reflections prompted by the CJEU judgment in Heureka and the Opinion of Advocate General Medina in Nissan” and a legal opinion of Ass. Prof. K. Rokas (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki), on ‘Recognition of a foreign divorce judgment from a third country: the requirement concerning the applicable law under Article 780 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure’. It also features the thoughts of Dr. Apostolos Anthimos, on ‘UK Third party costs orders enforceable in Greece’, as well as the particularly important in enforcement of foreign judgements proceedings Certificate of enforceability under Article 53 of the Brussels I bis Regulation, edited by Judje A.  Kargopoulos.. The issue concludes with the regular quarterly review of the CJEU’s case-law, covering the period January-March 2025, by Dr. A. Anthimos.

Lex&Forum renews its scientific appointment with its readers for the next 18th issue, with the central topic of ‘The EU Accession to the ECHR – Procedural Hurdles and Prospects Before the ECtHR -‘.

                                                                                    Prof. Paris Arvanitakis

The sweeping pace of technological advancement and the accelerated transition to the digital realm are generating novel and complex challenges for the law. Established legal frameworks are increasingly being tested within the digital environment, where cutting-edge technologies — such as digital platforms and artificial intelligence — have come to play a decisive role in both social and economic activity.

Although the European Union may not yet have attained its full technological maturity, it stands at the forefront of confronting the legal implications of the digital era. The Union’s legislative agenda seeks to maintain a delicate equilibrium between, on the one hand, promoting innovation and technological development, and, on the other, safeguarding the fundamental rights of individuals while ensuring transparency and accountability among digital service providers.

The areas most profoundly affected by the digital transformation of European law include data protection — governed primarily by Regulation (EU) 2016/679, commonly known as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR); electronic commerce and digital platforms facilitating cross-border transactions — regulated by Directive 2000/31/EC; cybersecurity; electronic governance; and digital markets — significantly shaped by Regulation (EU) 2022/1925. Within these domains, a dense and intricate body of Regulations, Directives, and legislative Acts has redefined the structure and operation of the online marketplace.

Prominent among these legislative instruments are the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), both designed to counter disinformation and enhance transparency in the operation of digital platforms; the Digital Governance Act (DGA), which seeks to reinforce the effective and trustworthy governance of digital services; the Data Act (DA), aimed at facilitating data access, management, and reuse in innovative applications; and the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA), which establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework to ensure the safe, lawful, and ethical deployment of artificial intelligence systems. Collectively, these instruments have come to dominate contemporary European legal discourse concerning the digital transformation.

The 17th online conference of Lex&Forum, held on 27 February 2025, was devoted to issues of particular interest and considerable complexity within the field of law. This session was organized, on this occasion, in collaboration with Frederick University of the Republic of Cyprus.
The conference was chaired by Professor Panagiotis Degleris of the co-organizing University, within the framework of which the following presentations of the invited speakers were delivered: Theodoros Galanis, PhD, ‘The Digital Markets Act: Brief Overview and Implementation Challenges’; Efrosyni Siougle, PhD, Head of Advisory and Compliance at the Data Protection Authority, ‘The interaction of the GDPR with recent EU legislative developments (DSA, DMA, DGA, DA, AIA)’, Ioannis Revolidis, Lecturer in Media, Communication & Technology Law, Law School, University of Malta, ‘The Strengthened 2022 Code of Practice on Disinformation: Continuities and Innovations in EU Digital Regulation’; Anastasia Kalantzi, PhD, Lawyer, ‘The General Data Protection Regulation as court evidence in the digital age’, Maria Stylianidou, Assistant Professor, Law School, Frederick University,
‘The Protection of Whistleblowers in the Digital Age / The Contemporary Face of Governance’.

As the Praefatio of the first issue of the year, we have the great honor of presenting the speech-reflection of an unrivaled scientific career and academic ethos of the world-renowned international law Professor, Mr. Symeon Symeonides at the scientific symposium organized in his honor as an academic farewell by the Willamette University School of Law, in collaboration with the ‘Association of American Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws’, in May 2024, on the topic of “Reflections from Fifty Years in the Conflicts Vineyard: An Immigrant’s Story”.

