
Private international law in Egypt has often been described as being in a state of stagnation. After enormous efforts by the government since the end of the 19th century, and particularly during the beginning of the 20th century, Egypt succeeded in developing a relatively comprehensive PIL framework, covering choice of law (Arts 10–28 of the 1948 Civil Code), international jurisdiction (Arts 28–35 of the 1968 Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure), and the enforcement of foreign judgments (Arts 296–301 the 1968 Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure), alongside other rules scattered across various pieces of legislation. While these rules could be considered relatively modern and well developed, and broadly in line with the general tendencies of comparative law at the time, they have since become quite outdated and, in many respects, old-fashioned. This, however, has not prevented Egyptian law from exerting considerable influence throughout the region, with more recent codifications often reproducing or adapting Egyptian solutions.
The influence of Egyptian law is due not only to its legislation, but also to the role played by Egyptian scholars in laying the foundations of a genuine Egyptian PIL scholarship. Early treatises were, more often than not, encyclopedic in scope, deeply engaged with comparative law and attentive to judicial practice. In this respect, one may cite the seminal work of Ezzeddine Abdallah, Al-qānūn ad-Duwalī al-Khāṣ [القانون الدولي الخاص – Private International Law], which consists of two volumes: Volume I, dealing with Nationality, Domicile and the Status of Aliens (1986), and Volume II, dealing with Conflict of Laws and Conflict of Jurisdictions (1986). This work remains, in my view, one of the leading and most authoritative scholarly works in the field.
Slowly, however, the golden age of Egyptian scholarship in private international law entered a period of decline. Much recent scholarship has, more often than not, contented itself with reproducing the work of the great early scholars, while often neglecting the comparative-law dimension from primary sources that was so prominent in those earlier works. Indeed, it is not uncommon for recent publications to refer to existing descriptions of old French case law, to engage in detailed discussions of issues with little practical relevance for Egypt, such as renvoi, or to refer to private international law systems that no longer exist, such as those of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Some also continue to cite, without any particular relevance to the issues under discussion, rather outdated French scholarly works.
More importantly, recent scholarship has generally paid insufficient attention to developments in case law. Rather than systematically examining the more recent decisions of the Egyptian Court of Cassation, despite their relative accessibility, many works continue to rely heavily on older French decisions or on relatively old Egyptian Court of Cassation judgments. This is particularly unfortunate in a field such as private international law, where the practical meaning and development of legal rules can often be understood only by looking closely at how courts actually apply them.
In this regard, the publication of Professor Abdel Moneem Zamzam‘s book on Egyptian private international law provides a useful opportunity to examine the current state and development of Egyptian law and legal scholarship in this field. Professor Zamzam, who is also Head of the Department of Private International Law at the Faculty of Law, Cairo University, is an outstanding scholar of private international law and international civil procedure, including international insolvency and arbitration, as well as international investment law. He obtained his PhD from the University of Dijon in 2003 with a thesis entitled “Overriding Mandatory Rules in State Courts and International Arbitration: A Comparative Franco-Egyptian Study” (Les lois de police dans la jurisprudence étatique et arbitrale : étude comparée franco-égyptienne). The thesis was first published in 2004 by the Atelier national de reproduction des thèses and was republished in 2021 by Éditions universitaires européennes. Professor Zamzam has also published several works in English, notably an article published in 2010 in the Journal of Private International Law, entitled “Bankruptcy Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign Bankruptcy Judgments in Egypt”.
The book, entitled Al-muṭawwal fī al-Qānūn al-Duwalī al-Khāṣ [المطول في القانون الدولي الخاص – The Treatise on Private International Law] (Dar al-Nahḍa al-ʿArabiyya, 2027), revives an old Egyptian tradition of lengthy legal treatises, running to approximately 1,100 pages. It covers the core areas of private international law, namely choice of law, international jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, with particular reference to the case law of the Egyptian Court of Cassation (Maḥkamat al-Naqḍ / محكمة النقض).
The book, kindly made available by the author here for the benefit of Arab PIL scholars and other Arabic-speaking readers, consists of three main parts, preceded by a general introduction.
