Feed aggregator

INTRODUCTION

Following a significant hiatus, the public policy defense has re-emerged prominently in discussions surrounding the enforcement of foreign judgments, particularly in the context of a judgment issued by the Panama Maritime Court in 2024. The primary issue addressed by the Greek court was whether a foreign judgment could be recognized and enforced when the foreign court denied appellate proceedings due to the failure to post a security deposit that was both substantial and necessary for the appeal process.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The case involved a claim for damages between a company based in Hong Kong and another company registered in the Marshall Islands. This dispute was adjudicated under Panama’s maritime law, established by Law 8 of 1982 and updated by Law 55 of 2008, which governs maritime-related disputes through a specialized and efficient legal framework. The Panamanian maritime courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over in rem actions, enabling prompt vessel arrests and maritime liens within both Panamanian territorial waters and the Panama Canal for claims related to damages, cargo issues, and collisions.

The Panamanian court ruled in favor of the claimant, mandating the defendant to either return the vessel or pay approximately 45 million USD, i.e., the valuation of the vessel along with associated legal costs, as ordered by the court.

Subsequently, the judgment creditor sought recognition and enforcement of the Panamanian judgment in Greece, as the vessel was docked within Greek territorial waters.

The opposing party contended that the ruling from the Panamanian Naval Court of First Instance contravened Greek public policy and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), primarily because the appellate process was effectively obstructed. According to Article 490 of Panama’s Maritime Courts and Disputes Law, the appellant was required to deposit a security of nearly 45 million USD (equivalent to the judgment amount and associated legal fees) within ten days to have its appeal considered.

The original text from Article 490 reads:

“Artículo 490. Para cursar la apelación se requerirá la consignación, ante la secretaría del Tribunal Marítimo de primera instancia, de una caución que garantice el pago del monto de la condena más las costas. Para determinar el monto de la caución se considerará la caución consignada para levantar el secuestro o el valor del bien secuestrado. Dicha caución será consignada dentro de los diez días siguientes a la notificación de la providencia que admita el recurso. Si el apelante no consigna la caución de que trata este artículo, el juez declarará desierto el recurso.”

In light of the above, the excessive requirement for a security deposit resulted in the judgment debtor’s appeal being dismissed, thereby forfeiting its right to be heard.

 

FINDINGS OF THE GREEK COURT.

The Greek court recognized that while imposing a financial guarantee as a prerequisite for appeal can have legitimate justifications, such as discouraging vexatious litigation and promoting judicial efficacy, the circumstances in this case revealed that the requirement was manifestly disproportionate and unduly burdensome. The court articulated the following concerns:

– The required guarantee matched the total amount of the initial judgment plus costs.

– There was no cap, no exceptions, and no discretion for reduction based on the specifics of the case.

– It effectively forced the appellant to comply with the first-instance judgment in full just to access the appeal process.

The court referenced Article 323(5) of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure, which encompasses the public policy clause, confirming that the security requirement violated the principle of proportionality. Furthermore, limiting access to the court and undermining judicial protection directly contravened Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 20, paragraph 1 of the Greek Constitution.

Consequently, the obligation to deposit an amount of USD 44,397,715.97, which constitutes the awarded sum of the initial judgment (USD 41,248,107.88) plus legal costs (USD 3,149,608.09), was viewed as an untenable financial burden that contradicts the right to judicial protection.

More specifically, the imposition of a security deposit that equaled the judgment amount plus legal fees, with no statutory limits, exceptions, or discretionary reduction possibilities, violated public policy. This requirement substantially infringed upon the appellant’s right to access judicial remedies against an enforceable ruling.

Finally, the court noted that while Greek law allows for provisional enforceability of first-instance judgments under certain conditions, including the possibility of appeal suspension without a guarantee if there is a likelihood of success, such provisions were absent in Panamanian law.

The author of this post is Iina Tornberg, who is a project researcher at the University of Eastern Finland and a visiting researcher at the University of Helsinki. The judgment rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on 16 December 2025 addressed the protection of family life in a case involving the return […]

This blog note is kindly provided by Dr. Muhammad Zubair Abbasi (Lecturer, School of Law, Royal Holloway, University of London; zubair.abbasi@rhul.ac.uk). It follows the author’s previous post on this topic, which was published earlier on this blog.

Introduction

In MA v WK [2025] EWFC 499, three women had undergone Islamic marriage (nikah) ceremonies in England. Each argued that subsequent registration of her marriage in Pakistan had converted it into a valid foreign marriage entitled to recognition in England and Wales. The Family Court rejected this argument because the lex loci celebrationis is fixed at the place and moment of the ceremony; no later act of registration in another jurisdiction can alter it.

