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This post was written by Matthias Lehmann, Professor at the University of Vienna. It is the third contribution to the EAPIL online symposium on the Law Commission of England and Wales’s Consultation Paper on Digital Assets and Electronic Trade Documents in Private International Law. Readers are encouraged to participate in the discussion by commenting on the […]

The latest issue of RabelsZ has just been released. It contains the contributions to the symposium in honor of Jürgen Basedow that was held in Hamburg in November 2024. The table of contents is available here. All content is Open Access: CC BY 4.0 and more articles are available Online First.

Eva-Maria Kieninger, Konrad Duden and Ralf Michaels, Preface to the Symposium Issue, pp. 409–410, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2025-0046

 

Hannah L. Buxbaum, The New Unilateralism in EU Cross-Border Regulation: Objectives, Methods, Institution, oo. 411–431, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2025-0043

For years, Europe was a site of resistance to regulatory unilateralism, particularly as practiced by the United States. Today, though, there are signs of a robust unilateralism at work in EU regulatory practices. To some extent it simply mirrors practices adopted in the United States and elsewhere: Like other lawmakers, the EU has begun to act unilaterally where necessary to achieve effective regulation of its own markets and to protect local interests. In other respects, though, the new unilateralism in the EU presents quite differently. First, the EU increasingly uses its own legislation not to advance purely local regulatory interests, but rather to achieve international or global goals – classically a more multilateral objective. Second, under EU law individual regulations in particular substantive areas are embedded in a larger framework of norms and values that claim universal appeal. In both of these regards, the EU version of unilateralism appears more benign than purely »self-interested« unilateralism. It nevertheless raises important questions about the way that local laws and institutions are used to project regulatory power in the international arena. The goal of this article is to explore these questions. It begins by describing the characteristics of this new unilateralism, in terms of both its doctrinal foundations and its regulatory objectives. It then focuses on one particular mechanism: the adequacy regime established under EU data protection law.

Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, Einheitsrecht – prinzipiell oder sektoral? [Uniform Law – a Principle- or Sector-based Approach?], pp. 432–450, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2025-0040

The purpose of this article is to shed some light on the possible future of uniform law. Notwithstanding the possible hinderances and difficulties faced by unification activities, especially a possible lack of interest in such activities, the article considers the question of which actors are and will be involved in legal unification and what types of uniform law can be expected. The growing involvement of private actors (the so-called commercial approach) and the concentration on different kinds of soft law promise an increasing degree of sectoral projects featuring a functional approach. However, it is essential to continue work on general principles that have applicability in specific areas of law; such principles are needed as interpretative aids and serve an important gap-filling function. Jürgen Basedow recommended keeping general principles in mind already at the stage of formulating a sectoral project. Thus, it can be expected that both the concept of principles and a sectoral approach will play an important role also in the future.

 

Christian Kohler, Zur Außenprivatrechtspolitik der Europäischen Union, [On the External Policy of the European Union in the Field of Private Law], pp 451–482, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2025-0041

The policy of the European Union in the field of private law is primarily aimed at shaping the internal market, but it also affects relations with non-EU states in a variety of ways as regards both regulatory private law and the conflict of laws. The EU’s underlying »external private law policy« is pursued in two ways. First, legal instruments include unilateral scope rules which bring persons or events in third states within the scope of the measure and which should promote the regulatory objectives at issue. Second, agreements on private law matters are concluded by or on behalf of the EU with third states. However, institutional weaknesses and the Union’s notorious lack of competence make it difficult to develop a coherent external private law policy. In the field of conflict of laws, the conclusion of multilateral agreements makes the unilateral extension of EU rules to situations involving third states not redundant. There is no discernible political will to extend the Union’s powers in the field of private law and thereby change the conditions under which the EU’s external private law policy is currently formed.

