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Advocate General Norkus opined early July in Case C-485/24 Locatrans Sarl v ES. At issue is the application of the protective regime for lex contractus viz employees under the Rome Convention (applicable ratione temporis in the case at issue).
The facts of the case echo, but with distinctions, CJEU Weber, Koelzsch, and Voogsgeerd, as well as Nogueira (Ryanair). The novelty of the question in current case is the period of work to be taken into account in determining which law is applicable if the employee has worked for his or her employer in two separate stages: first, in several States and next, during the period preceding the end of the employment relationship, on a permanent basis in a single State, which parties clearly intend to be the new place of habitual performance.
The opposing views are summarised (23):
Referring to the judgment in Weber, Locatrans and the Czech Government submit, inter alia, that where the employee carries out the same activities for his or her employer in more than one State, account must be taken of the whole duration of the employment relationship in order to identify the place where the person concerned habitually worked and, consequently, the law applicable in the absence of a choice made by the parties. For its part, the French Government considers that, that being the case, the most recent period of work could be taken into account in order to determine, in the light of all of the relevant circumstances, the existence of closer connections with another country. By contrast, ES maintains, as a preliminary point, that, despite the wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling, he did not change his place of work during his employment relationship. He submits, therefore, that his situation is clearly distinguishable from that which gave rise to the judgment in Weber, where the worker had performed his duties successively in two different places of work. In any event, even if the judgment in Weber were to be held to be relevant to the present case, ES argues that reference must be made to the most recent period of work. For its part, the Commission maintains that, in a case such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which the dispute concerns the termination of the contract and where the relevant facts for the purposes of coming to a judgment arise at the end of the contract, account must be taken of the most recent period of work.
(36) the core rule per Koelzsch is
‘the country in which the employee habitually carries out his [or her] work in performance of the contract’ is that in which or from which, in the light of all of the factors which characterise that activity, the employee performs the greater part of his or her obligations towards his or her employer’
In footnote the AG adds that what must be at the heart of the national court’s assessment is the activity of the worker and not that of the employer (for which he refers to the Handbook, much obliged and humbly noted).
Having summarised the relevant case-law, (51) the Opinion takes a decisive turn when the AG refers to the need to interpret the regime with stability in mind:
[I] would point out that, in so far as the employment relationship is a permanent one, the elements characterising that relationship, such as the performance of work, the place of performance of the work or the remuneration, may change. In particular, in a cross-border employment situation, the country where the employee ‘habitually carries out his [or her] work’ may also change depending on changes in objective circumstances. In other words, the law applicable in the absence of a choice made by the parties may change due to the very nature of the employment relationship, which continues over time. However, since one of the objectives of the Rome Convention is to fortify confidence in the stability of the relationship between the parties to the contract, a change in the applicable law resulting from changes in factual circumstances must also be the result of a clear intention on the part of the parties. That change must not affect legal relationships which arose prior to that change, so that, rationae temporis, the dispute remains governed by the law applicable at the time those circumstances arose (tempus regit actum). (footnotes omitted)
Tempus regit actum is a principle with direct appeal and application for procedural law, for issues of intertemporary law (scope of application ratione temporis, particularly of statute) and for formal validity in private international law. Its application for substantive provisions in private international law is less obvious (there are traces of it of course in Rome I’s Article 3(2) on voluntary change of applicable law, Article 11’s formal validity, and Article 13 incapacity).
For employment contracts, in my opinion the very first agreed “place from where the employee habitually carries out his work” must be seen as an implicit mutual choice of law, and any mutually agreed (or at least transparent and uncontested) change in said place, as an implicit change in that choice of law. Article 3(2) must then be applied mutatis mutandis
The parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law other than that which previously governed it, whether as a result of an earlier choice made under this Article or of other provisions of this Regulation. Any change in the law to be applied that is made after the conclusion of the contract shall not prejudice its formal validity under Article 11 or adversely affect the rights of third parties.
(52) the AG follows a similar approach focused on deciding what it is the parties are actually litigating about, to then fix the lex causae applicable to the claim, to the relevant, mutually agreed, place of habitual employment in force at the time:
In the light of the foregoing, the essential question is what is, in the present case, the relevant criterion for determining, in concreto, the point in time at which the subject matter of the dispute arose in order to identify the place where the employee habitually carried out his work and, consequently, the law applicable in the absence of a choice made by the parties.
(54) the AG like the Commission identifies the nature of the claim as one in which the employee’s dispute concerns the termination of the contract. The facts relevant to the determination of that dispute in casu it seems arise at the end of that contract, hence the most recent period of employment (with fixed place of employment in France) should be taken into account to determine the lex causae. (57) Gleichlauf is mentioned as one of the reasons for suggesting so.
If followed by the CJEU, a sophisticated litigant could of course abuse this approach to formulate their claim in such a way as to lead to an attractive applicable law. However as a general rule the approach seems a solid one to me.
Geert.
EU Private International Law, 4th ed 2024, 3.39 ff.
Opinion Norkus AG this morningFavor laboris in Rome Convention, applicable lawPlace of habitual place of employment must focus on most recent period if place has become fixed, by mutual agreementC‑485/24 Locatrans curia.europa.eu/juris/docume… (citjng ia your truly – sincerely humbled)
— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-07-03T11:57:31.029Z
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