Feed aggregator

 

As was mentioned before on this blog, increasing the participation of African states in the HCCH appears to be the most promising avenue to strengthen judicial cooperation on the African continent in the context of intracontinental, interregional as well as global judicial integration. Following several unsuccessful attempts to establish a physical presence on the African continent,[1] the HCCH Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP) has now warmly welcomed the Kingdom of Morocco’s proposal to host and, perhaps most importantly, entirely fund a HCCH Regional Office for Africa (ROAF) in Rabat.[2] While the capital of multilingual Morocco, at the crossroads of North Africa with both Europe and the Arab world, seems to be an ideal location for such an endeavor, the proposal does not (yet?) appear to also include the Arabian Peninsula. However, as the Moroccan Ministry of Justice is explicitly seeking to play an active role in the framework of the League of Arab States (LAS) as well,[3] it is not unlikely that the ROAF will follow the example of the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ROLAC) in Buenos Aires and the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) in Hong Kong and cover a broader regional spectrum.

 

The excerpt from the HCCH CGAP 2025 Conclusions and Decisions (C&D) reads as follows:

A. Proposal for the Establishment of a Regional Office for Africa

83 CGAP warmly welcomed the proposal of the Kingdom of Morocco to host a Regional Office for Africa (ROAF) and decided that the office may be opened in accordance with the 2020 Rules for the Establishment of Regional Offices (2020 Rules). The Regional Office, which will be located in Rabat, shall operate continuously for a period of five years. CGAP will conduct a Performance Review, in accordance with Rules 6 to8 of the 2020 Rules.

84 CGAP noted with satisfaction, and thanks, the Kingdom of Morocco’s commitment to fund the entire operation of the Regional Office. CGAP also reaffirmed that the Representative shall report exclusively to the Secretary General of the HCCH. The Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Secretary General will finalise the Host Seat Agreement in light of the comments made by Members at CGAP 2025. The final version of the Agreement shall be shared with Members for information.

 

The full HCCH CGAP 2025 C&D are now available on the HCCH Website (here).

[1] See HCCH Prel. Doc. No. 6 of 2015 – Africa Strategy, paras 7 and 10.

[2] HCCH CGAP 2025 C&D, paras. 83 et seq.

[3] Press Release of the Kingdom of Morocco’s Ministry of Justice of March 2025.

 

 

The Japanese Yearbook of International Law  (JYIL) is a leading reference publication that provides in-depth analysis and commentary on developments in international law from a Japanese perspective.

Published by the International Law Association of Japan since 1957 (originally as the Annual Yearbook of Private International Law until 2007), the JYIL covers a broad spectrum of topics, from public and private international law to comparative law, bringing together insights from top scholars and legal experts in Japan and beyond.

Each issue dives into key legal cases, legislative updates, and emerging trends, making it a must-read for researchers, academics, and professionals looking to stay in the loop on Japan’s legal landscape.

 

On that note, the latest volume of the JYIL (Vol. 67, 2024) has recently been released. Readers of this blog may find particular interested in selected articles, case notes, books review and English translations of court decisions related to private international law.

 

LEGAL ANALYSIS ON SUCCESSION SUBSTITUTES

(Author’s note: This Volume’s PIL Special Issue)

 

Dai Yokomizo

Introductory Note (p. 162)

 

OSHIMA Lisa

The Potential and Limitations of Contracts That Function as Succession Substitutes (p. 164)

 

Dai Yokomizo

Succession Substitutes and Japanese Conflict of Laws: Including the Possibility of Introducing Limited Professio Juris to Japanese Choice-of-Law Rule Relating to Succession (p. 180)

 

Takami Hayashi

Conflict-of-Law Issues Regarding Succession Substitutes with a Focus on Trusts (p. 195)

 

Charlotte Wendland

The Law Applicable to Succession Substitutes: European Perspective (p. 214)

 

Takeshi Fujitani

Succession Substitutes and Taxation – An Analysis from the Perspective of Party Autonomy and Tax Neutrality – (p. 253)

 

CASES AND ISSUES IN JAPANESE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Author’s note: Case Notes)

 

Yusuke Tanemura

Breach of the Arbitrator’s Obligation of Disclosure in Article 18(4) of the Arbitration Act (p. 446)

 

Naohiro Kitasaka

Application Mutatis Mutandis of Art. 117(1) of the Child Abduction Convention Implementation Act to a Return Agreement in an In-Court Conciliation (p. 460)

 

BOOK REVIEWS

(Author’s note: Selection only)

 

Corporate Environmental Responsibility in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Unexhausted Potential of Current Mechanisms, by Tomoko Ishikawa. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2023. Pp. xxxix, 302.

