
Saisie d’un renvoi préjudiciel, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne devait se prononcer sur l’interprétation des articles 6 et 7 de la directive 93/13/CEE du Conseil du 5 avril 1993 concernant les clauses abusives dans les contrats conclus avec les consommateurs. Par ces questions, le requérant demande à la Cour de justice si ces dispositions doivent être interprétées en ce qu’elles s’opposent à une réglementation nationale prévoyant la possibilité, pour le juge saisi par un professionnel d’une demande d’injonction de payer contre un consommateur de faire, à l’issue d’une procédure non contradictoire, une proposition de réduction du montant de la créance, qui exclut les montants résultant de l’application d’une clause contractuelle qu’il a considérée comme étant abusive, sans pouvoir constater la nullité de celle-ci, ainsi que la possibilité, pour le professionnel, après acceptation de cette proposition, d’introduire une autre procédure juridictionnelle afin de recouvrir, auprès du consommateur, le montant de la créance rejeté par le juge.
The 19th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law (ISFL) will take place in Istanbul, Türkiye, from 9 to 12 September 2026. The conference will be hosted by Pîrî Reis University at its Marine Campus in Tuzla, offering a distinctive coastal setting for this major event.
The theme of the conference is “Family Law & Vulnerability.”
The conference will explore how family law engages with different forms of vulnerability across diverse legal systems and social contexts. Contributions addressing the theme from comparative, interdisciplinary, theoretical or practice-oriented perspectives are welcomed.
The deadline for abstract submission has been extended to 20 February 2026. Abstracts may be submitted for paper presentations (including jointly authored papers) as well as for organized panels. Detailed submission guidelines are available on the conference website.
Conference registration will open in late February 2026. Registration fees for participation in the scientific program are as follows:
The early bird rates will apply until 1 May 2026. Registration fees cover access to the scientific sessions of the conference; social events will be subject to separate registration and fees.
The conference venue, Tuzla, is located on the Asian side of Istanbul and is conveniently close to Sabiha Gökçen International Airport, which serves numerous international and domestic flights. Tuzla is well connected to other parts of the city by public transport.
A list of recommended hotels on the Asian side of Istanbul will be published on the conference website in due course, providing a range of accommodation options with convenient access to the venue by public transport.
Further information on registration procedures, accommodation and the conference program will be made available on the official conference website: www.isfl2026.org.
Giacomo Marola’s International Jurisdiction over Infringements of Personality Rights in EU Private International Law (2025 Wolters Kluwer) addresses a deceptively simple but persistently debated question: where should a claimant be entitled to sue when reputation, privacy, or personal data are infringed across borders? As the book makes clear from the outset, this question lies at the intersection of private international law, fundamental rights, and the realities of online communication. Personality rights disputes are structurally conflictual, typically opposing the protection of moral integrity to freedom of expression, while the Internet continues to strain jurisdictional rules built around territorial connecting factors. Against this backdrop, the book offers a timely and systematic assessment of the EU framework.
Chapter I constitutes the analytical core of the work. It provides a detailed examination of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I-bis Regulation and the Court of Justice’s case law on the ‘place of the harmful event’ in personality rights disputes. From Shevill to eDate Advertising, Bolagsupplysningen, Mittelbayerischer and Gtflix, Marola carefully examines the construction of locus actus and locus damni, focusing in particular on the publisher’s place of establishment, the persistence of the ‘mosaic’ approach, and jurisdiction based on the victim’s centre of interests. The chapter goes beyond doctrinal reconstruction by assessing these solutions against the objectives of proximity, predictability, and procedural balance, and by advancing a well-argued proposal de lege ferenda.
Chapter II places the EU approach in comparative perspective through an analysis of US jurisdictional doctrine in defamation and online tort cases. By retracing the path from Keeton and Calder to the rise and decline of the Zippo test and the renewed prominence of the ‘effects’ doctrine, the chapter sheds light on both convergences and structural differences. In doing so, it provides a useful corrective to overly enthusiastic transatlantic borrowings sometimes found in the European literature.