 

Matteo Fornasier, Modelle europäischer Privatrechtsharmonisierung. Die prozedurale Harmonisierung als neue Form der Rechtsvereinheitlichung in der EU? [Harmonization of Private Law in Europe. Procedural Harmonization as a New Path Towards the Approximation of National Laws in the EU?], pp. 483–505, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2025-0042

The article offers an overview on the variety of regulatory approaches towards the harmonization of private law in Europe, covering both negative and positive harmonization, including full, minimum, and optional harmonization. Particular attention is devoted to what appears to be a new model of harmonization, which is referred to in this article as procedural harmonization. Procedural harmonization occurs where the EU legislature or, in some cases, the EU Court of Justice confines itself to setting common European procedural standards for the protection of certain individual rights, without harmonizing the substance of those rights. The article draws on a number of examples from EU employment law, which is an important element of the system of EU private law, though it is often marginalized in European private law discourse.

 

Herbert Kronke, Weil Wissenschaft Wissen schafft: Zu Jürgen Basedows »Uniform Law« [Because Scholarship Generates Knowledge: On Jürgen Basedow’s »Uniform Law«], pp 506–521, https://doi.org/10.1628/rabelsZ-2025-0045

The article highlights the innovative nature of Basedow’s third major monograph relative to other »modern classics« on uniform law, noting in particular its combination of (almost) encyclopaedic coverage, systematic structure, and critical analysis, incorporating well-known central topics along with commentary on numerous uniform legal instruments. In addition, there are new and surprising elements awaiting comparative commercial law scholars, such as the topic of »negative harmonization«. The author of the article also discusses hypotheses, arguments, and conclusions in regards to perpetual themes of transnational law, such as the choice between a classic international treaty or the now frequent alternative of a soft law instrument, the dynamic of mutual influence between uniform law and non-uniform national law, and the relationship of uniform law and private international law. Finally, the article looks at institutional, cultural, and economic framework conditions and – politically determined – obstacles to the development of modern uniform law, as felt by the institutions, as well as experts involved in their work.

 

The issue also contains several reviews of literature in the fields of comparative private and private international law and on related topics (pp. 522–610).

This post was written by Burcu Yüksel Ripley, Professor at the University of Aberdeen School of Law. It is the second contribution to the EAPIL online symposium on the Law Commission of England and Wales’s Consultation Paper on Digital Assets and Electronic Trade Documents in Private International Law. Readers are encouraged to participate in the […]

The Bahrain International Commercial Court (BICC) was launched on 5 November 2025. It joins the long established Dubai International Financial Centre Courts, Abu Dhabi Global Market Courts and Qatar International Court and Dispute Resolution Centre in the Middle East as a specialist court devoted to resolving international commercial disputes and operating under special procedural rules.

The BICC was developed in partnership with the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC). It shares many key features with the SICC such as a multinational bench, foreign counsel representation and use of the English language in proceedings. Of particular note is the appeal mechanism for BICC judgments; as discussed previously here, appeals from the BICC will be heard by the International Committee of the SICC.

La Cour européenne des droits l’homme, en rejetant les requêtes de M. Fillon, de son épouse et de M. Joulaud au motif d’un défaut manifeste de fondement, retient que la procédure aboutissant à leur condamnation était équitable et que les requérants ont eu accès à un tribunal indépendant et impartial en respect de leurs droits de la défense.  

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La chambre criminelle confirme la compétence du procureur européen délégué pour prendre des décisions en matière de contrôle judiciaire (C. pr. pén., art. 696-119), notamment au regard de son impartialité. De surcroît, elle applique la réserve d’interprétation du Conseil constitutionnel qui unifie les recours contre ces décisions devant le juge des libertés et de la détention, lequel doit statuer sous 72 heures. 

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It is common to see some variation of the phrase “without regard to conflict of laws principles” appear at the end of a choice-of-law clause. Here are some examples:

“This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of China, without regard to its principles concerning conflicts of laws.”

“This Agreement and all acts and transactions pursuant hereto and the rights and obligations of the parties hereto shall be governed, construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware, without giving effect to principles of conflicts of law.”

“This Note is being delivered in and shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York, without regard to the conflict of laws provisions thereof.”

Although this phrase is common, its purpose and origin are poorly understood. In 2020, I published an article, A Short History of the Choice of Law Clause, that attempted to demystify these issues.

