[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
In Stichting Environment and fundamental rights v Repsol Perú BV et al ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2025:8700, the claim relates to the 15 January 2022 oil leak at La Pampilla, Peru, also known as the Callao Oil Spill.
Defendants are Repsol Perú BV, domiciled at The Hague: this is the anchor defendant and jurisdiction against it is easily established using Article 4 Brussels Ia. The other defendants are Repsol SA Madrid, and Refinería La Pampilla SAA of Callao. Peru.
‘Forum connexitatis’ is the power for a court to exercise jurisdiction over defendants against whom it does not ordinarily have jurisdiction, provided the claims against them are so closely related to (hence ‘connexitatis’) one against a defendant viz whom said court undisputedly has jurisdiction, that the interest of justice requires joint treatment of all claims concerned. The latter defendant is called the ‘anchor defendant’.
In the case at issue, forum connexitatis needs to be tested against the EU rules (Article 8 Brussels Ia) in the case of Repsol SA; and under residual Dutch rules (Article 7(1) CPR, because A8(1) does not apply against non-EU domiciled defendants) in the case of Refiniería La Pampilla SAA.
Current judgment deals with the jurisdictional issues only and does not mention applicable law at all. It is likely claimants make use of Article 7 Rome II’s lex ecologia provisions (compare the Lliuya v RWE judgment just last week) however I cannot be sure.
A first argument of defendants is that under Article IX of the 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage – CLC, the claim must be brought in Peru:
“Where an incident has caused pollution damage in the territory, including the territorial sea or an area referred to in Article II, of one or more Contracting States or preventive measures have been taken to prevent or minimize pollution damage in such territory including the territorial sea or area, actions for compensation may only be brought in the Courts of any such Contracting State or States.”
[4.6] the court acknowledges that prima facie this does look like a knock-out point. However [4.7] it points out that on the other hand, the CLC only regulates the liability of the ship owner and its insurer and how they can be sued. [4.9] the court confirms its reading of text itself, the travaux and the DNA of the CLC as not pertaining to claims against parties other than the ship owner and its insurer. ‘A 2002 judgment by the Italian Supreme Court’ which I suspect is I.O.P.C.F. v. Registro Italiano Navale and others, re the sinking
of m/t “Erika”, Italian Supreme Court 17 October 2002 n. 14769 is distinguished on the ground that that claim involved the affiliated persons listed in A IX CLC.
The court then considers A8(1) BIa viz Repsol SA, and [4.13] points out that the same principles in application of the EU anchor rules, apply equally to the residual Dutch rules.
[4.11] it suggests that the claim against the anchor defendant must have a prospect of success, for A8(1) jurisdiction to be possible. That view is not imo supported by the authorities and the issue is currently sub judice at least as far as follow-on damages claims are concerned, in CJEU C-673/23 Electricity & Water Authority of Government of Bahrain ea v Prismiian ea. I review the Opinion of Kokott AG here.
[4.16] the core reproach viz the defendants is said to concern the inadequacy of the La Pampilla reception facilities, and defendants’ inadequate response to the spill. Repsol BV argues that it is a most remote shareholder and not at all involved in the goings-on in Peru and that even Repsol SA has no direct dealings with the Peruvian operations. [4.17] claimants argues the near exclusive ownership (more than 99%) of Repsol BV in La Pampilla, a shared director and other links show the direct involvement or at the very least a culpable non-involvement: Repsol VB ought to have used its influence to avoid the calamity.
[4.18] however the court rejects the shareholding and other circumstances and demands claimants show “direct involvement” by Repsol BV. That is most definitely a step back viz recent duty of care litigation, including in The Netherlands. The court did not immediately refuse instant permission to appeal hence I suspect (but I am not a Dutch CPR expert) this must be possible – and most definitely should be exercised.
The merits review test is as I argue above, not good law under A8(1) authority and the requirement of ‘direct involvement’ is not in line with recent duty of care practice.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.13.1 (in particular 2.496); Heading 2.2.15.3.2; Chapter 7.
