Flux européens

Autriche / Commission (Centrale nucléaire Paks II)
Aide d'État
L’avocate générale Medina propose d’annuler l’arrêt du Tribunal qui a confirmé la décision de la Commission approuvant l’aide de la Hongrie pour deux nouveaux réacteurs nucléaires à Paks

Apothekerkammer Nordrhein
Rapprochement des législations
Les États membres peuvent autoriser des actions publicitaires pour l’achat de médicaments indéterminés soumis à prescription médicale qui revêtent la forme de réductions de prix ou de paiements d’un montant exact

Dun & Bradstreet Austria
Principes du droit communautaire
Évaluation de crédit automatisée : la personne concernée a droit à ce qu’on lui explique comment la décision a été prise à son égard

AEON NEPREMIČNINE e.a.
Services d’intermédiation immobilière : le droit de l’Union ne s’oppose pas au plafonnement de la commission de l’agence immobilière à 4 % du prix de vente ou de location

The CJEU confirmed this morning in C‑339/22 BSH Hausgeräte GmbH v Electrolux AB (no language versions other than French and Swedish at the time of posting) that in principle Brussels Ia’s exclusive jurisdictional rule for registered intellectual property rights (A24(4) has no reflexive effect. [I suggest below that the reasoning extends to all of A24).

In doing so it did not follow the Opinions of its AG, which I reviewed here for the first one, and here for the second one. (There were two seeing as the case was reassigned to Grand Chamber).

The case in essence concerns two issues: the extent of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Article 24(4) court in infringement claims (as opposed to direct invalidity actions); and the question whether A24 works reflexively: ie whether the surrender of jurisdiction should also be applied in cases where the A24(4) court is not in an EU Member State – previously addressed in  IRNova f FLIR. In current case the CJEU frequently cites IRNova, confirming as it were that judgment’s matter of factly rejection of reflexivity.

The Court did, justifiably in my view, follow the AG on the issue of a stay between EU Member States courts, when the claim is one for infringement of an intellectual property right (‘IPR’), and the defendant raises a defence of illegality.

Like the AG the CJEU opts for a “narrow reading” of GAT v LUK: a stay of the infringement proceedings until the A24(4) court holds on validity, and then continued jurisdiction for the ‘infringement’ court. The CJEU

cites [43] the need for a restrictive interpretation of the exceptions to A4’s principled actor sequitur forum rei jurisdiction.

[44] and referring to the AG, a different interpretation would make full jurisdiction for the A24(4) court the rule rather than the exception (seeing as an invalidity defence is run of the mill in IPR infringement cases).

[46] particularly in Member States where civil procedure rules allow for the invalidity defence to be pleaded throughout the proceedings, it would lead to uncertainty of jurisdiction throughout the proceedings.

The question of extra-EU reflexive effect of Article 24(4) then. This is

kicked off [55] by a reference to the core objectives of Brussels Ia: lubrication of the internal market, and (later in the legislative history), part of the creation of a European judicial area. This is an internal EU objective ([55]: [BIa] est un régime de compétence interne à l’Union européenne.

[56] IRNova had already held that A24(4) does not apply where the patent at issue was granted by a third state; [57] A24(4) does not grant any jurisdiction, exclusive or not, to third States;

[59] BIa kicks in the moment there is an ‘international element’, whether the competition between courts is between EU Member States courts or third State courts (reference to IRNova which however at this point had itself referred to Owusu: Owusu rules! ) and [61] in principle a Member State court may well have jurisdiction on the basis of A4 BIa, like precisely in Owusu[ [67] the Court remarks that the 1974 Munich Patent Convention does not dislodge this jurisdictional finding when a third country patent is involved;

[62] ff A73 BIa may lead to alternative fora, either by way of a multilateral agreement such as the Lugano Convention, or through bilateral agreement entered into force before the Regulation; neither applies in the case at issue.

[65] finally A33-34 may lead to a stay issued by the Member State court under the conditions laid down in those Articles: again: these conditions have neither been met nor applied in the case at issue.

