This post was written by Lukas Petschning, University of Vienna.
Conflict of laws is one of the most complex and disputed subject areas in international arbitration. An abundance of academic works has examined the issue and proposed widely diverging solutions. Yet, these studies frequently focus on isolated issues and lack overall consistency. Equally, they are often overly theoretical, lacking practical guidance useful to the average arbitrator or judge.
Forging a path toward more legal certainty, the International Law Association has established a new Committee on Conflict-of-Laws Issues in International Arbitration. It is chaired by Dr Nikolaus Pitkowitz and Ms Wendy Lin, with Professor Matthias Lehmann and Dr Mariel Dimsey acting as co-rapporteurs.
The Committee plans to exercise its mandate in three phases from 2025 to 2030. Initially, a general methodology for the resolution of conflict-of-laws issues faced by arbitrators and supervisory courts will be developed. In the second phase, the Committee will transform this methodology into draft principles, which shall provide a harmonious approach to all or most conflict-of-laws issues which may arise in the context of international arbitration. The principles will be sufficiently precise to enable their citation as soft law by arbitral tribunals or courts on specific subject matters. In a third phase, the Committee will explore the advisability of developing hard law rules, e.g. in the form of treaties, model laws, or amendments to existing institutional rules.
The Committee is excited to announce its first webinar, introducing its mandate, the envisaged timeline of the Committee’s work, and the principal issues likely to be discussed. All interested individuals are expressly encouraged to participate via the following Zoom links; prior registration is not necessary.
The webinar will be held in two sessions on 18 February 2025, to enable participation from most time zones:
Session 1 (Asia, Oceania, EMEA): 8am (London) / 4pm (Hong Kong) / 7pm (Sydney)
Session 2 (Americas, EMEA): 8am (US Pacific) / 11am (US Eastern) / 4pm (London)
The Committee can be reached via email at ILA-CLC-Committee@pitkowitz.com.
More information on the Committee’s work can be found here.
Servis-Terminal LLC v Drelle [2025] EWCA Civ 62 is an interesting case highlighting the difference between recognition and enforcement, and the circumstances in which one may not need formal recognition of a foreign court’s finding, in order effectively to enforce that finding.
Can a bankruptcy petition be presented when payment ordered by foreign Court has not been made yet foreign judgment has not been sought to be enforced? The first instance judge had held [Drelle v Servis-Terminal LLC [2024] EWHC 521 (Ch)] that the fact that the Judgment had not been the subject of recognition proceedings in this jurisdiction did not prevent it from being the basis of a bankruptcy petition.
Newey LJ [40], reversing, confirms that “(p)lainly, a foreign judgment can be determinative on a point even in the absence of recognition or registration.” Referring to Dicey Rule 45, the Court of Appeal recalls that as a general principle a foreign judgment “has no direct operation in England” and [39] “[a] judgment creditor seeking to enforce a foreign judgment in England at common law cannot do so by direct execution of the judgment” but “must bring an action on the foreign judgment”. Lord Justice Newey then uses a sword and shield analogy: [41]
The principle that a foreign judgment “has no direct operation in England” reflects the common law’s aversion to enforcing a foreign exercise of sovereign power. As Professor Briggs has explained, “if a foreign adjudication and judgment is understood as being an act of state sovereignty, … it is regarded as completely effective within the territory of the sovereign, and as completely unenforceable outside it”: see paragraph 21 above. That logic suggests that any use of an unrecognised and unregistered judgment as a “sword”, including presentation of a bankruptcy petition founded on it, is objectionable.
The ‘revenue rule’ (famously and extensively entertained in SKAT) [42]
has a similar root. Professor Briggs referred to it as “a particular manifestation of a more fundamental rule, that an assertion or exercise of the sovereign right of a foreign state will not be enforced by an English court”: see paragraph 21 above. In Solo Partners, Lord Lloyd-Jones thought that the “revenue rule” was to be explained on the basis that “enforcement of a claim for taxes is but an extension of the sovereign power which imposed the taxes, and … an assertion of sovereign authority by one state within the territory of another, as distinct from a patrimonial claim by a foreign sovereign, is (treaty or convention apart) contrary to all concepts of independent sovereignties”: see paragraph 20 above.
Further authorities re discussed however Newey LJ’s mind is firm on the ‘shield and sword’ issue: [55] an unrecognised foreign judgment, which …involves an exercise of sovereign power [similar to a foreign tax not giving rise to a debt that can be the foundation of a bankruptcy petition] cannot form the basis of such petition. Of note! Geert. https://x.com/GAVClaw/status/1886740770033438751As part of Hart’s Studies in Private International Law – Asia, Min Kyung Kim, Judge at the Incheon District Court in Korea, just published her new book on Overriding Mandatory Rules in International Commercial Disputes: Korean and Comparative Law.