The original purpose of this language, as best I can tell, was to signal disapproval of decisions such as Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corporation, a 1948 case in which a U.S. court interpreted a clause choosing Pennsylvania law to select the whole law of Pennsylvania (including its conflicts rules). The court then applied Pennsylvania conflicts rules to conclude that the agreement was, in fact, governed by the law of Alabama. Needless to say, it seems highly unlikely that this is what the parties intended.

When the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was published, it criticized the holding in Duskin. The drafters of the Restatement took the position that choice-of-law clauses should not be interpreted to select the conflicts rules of the chosen jurisdiction. The prominence assigned to the topic in the section of the new Restatement dealing with choice-of-law clauses (Section 187(3)) prompted contract drafters across the United States to think seriously about the issue for the first time. So far as I can determine, the language quoted above did not appear in a single U.S. choice-of-law clause drafted before the late 1960s. In the years that followed the publication of the Restatement (Second) in 1971, the number of contracts containing this language exploded.

The irony is that the holding in Duskin was widely ignored by U.S. courts. In the decades since that case was decided, these courts have consistently interpreted choice-of-law clauses to exclude the conflicts rules of the chosen jurisdiction even when they omit the phrase “without regard to principles of conflict of laws.” Nevertheless, this language continues to be written into thousands upon thousands of choice-of-law clauses each year.

 

This post was written by Koji Takahashi, Professor at the Doshisha University Law School. It is the first contribution to the EAPIL online symposium on the Law Commission of England and Wales’s Consultation Paper on Digital Assets and Electronic Trade Documents in Private International Law. Readers are encouraged to participate in the discussion by commenting […]

On 5 June 2025, the Law Commission of England and Wales published a consultation paper (paper; summary) proposing reform to certain rules of private international law that apply in the context of digital assets and electronic trade documents. This development was covered by the EAPIL blog. In brief, the Consultation Paper makes four key contributions: Proposals for […]

The Court’s activities are suspended during the so-called semaine blanche, i.e., between 3 and 7 November 2025. The first event related to private international law is the hearing that is set to take place on 12 November in case C-14/25, Thüringer Aufbaubank. The Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) is requesting the interpretation of Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 […]

By Catherine Shen, Asian Business Law Institute

In 2023 Su 05 Xie Wai Ren No. 8 dated March 14, 2025, the Suzhou Intermediate People’s Court of Jiangsu Province in China (Suzhou Court) recognized and enforced civil judgment HC/S194/2022 under file number HC/JUD47/2023 by the Supreme Court of Singapore (Singapore Judgment). The judgment by the Suzhou Court (Suzhou Judgment) was announced in September 2025 by the Supreme People’s Court of China (SPC) as among the fifth batch of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) model cases.

Background

The applicant, Company Golden Barley International Pte Ltd (legal representative Wu), requested the Suzhou Court to recognize and enforce the Singapore Judgment, including the obligations imposed on the respondent Xiao to make payment.

The applicant claimed, among others, that Xiao, a director of Company Ba, colluded with other defendants of the case and procured Company Golden Barley into signing contracts with Company Ba and another company and making prepayment, without delivering to Company Golden Barley the goods agreed under those contracts. The Singapore Judgement, among others, ordered Xiao to pay over $6.6 million plus interest to Company Golden Barley. The applicant based its application on China’s Civil Procedure Law, the Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of Law to Interest Accrued on Debt during the Period of Delayed Performance during Enforcement and the Memorandum of Guidance between the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China and the Supreme Court of Singapore on Recognition and Enforcement of Money Judgments in Commercial Cases (MOG).

The respondent Xiao, on her part, made several counterclaims. Among others, she contended that service of the Singapore documents was defective as service was forwarded by the International Cooperation Bureau of the SPC rather than the Ministry of Justice which is the competent authority designated by China to transmit foreign judicial documents under the 1965 HCCH Service Convention, and that the documents served on her were copies in the English language. Xiao also pointed out that the MOG is non-binding and that the treaty between China and Singapore on judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters does not cover judgments recognition and enforcement. Further, the respondent argued that the Singapore Judgment was not final and binding because it was pending appeal among some other defendants, making it ineligible for recognition and enforcement.