'Global North' business & human rights claim, Peru oil spillDutch court rejects forum connexitatis viz Spanish, Peruvian corps, wth Dutch anchor defendantAccepts jurisdiction viz NL defendant despite 1992 CLC ConventionStichting E&FR v Repsol BV ea deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id…
— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-05-26T07:17:55.045Z
Tony’s Open Chair have today published my opinion on the impact the European Commission’s ‘Omnibus’ deregulation proposal will have on the applicable law for supply chain liability claims. In short: not a good one.
Richard Gardiner has other updates on the issue here and he is generally a marvel when it comes to sharing all things CS3D.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed 2025, Chapter 7.
A book on The New Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union was recently published. The book is edited by Dr. Emmanuel Guinchard (Liverpool John Moores University) and Prof. Carlo Panara (Leicester University) and may be accessed here.
Overview
About the book
Brexit has reshuffled the cards of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union. It is a once in a lifetime event, which ended nearly 50 years of EU Membership. EU law as such no longer applies in the United Kingdom and British citizens and companies no longer benefit from its advantages. Part of the previous regime has however been maintained (at times with amendments) through the series of treaties negotiated between the UK and the EU in 2019 and 2020, in particular the Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 2020, to which the 2023 Windsor Agreement can be added. The end result is a legal regime which is perhaps even more complex than EU law itself. This book aims to provide the reader with a clarification of this legal regime as well as provide context to it and suggestions to improve it. All key topics are covered, such as citizens of the EU in the UK and British citizens in the EU, trade in goods and in services, criminal justice, public procurement, Northern Ireland, the UK overseas territories, the dispute settlement, security and defence, international trade agreements of the UK post-Brexit, environmental protection, European civil justice, financial services, education and research, and the European offices of the UK local authorities and devolved administrations after Brexit. All the chapters follow, wherever possible, the same triadic structure. The first part looks at the regime prior to Brexit; the second part analyses the current regime; and the third part discusses ongoing and predictable trends. The concluding chapter attempts to identify some themes likely to impact on the forthcoming preparation of the 2026 review.
The European Commission’s recent Omnibus proposes a significant change to the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD). Article 29(7) of the original CSDDD requires Member States to implement its rules on civil liability rules so that these rules apply as overriding mandatory provisions, if the law applicable to the claim is not a law of a Member State. The Omnibus package proposes to delete art. 29(7) CSDDD. As a result, Member States will no longer be obliged to implement CSDDD’s rules on liability as overriding mandatory provisions.
The Omnibus
On 26 February 2025 the European Commission presented the so-called Omnibus. It is a proposal to simplify reporting and compliance in the fields of ESG and corporate societal responsibility (COM(2025) 81 final). Subject to approval by the European Parliament and the Council, Member States will have to implement the changes introduced by the Omnibus by 31 December 2025. The updated instruments will be effective from 1 January 2026.
The Omnibus amends several existing instruments, including the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), which entered into force on 25 July 2024. The Omnibus postpones the deadline for the CSDDD’s implementation to 26 July 2027; and the deadline for companies covered by the directive’s scope to be compliant is postponed to 26 July 2028.
CSDDD: civil liability by overriding mandatory provisions
Art. 29 CSDDD provides a harmonised EU uniform liability regime for breaches of due diligence in (cross-border) supply chains. While the CSDDD contains no rules on international jurisdiction (see the blogpost by Ralf Michaels on this matter here), the directive explicitly positions its provisions on civil liability within the conflict of laws. The current text of art. 29(7) CSDDD provides:
Member States shall ensure that the provisions of national law transposing this Article are of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the national law of a Member State.
This provision requires that Member States implement the directive’s rules on civil liability so that they apply as overriding mandatory provisions (of national substantive law) if the claim is not governed by the law of a Member State. This rationale is also reiterated in Recital 90. The current text of the CSDDD allows for differences within the EU (between Member States’ regimes); these differences would not trigger the application of overriding mandatory provisions. The overriding mandatory character (of any Member State’s national civil liability regime based on the CSDDD) would only manifest itself when the applicable is the law of a third state. It is in relation to the latter situations, that the CSDDD has elevated the civil liability regime to the level of semi-public provisions.