The more important question is why the argument was made at all. Each applicant had already accepted that her ceremony was a non-marriage or non-qualifying ceremony (NQC) under English matrimonial law. Each had therefore been excluded, by the rule established in Attorney General v Akhter & Others [2020] EWCA Civ 122 from the financial remedies that the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 would otherwise have provided. The argument from Pakistani registration was, in substance, a desperate attempt to find through private international law a route that domestic law had closed. It was always going to fail but the fact that it was attempted is itself instructive. When the law systematically denies recognition to a form of marriage that a significant part of the population regards as valid, litigants will look for whatever route remains open. MA v WK is a record of one such attempt, and it is unlikely to be the last as long as the existing legal framework remains unreformed.

The Facts

There were three female applicants, each of whom had celebrated a nikah-only in England and sought to rely on subsequent registration in Pakistan. The first, MA, had celebrated a nikah with WK in Oxfordshire on 1 April 2013. She produced a Pakistan Marriage Registration Certificate recording both the marriage date and entry date as 1 April 2013, with an issue date of 26 August 2024. The second, TM, had celebrated a nikah with MM at a mosque in England on 19 January 1992. She produced a Pakistan Marriage Registration Certificate, but the entry date was 2 October 2025 — thirty-three years after the ceremony and after MM had already remarried in Pakistan in 2017. The third, AM, had celebrated a nikah with RK in England in 2005. No evidence of registration was produced.

Non-Qualifying Ceremonies and Private International Law

The formal validity of a marriage is governed by the lex loci celebrationis, as restated by Moylan LJ in Tousi v Gaydukova [2024] EWCA Civ 203. All three ceremonies took place in England; all three applicants accepted that none had complied with the Marriage Act 1949. Each was therefore a non-qualifying ceremony (NQC). The question was whether subsequent registration in Pakistan could convert them into valid foreign marriages capable of recognition in England and Wales. The court held that it could not: the lex loci is determined by the place of celebration, not by any later administrative act. There is no authority for the proposition that registration can substitute for, or supplement, the ceremony for the purposes of legal recognition.

The applicants advanced two arguments. First, that registration is the operative event for lex loci purposes, deriving from Sottomayor v De Barros (No 1) (1877) 3 PD 1, a principle elevating it to the “pinnacle” of matrimonial law [para 16]. That reading does not survive examination: in Sottomayor ceremony and registration happened simultaneously at an English register office, and their coincidence does not make registration the constitutive event. The three further authorities relied upon, Boughajdim v Hayoukane [2022] EWHC 2673; Entry Clearance Officer v Firdous [2018] HU/04562/2016 (Upper Tribunal); and Farah v Farah 16 Va. App. 329 (Va. Ct. App. 1993), each turned on where the ceremony, or its dominant elements, had taken place. None held that registration of an English ceremony abroad could shift the lex loci; they are authority for the opposite proposition.

The second argument assumed what it needed to prove. The principle in Berthiaume v Dastous (Quebec) [1929] UKPC 73, that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere, operates in favour of a marriage validly formed at its place of celebration. It avails nothing where the ceremony was not valid there in the first place. A further difficulty lay in Pakistani law itself. On the expert evidence, accepted in Rana v Manan 2011] EWHC 2132 and applied here, registration under section 5 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 is directory rather than mandatory: it is the nikah contract that creates the marriage. What Pakistani law had done in registering these marriages was not to create new Pakistani marriages, but to record marriages that Pakistani law treated as having taken place in England.

On the presumption of marriage, the answer was straightforward. The presumption, as Evans LJ explained in Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath 1999] EWCA Civ 3008 at [31]–[32], fills evidential gaps; it does not operate where there is positive evidence of non-compliance with the statutory formalities. The circularity this produces is uncomfortable. A party who wishes to argue for recognition of her marriage must disclose to the court the circumstances of the ceremony; and once she has done so honestly, she will typically have foreclosed the only doctrine that might have assisted her.