Decision

The Suzhou Court noted that courts in China and Singapore have recognized and enforced each other’s civil and commercial judgments since the MOG was signed in August 2018. Reciprocity therefore exists between the two jurisdictions which is required under Chinese law for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments in the absence of any international treaty on judgments recognition and enforcement signed by or acceded to by the jurisdictions concerned.

The Suzhou Court also found that service of the Singapore documents on Xiao was not defective. The Chinese embassy in Singapore had entrusted the International Cooperation Bureau of the SPC to assist with service for case HC/S194/2022 in July 2022. One month later, the Zhangjiagang People’s Court in Jiangsu Province (Zhangjiagang Court) served those documents on Xiao who acknowledged receipt. Xiao then declined to take delivery of the originals of those documents when contacted again by the Zhangjiagang Court after the originals were subsequently forwarded by the Chinese embassy in Singapore.

Further, the Suzhou Court found that the Singapore Judgment is final and binding. Specifically, the Suzhou Court had requested the SPC to submit a Request for Assistance in Ascertaining Relevant Laws of Singapore to the Supreme Court of Singapore. In its reply issued in December 2024, the Supreme Court of Singapore explained the scope of application of Singapore’s Rules of Court and the provisions therein on default judgments, which helped the Suzhou Court reach its conclusion.

The Suzhou Court accordingly recognized and enforced the Singapore Judgment.

Commentary

With this decision, the Suzhou Court continues the favorable momentum of the courts of China and Singapore recognizing each other’s civil and commercial judgments and affirms the importance and practical application of the MOG despite its non-binding nature.

Further, according to the SPC, this is the first time that a Chinese court has activated the procedure for seeking assistance from a Singapore court to provide clarifications on relevant Singapore law. Article 19 of the MOG says Singapore courts may seek assistance from the SPC to obtain certification that the Chinese judgment for which enforcement is sought is final and conclusive. This “right” is not provided in the MOG for Chinese courts. According to the SPC, the Suzhou Court sought assistance from the Supreme Court of Singapore based on a separate instrument titled the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore on Information on Foreign Law (MOU). This MOU provides a route for referrals between the courts of the two jurisdictions to seek information or clarifications on each other’s relevant laws. Under the MOU, if it is necessary for courts in China or Singapore to apply the law of the other jurisdiction in adjudicating international civil and commercial cases, a request may be made to the relevant court in the other jurisdiction to provide information and opinions on its domestic law and judicial practice in civil and commercial matters, or matters relating thereto. The Supreme Court of Singapore and the SPC are the courts designated for transmitting, and for receiving and responding to, such requests in Singapore and China, respectively. Any request should be responded to as soon as possible, with notice to be given to the requesting court if the receiving court is unable to furnish a reply within 60 days. Further requests can also be made for more clarifications.

In Singapore domestic law, Order 29A of the Rules of Court 2021 empowers the Supreme Court of Singapore, on the application of a party or its own motion, to transmit to a specified court in a specific foreign country a request for an opinion on any question relating to the law of that foreign country or to the application of such law in proceedings before it. So far, China and the SPC are the only specified foreign country and specified court under Order 29A. Essentially, Order 29A has formalized the procedures under the MOU for Singapore.

This is different from Order 29 of the Rules of Court 2021 which currently lists New South Wales in Australia, Dubai of the United Arab Emirates and Bermuda as “specified foreign countries” and their relevant courts as “specified courts”. Under Order 29, where in any proceedings before the Supreme Court of Singapore there arises any question relating to the law of any of those specified foreign countries or to the application of such law, the Supreme Court of Singapore may, on a party’s application or its own motion, order that proceedings be commenced in a specified court in that specified foreign country seeking a determination of such question. The Supreme Court of Singapore has in place memoranda of understanding on references of questions of law with the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the Supreme Court of Bermuda and the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts. These memoranda of understanding all “direct” parties to take steps to have the contested issue of law determined by the foreign court.