Part I deals with the general theory of private international law, notably the nature and scope of private international law and its branches (Chap. I), the nature of the conflict-of-laws rule (Chap. II), the application of the conflict-of-laws rule (Chap. III), and disregarding the conflict-of-laws rule and correcting its application (Chap. IV).
Part II deals with the substantive rules of the conflict of laws, notably conflict of laws in personal status matters, or The Principle of the Personal Law (Chap. I), conflict of laws in immovable and movable property, or The Principle of the Territorial Law (Chap. II), conflict of laws in international contractual obligations, or The Principle of Party Autonomy (Chap. III), and conflict of laws in international non-contractual obligations, or The Principle of the Local Law (Chap. IV).
Part III deals with procedural private international law and is divided into two main sections: the first concerns conflicts of international adjudicatory jurisdiction and the international jurisdiction of Egyptian courts (Chap. I), while the second deals with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (Chap. II).
The book has several notable strengths. First, it builds on the existing literature while proposing a broader treatment of private international law in Egypt, often advancing positions that are original, or at least distinct from those prevailing in Egyptian scholarship. Second, it gives an important place to the case law of Egyptian courts, particularly that of the Egyptian Court of Cassation. Finally, in keeping with the tradition of Egyptian scholarly works, it adopts a comparative-law approach, presenting different approaches in major legal systems.
Despite these strong points, there are also some aspects that could, in my view, be taken into account by the author in future editions.
First, I found it particularly unfortunate that the book pays relatively little attention to private international law in other Arab countries. For instance, when discussing the trend towards comprehensive codifications of private international law, the author refers, inter alia, to the Swiss codification of 1984 and the Italian codification of 1995. Surprisingly, however, he also refers to a number of outdated codifications that have since been repealed and replaced by new legislation, such as the Turkish codification of 1982, which was replaced by new legislation in 2007, the Hungarian PIL Law-Decree of 1979, replaced in 2017, and the Romanian PIL Act of 1992, whose substantive provisions were subsequently incorporated into Book VII of the Civil Code, adopted in 2009 and in force since 2011. He also refers to instruments that, although bearing the title “private international law”, deal essentially with choice of law and therefore cannot properly be regarded as comprehensive codifications, such as the Polish Act of 1965, which was replaced by a new Act in 2011.
Surprisingly, the author does not refer to the Tunisian Code of Private International Law of 1998, despite its being available in both Arabic and French. This could have provided a particularly relevant point of reference for a comparative examination of Arab private international law systems. More generally, this reflects a second aspect that, in my view, deserves closer attention: a more systematic comparative-law approach would have benefited from references to the EU regulations, recent developments in US conflict of laws, and, importantly, the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), including the more recent conventions and other instruments adopted in areas such as international jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, choice of court agreements, and international family law. It would also have been useful to consider contemporary developments observable in other Arab jurisdictions. These developments are largely overlooked, with the author relying instead on classical references found in classical Egyptian legal literature, together with citations to older French textbooks that have since been substantially revised, updated or, in some cases, ceased to be regarded as authoritative references, except in relation to the historical issues that were relevant at the time of their publication.
Another aspect that deserves attention is the use of the case law of the Egyptian Court of Cassation. The author’s effort to identify and discuss relevant cases is certainly to be appreciated. At times, however, the references to the case law appear to be more illustrative than substantive. The treatment of derogative choice-of-court agreements provides a good example. The author cites only two decisions in which the Court of Cassation appears to uphold the validity of such agreements. A closer examination of the available case law on the issue, however, reveals a considerably more complex picture, and one that does not necessarily support the author’s position in favour of derogative choice-of-court agreements. It is also unfortunate that some recent decisions, including cases reported on this blog (here, here, here, here, and here) together with the relevant references to the case law, as well as other useful and more recent sources, have not found their way into this latest contribution to Egyptian private international law.
A third point, and in my view the most important one, concerns the history of Egyptian private international law, which is almost entirely overlooked in the book, as if its development had begun only in 1948 with the adoption of the Egyptian Civil Code and the set of private international law rules contained therein. A historical approach to Egyptian private international law, however, would reveal the broader context in which the present rules were developed, the tensions surrounding their adoption, the extraordinary work undertaken by the early scholars, and, above all, the important role played by the case law of the Mixed Courts in shaping the Egyptian private international law that we know today.
