Feed aggregator

The first issue of 2026 of ZEuP – Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht contains the following articles and case note which might be of interest for the readers of the EAPIL blog: Ignacio Tirado, UNIDROIT on the Occasion of Its (first) 100 Years The editorial traces the UNIDROIT’s origins and evolution, reflects on how it has […]

La rédaction de Dalloz actualité fait une petite pause pendant les vacances de Pâques.

en lire plus

La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne apporte une réponse négative à la question de savoir si le décret flamand du 23 juin 2023 dit « Habiter sa propre région » – permettant aux communes flamandes situées en zone de forte pression immobilière de réserver des logements à des acquéreurs justifiant d’un lien local suffisant, grâce à une prise en charge partielle du prix par la commune – constitue un « régime d’aides » soumis à l’obligation de notification préalable prévue à l’article 108, § 3, du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne. L’affaire lui permet de rappeler que la qualification de régime d’aides au sens de l’article 1er, sous d), du règlement (UE) 2015/1589 suppose notamment qu’aucune mesure d’application supplémentaire impliquant l’exercice d’un pouvoir d’appréciation ne soit requise.

en lire plus

Le demandeur à une instance peut s’en tenir à la simple apparence de domicile pour y assigner le défendeur en application du règlement Bruxelles I bis, s’il a pu de bonne foi croire qu’il constituait le domicile réel et s’est fié à une apparence trompeuse à la constitution de laquelle le défendeur n’est pas étranger.

en lire plus

Tobias Lutzi, Ennio Piovesani and Dora Zgrabljic Rotar have edited Recognition and Enforcement of Non-EU Judgments, a collection of essays resulting from a project run under the same name by the Young Research Network of EAPIL. This book examines the EU Member States’ national rules on recognition and enforcement of Non-EU judgments. Through its country […]

 

I. Introduction

Finally out: the new Moroccan Code of Civil Procedure (Law No. 58.25), the preparation of which was previously announced on this blog, has been promulgated by Dahir (Royal Decree) No. 1.26.07 of 11 February 2026 and published in the Official Journal (Al-Jarida Ar-Rasmiyya) No. 7485 of 23 February 2026. The legislative process was fraught with difficulties, and the draft went back and forth several times before its final adoption earlier this year. The Code will enter into force six months after its publication, i.e. on 24 August 2026.

As previously introduced on this blog, the preparatory work for the new Code dates back to 2023, when a first draft was submitted to the Moroccan House of Representatives (Draft No. 02.23). One of the main innovations of the new Code is the introduction, for the first time in Moroccan history, of a catalogue of rules on international jurisdiction. The Code also amends the existing rules governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Apart from a few minor exceptions, the provisions contained in the new Code, both on international jurisdiction and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, remain largely unchanged compared with those previously presented, save for limited linguistic and stylistic adjustments that do not entail any substantive legal implications.

What follows is a brief outline of the main solutions adopted in the Code, followed by a short assessment.

 

II. International Judicial Jurisdiction

The rules governing international jurisdiction are now expressly set out in Articles 72 to 75 of the new Code, contained in Chapter IV, entitled “International Judicial Jurisdiction” (al-Ikhtisas al-Qada’i ad-Duwali). The new rules may be summarized as follows:

 

1. General jurisdiction based on the defendant’s Moroccan nationality and the domicile or residence of a foreign defendant in Morocco (Articles 72 and 73)

Article 72 confers general jurisdiction on Moroccan courts on the basis of the Moroccan nationality of the defendant, even where the latter has neither domicile nor residence in Morocco. Article 73, by contrast, adopts the classical principle of actor sequitur forum rei when proceedings are brought against a foreign defendant. In both cases, jurisdiction is excluded where the action concerns an immovable property located abroad (last sentence of Articles 72 and 73).