This may explain why Order 29 is titled referrals on issues of law while Order 29A is titled requests for opinions on questions of foreign law. It should be noted that equivalent provisions are in place for referrals involving the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) (SICC Rules, Order 15 and Order 15A).

Finally, it may also be interesting to explain SPC’s lists of model cases. As a civil law jurisdiction, China does not practice Stare Decisis. Nor does it formally recognize the binding effects of precedents. However, the SPC does publish different lists of judgments which it deems of guiding value from time to time. Those judgments can be “guiding cases” which, loosely speaking, are of the highest “precedent value” and are subject to the most stringent selection criteria. They can be “model cases” which are of significant importance but are subject to less stringent selection criteria. They may also be “gazetted cases” which are judgments published on the official SPC newsletter for wider reference (but not guidance). Model cases may also be released for specific subject matter areas, such as intellectual property, financial fraud, etc. The Suzhou Judgment here is among the BRI model cases which mostly concern commercial disputes involving jurisdictions along the route of China’s BRI program.

This write-up is adaptation of an earlier post by the Asian Business Law Institute which can be found here.

 

 

In Case C‑398/24 [Pome], the CJEU yesterday held without AG Opinion.

Under Estonian law, choice of court is only valid in respect of disputes connected with the economic or professional activity of both parties to the agreement in question (in the case at issue, an agreement between two natural persons concerning the transfer of half the share of the equity in a flat, and the coinciding monies owed by the acquiring party to the other; neither of them seemingly professionally engaged in real estate.

The question referred is essentially whether Brussels Ia tolerates

a condition, imposed by the national law of the Member State whose court has been designated by the parties to an agreement as having jurisdiction, according to which an agreement conferring jurisdiction entered into by natural persons is valid only if the dispute at issue is connected with the economic or professional activity of those parties, amounts to a ground for the agreement being ‘null and void as to its substantive validity’, within the meaning of [Article 25 Brussels Ia]

[27] the CJEU with reference to Lastre points out the limited reach of Article 25’s lex fori prorogati rule:

the first sentence of Article 25(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 merely lays down a conflict-of-law rule by specifying which national law is applicable as regards the question whether, notwithstanding the fact that all the conditions of validity laid down in that article are satisfied, such an agreement may be null and void on other substantive grounds under that national law

[32] The lex fori prorogati rule only “covers the general grounds for an agreement being null and void that may have an impact on a contractual relationship, namely – in particular – those which vitiate consent, such as error, deceit, violence or fraud, and incapacity to contract”. By contrast [35] the Estonian rule at stake “does not constitute one of the general grounds for [contractual] invalidity”, rather [37] undermines the respect for “the autonomy of the parties..the effectiveness of exclusive choice-of-court agreements” which are clearly essential to Brussels Ia. Ad nauseam, [39]

to impose a condition under national law, which renders an agreement conferring jurisdiction invalid if the dispute is not connected with the economic or professional activity of the parties to the agreement, would be contrary to those parties’ freedom of choice’ (reference here to Refcomp).

[42] over and above the principle of party autonomy, the Estonian rule also infringes the core objective of legal certainty:

the legal certainty ensured by Regulation No 1215/2012 would be compromised if it were possible, for a national legislature, to lay down additional conditions of validity pertaining to agreements conferring jurisdiction themselves and insisting in particular on the existence of a connection with the type of activity of the parties to the dispute.

The CJEU’s emphatic support for party autonomy also means it did not entertain the referring court’s suggestions on recital 20’s renvoi rule (with Estonian residual private international law, like many Member States, declaring Rome I to be applicable despite its exclusion of choice of court agreements, hence making the lex (voluntatis) contractus applicable to the question of substantive validity of choice of court).

The judgment is yet again solid evidence of the status of party autonomy as a foundational principle under Brussels Ia.

Geert.

EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.343 ff.