Omnibus: no uniform civil liability regime; not by overriding mandatory provisions
The Omnibus restrains this ambition. Firstly, it contains a proposal to abolish an EU-wide harmonised liability regime. Secondly, it removes Member States’ obligation to implement the (remaining elements of the uniform) liability regime as overriding mandatory provisions. Under the Omnibus:
‘paragraph (12) amends Article 29 of the CSDDD as regards civil liability by deleting paragraph (1), paragraph (3), point (d) and paragraph (7), and changing paragraphs (2), (4) and (5).
(…)
Motivation
The provisions that propose to abandon the EU-wide liability regime, quoted above, refers to the divergence in the regulation of representative actions across the EU Member States. The Explanatory Memorandum included in the Omnibus provides several other reasons of the proposal. One of the main reasons is the aim to reduce the ‘administrative, regulatory and reporting burdens, in particular for SMEs’ (small and medium size enterprises). Although the Omnibus package amends instruments that cover primarily large economic players, the simplification aims to prevent a de facto shift of the compliance costs to smaller players, because ‘[t]he ability of the Union to preserve and protect its values depends amongst other things on the capacity of its economy to adapt and compete in an unstable and sometimes hostile geopolitical context,’ as stated in the document with reference to the reports on EU global competitiveness.
Implications
From the perspective of private international law, the original art. 29(7) CSDDD is certainly challenging. It is namely not entirely clear how the doctrine of overriding mandatory rules (based on art. 9 Rome I, and art. 16 Rome II Regulations) would apply to civil liability claims grounded in the rules implementing the directive. Nonetheless, the CSDDD approach might have the potential to open new avenues for further practical and conceptual development of this conflict-of-law doctrine in the future.
Currently, as the Omnibus explicitly rules out the overriding mandatory character of the (remaining parts of) the CSDDD civil liability regime, if the Omnibus is adopted, one would rather not expect from Member States’ legislatives or courts to elevate the regular domestic civil liability rules to the semi-public level of overriding mandatory provisions.
[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
I have posted before of course on the jurisdictional and applicable law rules for climate claims (see in particular my post on Hugues Falys v Total) and on Article 7 Rome II’s special rule for choice of law in environmental claims. On the latter, use ‘Article 7’ or ‘A7’ in the search box, and see also my paper on A7/ lex ecologia as well as my paper here on climate justice litigation and private international law.
A few days ago I posted my overall assessment of the most recent climate judgment, Lliuya v RWE (more generally known as ‘Peruvian farmer v RWE) and in that post I said I would leave the applicable law analysis for a later post. So here we are.
Frustratingly there is still no sign of the judgment in the original German so like in my earlier post I am working with the unofficial English translation that is circulating. This may have an impact on how some of the court’s reasoning is translated and hence I may perhaps have to soften some of the criticism below once the judgment’s German version is out.
P.26 the court first of all confirms the straightforward jurisdictional basis: Article 4 of the Brussels Ia Regulation, establishing the principal rule that a defendant can and should as of right be sued in their domicile. Note the difference here with Hugues Falys where claimant is suing Total, domiciled at France, in what he presumable argues is a locus damni or locus delicti commissi under Article 7(2) Brussels Ia. The possibility to claim as of right in the defendant’s domicile is not easily dislodged in the European system, as I explain here.
Next up is the applicable law p.32 ff. Here the court’s plan of approach is, with respect, messy.
Overall the court could have sufficed with its primary finding of lex voluntatis. Much of its remaining discussion therefore would be obiter in the common law.
[2.a.aa] it first suggests implied choice of law in that parties invoked in their submissions almost exclusively provisions of German law. It refers to pre-Rome II German authority for its finding that this implies choice of law.