 

2. Special jurisdiction in cases where the action is brought against foreign defendants with no domicile or residence in Morocco (Article 74)

Article 74 lays down an additional set of rules on special international jurisdiction applicable where proceedings are brought against foreign defendants who have neither domicile nor residence in Morocco. In such cases, Moroccan courts may assume jurisdiction when the action concerns:

1) assets located in Morocco, or obligations formed, performed, or to be performed in Morocco (Article 74(1));

2) tortious liability where the act giving rise to liability or the damage occurred in Morocco (Article 74(2));

3) the protection of intellectual property rights in Morocco (Article 74(3));

4) proceedings relating to businesses in difficulty instituted in Morocco (Article 74(4));

5) cases involving multiple defendants, provided that at least one of them is domiciled in Morocco (Article 74(5));

6) maintenance obligations where the maintenance beneficiary resides in Morocco (Article 74(6));

7) matters relating to the filiation of a minor residing in Morocco, or to guardianship over a person or property (Article 74(7));

8) matters of personal status where

• (i) the plaintiff is Moroccan, or
• (ii) the plaintiff is a foreigner residing in Morocco and the defendant has no known domicile abroad (Article 74(8))

9) dissolution of the marital bond where

• (i) the marriage contract was concluded in Morocco;
• (ii) the action is brought by a spouse who is a Moroccan national; or
• (iii) one spouse has abandoned the other and established domicile abroad or has been deported from Morocco (Article 74(9)).

In addition, article 74 in fine further clarifies the ancillary heads of international jurisdiction. In particular, Moroccan courts to hear an original action are also empowered can assume jurisdiction to adjudicate any counterclaims and related claims arising from the same legal relationship. Finally, Moroccan courts are granted jurisdiction to order conservative and provisional measures intended to be executed in Morocco, even where they lack jurisdiction over the merits of the principal dispute.

 

3. Jurisdiction based on the agreement of the parties (Art. 75)

The new Code also recognises party autonomy as an independent basis of international jurisdiction. Under Article 75 para. 1, even where a dispute would not otherwise fall within the ordinary heads of jurisdiction set out above, Moroccan courts may assume jurisdiction where the defendant expressly or implicitly consents to, or submits to, their jurisdiction. This jurisdiction by consent is, however, excluded where the action concerns immovable property situated abroad.

 

4. Ex officio declining jurisdiction in the event of non-appearance

The Code further introduces a rule aimed at preventing the exercise of jurisdiction by default (Article 75 in fine). Where the defendant fails to enter an appearance, the court is required, ex officio, to decline jurisdiction and to declare itself incompetent.

 

III. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

The new rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are now set out in Articles 451 to 456 of the new Code. While they largely reproduce existing solutions, they nonetheless introduce several important innovations.

 

1. Necessity of exequatur

Article 451 establishes the principle that foreign judgments cannot be enforced in Morocco as such. Their enforcement is subject to a prior declaration of enforceability (exequatur) by the competent Moroccan court, granted in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Code. Article 452 sets out the procedural framework governing applications for exequatur, while article 454 specifies the documentary requirements and the avenues of appeal applicable to exequatur proceedings.

 

2. Enforcement requirements

Article 453 sets out the substantive conditions that must be satisfied before a foreign judgment may be declared enforceable in Morocco. These requirements may be grouped as follows.

a) Requirements relating to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. First, the foreign court must not have ruled on a matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of Moroccan courts (Article 453(i)). In addition, the choice of the foreign forum must not have been tainted by fraud (Article 453(ii)).

 b) Requirement relating to due process. Due process guarantees must have been respected, in particular insofar as the parties were duly summoned and properly represented in the proceedings before the foreign court (Article 453(iii)).

 c) Requirements relating to finality and the absence of conflicting judgments. The judgment must be final and conclusive under the law of the court of origin (Article 453(iv)). Moreover, it must not be incompatible with a judgment previously rendered by Moroccan courts (Article 453(v)).

 d) Requirement relating to public policy. The foreign judgment must not violate Moroccan public policy (Article 453(vi)).

 e) Requirement relating to the contravention of international conventions ratified by Morocco. Finally, the content of the enforcement judgment must not contravene the provisions of any international convention ratified by Morocco and published in the Official Gazette (Article 453(vii)).