The latest issue of the International & Comparative Law Quarterly includes two contributions dealing with private international law. The first, by Richard Garnett, is entitled Foreign Judgments and the Relationship between Direct and Indirect Jurisdiction. A key issue in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is jurisdiction, with a distinction drawn between ‘direct’ jurisdictional […]

Jean-Baptiste Racine (University Paris II Panthéon Sorbonne), Fabrice Siiriainen (University of Nice) and Séverine Menétrey (Free University of Brussels) have published the fourth edition of a manual of French international commercial law (Droit du commercial international). The book surveys all aspects of international commercial law: private international law of corporations, of contracts, and of guarantees. […]

As announced earlier on this blog, applications are open to join the Lindemann Fellowship, a programme established in 2024 to support promising academics in the field of private international law. Fellows are accepted for a three-year period, with new Fellows joining each year.  The core of the Fellowship is an annual fully funded meeting of […]

On 19 November 2025, from 2 to 3 pm UK time, the Aberdeen Centre for Private International Law and Transnational Governance will host a webinar featuring Kirsten Henckel (University of Groningen) on The Digital Afterlife: Digital succession and private international law. The webinar will explore how digitalisation has transformed property and inheritance, raising new challenges […]

The Greek publisher Nomiki Bibliothiki has published a book by Haris Meidanis, in English, titled The Private International Law of Commercial Mediation. In a commercial contract that contains a mediation clause, a dispute arises. Mediation starts and the related questions begin: Must the parties sign an agreement with the mediator and under which law? Should […]

The CJEU held last Thursday in C-682/23 E.B. sp. z o.o. v K.P. sp. z o.o. (my usual grumble on anonymisation: there is exactly zero reason to anonymise names in a bog standard B2B litigation fought in open court).

E.B. (the principal) and E. PL. (the service provider) are two companies incorporated under Polish law. They contracted on 24 March and 24 July 2017 two contracts for construction work in Poland. With effect from 4 March 2017, E. PL. subcontracted with E. S.A., a company incorporated under Romanian law. On 10 July 2017, E. S.A., in turn, concluded a subcontract with K.P., yet another company incorporated under Polish law. This contract contains a jurisdiction clause under which ‘any dispute shall be resolved by the court within whose jurisdiction the contracting party has its registered office’. The clause does not specify the exact scope of the term ‘contracting party’. This is the clause at the centre of the case.

The four contracts referred to above all have Polish law as lex contractus by way of lex voluntatis.

K.P. then allegedly misperformed under the subcontract leading to E.S.A having a €3 million plus claim against K.P. This claim was assigned by agreement of 16 December 2021, concluded between E. S.A. and E.B. and with the participation of E. PL. E.B. took that claim in what it said is both contractual liability and liability in tort, to the Romanian court which it said had jurisdiction in its capacity as the court within whose jurisdiction E. S.A. had its registered office.

K.P. argued lack of jurisdiction for the Romanian court, suggesting a tortious claim did not engage the choice of court and per A7(2) Ia should be heard in Poland as locus delicti commissi. As for contractual liability, K.P. argued that E.B. could not, as a third party to the subcontract in question, rely on the jurisdiction clause at issue.

To question before the CJEU is whether the assignee of a claim arising from a contract, has the right to enforce the jurisdiction clause in that contract against the original party to the contract, if the assignment contract has, in accordance with the national law applicable to the substance of the dispute, transferred the claim and its ancillary rights, but NOT the obligations arising from the contract.

The CJEU up to [40], referring to previous case law (including Maersk, of course), firstly postulates a ius commune rule (supported by the principles of predictability, certainty and good administration of justice of Brussels Ia) that in any case there is enforceability under Article 25 if rights AND obligations have been assigned.

It then [41] ff concludes that it is however also compatible with A25 BIa if a national regulation such as, in this case, Polish private law, as applied by Polish case law, includes enforceability by the assignee of the jurisdiction agreement against the original contracting party, even if the assignment transfers rights only and not obligations, and even if the other, originally contracting party did not consent to the assignment in general or to the assignment of the choice of forum in particular. Except if the original contracting parties expressly agreed that such assignment could not result in the enforceability of the choice of court clause.

The judgment reemphasises the incomplete assignment picture under EU private international law which I also flagged for a planned talk at the Asser institute last week.