The final chapter turns to the General Data Protection Regulation and its interaction with the Brussels I-bis Regulation. Chapter III examines both public and private enforcement mechanisms, with particular attention to Article 79 GDPR and its implications for jurisdictional choice in data protection litigation. By integrating GDPR disputes into the broader analysis of personality rights, the book captures an increasingly central area of cross-border litigation.
Overall, the monograph combines doctrinal precision, critical insight, and pragmatic proposals, making it a valuable contribution for scholars and practitioners engaged with jurisdictional questions at the crossroads of EU private international law and fundamental rights.
On Thursday 12 February 2026, the Australasian Association of Private International Law (AAPrIL) is hosting its first seminar of 2026, as Professor Stephen Pitel presents free online and in-person (Qld, Australia) on the topic, ‘Reconsidering the “Proper Party” Basis for Jurisdiction’.
Abstract:
In several jurisdictions the fact that a defendant is a ‘proper party’ to a legal proceeding constitutes a sufficient basis for taking jurisdiction over that defendant. Advocates of the proper party basis rely on considerations of fairness and efficiency to support it. Do these considerations support the proper party basis, especially if it is given a wide scope? Recently Canadian courts have been reconsidering their approach to the proper party basis, as seen (somewhat opaquely) in Sinclair v Venezia Turismo, 2025 SCC 27. This presentation will explore that reconsideration and offer thoughts for changes in other jurisdictions including Australia and New Zealand.
Chair:
Mary Keyes is Professor of Law at Griffith University, and President of AAPrIL. She is a leading scholar on questions of international jurisdiction and international family law. Mary is co-author of Private International Law in Australia, and is a member of the Working Group on Jurisdiction at the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
Presenter:
Stephen Pitel Stephen G.A. Pitel is a Professor in the Faculty of Law at Western University. His research and teaching are focused on private international law, tort law, civil procedure and legal ethics. Stephen is the author of Conflict of Laws (3rd ed. 2025) and co-author of Private International Law in Common Law Canada: Cases, Text and Materials (5th ed. 2023) and Statutory Jurisdiction: An Analysis of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (2012). His tort law scholarship includes co-authoring Fridman’s The Law of Torts in Canada (4th ed. 2020) and Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts (11th ed. 2023). In the field of legal ethics, Stephen is a contributor to Lawyers’ Ethics and Professional Regulation (4th ed. 2021). He is a former President of the Canadian Association for Legal Ethics.
Details:
Date and time: Thursday 12 February 2026, 5:00pm to 6:00pm (AEST)*
Date and time Thursday 12 February 2026, 5:00pm to 6:00pm (AEST)
in person: Griffith University, Southbank, Brisbane: Room 4.03 Building S07. The map is available here.
RSVP (essential): Please register via this link by COB Wednesday 11 February 2026, and advise whether you are attending in person or online. Please access the Teams link here. There is no cost.
* NZ. 8:00pm-9:pm; ACT, NSW, Tas and Vic. 6:00pm-7:00pm; SA, 5:30pm-6:30pm; Qld, PNG. 5:00pm-6:00pm; NT, 4:30pm-5:30pm; WA, 3:00pm-4:00pm
The Child Support Forum in cooperation with the International Union of Judicial Officers is pleased to invite every interested stakeholders of the cross border child support recovery to an open conference on January 28th, 2026 from 3 to 5:30 pm (CET).
According to Art. 41 of Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009 and Art. 32 of the 2007 Child Support Convention, the enforcement procedure shall be governed by the law of the state of enforcement. But in practice, the prospects of successfully initiating cross-border enforcement proceedings are not always easy to assess. In order to enforce successfully, it is necessary to know the specifics of the legal system of the state of enforcement (the Requested state).
Key questions in this context are:
The meeting aims to review the international legal framework and provide an overview of the various national enforcement systems. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of the different systems from a legal policy perspective shall be discussed.
The participation is free of charge but registration is required.
To register, click here.
Following the successful release of Legal Challenges of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative: Private International Law Considerations late last year, as previously announced on this blog, co-editors Dr Poomintr Sooksripaisarnkit (University of Tasmania) and Dr Sai Ramani Gariimella (South Asian University) are pleased to invite you to an upcoming online book launch.
This virtual event will feature insights from three distinguished contributors:
Presentations will be followed by a moderated Q & A and discussion session.