These comments may appear critical, but my intention is simply to express the hope that the tradition of the classical authors, who through meticulous comparative research combined with close attention to judicial practice succeeded in bringing Egyptian private international law to a remarkably advanced level for its time, can be revived. In this sense, the challenge today is not merely to describe the current state of Egyptian private international law by largely reproducing the prevailing literature, but to build on the foundations laid by earlier generations while engaging seriously with contemporary comparative developments and the evolving case law of Egyptian courts. If Egyptian private international law is to regain the dynamism and intellectual ambition that characterised what might be described as its golden age, future editions could benefit from a broader comparative perspective, more systematic and substantive engagement with the case law of Egyptian courts, including the Court of Cassation, and greater attention to the historical experiences that have shaped the present system. Such an approach would not simply document the current state of Egyptian private international law; it could also contribute to reviving the golden age of Egyptian private international law and laying the foundations for its further development.
Despite the above comments, the book remains an important contribution to the field and a valuable addition to the literature on Egyptian private international law. It provides a comprehensive account of the current state of Egyptian PIL and, importantly, brings together the relevant statutory provisions, doctrinal debates and judicial developments in a single work. I hope that it will stimulate further discussion and research and, in future editions, contribute even further to the renewal and development of Egyptian private international law.
Dans son arrêt de synthèse RRC Sports, la Cour de justice apporte des précisions quant à la méthode d’appréciation de la licéité d’une réglementation sportive au regard des articles 101 et 102 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne.
L’été 2026 aura été particulièrement riche pour la grande chambre de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Avec l’arrêt Kavala c/ Turquie n° 2, la Cour franchit une étape remarquable dans l’affirmation de l’autorité de ses arrêts, en exigeant la libération du requérant et en considérant sa condamnation pénale comme « nulle et non avenue » au regard du droit conventionnel. Dans le même temps, elle renouvelle en profondeur l’interprétation du principe non bis in idem face à la sophistication croissante de la criminalité et encadre, au nom de la prééminence du droit, les pouvoirs coercitifs des commissions d’enquête parlementaires. Un été de jurisprudence placé, en somme, sous le signe de l’autorité et de l’adaptation de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.
Judgment by the CJEU in Case C-320/24 Soledil engages with two long-standing principles of EU law.
Firstly, the need for courts motu proprio to raise arguments that contractual terms in B2C contracts may not stand the test of the EU’s Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive 93/13/EEC (‘UCTD’).
Next, the principle that claims between parties must not be allowed to be infinitely pursued and relitigated (named here by the CJEU under the broad term ‘res judicata’). In Soledil the CJEU engaged in essence, and not for the first time, with the balance that needs to be struck between consumer protection and sound administration of justice. It came down firmly in favour of the former.
My note on the case in the Journal of European Consumer and Market Law is here.
Geert.
Dans son arrêt ROGON e.a., la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne précise, d’une part, que l’incidence d’une réglementation sur des entreprises tierces ne fait pas obstacle à l’applicabilité de l’exception Meca-Medina, et, d’autre part, que les conditions de cette exception doivent être appréciées de façon groupée pour les dispositions indissociables ou accessoires, et de façon autonome pour celles poursuivant des objectifs distincts ou produisant des effets différents.
If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, and of course for practice purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.
Like all my posts, this post is entirely AI free.
I reviewed the Opinion of Emiliou AG (as he then was; meanwhile he has been appointed judge in the ECtHR) in Case C-176/25 [Steizer], IU v BT, here. The CJEU held last week, confirming the AG’s view.
As I suspected, the CJEU replied on point, in 20 succinct paras. The judgment does not as such settle the ‘proprietary rights’ issue viz Rome I that I flag in my review of the Opinion.
[40], having recalled the core definitions of ‘contract’ and ‘non-contractual’ with reference to the usual Handte and Kalfelis authorities (the Court refers to recentish core applications, Ergo and Kerr) and to the need for consistency between Rome I, II and Brussels Ia, the Court confirms “‘non-contractual obligation’, within the meaning of the Rome II Regulation, must be understood as meaning an obligation which derives from one of the events listed in Article 2 of that regulation.”