[70] now specifically refers to Owusu, to then [71] ponder whether the public international law principle of non-interference in other States’ domestic affairs (one assumes the English translation will use  the notion of ‘comity’) alters things. [72] ff while the EU Member State seized of the infringement claim, will also have jurisdiction to hold on the validity of the third country’s patent (and will have to exercise such jurisdiction other than in the bi-or multilateral Convention scenario, or within the confines of A33-34), such finding of (in)validity will only have effect inter partes: an erga omnes (in)validity finding can only be issued by the third State’s courts.

Conclusion [76]:

 Il ressort de l’ensemble des considérations qui précèdent qu’il y a lieu de répondre à la troisième question que l’article 24, point 4, du règlement Bruxelles I bis doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il ne s’applique pas à une juridiction d’un État tiers et, par conséquent, ne confère aucune compétence, exclusive ou non, à une telle juridiction en ce qui concerne l’appréciation de la validité d’un brevet délivré ou validé par cet État. Si une juridiction d’un État membre est saisie, sur le fondement de l’article 4, paragraphe 1, de ce règlement, d’une action en contrefaçon d’un brevet délivré ou validé dans un État tiers dans le cadre de laquelle est soulevée, par voie d’exception, la question de la validité de ce brevet, cette juridiction est compétente, en application de cet article 4, paragraphe 1, pour statuer sur cette exception, sa décision à cet égard n’étant pas de nature à affecter l’existence ou le contenu dudit brevet dans cet État tiers ou à entraîner la modification du registre national de celui-ci.

An important de lega lata finding, supported as I had discussed in my earlier posts, by many arguments. Whether the Commission may want to propose de lege ferenda other solutions, is a different call.

The case in principle applies to A24(4) only. Its reasoning however in my view extends across the A24 board.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.217 ff.

 

https://x.com/GAVClaw/status/1894317278503543192

 

 

 

 

 

Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku
Droit institutionnel
Indépendance des juges : la Cour de justice précise les exigences du droit de l’Union relatives à la fixation de la rémunération des juges nationaux

Alphabet e.a.
Concurrence
Le refus d’une entreprise en position dominante d’assurer l’interopérabilité de sa plateforme avec une application d’une autre entreprise, qui deviendrait ainsi plus attractive, peut être abusif

A quick note on Hugues Falys, FIAN, Greenpeace and Ligue des droits humains v Total Energies SE (domiciled at France), in which submissions are being exchanged and hearings are scheduled for 19 and 26 November 2025. A summary of the claim is reported here. In essence, the Belgian Farmer is seeking damages for harm done to the farming business due to climate change, and an injunction seeking to prohibit Total form further investing in fossil fuel operations.

The case has been lodged with the commercial court at  Doornik /Tournai, one assumes the territorially relevant court on argued locus damni grounds. Of interest is that an appeal will be heard at the Court of Appeal at Bergen /Mons, which has a specialised environmental chamber.

It is the kind of claim in which one can imagine the corporate defendant trying to outgun the claimant on the private international law issues, here: locus damni /locus delicti commissi jurisdiction under Article 7(2) Brussels Ia, and applicable law under lex ecologia – Article 7 Rome II, cq impact of Article 4 Rome II.

Re the jurisdictional issues see likely Total use of an argument which I flagged here: viz an emerging corporate strategy to deflect A7(2) forum damni jurisdiction, the argument that a causal link between the damage and the alleged shortcoming of the defendant needs to be shown in the claim form itself for it to ground jurisdiction.

Geert.

 

On 12 December 2024 the University of Milan hosted a conference on The Enforcement of the ESG Principles in a Transnational Dimension: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law, under the scientific direction of Stefania Bariatti, Luigi Fumagalli, Zeno Crespi Reghizzi, Michele Grassi, Anna Liebman.

I was asked to address jurisdictional issues for environmental law claims, and promised to upload my speaking notes the next day. Err, that turned out to be a bit later for I entirely forgot – and have now remembered. Here are the notes.

Geert.

 

The CJEU held earlier this morning in C‑393/23 Athenian Brewery SA, Heineken NV v Macedonian Thrace Brewery SA (no language versions available at the time of posting than Dutch and French).