 

3. The reciprocity requirement

In addition to the foregoing conditions, Article 456 introduces the requirement of reciprocity as a condition for the enforcement of foreign judgments. While the application of the above requirements remains subject to international conventions binding on Morocco, the new Code now expressly requires that the existence of reciprocal treatment between Morocco and the State of origin be taken into account when ruling on an application for exequatur.

 

4. Instruments eligible to enforcement

Article 455 extends the exequatur mechanism beyond foreign judgments to cover titles and authentic instruments drawn up abroad. Such instruments may be enforced in Morocco provided that they were established by competent public officers or public servants and that they qualify as enforceable titles under the law of the State of origin. Their enforcement in Morocco is subject to a prior declaration of enforceability and is conditional upon the instrument being enforceable in its State of origin and not being contrary to Moroccan public policy.

 

IV. Comments

The introduction of new rules on international jurisdiction and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is, in itself, a welcome development. It reflects a growing awareness among the Moroccan authorities of the practical importance of private international law and an intention to provide legal practitioners and courts with a clearer and more structured framework. This development is consistent with Morocco’s increasing engagement at the international level, notably through the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), an engagement that has recently culminated in the establishment of an HCCH Regional Office for Africa in Morocco.

However, from a substantive point of view, the newly adopted rules may leave a certain sense of dissatisfaction. This is due to a number of issues, most of which were already pointed out in a previous post on this blog.

 

1. International jurisdiction

First, as regards the legal framework governing international jurisdiction, a reading of the adopted provisions gives the impression that the legislature has remained attached to an outdated conception of private international law, and has failed to take account of more recent developments, even with respect to some fundamental issues. In particular, the new rules do not distinguish between exclusive and concurrent heads of jurisdiction, despite the practical importance of such a distinction for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Nor do they introduce specific regimes for situations requiring enhanced protection, such as disputes involving weaker parties (notably consumers and employees), or provide more detailed rules for parallel proceedings, including lis pendens and connexity.

More importantly, the new Code introduces a number of questionable grounds of jurisdiction. These include, in particular, the nationality of the defendant, the place of conclusion of the contract, and the mere location of property in Morocco, irrespective of its value. Finally, although the Code introduces a new rule based on party autonomy in matters of jurisdiction, it fails to provide a clear and coherent regime governing choice-of-court agreements, in particular as regards whether the parties may oust the jurisdiction of Moroccan courts that would otherwise be competent under the newly adopted rules.

 

2. Enforcement of foreign judgments

While the new provisions clarify the formal requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments, they fail to take sufficient account of existing judicial practice and introduce rules that lack precision and are open to divergent interpretations.

For instance, Moroccan law does not, as a general rule, clearly distinguish between recognition and enforcement, as foreign judgments are in principle subject to a prior declaration of exequatur. Nevertheless, the case law of the Moroccan Supreme Court has, to some extent, developed a pragmatic approach that de facto allows the recognition of certain effects of foreign judgments even in the absence of a prior exequatur declaration. However, the new Code does not take these developments into account and instead adopts rules focusing exclusively on the enforcement of foreign judgments, thereby leaving the status quo on this issue largely unchanged.

In addition, the new rules clarify the control exercised over the jurisdiction of the foreign court by introducing a twofold examination. First, the matter decided by the foreign court must not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Moroccan courts. However, as noted above, the new provisions on international jurisdiction fail to identify or define the matters that are to be regarded as falling within such exclusive jurisdiction. Secondly, the rules require that the choice of the court of origin must not have been fraudulent. In this respect, it should be noted that an additional requirement concerning the existence of a characteristic connection between the dispute and the State of the rendering court had initially been envisaged. This requirement, which echoed the approach adopted by the French Cour de cassation in the well-known Simitch case, was ultimately removed from the final version of the Code, arguably because of the practical difficulties it would have entailed for judges in assessing the existence of such a connection.

