Conflictoflaws

The following announcement was shared with us by the conference organizers, Aleksandrs Fillers (Riga Graduate School of Law, Latvia), Adrian Rycerski (SWPS University in Poznan, Poland).

Please save the date: 19 November 2026

We are pleased to invite you to an international scientific conference devoted to modern problems of Private International Law, with particular attention to the impact of new technologies.

We hope the event will provide an excellent opportunity for the exchange of views, experiences, and in-depth discussion.

The conference will be held online and will bring together students, PhD candidates, and experienced experts.

The organizers plan a post-conference publication.

We welcome abstracts addressing any aspect of Private International Law, especially those focusing on modern issues and emerging challenges.

Abstracts (in English, max. 1500 characters) should be submitted to:
Aleksandrs.Fillers@rgsl.edu.lv and arycerski@swps.edu.pl

Submission deadline: 31 May 2026

Notification of acceptance: by 30 June 2026

Participation in the conference is free of charge.

We look forward to your contributions!

Aleksandrs Fillers, PhD
Associate Professor at Riga Graduate School of Law

Adrian Rycerski, PhD
Assistant Professor at SWPS University in Poznan

The University of Udine, together with its partners, has announced two exciting opportunities for students, researchers and practitioners interested in European consumer and market law, with a particular focus on sustainability and the circular economy.

The first call invites participants to register for the Summer School “Consumer and Market Law in the European Circular Economy” to be held at the University of Udine, from 8 to 17 July 2026. This programme offers a unique chance to engage with leading scholars and experts, explore the evolving legal framework surrounding sustainable markets and deepen understanding of how EU law is adapting to support the transition toward a circular economy. The Summer School promises an interdisciplinary and international learning environment, making it especially valuable for those looking to expand both their academic knowledge and professional networks. The organisers have provided the Call for applications – Udine Summer School 2026 and the Brochure – Udine Summer School 2026.

In parallel, a second call has been launched for abstracts for the Workshop “Judicial Protection and Enforcement of ‘Green’ Rights in the EU”. This workshop aims to bring together researchers and practitioners to discuss critical issues related to environmental rights enforcement, judicial protection mechanisms and the role of courts in advancing the EU’s green transition. Contributors are encouraged to submit abstracts that engage with current challenges and emerging developments in this rapidly evolving field. The workshop will be held at the University of Udine, on 14 July 2026. The organisers have provided the Call for Abstracts – Workshop Udine Summer School 2026.

Registration is now open for the Summer School, and interested participants are encouraged to apply promptly. At the same time, those wishing to present at the workshop can submit their abstracts for consideration.

Both initiatives reflect a growing commitment within the European academic and legal community to address sustainability challenges through legal innovation and collaboration. For more information on the programmes, application procedures and deadlines, please visit the official project website.

Activities are co-funded by the EU Erasmus+ Programme.

Introduction

Hilton v Guyot, is the most influential case in the United States—and perhaps globally—on the use of comity as a basis for recognising and enforcing foreign judgments. In that case, Justice Gray of the United States Supreme Court defined comity as follows:

“No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent of which the law of one nation… shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon… the “comity of nations”…”

Comity in the legal sense is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on one hand, nor a mere courtesy and goodwill, on the other; it is the recognition which one allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial act of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under protection of its laws…”

By contrast, under English common law, the dominant basis for recognising and enforcing foreign judgments is the theory of obligation. Blackburn, J in the English case of Schibsy v Westenholz  stated that the true principle is that,

“…the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction over the defendant, imposes a duty or obligation on him to pay the sum for which the judgment is given, which the courts in this country are bound to enforce…”

And further on in his judgment, Blackburn J. makes it plain that the doctrine of “comity” is incorrect. Thus, no question of reciprocity could arise in an action brought upon a foreign judgment.”

The theory of obligation is applied in many Commonwealth and Anglophone African countries. Interestingly, an emerging but underexplored trend is the growing consideration—and in some instances, application—of the principle of comity by courts in these jurisdictions, with several African judges expressly citing Hilton v Guyot.

This blog highlights selected cases illustrating this development, focusing on Liberia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa, and Nigeria. The discussion is limited to the common law framework and does not address statutory regimes or international conventions.

 

Liberia

Liberia is a former colony of the United States located in West Africa. In  Turner v Burnette, the Liberian Supreme Court firmly established the principle of comity in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, drawing particular support from Hilton v Guyot. The Court further explained—by reference to another U.S. authority—that:

“The application of comity does not rise [sic] to the effect of establishing an imperative rule of law; it has the power to persuade but not command. Comity being voluntary, and not obligatory, rests in the discretion of the tribunal of the forum and is governed by certain more or widely recognized rules.” Generally, greater force and dignity will be given to judgments of foreign courts when parties have had their day in a court of competent jurisdiction, after due service of process or after an entry of appearance, and have had a full and impartial hearing upon the merits of their case; unless it can be shown that the proceedings were tainted with fraud.”

Andrew Moran and Anthony Kennedy, conclude on the basis of the above Liberian Supreme Court decision that, “It seems, therefore, that any foreign judgment may be enforceable in Liberia at common law as a matter of comity between nations. The procedure appears to be that a suit commenced on the foreign judgment, in the same way as an action is commenced at common law in other jurisdictions.”

Kenya

Kenya is a former colony of the United Kingdom located in East Africa. Nevertheless, Kenyan courts apply both the theory of obligation and the principle of comity in recognising and enforcing foreign judgments at common law.

In ABSA Bank Uganda Limited (Formerly Known as Barclays Bank of Uganda Limited) v Uchumi Supermarkets PLC, the Kenyan High Court held at paragraph 5 that,

In the absence of a reciprocal enforcement arrangement, a foreign judgment was enforceable in Kenya as a claim in common law. Where a foreign court of competent jurisdiction had adjudicated a certain sum to be due to another, a legal obligation arose to pay that sum, on which an action of debt to enforce the judgment could be maintained. In deciding whether a foreign court was one of competent jurisdiction, the courts would apply not the law of the foreign court itself but English rules of private international law. The competence of the foreign court was the competence of the court in an international sense, that was, its territorial competence over the subject matter and the defendant. Its competence or jurisdiction in any other sense was not material.”

However, in a more recent case, the Kenyan Supreme Court, relying on Hilton v Guyot, applied the principle of comity in determining whether to recognise and enforce a locus inspection order from Scotland (see Anam Abdul Majid and Chukwuma Okoli). After quoting the key passage from Hilton v Guyot with approval, the Court stated at paragraph 60 that:

“This approach prioritizes citizen protection while taking into account the legitimate interests of foreign claimants. This approach is consistent with the adaptability of international comity as a principle of informed prioritizing national interests rather than absolute obligation, as well as the practical differences between the international and national contexts.”

Uganda

Uganda is a former colony of the United Kingdom located in East Africa. Nevertheless, Ugandan judges apply both the theory of obligation and the principle of comity in recognising and enforcing foreign judgments at common law. More recently, Ugandan courts have justified the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments by reference to the theories of obligation, comity, and reciprocity. In the very recent case of Brianna v Mugisha, Justice Nagawa, after a careful consideration of Ugandan case law authorities and Hilton v Guyot, stated that:

 

“5.4 However, I have observed that despite the absence of a statutory
reciprocal arrangement, Ugandan courts have recognized and
enforced foreign judgments under the common law principles of
obligation, reciprocity, and comity.

5.5. These doctrines provide a legal foundation for cross-border judicial
cooperation, particularly in the absence of a formal treaty or statutory
framework, such as in the case of Uganda and the United States.

 

5.6. The doctrine of comity is based on mutual respect between sovereign
states. It allows a court to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment
not as a matter of strict legal obligation, but out of respect to the
foreign court’s authority and fairness in its proceedings. Courts apply
comity where: the foreign court had competent jurisdiction over the matter and the parties, the proceedings were conducted fairly, with
due process observed and enforcing the judgment would not be
contrary to public policy in the recognizing jurisdiction.

 

5.7. The obligation theory treats a valid foreign judgment as creating a legal
duty on the judgment debtor to comply, similar to a contractual
obligation. This approach holds that once a court of competent
jurisdiction has determined a party’s liability, that decision should be
respected and enforced in other jurisdictions unless there is a
compelling reason not to do so, such as: Fraud in obtaining the
judgment, Violation of natural justice, or a fundamental defect in
jurisdiction.

