Last month the book The Heroes of the Judicial Periphery: Court Experts, Court Clerks, and Other Actors in the Shadows, edited by Alan Uzelac and Stefaan Voet (Hart/Bloomsbury Publising, 2025) was published. The book highlights the role of perhaps less prominent, but nevertheless important actors in (international) judicial procedures from a national, comparative and/or international perspective.
The European Civil Justice Centre (Erasmus School of Law) hosts a seminar in collaboration with the editors to launch the book on 4th July 2025 from 10-12 CEST.
Discussions on civil justice mostly focus on procedural rules, and the role of courts, parties and lawyers. This book addresses other actors that are often overlooked in academic and policy debates. It assesses the role of court experts, court clerks and court staff, and other actors on the ‘judicial periphery’ who play an important role and often co-determine the pace, outcome, and tone of the judicial process.
The knowledge and skills of experts may be indispensable at times, but it is among the most expensive, complicated and time-consuming means of evidence. The judges adjudicate, but where experts are involved in the process, they have a decisive impact on the outcome of litigation. Therefore, a principal focus of the book is on experts and how they are appointed, managed, and remunerated across Europe and the world.
The editors will discuss topical issues highlighting these ‘actors in the shadows’ and key experts will present their ideas based on the key findings of the book chapters, followed by discussion.
Registration for free here (hosted through Eventbrite)
Speakers & program:
10.00 Opening and welcome: Xandra Kramer
10.05 Alan Uzelac & Stefaan Voet – Heroes of the Judicial Periphery
10.15 Juraj Brozovic – The Case of Judicial Advisors in Croatia
10.30 Camilla Bernt – Expert Evidence in Custody Disputes and Child Protection Cases
10.50 Discussion
11.05 Michael Stürner – Experts on Foreign Law in German Civil Procedure
11.30 Adriani Dori & Xandra Kramer – The Role of Third-Party Funders in the Shadow of the Procedure
11.45 Discussion
[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
Thank you Alain Devers for alerting us to the Supreme Court’s decision in follow-up of the CJEU judgment in Case C‑633/22 Real Madrid Club de Fútbol, AE v EE, Société Éditrice du Monde SA which I discussed here.
On 28 May the Supreme Court held that the court of appeal’s refusal of recognition is annulled, and needs to be reconsidered by a different court of appeal. Its annulment is based squarely on the court of appeal not having properly considered the elements identified by the CJEU. Evidently, the final judgment may still lead to the same result, but will have to be justified differently if that is the route that will be taken.
[33] it notes that the court of appeal had reviewed the substance of the Spanish courts’ findings, in reassessing whether the French journalists and editor had acted with disregard for their professional duties and in reevaluating both the seriousness of their disregard and the impact this had on the aggrieved.
[39] it refers to the court of appeal’s ordre public finding which had not considered the seriousness of the infringement as held by the Spanish courts.
[45] the court of appeal is faulted for not having considered the financial means of the journalist in question, in considering whether the recognition and enforcement would have an impact on free speech: this is one of the criteria the CJEU had held as being relevant.
[51] the same consideration is made viz the newspaper itself.
[57] the court of appeal should have considered, as now instructed by the CJEU, the distinction between the reputation of a legal cq natural person (the former lacking the ‘moral’ element of impacting on the ‘dignity’ of the person).
The CJEU had given very specific instructions to the national judges in cases like these and I am not sure that is the way to go. As Szpunar AG had noted in his Opinion in the case, the relevant CJEU authorities prior to current case hitherto had engaged with procedural law ordre public exceptions, rather than substantive rules such as here fundamental rights. The obvious downside of that route is that national courts may now be tempted nay feel obliged to refer to the CJEU to seek substantive instruction for the ordre public assessment of other rights, too, leading to Kirchberg having to give specific instructions for umpteen scenarios. Not what Brussels Ia intended, me thinks.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed, 2024, 2.619 ff.
[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
In Stichting Environment and fundamental rights v Repsol Perú BV et al ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2025:8700, the claim relates to the 15 January 2022 oil leak at La Pampilla, Peru, also known as the Callao Oil Spill.
Defendants are Repsol Perú BV, domiciled at The Hague: this is the anchor defendant and jurisdiction against it is easily established using Article 4 Brussels Ia. The other defendants are Repsol SA Madrid, and Refinería La Pampilla SAA of Callao. Peru.