My post on Kokott AG’s Opinion is here. The AG all in all supported a ready acceptance of forum connexitatis in competition law cases – in the case at issue a follow-on damages claim, filed in the mother corporation’s domicile, jointly against the daughter against whom a national competition authority had found a competition law infringement.

The Court is somewhat more cautious.

[26] The finding in CDC that A8(1)’s requirement of ‘same situation of law and fact’ is presumed to be met when various corporations have been held by a Decision of the European Commission to have violated competition law and are now pursued in the A4 court of one of them, also applies [27] when a mother and daughter corporation are pursued on the assumption they are part of one and the same economic unity. Once that unity established, it leads to joint and several liability in EU competition law [29].

[30-31] The risk of irreconcilable judgments  increases in the event of bifurcation of claims against the mother corporation and related undertakings when it is not the EC but rather a national competition authority which has found an infringement seeing [32] as the Damages Directive 2014/104 only instructs national authorities to take a finding of infringement by another Member State as prima facie, not binding evidence of such infringement on their own territory.

[39] ff the economic unit theory in competition law can and ought to be extended to follow-on damages claims so as to preserve the effet utile of EU competition law.

[41] ff focusing then on Brussels Ia, the national court’s jurisdictional assessment in the context of A8(1) is not one of intense engagement with the facts let alone the merits of the claim. [43] The claims by the defendant must be given proper attention however the court seized can presume that the information furnished by the claimant as to the alleged tort, is correct.

[45] all in all, the room for manoeuvre for the court seized in the context of an A8(1) claim aimed at joint and several liability, is limited to assessing whether decisive influence by the mother corporation on the related corporation, is excluded. Hence [46] the defendant corporations must be given the opportunity, at the jurisdictional level, to show only that

either the mother corporation neither directly nor indirectly holds all or almost all of the capital of the related undertaking, or

that it did not hold decisive influence despite holding all or almost all of the capital.

In summary therefore while the court seized in a claim for joint and several liability will not be able to hold a mini trial on the alleged tort, it must engage with the corporations’ arguments on capital control and /or decisive influence.  That is not a large window for extensive delay and argumentation yet neither is it the kind of swift A8(1) check which in my view the AG had in mind in her opinion.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024, 2.516.

 

Slagelse Almennyttige Boligselskab Afdeling Schackenborgvænge
Principes du droit communautaire
Avocate générale Ćapeta : la législation danoise en matière de logement public dans les zones en transformation constitue une discrimination directe fondée sur un critère ethnique

Alchaster II
Mandats d’arrêt émis au titre de l’ACC avec le Royaume-Uni : selon l’avocat général Spielmann, les modifications apportées aux règles relatives à la libération conditionnelle ne relèvent pas, en principe, de la notion de « peine plus forte » au sens de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne

Lexitor
Environnement et consommateurs
Contrats de crédit à la consommation : en cas de non-respect de l’obligation d’information, une banque peut être privée de son droit aux intérêts

Engagement solennel de trois membres de la Commission européenne

Servis-Terminal LLC v Drelle [2025] EWCA Civ 62 is an interesting case highlighting the difference between recognition and enforcement, and the circumstances in which one may not need formal recognition of a foreign court’s finding, in order effectively to enforce that finding. 

Can a bankruptcy petition be presented when payment ordered by foreign Court has not been made yet foreign judgment has not been sought to be enforced? The first instance judge had held [Drelle v Servis-Terminal LLC [2024] EWHC 521 (Ch)] that the fact that the Judgment had not been the subject of recognition proceedings in this jurisdiction did not prevent it from being the basis of a bankruptcy petition. 

Newey LJ [40], reversing, confirms that “(p)lainly, a foreign judgment can be determinative on a point even in the absence of recognition or registration.” Referring to Dicey Rule 45, the Court of Appeal recalls that as a general principle a foreign judgment “has no direct operation in England” and [39] “[a] judgment creditor seeking to enforce a foreign judgment in England at common law cannot do so by direct execution of the judgment” but “must bring an action on the foreign judgment”. Lord Justice Newey then uses a sword and shield analogy: [41]

The principle that a foreign judgment “has no direct operation in England” reflects the common law’s aversion to enforcing a foreign exercise of sovereign power. As Professor Briggs has explained, “if a foreign adjudication and judgment is understood as being an act of state sovereignty, … it is regarded as completely effective within the territory of the sovereign, and as completely unenforceable outside it”: see paragraph 21 above. That logic suggests that any use of an unrecognised and unregistered judgment as a “sword”, including presentation of a bankruptcy petition founded on it, is objectionable.