Geert.

EU private international law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.373 ff.

The ASADIP conference is an annual highlight of the discipline. The reports from the 2025 conference in Rio de Janeiro are now available, in English, Spanish, and Portuguese, here

And the location and date for the 2026 have been set for San Salvador, El Salvador, 20-23 October. See you there.

 

On 17 October 2025, the EBS Law School in Oestrich-Winkel, Germany, hosted a conference Sustainable Global Value Chains and Private International Law. The conference was organised by Professors Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm (Edinburgh Law School) and Michael Nietsch (EBS Law School) as part of the Law Schools Global League Sustainable Global Value Chains Project (see also here).

The conference brought together a number of scholars specialised in private international law, company law, and contract law to discuss the role of private law and private international law in social, economic, and environmental sustainability within global value chains.

Keynote

Ralf Michaels (Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany) delivered the keynote lecture entitled “European Law for Global Value Chains – Human Rights Advancement or European Imperialism?” Professor Michaels addressed this question from a historical perspective. He related the historical roots of existing sourcing practices to contemporary supply chains, drawing on a wealth of theoretical insights. He further reflected on the conceptualisations that remain necessary for the legal discipline to contribute to addressing economic inequalities in contemporary global sourcing practices facilitated by interconnected chains of contracts.

After the keynote, several scholars provided insights into their current research, which resonated with various aspects of the keynote lecture.

Other contributions

Ren Yatsunami (Kyushu University, Japan) addressed the ‘Governance Gaps on Global Value Chains from the Perspective of Private International Law’. Professor Yatsunami sketched, inter alia, a situation in which an act taking place in Japan triggered the application of French law on the duty of vigilance. He discussed this situation from the perspective of Japanese courts and Japanese private international law, including the question of overriding mandatory rules, to illustrate the intricacies of applying the sets of rules involved.

Carlos Vázquez (Georgetown University, Washington D.C., United States) elaborated on the ‘Choice of Law in Transnational Business and Human Rights Litigation’. Professor Vázquez discussed the conflict-of-law approaches in both the United States and the European Union, distinguishing between two ways of framing litigation — as a breach of international law and as a breach of national law, primarily tort law — and examined the peculiarities of each. Relying on historical and theoretical insights into both ways of framing litigation, the contribution offered a reflection on possible ways forward.

The discussion then turned to contract law, namely the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). Felix M. Wilke (EBS Law School, Oestrich-Winkel, Germany) titled his contribution ‘’Tainted by Harm but Fit for Sale? Human Rights and the Concept of Non-Conformity under the CISG’. Professor Wilke focused on the connection between supply chain regulation and the CISG’s provisions on the quality and conformity of goods and remedies.

Thereafter, Sara Sánchez (IE University, Madrid, Spain) connected the contract law framework with procedural law and EU law. In her contribution ‘Access To Justice in CS3D-Related Claims’, Professor Sánchez discussed the absence of jurisdictional rules in the regulation of due diligence in supply chains (see also posts by Michaels & Sommerfeld here and by Silva de Freitas & Kramer here). Professor Sánchez proposed an EU law-based solution to address this gap.

Irene-Marie Esser (University of Glasgow, Scotland UK) and Christopher Riley (University of Durham) then turned to ‘The Interplay between Reporting Requirements and Group Liability for Supply Chain Misconduct – Transnational Business Corporations’. They addressed the existing case law, normative considerations, and avenues for the further development of company law aspects of liability related to acts and omissions involving groups of companies in supply chains.

Simone Lamont-Black (University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK) and Catherine Pédamon (University of Westminster, UK) took a broad look at the agricultural business and food supplies. Departing from the premise that contractual clauses are not sufficient to provide food security and sustainability in global food supply chains, these scholars elaborated on other possible solutions.

The last panel drew conclusions and discussed emerging themes for further research. The discussants were Nevena Jevremovic (University of Aberdeen, UK), Matthias Goldmann (EBS Law School), Klaas Hendrik Eller (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands), and Ekaterina Pannebakker (Leiden University, the Netherlands).