‘Forum connexitatis’ is the power for a court to exercise jurisdiction over defendants against whom it does not ordinarily have jurisdiction, provided the claims against them are so closely related to (hence ‘connexitatis’) one against a defendant viz whom said court undisputedly has jurisdiction, that the interest of justice requires joint treatment of all claims concerned. The latter defendant is called the ‘anchor defendant’.
In the case at issue, forum connexitatis needs to be tested against the EU rules (Article 8 Brussels Ia) in the case of Repsol SA; and under residual Dutch rules (Article 7(1) CPR, because A8(1) does not apply against non-EU domiciled defendants) in the case of Refiniería La Pampilla SAA.
Current judgment deals with the jurisdictional issues only and does not mention applicable law at all. It is likely claimants make use of Article 7 Rome II’s lex ecologia provisions (compare the Lliuya v RWE judgment just last week) however I cannot be sure.
A first argument of defendants is that under Article IX of the 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage – CLC, the claim must be brought in Peru:
“Where an incident has caused pollution damage in the territory, including the territorial sea or an area referred to in Article II, of one or more Contracting States or preventive measures have been taken to prevent or minimize pollution damage in such territory including the territorial sea or area, actions for compensation may only be brought in the Courts of any such Contracting State or States.”
[4.6] the court acknowledges that prima facie this does look like a knock-out point. However [4.7] it points out that on the other hand, the CLC only regulates the liability of the ship owner and its insurer and how they can be sued. [4.9] the court confirms its reading of text itself, the travaux and the DNA of the CLC as not pertaining to claims against parties other than the ship owner and its insurer. ‘A 2002 judgment by the Italian Supreme Court’ which I suspect is I.O.P.C.F. v. Registro Italiano Navale and others, re the sinking
of m/t “Erika”, Italian Supreme Court 17 October 2002 n. 14769 is distinguished on the ground that that claim involved the affiliated persons listed in A IX CLC.
The court then considers A8(1) BIa viz Repsol SA, and [4.13] points out that the same principles in application of the EU anchor rules, apply equally to the residual Dutch rules.
[4.11] it suggests that the claim against the anchor defendant must have a prospect of success, for A8(1) jurisdiction to be possible. That view is not imo supported by the authorities and the issue is currently sub judice at least as far as follow-on damages claims are concerned, in CJEU C-673/23 Electricity & Water Authority of Government of Bahrain ea v Prismiian ea. I review the Opinion of Kokott AG here.
[4.16] the core reproach viz the defendants is said to concern the inadequacy of the La Pampilla reception facilities, and defendants’ inadequate response to the spill. Repsol BV argues that it is a most remote shareholder and not at all involved in the goings-on in Peru and that even Repsol SA has no direct dealings with the Peruvian operations. [4.17] claimants argues the near exclusive ownership (more than 99%) of Repsol BV in La Pampilla, a shared director and other links show the direct involvement or at the very least a culpable non-involvement: Repsol VB ought to have used its influence to avoid the calamity.
[4.18] however the court rejects the shareholding and other circumstances and demands claimants show “direct involvement” by Repsol BV. That is most definitely a step back viz recent duty of care litigation, including in The Netherlands. The court did not immediately refuse instant permission to appeal hence I suspect (but I am not a Dutch CPR expert) this must be possible – and most definitely should be exercised.
The merits review test is as I argue above, not good law under A8(1) authority and the requirement of ‘direct involvement’ is not in line with recent duty of care practice.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.13.1 (in particular 2.496); Heading 2.2.15.3.2; Chapter 7.
'Global North' business & human rights claim, Peru oil spillDutch court rejects forum connexitatis viz Spanish, Peruvian corps, wth Dutch anchor defendantAccepts jurisdiction viz NL defendant despite 1992 CLC ConventionStichting E&FR v Repsol BV ea deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id…
— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-05-26T07:17:55.045Z
Tony’s Open Chair have today published my opinion on the impact the European Commission’s ‘Omnibus’ deregulation proposal will have on the applicable law for supply chain liability claims. In short: not a good one.
Richard Gardiner has other updates on the issue here and he is generally a marvel when it comes to sharing all things CS3D.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed 2025, Chapter 7.
A book on The New Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union was recently published. The book is edited by Dr. Emmanuel Guinchard (Liverpool John Moores University) and Prof. Carlo Panara (Leicester University) and may be accessed here.