Commentary

The judgment in this case is the latest in a sequence that has progressively narrowed the legal options available to parties in religious-only or a nikah-only marriages. Until Attorney General v Akhter & Others [2020] EWCA Civ 122, the courts had available to them a range of tools: the “hallmarks of marriage” test from Gereis v Yagoub [1997] Fam Law 475; the presumption of marriage from long cohabitation from Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath1999] EWCA Civ 3008; and a generally flexible approach to the non-marriage category, which had been applied in reported cases almost exclusively to polygamous unions (A-M v A-M (Divorce: Jurisdiction: Validity of Marriage) [2001] 2 FLR 6; Gandhi v Patel [2002] 1 FLR 603; Shagroon v Sharbatly [2012] EWCA Civ 1507; and El Gamal v Al-Maktoum [2011] EWHC B27.

The Court of Appeal’s introduction of the NQC category in Attorney General v Akhter & Others [2020] EWCA Civ 122 changed the landscape. A court asked to classify a religious-only ceremony now asks a single, decisive question: did the ceremony comply, at least to some degree, with the statutory requirements? If the answer is no, the ceremony is outside the regulatory framework entirely, and neither the hallmarks test nor the presumption can operate to bring it back in. The present case is a private international law application of the same logic: the question is what happened at the ceremony, assessed as at the date of the ceremony, and later events, including registration abroad, are irrelevant.

The choice of jurisdiction made no difference to that conclusion. The applicants sought declarations of marital status under section 55(1) of the Family Law Act 1986, which enables a person to apply for a declaration that a marriage was at its inception valid, or that it subsisted on a particular date. That jurisdiction is declaratory, not constitutive: it identifies the status that the law recognises, it does not create one. The argument from foreign registration was in substance an invitation to the court to use the section 55 jurisdiction to confer a status that English law does not recognise. It was always going to fail, not because of any deficiency in the evidence or any technical point of procedure, but because the declaratory jurisdiction cannot be deployed as a means of circumventing the requirements that the Marriage Act 1949 imposes.

None of this is a criticism of the applicants, who were doing what people in their position typically do: looking for whatever route the law might offer. It is a comment on the law itself. The Attorney General had foreshadowed a public policy objection under section 58(1) of the 1986 Act had the court found in the applicants’ favour, an indication that the state’s interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage framework is regarded as sufficiently strong to resist even a successful argument from foreign registration [para 30]. That the argument failed means the public policy point did not arise, but its potential invocation confirms that the current framework is not one the courts are inclined to look for ways around.

Conclusion

The decision in MA v WK is easy to justify on the law as it stands. The lex loci celebrationis is not a rule that administrative convenience in another jurisdiction can displace, and the section 55 jurisdiction does not exist to remedy the deficiencies of the Marriage Act 1949. But the case is a reminder that when domestic law closes every available door, litigants will look elsewhere.

The failure in this case is not one of private international law. The Marriage Act 1949, built on foundations laid by Lord Hardwicke’s Clandestine Marriages Act 1753, which transformed the private marriage contract into a public act requiring the sanction of the church-state — was not designed with cultural and religious diversity in mind. The Government has committed to reform. But the proposed changes are prospective. They will not assist the three women in this case, nor the many others in the same position. Until Parliament addresses that gap, family courts will continue to turn away women whose marriages are real to everyone except the law.

The authors of this post are Mathilde Codazzi (Paris-Panthéon-Assas University), Paul Eichmüller (University of Vienna) and Marco Pasqua (Examiner – Catholic University of the Sacred Heart of Milan), co-Chairs of the EAPIL Young Research Network.  As already noted on this blog, the EAPIL Young Research Network (YRN) will hold its 5th Project Final Conference on Privacy […]

This post was written by Artur Doržinkevič and Ana Kiknadze, PhD candidates at Mykolas Romeris University, and Working Group members for Lithuania in the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions. On 18 December 2025, the Lithuanian legislator adopted amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC”) and other domestic laws, thereby transposing Directive (EU) 2024/1069 […]

Une personne remise à la France en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen et qui n’a pas renoncé au principe de spécialité ne peut faire l’objet d’une mesure de contrôle judiciaire pour une infraction autre que celle ayant motivé sa remise, avant que son consentement ait été obtenu, sauf si cette mesure restrictive de liberté est légalement justifiée par les autres chefs d’accusation figurant dans le mandat. Partant, la juridiction saisie de la violation du principe de spécialité est tenue de le vérifier avant de prononcer une telle mesure de sûreté. 

en lire plus

Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) has kindly shared the following Call for Papers with us.

We are pleased to announce a forthcoming Transnational Dispute Management (TDM, ISSN 1875-4120, www.transnational-dispute-management.com) special issue on “International Arbitration and the Space Industry.”

This Special Issue will be edited by Alexandra van der Meulen, Kate Gough, Joshua Kelly, Annie Pan and Veronika Timofeeva (Freshfields LLP).

