Droit international général

I have reported before on the jurisdictional issues of collective action under Dutch law, viz both the GPDR (Article 79; 80) and Brussels Ia. See in particular my post on the claim against TIKTOK and various references there. In an update to that post over the summer I also refer to the Rotterdam courts’ reference to the CJEU on the application of Article 80 GPDR: Stichting Data Bescherming Nederland v Amazon ECLI:NL:RBROT:2025:9088.

Yesterday the Amsterdam courts [Stichting Massaschade en Consument t Tiktok Technology LTd et al ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2025:2666] published their partial appeal finding in the case that led to my orginal post [the first instance jurisdictional finding ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2022:6488].

The appeals court first of all holds [4.16] to continue its discussion of the non-GDPR claims seeing as, it argues, WAMCA (the Dutch collective action  procedure) encourages swift outcome of claims, and give that success in these might render the GDPR-based claims without purpose. The non-GDPR claims include unjust enrichment, economic law (acts of unfair competition: eg hidden prices of in-app purchases of “digitale items”) and consumer law claims.

Viz the Irish TikTok entitity, Brussels Ia determines jurisdiction (as TikTok note, leading also to territorial not just national jurisdiciton). Viz the non-EU defendants, Dutch residual private international law does (with CPR rules allocating territorial jurisdiction), however [4.18] those are applied as the EU rules would.

Like the first instance judgment, the appeals judgment IMO too readily assumes application of A7(2) BIa (non-contractual obligations) rather than A7(1) (contractual. The collective organisations are said [4.19] to act using their own representative interest, which it is said is non-contractual. CJEU C-167/00 VKI v Henkel in my view is not entirely relevant authority: in Henkel the relevant organisation was Verein für Konsumenteninformation, a consumer protection organisation created purely to uphold statutory consumer law, and in the case at issue seeking an injunction to prevent a trader from using unfair terms in consumer contracts; see similarly also CJEU VKI v Amazon, where VKI sought a similar injunction. In a WAMCA action, the often ad hoc collective organisations seek financial damages for and on behalf of enlisted consumers, but often also for their own financial benefit and usually indeed, as here, financed by third party litigation funding. Claimants arguably are purely procedural vehicles. Their claim in my opinion is so intimately bound up with the contracts of the consumers that it can hardly qualify as a non-contractual claim.

Having identified A7(2) BIa als the jurisdictional gateway (again: I am not convinced), in 4.21.2 the court identifies The Netherlands as forum damni /Erfolgort. 4.1.1 and elsewhere the court supports the use of centre of interests as a relevant jurisdictional trigger which again I find awkward: that criterion per CJEU eDate etc only applies to the infringement of personality rights and quite a few of the claims are related to issues such as financial interest for which centre of interest has no calling. Hence I also find the court’s finding unconvincing [4.21.2]

Voor zover SMC bedoelt op te komen voor personen die de TikTok Dienst gebruiken of hebben gebruikt ”op een moment” dat zij in Nederland waren terwijl zij hun gewone verblijf elders hebben (zie hiervoor rov. 4.1.1.), heeft de Nederlandse rechter geen rechtsmacht.

: Dutch court’s have no jurisdiction for those who used TikTok ‘at a time they were in The Netherlands whilst having their habitual residence elsewhere”. That is not just an unorthodox use of locus damni; it also conflates the relevance of habitual residence, which earlier in the judgment the court used to refer to GDPR-based jurisdiction.

[4.22.2] the court summarily dismisses TikTok’s argument that A7(2) determines territorial jurisdiction, hence that the claims cannot be centralised in Amsterdam. That Dutch civil procedure rules may trump A7(2)’s clear instruction to this effect, cannot in my view be right.

The remainder of the judgment then discusses the merits of the issues and largely upholds the first instance court’s findings.

I think it is clear from the above that I am far from convinced the jurisdictional analysis here is right.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12.2

On 3 July 2025, Advocate General Norkus delivered an opinion in Case C‑485/24 Locatrans Sarl v ES ECLI:EU:C:2025:528. The case concerns the determination of the habitual place of work under Article 6(2)(a) of the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations of a driver who, under a single employment contract, worked for […]

Applications are now open for three- to six-month legal internships at the headquarters of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) in The Hague, for the period from January to June 2026!

Interns work with our legal teams in the Family and Child Protection Law Division, the Transnational Litigation and Apostille Division, and the Commercial, Digital and Financial Law Division. Duties may include carrying out research on particular points of private international law and/or comparative law, taking part in the preparation of HCCH meetings, and contributing to the promotion of the HCCH and its work.

Applications should be submitted by Friday, 31 October 2025 at 18.00 (CET). For more information, please visit the Internships Section of the HCCH website.

 

This post is published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law (HCCH).

 

In a judgment of 20 September 2025 (Case BS-19161/2025-HJR), the Danish Supreme Court clarified that the 2007 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters governs the time limit for appealing exequatur decisions. National procedural rules, the Court added, cannot be applied to issues for which the […]

Guest post by Janaína Albuquerque, International Family Lawyer; Research Associate at the NOVA Centre for the Study of Gender, Family and the Law; Legal Coordinator at Revibra Europa. Janaína represented Revibra, Instituto Maria da Penha and Instituto Superação da Violência Doméstica as amici curiae in the cases discussed below.