Overview
About the book
Brexit has reshuffled the cards of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union. It is a once in a lifetime event, which ended nearly 50 years of EU Membership. EU law as such no longer applies in the United Kingdom and British citizens and companies no longer benefit from its advantages. Part of the previous regime has however been maintained (at times with amendments) through the series of treaties negotiated between the UK and the EU in 2019 and 2020, in particular the Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 2020, to which the 2023 Windsor Agreement can be added. The end result is a legal regime which is perhaps even more complex than EU law itself. This book aims to provide the reader with a clarification of this legal regime as well as provide context to it and suggestions to improve it. All key topics are covered, such as citizens of the EU in the UK and British citizens in the EU, trade in goods and in services, criminal justice, public procurement, Northern Ireland, the UK overseas territories, the dispute settlement, security and defence, international trade agreements of the UK post-Brexit, environmental protection, European civil justice, financial services, education and research, and the European offices of the UK local authorities and devolved administrations after Brexit. All the chapters follow, wherever possible, the same triadic structure. The first part looks at the regime prior to Brexit; the second part analyses the current regime; and the third part discusses ongoing and predictable trends. The concluding chapter attempts to identify some themes likely to impact on the forthcoming preparation of the 2026 review.
The European Commission’s recent Omnibus proposes a significant change to the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD). Article 29(7) of the original CSDDD requires Member States to implement its rules on civil liability rules so that these rules apply as overriding mandatory provisions, if the law applicable to the claim is not a law of a Member State. The Omnibus package proposes to delete art. 29(7) CSDDD. As a result, Member States will no longer be obliged to implement CSDDD’s rules on liability as overriding mandatory provisions.
The Omnibus
On 26 February 2025 the European Commission presented the so-called Omnibus. It is a proposal to simplify reporting and compliance in the fields of ESG and corporate societal responsibility (COM(2025) 81 final). Subject to approval by the European Parliament and the Council, Member States will have to implement the changes introduced by the Omnibus by 31 December 2025. The updated instruments will be effective from 1 January 2026.
The Omnibus amends several existing instruments, including the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), which entered into force on 25 July 2024. The Omnibus postpones the deadline for the CSDDD’s implementation to 26 July 2027; and the deadline for companies covered by the directive’s scope to be compliant is postponed to 26 July 2028.
CSDDD: civil liability by overriding mandatory provisions
Art. 29 CSDDD provides a harmonised EU uniform liability regime for breaches of due diligence in (cross-border) supply chains. While the CSDDD contains no rules on international jurisdiction (see the blogpost by Ralf Michaels on this matter here), the directive explicitly positions its provisions on civil liability within the conflict of laws. The current text of art. 29(7) CSDDD provides:
Member States shall ensure that the provisions of national law transposing this Article are of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the national law of a Member State.
This provision requires that Member States implement the directive’s rules on civil liability so that they apply as overriding mandatory provisions (of national substantive law) if the claim is not governed by the law of a Member State. This rationale is also reiterated in Recital 90. The current text of the CSDDD allows for differences within the EU (between Member States’ regimes); these differences would not trigger the application of overriding mandatory provisions. The overriding mandatory character (of any Member State’s national civil liability regime based on the CSDDD) would only manifest itself when the applicable is the law of a third state. It is in relation to the latter situations, that the CSDDD has elevated the civil liability regime to the level of semi-public provisions.
Omnibus: no uniform civil liability regime; not by overriding mandatory provisions
The Omnibus restrains this ambition. Firstly, it contains a proposal to abolish an EU-wide harmonised liability regime. Secondly, it removes Member States’ obligation to implement the (remaining elements of the uniform) liability regime as overriding mandatory provisions. Under the Omnibus:
‘paragraph (12) amends Article 29 of the CSDDD as regards civil liability by deleting paragraph (1), paragraph (3), point (d) and paragraph (7), and changing paragraphs (2), (4) and (5).
(…)
Motivation
The provisions that propose to abandon the EU-wide liability regime, quoted above, refers to the divergence in the regulation of representative actions across the EU Member States. The Explanatory Memorandum included in the Omnibus provides several other reasons of the proposal. One of the main reasons is the aim to reduce the ‘administrative, regulatory and reporting burdens, in particular for SMEs’ (small and medium size enterprises). Although the Omnibus package amends instruments that cover primarily large economic players, the simplification aims to prevent a de facto shift of the compliance costs to smaller players, because ‘[t]he ability of the Union to preserve and protect its values depends amongst other things on the capacity of its economy to adapt and compete in an unstable and sometimes hostile geopolitical context,’ as stated in the document with reference to the reports on EU global competitiveness.