In the case-law section, we present (a) The CJEU, 27.2.2025, Società Italiana Lastre/Agora, on asymmetrical choice of court agreements (commented by Prof. D. Stamatiadis), (b) the domestic rulings: Piraeus Court of Appeal 398/2024, on service to a company with a registered office in Singapore (commented by A. Anthimos), Athens Court of First Instance cases 3150/2024 and 269/2025, on recognition of a final (non-appealable) divorce judgment issued by a Swiss court (connected with the legal opinion by Ass. Prof. K. Rokas), and Athens Court of First Instance 244/2025, on recognition of the res judicata effect of foreign court orders issued by a U.S. court placing a legally incapacitated adult under guardianship and appointing a conservator of the adult’s estate (commented by Ass. Prof. G.-A. Georgiades), and (c) the foreign National Court Caselaw, Cour de Cassation, 2.4.2025, Pourvoi n. 23-11.456, on submission of a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU regarding whether a claim for damages arising from the abrupt termination of a commercial relationship is contractual or non-contractual in nature. (commented by E. Tsikrika), and Cassazione Civile, 10.7.2024, ??. 18445/2024, on determination of the child’s ‘habitual residence’ in cases of international child abduction involving a child of tender age. (commented by Judge I. Valmantonis).

The scientific section includes a study by Prof. Efie Kinini (Univeristy of Athens) on “The limitation period for a damages claim in cases of infringement of competition rules. Reflections prompted by the CJEU judgment in Heureka and the Opinion of Advocate General Medina in Nissan” and a legal opinion of Ass. Prof. K. Rokas (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki), on ‘Recognition of a foreign divorce judgment from a third country: the requirement concerning the applicable law under Article 780 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure’. It also features the thoughts of Dr. Apostolos Anthimos, on ‘UK Third party costs orders enforceable in Greece’, as well as the particularly important in enforcement of foreign judgements proceedings Certificate of enforceability under Article 53 of the Brussels I bis Regulation, edited by Judje A.  Kargopoulos.. The issue concludes with the regular quarterly review of the CJEU’s case-law, covering the period January-March 2025, by Dr. A. Anthimos.

Lex&Forum renews its scientific appointment with its readers for the next 18th issue, with the central topic of ‘The EU Accession to the ECHR – Procedural Hurdles and Prospects Before the ECtHR -‘.

                                                                                    Prof. Paris Arvanitakis

Written by Fikri Soral, Independant Lawyer, Turkey; and LL.M. student, Galatasaray University, Turkey

The Tatlici litigation continues to unfold as one of the most noteworthy examples of how national courts in Europe are responding to transnational defamation judgments obtained in the United States. The previous commentary examined Malta’s First Hall Civil Court judgment refusing to enforce the U.S. default award of US$740 million.[1] The Malta Court of Appeal’s judgment of 14 October 2025 builds upon that foundation by upholding non-enforcement while clarifying the legal reasoning behind it.[2] The Malta Court of Appeal’s judgment came as the second major development, following an earlier first-round enforcement attempt in Turkey that had already failed on venue.[3]

The Malta Court of Appeal upheld the First Hall Civil Court’s rejection of enforcement but replaced procedural formalism with a more principled proportionality analysis grounded in ordre public. The judges, Chief Justice Mark Chetcuti, Hon. Judge Robert G. Mangion and Hon. Judge Grazio Mercieca, held that the magnitude and moral nature of the award—being damages for defamation—“manifestly” offended Maltese public policy.[4] Such “astronomic” damages, the court reasoned, would have a chilling effect on free expression and thereby upset Malta’s constitutional balance between protecting reputation and safeguarding democratic speech.[5]

The court also noted that the absence of a reasoned Florida judgment hindered the court’s ability to test the applicant’s belated claim that the award represented “real” rather than moral damages.[6]

It is against this backdrop that the Maltese decision must be read alongside the unfolding NEKO 2018 A, LLC receivership before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, which is a case that exposes how litigation finance now shapes both litigation conduct and judgment enforcement across borders.[7] The Florida proceedings, captioned Mehmet Tatlici and Craig Downs v. Ugur Tatlici—as cited in the Malta Court of Appeal’s judgment, directly link the plaintiff, Mehmet Tatlici, with his Florida attorney, Craig Downs, who appeared as co-plaintiff in the U.S. default judgment awarding US$740 million in damages.