Reviewed by NISUGI Kento (p. 489)

 

Chugoku ni okeru Kokusaitorihikifunso Kaiketsuho [International Commercial Dispute Resolution Law in China], by Yukio Kajita. Tokyo: Nihonhyoronsha, 2022. Pp. 344

Reviewed by Xi Feng (p. 506)

 

Kokusaidairishokeiyakuho no Kenkyu [International Aspects of the Law of Commercial Agency], by KIM Mihwa. Tokyo: Shinzansha, 2022. Pp. xii, 382

Reviewed by Masayo Kataoka (p. 516)

 

The International Law of Sovereign Debt Dispute Settlement, By Kei Nakajima. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. xxx, 339

Reviewed by Yuka Fukunaga (p. 522)

 

Ko no Hikiwatashi-Tetsuzuki no Riron to Jitsumu [Theory and Practice of the Procedure for Ha-nding-Over a Child in Custody Disputes], edited by Kazuhiko Yamamoto. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2022. Pp. x, 373

Reviewed by Hajime Sakai (p. 536)

 

Kokusaihochitsujo to Gurobaru Keizai [International Legal Order and Global Economy], edited by Masaharu Yanagihara, Koichi Morikawa, Atsuko Kanehara, and Taro Hamada. Tokyo: Shinzansha, 2021. Pp. xvi, 614

Reviewed by Satoru Taira (p. 541)

 

JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN JAPAN

II. Private International Law

(Author’s note: Case Law Translation)

 

Osaka High Court; Adjudication, May 26, 2021 (p. 581)

International Child Abduction – Habitual Residence – Infant

 

Tokyo High Court, Judgment, January 25, 2023 (p. 584)

Applicable Law to Vicarious Liability – Traffic Accidents of an Employee on Overseas Business-Trips – Escape Clause

 

Tokyo High Court, Judgment, October 30, 2023 (p. 589)

State Immunity – Un recognized States – jurisdiction – Place of Tort – Continuous Tort

 

Tokyo District Court, Judgment, May 9, 2022 (p. 594)

Validity of Agreements on jurisdiction – Sea Carriage Contracts – Surrender Bill of Lading (B/L)

 

Tokyo District Court, Judgment, March 27, 2023 (p. 597)

Applicable Law – Labor Contracts – Mandatory Provisions – Place with Which the Labor Contract Is Most Closely Connected – Place of Business at Which the Worker Was Employed – International Airline Cabin Crew

 

Yokohama Family Court, Judgment, March 30, 2021 (p. 602)

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign judgments on Child Custody

 

• The full table of contents will be made available soon on the JYIL’s website.
• More information about the Yearbook and the content of its previous volumes can be found here.
• The full contents of Vols. 1-65 (1957-2022) are available on HeinOnline.

The conclusions and decisions adopted by the Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP) of the Hague Conference on Private International at its 2025 meeting, which ended today, have just been made available here. Ongoing Projects In the coming months, additional meetings will be convened of the Working Groups in charge of the Parentage / […]

I am much pleased that Dr Brooke Marshall has accepted to write on CJEU Lastre for the blog. Dr Marshall has written the guiding volume on the issue (highlights of the book’s launch are here). True to form, her analysis below is as complete as it is on point, and a most excellent addition to the analysis already out there.

Geert.

 

CJEU on substantive validity and on asymmetric clauses: what we now know, and what we (still) don’t.

The background to Case C-537/23 Società Italiana Lastre ECLI:EU:C:2025:120, and commentary on it, has already been expertly provided by François Mailhé, Gilles Cuniberti, and Geert van Calster. It is a privilege for me to contribute to that discussion on this excellent blog.

My post confines itself to the questions that the French Cour de cassation asked and the answers which the CJEU gave (and did not give). My analysis draws heavily from my book on the subject, so pinpoint references to that are given in each section below.

The asymmetric jurisdiction clause in issue said:

‘the court of Brescia [(Italy)] will have jurisdiction over any dispute arising from or related to this contract. [SIL] reserves the right to bring proceedings against the purchaser before another competent court in Italy or elsewhere’.