Implications
From the perspective of private international law, the original art. 29(7) CSDDD is certainly challenging. It is namely not entirely clear how the doctrine of overriding mandatory rules (based on art. 9 Rome I, and art. 16 Rome II Regulations) would apply to civil liability claims grounded in the rules implementing the directive. Nonetheless, the CSDDD approach might have the potential to open new avenues for further practical and conceptual development of this conflict-of-law doctrine in the future.
Currently, as the Omnibus explicitly rules out the overriding mandatory character of the (remaining parts of) the CSDDD civil liability regime, if the Omnibus is adopted, one would rather not expect from Member States’ legislatives or courts to elevate the regular domestic civil liability rules to the semi-public level of overriding mandatory provisions.
Pour la première fois, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme s’est prononcée sur la compatibilité entre une discrimination à rebours et la Convention. Elle était saisie par trois requérants qui contestaient l’imposition sur la taxation des plus-values mobilières qui leur avait été appliquée. Les affaires ont été jointes pour donner naissance à l’arrêt de Galbert Defforey et autres c/ France.
[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
I have posted before of course on the jurisdictional and applicable law rules for climate claims (see in particular my post on Hugues Falys v Total) and on Article 7 Rome II’s special rule for choice of law in environmental claims. On the latter, use ‘Article 7’ or ‘A7’ in the search box, and see also my paper on A7/ lex ecologia as well as my paper here on climate justice litigation and private international law.
A few days ago I posted my overall assessment of the most recent climate judgment, Lliuya v RWE (more generally known as ‘Peruvian farmer v RWE) and in that post I said I would leave the applicable law analysis for a later post. So here we are.
Frustratingly there is still no sign of the judgment in the original German so like in my earlier post I am working with the unofficial English translation that is circulating. This may have an impact on how some of the court’s reasoning is translated and hence I may perhaps have to soften some of the criticism below once the judgment’s German version is out.
P.26 the court first of all confirms the straightforward jurisdictional basis: Article 4 of the Brussels Ia Regulation, establishing the principal rule that a defendant can and should as of right be sued in their domicile. Note the difference here with Hugues Falys where claimant is suing Total, domiciled at France, in what he presumable argues is a locus damni or locus delicti commissi under Article 7(2) Brussels Ia. The possibility to claim as of right in the defendant’s domicile is not easily dislodged in the European system, as I explain here.
Next up is the applicable law p.32 ff. Here the court’s plan of approach is, with respect, messy.
Overall the court could have sufficed with its primary finding of lex voluntatis. Much of its remaining discussion therefore would be obiter in the common law.
[2.a.aa] it first suggests implied choice of law in that parties invoked in their submissions almost exclusively provisions of German law. It refers to pre-Rome II German authority for its finding that this implies choice of law.
[2.a.bb] p.33 it then confirms this additionally as choice of law under the Rome II Regulation: reference here is made to Article 14(1) Rome II.
[2.a.cc] it confirms the universal character of Rome II but either misunderstands what this implies, or jumbles it with the meaning of ‘international’ under Rome II: for the court here rightly points out that Rome II may lead to the application of a law that is not the law of a Member State (here Peruvian law would be the obvious candidate) but then states “The Regulation therefore also applies in the case of a foreign connection to a non-member state in its material scope of application as the conflict of laws of the member state -…” (emphasis added). That is wrong; the latter (the choice of law being either for an EU or non-EU Member State, ie the conflict of laws not being between two EU laws but between an EU and non-EU law) relates to the ‘international’ element required to trigger Rome II. It is not at all related to the universal character of Rome II.
[2.a.dd] p.33 onwards the court then probably (it really could have formulated its approach here much more clearly) dismissed lex rei sitae as a rule that would bounce German law. It is unclear whether it does this proprio motu or in answer to an argument formulated by REWE (but had it not been established that REWE had agreed to German law?) and /or in German scholarship?