Space exploration was once the traditional domain of State actors, with the government space agencies of the United States and the USSR leading the way. Today, the landscape has shifted dramatically: private companies are now at the forefront, driving innovation in areas such as satellite launches, commercial space flight and space stations, among others. According to the World Economic Forum, the global space economy is projected to reach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, growing at an average annual rate of 9%.[1]

The influence of the space industry is becoming increasingly pervasive. Once associated mainly with satellite launches and services such as satellite radio, broadcast television and GPS, these technologies now represent only a fraction of the space industry’s reach. Satellite communications technologies have only grown in sophistication over the past decade, with thousand-strong satellite constellations now delivering a wide variety of commercial and societal services to businesses and consumers. These range from satellite broadband to climate monitoring, enabling accurate environmental data collection and analysis, to supply chain and transportation applications. Aside from its commercial applications, space has also become indispensable for defense purposes, with satellites and other space-based assets providing the backbone for surveillance, communication and strategic operations.

With the rapid growth of the space industry and heightened financial stakes, an increase in space-related disputes is inevitable. In the commercial arena, these disputes are likely to center on contractual issues, such as the supply of services by satellite operators to the telecoms and defense sectors, disputes concerning launch, refueling and maintenance service, and joint venture disputes between State-owned entities and private-sector operators.

Growing private-sector investment in space-related activities is also likely to fuel investor-State disputes. States’ interests in controlling various aspects of space-related technologies and resources (such as spectrum usage) for national security or public interest reasons will inevitably rub up against the purely commercial interests of private operators. Striking the right balance between these competing interests will be critical to sustaining confidence and investment in the sector.

International arbitration is well-positioned to address space-related disputes. In doing so, the international arbitration community will have to grapple with a range of novel legal and technical issues, such as:

• Territoriality in investor-State disputes involving space law
• Specialised rules for disputes related to outer space activities
• The need for specialised treaties protecting foreign investment in the space sector
• The notion of ownership in space
• The role of international and regional space agencies in shaping space-related arbitration
• Damages assessment, particularly for novel space projects
• Multi-contract and multi-party space disputes in complex space ventures
• Space-related disputes under domestic law
• State-to-State disputes concerning space activities
• Mitigation of third-party losses from satellite collisions and space debris
• Licensing and authorization disputes (national overlap, ISDS, etc.)
• Insurance and liability regimes
• National security overlap

We invite all those with an interest in the subject to contribute articles or notes on one of the above topics or any other relevant issue. Proposals for papers (150-200 words) should be submitted to the editors by May 31, 2026, publication is expected in final quarter of 2026.

Please address all questions and proposals to Annie Pan, at annie.pan@freshfields.com, and Veronika Timofeeva, at veronika.timofeeva@freshfields.com. Please CC info@transnational-dispute-management.com when submitting your materials.

Articles accepted for publication before this deadline will also go through TDM’s on-line advance publication process, allowing your work to reach its target audience as soon as the paper completes peer review and the editing process.

The minimum word count for articles is 5,000 words (excluding footnotes, endnotes, appendices, tables, summary etc.). Articles must include a short summary of the key points addressed and any conclusions drawn (150-200 words). The layout of the articles should conform to TDM’s submission guidelines, available at: www.transnational-dispute-management.com/contribute.asp (more information available upon request).

For citations, follow OSCOLA (4th Edition): www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/publications/oscola

This call for papers can also be found on the TDM website here:
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news.asp?key=2101

[1] https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Space_2024.pdf

 

The Permanent Bureau (PB) is pleased to announce that registration is now open for participation in the 14th International Forum on the electronic Apostille Programme (e-APP Forum), which will take place on Tuesday 12 and Wednesday 13 May 2026 in Marrakesh, Morocco. To be held for the first time in Africa, this edition of the e-APP Forum will be organised by the HCCH’s Regional Office for Africa, with the support of the Ministry of Justice of Morocco. The Forum will be conducted in English, French, and Arabic, with simultaneous interpretation provided.

Since its launch in 2006, the e-APP has become an integral part of the operation of the Apostille Convention. The e-APP has two electronic components: an e-Apostille and an e-Register, which, over the past twenty years, have been instrumental in ensuring the practical, effective, and secure operation of the Apostille Convention amid constant technological development.

The e-APP Forum gathers experts and stakeholders from around the world. The Forum will provide a unique international platform for governments, organisations, and the private sector to learn more about the benefits of the e-APP, to promote its effective implementation, and to discuss the latest developments in relation to the e-APP worldwide.