[2.a.bb] p.33 it then confirms this additionally as choice of law under the Rome II Regulation: reference here is made to Article 14(1) Rome II.
[2.a.cc] it confirms the universal character of Rome II but either misunderstands what this implies, or jumbles it with the meaning of ‘international’ under Rome II: for the court here rightly points out that Rome II may lead to the application of a law that is not the law of a Member State (here Peruvian law would be the obvious candidate) but then states “The Regulation therefore also applies in the case of a foreign connection to a non-member state in its material scope of application as the conflict of laws of the member state -…” (emphasis added). That is wrong; the latter (the choice of law being either for an EU or non-EU Member State, ie the conflict of laws not being between two EU laws but between an EU and non-EU law) relates to the ‘international’ element required to trigger Rome II. It is not at all related to the universal character of Rome II.
[2.a.dd] p.33 onwards the court then probably (it really could have formulated its approach here much more clearly) dismissed lex rei sitae as a rule that would bounce German law. It is unclear whether it does this proprio motu or in answer to an argument formulated by REWE (but had it not been established that REWE had agreed to German law?) and /or in German scholarship?
Whatever the trigger, the court’s approach to a role for lex rei sitae is most unclear. p.33 in fine the court refers to “legal claims resulting from an (alleged) violation of (co-)ownership and which – as in this case – are based on the law of the place where the property is located.” I assume this must be a discussion under German conflict of laws prior to Rome II, which it seems classifies nuissance claims as claims in rem, subject to the lex rei sitae. However as the court points out p.34, this qualification is irrelevant as far as Rome II is concerned. Rome II’s concepts need to be applied autonomously and lex rei sitae is not a rule contemplated by it.
Only then does the court address Article 7 Rome II, the tailor-made rule for environmental damage:
The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of
environmental damage or damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage shall be the law determined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking compensation for damage chooses to base his or her claim on the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred
Midway p.34 the ’emission’ is identified as the ‘event giving rise to the damage’.
The court’s engagement with Article 7 is unclear as to how it seems climate damage in relation to that Article. It has been suggested by some that Article 7 does not see to climate damage as such.
Either the court in current case dismissed that argument out of hand, seeing as it straightforwardly applies Article 7 to what is arguably a climate claim. Or it sees (the threat of) flooding (as opposed to ‘climate change’) as the environmental damage. A matter of course application of Article 7 to climate claims would be supportive of a wide notion of the statutory language “arising out of” environmental damage.
The court once again notes parties’ agreement on the applicable law being German law but then seemingly proprio motu flags the potential for dépeçage, midway through p.34:
However, a distinction must be made because, according to the plaintiff’s submission, the defendant’s conduct (issuing activity) has been ongoing since 1965 and the Rome II Regulation has only been applicable to non-contractual obligations since January 11, 2009 (see Art. 31 Rome II Regulation).
Under applicable German conflicts rules then, between 1 June 1999 and the entry into force of Rome I, German law would have applied as lex fori solutionis (the place of performance; I am not familiar enough with German conflicts rules to understand what performance is talked about here) and prior to 1 June 1999 the German rule it seems was ‘the place of action’ (presumably the locus delicti commissi: here earlier established of Germany as the place of emission) or the locus damni (surely Peru?), with it seems here like now in Rome II, claimant being able to choose.
For this section, availability of the judgment in German would be most welcome.
Importantly, the court’s reading suggest that for continuing torts, it decides (but it does so obiter, surely: see its overall finding of lex voluntatis) dépeçage applies.
As regular readers of the blog may remember, the Dutch Supreme Court has referred to the CJEU on the issue of continued infringement, in the case of competition claims.
The judgment overall has some loose ends on the Article 7 Rome II issue (compare similarly Milieudefensie v Shell) and the expression of the train of thought imo could have been clearer.
As noted, once I have the German version of the judgment, I shall revisit.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2023, 4.56 ff.