Furthermore, the version finally adopted introduces a new requirement that was absent from earlier drafts and appears to have been added during the legislative process. This concerns the condition that the content of the enforcement judgment must not contravene an international convention duly ratified by Morocco. The rationale for the introduction of this requirement is not only unclear, but the provision itself is largely redundant. Indeed, Articles 454 and 456 of the new Code already give priority to the application of international conventions ratified by Morocco. The provision appears also to be difficult to apply in practice, given that the manner in which this provision is formulated, particularly in the Arabic version of the text, is awkward and makes its precise scope and operation difficult to ascertain.

Finally, the introduction of reciprocity as a condition for the enforcement of foreign judgments comes as something of a surprise and is arguably problematic. The former Code of Civil Procedure contained no reference to reciprocity, and Moroccan practice had long evolved without treating it as a relevant requirement. It is true that Article 19 of the Dahir (Royal Decree) of 12 August 1913 on the civil status of French nationals and foreigners in Morocco refers to reciprocity. However, although that provision has never been formally repealed, the prevailing view among Moroccan scholars is that it is no longer applicable, a position reflected in judicial practice, as Moroccan courts do not rely on it in their decisions. More importantly, the inclusion of reciprocity appears at odds with the general tendency in comparative law, which is either to abandon this requirement or to significantly limit its effect. Its (re?)introduction sends a negative signal to jurisdictions where reciprocity remains a condition for recognition and enforcement and is likely to unnecessarily complicate both the recognition of foreign judgments in Morocco and, consequently, the circulation of Moroccan judgments abroad.

 

V. Concluding Remarks

The general impression that emerges from a reading of the new rules is, on the whole, one of disappointment. The newly adopted provisions appear to be based on an outdated model and fail to take account of recent developments, including those observed in neighbouring jurisdictions. The content of a number of provisions gives the impression of a step backwards in time. For instance, some of the newly adopted rules, notably in matters of international jurisdiction, are comparable to those formerly found, for example, in Tunisia under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1959, which were later repealed and replaced by more modern provisions now contained in the Code of Private International Law of 1998. The new rules also do not fully reflect existing Moroccan practice, whether at the diplomatic level, where Morocco has been actively engaged with the work of the HCCH – an engagement that contributed to the establishment of its Regional Office for Africa in Morocco – or at the judicial level, particularly in the field of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Available records relating to the drafting process suggest that these issues did not receive the level of attention they deserved, nor did they benefit from sufficient expert consultation or discussion that might have allowed the legislature to draw on both recent international developments and established domestic practice. One hope nevertheless remains: that the Code will already be subject to early reform.

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

In Re Tesla, Inc. Derivative Litigation C.A. No. 2024-0631-BWD, the Delaware Court of Chancery the day before yesterday essentially held that a shareholder (majority) move of seat, with coinciding amendment of the corporation’s bylaws re choice of court for derivative action, implies that the newly mandated venue applies even to claims filed prior to the move taking effect.

The ratione temporis and conflit mobile question was at issue in Tesla’s successful motion to dismiss a number derivative shareholder claims, based on an (amended) forum selection clause.

As the FT Reports, “At stake were a series of investors’ lawsuits that had accused Musk of breaching his duties to Tesla’s shareholders. [Claimants] argued he had diverted resources from the EV maker to other companies in his universe, and that he had sold stock while in possession of negative information about Tesla.”

The Texas Forum Bylaw was publicly proposed with the Redomestication [change of seat, GAVC] on 17 April 2024; the derivative actions were filed on 24 May, 10 June, and 13 June, respectively. The Texas Forum Bylaw was adopted on 13 June, so by the time Defendants appeared in the Actions on 25 June and 16 September, the Texas Forum Bylaw was in effect.