 

5.8. Under reciprocity, a foreign judgment will only be enforced if courts in
the originating country would likewise enforce judgments from the
enforcing country. This principle ensures mutual legal cooperation
between jurisdictions.”

It must, however, be noted that the acceptance of reciprocity as a basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments at common law marks a significant departure from the position in other Anglophone and Commonwealth African countries, as well as Commonwealth jurisdictions more broadly.

Tanzania

In Tanzania, a significant number of recent cases have used foreign judgments to preclude new actions on grounds of res judicata, obligation, and comity (Exim Bank (COMORES) SA vs Costa Sari;  Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited & Another vs Independent Power Tanzania Limited & Others)

South Africa

South Africa, located in Southern Africa and formerly colonised by both Britain and the Netherlands, is a mixed legal system drawing from Roman Dutch law and the common law. The theory of obligation remains the dominant basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This position was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Jones v Krok, where the Court endorsed the English authority of  Nouvion v Freeman as support for applying the obligation theory in recognising and enforcing foreign judgments

However, in Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick,, the Constitutional Court referred to the principle of comity to justify the development of the common law framework for recognising and enforcing judgments from international courts, signalling a limited but notable openness to comity based reasoning.

Nigeria  

Nigeria is a former colony of the United Kingdom and is located in West Africa. Under the common law regime, it applies the theory of obligation in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments (Alfred C Toepfer Inc v Edokpolor).

However, some Nigerian judges at the Supreme Court have proposed comity, jurisdictional reciprocity, and the facilitation of international trade and commerce as additional bases for enforcing foreign judgments (Grosvenor Casinos Ltd v Ghassan Halaoui (2009) 10 NWLR 309, 338–39 (Oguntade JSC)), but there has been no reported case where these proposals have been implemented in practice.

 

Conclusion

The purpose of this post is to highlight how selected Commonwealth and Anglophone African courts have received and applied the principle of comity in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under the common law, particularly as articulated in Hilton v Guyot.

At present, Liberia is the only jurisdiction that fully applies the principle of comity as advanced in Hilton v Guyot, arguably influenced by its historical ties to the United States.

Kenya applies the doctrine of obligation alongside the principle of comity, while Uganda adopts a similar approach and has recently gone further by recognising reciprocity as an additional basis for enforcement.

South Africa primarily follows the doctrine of obligation, although a few cases have considered comity in the context of recognising and enforcing foreign judgments, albeit without concrete application.

In Nigeria, courts continue to rely principally on the doctrine of obligation at common law. Although some Supreme Court justices have proposed comity as a possible basis for enforcement, this has not been implemented in practice.

Overall, the doctrine of obligation remains the dominant common law basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments across Anglophone and Commonwealth Africa. Nonetheless, the principle of comity, as developed in Hilton v Guyot, continues to play an important role in shaping the jurisprudence of a limited number of African jurisdictions.

 

 

Applications are now open for three- to six-month legal internships at the headquarters of the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH in The Hague, for the period from September 2026 to February 2027!

Interns work with our legal teams in the Family and Child Protection Law Division, the Transnational Litigation and Apostille Division, and the Commercial, Digital and Financial Law Division.

Duties may include carrying out research on particular points of private international law and/or comparative law, taking part in the preparation of HCCH meetings, and contributing to the promotion of the HCCH and its work.

Applications should be submitted by Monday, 20 April 2026 at 18.00 (CEST). For more information, please visit the Internships Section of the HCCH website.

This post is published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference of Private International Law (HCCH).

 

INTRODUCTION

Following a significant hiatus, the public policy defense has re-emerged prominently in discussions surrounding the enforcement of foreign judgments, particularly in the context of a judgment issued by the Panama Maritime Court in 2024. The primary issue addressed by the Greek court was whether a foreign judgment could be recognized and enforced when the foreign court denied appellate proceedings due to the failure to post a security deposit that was both substantial and necessary for the appeal process.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The case involved a claim for damages between a company based in Hong Kong and another company registered in the Marshall Islands. This dispute was adjudicated under Panama’s maritime law, established by Law 8 of 1982 and updated by Law 55 of 2008, which governs maritime-related disputes through a specialized and efficient legal framework. The Panamanian maritime courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over in rem actions, enabling prompt vessel arrests and maritime liens within both Panamanian territorial waters and the Panama Canal for claims related to damages, cargo issues, and collisions.

The Panamanian court ruled in favor of the claimant, mandating the defendant to either return the vessel or pay approximately 45 million USD, i.e., the valuation of the vessel along with associated legal costs, as ordered by the court.

Subsequently, the judgment creditor sought recognition and enforcement of the Panamanian judgment in Greece, as the vessel was docked within Greek territorial waters.

The opposing party contended that the ruling from the Panamanian Naval Court of First Instance contravened Greek public policy and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), primarily because the appellate process was effectively obstructed. According to Article 490 of Panama’s Maritime Courts and Disputes Law, the appellant was required to deposit a security of nearly 45 million USD (equivalent to the judgment amount and associated legal fees) within ten days to have its appeal considered.

The original text from Article 490 reads:

“Artículo 490. Para cursar la apelación se requerirá la consignación, ante la secretaría del Tribunal Marítimo de primera instancia, de una caución que garantice el pago del monto de la condena más las costas. Para determinar el monto de la caución se considerará la caución consignada para levantar el secuestro o el valor del bien secuestrado. Dicha caución será consignada dentro de los diez días siguientes a la notificación de la providencia que admita el recurso. Si el apelante no consigna la caución de que trata este artículo, el juez declarará desierto el recurso.”

In light of the above, the excessive requirement for a security deposit resulted in the judgment debtor’s appeal being dismissed, thereby forfeiting its right to be heard.

 

FINDINGS OF THE GREEK COURT.

The Greek court recognized that while imposing a financial guarantee as a prerequisite for appeal can have legitimate justifications, such as discouraging vexatious litigation and promoting judicial efficacy, the circumstances in this case revealed that the requirement was manifestly disproportionate and unduly burdensome. The court articulated the following concerns:

– The required guarantee matched the total amount of the initial judgment plus costs.

– There was no cap, no exceptions, and no discretion for reduction based on the specifics of the case.

– It effectively forced the appellant to comply with the first-instance judgment in full just to access the appeal process.

The court referenced Article 323(5) of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure, which encompasses the public policy clause, confirming that the security requirement violated the principle of proportionality. Furthermore, limiting access to the court and undermining judicial protection directly contravened Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 20, paragraph 1 of the Greek Constitution.

Consequently, the obligation to deposit an amount of USD 44,397,715.97, which constitutes the awarded sum of the initial judgment (USD 41,248,107.88) plus legal costs (USD 3,149,608.09), was viewed as an untenable financial burden that contradicts the right to judicial protection.

More specifically, the imposition of a security deposit that equaled the judgment amount plus legal fees, with no statutory limits, exceptions, or discretionary reduction possibilities, violated public policy. This requirement substantially infringed upon the appellant’s right to access judicial remedies against an enforceable ruling.

Finally, the court noted that while Greek law allows for provisional enforceability of first-instance judgments under certain conditions, including the possibility of appeal suspension without a guarantee if there is a likelihood of success, such provisions were absent in Panamanian law.

This blog note is kindly provided by Dr. Muhammad Zubair Abbasi (Lecturer, School of Law, Royal Holloway, University of London; zubair.abbasi@rhul.ac.uk). It follows the author’s previous post on this topic, which was published earlier on this blog.

Introduction

In MA v WK [2025] EWFC 499, three women had undergone Islamic marriage (nikah) ceremonies in England. Each argued that subsequent registration of her marriage in Pakistan had converted it into a valid foreign marriage entitled to recognition in England and Wales. The Family Court rejected this argument because the lex loci celebrationis is fixed at the place and moment of the ceremony; no later act of registration in another jurisdiction can alter it.