The preliminary questions of the Cour de cassation, in essence, were:

(1) Is a complaint about a clause’s asymmetric character or imprecision an autonomous (EU law) question or a question of the clause’s substantive validity? Or should substantive validity be interpreted restrictively ‘and regarded as relating purely to the material grounds for invalidity, which are principally fraud, error, deceit, violence and incapacity’?

(2) If it is an autonomous question, is a clause like the one in issue compatible with Art 25 of the Recast?

(3) If asymmetry goes to substantive validity, how does the conflict-of-laws rule in Art 25 of the Recast work? Which court’s law applies and does that law include renvoi?

These were all good questions, each deserving an answer. Regrettably, the Court only answered the first two.

The Court’s decisions on the first question:

I. The phrase ‘null and void as to its substantive validity’ must be interpreted autonomously

The Court begins at [30] by resolving several uncertainties attending the process of characterisation and the substantive validity rule, which are relevant to jurisdiction clauses generally. The first is as to which law applies to the interpretation of the phrase ‘null and void as to its substantive validity’ in Art 25(1). It had hitherto been uncertain whether the meaning of that phrase and the scope of the issues it covers was a question to be resolved by the law of the court seised, by reference to an autonomous interpretation or by reference to the law applicable to substantive validity of the clause itself, as designated by the conflict-of-laws rule in Art 25(1).

Sensibly, and unsurprisingly in my and Gilles Cuniberti’s view, the Court decides that this question is to be resolved by an autonomous interpretation. This ensures that issues of substantive validity, governed by national law, do not overlap with other aspects of Art 25(1) which are governed by an autonomous approach. Several of those other aspects are pointed out by the Court at [35], namely: that ‘the parties … have agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship’, which the Court describes as requirements as regards a jurisdiction agreement’s ‘substance’; and that the agreement complies with conditions as to form. In this respect, the Court’s decision coheres with its decision in C- 519/ 19 Ryanair DAC, paras 41, 48– 61. There, the Court observed that it is for the court seised to ascertain first whether a jurisdiction agreement satisfies the requirements of form and consensus under the Recast before turning to the separate issue of substantive validity. So far, so good.

Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses (OUP 2023), para 6.35.

 

II. Few issues can be characterized as issues of substantive validity (and asymmetry is not one of them)

At [36] and [37], the Court resolves a second uncertainty of general application, namely as to which kinds of issues can be characterized as issues of substantive validity, adopting a restrictive approach. It rules that ‘that concept covers the general causes of nullity of a contract, namely, in particular, those which vitiate consent, such as error, deceit, violence or fraud, and incapacity to contract’ and that it must be interpreted as ‘referring solely to [a jurisdiction agreement’s] nullity in respect of general causes of nullity of a contract’ (my emphasis). In other words, the issues that we knew were already covered by the substantive validity rule are covered but nothing else.

That nothing else is covered is a surprising result, given that there had been some sign that the CJEU might favour a broad interpretation in C- 519/ 19 Ryanair DAC, para 50. One of the reasons the Court gives for its approach is to reflect the solution taken in the 2005 Hague COCA Convention (at [40]). It does not say anything more, but the Court seems to be insinuating that since there is some support for the view that the null and void rule under Art 5(1) of the COCA Convention should be interpreted restrictively (see the COCA Convention’s Explanatory Report, para 126), so too should the substantive validity rule under the Recast. I, therefore, share Gilles Cuniberti’s view that the Court may seek to align its interpretation of the null and void rule in the COCA Convention and the substantive validity rule in the Recast.

Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses (OUP 2023), para 6.37, cf paras 6.38-6.48, 6.52–6.55

 

III. A complaint about asymmetry in a jurisdiction clause is an autonomous question (and only an autonomous question)

In light of the Court’s restrictive approach to the characterization of issues relevant to substantive validity, the Court consequentially rules at [51] that ‘the validity of an agreement conferring jurisdiction in view of its alleged asymmetry must be examined having regard not to criteria relating to the causes of an agreement being ‘null and void as to its substantive validity’, within the meaning of the first sentence of Art 25(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, but to autonomous criteria which are derived from that Art 25 as interpreted by the Court.’

Seemingly, to justify that autonomous approach, the Court relies on the fact that the former Art 17(4) of the Brussels Convention expressly provided for clauses to the benefit of one party and that asymmetric jurisdiction agreements which favour consumers, insureds etc, and employees are contemplated and permitted by Recast: [48]–[50], [52]. For cogent criticism on the latter point, see Geert van Calster’s post.

Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses (OUP 2023), paras 1.27–1.36 cf paras 6.69–6.82

 

IV. Whether a jurisdiction clause is sufficiently precise is a question to be resolved by applying an autonomous standard

The Court reiterates the requirement that the court or courts on which the agreement confers jurisdiction must be sufficiently precisely identified, and that this applies to Art 25(1) of the Recast, as it did to the Recast’s predecessors: [45]. Any complaint about an asymmetric jurisdiction clause being insufficiently precise must, therefore be resolved autonomously: [47].

Frustratingly, the Court merely repeats the crux of that previous case law without elaboration at [42]:

‘It is sufficient that the clause state the objective factors on the basis of which the parties have agreed to choose a court or the courts to which they wish to submit disputes … Those factors, which must be sufficiently precise to enable the court seised to ascertain whether it has jurisdiction, may, where appropriate, be determined by the particular circumstances of the case being examined by the court.’  (C-387/98 Coreck, para 15; C-222/15 Hőszig, para 43).

Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses (OUP 2023), paras 6.05–6.07

 

The Court’s decisions on the second question:

 V. Assessed autonomously, an asymmetric jurisdiction clause is valid under EU law and sufficiently precise where the optional limb can be interpreted as contemplating proceedings only before an EU Member State or EFTA Lugano State court

The Court rules that an asymmetric jurisdiction is in principle valid/admissible under EU law, relying especially on the need to protect party autonomy (recital 19) (see [56], [58], [64], [65]). No surprises there, until one does a double take at [58]: what the Court rules is valid is an asymmetric jurisdiction clause the optional limb of which is limited to courts with jurisdiction under the Recast and the 2007 Lugano Convention. More on that in a moment (see VI).

So far as the requirement of precision of content is concerned, the Court rules at [59] that an asymmetric agreement clause which designates a particular EU Member State or EFTA Lugano State court, on the one hand, and courts which have jurisdiction under the Recast and 2007 Lugano Convention, on the other, ‘satisfies the requirement of precision resulting from Art 25(1) of that regulation and the objectives of foreseeability, transparency and legal certainty, set out in recitals 15 and 16 of that regulation.’ Subject to the reservations I have as to what the Court means by the word ‘designate’ (see VIII below), that seems to me to be a cogent conclusion:  ‘any court with jurisdiction’ is an objective factor that is sufficiently precise, assessed from the perspective of a court seised: any court EU Member State or EFTA Lugano State court which would otherwise regard itself as competent has jurisdiction.

Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses (OUP 2023), paras 6.09–6.10

 

VI. Assessed autonomously, an asymmetric jurisdiction clause is not sufficiently precise and contrary to EU law where the optional limb is to be interpreted as contemplating proceedings before a Third State court

The Court rules at [60] that, if, in referring to ‘another competent court … elsewhere’, the agreement ‘must be interpreted’ as meaning that it also designates the courts of one or more Third States, it would be contrary to the Recast. Put another way, the asymmetric clause in issue ‘is incapable of satisfying the requirement of precision, … unless it may be interpreted as designating the court of Brescia and the courts of Member States or States that are parties to the Lugano II Convention as having jurisdiction to resolve disputes between the parties’: [62] (my emphasis). In practical terms, if the words ‘another competent court … elsewhere’ could encompass an English court, for example, because one of the parties has some connection to England, the clause would not be valid under the Recast.

What I find curious about this aspect of the Court’s decision is the lack of clarity in the reasoning it used to get there. It reasoned, at [60], that where the optional limb can be interpreted as contemplating proceedings before a Third State court:

‘that agreement conferring jurisdiction would not be consistent with the objectives of foreseeability, transparency and legal certainty referred to in recitals 15 and 16 of that regulation, to the extent that EU law does not, in itself, make it possible to designate the courts which have jurisdiction, as that designation is, where appropriate, the result of the application of the rules of private international law of third countries.’