The relevant Civil Procedure Rule is the US Federal Rule 12(b)(3), improper venue. Relevant authority is Ingres Corp v CA Inc: Forum selection provisions, including those contained in corporate bylaws, “are ‘presumptively valid’ and should be ‘specifically’ enforced unless the resisting party ‘[] clearly show[s] that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause [is] invalid for such reasons as fraud and overreaching.’”

The judge rejected arguments that venue be determined at the time a complaint is filed, arguments which were based on federal precedent found not to apply to the case, but she also generally referred to Tesla not having exercised a unilateral right to alter its forum selection bylaw, nor having done so months after the claims were filed. The judgment concedes that Delaware courts sometimes do look to later points in time when determining venue, such as when the defendant appears or at the time a movant seeks transfer.

Vice Chancellor David emphasised however that

A stockholder does not have a vested right to litigate in a particular forum, even for claims arising from past conduct, because the contractual relationship “among the directors, officers, and stockholders formed within the statutory framework of the DGCL [Delaware General Corporation Law, GAVC]” is, “by design, flexible and subject to change in the manner that the DGCL spells out and that investors know about when they purchase stock in a Delaware corporation.”

and in essence

I am loath to second-guess Tesla stockholders’ chosen forum by purporting to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of Texas law and procedure relative to our own.

All in all an interesting comparative conflicts judgment.

Geert.

This post was contributed by Dr. Mohammed Rakib-ul-Hassan who is currently serving as a Professor at Geneva Business School. The digitalisation of commerce has fundamentally altered the landscape of cross-border disputes. Traditional private international law (PIL), built upon territorial connecting factors such as domicile, habitual residence, and place of performance, is increasingly strained in addressing […]

If you do use the blog for research or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.

I fear this post is fairly anorak, meant for the die hard conflicts nerd. In X v Y ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2026:1482 (the usual anonymisation nonsense), essentially a claim by a Dutch consumer against a set of BVI companies, the Rechtbank Midden-Nederland, in interlocutory proceedings, ordered the BVI companies to surrender relevant data on the holder of a wallet in their crypto exchange. The wallet allegedly holds ia the crypto currencies financed by X, following a ‘boiler room’ fraud.

My reason for flagging it lies in the interesting approach of the court towards using, or not, Brussels I authority in its application of the residual space: national private international law that fills the gap where EU law does not apply. Of course whether or not to do so is the prerogative of the Member States: EU law has no bearing on it.

Here, the court [3.7] generally holds that seeing as what was A5(3) of the Brussels Convention and the Brussels Ia Regulation, served as a model for the Dutch residual rule of Article 6e CPR, CJEU authority may be used as guidance for the interpretation of the Dutch rules.

However it then [3.9] holds that the very qualification of a claim as in in tort, must not so use CJEU authorities, instead relying on lex fori: “It is not obvious that the definition of the term ‘tort’ should be aligned with the much broader interpretation given to this term by [the CJEU]”: one assumes it is thinking here of the CJEU Kalfelis formula, where the Court of Justice held [17] that ‘matters relating to tort, delict and quasi-delict’ “covers all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a ‘contract’ within the meaning of Article [7](1).”

[3.11] the court refers to Dutch substantive lex fori to qualify the claim as one in tort.

Article 6e CPR allocates jurisdiction to the Dutch courts insofar as the “place where the harmful event occurred” took place in The Netherlands. Here the court [3.13] holds that CJEU authority can fully play, subsequently referring to CJEI Bier’s locus delicti commissi /locus damni distinction, and placing the locus damni in The Netherlands (in particular the loss of the opportunity, were the data not surrendered, of claiming compensation etc from the fraudsters.

I m not sure whether there is a PhD in the application of BIa to residual PrivIntLAw in the Member States. But there most certainly is a good paper in it.

Geert.