The Brazilian Supreme Court has recently delivered a landmark judgment in two Direct Actions of Unconstitutionality (Ações Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade, or ADIs), namely ADI 4245 and ADI 7686, concerning the application of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction(1980HC). Despite their denomination, these actions did not aim to invalidate the Convention, but rather to harmonize its interpretation with the principles enshrined in the Brazilian Federal Constitution.[1]

The full written judgment has not yet been published. What follows is the official summary, which consolidates the main points reached by the Justices:[2]

“The Court unanimously ruled partially in favor of the requests made in ADI 4.245 and, by majority vote, ruled partially in favor of the requests made in ADI 7.686, on the following grounds:

1. To interpret Art. 13(1)(b) of the 1980 Hague Convention in conformity with the Constitution, recognizing that the exception to the immediate return of the child due to grave risk to his or her physical or psychological integrity or intolerable situation applies in cases of domestic violence, even if the child is not a direct victim, provided that objective and concrete indications of the risk situation are demonstrated, in accordance with the principle of the best interests of the child (Art. 227, CF/1988) and under a gender-based perspective (Arts. 1, III, and 226, § 8, CF/1988);
2. To determine that the National Council of Justice (CNJ) should establish an inter-institutional working group to prepare, within 60 (sixty) days, a proposed resolution aimed at increasing the speed and efficiency of international child abduction return proceedings, ensuring, through adversarial proceedings and full defense, that the final decision on the return of the child is made within a period not exceeding 1 (one) year;
3. The resolution, which will bring CNJ Resolution No. 449/2022 into line with the terms of this decision, will establish the duty of the respondent to report the existence of any ongoing child custody proceedings in the national territory and will assign the management of such proceedings in the country to the CNJ’s National Forum for Children and Youth (Foninj). The requirement for adversarial proceedings and full defense applies both in the cases of Art. 1 and Art. 12 of the Convention. Public and notorious facts and rules of experience (Civil Procedure Code, Arts. 374 and 375) will also serve as elements of conviction;
4. To determine that the Federal Regional Courts issue normative acts to promote the concentration of jurisdiction to process and judge actions related to the 1980 Hague Convention, with regard to restitution proceedings, in one or more courts in the capital and judging chambers, based on Art. 96, I, “d,” CF/1988, aiming at procedural uniformity and celerity;
5. To determine the establishment of specialized support centers within the Federal Regional Courts to encourage conciliation, the adoption of restorative practices and methodologies, to qualify and coordinate the performance of psychosocial assessments, and to act as a source of technical and methodological support for judges;
6. To determine that the bodies of the Judiciary Branch, with the support of the CNJ, adjust the electronic case management systems to enable the inclusion of preferential processing tags for all cases that receive the subject code “10921 Child Restitution, 1980 Hague Convention,” as established in Art. 27 of CNJ Resolution No. 449/2022;
7. To determine that the Executive Branch adopt structural and administrative measures to strengthen the work of the Federal Central Administrative Authority (ACAF), with the definition of goals, timelines, and performance indicators;
8. To determine that the Executive Branch evaluates the convenience of Brazil’s accession to the 1996 Hague Convention (on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement, and cooperation in matters of parental responsibility and protection measures for children), with the preparation of a technical report to be forwarded to the heads of the three branches of the government;
9. To determine that the Executive Branch, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shall prepare, within six months, a protocol for assisting women and children who are victims of domestic violence, to be adopted in all Brazilian consular units abroad, taking as a reference the pilot project developed by the Consulate General of Brazil in Rome;
10. To call on the Legislative Branch, in dialogue with the Executive Branch, to assess the need for specific legislation to regulate the 1980 Hague Convention, particularly with regard to the procedural and evidentiary aspects of its application;
11. To determine that Federal Regional Courts and Courts of Justice enter into judicial cooperation agreements to establish protocols for coordinated action in cases of international child abduction, including, among other measures, the sharing of information relating to custody actions and actions based on the 1980 Hague Convention and the joint use of multidisciplinary structures and teams, especially for the production of expert reports;
12. Once it is recognized that the conditions set forth in the Convention for determining return are not met, that the Brazilian courts’ jurisdiction, as the forum of the taking parent’s domicile, is established to decide on the substantive issues involved in the case, including the custody of the child.

Finally, the following judgment thesis[3] was established:

1. The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is compatible with the Federal Constitution and has supra-legal status in the Brazilian legal system due to its nature as an international treaty for the protection of children’s rights.
2. The application of the Convention in Brazil, in light of the principle of the best interests of the child (Art. 227, CF), requires the adoption of structural and procedural measures to ensure the swift and effective processing of actions for the international restitution of children.
3. The exception of grave risk to the child, provided for in Art. 13 (1)(b) of the 1980 Hague Convention, must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the principle of the best interests of the child (Art. 227, CF) and under a gender-based perspective, so as to allow its application when there are objective and concrete indications of domestic violence, even if the child is not a direct victim.

All in accordance with the vote of Justice Luís Roberto Barroso (President and Rapporteur). Justice Dias Toffoli was partially defeated in ADI 7.686, as he considered the action to be entirely well founded. Plenary session, August 27, 2025.”

The judgment introduced three important innovations that will standardize and shape the interpretation of the Convention going forward. First, by recognizing domestic violence as an arguable exception under Art. 13(1)(b), the Court established that this ground can no longer be dismissed on the basis that it is not expressly mentioned in the Convention. Second, the clarification that children need not be the primary victims ensures that courts cannot disregard evidence showing that they merely witnessed the violence, since such exposure also constitutes harm. Third, the instruction to evaluate abduction cases through a gender-based lens acknowledges the multiple and intersecting vulnerabilities faced by migrant women and requires a contextual assessment of each situation.

Nevertheless, the central unresolved issue concerns the evidentiary threshold. While the Court established that proof is required, it also indicated that the standard should be lower, without clarifying what qualifies as objective and concrete indications of violence sufficient to configure grave risk. Given the repeated acknowledgment of the obstacles faced by migrant mothers, it seems evident that demanding criminal convictions would set the bar far too high. What remains uncertain is whether police complaints, medical records, social service evaluations, psychological reports, or even documented but unsuccessful attempts to obtain assistance in the State of origin will suffice. This definition can only be built with time and through the practical application by domestic federal courts.