[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]
Pietro Franzina has excellent summary of European Commission report COM (2025) 268 and Staff Working Document SWD(2025) 135, both discussing the implementation of Brussels Ia, building inter alia on the Milieu Study on the same topic.
Pietro has done a tour de force in summarising both documents, highlighting the areas where statutory change might be proposed:
scope of application (‘civil and commercial’; ! arbitration; vis attractiva concursus /insolvency);
third country defendants: crucial for business and human rights claims and harmonisation here would be welcome ia in light of the expanded use of EU sustainability instruments with extended territorial scope; I discussed the issue briefly here;
rules on special jurisdiction where ia the A7(1) and (2) distinction is getting opaque but where as Pietro notes little change may be expected;
consumer contracts (with special mention for the imo outdated carve-out for contracts of transport);
exclusive jurisdiction with likely an amendment to be proposed to codify CJEU BSH Hausgeräte;
potential for clarification of the lis pendens rules;
ditto for collective redress actions and, but with less immediate urgency it would seem, for digital assets.
Of side note is that the Staff Working Document would seem to add little to the actual Report. There is probably an institutional reason, eg SWDs do not require translation into all EU languages, however in general one would expect the SWDs to bring a bit more beef to the analytical bone. Otherwise there seems little point in having one at all.
All in all extensive proposed amendments are not to be expected however that does not mean those that might me, could not be impactful.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed 2024, Chapter 2.
Today the European Commission published its eagerly awaited Commission Report on the application of the Brussels Ia Regulation (also referred to as Brussels I-bis), No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast). The Report is accompanied by a Staff Working Document, detailing a number of selected topics addressed in the Report. The documents rely in particular on the extensive Evaluation Study that was published in January 2023 as well as the findings of the JUDGTRUST project and the resulting book.
The Report states that it is ‘generally agreed that the Regulation is a highly successful instrument’ and that the enhancements, including the abolition of the exequatur, have strengthened judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters. Its overall ‘clear and simple’ rules are ‘highly appreciated amongst practitioners. The Report also emphasizes the essential role of the CJEU case law in interpreting and applying the rules. While several complex issues require clarification, given the ‘general satisfaction with the operation of the Regulation, any modifications should respond to real practical difficulties and should not lead to an overhaul of the well functioning system of the Regulation’, according to the Commission.
The Report addresses the scope of application laid down in Art. 1 (in particular the exclusion of arbitration) as well as a number of issues in applying Arts. 2 and 3, including definitions (in particular the term ‘judgment’ in relation to provision and protective measures, and definition of ‘court’ referring to the Pula Parking judgment, see here).
As regards the scope of the jurisdiction rules, the much debated issue of the (non) application to third-country defendants and possible extension is addressed. Topics pointed out in relation to the special, alternative jurisdiction rules in Arts. 7-9 include the increasingly broad interpretation of ‘matters relating to a contract’, determining the place of performance of contractual obligations (Art. 7, para 1), and as regards torts (Art. 7, para 2) the often problematic determination of the place of damage of pure financial loss (similar to Rome II Regulation, see also here) and the application of the mosaic principle in cases regarding the violation of privacy rights. As to the latter, reference is also made to the (negative) implication in SLAPP cases and the Anti-SLAPP directive, which was adopted in 2024. A number of issues are pointed out in applying the consumer protective rules in Arts. 17-19, including the notion of ‘consumer’, the phrase ‘directing of commercial activity’, the exclusion of transport contracts as well as their non-applicability in collective redress actions, where cases are brought by a representative organisation. A few minor (formulation) issues in the application of Art 24 on exclusive jurisdiction are pointed out.
As regards the rules on recognition and enforcement, it is concluded that the system of the recast Regulation, which abolished the declaration of enforceability (exequatur) works generally well in practice and has had a positive effect on the costs and workload of courts. The Report refers to a number of CJEU rulings on the application of the public policy exception, including in the cases Diageo Brands, H Limited and most recently, the Real Madrid. The CJEU upheld the restrictive application of the public policy exception, though created room for its application in the latter case in which the violation of a fundamental right under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (freedom of press) was at stake.