 

This post was written by Lorène Anthonioz, who is PhD candidate in Private International Law at the University of Geneva and a Research and Teaching Assistant in Private International Law at UniDistance. On 15 September 2025, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court issued a judgment in case 4A_129/2024. Applying the CJEU case law, the Court ruled, for […]

A new extensive handbook on European Civil Procedure (eds. Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet and Adriani Dori) was just published by De Gruyter Brill. This book offers a comprehensive overview of the overarching themes shaping civil justice in Europe, an overview of key instruments and a broader outlook on the future of European civil procedure.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the general themes regarding the development of European civil procedure, including the EU competence, historical perspectives, the principles of mutual trust and access to justice as foundational principles, the interaction between European and national civil procedure and innovation and the role of digitalisation in civil procedure. Part II deals with key topics of litigation and other means of dispute resolution. It starts with the service of documents as this is usually the first step in initiating litigation, and following the sequence of the procedure discusses the international jurisdiction, taking of evidence and the recognition and enforcement based on the general EU instruments. Two chapters address international jurisdiction and enforcement in family matters, maintenance, matrimonial property and succession. Uniform debt collection procedures, asset preservation, insolvency proceedings and specialised courts are discussed in separate chapters. The last three chapters focus on ADR and ODR as alternative pathways, collective redress and legal aid, costs and funding of civil litigation. Part III is dedicated to general and future outlooks on European civil procedure, including harmonisation through soft law, the EU enlargement process (Albania, Serbia and Ukraine) and perspectives from non-European jurisdictions (China, South Africa, the United States and Brazil) and wider challenges of European civil procedure. A hybrid launch event, organised by the European Civil Justice Centre, will be held at Leuven University on 25-26 June (information to follow). More information available at the publisher’s website here.

Part I: Introduction and General Perspectives on European Civil Procedure
Chapter 1  Xandra Kramer, Stefaan Voet, and Adriani Dori  – Introduction to European Civil Procedure
Chapter 2  Eva Storskrubb – Civil Justice and EU Competence
Chapter 3  Cornelis Hendrik van Rhee – The History of Civil Procedure in Europe
Chapter 4  Matthias Weller – Mutual Trust
Chapter 5  Burkhard Hess – Access to Justice as a Fundamental Principle of European Union Procedural Law
Chapter 6  Alain Ancery and Bart Krans – EU Law and National Civil Procedural Law: A Much Greater Area than at First Glance
Chapter 7  Anna Nylund – Innovation and Digitalisation

Part II: Litigating and Other Means of Dispute Resolution in Europe 
Chapter 8  Wendy Kennett – Getting Started: Service of Documents
Chapter 9  Geert van Calster – International Jurisdiction: Fundamental Issues and ‘Principles’ of EU Private International Law
Chapter 10  Pietro Franzina – International Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial Matters

Chapter 11  Jachin Van Doninck and Wannes Vandenbussche – Taking of Evidence
Chapter 12  Fernando Gascón Inchausti – Recognition and Enforcement: Fundamental Issues
Chapter 13  Wolfgang Hau – Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments
Chapter 14  Apostolos Anthimos – International Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement in Family Matters and Maintenance
Chapter  15  Anna Wysocka-Bar – International Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement in Matters of Property Regimes and Succession
Chapter 16  Elena D’Alessandro – Debt Collection and Special Procedures: Small Claims and Orders for Payment
Chapter 17  Carlos Santaló Goris – Asset Preservation and Provisional Measures
Chapter 18  Vesna Lazic – Insolvency Proceedings
Chapter 19  Georgia Antonopoulou – Specialised Courts: The Unified Patent Court and International Commercial Courts
Chapter 20  Emma van Gelder – Alternative Pathways: ADR/ODR
Chapter 21  Eva Lein – Collective Redress
Chapter 22  John Sorabji – Legal Aid, Costs and Funding