Whatever the trigger, the court’s approach to a role for lex rei sitae is most unclear. p.33 in fine the court refers to “legal claims resulting from an (alleged) violation of (co-)ownership and which – as in this case – are based on the law of the place where the property is located.” I assume this must be a discussion under German conflict of laws prior to Rome II, which it seems classifies nuissance claims as claims in rem, subject to the lex rei sitae. However as the court points out p.34, this qualification is irrelevant as far as Rome II is concerned. Rome II’s concepts need to be applied autonomously and lex rei sitae is not a rule contemplated by it.
Only then does the court address Article 7 Rome II, the tailor-made rule for environmental damage:
The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of
environmental damage or damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage shall be the law determined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking compensation for damage chooses to base his or her claim on the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred
Midway p.34 the ’emission’ is identified as the ‘event giving rise to the damage’.
The court’s engagement with Article 7 is unclear as to how it seems climate damage in relation to that Article. It has been suggested by some that Article 7 does not see to climate damage as such.
Either the court in current case dismissed that argument out of hand, seeing as it straightforwardly applies Article 7 to what is arguably a climate claim. Or it sees (the threat of) flooding (as opposed to ‘climate change’) as the environmental damage. A matter of course application of Article 7 to climate claims would be supportive of a wide notion of the statutory language “arising out of” environmental damage.
The court once again notes parties’ agreement on the applicable law being German law but then seemingly proprio motu flags the potential for dépeçage, midway through p.34:
However, a distinction must be made because, according to the plaintiff’s submission, the defendant’s conduct (issuing activity) has been ongoing since 1965 and the Rome II Regulation has only been applicable to non-contractual obligations since January 11, 2009 (see Art. 31 Rome II Regulation).
Under applicable German conflicts rules then, between 1 June 1999 and the entry into force of Rome I, German law would have applied as lex fori solutionis (the place of performance; I am not familiar enough with German conflicts rules to understand what performance is talked about here) and prior to 1 June 1999 the German rule it seems was ‘the place of action’ (presumably the locus delicti commissi: here earlier established of Germany as the place of emission) or the locus damni (surely Peru?), with it seems here like now in Rome II, claimant being able to choose.
For this section, availability of the judgment in German would be most welcome.
Importantly, the court’s reading suggest that for continuing torts, it decides (but it does so obiter, surely: see its overall finding of lex voluntatis) dépeçage applies.
As regular readers of the blog may remember, the Dutch Supreme Court has referred to the CJEU on the issue of continued infringement, in the case of competition claims.
The judgment overall has some loose ends on the Article 7 Rome II issue (compare similarly Milieudefensie v Shell) and the expression of the train of thought imo could have been clearer.
As noted, once I have the German version of the judgment, I shall revisit.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2023, 4.56 ff.
[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
Pietro Franzina has excellent summary of European Commission report COM (2025) 268 and Staff Working Document SWD(2025) 135, both discussing the implementation of Brussels Ia, building inter alia on the Milieu Study on the same topic.
Pietro has done a tour de force in summarising both documents, highlighting the areas where statutory change might be proposed:
scope of application (‘civil and commercial’; ! arbitration; vis attractiva concursus /insolvency);
third country defendants: crucial for business and human rights claims and harmonisation here would be welcome ia in light of the expanded use of EU sustainability instruments with extended territorial scope; I discussed the issue briefly here;
rules on special jurisdiction where ia the A7(1) and (2) distinction is getting opaque but where as Pietro notes little change may be expected;
consumer contracts (with special mention for the imo outdated carve-out for contracts of transport);
exclusive jurisdiction with likely an amendment to be proposed to codify CJEU BSH Hausgeräte;
potential for clarification of the lis pendens rules;
ditto for collective redress actions and, but with less immediate urgency it would seem, for digital assets.
Of side note is that the Staff Working Document would seem to add little to the actual Report. There is probably an institutional reason, eg SWDs do not require translation into all EU languages, however in general one would expect the SWDs to bring a bit more beef to the analytical bone. Otherwise there seems little point in having one at all.
All in all extensive proposed amendments are not to be expected however that does not mean those that might me, could not be impactful.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed 2024, Chapter 2.
Dès lors que le premier appel est irrégulier, faute d’avoir été remis au greffe de la cour par voie électronique, est recevable le second appel, formé dans le délai d’appel et avant le prononcé de l’irrecevabilité du premier appel. C’est donc à tort que la cour d’appel, sur déféré, a prononcé l’irrecevabilité de l’appel pour défaut d’intérêt.
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