Lastly, the Report reflects on the relationship with other instruments (Arts. 67-74), referencing in particular the Lugano Convention, the New York Convention, bilateral conventions of Member States with third states, and the establishment of the “United” (this should be “Unified”) Patent Court.
A number of important horizontal issues that are pointed out are that of the potential problematic application in collective redress cases, as is also clear from a number of rulings of the CJEU, and the impact of digitalisation, including the increase of digital content and blockchain technologies, and the digitalisation of judicial procedures.
In conclusion, the Commission will initiate ‘a formal review of the Regulation in order to consider and potentially prepare a proposal to amend or recast the Regulation in accordance with the Better Regulation rules’. Highlighted topics in this context are:
To be continued!
Conflictoflaws will organise an online roundtable on designated topics of the report, following the succesful roundtable on Rome II – Stay tuned
The 20th Anniversary Conference of the Journal of Private International Law will take place at the Faculty of Laws of University College London between 11 and 13 September 2025.A
The conference organizers, Ugljesa Grusic (UCL) and Alex Mills (UCL), and the editors of the Journal, Paul Beaumont (University of Stirling) and Jonathan Harris (King’s College London), are pleased to announce that the conference programme is now available on the conference website.
The conference will include, in the customary manner, a mixture of parallel panel sessions (on Thursday afternoon and Saturday morning) and plenary sessions (on Friday).
A limited number of non-speaker tickets and conference dinner tickets are available via the conference website, with early bird fees until 1 July 2025.
EDITORIAL
In an increasingly globalized world—and especially within the framework of a unified market founded on economic freedom and the free movement and establishment of individuals and businesses—international sales have emerged as a cornerstone of the legal and economic order. They are not merely instruments for the acquisition of assets across borders; they also function as a key mechanism for fostering business growth and enhancing competitiveness through the expansion of commercial activity and client networks.
Given their fundamental role, international sales are subject to a broad and multi-layered legal framework at the international level. This complex regulatory landscape gives rise to a number of interpretative and practical challenges, particularly with regard to the interaction and prioritization of overlapping legal norms.
With these considerations in mind, our journal hosted an online event on 1 October 2025, aiming to shed light on the central legal issues surrounding international sales in the current international context. The scholarly contributions presented during that event are now published in this issue, enriched with doctrinal analysis and case law references, in the hope of contributing meaningfully to ongoing academic and professional discourse. It opens with a study by Professor Michael Sturner, Chair of Civil Law, Private & Procedural International Law and Comparative Law at the University of Konstanz and Judge at the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal, entitled “The Right to Repair: A New Paradigm in EU Sales Law”. Judge Dimitrios Koulaxizis contributes an article examining “The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in Relation to the Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations”; Prof. Anastasios Valtoudis, Professor of Civil Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, addresses “Issues Concerning the Preconditions for the Application of the CISG – Delimitation in Light of Directive 2019/771 and Articles 534 et seq. of the Greek Civil Code”; Prof. Eugenia Dacoronia, Professor of Civil Law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Athens, offers a critical reflection on “The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts – 30 Years On: Their Significance and Comparison with the Provisions of the Greek Civil Code”. The volume also includes the contribution of Associate Professor of Civil Law at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki Timoleon Kosmidis, who explores “Natural Gas Supply: National Legislation and International Commercial Practice”.
The Praefatio of the issue hosts the valuable reflections of Professor Silvia Marino of the University of Insubria/Italy, on the complex issue of lis pendens and related actions in the context of family property disputes under European Union Private International Law (“Lis Pendens and Related Actions in European Union Private International Law on Family Property Issues”).