Part III: Outlooks on European Harmonisation and Beyond
Chapter 23  Emmanuel Jeuland – Harmonisation Through Soft Law, Common Standards, and Best Practices
Chapter 24  Monika Canco, Ana Harvey, and Iryna Izarova – European Civil Procedure and the EU Enlargement Process
Chapter 25  Magdalena Tulibacka, Peter C.H. Chan, Mohamed Paleker and Eduardo Silva de Freitas – European Civil Procedure From a Non-European Perspective
Chapter 26  Alan Uzelac – Wider Challenges: The EU, Europe, and the World

 

The author of this post is Ulf Maunsbach who is a professor of private international law at Lund University. On 5–6 March 2026, the Swedish Network for International Family Law (SNIF) organized a conference in Lund on cooperation in international family law. SNIF is a newly established network intended to serve as a meeting place […]

L’article 267 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, lu à la lumière de l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, s’oppose à une réglementation nationale en vertu de laquelle une juridiction nationale de dernier ressort peut statuer sur une question relative à l’interprétation ou à la validité d’une disposition du droit de l’Union soulevée par l’une des parties au litige en motivant sa décision de manière sommaire, sauf si cette juridiction expose les raisons spécifiques et concrètes pour lesquelles l’une des trois exceptions énoncées dans l’arrêt Cilfit trouve à s’appliquer dans l’affaire concernée.

en lire plus

Même si le rappel à la loi « n’établit pas la culpabilité de la personne suspectée ou poursuivie » (Crim. 6 déc. 2011, n° 11-80.419, Dalloz actualité, 3 janv. 2012, obs. M. Léna), il n’en demeure pas moins que la mesure anciennement visée à l’article 41-1 du code de procédure pénale, et depuis remplacée par l’avertissement pénal probatoire, reste soumise aux exigences du droit au procès équitable tel que défini par l’article 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.

en lire plus

On 15 December 2025, a French Report on the Applicable Law to Generative AI Models Available in the European Union has been published under the auspices of the advisory body to the French Minister of Culture on intellectual property (CSLPA). Tristan Azzi (University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Sorbonne Law School) and Yves El Hage (University […]

Assurer l’accès à la justice aux consommateurs passe par l’encadrement des clauses attributives de juridiction imposées par les contractants professionnels. Or, si le droit international privé de l’Union européenne s’est doté depuis longtemps de dispositions idoines, tel n’est pas le cas du droit international privé français. La première chambre civile de la Cour de cassation comble cette lacune en créant une nouvelle limite au principe de licéité des clauses d’élection de for : elles ne peuvent priver le consommateur du droit de saisir les juridictions françaises s’il est domicilié en France à la date de l’acte introductif d’instance.

en lire plus

On 20 March 2026 the Supreme Administrative Court in Poland handed down the decision following Cupriak-Trojan case (C-713/23, commented on this blog within an on-line symposium here, here, here, here, here and here; and additionally here; Opinion of the AG de la Tour in this case was also commented on the blog – here). Facts […]

The Court of Justice will resume its work on Monday 13th, after the Easter break.  On Thursday 16th, it will deliver its judgment in joined cases C-672/23, Electricity & Water Authority of the Government of Bahrain e.a. and C-673/23, Smurfit Kappa Europe e.a. A hearing had taken place on January 2025; Advocate general J. Kokott’s […]

The Universitat Rovira i Virgili (Tarragona, Spain), in collaboration with the Institut Català Internacional per la Pau (ICIP) and the Centre d’Estudis de Dret Ambiental de Tarragona (CEDAT), has launched a call for abstracts for the international conference SLAPP, Activism and Human Rights: Legal and Social Challenges in the Defense of the Environment, to be […]

This post was written by Birgit van Houtert and Marco Pasqua, co-Chairs of the EAPIL Working Group on Anti-SLAPP Directive Transpositions, as report of the Working Group’s third meeting. This post follows up on the report (Part I). The third meeting of the Working Group continued with an in-depth discussion structured around a case study, […]