The timing of the judgment coincides with the organization of the Second Forum on Domestic Violence and the 1980 Child Abduction Convention, scheduled for October 2025 in Fortaleza, Brazil. Building on the discussions initiated at the first meeting in Sandton, South Africa, in 2024, the Forum will once again convene experts from around the world to reflect on the persistent challenges posed by cases involving allegations of domestic and family violence. In this setting, the recent decision of the Brazilian Supreme Court will likely serve as a point of reference for its methodological contribution to advancing a gender-sensitive and human rights-based approach.

 

Background of the Actions

ADIs are a special kind of proceedings that may only be introduced by the President of the Republic; the President of the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, or state legislative assemblies; the Brazilian Bar Association; the Attorney General; political parties; or national unions. Unlike ordinary judicial proceedings, whose effects only extend to the parties, ADI rulings have erga omnes effect and are endowed with binding force, compelling compliance by the Judiciary, the Legislature, and the Executive at all levels.

The first ADI (4245) was filed in 2009 by the now-dissolved Democratas party (DEM), less than a decade after Brazil’s ratification of the Convention and against the backdrop of the Sean Goldman case.[4] The dispute concerned the wrongful retention in Brazil of a 4 year-old child habitually resident in the United States, leading to lengthy proceedings under the 1980HC. Although lower courts initially concluded that Sean had become settled in the new environment, the Supreme Court ultimately ordered his return 5 years later following the death of the taking parent. The litigation attracted intense media scrutiny and sustained significant political and diplomatic pressure. Its repercussions also contributed to the enactment of the Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2014[5] in the United States, a statute designed to strengthen governmental responses to abduction cases and to oversee compliance by other Contracting States.

Prompted by these circumstances, the DEM party brought the matter before the Supreme Court to assess whether the manner in which the Convention was being applied was compatible with the constitutional framework. Their concern was that, following the damaging repercussions of the Goldman case, domestic authorities had adopted an automatic-return approach without sufficient consideration of the specific circumstances of each case, thereby infringing fundamental principles such as human dignity and the best interests of the child.

The initiating application requested that return orders and urgent measures be issued only after due process and a case-specific assessment; that the one-year time limit not prevail over the best interests of the child; and that the grave risk exception be interpreted broadly. It further sought to limit the Attorney General’s Office’s legitimacy to initiate return proceedings, to condition the effectiveness of foreign custody decisions on recognition by the Superior Court of Justice, and to preserve the validity of domestic custody rulings. The main legal basis invoked was Art. 227 of the Constitution, which enshrines the principle of ‘integral protection’ and imposes on the family, society, and the State the duty to ensure, as an absolute priority, children’s rights to life, health, education, dignity, and protection against neglect, exploitation, and violence.

ADI 4245 remained without significant developments for 15 years, until a hearing was scheduled for the presentation of oral arguments in May 2024. The judgment was set to take place in August 2024, yet, the Socialism and Liberty party (PSOL) filed another ADI (7686) in July of the same year, which led to the suspension of the first so that both could eventually be judged together.

The circumstances surrounding the second ADI differed, despite being similarly propelled by not one, but numerous widely covered cases, which were further amplified through social media. Most involved mothers who had fled to Brazil after experiencing discrimination and domestic violence abroad, yet, whose children were nevertheless ordered to return. Public pressure and social mobilization were decisive in bringing these issues to the forefront and making them the central focus of the proceedings.

As regards the merits, ADI 7686 contained only one request: that suspicion or indications of domestic violence in the foreign country be taken into account when assessing the grave risk standard and the applicability of the exception under Art. 13(1)(b) of the 1980HC, so that children would not have to be returned  The legal basis rested primarily on Art. 226 (8) of the Constitution, which explicitly establishes the State’s positive obligation to ‘ensure assistance to the family in the person of each of its members, creating mechanisms to suppress violence within the family’.

Oral arguments in ADI 7686 were presented in February 2025, but the rendering of the Justices’ votes only began in August. The case was considered by the Plenary of the Supreme Federal Court, composed of eleven Justices, of whom a single member is a woman. Three sessions were needed to conclude, and a decision was finally reached on 27 August 2025.  Although the written judgment has not yet been released, the hearings were televised, and each Justice presented at least a summary of their vote. For clarity, the following account is organized thematically rather than chronologically, highlighting the main strands of reasoning that emerged.

(i) Gender, domestic violence and the reframing of the best interests principle

The deliberations revealed a broad consensus that gender inequalities are central to the evaluation of return requests under the Convention, particularly where domestic violence is raised. Justice Barroso, rapporteur of the case, underscored that most taking parents are mothers fleeing from abandonment or abuse, cautioning that automatic returns in such circumstances risk perpetuating cycles of violence. Justices Mendonça and Cármen Lúcia echoed this concern, stressing that intimate-partner violence destabilizes the family environment and thereby places the child in danger.

Justice Moraes added that the prevalence of taking mothers reflects structural patriarchy, requiring an interpretation of the Convention consistent not only with the standards inscribed in domestic law but also with international human rights instruments such as the UNCRC and the Convention of Belém do Pará. Justice Dias Toffoli supported this approach by grounding it in the Convention’s own architecture, highlighting a combined interpretation of Arts. 13(1)(b) and 20, insofar as the latter provides that courts may refuse the return when such an order would conflict with the fundamental principles and freedoms of the requested State.

Taken together, these positions signalled a jurisprudential shift: the Convention’s effectiveness in Brazil will henceforth be measured not solely by the speed of returns but by its capacity to reconcile international cooperation with the substantive protection of women and children.

(ii) Procedural and evidentiary standards

A central aspect of the debate revolved around the difficulties faced by migrant women and their intersecting vulnerabilities. Justice Barroso argued that imposing a standard of irrefutable proof in cases involving domestic violence is both inconsistent with the Convention’s requirement of urgency and detrimental to the best interests of the child. He stressed that migrant mothers are frequently cut off from institutional resources and isolated from their support networks, which, compounded by linguistic and cultural obstacles, place them at a significant disadvantage in producing evidence. Justice Toffoli further developed this argument, insisting that courts must apply a gender-based perspective and give decisive weight to victims’ testimonies, precisely because these structural barriers cannot be overcome through procedural formalities.