The case law section features a number of significant judicial decisions. Notably, it includes the important judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 4 October 2024, C-633/22, Real Madrid Club, addressing public policy as a ground for refusing the enforcement of a foreign judgment on account of an infringement of freedom of the press (commented by R. Tsertsidou). Also presented is the ruling of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), 29 November 2023, VIII ZR 7/23, which deals with the application of domestic mandatory rules even in the presence of a contractual choice of law, where the contractual relationship lacks a substantial connection to a foreign legal system (commented by N. Zaprianos). From the Greek courts, this issue includes: Athens Court of First Instance, judgment no. 3155/2022, concerning the possibility of reviewing the parties’ freedom to choose the competent court under the rule (Art. 281 grCC) prohibiting of abuse of rights (commented by S. Karameros); Athens Court of Appeal (Single-Member), judgment no. 2435/2024, concerning the recognition of a foreign adoption judgment issued in favor of a same-sex couple (commented by M. Gerasopoulou); and Piraeus Court of First Instance (Single-Member), judgments no. 3355/2023 and 11/2022, regarding the applicable law for the appointment of a special guardian to initiate a paternity challenge, pursuant to the 1996 Hague Convention (commented by G.-A. Georgiadis).
The scientific section of this issue includes a study by Associate Professor V. Kourtis (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki), entitled “Issues of Intertemporal Law in Cross-Border Maintenance Claims within the European Area”. It also features the academic contribution of Judges P. Kapelouzos, St. Krassas, and M. Martinis, submitted in the context of the Themis Competition 2023, under the title “May I ‘book’ my forum delicti? Or else: The Objective Limits of Jurisdiction Clauses in Tort Cases”. The issue concludes with the regular quarterly review of the CJEU’s case law covering the period July–September 2024, edited by A. Anthimos.
Lex&Forum renews its scientific appointment with our readers for the next, 16th issue, with the central topic (Focus) on “Cross-border matrimonial and registered partnership property regimes”.
The Journal of Law, Market & Innovation (JLMI) welcomes submissions for its first issue of 2026.
The Call for Papers for this second issue is devoted to Tariffs: Emerging challenges in global trade.
You can find the call with all the details at this link.
Prospective articles should be submitted in the form of an abstract (around 800 words) or draft articles to submissions.jlmi@iuse.it within 10 July 2025. The publication of the issue is set for the end of March, 2026.
For further information, or for consultation on a potential submission, you can contact us by email at editors.jlmi@iuse.it.
Delighted to have been asked by Arie Van Hoe to post on the Lliuya v RWE climate ruling. See the link below to Corporate Finance Lab.
Geert.
Lliuya v RWE. Germany’s historic climate ruling: A pyrrhic loss for claimants?At the occasion on 5 June of the PhD Defence of Leontine Bruijnen on How can Private International Law bridge the Gap between the Recognition of Unknown Family Relations such as Kafala and Child Marriage for Family Law and Migration Law Purposes? , we are organising an expert seminar at the University of Antwerp and online:
Child marriage: root causes and questions of recognition:
11.00: Welcome and introduction by Thalia Kruger, University of Antwerp
11.10: The Role of Customs and Traditions in Addressing Child Marriages in Tanzania: A Human Rights-Based Approach, by Esther Kayamba, Mzumbe University and University of Antwerp
11.25: The link between climate change and child marriage in Tanzania, by Agripina Mbilinyi, Mzumbe University and University of Antwerp
11.40: Socio-cultural factors that Sustain Child Marriage at Quarit Wereda, Amhara Region, Ethiopia by Yitaktu Tibetu, Human Rights Lawyer, Senior Gender Adviser and councillor psychologist
12.00: Perspective from Europe by Bettina Heiderhoff, University of Münster and Trui Daem, PhD researcher Ghent University
12.20: Debate and Q&A
12.50: End
To register, please contact Thalia Kruger
The second issue of LMCLQ was recently published.
It contains the following conflict of laws works,
David Foxton, “The Applicable Law of an Arbitration Agreement: Floating or on the Rocks?”
Marcus Teo and Kah-Wai Tan, “Territoriality over Universalism”
Adrian Briggs, “Submission to a Russian Court”
Theme by Danetsoft and Danang Probo Sayekti inspired by Maksimer