While it is true that whether a Third State court is competent is not the result of EU law, it is difficult to see why that matters if the requirement of precision applies to the clause as a whole and is to be assessed only from the perspective of a court seised. Indeed, it is difficult to see why the criterion ‘another competent court … elsewhere’ is not an objective factor or why it is insufficiently precise, assessed only from the perspective of a court seised: any court which would otherwise regard itself as competent has jurisdiction, whether that court is a Third State court or not. Although the optional limb does not, in my view, confer jurisdiction on those courts (only the clause’s first sentence designating the courts of Brescia does that), the optional limb provides a criterion allowing any court that is seised to determine whether it is one of the courts before which the parties had contemplated that the option holder could bring proceedings.

Instead, the Court could have more persuasively justified its decision by elaborating on its previous case law in C-387/98 Coreck and C-222/15 Hőszig to clarify that the requirement of precision applies as much to the parties as it does to the court. Put another way, the Court could have clarified that the requirement of precision is not to be examined purely from the perspective of a court seised; rather, as a result of the ‘objectives of foreseeability, transparency and legal certainty, set out in recitals 15 and 16’ of the Recast,  it also requires that the parties be able to foresee from a jurisdiction clause where they may be called upon to defend proceedings. Reference to C-566/22 Inkreal paras 28–29 would have done the job. There, the court said that an agreement conferring jurisdiction coheres with the aim of legal certainty because it ‘helps the applicant to ascertain the court before which he or she may bring proceedings and the defendant to foresee the court before which he or she may be sued, and enables the national court seised to be able readily to decide whether it has jurisdiction’. (The Court did refer to Inkreal but, unfortunately, not to make this point.)

I had foreshadowed the Court’s decision at [60] and [62] as a possible problem for asymmetric clauses of this kind, albeit on the argument that an aspect of the requirement of precision under EU law ought to be that the agreement should allow a reasonably well-informed defendant to foresee the courts before which they may be sued. I had suggested that since it was uncertain what the CJEU may say, it might be thought prudent for drafters to specify (expressly) that ‘any competent court’ is restricted to those within the EU or to an EFTA Lugano State, if that was their intention. In light of the CJEU’s decision, that suggestion may well warrant some serious consideration.

The Court’s decision may also give cause to reconsider non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses which designate one EU Member State or EFTA Lugano State court, to the extent that these impliedly permit both parties to bring proceedings before any other competent court, including Third State courts.

Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses (OUP 2023), paras 2.31–2.33, 5.50, 6.10, 6.14–6.24

 

Unanswered questions

VII. So is the clause in Case C-537/23 Società Italiana Lastre sufficiently precise and compatible with the Recast?

This is not a question for the CJEU to answer and, on my reading, it is not one which the Court did. For a different view, see Gilles Cuniberti’s post. Note that the Court’s careful use of conditional language in [60] and [62] ‘if’ … ‘unless’… One may only speculate on how a French court will now interpret the clause against the backdrop of the CJEU’s rulings.

 

VIII. Which court(s) does an asymmetric clause ‘designate’? And how does the substantive validity rule work for them?

The Court, is to my eyes, vague or perhaps ambivalent as to which court or courts an asymmetric clause typically ‘designates’ (ie confers jurisdiction on/ prorogates the jurisdiction of). Does it designate (1) only the ‘anchor court’ (to use Richard Fentiman’s words), here Brescia, and merely preserve the special or general jurisdiction that other courts have under the Recast or 2007 Lugano Convention for one of the parties? Or (2) does it ‘designate’/confer jurisdiction on/prorogate the jurisdiction of all those courts? The Court’s reasons at [55] suggest the latter and [59] appears to contemplate both possibilities.

This opacity is regrettable for multiple reasons. One reason is that the conflict-of-laws rule in Art 25(1) for determining a clause’s substantive validity presupposes that the clause confers jurisdiction on/designates only one court. That conflict-of-laws rule necessitates the following interpretation for an asymmetric clause of this kind: only the anchor court is ‘prorogated’ and the jurisdiction under the default rules of the courts the subject of the option is preserved but not prorogated. On that argument: if the anchor court is seised by either party, it should apply the law selected by its conflict-of-laws rules to the substantive validity of the clause (assuming renvoi is included – see IX below). If, instead, another court is seised, it should apply the law selected by the anchor court’s conflict-of-laws rules to the clause’s substantive validity. Whether that other court is seised by the option holder, according to the agreement, or by the non-option holder, contrary to it, is immaterial for the purposes of the rule.

Put another way, if that argument is wrong and an asymmetric clause of this kind ‘designates’ more than just the anchor court, the Court will (again) be called upon to explain how the substantive validity rule is supposed to work for a clause that ’designates’ multiple courts. It is a shame that it did not grasp the nettle and do so in this case.

Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses (OUP 2023) paras 5.07–5.09, 5.33, 6.58–6.59

 

IX. Is renvoi included in the substantive validity rule?

Also unfortunate is that the Court did not clarify whether the conflict-of-laws rule for substantive validity in Art 25(1) includes renvoi as recital 20 suggests. At [33], as Geert van Calster has highlighted, the Court quotes recital 20 in its entirety but for the crucial words ‘including the conflict-of-laws rules of that Member State’. Alignment of the conflicts rule in Art 25(1) with the COCA Convention, which the Court appears to favour (see II above) would militate in favour of including renvoi. What one should make of the Court’s misleading truncation of recital 20 is, therefore, anyone’s guess.

Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses (OUP 2023), paras 6.50–6.51

 

Luxembourg should expect more questions to come…

Brooke Marshall.

The Court of Justice gave on 6 March 2025 its ruling in Anikovi. The case concerns the scope of application of the Brussels II ter Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and its relationship with conventions concluded by a Member State with a […]

The OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (OULR) is a prestigious international academic journal on law and politics with a rich history. Published annually by the Graduate School of Law and Politics at Osaka University since 1952, the OULR offers a valuable platform for discussing and sharing information on Japanese law and politics, all presented in English and other foreign languages including French and German from a comparative law perspective.

The OULR’s ultimate goal is to foster debate and facilitate the exchange of ideas between Japanese and international scholars, while promoting and disseminating original research in the fields of Japanese law and politics and other related areas.

 

That said, the latest volume (No. 72) features some papers that might be of interest to the readers of this blog, as well as researchers and practitioners of private international law. These papers highlight important legal developments in China, particularly in the areas of international civil procedure and sovereign immunity.

 

Hongman QIN, Yongping XIAO, and Xiaoke LUO

New Developments in Chinese International Civil Procedure Law: A Perspective from the Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States

Asbtract:

This paper explores and compares the 2023 amendments to the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China with the corresponding rules in the Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. It finds that China’s new rules on international civil jurisdiction, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, service and evidence-taking abroad, and the structured mechanisms for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments are clearer and more detailed for respecting other countries’ sovereignty and facilitating the participation of Chinese and foreign parties in litigation before Chinese courts. These updates reflect China’s efforts to modernize its legal framework, enhance judicial efficiency, align with international norms, promote cross-border legal cooperation, and ensure the protection of national interests while facilitating cross-border legal interactions.

 

Zhengxin HUO

A Landmark Change from Absolute to Restrictive Immunity: A Commentary on Foreign Sovereign Immunity Law of the People’s Republic of China

Abstract:

On 1 September 2023, the Chinese national legislature adopted the ‘Law of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign State Immunity’. Comprising 23 articles, the Law represents a landmark change in China’s foreign state immunity doctrine from absolute to restrictive immunity. The Law deals with a foreign state’s immunity and property from civil lawsuits in Chinese courts and judicial enforcement in the People’s Republic of China, representing a new chapter for foreign states in Chinese courts. The adoption of the restrictive immunity doctrine significantly increases the scope of proceedings to be pursued against foreign states with respect to their commercial transactions and enforcement actions to be implemented against foreign states’ commercial assets within China. Parties entering commercial transactions with foreign states will benefit from this law in the event that a dispute arises, and thus, enforcing their rights against a state in Chinese courts becomes necessary.

 

These papers are available online for free—just click and save them to your preferred device!

You can find all past issues of the OULR in the Osaka University Journal Repository. [here].

 

I personally had  the opportunity to publish an article on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Japan in the OULR in the past.

 

The OULR also welcomes submissions in foreign languages, including French or German. Those who are interested in having their research published in the OULR, please refer to our Guide for Authors [available here]. As a tradition, the submission deadline for manuscripts is the first Tuesday of the first week of November. All details about submissions can be found in the Guide for Authors.

 

For those able to read Portuguese, 3 new books of great interest have been published in the last months.

In January 2025, Professor Luís de Lima Pinheiro published a new, 4th edition of Volume I of the treatise on Private International Law. In more than 600 pages, the book gives an introduction to Conflict of Laws and deals with the General Part of this field. Along with the in-depth analysis of all those subjects, a comprehensive list of legal literature can be found at the beginning of each Chapter.