Alongside evidentiary issues, the Justices devoted close attention to procedural safeguards. Justice Flávio Dino criticised the privileged role of the Attorney General’s Office, noting that its authority to initiate proceedings produces inequality of arms. While the interests of left-behind parents are defended, even if representation is for the State, taking parents are not ensured access to legal aid. Building on this concern, Justice Cristiano Zanin drew attention to the absence of a specific law governing Hague cases in Brazil. In his view, this vacuum not only generates procedural uncertainty but also creates room for jurisdictional conflicts, especially when custody proceedings are initiated domestically in parallel with return requests.

Other votes highlighted the persistent tension between efficiency and fairness. Justice Nunes Marques stressed that the Convention’s effectiveness depends on swift decisions and suggested technology and mediation as tools to accelerate outcomes. Justice Barroso, however, set this pursuit for speed against the structural reality of Brazil’s civil procedure, which, though intended to protect due process, is overly complex and has become a recurrent source of delay. Justice Dino noted that, as a result, courts frequently resort to urgent measures, granting return orders without analysing the case in depth and even without hearing the taking parents, a practice he considered incompatible with constitutional guarantees. Justice Luiz Fux disagreed with Dino on this point, resisting the view that judicial discretion should be in any way limited.

(iii) Measures to strengthen the application of the Convention

Apart from the interpretative parameters and procedural elucidations, a series of proposals were advanced to reinforce the Convention’s operation through systemic measures and reforms. Consensus emerged around the need for standardized protocols in embassies and consulates to ensure consistent assistance and reliable mechanisms for processing reports of abuse. In addition, the Justices addressed the domestic judicial structure, calling for stronger coordination between federal and family courts and for the use of liaison judges to improve communication with foreign authorities. The Court also encouraged studies to support legislative initiatives, including the prospect of Brazil’s accession to the 1996 HCCH Child Protection Convention as part of a broader effort to align institutional practice with international standards.

A final strand of discussion was dedicated to the participation of children. Justice Cármen Lúcia stressed that they must be recognised as rights-bearing subjects and that procedural mechanisms should be developed to secure their direct involvement in return proceedings. At present, the law provides only for the hearing of children from the age of 12 and contains no guidance on the manner in which their statements are to be obtained. Ensuring that children’s perspectives are effectively taken into account was thus deemed essential to aligning the Convention’s operation with the principle of integral protection enshrined in the Constitution.

[1] Available in English at: <https://www.oas.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/acceso_informacion_base_dc_leyes_pais_b_1_en.pdf>.

[2] Available, only in Portuguese, at: <https://portal.stf.jus.br/processos/detalhe.asp?incidente=2679600>.

[3] In the context of Direct Actions for the Declaration of Unconstitutionality (ADIs) before the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court, the term ‘thesis’ refers to the authoritative interpretative statement of the Constitution that distills the complex reasoning into a concise and binding formula. Arising from the abstract constitutional review of statutes, such theses clarify the constitutional meaning of contested provisions and ensure that the decision extends beyond the specific case at hand. By consolidating the practice of formulating theses at the end of landmark rulings, the Court provides clarity, consistency, and general applicability, thereby guiding judges, public administration, and society as a whole while establishing constitutional standards for future cases.

[4] Brazilian Supreme Federal Court, 2009 Activities Report. Available in Portuguese at: <https://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/principaldestaque/anexo/relatorio_stf_2009__18032010__qualidade_web__orcamento.pdf>.

[5] Available at: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3212>.

IE Law School in Madrid, Spain, is again advertising four tenure-track assistant professorships, preferably in private law, commercial & corporate law, and IP law among others. Scholars of private international law are also invited to apply.

The deadline is 31 October 2025.

More information can be found here.

By Alexia Kaztaridou (Linklaters)

On 25 September 2025, the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO) of the European Parliament approved the text of the political agreement on the Alternative Disputes Resolution for Consumer Disputes Directive. This Directive establishes a framework for resolving through ADR procedures contractual domestic and cross-border consumer disputes arising from the sale of goods or provision of services between consumers and traders within an EU context. The amendments to the prior Directive aim to modernise the existing framework in light of new consumer trends, such as the growth of e-commerce, and bring significant changes across several areas, enhancing the protection for consumers and clarifying obligations for traders and ADR entities. The Directive maintains its minimum harmonisation approach, allowing Member States to provide for stronger consumer protection.

Key changes introduced

Enhanced obligations for traders

• Geographical scope: The Directive’s scope is extended to traders established in third countries who are willing to participate in an ADR procedure and direct their activities towards consumers in one or more Member States, within the meaning of the  Rome I Regulation and the Brussels I bis Regulation (recast). To determine if a trader’s activities are directed to a Member State, factors such as the language or currency used, the ability to order products, or the availability of an application in a national app store may be considered. Member States can also set conditions for the participation of these traders in ADR procedures, such as requiring the trader’s consent for the dispute to be resolved based on the law of the Member State where the consumer resides.
• Duty to reply: Traders established in the Union will have a duty to reply within, in principle, 20 working days when contacted by an ADR entity, stating whether they will participate in a procedure. This is not required where participation is mandatory by law, to fulfil a contractual obligation or when the ADR entity is entitled to reach an outcome even if the trader did not participate in the procedure. This period may be extended to a maximum of 30 working days for complex disputes, provided the consumer is informed of the extension. If a trader fails to reply within the prescribed deadline, the ADR entity may consider the non-reply as a refusal of the trader to participate and should inform the consumer accordingly.
• Information and transparency: To improve consumer awareness, traders must provide clear information about ADR, including on their websites.