The more important question is why the argument was made at all. Each applicant had already accepted that her ceremony was a non-marriage or non-qualifying ceremony (NQC) under English matrimonial law. Each had therefore been excluded, by the rule established in Attorney General v Akhter & Others [2020] EWCA Civ 122 from the financial remedies that the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 would otherwise have provided. The argument from Pakistani registration was, in substance, a desperate attempt to find through private international law a route that domestic law had closed. It was always going to fail but the fact that it was attempted is itself instructive. When the law systematically denies recognition to a form of marriage that a significant part of the population regards as valid, litigants will look for whatever route remains open. MA v WK is a record of one such attempt, and it is unlikely to be the last as long as the existing legal framework remains unreformed.

The Facts

There were three female applicants, each of whom had celebrated a nikah-only in England and sought to rely on subsequent registration in Pakistan. The first, MA, had celebrated a nikah with WK in Oxfordshire on 1 April 2013. She produced a Pakistan Marriage Registration Certificate recording both the marriage date and entry date as 1 April 2013, with an issue date of 26 August 2024. The second, TM, had celebrated a nikah with MM at a mosque in England on 19 January 1992. She produced a Pakistan Marriage Registration Certificate, but the entry date was 2 October 2025 — thirty-three years after the ceremony and after MM had already remarried in Pakistan in 2017. The third, AM, had celebrated a nikah with RK in England in 2005. No evidence of registration was produced.

Non-Qualifying Ceremonies and Private International Law

The formal validity of a marriage is governed by the lex loci celebrationis, as restated by Moylan LJ in Tousi v Gaydukova [2024] EWCA Civ 203. All three ceremonies took place in England; all three applicants accepted that none had complied with the Marriage Act 1949. Each was therefore a non-qualifying ceremony (NQC). The question was whether subsequent registration in Pakistan could convert them into valid foreign marriages capable of recognition in England and Wales. The court held that it could not: the lex loci is determined by the place of celebration, not by any later administrative act. There is no authority for the proposition that registration can substitute for, or supplement, the ceremony for the purposes of legal recognition.

The applicants advanced two arguments. First, that registration is the operative event for lex loci purposes, deriving from Sottomayor v De Barros (No 1) (1877) 3 PD 1, a principle elevating it to the “pinnacle” of matrimonial law [para 16]. That reading does not survive examination: in Sottomayor ceremony and registration happened simultaneously at an English register office, and their coincidence does not make registration the constitutive event. The three further authorities relied upon, Boughajdim v Hayoukane [2022] EWHC 2673; Entry Clearance Officer v Firdous [2018] HU/04562/2016 (Upper Tribunal); and Farah v Farah 16 Va. App. 329 (Va. Ct. App. 1993), each turned on where the ceremony, or its dominant elements, had taken place. None held that registration of an English ceremony abroad could shift the lex loci; they are authority for the opposite proposition.

The second argument assumed what it needed to prove. The principle in Berthiaume v Dastous (Quebec) [1929] UKPC 73, that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere, operates in favour of a marriage validly formed at its place of celebration. It avails nothing where the ceremony was not valid there in the first place. A further difficulty lay in Pakistani law itself. On the expert evidence, accepted in Rana v Manan 2011] EWHC 2132 and applied here, registration under section 5 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 is directory rather than mandatory: it is the nikah contract that creates the marriage. What Pakistani law had done in registering these marriages was not to create new Pakistani marriages, but to record marriages that Pakistani law treated as having taken place in England.

On the presumption of marriage, the answer was straightforward. The presumption, as Evans LJ explained in Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath 1999] EWCA Civ 3008 at [31]–[32], fills evidential gaps; it does not operate where there is positive evidence of non-compliance with the statutory formalities. The circularity this produces is uncomfortable. A party who wishes to argue for recognition of her marriage must disclose to the court the circumstances of the ceremony; and once she has done so honestly, she will typically have foreclosed the only doctrine that might have assisted her.

Commentary

The judgment in this case is the latest in a sequence that has progressively narrowed the legal options available to parties in religious-only or a nikah-only marriages. Until Attorney General v Akhter & Others [2020] EWCA Civ 122, the courts had available to them a range of tools: the “hallmarks of marriage” test from Gereis v Yagoub [1997] Fam Law 475; the presumption of marriage from long cohabitation from Chief Adjudication Officer v Bath1999] EWCA Civ 3008; and a generally flexible approach to the non-marriage category, which had been applied in reported cases almost exclusively to polygamous unions (A-M v A-M (Divorce: Jurisdiction: Validity of Marriage) [2001] 2 FLR 6; Gandhi v Patel [2002] 1 FLR 603; Shagroon v Sharbatly [2012] EWCA Civ 1507; and El Gamal v Al-Maktoum [2011] EWHC B27.

The Court of Appeal’s introduction of the NQC category in Attorney General v Akhter & Others [2020] EWCA Civ 122 changed the landscape. A court asked to classify a religious-only ceremony now asks a single, decisive question: did the ceremony comply, at least to some degree, with the statutory requirements? If the answer is no, the ceremony is outside the regulatory framework entirely, and neither the hallmarks test nor the presumption can operate to bring it back in. The present case is a private international law application of the same logic: the question is what happened at the ceremony, assessed as at the date of the ceremony, and later events, including registration abroad, are irrelevant.

The choice of jurisdiction made no difference to that conclusion. The applicants sought declarations of marital status under section 55(1) of the Family Law Act 1986, which enables a person to apply for a declaration that a marriage was at its inception valid, or that it subsisted on a particular date. That jurisdiction is declaratory, not constitutive: it identifies the status that the law recognises, it does not create one. The argument from foreign registration was in substance an invitation to the court to use the section 55 jurisdiction to confer a status that English law does not recognise. It was always going to fail, not because of any deficiency in the evidence or any technical point of procedure, but because the declaratory jurisdiction cannot be deployed as a means of circumventing the requirements that the Marriage Act 1949 imposes.

None of this is a criticism of the applicants, who were doing what people in their position typically do: looking for whatever route the law might offer. It is a comment on the law itself. The Attorney General had foreshadowed a public policy objection under section 58(1) of the 1986 Act had the court found in the applicants’ favour, an indication that the state’s interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage framework is regarded as sufficiently strong to resist even a successful argument from foreign registration [para 30]. That the argument failed means the public policy point did not arise, but its potential invocation confirms that the current framework is not one the courts are inclined to look for ways around.

Conclusion

The decision in MA v WK is easy to justify on the law as it stands. The lex loci celebrationis is not a rule that administrative convenience in another jurisdiction can displace, and the section 55 jurisdiction does not exist to remedy the deficiencies of the Marriage Act 1949. But the case is a reminder that when domestic law closes every available door, litigants will look elsewhere.

The failure in this case is not one of private international law. The Marriage Act 1949, built on foundations laid by Lord Hardwicke’s Clandestine Marriages Act 1753, which transformed the private marriage contract into a public act requiring the sanction of the church-state — was not designed with cultural and religious diversity in mind. The Government has committed to reform. But the proposed changes are prospective. They will not assist the three women in this case, nor the many others in the same position. Until Parliament addresses that gap, family courts will continue to turn away women whose marriages are real to everyone except the law.

Transnational Dispute Management (TDM) has kindly shared the following Call for Papers with us.

We are pleased to announce a forthcoming Transnational Dispute Management (TDM, ISSN 1875-4120, www.transnational-dispute-management.com) special issue on “International Arbitration and the Space Industry.”

This Special Issue will be edited by Alexandra van der Meulen, Kate Gough, Joshua Kelly, Annie Pan and Veronika Timofeeva (Freshfields LLP).

Space exploration was once the traditional domain of State actors, with the government space agencies of the United States and the USSR leading the way. Today, the landscape has shifted dramatically: private companies are now at the forefront, driving innovation in areas such as satellite launches, commercial space flight and space stations, among others. According to the World Economic Forum, the global space economy is projected to reach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, growing at an average annual rate of 9%.[1]

The influence of the space industry is becoming increasingly pervasive. Once associated mainly with satellite launches and services such as satellite radio, broadcast television and GPS, these technologies now represent only a fraction of the space industry’s reach. Satellite communications technologies have only grown in sophistication over the past decade, with thousand-strong satellite constellations now delivering a wide variety of commercial and societal services to businesses and consumers. These range from satellite broadband to climate monitoring, enabling accurate environmental data collection and analysis, to supply chain and transportation applications. Aside from its commercial applications, space has also become indispensable for defense purposes, with satellites and other space-based assets providing the backbone for surveillance, communication and strategic operations.