This event is open to the public; please refer to the attached flyer to scan the QR Code for Zoom access.
Comme d’habitude, l’actualité de la jurisprudence de la Cour de Strasbourg a été un peu moins chargée au cours des deux derniers moins de l’année puisque la deuxième quinzaine de décembre a été pratiquement neutralisée. Ce sont surtout les affaires françaises qui se sont raréfiées.
Dans cet arrêt, la chambre criminelle se prononce sur le contrôle de la décision de la chambre de l’instruction décidant de l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen après que la personne recherchée a consenti à sa remise. En interprétant l’article 695-31 du code de procédure pénale, elle limite l’accès au pourvoi au seul enjeu de la validité du consentement.
La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme se prononce pour la première fois sur les retards de paiement d’indemnités dues à des avocats au titre de l’aide judiciaire. Au-delà du cadre italien, l’affaire retient l’attention par la méthode qu’elle déploie pour analyser l’applicabilité de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et apprécier le caractère excessif du retard. La grille d’analyse est aisément transposable à d’autres systèmes juridiques et inscrit l’exécution des créances définitives dans le prolongement naturel de leur reconnaissance.
Présenté par le journaliste Laurent Neumann, Quid Juris est un podcast du Club des juristes, réalisé en partenariat avec Lefebvre Dalloz, qui décrypte chaque semaine l’actualité à travers le prisme du droit. Il donne la parole aux meilleurs professeurs, magistrats, avocats et experts du monde juridique. Cette semaine, Laurent Neumann reçoit Mattias Guyomar, président de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Gardienne des droits et libertés fondamentales, la Cour européenne est régulièrement critiquée parce qu’elle s’opposerait à la loi nationale et aux choix du législateur. Elle est ainsi au cœur des débats et polémiques sur l’État de droit, qui ne cessent de gagner du terrain. Pour la première fois depuis son élection en mai dernier, Mattias Guyomar prend la parole pour rappeler le rôle essentiel de la Cour européenne et réfuter les attaques dont elle est l’objet. Sans oublier de montrer comment elle défend, au quotidien, les droits et libertés de plus de 450 millions d’Européens.
Canada’s highest court does not grant leave to appeal in many cases involving private international law. In November 2025 it granted leave to appeal from NHK Spring Co., Ltd. v Cheung, 2024 BCCA 236, in which the British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed with the court below in holding that it had jurisdiction to hear a price fixing class action. The action is interesting because it involves what could be described as a “foreign” conspiracy that had effects within Canada.
The defendants are Japanese entities and the claim alleges that they conspired to fix the price of “suspension assemblies” which are a component of hard disk drives which are in turn a component of things like computers. The claim alleges that Canadians purchased products that contained these assemblies and because of the price fixing they paid more than they otherwise would have done.
The defendants object to being sued in British Columbia. As the Court of Appeal explained (at [11]), “None of the appellants have a relevant personal presence in Canada. Their headquarters are overseas. They do not operate in Canada. They do not carry out business in Canada for Assemblies. There have been no direct sales of Assemblies in Canada. There has been no pleading that they conspired to fix prices in Canada, actually fixed prices in Canada, or allocated markets within Canada. The initial action does not name a defendant located in Canada and there is no Canadian market for Assemblies. That market exists outside Canada. Assemblies are low cost components and any overcharge in relation to a particular final product is arguably negligible.”
British Columbia is one of the provinces that has adopted a statute on jurisdiction (the CJPTA) and it presumes a real and substantial connection to the forum, and thus territorial competence (jurisdiction), in a proceeding concerning a tort committed in the forum (s 10(g)). The Court of Appeal relied on several of its own prior decisions in stating (at [43]) that “The judge’s statement that the tort of conspiracy is committed where the harm occurs, even if the conspiracy is entered into elsewhere, is indisputably correct” (emphasis added). It went on to conclude that the presumed connection had not been rebutted by the defendants.