Expanded material scope

• Pre-contractual and post-contractual phases: The Directive’s material scope is extended to cover disputes arising from obligations in the pre-contractual and post-contractual phases. Examples include disputes related to misleading advertising, a failure to provide compulsory pre-contractual information required by the Consumer Rights Directive, or issues concerning the use of consumer-provided digital content after a contract has terminated.
• Contracts paid for with personal data: The scope now includes contracts for the supply of digital content or services where the consumer provides or undertakes to provide personal data instead of making a payment.
• Member State discretion: Member States are authorised to make trader participation in ADR procedures mandatory in sectors they deem fit, such as transport and tourism. They can also extend ADR procedures to other types of disputes under Union and national law, for instance in relation to competition law.

New requirements for ADR entities

• Accessibility and fairness: ADR procedures must be made accessible to all, including vulnerable consumers, through ‘easily accessible and inclusive tools’. If a procedure uses automated means, both parties have the right to have the process reviewed by a natural person. Furthermore, ADR entities should not refuse to deal with a dispute where a trader has established disproportionate rules for their own internal complaint handling systems that must be completed before the case can be referred to the ADR entity.
• Bundling of cases: To promote efficiency, Member States are to allow ADR entities to bundle similar cases into a single procedure where it may lead to a faster or more coherent resolution. Member States may require explicit consumer consent for this.
• Training and transparency: ADR entities must ensure that the natural persons in charge of dispute resolution have the necessary expertise, including a general understanding of private international law. They must also inform consumers in advance if non-high-risk automated means are used in the decision-making process.
• Publication of reports: ADR entities are required to publish activity reports to enhance transparency at least every two years. Therein, ADR entities must include information about traders who systematically refuse to comply with the outcomes of ADR procedures.

Promoting participation to the procedures

In principle, the Directive provides that the ADR procedures should be free of charge for consumers. In the event that costs are applied, those costs should not exceed a nominal fee. Member States should encourage ADR entities to reimburse consumers the nominal fee paid where and to the extent that their complaint is justified.

In that context, the Directive requires Member States to implement measures that promote participation in ADR procedures from both traders and consumers. These measures can be either financial or non-financial in nature.

A new role for ADR contact points

Following the discontinuation of the Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) platform, the tasks previously handled by ODR contact points will be taken over by newly established ADR contact points. These contact points will be, inter alia, responsible for:

• Providing assistance and guidance to consumers and traders on accessing the competent ADR entity, particularly in cross-border disputes.
• Explaining the procedural rules of relevant ADR entities.

The ADR contact point is to be determined by the consumer’s place of residence. Member States can choose to extend the mandate of these contact points to cover domestic disputes as well.

Consumer assistance and new digital tools

Consumers will have the right to be assisted by third parties, such as consumer organisations or businesses that specialise in claims management, though transparency must be ensured.

In addition, the Commission is mandated to develop a digital interactive tool to guide consumers to the correct ADR entity.

Next steps and national transposition

The next step is the formal adoption of the text by the European Parliament’s plenary, which is expected to take place between 15 and 18 December. Following this, the text must also be formally adopted by the Council. Once the Council has formally adopted the text, it will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Directive will then enter into force 20 days after its publication.

The timeline for the Directive’s implementation is set out in Article 5. Specifically, Member States are required to adopt and publish the national laws necessary to comply with the Directive by 26 months after its entry into force. These new national measures must then be applied starting from 32 months after the Directive’s entry into force.

Given this is a minimum harmonisation Directive, Member States retain discretion to introduce measures that empower consumers even further. For example, they may make ADR mandatory for certain disputes or further extend the material scope. It will therefore be crucial to monitor the national transposition of the Directive to understand how the legal framework will evolve in each Member State.

As part of the International Law Association (British Branch) Lecture Series, a special lecture on Cross-Border Disputes and Conflict of Laws in India: The Case for Asian-Inspired Reform will be delivered by Prof. (Dr) Saloni Khanderia, Professor at Jindal Global Law School (India) and Professor at the Center for Transnational Legal Studies (London), on Wednesday, 15 October 2025, at 6:00 PM (London BST ??) | 10:30 PM (India IST ??). The event takes place at the UCL Faculty of Laws and will also be available online. The session will be chaired by Professor Alex Mills (UCL Laws).

India’s transformation since its 1991 economic liberalisation has positioned it as a key player in global commerce. Indian judges have contributed significantly to international law, both domestically and in global forums such as the International Court of Justice and commercial courts abroad. Yet, despite judicial progress, structural gaps in India’s private international law persist.

This lecture examines how India can strengthen its framework for cross-border dispute resolution, drawing lessons from leading Asian jurisdictions—Singapore, China, Japan, and South Korea—to ensure coherence, predictability, and competitiveness in transnational litigation.

Who should attend:
Practitioners, scholars, students, policymakers, and anyone interested in India’s evolving role in global dispute resolution.

For more details about the lecture and the registration process, visit https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/events/2025/oct/hybrid-cross-border-disputes-and-conflict-laws-india-case-asian-inspired-reform?mc_cid=f1dfe473a9&mc_eid=UNIQID

On Wednesday, October 8, 2025, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CEST). Professor Nadia de Araujo (Pontifícia Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro) will speak, in English, about the topic

“Highlights on the project for a Brazilian Law on Private International Law”

After more than eighty years Brazil finally has a project for a new Law on Private International Law. The current 1942 law devotes only seven articles to the whole subject. In light of the developments in PIL, the complexities of modern life and the adoption of a series of Hague Conventions and Inter-American Conventions, the project addresses PIL in its entirety. The new law introduces several significant changes: it expressly allows for party autonomy in international contracts, a concept that was not clearly defined in previous legislation, while safeguarding consumer and labour contracts. Additionally, it introduces new rules for proof of foreign law and a more comprehensive set of family law. It also retains domicile as the main rule for capacity and other family rights.