[41-42] BT’s claim against IU, allegedly the infringer of the (allegedly established) copyright, clearly is a non-contractual one, covered by A8(1) Rome II’s lex loci protectionis provision.
However [46] the Vorfrage, the formal validity of the contract assigning the exclusive rights of use allegedly infringed, is held instead to be subject to Rome I. This also leads to legal certainty (reference here to Liechtensteinse Landesbank):
“Treating that formal validity as a contractual matter thus provides legal certainty and a degree of predictability which it would not be possible to achieve were that aspect treated as a non-contractual matter.” (For in the latter case it would be subject to a patchwork of leges causae, linked to each of the Member States of infringement).
[53] The CJEU seeks additional support in A12 Rome I (the lex contractus governs, inter alia, the consequences of nullity of the contract):
“it is the law applicable to the contract which determines whether or not the assignee of a formally invalid contract must be considered to be the holder of the rights concerned, since that question is a consequence of the primary issue of the formal validity of the contract.”
[55] The infringement of the exclusive rights of use (were the national court to hold that formal validity is established), need to be assessed in the light of the law established by A8(1) Rome II.
The Court refers [48] to the European Commission’s professed split between proprietary rights and those capable of being the subject of Rome I, and [49] it refers to the AG’s implicit deference to that distinction, but it does not in so many words itself make that distinction, and of course intellectual property rights, and their limited territorial scope, may make one or two things in the judgment distinguishable.
As things stand therefore, in the words of Vlas AG in Tavrida Central Museum (at the Dutch SC), a different view IMO is still possible on the issue of proprietary rights and Rome I.
Geert.
L’existence de la Cour pénale internationale vit sous la crainte d’une nouvelle offensive de l’administration Trump. Après le juge Nicolas Guillou, la vice-présidente de la Cour, Reine Alapini-Gansou, a témoigné mercredi 23 septembre 2026 à l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies de son quotidien sous sanctions. La réponse de l’Europe reste timide.
Ulla Liukkunen (University of Helsinki) has kindly shared the attached programme for the Second Seminar of the Global Network on Private International Law, Employment, and Labour Relations (GNPILE).
The event is open to all, but registration is required.
On Tuesday, October 6 2026, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CEST).
Sandrine Brachotte (University of Antwerp) and María Julia Ochoa Jiménez (Comillas Pontifical University) will speak, in English, about the book
“Conflicts of Worldviews and Private International Law” (Hart Publishing, 2026).
This book brings together European private international law and decolonial thinking. It examines how European courts deal with conflicts between legal frameworks and postcolonised worldviews. Through three case studies—religious arbitration, Indigenous sacred land, and sexual minorities in the Global South—it shows that these conflicts are often overlooked. This results in the inadequate protection of the claims and identities of formerly colonised peoples. The book therefore proposes a more pluralist approach to jurisdiction, choice of court, and foreign law, giving greater weight to postcolonised worldviews. Prof. Ochoa Jiménez will comment on it, while focusing on private international law.
The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.
If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.
Dans cet arrêt, la chambre criminelle apporte trois précisions relatives à l’exécution de mandats d’arrêt européens successifs. Elle affirme, d’abord, que l’ordre d’accomplissement des formalités préliminaires au débat devant la chambre de l’instruction, l’audition de la personne recherchée sur son consentement à la remise (C. pr. pén., art. 695-30) et le rapport du conseiller (C. pr. pén., art. 199), est indifférent, dès lors qu’ils précèdent les débats sur le fond. Elle considère, ensuite, que la communication d’informations relatives à la composition de la juridiction de condamnation constitue un élément nouveau suffisant pour justifier la réitération d’une demande de remise après un refus antérieur définitif, sans que l’autorité de la chose jugée ou le principe ne bis in idem y fasse obstacle. Elle juge, enfin, en reprenant la solution dégagée par la Cour de justice dans l’affaire Breian (CJUE 29 juill. 2024, aff. C-318/24), que l’absence de procès-verbal de prestation de serment d’un juge, ou la circonstance qu’un autre juge de la même formation n’ait prêté serment qu’en tant que procureur, ne caractérise pas une atteinte aux droits fondamentaux de nature à faire obstacle à l’exécution du mandat.
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