The parties’ written arguments for and against leave to appeal are available here. The defendants seek to have the SCC develop the law on how the place of a tort is identified. They raise the concern that the focus on the location of the harm does not sit well with earlier SCC decisions, notably Club Resorts (available here) rejecting the place of damage or injury as a sufficient jurisdictional connection. The defendants also ask the SCC to provide more clarification on how a presumption of jurisdiction is to be rebutted, though it should be noted that since those arguments were filed the SCC has released Sinclair v Venezia Turismo, 2025 SCC 27 which does contain significant discussion of that stage of the analysis.
In response, the plaintiffs argue that the law regarding the place of the tort of conspiracy for jurisdiction purposes is well-settled and not in need of development or revision. In the context of taking jurisdiction, it is acceptable for more than one place to be considered the place of a tort; a single place need not be identified. The plaintiffs rely on the longstanding approach in Moran v Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., [1975] SCR 393. Not surprisingly, both sides of the dispute rely on various aspects of the competing decisions in the English Brownlie litigation.
As is its practice, the SCC did not provide reasons for granting leave to appeal. We have to await clues in the oral argument and then of course the subsequent written decision to determine what the SCC thought warranted its involvement.
I. Introduction
On 1 January 2026, the Legislative Decree No. 25/2025 promulgating a new Civil Transactions Act (hereafter ‘NCTA’) entered into force. The NCTA repeals and replaces the former Federal Civil Transactions Act of 1985 (hereafter ‘the 1985 Act’). The adoption of the NCTA forms part of the State’s broader and ongoing effort to comprehensively update and modernize its legal system, an effort that has already touched major legislative instruments, including, among many others, the 2022 Civil Procedure Act, the 2024 Personal Status Act, the 2023 Competition Act, and the 2022 Commercial Transactions Act.
Since the 1985 Act contained a codified set of conflict-of-laws rules, its replacement necessarily entails a re-examination of the UAE’s private international law framework and, at least in principle, the introduction of new or revised choice-of-law provisions. Against this background, this note offers a preliminary and necessarily tentative assessment of the modifications introduced by the NCTA. It focuses on the main features of the new law in relation to choice-of-law regulation, highlighting both the changes introduced and the limits of the reform.
II. The Choice-of-Law System under the 1985 Act and its Evolution
1. Choice of Law Rules under the 1985 Act
It is worth recalling that the first codification of conflict-of-laws rules in the UAE was introduced in 1985 as part of the 1985 Act. This codification consisted of 29 provisions (Arts. 10–28), incorporated into the Preliminary Part of the Act. In both structure and substance, the UAE codification closely followed the Egyptian model. Remarkably, despite the 37 years separating the two codifications, most of the Egyptian rules were retained almost unchanged. Some divergences nevertheless existed. For instance, while renvoi is entirely excluded under Egyptian law (Art. 27 of the Egyptian Civil Code), it is permitted under the 1985 Act only where it leads to the application of UAE law (Art. 26 of the 1985 Act).
The codification was relatively simple, comprising general choice-of-law rules structured by reference to broad legal categories, dealing in particular with status and capacity (Art. 11); marriage, its effects, and dissolution (Arts. 12–14); maintenance (Art. 15); guardianship and other measures for the protection of persons with limited capacity and absentees (Art. 16); succession and wills (Art. 17); real rights (Art. 18); contractual obligations (Art. 19); non-contractual obligations (Art. 20); and procedure (Art. 21).
The codification also included general provisions governing characterization (Art. 10); the priority of international conventions (Art. 22); general principles of private international law (Art. 23); national law (Art. 24); multi-jurisdictional legal systems (Art. 25); renvoi (Art. 26); public policy (Art. 27); and the application of UAE law in cases where the content of the applicable foreign law cannot be ascertained (Art. 28).
2. The 2020 Reform
It was not until 2020 that the choice-of-law rules were partially reformed through the Legislative Decree No. 30/2020, which amended certain provisions of the 1985 Act. This reform was not comprehensive but instead targeted four key areas.
First, the rule on substantive and formal validity of marriage was amended to replace the former connecting factor based on the lex patriae of each spouse with the lex loci celebrationis (Art. 12).
Second, the rule on personal and patrimonial effects of marriage and its dissolution based on the lex patriae of the husband was similarly abandoned in favor of the lex loci celebrationis.