The ‘revenue rule’ (famously and extensively entertained in SKAT) [42]

has a similar root. Professor Briggs referred to it as “a particular manifestation of a more fundamental rule, that an assertion or exercise of the sovereign right of a foreign state will not be enforced by an English court”: see paragraph 21 above. In Solo Partners, Lord Lloyd-Jones thought that the “revenue rule” was to be explained on the basis that “enforcement of a claim for taxes is but an extension of the sovereign power which imposed the taxes, and … an assertion of sovereign authority by one state within the territory of another, as distinct from a patrimonial claim by a foreign sovereign, is (treaty or convention apart) contrary to all concepts of independent sovereignties”: see paragraph 20 above.

Further authorities re discussed however Newey LJ’s mind is firm on the ‘shield and sword’ issue: [55] an unrecognised foreign judgment, which …involves an exercise of sovereign power [similar to a foreign tax not giving rise to a debt that can be the foundation of a bankruptcy petition] cannot form the basis of such petition. Of note! Geert. https://x.com/GAVClaw/status/1886740770033438751

Russmedia Digital et Inform Media Press
Liberté d'établissement
Commerce électronique et RGPD : l’avocat général Szpunar clarifie les responsabilités de l’exploitant d’une place de marché en ligne

A short note (on the day the UKSC appeal in MSC Flaminia is being heard) on the CJEU judgment in C‑188/23 Land Niedersachsen v Conti  11. Container Schiffahrts-GmbH & Co. KG MS ‘MSC Flaminia’.

The Court essentially followed the Opinion of Capeta AG which I discussed here. The operative part reads

Article 1(3)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments of waste

must be interpreted as meaning that the exclusion from the scope of that regulation that that provision provides for, pertaining to the waste generated on board a ship following damage sustained by that ship on the high seas until that waste is offloaded in order to be recovered or disposed of, no longer applies to the waste which remains on board that ship in order for it to be shipped, together with that ship, for recovery or disposal, after part of that waste has been offloaded in a safe port in order to be recovered or disposed of, that interpretation being in conformity with Article 1(4) of the Convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal, signed in Basel on 22 March 1989, approved on behalf of the European Economic Community by Council Decision 93/98/EEC of 1 February 1993.

The CJEU applies the VCLT’s interpretative matrix holding it leads to the Basel Convention having to be applied teleologically, and it also reminds us [58] of the ling-standing CJEU authority that “in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the legislation of which it forms part”. It then essentially repeats the AG’s lines of analysis that while exemption from notification etc may be justified in the light of the immediate aftermath of an incident at sea, but is no longer justified once the ship had docked and the captain etc can properly assess the various implications of what has happened.

All in all a sensible judgment.

Geert.

Handbook of EU Waste Law, 2nd ed. 2015, Oxford, OUP, Chapter 3, 3.27 ff.

Ryanair / Commission (TAP II ; aide au sauvetage ; COVID-19)
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal rejette le recours de Ryanair contre la décision de la Commission approuvant de nouveau l’aide au sauvetage à TAP dans le contexte de la pandémie de Covid-19

Pologne / Commission
Droit institutionnel
Réforme de la justice polonaise de 2019 : le Tribunal confirme que la Pologne doit payer un montant total d’environ 320 200 000 euros au titre de l’astreinte prononcée par la Cour de justice au cours de la procédure en manquement

Commission / Courtois e.a.
Droit institutionnel
L’obligation de la Commission de divulguer l’identité des membres de l’équipe de négociation pour l’achat anticipé de vaccins contre la Covid-19 est suspendue provisoirement, dans l’attente de l’arrêt de la Cour