 

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

The latest issue of the Journal of Private International Law (Volume 21, Issue 2) features seven articles. Andrew Tettenborn, English conflicts law at sea – the transfer and creation of proprietary interests in ships, 211-227 Surprisingly, the law applicable to the creation and transfer of proprietary interests in ships remains remarkably obscure as a matter of the […]

The University of Genoa (Italy), together with the partnership of the EU co-funded project UniPAR, is organizing a conference on parenthood in the light of Human Rights Law and Private International Law.

In the Conference, the UniPAR research team will present the results of the research and various topics related with EU private international law and children’s rights in the context of parenthood will be addressed. Dr. Raffaele Sabato, judge of the European Court of Human Rights, will deliver the introductory speech.

The Conference will take place on Friday 24 October, 10.00-13.00 CET and 14.00-17.00 CET.

See the programme. Online attendance is possible after prior registration.

When I teach trade law, I often emphasise the standardisation part of international trade including the relevance of CE marking, self-certification, accreditation, conformity assessment etc and their impact on manufacturers and importers’ liability. These laws are not often the subject of scholarship and in handbooks on EU internal market they are usually dealt with succinctly. Yet they are a crucial cog in the machinery of international trade and the EU system for same has its equivalents in the US, UK, Australia etc.

In the case discussed in this post, EU law applies.

Secretary of State for Health and Social Care v PPE Medpro Ltd [2025] EWHC 2486 (Comm) is an excellent illustration of this reliance in international trade on quality assurance and self-certification (as opposed to government agents having to check whether imported products meet with the EU’s essential health and safety requirements, here of PPE: Personal Protection Equipment).

The judgment’s context is the UK’s rather awkward ‘VIP lane’ at the time of Covid procurement. The idea behind this ‘priority lane’ for suppliers, as summarised by the BBC, was to “treat offers to supply PPE with greater urgency if they came with a recommendation from ministers, MPs, members of the House of Lords, or other senior officials.” The inevitable result were accusations of cronyism and stories of corporations, set up overnight, gaining multi million pound contracts without the necessary experience in procuring often tightly regulated medical equipment.

In the case at issue, the Government are seeking to recover the considerable monies paid (and some associated costs) after 25m supposedly sterile  surgical gowns were found not to be sterile.

Under the relevant technical specifications for the order, [52] the usual ways of showing compliance with EU essential health and safety requirements was prescribed; and, importantly, per the Medical Devices Regulations – MDR 2002, now assimilated EU law, no person is to place on the market, put into service, or supply a medical device unless it meets the essential requirements set out in Annex I to the Medical Devices – MDs Directive, which provided (section 8.4) that the device must be manufactured and sterilised by an appropriate, validated method.

The formulation of the MDR implies that manufacturers cannot essentially just self certify when it comes to the gowns of relevance to the case (I did not study the classification of the gowns for this post; it is what I surmise from the judgment). The gowns at issue are in a category where the risk profile required higher quality assurance, including “the intervention of a notify body at the production stage” – and where compliance could not be achieved without it: for sterilised products the notified (certification) body needs to certify the procedure leading to the obtaining of sterility until the sterile package is opened.

The CE mark for the shipments at issue was not so accompanied by a notified certification body and were not so certified; upon testing the gowns were shown not to be sterile.

The issues of contractual construction in the case essentially arise out of the practical and regulatory confusion surrounding the purchase of PPE equipment at the time of the pandemic, including European Commission communications suggesting possibilities for derogation from CE marking duties (no such derogation was requested in the case at issue) and the complicated factual to and fro, largely by email, between PPE Medpro (which had ended up in the VIP lane [57] via Lady Mone) and the Government.

[218] Cockerill J after lengthy discussion of all this context holds

on the true construction of the Contract there was a requirement for a validated process; and in breach of the Contract there was no validated process. The evidence which there was did not establish two key parts of the process had been undertaken: bioburden testing and dose setting.

The remainder of the judgment then deals with quantum etc.

A most relevant and instructive judgment.

Geert.

Looking forward to getting my teeth stuck into this one. EU standardisation lawCE marking, conformity assessment, declaration of conformity, manufacturer v importer duty [HMG] v PPE Medpro [2025] EWHC 2486 (Comm)www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/u…

— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-10-02T07:40:42.286Z

The program of the XLVIII Seminar of the Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) has been published, click here.

To register, click here. Registration is free of charge (except if a certificate of attendance is requested). Only in-person participation is possible this year (with the exception of speakers, who may present online).

For more information, click here and here.

Professors Marilyn Freeman (University of Westminster, UK) and Nicola Taylor (University of Otago, NZ) are carrying out a research project on international child abduction. The research investigates what happens after children have been removed to, or retained in, a country in a way which is considered wrongful in law. This is an issue which has […]

20th Regional Private International Law Conference will be held in Istanbul on 6-8 November 2025 in collaboration with Erdem&Erdem Law Office and Istanbul Arbitration Center (ISTAC). This year’s conference topics are focusing on choice of court/arbitration agreements and the enforcement of decisions rendered by chosen courts or arbitral tribunals. The conference programme can be viewed in here.

Participation is available via Zoom, through the link provided: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/84302415223?pwd=JdVlMzX7dzabawYUF6TnjKnjp8xKhf.1 (Meeting ID: 843 0241 5223 Password: 786753)

For further questions you may contact the organizers Prof. Dr. Zeynep Derya Tarman (Koç University Faculty of Law, Dean) and Prof. Dr. Ceyda Süral Efeçinar (Piri Reis University Faculty of Law, Dean) at meoba@ku.edu.tr (M. Ece Oba, Research Assistant at Koç University Faculty of Law).

The Permanent Bureau of the HCCH welcomes applications for the position of Legal Officer, based at its headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands.