Third, Article 17, relating to succession and wills, was revised to allow professio juris for both the substantive and the formal validity of wills. As regards the former, the will is governed by the law chosen by the testator, failing which the lex patriae of the deceased at the time of death applies. As for formal validity, professio juris now operates as an additional alternative connecting factor.
Finally, the reform addressed public policy. For reasons that remain unclear, Article 27 expressly limited the operation of the public policy exception by excluding matters traditionally associated with personal status – such as marriage, divorce, filiation, maintenance, guardianship, succession, and wills – from its scope, despite the fact that these matters are generally regarded as having a strong public policy character (Art. 3).
Other provisions, however, were left unchanged, notwithstanding the fact that many of them are outdated and no longer reflect contemporary developments in private international law, in particular the persistence of traditional connecting factors such as the common domicile of the contractors and the locus contractus in contractual matters or double actionability rule for non-contractual obligations. More fundamentally, the reform failed to address the interaction between the conflict-of-laws rules contained in the 1985 Act and the provisions delimiting the scope of application of the 2005 Personal Status Act, which was subsequently replaced by the 2024 Personal Status Act. This unresolved issue of articulation continues to generate significant legal uncertainty (for an overview, see my previous posts here).
III. The New Reform under the NCTA
It was therefore with genuine enthusiasm that the reform of the existing legal framework was awaited, particularly in light of the ongoing efforts to modernize the UAE legal system and align it with international standards. However, while the reform does present some positive aspects (1), it is with considerable regret that the NCTA appears to have devoted only very limited attention to the modernization of the UAE conflict-of-laws regime (2).
This assessment is grounded in two main observations:
First, the existing system has largely been maintained with only some minor changes, including changes in wording.
Second, the very limited modifications that were introduced reflect a legislative approach that, at best, appears insufficiently informed by contemporary developments in private international law.
1. Positive Aspects of the Reform
Three main positive aspects can be identified:
The first concerns the clear affirmation of party autonomy as a guiding principle in contractual matters. Under the 1985 Act, although party autonomy was formally recognized, its formulation tended to present it as an exception rather than as a genuine principle. This shortcoming has now been remedied in the NCTA. The new provision expressly states that “contractual obligations, as to both form and substance, are governed by the law expressly chosen by the parties.” In addition, the NCTA abolishes the place of conclusion of the contract as an objective connecting factor applicable in the absence of a choice of law by the parties, thereby moving away from a traditional and often criticized criterion.
Second, the questionable rule allowing the application of UAE law when one of the parties has multiple nationalities is now abandoned. According to the new rule, in case a person has multiple nationalities, the law of nationality under which that person entered the UAE would apply.
The third important modification concerns public policy. As noted above, the 2020 reform introduced considerable confusion and ambiguity in the application of the public policy exception by unduly restricting its scope and excluding matters that have traditionally been regarded as falling within public policy. The NCTA addresses this difficulty by removing the limitation introduced in 2020 and by restoring the public policy exception to its more general function within the UAE conflict-of-laws system.
Another modification of particular significance should also be highlighted, although it must be acknowledged that its practical impact may be more symbolic than substantive. This concerns the abandonment, in the current reform, of any explicit reference to Islamic Sharia in the context of public policy, even though such a reference, which appeared in the original provision in 1985, was expressly maintained in the 2020 reform. This omission marks a notable shift in legislative technique and appears to signal a move toward a more neutral formulation of public policy, at least at the level of statutory language.
The removal of the explicit reference to Islamic Sharia may thus be understood as part of a broader trend toward the modernization and internationalization of the UAE’s private international law framework. This interpretation is further supported by the redefinition of the role of Islamic Sharia as a formal source of law under the NCTA. Indeed, whereas former Article 1 of the 1985 Act set out a detailed hierarchy of rules prioritizing specific schools of jurisprudence (most notably the Maliki and Hanbali schools), the new Article 1 of the NCTA adopts a more open-ended formulation, granting judges greater discretion to select “the solution that is most appropriate in light of the interests at stake,” without specifying any particular school of reference. A similar approach was adopted in the 2024 reform of the Personal Status Act.