 

Although litigation funding was not part of the Maltese court’s formal reasoning, the Tatlici dispute shows how financial mechanisms behind litigation are beginning to shape the transnational life of judgments. This connection matters for private international law because recognition and enforcement today concern not only the validity of foreign judgments but also the economic structures that propel those judgments across jurisdictions.

 

Litigation Funding as a Governance Warning

As Cassandra Burke Robertson observes, third-party funding externalises litigation risk and encourages high-variance, high-quantum claims that might otherwise settle early.[8] Funders’ capital increases the number of transnational lawsuits filed, raises settlement values, and spreads litigation across more jurisdictions.[9] This tendency is especially visible in defamation and other reputation-based torts, where damages are inherently subjective and national legal systems diverge sharply on what counts as a proportionate remedy.

Maya Steinitz’s governance theory underlines a concern that once funders gain control over budgets and strategic decisions, they develop portfolio-level incentives to pursue outsized awards that maximise aggregate returns—even when enforcement remains uncertain.[10] This creates a structural tension that private international law cannot ignore because enforcement courts are ultimately asked to enforce judgments whose underlying dynamics are driven as much by capital as by legal merit.

The NEKO receivership makes these abstract concerns tangible. In October 2025, NEKO 2018 A, LLC, a litigation funder with an investor’s interest, secured a collateral receivership over its funded law firm, the Downs Law Group, the same firm involved in Tatlici.[11] The receivership order placed all accounts, rights to payment, proceeds, substitutes, and records under the control of a court-appointed receiver and suspended pre-trial deadlines to “preserve resources … without the burden of potential protracted litigation.”[12] This effectively turned litigation receivables into tradable assets by allowing the funder to monetise pending claims and future enforcement proceeds.

Scholars such as John Gotanda and Ronald Brand warn that this financialisation of litigation detaches judgments from substantive justice and proportionality, compelling enforcement courts—like Malta’s—to reimpose those limits through ordre public review.[13] Seen from a private international law perspective, this convergence between capital markets and cross-border enforcement exposes a governance gap: Article 2(1)(k) of the Hague Judgments Convention 2019 explicitly excludes defamation from its scope, while the Convention remains entirely silent on litigation funding. This dual absence, of both defamation and funded claims, leaves national courts to fill that regulatory void case by case, relying on domestic ordre public standards to assess the enforceability of judgments shaped by third-party capital.

Funding Under Scrutiny for Potential Fraud on Court

The relationship between litigation funding and the manner in which a judgment is obtained deserves careful attention. While the Maltese appellate court did not address the issue of fraud, ongoing criminal proceedings in Turkey—where judicial and prosecutorial authorities are examining how the Florida judgment was obtained—illustrate how difficult it can be to distinguish legitimate litigation conduct from actions that are not merely procedural but go to the integrity of the adjudicative process.

In highly financed, cross-border cases, the line between assertive advocacy and excessive pressure can become blurred. When litigation outcomes are closely tied to the financial expectations of external funders, there is a risk that commercial considerations may influence legal strategy or procedural choices. As Steinitz’s governance analysis suggests, such dynamics can create “agency costs,” where professional judgment becomes constrained by the funder’s return-driven objectives.[14] These constraints indicate that there must be increased protection and openness in recognition and enforcement actions to guarantee that financing efficiency does not compromise procedural integrity in the judicial process. In extreme cases, these forces can blur the line between zealous advocacy and alleged fraudulent conduct, which has been a tension made visible in the Tatlici litigation.