The impressive monograph, just shy of 200 pages, takes a comprehensive look at the role of overriding mandatory rules in international commercial litigation and arbitration, using Korea as a vantage point. It takes a close look at a large variety of (mainly European) sources in order to interpret and critically discuss the Korean Act on Private International Law, with a particular focus on the treatment of third-country mandatory rules. The book also identifies a range of potentially overriding mandatory provisions in Korean law.
The book is available open access at the publisher’s website.
A short note (on the day the UKSC appeal in MSC Flaminia is being heard) on the CJEU judgment in C‑188/23 Land Niedersachsen v Conti 11. Container Schiffahrts-GmbH & Co. KG MS ‘MSC Flaminia’.
The Court essentially followed the Opinion of Capeta AG which I discussed here. The operative part reads
Article 1(3)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments of waste
must be interpreted as meaning that the exclusion from the scope of that regulation that that provision provides for, pertaining to the waste generated on board a ship following damage sustained by that ship on the high seas until that waste is offloaded in order to be recovered or disposed of, no longer applies to the waste which remains on board that ship in order for it to be shipped, together with that ship, for recovery or disposal, after part of that waste has been offloaded in a safe port in order to be recovered or disposed of, that interpretation being in conformity with Article 1(4) of the Convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal, signed in Basel on 22 March 1989, approved on behalf of the European Economic Community by Council Decision 93/98/EEC of 1 February 1993.
The CJEU applies the VCLT’s interpretative matrix holding it leads to the Basel Convention having to be applied teleologically, and it also reminds us [58] of the ling-standing CJEU authority that “in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the legislation of which it forms part”. It then essentially repeats the AG’s lines of analysis that while exemption from notification etc may be justified in the light of the immediate aftermath of an incident at sea, but is no longer justified once the ship had docked and the captain etc can properly assess the various implications of what has happened.
All in all a sensible judgment.
Geert.
Handbook of EU Waste Law, 2nd ed. 2015, Oxford, OUP, Chapter 3, 3.27 ff.
The latest issue of the Dutch Journal on Private International Law (NIPR) has been published.
EDITORIAL
M.H. ten Wolde / p. 626-628
ARTICLES
A. Mens, De kwalificatie en de rechtsgevolgen van de erkenning van een kafala op grond van het Nederlandse internationaal privaatrecht/ p. 628-649
Abstract
This article focuses on the qualification and legal consequences of recognising a kafala under Dutch private international law. A kafala is a child protection measure under Islamic law, which entails an obligation to care for, protect, raise, and support a child, but without any implications for lineage or inheritance rights. The main conclusion is that a kafala generally constitutes both a guardianship and a maintenance decision. Consequently, the recognition of a foreign kafala in the Netherlands essentially entails the recognition of both the guardian’s (kafil) authority over the child (makful) and the recognition of the guardian’s maintenance obligation towards the child.
B. van Houtert, The Anti-SLAPP Directive in the context of EU and Dutch private international law: improvements and (remaining) challenges to protect SLAPP targets / p. 651-673
Abstract
While the scope of the Anti-SLAPP Directive is broad, this paper argues that the criteria of ‘manifestly unfounded claims’ and the ‘main purpose of deterrence of public participation’ may challenge the protection of SLAPP targets. The Real Madrid ruling should nonetheless play an important guiding role in all Member States; the legal certainty and protection for SLAPP targets will increase by applying by analogy the factors of the Real Madrid ruling established by the CJEU to assess whether there is a manifest breach of the right to freedom of expression. Although the Anti-SLAPP Directive provides various procedural safeguards for SLAPP victims, it does not prevent SLAPP targets from being abusively sued in multiple Member States on the basis of online infringements of personality rights or copyrights. The recast of the Brussels Ibis and Rome II should alleviate this negative effect of the mosaic approach by adopting the ‘directed activities’ approach.
While the public policy exception in Dutch PIL already has a great deal of potential to refuse the recognition and enforcement of third-country judgments involving a SLAPP, the grounds in Article 16 Anti-SLAPP Directive provide legal certainty, and likely have a deterrent effect on claimants outside the EU. As EU and Dutch PIL generally do not provide a venue for SLAPP targets to seek compensation for the damage and costs incurred regarding the third-country proceedings initiated by the SLAPP claimant domiciled outside the EU, the venue provided by Article 17(1) Anti-SLAPP Directive improves the access to Member State courts for SLAPP targets domiciled in the EU. However, although Articles 15 and 17 Anti-SLAPP Directive aim to facilitate redress for SLAPP victims, the re-sulting Member State judgments may not be effective in case these are not recognised and enforced by third states. Hence, international cooperation is important to combat SLAPPs worldwide.