With the rapid growth of the space industry and heightened financial stakes, an increase in space-related disputes is inevitable. In the commercial arena, these disputes are likely to center on contractual issues, such as the supply of services by satellite operators to the telecoms and defense sectors, disputes concerning launch, refueling and maintenance service, and joint venture disputes between State-owned entities and private-sector operators.

Growing private-sector investment in space-related activities is also likely to fuel investor-State disputes. States’ interests in controlling various aspects of space-related technologies and resources (such as spectrum usage) for national security or public interest reasons will inevitably rub up against the purely commercial interests of private operators. Striking the right balance between these competing interests will be critical to sustaining confidence and investment in the sector.

International arbitration is well-positioned to address space-related disputes. In doing so, the international arbitration community will have to grapple with a range of novel legal and technical issues, such as:

• Territoriality in investor-State disputes involving space law
• Specialised rules for disputes related to outer space activities
• The need for specialised treaties protecting foreign investment in the space sector
• The notion of ownership in space
• The role of international and regional space agencies in shaping space-related arbitration
• Damages assessment, particularly for novel space projects
• Multi-contract and multi-party space disputes in complex space ventures
• Space-related disputes under domestic law
• State-to-State disputes concerning space activities
• Mitigation of third-party losses from satellite collisions and space debris
• Licensing and authorization disputes (national overlap, ISDS, etc.)
• Insurance and liability regimes
• National security overlap

We invite all those with an interest in the subject to contribute articles or notes on one of the above topics or any other relevant issue. Proposals for papers (150-200 words) should be submitted to the editors by May 31, 2026, publication is expected in final quarter of 2026.

Please address all questions and proposals to Annie Pan, at annie.pan@freshfields.com, and Veronika Timofeeva, at veronika.timofeeva@freshfields.com. Please CC info@transnational-dispute-management.com when submitting your materials.

Articles accepted for publication before this deadline will also go through TDM’s on-line advance publication process, allowing your work to reach its target audience as soon as the paper completes peer review and the editing process.

The minimum word count for articles is 5,000 words (excluding footnotes, endnotes, appendices, tables, summary etc.). Articles must include a short summary of the key points addressed and any conclusions drawn (150-200 words). The layout of the articles should conform to TDM’s submission guidelines, available at: www.transnational-dispute-management.com/contribute.asp (more information available upon request).

For citations, follow OSCOLA (4th Edition): www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/publications/oscola

This call for papers can also be found on the TDM website here:
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news.asp?key=2101

[1] https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Space_2024.pdf

 

The Permanent Bureau (PB) is pleased to announce that registration is now open for participation in the 14th International Forum on the electronic Apostille Programme (e-APP Forum), which will take place on Tuesday 12 and Wednesday 13 May 2026 in Marrakesh, Morocco. To be held for the first time in Africa, this edition of the e-APP Forum will be organised by the HCCH’s Regional Office for Africa, with the support of the Ministry of Justice of Morocco. The Forum will be conducted in English, French, and Arabic, with simultaneous interpretation provided.

Since its launch in 2006, the e-APP has become an integral part of the operation of the Apostille Convention. The e-APP has two electronic components: an e-Apostille and an e-Register, which, over the past twenty years, have been instrumental in ensuring the practical, effective, and secure operation of the Apostille Convention amid constant technological development.

The e-APP Forum gathers experts and stakeholders from around the world. The Forum will provide a unique international platform for governments, organisations, and the private sector to learn more about the benefits of the e-APP, to promote its effective implementation, and to discuss the latest developments in relation to the e-APP worldwide.

Interested persons should register via this form no later than Friday 1 May 2026, 5.00 p.m. (CEST). Participation in the Forum is free of charge. However, participants are required to make their own travel and hotel arrangements and cover all related costs if participating in person. Please note that in-person seats will be allocated on a first-come, first-served basis and will be confirmed via e-mail by the PB.

For more information on the e-APP Forum, please visit the dedicated page on the HCCH website. A draft Agenda is available on the HCCH website and will be updated as panellists are confirmed.

For further information on the Apostille Convention and the e-APP, please visit the Apostille Section of the HCCH website.

This post is posted on behalf of Kwamou FEUKEU Eva, Head of the Africa Centre of Expertise and Coordinator of Decolonial Comparative Law, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht

The Africa Centre of Expertise and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law have announced a call for papers for the fourth edition of their Decolonial Comparative Law Workshop series, to be held on 5–6 May 2027 in Douala in collaboration with the Fondation Afric’Avenir. This edition focuses on the theme “Decolonial Comparative Law and the Informal/Formal Economy,” asking scholars to rethink the distinction between formal and informal economies from a decolonial and comparative perspective. The workshop places particular emphasis on recognising the informal economy as a site of legality in its own right, foregrounding legal pluralism and context-specific practices. Contributions are encouraged on a wide range of topics, including microlending, alternative forms of value creation, labour rights in informal work, and indigenous and customary economies. Selected papers will be discussed in an interdisciplinary setting, with engagement from peers, scholars from fields such as anthropology, history, and economics, and practitioners and artists.

The deadline for paper submissions is 1 September 2026. Further details, including the full call for papers (available in English, French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Arabic), can be accessed here: https://www.mpipriv.de/2020710/decola-informal-formal-economy. An online information session for prospective applicants will be held on 18 March 2026 at 10:00 and 16:00 GMT, with registration available here: https://events.mpipriv.de/b?p=decola_and_the_informal_forma_leconomy_information_session. Following the workshop, an “Epupa School” (meaning “rainy season” in the Douala language) will take place from 10 to 12 May 2027 at the Fondation Afric’Avenir, offering scholars, students, and activists an opportunity to further engage with decolonial comparative approaches to the formal and informal economy.

On 24 and 25 September 2026, the international conference ‘International Filiation Law in the EU’ will take place at the University of Bonn (Germany). The conference will analyse the EU Parenthood Proposal and the several academic and political reactions to this Proposal, and embed it in a human rights and EU law frame.

Confirmed speakers are Cristina González Beilfuss (Barcelona, Spain), Susanne Lilian Gössl (Bonn, Germany), Ulrike Kjestina Janzen (German Federal Ministry for Justice and Consumer Protection), Martina Melcher (Graz, Austria), Nicolas Nord (CIEC/ICCS), Ilaria Pretelli, (Lausanne, Switzerland), Velina Todorova (Plovdiv, Bulgaria), Alina Tryfonidou (Cyprus), and Patrick Wautelet (Liége, Belgium).

Everybody who is interested in cross-border questions of filiation, child protection and EU law is invited to come and contribute to the ongoing discussion!

More information and the programme will follow soon. If you have questions, please write to sekretariat.goessl@jura.uni-bonn.de.

The next Asian Private International Law Academy (APILA) meeting will be on Tuesday 24 March (not 17 March) when Professor Tu Guangjian will introduce his work in progress on “Legislative Jurisdiction, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Enforcement Jurisdiction: How Can They Be Reconciled in Private International Law and Beyond?”. Professor Tu looks forward to the insights and comments of attendees on how he might develop his ideas on the topic.

Here is link for the APILA meeting on 24 March:

Topic: APILA Monthly Online Meeting on Tuesday 24 March 2026

Time: Mar 24, 2026 07:00 PM Japan Standard Time

Join Zoom Meeting

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/89964430222?pwd=xiXxPfPw76j4oOwXCJTGC941teKWjM.1

Meeting ID: 899 6443 0222

Passcode: 670895

On Tuesday, April 7, 2026, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CEST). Chukwuma Okoli (University of Birmingham) will speak, in English, about the topic

“Choice of Law for Employment Contracts in Africa: Rethinking the EU Methodology in an African Context”

This presentation examines how African courts have approached choice of law in cross-border employment contracts, often drawing—explicitly or implicitly—on the dominant EU methodology reflected in the Rome I framework. It argues that while the EU model has influenced doctrinal development, its underlying assumptions do not always align with African values and labour realities. Drawing on primary sources from across African jurisdictions, including case law and legislation, the paper proposes a modified methodology that better reflects worker protection, and normative commitments embedded in African legal systems.