In November 2024, Professor Dário Moura Vicente published the 5th volume of his PIL “Essays” collection. It gathers 22 scholarly contributions of the author divided into five categories, namely general issues of Private International Law, jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgments in the EU, international unification of Private Law, the information society and its international regulation, and international arbitration.

And in October 2024, Professor Elsa Dias Oliveira published a book on Conflict of Laws in the EU. It deals with the «general part» issues that for decades have been puzzling many European private international lawyers, due to the fact that for some of them, such as renvoi or ordre public, we may find explicit rules in many PIL regulations, while for others, such as characterization or the application of foreign law, that is not the case.

Lauren Clayton-Helm and Ana Speed (both Northumbria University) are hosting a Modern Law Review funded conference at Northumbria University Law school on the 24th April entitled ‘Gender-based violence across borders: challenges and opportunities to establishing routes to safety in a migratory world’.

Further information can be found on the poster.

There will be space for up to 40 attendees.

Registration is mandatory under this link.

The Faculty of Law of the University of Bremen is recruiting a doctoral researcher in Private International Law, Civil Law and Legal Theory (‘wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter’ m/w/d; salary group 13 TV-L), part time 50 per cent, starting in 2025, for a duration of 36 months.

The researcher will provide scientific services in teaching to the extent of 2 SWS, and will be expected to work towards a PhD-thesis (doctor iuris) under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Gralf-Peter Calliess, in the research focus of the professorship, namely, private international law, civil procedure, arbitration, antitrust law and legal theory.

Candidates shall hold a first state examination in law (Staatsprüfung) or comparable academic university degree (graduation among the top 20 per cent of the year). A very good command of the German language is required, while a good command of English and/or other foreign language skills is an additional asset.

Deadline for applications with a letter of motivation, CV and certificates: 25th of March of 2025. For further information, please the legally binding call for applications (in German) to be found here or contact Margrit Knipper: knipper@uni-bremen.de.

Commission / Croatie (Décharge de Biljane Donje II)
Environnement et consommateurs
La Cour impose des sanctions financières à la Croatie pour n’avoir pas géré de manière adéquate des déchets mis en décharge présentant une menace pour la santé humaine et l’environnement

Commission / Allemagne (Directive lanceurs d’alerte)
Rapprochement des législations
Manquement d’État : cinq États membres sont condamnés à des sanctions financières pour défaut de transposition de la directive « lanceurs d’alerte »

D. K. (Dessaisissement d’un juge)
Droit institutionnel
Indépendance des juges : la décision de dessaisir un juge de ses affaires doit être fondée sur des critères objectifs et précis

Cymdek
Transport
Droits des passagers aériens : une carte d’embarquement peut suffire à prouver une réservation confirmée sur un vol

On 27 February 2025, the research services of the European Parliament published on line a briefing authored by David de Groot, entitled Surrogacy: The legal situation in the EU, setting out the legal situation in the EU regarding surrogacy. The document provides a good, well-researched and easy-to-follow introduction to the topic. In 17 pages, it […]

A new paper by Michael Green, A Plea for Private International Law (Conflict of Laws), was recently published as an Essay in the Notre Dame Law Review Reflection. Michael argues that although private international law is increasingly important in our interconnected world, it has fallen out of favor at top U.S. law schools. To quote from the Essay:

Private international law has not lost its jurisprudential import. And ease of travel, communication, and trade have only increased in the last century. But in American law schools (although not abroad), private international law has started dropping out of the curriculum, with the trend accelerating in the last five years or so. We have gone through US News and World Report’s fifty top-ranked law schools and, after careful review, it appears that twelve have not offered a course on private international law (or its equivalent) in the last four academic years: Arizona State University, Boston University, Brigham Young University, Fordham University, University of Georgia, University of Minnesota, The Ohio State University, Pepperdine University, Stanford University, University of Southern California, Vanderbilt University, and University of Washington. And even where the course is taught, in some law schools—such as Duke, New York University, and Yale—it is by visitors, adjuncts, or emerita. It is no longer a valued subject in faculty hiring.