V. Van Den Eeckhout, Rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie inzake internationaal privaatrecht anno 2024. Enkele beschouwingen over de aanwezigheid, de relevantie en de positie van internationaal privaatrecht in de rechtspraak van het Hof. Een proces van inpassing? Over de gangmakersfunctie van het ipr / p. 675-693
Abstract
With the increase in the number of European regulations on Private International Law, increasing attention has been paid by scholars to issues of consistency between different private international law regimes. The foregoing also includes attention to the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union with regard to (un)harmonised interpretation when answering preliminary questions on the interpretation of those regimes.
This contribution examines a number of current developments concerning the ‘PIL case law’ of the Court, viewed from the perspective of consistency, albeit in a broad sense: it examines aspects of judgments of the Court that lend themselves to highlighting various facets and dimensions of consistency. As a matter of fact, current case law and developments invite those who wish to pay attention to issues of consistency regarding the Court’s PIL case law to adopt a broad perspective and, while discussing aspects of consistency, to highlight points of attention regarding the presence, the relevance and the position of PIL in the Court’s case law, going along with issues of ‘fitting in’ of case law.
The paper includes a discussion of aspects of, i.a., C-267/19 and C-323/19 (joined cases Parking and Interplastics), C-774/22 (FTI Touristik), C-230/21 (X v. Belgische Staat, Refugiee mineure mariee), C-600/23 (Royal Football Club Seraing), C-347/18 (Salvoni) and C-568/20 (H Limited).
M.H. ten Wolde, Oude Nederlandse partiële rechtskeuzes en het overgangsrecht van artikel 83(2) Erfrechtverordening / p. 695-702
Abstract
On 9 September 2021, the ECJ ruled in case C-277/20 (UM) that Article 83(2) of the Regulation on succession does not apply to a choice of law made in an agreement as to succession in respect of a particular asset of the estate. Such a choice of law does not concern the succession in the estate as a whole and therefore falls outside the scope of the said provision, the Court stated. The question arises whether such partial choices of law made before 17 August 2015 have been voided with the CJEU’s ruling now that they likewise concern only certain assets and not the estate as a whole.
CASE NOTE
B. Schmitz, Artikel 6 lid 2 Rome I-Verordening en het Duitse Bundesgerichtshof. Bundesgerichtshof 15 mei 2024 – VIII ZR 226/22 (Teakbomen) / p. 703-709
Abstract
The German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) has ruled in its recent decision that Article 6(2) Rome I Regulation contains the preferential law approach. In its reasoning, the court specifically refers to three recent CJEU judgements to support this view. However, this case note argues that these CJEU judgements are not a valid basis for such reasoning. Instead, the BGH should have turned to Article 8 Rome I Regulation and its case law to apply the Gruber Logistics ruling by analogy.
LATEST PHDS
B. Schmitz, Rethinking the consumer conflict rule – Article 6(2) Rome I Regulation and party autonomy in light of principles, efficiency, and harmonisation (dissertation, University of Groningen, 2024) (Summary) / p. 711-714
BOOK ANNOUNCEMENT
M.H. ten Wolde, book announcement: Chr. von Bar, O.L. Knöfel, U. Magnus, H.-P. Mansel and A. Wudarski (eds.), Gedächtnisschrift für Peter Mankowski [A Commemorative Volume for Peter Mankowski], Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck 2024, XIV + 1208 p. / p. 715-717
A recent study by the Law Commission of England and Wales has resulted in proposed amendments to the Arbitration Act 1996 that include a default rule that an arbitration agreement will be governed by the law of England and Wales if the arbitration is seated in that territory. Given the importance of London as an arbitration center, this has implications for many international commercial contracts.
In his new article, Professor Ron Brand from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law challenges the premise behind the proposed amendment that there is a single “law of the arbitration agreement.” Instead, he demonstrates that there are multiple laws applicable to an arbitration agreement. He explains this multiplicity of applicable laws by considering the possible grounds for challenge of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal based on the arbitration agreement. Such an analysis demonstrates that very different laws may apply to questions of the existence, formal validity, substantive validity, scope, and exclusivity of an arbitration agreement. He reviews these issues in the broader context of choice of forum clauses generally, including both arbitration and choice of court agreements, and then considers a hypothetical international commercial transaction in which questions might arise about the first four of these five jurisdictional questions – demonstrating both the problems with the idea of a single “law of the arbitration agreement,” as well as the practical impact and importance of well-drafted choice of forum agreements, including provisions on choice of law. Although prompted by the proposed change in English law, this discussion has implications for the law in every jurisdiction regarding agreements to arbitrate, indicating that both transaction planners and dispute resolution lawyers need to be cognizant of the laws applicable to arbitration and choice of court agreements.
The article is available here.
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