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

This week the Conclusions & Decisions (C&D) of the HCCH governing body, the Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP or Council), were published. Click the links below for the relevant language versions (English, French and Spanish).

Although a wide range of topics were discussed, I would like to focus on four items: parentage/surrogacy project, the cross-border recognition and enforcement of protection orders, the jurisdiction project and a Note on the Trusts Convention.

In my view, the C&D are significant for two reasons. First, the work related to a possible new instrument of a long-standing topic at the HCCH has been concluded (without a Convention) and secondly, a “new” topic has been inserted into the agenda of the HCCH. For more information, see below.

Parentage/surrogacy project

The parentage/surrogacy project has been a recurrent topic in the work of the HCCH. It has expanded more than a decade, starting in 2010 with some preliminary research, which resulted in the establishment of an Experts Group (EG) and subsequently, a Working Group (WG).

In preparation for this meeting, a document was drawn up by the Working Group (WG) on Parentage / Surrogacy entitled: Final Report on the Feasibility of a possible Convention on the Recognition of Judgments on Legal Parentage (Preliminary Document (Prel. Doc.) No. 1). This is a monumental work, which includes a text of a draft Convention (as of p. 13).

The specific proposal of the WG to the Council was the following:

“The WG acknowledged the importance of the HCCH Parentage / Surrogacy Project to develop an international instrument on legal parentage in cross-border situations. The WG agreed that such an instrument is desirable, as it could enhance legal certainty, predictability and continuity while protecting the rights of children and families, and all persons involved.”

It further acknowledged that policy differences remained and for some experts these were fundamental, and as a result, consensus could not be reached on a way forward (i.e. advancing to a Special Commission, which is the usual path when negotiating a HCCH Convention and which are meetings held prior to a Diplomatic Session).

With this Final Report, and as its name suggests, the work of the WG has concluded and this Preliminary Document is the last document drawn up by the WG on this topic.

Reflecting the disagreement existing at the WG level, the Council decided on this topic the following: “While recognising the progress made by the Working Group, CGAP decided not to advance to a Special Commission at this stage, with the understanding that this issue may be revisited at a later stage.”

Accordingly, this year marks the end of this project (if not the end of an era), with the exception of monitoring legal and practical developments on the subject that are to be presented at the 2028 meeting of the Council (C&D No. 5). Perhaps this topic may be revived in the future when and if the time is ripe.

Cross-border recognition and enforcement of protection orders

While the ashes of the Surrogacy/Parentage project were still warm, a “new” proposal for a Convention emerged and was tabled by the UK as: Prel. Doc. No 25 of January 2026 – Proposal from the United Kingdom to establish a Working Group on Recognition and Enforcement of Protection Orders – not publicly available.

The Council mandated the establishment of a WG on a potential future convention on cross-border recognition and enforcement of protection orders (see C&D No. 22).This is remarkable and underlines the importance of keeping women and children safe. By tabling this proposal, the UK makes clear that this is an absolute priority.

This initiative will build on previous work conducted by the Permanent Bureau from 2011-2018, during which an Experts Group was established (see C&D No. 23 and 24). At its 2018 meeting, the Council noted that “14. The Council decided to remove from the Agenda of the HCCH the topic of recognition and enforcement of foreign civil protection orders, with the understanding that this issue may be revisited at a later stage.” A statement that now is history.

This will be an important initiative to follow in the future.

Jurisdiction project

The decision on the future of the jurisdiction project has been delayed until the next meeting of the Council in 2027. At that meeting a decision will be made whether that project advances to a Special Commission “or decide on any other outcome of the Project” (C&D 9).

A Report of the Chair of the Working Group on matters related to jurisdiction in transnational civil or commercial litigation was presented as Prel. Doc. No 2A of December 2025. This Report includes a draft text of a future convention on parallel proceedings and related actions (from p. 13, with many [square brackets], signalling lack of consensus or agreement on the text).

Last year a public consultation was launched on the Draft Text of a possible new convention on parallel proceedings and related actions, the results of which still need to be analysed. The Council mandated that a document be submitted analysing such responses by the end of September 2026 and gave specific instructions on how it should be drafted (C&D No. 8). The responses will be published subject to the permission of the respondents.

We will keep you informed of any new developments.

A Note on the Trusts Convention

Finally, a Note on the Application and Interpretation of Article 2 of the Convention of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition and on the Institutions Analogous to Trusts was submitted as Prel. Doc. No 12B of January 2026 (for the actual Note see Annex V, p. 25). In particular, a fascinating explanation of the terms used in English (estate) and French (patrimoine) is included in pages 28-29. Equally interesting is Annex A to Note (for Section V) – Institutions Meeting the Criteria in Article 2 of the Trusts Convention. This Note was approved and will be published together with its Annexes (C&D 69).

 

In sum, this Council’s meeting decided on crucial matters related to treaty making on Private International Law at the HCCH. The next meeting of the Council in 2027 will also be of great importance as it will decide on the future of the jurisdiction project. With regard to specific projects, the cross-border recognition and enforcement of protection orders attests to the fact that a topic can indeed return to the agenda of the HCCH, and thus some experts may harbour the wish that the parentage/surrogacy project may rise one day like a phoenix from the ashes.

Edinburg Law School and Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law organize a Private International Law Festival, to take place in Edinburgh 24-25 September 2026. Save the date!

And submit a proposal of up to 500 words, together with a short bio/s in the same word document, to law.events@ed.ac.uk by 10 April 2026 with the email subject clearly marked “Proposal PIL Festival_ Surname/s”. Selected speakers will be informed in May 2026.

More information about the event and the call for papers below.

 

As report earlier on this blog, the third bi-annual conference of the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL) will take place in Geneva, Switzerland, from 18 to 20 June 2026. Under the title “Shaping the Future of Private International Law in Europe – Putting Together the Pieces & Filling Gaps”, the conference will address structural developments, unresolved issues, and emerging challenges in European private international law.  The program is available on the conference’s website.

Early bird registration will close on 15 March 2026. You are welcome to register using this link.

EAPIL is looking forward to seeing you in Geneva!

Yesterday, the Regional Court of Munich (Landgericht München I) held a highly interesting oral hearing in a dispute brought by GEMA, a German collecting society representing composers, and Suno, a generative music AI company based in Cambridge, MA. The hearing was noteworthy, first, because it gave the public an opportunity to listen to numerous international hits, from Alphaville’s Forever Young to Lou Bega’s Mambo No. 5 (and their alleged copies created by Suno) in a courtroom; and secondly, because the dispute raises some interesting questions of private international law.

After GEMA had already scored a famous victory against OpenAI in November 2025, when the same chamber of the Munich Court had held that the company had been violating the copyrights of several artists and composers by reproducing their song texts, the present proceedings differed not just in scope (focusing on the musical arrangement rather than texts) but also in its international dimension. For the first time, the claimant explicitly included the use of the protected works for training that had happened (according to both parties) exclusively in the US.

As far as those claims are concerned, the main obstacle to overcome for the claimant is the German court’s jurisdiction. As Germany has no (codified) law on international jurisdiction over non-EU defendants, international jurisdiction is established by extending the rules on local jurisdiction (venue) to international jurisdiction (so-called ‘double funtionality’; see Lutzi/Wilke, in Lutzi/Piovesani/Zgrabljic Rotar (eds), Jurisdiction over Non-EU Defendants (Hart 2024), 111 et seq). In the present case, this appears to provide an opportunity for the claimant to rely on a little-known norm of the German Verwertungsgesellschaftsgesetz (VGG; own translation and emphasis):

§ 131 Exclusive Jurisdiction

(1) For legal disputes concerning claims by a collecting society for infringement of a right of use or right of consent administered by it, the court of the district in which the infringing act was committed or in which the infringer has their general place of jurisdiction shall have exclusive jurisdiction. (…)

(2) If, pursuant to paragraph 1, sentence 1, different courts have jurisdiction for multiple legal disputes against the same infringer, the collecting society may bring all claims before any one of these courts.