Interested persons should register via this form no later than Friday 1 May 2026, 5.00 p.m. (CEST). Participation in the Forum is free of charge. However, participants are required to make their own travel and hotel arrangements and cover all related costs if participating in person. Please note that in-person seats will be allocated on a first-come, first-served basis and will be confirmed via e-mail by the PB.

For more information on the e-APP Forum, please visit the dedicated page on the HCCH website. A draft Agenda is available on the HCCH website and will be updated as panellists are confirmed.

For further information on the Apostille Convention and the e-APP, please visit the Apostille Section of the HCCH website.

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

When I first flagged the claim by Belgian farmer Hugues Falys v Total, I concluded with

“Re the jurisdictional issues see likely Total use of an argument which I flagged here: viz an emerging corporate strategy to deflect A7(2) forum damni jurisdiction, the argument that a causal link between the damage and the alleged shortcoming of the defendant needs to be shown in the claim form itself for it to ground jurisdiction.”

My short paper for Lex&Forum flags this and other issues related to climate claims and private international law; in my post on Lluya v RWE I note the shortcomings in the German Court of Appeal’s Article 7 Rome II applicable law analysis (I had earlier expanded on Article 7 here); the earlier post on Hagues Falys contains some updated bibliographical references; and Stefania Bariatti et al have a considerable volume here dealing with ESG principles relevant to the claims, including chapters on jurisdiction and applicable law.

The first instance court at Tournai /Doornik issued its interlocutory judgment yesterday, holding solely on jurisdiction and applicable law and concluding with an Article 30 Brussels Ia stay. Guillaume Croisant has posted early overview here.

In essence, the Belgian court holds it has jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation: ‘locus damni’ jurisdiction, and that Belgian law applies to the case.

Note of course immediately that the judgment, if upheld on appeal, does not of course mean that Belgian or EU courts have jurisdiction as locus damni against all oil majors wherever incorporated: Article 7(2) only applies to defendants with domicile in  the EU.

Total had essentially argued what I had predicted, namely an emphasis on the diffuse nature of the damage in climate claims. Its objection to jurisdiction for the Belgian courts on the basis of A7(2) Brussels Ia relies on the foreseeability of damage and on a restrictive interpretation of CJEU Bier. It emphasises the CJEU’s reasons for its foundational approach to Article 7’s split between Handlungsort [place of the (in)action leading to the damage] and Erfolgort: [place where the damage occurs (or may occur)]. These foundational principles, it argues, are foreseeability and proximity (of the courts with jurisdiction, to the place of damage).

The court disagrees that these foundational principles are infringed in a finding of jurisdiction in Belgium [more specifically, the local legal district: A7(2) assigns territorial and not just national jurisdiction] as locus damni. It notes p.10: precisely following CJEU Bier, Total can hardly be surprised to find itself being sued in a place other than its place of domicile; and proximity is of course met where the alleged damaged occurred slap bang in the legal district seized.

However it is on this point that I feel the court may be a touch optimistic in its application of A7(2) locus damni jurisdiction: (footnotes omitted)

TE soutient que le Tribunal doit préalablement examiner l’existence du lien causal entre le fait générateur et le dommage allégué, en ce sens qu’à défaut de preuve de lien étroit suffisant entre les deux, la competence du tribunal de céans doit être déclinée.

S’il paraît justifié de procéder à un examen prealable au stade de la competence, celui-ci ne saurait se muer en un procès avant le procès et cette question doit naturellement être soumise a un examen « prima faciae », ce qui suppose d’apprécier uniquement si les prétentions du demandeur ne paraissent pas invraisemblables.

En l’espece, il ne paraît pas invraisemblable que les EME [court shorthand for ‘climate emergencies’, GAVC] dont se plaint Monsieur FALYS aient causé le dommage qu’il soutient avoir subi et que ces mêmes phénomènes soient en lien causal avec des émissions de gaz a effet de serre.

Translated this would read

[Total] contends that the Court must first examine whether there is a causal link between the event giving rise to the claim and the alleged damage, in that, in the absence of sufficient evidence of a close link between the two, this Court must decline jurisdiction.

Whilst it appears justified to carry out a preliminary examination at the stage of determining jurisdiction, this must not turn into a trial before the trial, and this question must naturally be subject to a ‘prima facie’ examination, which involves assessing only whether the claimant’s claims do not appear implausible.