The successful candidate will work in the field of international commercial, digital and financial law, under the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary General. In addition to work in relation to the operation of the 1985 Trusts Convention, the 2006 Securities Convention, and the 2015 Choice of Law Principles, duties will include general assistance in relation to the projects on Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), Carbon Markets, Digital Tokens, and the Digital Economy. Depending on the work programme established by CGAP, the successful candidate may be called upon to carry out work in other areas, and will respond to requests for information, assist with comparative law research, the preparation of research papers and other documentation, the organisation and preparation of materials for publication, the preparation of, and participation in, conferences, seminars and training programmes.

The successful candidate will also support the work of the office of the Deputy Secretary General, and may be called to take on such other work as may be required by the Secretary General from time to time.

Applications should be submitted by 1 November 2025 (5.00 p.m. CET). For more information, please visit the Recruitment section of the HCCH website.

This post is published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law (HCCH). 

 

The use of videoconferencing in cross-border civil and commercial court proceedings has its challenges in the EU, although the use of videoconferencing is supported by a number of regulations such as the Taking of Evidence Recast Regulation, the European Small Claims Procedure Regulation, the European Account Preservation Order Regulation, the Digitalisation of Judicial Cooperation Regulation. […]

After Indonesia, China, Japan, India and recently Hong Kong, the prestigious Hart series “Studies in Private International Law – Asia” has released a new volume on Cambodian Private International Law, authored by Nobumichi Teramura (Associate Professor, Keio University Law School; Affiliate, Centre for Asian and Pacific Law in the University of Sydney).

This book is the 14th volume in this outstanding series, which, in only six years of existence, has successfully manages to transform the “little attention” once paid to developments in private international law in Asia into an explosion of Asian scholarship and a growing and dynamic field of study.

This new volume, however, is somewhat different from the other abovementioned volumes that comprehensively cover private international law in a specific jurisdiction. As rightfully stated in the Series Editors’ Preface, “[o]f those six volumes, this is possibly the most challenging.” This is because, as the author points out, Cambodia “still does not have a comprehensive legal framework that addresses conflict of laws issues, and research on Cambodian private international law is still in its infancy.” Cambodian law “does not yet contain rules on international jurisdiction,” nor does it have “any special statutory body of law dealing specifically with the conflict of laws.” Moreover, Cambodian courts “have never recognised and enforced judgments issued abroad.”

In this regard, the Series Editors posed in their preface the question of whether, under such circumstances, “it is too early to speak of, much less write about, a coherent body of Cambodian private international law.” But this is precisely what makes this volume particularly interesting and unique. It proposes a striking approach: the development of principles of Cambodian private international law by reference to Japanese legal principles and experiences. This is explained by the long-standing involvement of Japanese scholars and agencies in Cambodia’s legal development through technical assistance, and by the fact that Cambodian law “borrow[s] heavily from Japanese law.”

In pursuing this undertaking, the author has relied “mostly…on English and Japanese literature on Cambodian law and society,” given the “significant volume” of materials available in those languages, particularly in Japanese, on Cambodian law. The author himself acknowledges that his “research approach to Cambodian private international law is experimental and will inevitably attract criticism.” Nevertheless, while engaging in this Sisyphus-like endeavor, he humbly “hopes that the discussion in this book can serve as a starting point for a dialogue among legal experts in Cambodian law for considering the next reform of Cambodian private international law, regardless of whether the experts agree or disagree with the suggestions made” therein.

One thing is certain: as the first (and so far the only) comprehensive contribution on Cambodian private international law in English, and probably in any language, it provides valuable access to the first sustained and systematic reflection on this subject. By doing so, the book fills a significant gap in the literature, opens new avenues for scholarly debate, and lays a foundation not only for discussion and critical reflection but also for future reforms in this field. From this perspective, the book’s objective can be said to have been fully achieved.

 

The description of the book reads as follows:

This book is the leading reference on Cambodian private international law in English.

The chapters systematically cover the whole of Cambodian private international law, including commercial matters, family law, succession, intellectual property, competition (antitrust), and environmental disputes.

The chapters do not merely cover the traditional conflict of law areas of jurisdiction, applicable law (choice of law) and enforcement. They also look into conflict of law questions arising in arbitration and assess Cambodia’s involvement in the harmonisation of private international law globally and regionally within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Similarly to the other volumes in the Studies in Private International Law – Asia series, this book presents the Cambodian conflict of laws through a combination of common and civil law analytical techniques and perspectives, providing readers worldwide with a more profound and comprehensive understanding of the subject.

 

Table of Contents includes the following:

1. Introduction

Part I: Foundations of Cambodian Private International Law

2. Status of Private International Law in Cambodia and Preliminary Matters

3. Treatment of Foreign Law

Part II: Jurisdiction

4. Direct Jurisdiction

Part III: Choice of Law

5. Choice of Law for Contractual Obligations

6. Choice of Law for Non-Contractual Obligations

7. Choice of Law for Property Issues

8. Family Law

9. Law of Corporations, Insolvency, Antitrust and Unfair Competition

Part IV: Recognition and Enforcement

10. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

Part V: Arbitration

11. International Arbitration

12. The Harmonisation of Private International Law

Written by Mayela Celis, Maastricht University

In June 2025, the US Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. et al. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexico) 605 U.S. 280 (2025). The Opinion is available here. We have previously reported on this case here,  here and here (on the hearing).

As previously indicated, this is a much-politicized case brought by Mexico against US gun manufacturers, alleging inter alia negligence, public nuisance and defective condition. The basic theory laid out was that defendants failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the trafficking of guns to Mexico causing harm and grievances to this country. In this regard, the complaint focuses on aiding and abetting of gun manufacturers (rather than of independent commission).

In a brilliant judgment, Justice Kagan ruled that PLCAA bars the lawsuit filed by Mexico. Accordingly, PLCAAS’s predicate exception did not apply to this case.