While the provision is clearly aimed at allocating local jurisdiction within Germany, nothing in its wording seems to exclude an international understanding, similar to other norms on local jurisdiction. While this would create a clearly exorbitant forum actoris for German collecting societies in cases falling under paragraph 2, this might be justified by the peculiar nature of collecting societies, which are heavily regulated in German law and are required, for instance, to enter into licensing agreements under ‘appropriate’ conditions (§ 34 VGG). Indeed, the Munich court appeared rather amenable to the proposition of applying § 131 VGG internationally.

In the present case, this would raise further interesting questions.

For once, does paragraph 1, according to which the courts of the place of infringing and the courts of the defendant’s seat are competent, lead to ‘different courts’ being competent in the sense of paragraph 2? Traditionally, the provision was supposed to solve the problem of traveling showmen performing committing similar infringements in numerous places. As far as the training of AI is concerned, there might only be a single place of infringement, though. Then again, paragraph 2 only requires multiple competent courts for proceedings ‘against the same infringer’, which should allow other infringements, such as the streaming of allegedly copyright-violating output in Germany to be taken into account.

Assuming that the court would not consider this sufficient to trigger the forum actoris of paragraph 2, it would need to answer another question, namely if paragraph 1 as a rule of exclusive jurisdiction would also prevent the claimant from (subsidiarily) relying on § 23 of the Civil Procedure Code (ZPO), which creates jurisdiction at the location of the defendant’s property. In other contexts, authors have argued that provisions of exclusive local jurisdiction should not be understood as provisions of exclusive international jurisdiction so as not to render the recognition and enforcement of decisions from other fora impossible.

If the Munich court accepted its international jurisdiction on either of those bases, the applicable law would, of course, still be US copyright law (including its relatively far-reaching exceptions for ‘fair use’, which the defendants argue should apply here) pursuant to Article 8 Rome II. Thus, if the decision – which has been scheduled for 12 June – includes a positive decision on international jurisdiction regarding the US-based training, it might not yet include a decision on the substance in this regard, but could instead include an order for expert evidence on foreign law (§ 293 ZPO).

The claimants would understandably still consider this as a win, though, as it would provide a basis for future claims by German collecting societies against AI companies. In this sense, it would fit neatly into what Linda Kuschel and Darius Rostam have described, in reaction to the previous decision against OpenAI, as ‘the current popular narrative of a tightly regulating EU that protects rightsholders and a US that favors AI-friendly market solutions.’ While the Munich judges said rather little about their own preferred interpretation of the law at yesterday’s hearing, especially with regard to international jurisdiction, they also made no effort to dispel this narrative.

This case note is kindly provided by Dr. Samuel Vuattoux-Bock, LL.M. (Kiel), Freiburg University (Germany)

 

On February 24, 2026, the German Federal Court of Justice ruled on the Kingdom of Morocco’s claim against the German news portal “Zeit Online” (Case no. VI ZR 415/23). In 2021, the journal alleged that Morocco had spied on several lawyers, journalists, and high-ranking politicians, including French President Emmanuel Macron, using the surveillance software “Pegasus”. Morocco denied the allegations and sued the publication for damages, claiming an infringement of its general right of personality. The Federal Court of Justice of Germany, the highest court for civil and criminal matters, rejected Morocco’s claim, arguing that states do not have such a right. This decision is interesting because it lies at the intersection of private international law, national tort law, and public international law. The following article aims to present the main points of this decision in terms of both its international and substantive aspects.

I. Aspects of Private International Law: A too Easy Gateway into German Law?

First, the court had to determine if it was competent and which law should apply to this claim (Nos. 7 et seq.). Despite the claimant’s status as a Third State, the application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (EU 1215/2012) was unproblematic here. Morocco’s claim was not made “in the exercise of State authority (acta iure imperii)” (Art. 1(1) Brussels Ibis), and the defendant is based in a European Union Member State (Hamburg, Germany).

However, the determination of the applicable law revealed some hesitation on the part of the Court (Nos. 11 et seq.). Surprisingly, the Court did not decide whether the Rome II Regulation or German autonomous private international law should apply to the case (no. 13). Although the court considered the possible application of the exception of Art. 1(2)(g) Rome II (“non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation.”), the Court did not address whether an infringement of a legal person’s reputation falls under this exception (nos. 15 and 16). However, infringements of rights relating to personality through the media clearly fall under the exception of Art. 1(2)(g) Rome II. The debate about applying this exception to legal persons is actually caused by the application of the Rome II Regulation to claims related to unfair competition (Art. 6(1) and (2) Rome II), not by their mere quality as legal persons (see CJEU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:766, Bolagsupplysningen and Ilsjan, mn. 38). However, the present case is not related to business matters or competition claims; therefore, the exception of Art. 1(2)(g) Rome II should clearly apply.

Therefore, German private international law should apply, which the Court also examined (nos. 18 et seq.). The Court found that the parties had made an implied choice-of-law agreement for German law (no. 19). The Court ruled that, throughout the entire procedure, the parties’ exclusive reference to substantive German law satisfied the conditions of such an agreement under Art. 14(1)(a) Rome II (no. 17) and Art. 42 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code (EGBGB). This decision, if it can be understood, left some kind of an aftertaste of insecurity of the Court, as it appeared to be the simplest way to reach German law. Art. 40 EGBGB, relating to the applicable law for torts, allows the claimant to choose between the place where the harm arose (Erfolgsort) and the place where the event which gave rise to the harm occurred (Handlungsort). The eventual question of the claimant’s (Morocco) choice for determining where the harm occurred would have led to the well-known difficult question of the localization of such an infringement through the Internet and the possible application of Moroccan law. In such a case, the Court would also have had to consider the application of Art. 40(3)(2) EGBGB, which states that this law is inapplicable if the claimant’s purpose is not actually to seek compensation (e.g. to exert pressure on the defendant). The Court did not address these issues and concluded that German law applies.

II. Aspects of Substantive Law: A Panorama of Public International Law for the Benefit of Private Law

German tort law is based on a restrictive approach. The central norm, Sect. 823(1) of the Civil Code (BGB), lists the legally protected rights: Life, Body, Health, Freedom, Property and “other right”. This last category allows for the protection of interests comparable to those listed, such as the right to one’s personality, or the protection of victims from certain types of professional pure economic loss. Schematically, damages can only be granted for other interests if the tortfeasor infringed upon a protective law (Sect. 823(2) BGB) or if the harmful act is immoral (Sect. 826 BGB), which conditions are stricter.

Therefore, the claimant first tried to obtain damages based on the general case law regarding the infringement of personality rights under Sect. 823(1) BGB, and second, based on the infringement of criminal laws as protective laws under Sect. 823(2) BGB. However, the claims based on criminal legislation (Sect. 90a, 90b, 185 et seq., 102 to 104a of the Criminal Code, StGB) failed because foreign states are not subject to these norms (nos. 62 et seq.).

Therefore, the debate focused on Sect. 823(1) BGB and, logically, if such a right of personality also exists for states. After establishing that domestic law does not grant states such a right according to settled case-law (nos. 21 et seq.), the Court considered whether such a right exists as a general principle of public international law (nos. 23 et seq). In doing so, the Court examined an extensive body of case law (nos. 28 et seq.) from international courts and arbitral tribunals, the European Court of Humans Rights, diverse international and regional organizations (e.g. the Council of Europe, the European Union, the OSCE…) and national courts (USA, England, Scotland, France and Germany). The Court concluded that a protection of an alleged right of personality for states against private individuals does not exist. Most of the relevant decisions involve cases concerning diplomats or claims from state to state. In fact, the Court noted that many organizations encourage states to refrain from suing journalists regarding questions of the state’s reputation to guarantee freedom of speech and press freedom (cf. no. 54). Although the Court does not explicitly refer to it, the idea of extracontractual liability that does not “open the floodgates” of liability, as well as the weighing of interests, are typical to German tort law. The interest of a foreign state in protecting its honor against statements by private individuals is neither necessary nor worthy of protection under civil law.