Conclusion

The Tatlici litigation illustrates how the ordre public exception has evolved into a constitutional safeguard within the global enforcement of judgments. The Malta Court of Appeal’s 2025 decision affirming the refusal to enforce a US $740 million Florida defamation award and treating “astronomic” moral damages as incompatible with freedom of expression, the court used ordre public as an active tool of constitutional governance. This aligns with the argument advanced by Symeon C. Symeonides, who conceptualises the public policy exception as a constitutional checkpoint ensuring that foreign judgments do not erode the forum’s fundamental rights.[15]

At the same time, Tatlici exposes enduring tensions between litigation finance, procedural integrity, and the enforceability of transnational awards. The claimant’s connection to the US federal receivership shows how financial structures can shape litigation strategy and the formation of judgments, while the ongoing Turkish criminal inquiry into the alleged fraudulent procurement of the Florida judgment illustrates the risks that arise when capital-backed claims intersect with procedural fragility.

The case exemplifies a wider paradox in which a claimant secures an extraordinary foreign award yet lacks attachable assets in the rendering state and faces recognition refusals abroad, so the judgment’s practical value collapses despite its formal validity. The defendant in the US$740 million action now occupies a jurisdictional and enforcement limbo, subject to a judgment that can neither be executed in foro domestico nor circulate transnationally through recognition or exequatur.

Tatlici confirms that public policy, founded on proportionality and constitutional values, still marks the outer boundary of the transnational movement of judgments in a system increasingly exposed to the financialisation of litigation.

[1] Fikri Soral, ‘Tatlici?v?Tatlici: Malta Rejects?$740?Million U.S. Defamation Judgment as Turkish Case Looms’ (Conflict?of?Laws, 28?April?2025) https://conflictoflaws.net/2025/tatlici-v-tatlici-malta-rejects-740-million-u-s-defamation-judgment-as-turkish-case-looms/

accessed 4?November?2025.

[2] Tatlici v Tatlici (Court of Appeal, Malta, 14 October 2025) App ?iv 719/20/1. (“Appellate Judgement”)

[3] Istanbul Regional Court of Appeal, 4th Civil Chamber, Decision No 2025/3701, File No 2025/2327, 13 October 2025,

[4] Appellate Judgement (n 2) para. 53

[5] ibid. para 47-52

[6] ibid. para. 50.

[7] NEKO 2018 A, LLC v Downs Law Group, P.A. (US District Court for the Southern District of Florida, No 1:25-cv-24580, filed 6 October 2025) https://dockets.justia.com/docket/florida/flsdce/1:2025cv24580/698527

[8] Cassandra Burke Robertson, ‘The Impact of Third-Party Financing on Transnational Litigation’ (2011) 44 Case W Res J Intl L 159.

[9] ibid at 164

[10] Maya Steinitz, ‘Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding’ (2011) 95 Minnesota Law Review 1268, 1318–25 (discussing funders’ portfolio-level incentives and the resulting agency-cost problems in litigation governance).

[11] NEKO 2018 A v Downs Law Group (n 7).

[12] ibid

[13] See Ronald A Brand, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments’ (2013) 74 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 491, 520–28; John Y Gotanda, ‘Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis’ (2004) 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 391. Both scholars argue that disproportionate awards, exacerbated by the financialisation of litigation, require recognition courts to restore proportionality through the ordre public exception.

[14] Steinitz (n 10) 1304, 1315.

[15] Symeon C Symeonides, ‘The Public Policy Exception in Choice of Law: The American Version’ (2025) Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) (forthcoming, also to appear in Emory Journal of International Law).

The German Law Journal has published a Special Issue featuring the proceedings of the international conference on Informed Consent to Dispute Resolution Agreements, held in Bremen on 20–21 June 2024 (see our earlier announcement here).

Edited by Gralf-Peter Calliess and Nicholas Mouttotos of the University of Bremen, the special issue brings together contributions from leading scholars in private international law, international civil procedure, and international arbitration. Contributors include: Symeon C. Symeonides, Nancy S. Kim, Gralf-Peter Calliess, Frederick Rieländer, Peter McColgan, Laura E. Little, Kermit Roosevelt III, Sören Segger-Piening, John F. Coyle, Hannah L. Buxbaum, Marta Pertegás Sender, Stephen Ware, Stefan F. Thönissen and Nicholas Mouttotos.