2. Limits of the Reform and Persisting Issues
Notwithstanding the positive aspects identified above, the reform also presents a number of significant shortcomings. These concern both certain newly introduced provisions, whose design or content raises serious difficulties, and important issues that the legislature chose not to address or appears to have overlooked altogether. Taken together, these weaknesses considerably limit the extent to which the reform can be regarded as a genuine modernization of the UAE conflict-of-laws regime.
a) New Solutions Introduced in the NCTA
i) The The Conflict-of-Law rule in Matters of Marriage and its Dissolution: The Further Extension of the Scope of the Nationality Privilege
As noted above, prior to the entry into force of the NCTA, the lex loci celebrationis governed the substantive and formal validity of marriage (Art. 12), as well as its personal and patrimonial effects and its dissolution (Art. 13). Marriages concluded between foreigners, or between a foreigner and a UAE citizen, could also be recognized as valid in form if they complied with the formalities of the place of celebration, or if they respected the formal requirements prescribed by the law of each of the spouses (Art. 12). The application of these rules was, however, subject to an important exception: they did not apply if one of the parties was a UAE citizen at the time of the marriage, except with respect to capacity (Art. 14).
First, it should be noted that the NCTA failed to resolve the inconsistency between Articles 12 and 14. While Article 12 allows the formal validity of marriages concluded by UAE citizens abroad to be governed by the lex loci celebrationis, Article 14 removes this possibility by subjecting all matters relating to the formation of marriage, its effects, and its dissolution exclusively to UAE law when one of the parties is a UAE citizen.
Second, and more importantly, the NCTA extends the scope of the exception in a problematic manner. Under the new rules, the exception now applies not only to persons who were UAE citizens at the time of the marriage, but also to those who subsequent to their marriage acquired UAE citizenship, and retained that citizenship up to the time the action is brought.
On its face, this rule raises two main concerns. First, it introduces retrospective effects by applying UAE law to marriages concluded before the acquisition of citizenship. This potentially affects the validity, formalities, and effects of marriages that were lawfully concluded under foreign law. Second, it may create uncertainty in cross-border matrimonial relations, as spouses who acquire UAE nationality after marriage could inadvertently subject themselves to UAE law even if all formal and substantive requirements were originally satisfied abroad. Such an extension of the nationality privilege, while it may be of very limited practical relevance, represents a questionable departure from traditional conflict-of-law principles based on the ideas of acquired rights, and the respect of the legitimate expectations of the parties.
ii) The Conflict-of-Law rule in Contractual Matters
Despite the positive aspects noted above, the new rule suffers from significant shortcomings. These shortcomings relate, first and foremost, to the scope and the regime of party autonomy. In particular, the provision remains silent on several crucial issues: whether the chosen law must have any connection with the parties or the contract; whether an initial choice of law may be modified at a later stage; and whether techniques such as dépeçage or the choice of non-State law are permissible. All these uncertainties undermine the effective operation of party autonomy and weaken legal certainty.
Second, in the absence of a choice of law by the parties, the NCTA not only retains the outdated reference to the parties’ common domicile as the primary objective connecting factor, but also introduces a new connecting factor whose application is likely, in practice, to lead systematically to the application of UAE law. Under the new rule, where there is neither a choice of law nor a common domicile, the contract is governed by the law of the State in which the principal obligation is to be performed. Unlike the traditional test of the “characteristic obligation”, which typically leads to the identification of a single governing law presumed to have the closest connection with the contract, the notion of “principal obligation” is inherently problematic in the field of choice of law. This is because bilateral contracts, which constitute the main instruments of international trade, by their very nature involve more than one principal obligation, such as the delivery of goods and the payment of the price in a contract of sale. As a result, in contracts involving a UAE party, whether as obligor or obligee, the performance of at least one principal obligation will often take place in the UAE, thereby triggering the systematic and largely indiscriminate application of UAE law. Even if the term “principal obligation” is understood as referring to the “characteristic obligation,” the new provision departs from the general approach adopted in leading recent codifications by designating the place of performance (locus solutionis) of that obligation, rather than the more widely accepted and more predictable connecting factor of the habitual residence of the party performing the characteristic obligation.