III. Final remarks

By ruling that foreign states do not have a right of personality that can be enforced against private individuals, the German Federal Court aligned itself with the decision of the French Cour de Cassation. The highest French court for civil and commercial matters also decided on the very same case in 2024, i.e. a claim of the Kingdom of Morrocco against a French journal regarding the very same accusations. In this case too, the French Cour de cassation – without spending a word on the aspects of private international law – decided that “a foreign state is not entitled to bring a public defamation action against an individual” (no. 12). These decisions are certainly welcome, as they reinforce the independence of the press against foreign attempts to influence press freedom in Europe, especially in these troubled times.

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts“ (IPRax) features the following articles:

 

C. Budzikiewicz/H.-P. Mansel/K. Thorn/R. Wagner: Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2025: Im Windschatten der Weltpolitik [German]

This article provides an overview of developments in Brussels in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters from January 2025 until December 2025. It presents newly adopted legal instruments and summarizes current projects that are making their way through the EU legislative process. It also refers to the laws enacted at the national level in Germany as a result of new European instruments. The authors discuss both important decisions and pending cases before the CJEU as well as important decisions from German courts pertaining to the subject matter of the article. In addition, the article also looks at current projects and the latest developments at the Hague Conference of Private International Law.

 

P. Stenko: Employer’s Liability Towards Subcontractors in International Construction Disputes: Direct Claims of the Subcontractor Against the Employer in European Civil Procedure Law and the New Interpretation of the Term “Matters Relating To a Contract” [German]

This paper examines international jurisdiction for direct claims of subcontractors against employers (clients) in international construction disputes under the Brussels I Recast Regulation. In several European legal systems, subcontractors are granted a statutory direct claim for payment of remuneration against the employer, in addition to their claim against the general contractor. Central to the analysis is whether such direct claims may be qualified as “matters relating to a contract” within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, even though there is no direct contractual relationship between the subcontractor and the employer. Traditionally, the CJEU required an “obligation freely assumed” for the application of the contractual jurisdiction under Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast Regulation. However, recent CJEU case law has relaxed this requirement: statutory claims arising in the context of a contractual relationship may also be treated as “matters relating to a contract” even if there is no direct contractual relationship between the parties. As a result of this change, the subcontractor’s claims against the employers may be qualified as “relating to a contract” and the subcontractor may sue at the contractual place of performance (Article 7(1) Brussels I Recast Regulation).

 

C. Wendland: The Jurisdiction of Member State Courts under the EU Maintenance Regulation in Cases Involving Third Countries [German]

While there have been repeated calls to extend the scope of the EuGVVO to third countries, the universal application of jurisdiction rules has been a reality in international maintenance law since the adoption of the EU Maintenance Regulation. The exhaustive nature of the jurisdiction rules in the Regulation was the focus of the ECJ’s ruling in the case Amozov, which is discussed here. While the court’s decision is hardly surprising, it nevertheless provides an opportunity to consider the challenges and opportunities of a conclusive jurisdiction system at the EU level.

 

S. Mock: Eligibility of US funds to apply for special court ordered audits under German corporate law [German]

The so-called Diesel-scandal has sparked interest, particularly among Volkswagen AG shareholders, in a comprehensive investigation into the responsibility for this scandal. Since the resolution of the annual meeting failed to achieve the required majority, several US shareholders applied for a court order for a special audit. Following several court decisions, including two successful constitutional complaints, the Court of Appeal Celle, in its decision of 27 November 2024, denied the US shareholders the capacity to participate in the proceedings, arguing that they were funds whose legal capacity was unclear. This article critically examines this decision and demonstrates that US funds are also eligible to participate proceedings in German courts.

 

J. Adolphsen: ECJ answers questions of jurisdiction of courts of the member states in patent infringement cases when patent infringers defend themselves with the argument the patent is not valid [German]

The judgment is the subsequent decision following a ruling from 2006. At that time, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) first addressed the question of the jurisdiction of courts of the member states in patent infringement cases when defending with the argument that the patent is not valid. It was established that any assessment of the validity of the patent is exclusively reserved for the courts of the granting state. Other questions remained unanswered. These are now answered by the present judgment. The infringement court may, but is not required to, stay its proceedings. It can also assume the validity of the patent and decide the infringement dispute accordingly. At the same time, the ECJ rejects the question of whether Article 24 Nr. 4 of the Brussels Ia Regulation also applies when a third country has granted the patent. In this case, the ECJ denies a reflexive effect of Article 24 Nr. 4 Brussels Ia Regulation and allows the infringement court to also examine the validity of the patent for the purpose of deciding the infringement dispute with inter partes effect. As a result, the judgment strengthens the possibilities for patent holders to take action against infringers at the defendant’s court, especially when multiple national patents are involved across different member states.

 

H. Roth: Possible Legal Remedies for Debtors in the Enforcement of Provisionally Enforceable EU Titles in Germany (Art. 39 Brussels I Regulation (recast)) [German]

In principle, the debtor is required to utilize the legal remedies against the provisional enforcement of a judgment that are available in the member state of origin, in this case before the Italian appellate court (Art. 283 of the Italian Codice di procedura civile [CPC]). Applications for enforcement protection by the debtor may only be submitted to German courts or enforcement authorities insofar as European law permits. This is the case, for example, under Article 44 (1) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) in conjunction with Section 1115 (6) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) and Article 44 (2) of the Brussels Regulation (recast) in conjunction with Section 1116 ZPO. If the conditions outlined in these provisions are not met, European law prohibits the debtor from seeking a suspension of enforcement based solely on German procedural law (e.g., by analogy to Sections 719 or 707 ZPO). The exhaustive regulation in Article 44 (1) and (2) of the Brussels I Regulation (recast) excludes additional legal protection under national law.

 

J. F. Hoffmann: Cross-border payment to the debtor after the opening of insolvency proceedings – continuation of the ECJ‘s restrictive rulings on Art. 31 EIR [German]

In its unambiguous scope of application, Art. 31 (1) of the European Insolvency Regulation protects a third-party debtor who has honoured his obligation to the benefit of the debtor in good faith after insolvency proceedings have been opened. The third-party debtor is protected from having to perform to the insolvency administrator for a second time. The ECJ had to decide whether the third-party debtor should also be protected if not only he had made his payment to the debtor after the opening of the proceedings, but also if the debtor had provided counter-performance belonging to the estate after the opening of the proceedings. A need for protection may also be apparent in this case, as the third-party debtor faces comparable economic losses. To achieve this, Art. 31 (1) EIR would need to recognise also the debtor’s counter-performance as being effective vis-à-vis the insolvency estate. However, national legal systems often do not grant any legal protection concerning asset dispositions made by the debtor after the opening of insolvency proceedings. The ECJ now continues its restrictive interpretation of Art. 31 (1) EIR, likely because the provision’s underlying regulatory purpose remains highly controversial.

 

K. Duden: From the principle of recognition in EU primary law to the replication of status: a doctrine decades in the making [German]

Since Grunkin-Paul, the principle of recognition based on primary EU law has – through the jurisprudence of the ECJ – gained increasing importance in international family law. The Cupriak-Trojan decision marks a milestone in this respect: the Court demands the comprehensive recognition of marriages concluded between Union citizens abroad. Not only characteristics of one’s individual status but also status relationships – at least between Union citizens – must be recognized as effective across borders. This makes the free movement of status the law in force for Union citizens. Although some open questions remain, Cupriak-Trojan, coupled with the previous Mirin decision, expands the jurisprudence on the recognition principle in a way that allows it to be consolidated into an independent doctrine of private international law. To describe this doctrine, I suggest the term “replication of status” (Statusnachvollzug), which distinguishes the replication of status from the recognition of judgments and from the referral method. Another differentiation is also necessary: between the replication of status as a doctrinal approach in conflict of laws and international civil procedural law on the one hand and the principle of recognition and the free movement of status as mandates of EU primary law on the other. While the latter currently provide their normative framework and basis, the replication of status could, in future legislation, be detached from this origin.

 

 

A. Schulz: Name and Gender: German Federal Court of Justice Ruling on a Name Change via UK Deed Poll [German]

A recent decision by the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) addresses two key issues in Private International Law. First, the Court held that a name change effected through a British “deed poll” can be recognised as a change of birth name under German civil status law. In this respect, the Court clarified that it is irrelevant whether the change concerns a person’s “legal name” or their “conventional name”. However, the Court ultimately rejected the requested amendments in their entirety, as the requirements for recognizing the applicant’s new legal gender had not been fulfilled. In particular, the applicant had not completed the formal procedure as required by the applicable Gender Recognition Act 2004.