The collection addresses a central tension in modern dispute resolution: how to reconcile party autonomy in forum and choice-of-law agreements with the requirement of consent, and how informed should consent be, particularly where such agreements are embedded in standard-form contracts affecting weaker parties such as consumers and employees.

The issue encompasses perspectives from both the United States and the European Union, examining questions of constitutional fairness, access to justice, and the legitimacy of contractual self-determination. Contributions trace the historical development of party autonomy, critique the adequacy of existing consent models, examine their outward abandonment while also exploring comparative regulatory approaches to protecting vulnerable contracting parties.

The special issue is available in the German Law Journal, Volume 26, Special Issue 5, and the editorial can be found here. The German Law Journal is a pioneering (Gold) open-access, peer-reviewed forum for scholarship and commentary on comparative, European, and international law, offering free and unrestricted online access to its publications since 1999.

A new issue of ZEuP – Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht is now available and includes contributions on EU private law, comparative law and legal history, legal unification, private international law, and individual European private law regimes. The full table of content can be accessed here: https://rsw.beck.de/zeitschriften/zeup.

The following contributions might be of particular interest for the readers of this blog:

• Mathias Reimann: The Elusive Goal of Private Law Unification – The Creation, Implementation, and Effect of Uniform Laws in the United States and Potential as a Model for Europe
  Mathias Reimann on The Elusive Goal of Private Law Unification – The Creation, Implementation, and Effect of Uniform Laws in the United States and Potential as a Model for Europe as an examination of how, in the United States, the core of private law is left to the individual states and thus often, and at times highly, diverse. A prominent vehicle for achieving greater uniformity has been the drafting and adoption of uniform and model laws, mainly under the auspices of the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), now more commonly called the Uniform Law Commission (ULC). Since its foundation in 1892, this institution has produced hundreds of such laws and presented them to the state legislatures for enactment. While some have been (almost) universally adopted, most notoriously the Uniform Commercial Code, such success is far more the exception than the rule – the majority of uniform laws have been enacted by, at best, a small minority of states and, thus, failed significantly to enhance legal uniformity. Even where a statute’s text has been widely adopted, it is unclear how much uniformity that has created in terms of actual practical outcomes. On the whole, the uniform law movement has somewhat diminished, but it has not broadly overcome, the diversity of American private law. Its mediocre track record suggests that the uniform law approach would scarcely be a suitable model for the unification of private law in Europe; this is especially true since the conditions for producing, adopting, and uniformly interpreting such laws are much less favorable here than in the United States.
• Stefan Thönissen: Die Kommunikation der obersten Gerichte
  Stefan Thönissen on Die Kommunikation der obersten Gerichte as an exploration of how the relevance of supreme courts’ communication of their decisions is closely connected with the purpose of contributing to legal development and unification. Although this purpose is – to different degrees – common to all supreme courts, the way they communicate through their decisions significantly differs. In recent years, there have been substantial developments. However, these developments have not necessarily led to a convergence.
• Matteo Bruno Fontana: Die verjährungshemmende Wirkung europäischer Kollektivklagen nach Umsetzung der Verbandsrichtlinie
  Matteo Bruno Fontana on Die verjährungshemmende Wirkung europäischer Kollektivklagen nach Umsetzung der Verbandsrichtlinie as an analysis of how the new Consumer Rights Enforcement Act (VDuG) empowers consumer associations to bring representative redress actions (Sec. 14 et seq. VDuG). While the suspension of the limitation period by representative actions brought before a domestic German court is addressed in detail in Sec. 204a (1) German Civil Code (BGB), the suspensory effect of a foreign collective action is only partially governed by Sec. 204a (2) BGB. Against the backdrop of the discussion on the suspensory effect of individual actions brought in a foreign forum, this article lays out why foreign collective redress actions should be deemed to have a suspensory effect on the limitation period under German substantive law.

The volume also features to book reviews related to private international law:

• Alan Brown reviews Jens M. Scherpe/Stephen Gilmore (eds): Family Matters: Essays in Honour of John Eekelaar (Intersentia 2022)
• Tobias Lutzi reviews Eva Jueptner: A Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments. Why did the Judgments Project (1992–2001) Fail? (Intersentia 2024)