I could not agree more. Nor am I alone. Although Michael did the bulk of the research and writing for the Essay, he shared credit with a number of scholars who endorse the arguments set forth therein. This list of credited co-authors includes:

Lea Brilmayer (Yale Law School)
John Coyle (University of North Carolina School of Law)
William S. Dodge (George Washington University Law School)
Scott Dodson (UC Law San Francisco)
Peter Hay (Emory School of Law)
Luke Meier (Baylor Law School)
Jeffrey Pojanowski (Notre Dame Law School)
Kermit Roosevelt III (University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School)
Joseph William Singer (Harvard Law School)
Symeon C. Symeonides (Willamette University College of Law)
Carlos M. Vázquez (Georgetown University Law Center)
Christopher A. Whytock (UC Irvine School of Law)
Patrick Woolley (University of Texas School of Law).

In addition to his empirical findings about the declining role of Conflict of Laws in the U.S. law school curricula, Michael seeks to explain precisely why the class matters so much and why it has fallen out of favor. He argues convincingly that part of the decline may be attributed to poor branding:

We suspect that part of the problem is that many American law professors and law school administrators are unaware that conflict of laws is private international law. One of us is an editor of a volume on the philosophical foundations of private international law, and in conversation several law professor friends (we won’t name names) told him that they weren’t aware that he worked on private international law, even though they knew that he worked on conflicts. Reintroducing conflicts to the law school curriculum might be as simple a matter as rebranding the course to make its connection with international law clear, as Georgetown has done.

He also considers—and rightly rejects—the notion that this is an area about which practicing attorneys can easily educate themselves. To quote again from the Essay:

Another argument that the disappearance of conflicts from the law school curriculum is not a problem is that a practitioner can identify a choice-of-law issue and get up to speed on the relevant law in short order. The truth, however, is that one is unlikely to recognize a choice-of-law issue without having taken conflicts. We have often been shocked at how law professors without a conflicts background (again, we are not naming names) will make questionable choice-of-law inferences in the course of an argument, based on nothing more than their a priori intuitions. They appear to be unaware that there is law—and law that differs markedly as one moves from one state or nation to another—on the matter. One can recognize a choice-of-law issue only by knowing what is possible, and someone who has not taken conflicts will not know the universe of possibilities.

The Essay contains a host of additional insights that will (fingers crossed) help to reinvigorate the field of private international law in the United States. Anyone with an interest in conflicts (or private international law) should read it. It can be downloaded here.

A version of this post also appears at Transnational Litigation Blog.

The author of this post is Lydia Lundstedt, who is an Associate Professor and Senior Lecturer at Stockholm University and Linköping University. In the interest of transparency, the author makes known that she previously wrote an expert legal opinion on behalf of BSH Hausgeräte. On 25 February 2025, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice […]

Dans l’affaire du boycott des publicités sur CNews et celle des méga-bassines de Sainte Soline, la Cour de cassation a vérifié l’absence d’ingérence disproportionnée dans l’exercice de la liberté d’expression. 

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Building on the success of the two previous editions (here and here), a new edition of the EAPIL Winter School is currently being organized by the European Association of Private International Law and the Department of Law, Economics and Cultures of the University of Insubria in Como, in cooperation with the Law Faculty of the […]

On behalf of Aleksandrs Fillers (Riga Graduate School of Law), we are happy to share the following conference announcement; more information can also be found here.

The European Union (EU) has become a central player in private international law (PIL) on the European continent. The scope of EU PIL is extensive and constantly poses challenges to scholars and courts. The objective of the Riga Private International Law Conference is to discuss the current weaknesses of EU PIL and share suggestions for improvements. The conference topics cover all areas of EU Private International Law, including private international law for divorces, maintenance, commercial contracts, torts, and more.

The conference will be held in Riga, Latvia, at the Riga Graduate School of Law on 7–8 June 2025.

Please submit abstracts of no more than 300 words to Associate Professor Dr Aleksandrs Fillers (aleksandrs.fillers@rgsl.edu.lv) by 15 April 2025.

We will notify you about the acceptance of papers by 1 May 2025. To cover the costs of lunches and administrative expenses, we foresee a moderate fee of EUR 30.

Directly after the conference, we intend to prepare a book proposal under the working title “Improving European Private International Law.” The proposal will be based on selected papers, and we aim to publish it with an international publishing house with broad distribution.

The European Commission has published on 26 February 2026 a proposal for a directive amending Directives 2006/43, 2013/34, 2022/2464 and 2024/1760 concerning certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements, as part of its Omnibus Simplification Package. The explanatory memorandum highlights that business associations have raised concerns about the regulatory burden resulting, inter alia, from […]