In the present case, it does not appear implausible that the climate emergencies complained of by Mr FALYS caused the damage he claims to have suffered and that these same phenomena are causally linked to greenhouse gas emissions.

The judgment cites one (scholarly) source for this contention. The court is certainly correct that there must not be a mini trial. However the CJEU with its mozaik, distributive jurisdiction approach per Shevill, does emphasise the  actual existence and demonstration of damage within the jurisdiction and one could also point to CJEU Mittelbayerischer Verlag – mutatis mutandis – as one of the recent cases circumscribing A7(2) scope. I am not saying that claimant did not in fact meet with a higher evidentiary standard. Yet with its ready acceptance and superficial burden of proof, the court imo takes the favor laesis (goodwill for the victim) implication of CJEU Bier too far.

Having established jurisdiction, the court most succinctly opts for Belgian law as the applicable law as a result of Article 7 Rome II. It does not discuss the many angles to Rome II which could have (and I understand, had actually been) raised by Total (in earlier submissions). Instead it held that Total had conceded the applicable law point should the court accept jurisdiction. I am not privy to all parties’ submissions and I was not at the hearings, yet if Total had not so in fact conceded then of course this is a clear ground for appeal.

Eventually the court decides to stay its case on the basis of Article 30 Brussels Ia’s ‘related cases’ provision. The court found sufficient connection with a parallel French proceeding against Total in Paris. I could not find further detail on that case (with claim number, “role n°” 22/03403) hence I cannot say much about it, yet of course an A30 stay is very much to the discretion of the judge seized. The Belgian judges note p.17 that while claimants are different, the objective of both the French and the Belgian proceedings are the same:

to secure an order requiring TOTAL ENERGIES to reduce its GHG emissions and fossil fuel production, and to refrain from making any new investments in projects related to these, on a global scale.

Given that both cases ultimately seek to compel the company to reduce its GHG emissions and fossil fuel production on a global scale, the judges hold that there is a genuine risk of irreconcilable outcomes, and seeing as Paris is expected to rule in mid (European) spring,they stay the Belgian case. The court emphasises in parting that this is merely to secure sound administration of justice as per Brussels Ia’s lis pendens requirements, that it reaffirms its findings on jurisdiction, and that is is not merely bowing to the Paris courts.

The judgment will be appealed at any event. I wonder whether upon appeal the same approach will be taken re burden of proof (or a reference made to the CJEU; current court saw no need at all); and whether there will be more engagement with Article 7 Rome II, which will be most welcome. Of course by the time of an appeal, the lis pendens issue will have become moot, lest any spring Paris judgment will in turn be appealed.

Geert.

 

 

Two recent Grand Chamber judgments of the Court of Justice suggest that the “principle of recognition” in international family law has undergone a qualitative shift: It does more than set vague limits on the outcomes reached by the national laws of Member States. Instead, read together, Mirin and Cupriak-Trojan establish a broad principle of free […]

This post is posted on behalf of Kwamou FEUKEU Eva, Head of the Africa Centre of Expertise and Coordinator of Decolonial Comparative Law, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht

The Africa Centre of Expertise and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law have announced a call for papers for the fourth edition of their Decolonial Comparative Law Workshop series, to be held on 5–6 May 2027 in Douala in collaboration with the Fondation Afric’Avenir. This edition focuses on the theme “Decolonial Comparative Law and the Informal/Formal Economy,” asking scholars to rethink the distinction between formal and informal economies from a decolonial and comparative perspective. The workshop places particular emphasis on recognising the informal economy as a site of legality in its own right, foregrounding legal pluralism and context-specific practices. Contributions are encouraged on a wide range of topics, including microlending, alternative forms of value creation, labour rights in informal work, and indigenous and customary economies. Selected papers will be discussed in an interdisciplinary setting, with engagement from peers, scholars from fields such as anthropology, history, and economics, and practitioners and artists.

The deadline for paper submissions is 1 September 2026. Further details, including the full call for papers (available in English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Arabic), can be accessed here: https://www.mpipriv.de/2020710/decola-informal-formal-economy. An online information session for prospective applicants will be held on 18 March 2026 at 10:00 and 16:00 GMT, with registration available here: https://events.mpipriv.de/b?p=decola_and_the_informal_forma_leconomy_information_session. Following the workshop, an “Epupa School” (meaning “rainy season” in the Douala language) will take place from 10 to 12 May 2027 at the Fondation Afric’Avenir, offering scholars, students, and activists an opportunity to further engage with decolonial comparative approaches to the formal and informal economy.