Of course, the parties may seek to avoid this difficulty by choosing the law applicable to their contract. However, given the very weak status of foreign law in the UAE, where it is treated as a mere question of fact, and the considerable hurdles imposed on the parties in establishing its content in judicial practice, the practical relevance of party autonomy is largely illusory. This assessment is once again confirmed by several recent Supreme Court decisions in which the law chosen by the parties was not applied on the grounds that the chosen law was not ascertained as required (see Dubai Supreme Court, Appeal No. 720 of 13 August 2025; Appeal No. 1084 of 22 October 2025; Appeal No. 1615 of 23 December 2025). The same difficulties arise in family law matters, as discussed in a previous post, but they are identical in substance in civil and commercial cases as well.
b) Persisting Issues
Notwithstanding the few positive developments highlighted above, the conflict-of-laws rules incorporated in the NCTA largely preserve the traditional Egyptian model introduced into the region in 1948. As a result, they remain significantly disconnected from contemporary developments and comparative trends in private international law and fail to fully reflect the principles increasingly adopted in other jurisdictions to address the needs of cross-border transactions, family relations, and international commercial practice. The reform also preserved a traditionally rigid approach, leaving little room for flexibility and excluding exception clauses that would allow courts to depart from the designated applicable law in favor of a more closely connected one. In particular, the NCTA does not introduce tailored conflict rules designed to reflect the specific characteristics of certain legal relationships. This omission is especially noticeable with regard to protective regimes for weaker parties, including employees and consumers. Unlike many modern conflict-of-laws systems, the NCTA does not limit the role of party autonomy in these contexts, nor does it provide specific choice-of-law rules for employment or consumer contracts. Similar shortcomings can be observed in the absence of specialized rules governing particular categories of torts or addressing specific aspects of family relationships.
Finally, as was already the case following the 2020 reform, the NCTA fails to resolve the longstanding and fundamental issue concerning the articulation between the rules delimiting the scope of application of the Personal Status Act and the choice-of-law rules set out in the NCTA. This problem has become even more acute with the recent introduction of “civil personal status” legislation at both the federal level and the local level in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, thereby further complicating the overall normative landscape (for an overview see my previous posts here and here).
IV. Some Concluding Remarks
Taken as a whole, while the adoption of the NCTA could have provided an opportunity to undertake a thorough and forward-looking reform of the UAE’s private international law framework by drawing inspiration from the most recent developments in the field and from general trends observed in comparative law. Such a reform would have helped consolidate the UAE’s position and ambitions as a leading hub not only for international finance and business transactions, but also as a melting pot of multiple nationalities living harmoniously within its territory. However, the reform ultimately falls short of this ambition. It largely preserves an outdated structure and introduces only limited, and at times problematic, adjustments. Moreover, the reform does nothing to address the strong homeward trend observed in judicial practice, which significantly limits the practical relevance of choice-of-law rules. This trend is particularly evident in personal status legislation and in the very weak status accorded to foreign law. In this respect, the NCTA represents a missed opportunity to align the UAE’s conflict-of-laws regime with modern comparative standards and to enhance legal certainty, predictability, and coherence in an increasingly international legal environment.
Les autorités françaises ont été condamnées par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur le fondement de l’article 3 de la Convention européenne, en raison du défaut d’accès aux soins d’un détenu conditionnant la compatibilité du maintien en détention avec son état de santé. Reprenant une jurisprudence classique, la Cour constate que les autorités françaises ont failli dans leur obligation positive de fournir des soins adaptés.
The PAX Moot 2026 Vladimir Koutikov Round is well underway. The case was published on 13 October 2025 and is available here. The deadline for registration is 16 January 2026 at 23:59 CET.
Save the date: The oral rounds will take place from 15 to 17 April 2026 in Sofia, Bulgaria.
The schedule of the case (incl. other deadlines) is the following:
Deadline for Requests for Clarifications 16 January 2026, 23:59 CET
Deadline for Submission of the Memorials 27 February 2026, 23:59 CET
Grading of Written Submissions 26 March 2026
Communication of Grading Sheets 27 April 2026
The PAX Moot is a specialized moot court competition focused on Transnational Law and Private International Law issues and is funded by the European Union. For more information, click here. To view the PAX partners, click here.
Views and opinions expressed are however those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Commission. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
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