Written by Marc-Philippe Weller, Carolina Radke, and Marianna Dänner (all Heidelberg University)

On 2 March 2026, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof; “BGH”) held an oral hearing in two proceedings concerning the civil liability of companies regarding climate change. The authors of this blog post attended the hearing as members of the audience.

The German NGO Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH) is suing the car manufacturers BMW and Mercedes Benz, requesting a legal order obliging both companies to refrain from placing combustion engine cars on the market beyond 2030. These two proceedings join the club of (strategic) climate change lawsuits in Germany. Crucially, they are the first of their kind based on tort law to reach the German Federal Court of Justice. Accordingly, the hearing was eagerly awaited by many. The decision, which will be rendered on 23 March 2026, will undoubtedly have an impact on future climate lawsuits.

While no issues of international jurisdiction or applicable law arose in the proceedings in question – as all Parties are seated in Germany –, the judgment of the BGH could further motivate foreign parties to bring claims against German companies, thereby giving rise to questions of international jurisdiction and the applicable law (see for more details Weller/Weiner, Corporate Climate Liability in Private International Law, in: Japanese Yearbook of Private International Law, Vol. 26 (2024), 2). In this context, one may refer to the deliberations of the Higher Regional Court (OLG) Hamm in Lliuya against RWE (OLG Hamm, 28. Mai 2025, 5 U 15/17).

1. Legal Framework

The climate goal of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz; GG) derived from its Art. 20a  was specified by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in line with the Paris Agreement, namely, to limit the rising global average temperature to well below 2°C and preferably to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Combustion engine cars contribute to the global CO2 emissions and hence to the greenhouse gas effect and the global warming. Against this background, the question arises whether the constitutional climate goal can (additionally) be enforced through private lawsuits against companies, notwithstanding the fact – as emphasized in the present case – BMW and Mercedes are acting in accordance with the existing public regulatory framework in Germany.

In both proceedings, the claim of DUH relies on Section 1004(1) of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch; BGB) in conjunction with Section 823(1) BGB.

Section 1004(1) BGB allows an owner of an absolute individual right (like property or health) to demand that a disturbing party (“Störer”) – i.e. the party interfering with the individual right – remove an interference or refrain from future interferences. Section 823(1) BGB provides claims for damages in the event of a violation of such a right.

DUH bases its claim – to prevent the manufacturers from placing combustion engine cars on the market from 2030 onwards – on an infringement of the so-called “General Right to Personality” (Allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht), which is provided for by the German constitution (Art. 2(1) in connection with Art. 1(1) GG) and which is recognized as protected right within the meaning of Section 823(1) BGB and Section 1004(1) BGB. Hence, infringements of that personality right can be stopped via an injunction based on Section 1004(1) BGB.

In the proceedings against BMW and Mercedes-Benz, the claimants want to activate an intertemporal dimension of that “General Right to Personality” called “Right to greenhouse gas-related freedom” (Recht auf treibhausgasbezogene Freiheit). This approach would be new in private law. It builds upon the famous “Klimaurteil” (climate judgment) of the Bundesverfassungsgericht from 24 March 2021. In this judgment, the Constitutional Court established a new legal figure called “eingriffsähnliche Vorwirkung”. It extends the basic rights protection to a protection against infringements by the state in the future that are grounded in present state omissions or insufficient actions (in the sense of a right to intertemporal freedom). By analogy to this legal concept in public law, DUH argues that the legal figure “eingriffsähnliche Vorwirkung” should also apply in tort law to actions by private companies (such as BMW and Mercedes).

The claims of DUH were rejected in the previous instances (LG München I, 07 Feb 2023, 3 O 12581/21, OLG München, 12 Oct 2023, 32 U 936/23 for the claim against BMW and LG Stuttgart, 13 Sept 2022, 17 O 789/21, OLG Stuttgart, 08 Nov 2023, 12 U 170/22 for the claim against Mercedes).

2. Inside the courtroom: key legal arguments

In the oral hearing before the BGH, the arguments focused on two legal aspects:

(1) Does the legal figure of intertemporal protection of basic freedoms in the form of an “eingriffsähnliche Vorwirkung” apply also to private actors if – as is currently the case in Germany – the national CO2 budget has not yet been attributed among industrial sectors, the federal states, or even single actors? According to the Constitutional Court, the state has the obligation to concretize the remaining national budget (“Konkretisierungsauftrag”) by assigning CO2 budgets to the different actors. What does this mean for the duties of private actors if the state fails to comply with this obligation by not assigning specific reduction targets? May civil courts assign specific reduction targets?

According to the claimant (DUH), the intertemporal protection of basic freedoms subsidiarily applies to such private actors that considerably contribute to global greenhouse gas emissions. The less reduction measures were taken now, the more strenuous reduction measures would be needed in the future, which would interfere in the basic rights freedoms more severely. CO2 budgets for private actors such as the car manufacturers could in that case be measured by scientific data (such as attribution science), so even without state-allocated CO2 budgets.

In the opinion of the defendants (BMW and Mercedes), it would exceed the competences of the courts if they were to allocate individual CO2 residual budgets to companies in such climate lawsuits. The counsels for the defendants relied on the argument of separation of powers and the complexity of climate change requiring multi-level solutions. Climate change would be a topic too complex to be solved by courts and by private law – instead, a mixture of legal instruments and a balancing of interests by the democratic legislator was needed. Any private law based litigation, being bilaterally restricted to the involved parties, would be arbitrary and could not solve the climate challenge which was a problem of societal scale. Courts would put themselves at the place of the legislator or at least thwart the legislator’s concept or solution. The defendants’ counsels also argued with the margin of appreciation granted by the German Federal Constitutional Court in its 2021 decision.

The defendants also raised the argument that a CO2-budget for civil actors would be ineffective, as the climate reduction goals could only be achieved globally – as such, if in other states major emitters did not comply with their obligations, the national emitters had to make “extra” efforts to make up for the gaps. Besides, “national solo runs” would endanger international cooperation.

(2) Can private actors, such as BMW and Mercedes, be treated as “disturbing” within the meaning of Section 1004(1) BGB for contributing to the risk of future state climate protection measures? The BGH raised the question whether the manufacturers could be qualified as indirect disturber by action (“mittelbare Handlungsstörer”). This was argued to result from an evaluative tailoring of the manufacturers’ responsibility (“wertender Zuschnitt von Verantwortungsbereichen”). A main point in the arguments in that respect revolved around the question if a private actor can be a disturber within the meaning of Section 1004(1) BGB if it complies with all legal requirements and duties. This was at least an indicator against a disturbance triggering liability under Section 1004(1) BGB.

The defendants argued that Section 1004(1) BGB as a bilateral claim was per se not suitable for resolving issues like climate change, which is a problem concerning our society as a whole, not only two parties in a civil proceeding. Civil law could not provide for protection if the threat caused concerned a mass of persons, not only another party.

Furthermore, according to the defendants, the disturber and the affected party would coincide since everyone contributed to climate change. It therefore would remain unclear where a distinction was to be drawn between who qualifies as a disturber and who does not. Besides, there was neither a general duty of care (“Allgemeine Verkehrspflicht”) nor specific CO2-budgets that the defendants are currently violating. Where the contested conduct was currently lawful, it could not be prohibited under civil law through the mechanism of Section 1004(1) BGB.

The claimant’s counsel argued that formal concerns against emitters being disturbers in the legal sense had to remain unapplied, as otherwise private law in general could not provide legal protection in the field of climate change.

The defendants relied finally on the argument that private law based litigation such as the given proceedings were arbitrary for the reason that (1) it was “random” which emitter would be the target of such litigation and (2) that there could be no redress in a bilateral two party relationship as this would lead to the same emission being litigated in several proceedings (e.g. car manufacturers, car rental agencies and car drivers).

III. Assessment and outlook

The final decision of the German Federal Court of Justice will be rendered on 23 March 2026. The Court will implicitly decide whether combating climate change primarily falls within the responsibility of the legislator, or whether civil courts can also play a meaningful role in addressing this global challenge.

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