On 12 March 2026, the Court of Justice rendered its judgment in Shipov (C-43/24), concerning the right of citizens of the Union to free movement and national rules on the amendment of gender data in civil-status registers. The Court held that Article 21 TFEU and Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38, read in the light of […]

On 24 and 25 September 2026, the international conference ‘International Filiation Law in the EU’ will take place at the University of Bonn (Germany). The conference will analyse the EU Parenthood Proposal and the several academic and political reactions to this Proposal, and embed it in a human rights and EU law frame.

Confirmed speakers are Cristina González Beilfuss (Barcelona, Spain), Susanne Lilian Gössl (Bonn, Germany), Ulrike Kjestina Janzen (German Federal Ministry for Justice and Consumer Protection), Martina Melcher (Graz, Austria), Nicolas Nord (CIEC/ICCS), Ilaria Pretelli, (Lausanne, Switzerland), Velina Todorova (Plovdiv, Bulgaria), Alina Tryfonidou (Cyprus), and Patrick Wautelet (Liége, Belgium).

Everybody who is interested in cross-border questions of filiation, child protection and EU law is invited to come and contribute to the ongoing discussion!

More information and the programme will follow soon. If you have questions, please write to sekretariat.goessl@jura.uni-bonn.de.

The next Asian Private International Law Academy (APILA) meeting will be on Tuesday 24 March (not 17 March) when Professor Tu Guangjian will introduce his work in progress on “Legislative Jurisdiction, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Enforcement Jurisdiction: How Can They Be Reconciled in Private International Law and Beyond?”. Professor Tu looks forward to the insights and comments of attendees on how he might develop his ideas on the topic.

Here is link for the APILA meeting on 24 March:

Topic: APILA Monthly Online Meeting on Tuesday 24 March 2026

Time: Mar 24, 2026 07:00 PM Japan Standard Time

Join Zoom Meeting

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/89964430222?pwd=xiXxPfPw76j4oOwXCJTGC941teKWjM.1

Meeting ID: 899 6443 0222

Passcode: 670895

I have already reported on the judgment of the High Court of England and Wales in Border Timbers Ltd v Zimbabwe [2024] EWHC 2024 (Comm), which dismissed an application to set aside an order granting registration of an ICSID award. The High Court had reached a similar conclusion in Infrastructure Services Luxembourg SARL v Spain […]

On Tuesday, April 7, 2026, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CEST). Chukwuma Okoli (University of Birmingham) will speak, in English, about the topic

“Choice of Law for Employment Contracts in Africa: Rethinking the EU Methodology in an African Context”

This presentation examines how African courts have approached choice of law in cross-border employment contracts, often drawing—explicitly or implicitly—on the dominant EU methodology reflected in the Rome I framework. It argues that while the EU model has influenced doctrinal development, its underlying assumptions do not always align with African values and labour realities. Drawing on primary sources from across African jurisdictions, including case law and legislation, the paper proposes a modified methodology that better reflects worker protection, and normative commitments embedded in African legal systems.

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

The author of this post is Lydia Lundstedt, who is an Associate Professor and Senior Lecturer at Stockholm University and Linköping University. On 6 March 2026, the Court of Appeal (CoA) of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) made the UPC’s first-ever reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), including questions on […]

Par un arrêt du 5 février 2026, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme juge que les dispositions du droit français relatives à l’arrêt des traitements de maintien en vie, en ce qu’elles ne confèrent pas un caractère impératif aux directives anticipées du patient, ne portent pas atteinte au droit à la vie garanti par l’article 2 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.

en lire plus

The members of the European Association of Private International Law have access to a reserved area of this website, called MyEAPIL, where they can find information on other members. To ensure this tool is as useful as it can be, it is important that members update their personal details (academic or professional affiliation, e-mail address, […]

This week the Conclusions & Decisions (C&D) of the HCCH governing body, the Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP or Council), were published. Click the links below for the relevant language versions (English, French and Spanish).

Although a wide range of topics were discussed, I would like to focus on four items: parentage/surrogacy project, the cross-border recognition and enforcement of protection orders, the jurisdiction project and a Note on the Trusts Convention.

In my view, the C&D are significant for two reasons. First, the work related to a possible new instrument of a long-standing topic at the HCCH has been concluded (without a Convention) and secondly, a “new” topic has been inserted into the agenda of the HCCH. For more information, see below.

Parentage/surrogacy project

The parentage/surrogacy project has been a recurrent topic in the work of the HCCH. It has expanded more than a decade, starting in 2010 with some preliminary research, which resulted in the establishment of an Experts Group (EG) and subsequently, a Working Group (WG).