This case has attracted wide media attention and a great number of amici curiae briefs was filed urging both reversal and affirmance or being neutral. Those urging reversal far outnumbered the other two categories, some of which were filed by Attorney Generals of numerous US states, American Constitutional Rights Union, American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Firearms Regulatory Accountability Coalition, Inc., National Association for Gun Rights, Inc., National Rifle Association of America, Product Liability Advisory Council, Second Amendment Foundation, Sen. Ted Cruz and others, Gun Owners of America, Inc., etc.

Primary holding

Held: Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, PLCAA bars the lawsuit.

Main federal statutes applicable and case law cited

The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), 119 Stat. 2095, 15 U. S. C. §§ 7901–7903

18 U. S. C. § 2(a) – Principals

Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 703 (1943)

Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471 (2023)

Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014)

United States v. Peoni, 100 F. 2d 401, 402 (CA2 1938)

For further information (incl. PLCAA’s predicate exception), please refer to the previous post on the hearing, here.

A few takeaways from the judgment are the following:

Plausibility

The Court clarified that plausibly “does not mean ‘probably,’ but ‘it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’” And Mexico did not meet that threshold (p. 291). Indeed, the Court goes even further and speaks of mere speculation as regards some of Mexico’s allegations (p. 296).

Aiding and Abetting

The Court stated the requirements of aiding and abetting derived from criminal law (as coined by Learned Hand): “an aider and abettor must ‘participate in’ a crime ‘as in something that he wishes to bring about’ and ‘seek by his action to make it succeed.’” The Court said that Mexico failed to properly plead this to the level required (p. 294).

Considering that Mexico based its claims on aiding and abetting liability, the Supreme Court begins by setting forth the three ancillary principles: 1) Citing Twitter, the Court notes that aiding and abetting is a rule of secondary liability for specific wrongful acts. In the case of a broad category of misconduct, the participation must be pervasive, systematic and culpable; 2) Aiding and abetting usually requires misfeasance rather than nonfeasance (such as failure to act or an omission when there is no independent duty to act); 3) Incidental activity is unlikely to count as aiding and abetting (p. 292).

In this regard, the Supreme Court ruled that Mexico’s allegations only refer to nonfeasance (or indifference) (p. 297). The Court also noted that contrary to normal practice in this type of cases, Mexico does not pinpoint any specific criminal transactions that the defendants allegedly assisted. And at the same time, Mexico sets the bar very high by alleging that all manufacturers assist a number of identified rogue dealers in their illegal pursuits (p. 294).

Importantly, the Court notes that “Mexico never confronts that the manufacturers do not directly supply any dealers, bad-apple or otherwise.” (p. 295) Indeed, they supply to middleman distributors that are independent. It is the conduct of rogue dealers, two levels down, that causes Mexico’s grievance and Mexico does not name them (there is only a reference to a Washington Post article, see our previous post).

A note to the reader: Mexico did identify a distributor in its complaint (Witmer Public Safety Group, Inc., which does business as Interstate Arms), however its complaint barely mentioned it, that is why the Court decided for simplicity’s sake to focus only on manufacturers (see footnotes 1 and 4 of the judgment).

The Supreme Court also dismissed Mexico’s allegations that the industry had failed to impose constraints on their distribution chains to reduce unlawful actions (e.g. bulk sales or sales from homes), which the court considers as “passive nonfeasance” in the light of Twitter. Nor were the allegations regarding the design and marketing decisions of guns accepted as these products may also appeal to law-abiding citizens.

History of PLCAA

The Court ends with some analysis of PLCAA’s purpose and the kind of suits it intended to prevent. The Court concludes that Mexico’s suit closely resembles those suits and if it were to fall in the predicate exception, it would swallow the entire rule.

Comments

At the outset, please note that the comments already made regarding the hearing of this case apply to a large extent to the final judgment.

The Supreme Court rendered a judgment that is clear, logical and addresses key matters of the litigation, without testing the troubled waters of proximate cause. In particular, it avoids departing from previous precedents such as Direct Sales and Twitter, which in my view set clear standards with regard to aiding and abetting liability. It also helpfully stated the requirements of aiding and abetting derived from criminal law (as coined by Learned Hand) and applicable to the case at hand.

During the hearing of this case, there was much uncertainty regarding the different federal statutes applicable, as well as the relationship between the different actors in the distribution chain of weapons. None of that confusion is seen in this judgment, which is extremely clear and well-thought through.

As regards, the liability of merchants and their products (as referred to in my previous post, such as baseball bats and knives), the Supreme Court helpfully clarified that: “So, for example, an “ordinary merchant[ ]” does not “become liable” for all criminal “misuse[s] of [his] goods,” even if he knows that in some fraction of cases misuse will occur. Twitter, 598 U. S., at 489; see id., at 499. The merchant becomes liable only if, beyond providing the good on the open market, he takes steps to “promote” the resulting crime and “make it his own.” United States v. Falcone, 109 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 311 U. S. 205 (1940).” (p. 292)

Justices Thomas and Jackson (coincidentally the two black justices of the Court, a conservative and a liberal justice, respectively) filed Concurrent Opinions, which blurs the line between the two camps. In my view, these Opinions are more restrictive than the unanimous decision and make it more difficult to file a suit, requiring an earlier finding of guilt or liability in an adjudication regarding the violation (Thomas) or making non-conclusory allegations about a particular statutory violation under PLCAA (Jackson). In my view, the majority decision does not require either.

In sum, the majority Opinion greatly clarifies this area of law. A positive development, amid the tumultuous docket of the Court in this era of great uncertainty.

 

Photo by Thinkstock on Freeimages.com

 

 

 

An e-mail has been sent to the members of the European Association of Private International Law, to invite them to attend invitation the a meeting of the General Assembly, due to take place via Zoom on Friday, 28 November 2025, at 5 pm CET. The Assembly will discuss, inter alia, about possible amendments to the […]