In preparation for this meeting, a document was drawn up by the Working Group (WG) on Parentage / Surrogacy entitled: Final Report on the Feasibility of a possible Convention on the Recognition of Judgments on Legal Parentage (Preliminary Document (Prel. Doc.) No. 1). This is a monumental work, which includes a text of a draft Convention (as of p. 13).

The specific proposal of the WG to the Council was the following:

“The WG acknowledged the importance of the HCCH Parentage / Surrogacy Project to develop an international instrument on legal parentage in cross-border situations. The WG agreed that such an instrument is desirable, as it could enhance legal certainty, predictability and continuity while protecting the rights of children and families, and all persons involved.”

It further acknowledged that policy differences remained and for some experts these were fundamental, and as a result, consensus could not be reached on a way forward (i.e. advancing to a Special Commission, which is the usual path when negotiating a HCCH Convention and which are meetings held prior to a Diplomatic Session).

With this Final Report, and as its name suggests, the work of the WG has concluded and this Preliminary Document is the last document drawn up by the WG on this topic.

Reflecting the disagreement existing at the WG level, the Council decided on this topic the following: “While recognising the progress made by the Working Group, CGAP decided not to advance to a Special Commission at this stage, with the understanding that this issue may be revisited at a later stage.”

Accordingly, this year marks the end of this project (if not the end of an era), with the exception of monitoring legal and practical developments on the subject that are to be presented at the 2028 meeting of the Council (C&D No. 5). Perhaps this topic may be revived in the future when and if the time is ripe.

Cross-border recognition and enforcement of protection orders

While the ashes of the Surrogacy/Parentage project were still warm, a “new” proposal for a Convention emerged and was tabled by the UK as: Prel. Doc. No 25 of January 2026 – Proposal from the United Kingdom to establish a Working Group on Recognition and Enforcement of Protection Orders – not publicly available.

The Council mandated the establishment of a WG on a potential future convention on cross-border recognition and enforcement of protection orders (see C&D No. 22).This is remarkable and underlines the importance of keeping women and children safe. By tabling this proposal, the UK makes clear that this is an absolute priority.

This initiative will build on previous work conducted by the Permanent Bureau from 2011-2018, during which an Experts Group was established (see C&D No. 23 and 24). At its 2018 meeting, the Council noted that “14. The Council decided to remove from the Agenda of the HCCH the topic of recognition and enforcement of foreign civil protection orders, with the understanding that this issue may be revisited at a later stage.” A statement that now is history.

This will be an important initiative to follow in the future.

Jurisdiction project

The decision on the future of the jurisdiction project has been delayed until the next meeting of the Council in 2027. At that meeting a decision will be made whether that project advances to a Special Commission “or decide on any other outcome of the Project” (C&D 9).

A Report of the Chair of the Working Group on matters related to jurisdiction in transnational civil or commercial litigation was presented as Prel. Doc. No 2A of December 2025. This Report includes a draft text of a future convention on parallel proceedings and related actions (from p. 13, with many [square brackets], signalling lack of consensus or agreement on the text).

Last year a public consultation was launched on the Draft Text of a possible new convention on parallel proceedings and related actions, the results of which still need to be analysed. The Council mandated that a document be submitted analysing such responses by the end of September 2026 and gave specific instructions on how it should be drafted (C&D No. 8). The responses will be published subject to the permission of the respondents.

We will keep you informed of any new developments.

A Note on the Trusts Convention

Finally, a Note on the Application and Interpretation of Article 2 of the Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition and on the Institutions Analogous to Trusts was submitted as Prel. Doc. No 12B of January 2026 (for the actual Note see Annex V, p. 25). In particular, a fascinating explanation of the terms used in English (estate) and French (patrimoine) is included in pages 28-29. Equally interesting is Annex A to Note (for Section V) – Institutions Meeting the Criteria in Article 2 of the Trusts Convention. This Note was approved and will be published together with its Annexes (C&D 69).

 

In sum, this Council’s meeting decided on crucial matters related to treaty making on Private International Law at the HCCH. The next meeting of the Council in 2027 will also be of great importance as it will decide on the future of the jurisdiction project. With regard to specific projects, the cross-border recognition and enforcement of protection orders attests to the fact that a topic can indeed return to the agenda of the HCCH, and thus some experts may harbour the wish that the parentage/surrogacy project may rise one day like a phoenix from the ashes.