EAPIL blog

Ioannis Revolidis, a lecturer at the University of Malta and a visiting lecturer at the Frederick University Cyprus, has recently published a book in Greek, based on his PhD thesis, on jurisdiction and the Internet.

The author has provided the following summary:

This monograph, which is the first of its kind to appear in Greek literature, examines the problem of allocation of jurisdiction in case of Internet-related disputes under the Brussels Ia Regulation. After an introduction into the meaning and practical ramifications of the phenomenon of international jurisdiction, it tries to identify the dogmatic depth of the Brussels Ia Regulation in order to form arguments on how Internet-related disputes can optimally be tackled in terms of international jurisdiction. In order to create an appropriate dogmatic background, the book also examines the particularities of the Internet culture.

In a more specific part, it examines the rules of international jurisdiction related to digital consumer disputes, digital contractual disputes, and digital non-contractual disputes (personality rights and intellectual property rights) under the Brussels Ia Regulation, coming to the conclusion that the existing rules can appropriately be applied within the Internet context, provided that they will be dogmatically adapted to the particular needs that are created through The Internet culture.

The publication is part of an ambitious project launched by Paris Arvanitakis (Aristotle University, Thessaloniki), and Dimitrios Kranis (former General Director at the Hellenic School of Judges) to cover a gap in domestic bibliography, by initiating a special series of studies in European Private / Procedural Law.

This post has been written by Vincent Richard, Senior Research Fellow at the MPI Luxembourg, Department of European and Comparative Procedural Law.

On 14 August 2020, the Luxembourg government introduced a bill before the Parliament aiming to introduce a collective redress procedure (file 7650) into Luxembourg Law.

This objective was set out in the coalition agreement of 2018 where the Democratic Party, the Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party and The Greens defined the policy outline for the  following five years.

The government’s intention is firstly to set up a collective redress mechanism for violations of consumer law and secondly to extend it afterwards to other areas such as environmental law, unlawful discriminations, abuse of dominant position and unfair competition.

While inspired by the proposal for a European directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, the bill had been finalised before an agreement was reached by the European Parliament and Council negotiators (reported here). The text of the bill may therefore evolve to reflect the latest progress of the EU negotiations.

The collective redress scheme proposed so far is heavily inspired by the corresponding mechanisms adopted in France and Belgium. The procedure is divided into three phases with a first judgment on admissibility, a second one assessing the professional’s liability and an enforcement phase to allocate compensation.

Admissibility Phase

The whole procedure takes place before the district court of Luxembourg and it can be initiated by a single consumer or a qualified entity. The first interesting aspect of the proposal is that qualified entities are not only Luxembourg and European consumer organisations but also non-profit organisations or a sectorial regulatory authority such as the banking sector regulator or the Data Protection Commission. For the action to be declared admissible, individual consumers and qualified entities must show that they have legal expertise and sufficient financial and human resources to adequately represent several consumers. They will also need to prove that a collective redress is more efficient than a typical individual action. Time will tell how much of an obstacle these thresholds will constitute. If the action is financed by a third party, the court has to verify that this third party is not a competitor of the professional and that it may not influence decisions taken by the representative. If the claim is declared admissible, the court rules on the publicity of the judgment and the procedure enters its second phase.

Judgment on Liability and Mediation

The second phase starts with a mandatory meeting between the representative and the professional where parties must decide if they want to resort to mediation. The bill is quite detailed on this mediation process which may be conducted by specially approved mediators. Mediation last six months and parties may ask the court to extend this delay by another six months. If an agreement is reached, it has to be approved by the court. If there is no agreement, the procedure continues before the court for a ruling on the professional’s liability.

This judgment on liability is a two parties’ procedure between the professional and the representative where the latter may ask for injunctive and compensatory relief. The court rules on the liability of the professional and on the criteria for the constitution of the group of consumers. As is the case in Belgium, the group may be constituted via an opt-in or an opt-out procedure. The opt-out procedure may not be used to compensate bodily harm or moral damages. Opt-out is also excluded if the group involves consumers located outside of Luxembourg which may be a significant limitation in practice. In the judgment on liability, the court also rules on the publication of the judgment, on the time limit given to consumers to opt-in or out and on the time limit given to the professional to compensate the group. Finally, the court decides whether it is necessary to appoint an administrator to handle the enforcement of the judgment.

 Enforcement of the Judgment

If enforcement is not handled directly by the professional, it is conducted under the supervision of an administrator who is paid by the professional. A supervising judge is appointed to handle procedural issues related to enforcement. At the end of the enforcement process, the administrator submits a report to the supervising judge who must approve it to bring the proceedings to an end. If a consumer belonging to the group has not been compensated, the supervising judge refers their individual claims to the court.

Preliminary Assessment

As it stands now, the bill is rather well drafted and it could have a real impact on the Luxembourg legal landscape. Although it is hard to be very optimistic when considering the relative failure of collective redress in France, Belgium and more generally in Europe, Luxembourg may have some encouraging distinctive features. The country hosts the seats of some of the biggest companies in Europe and it features a dense network of highly creative lawyers. Besides, if full contingency fees are forbidden under the ethical rules of the Luxembourg Bar Association, success fees whereby a limited part of the lawyers’ fees depends upon the result of the litigation are possible. Third party litigation funding is also allowed in Luxembourg and expressly taken into account in the collective redress bill. The main areas of concern are, on one hand, the potential length of the procedure considering that each phase gives rise to a judgment that could be appealed and, on the other hand, the overall cost of such actions.

The bill still needs to receive opinions from the Conseil d’État, professional associations and the main consumer organisation before public debate takes place in Parliament. Readers of this blog will be informed in due course of the content of the law once it becomes final.

A series of webinars devoted to the Conventions of the Hague Conference on Private International Law will be offered from 16 to 18 September by the the Supreme Court of the Philippines, the Philippine Judicial Academy and the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines.

Speakers include Christophe Bernasconi, Secretary General of the Hague Conference, Philippe Lortie, First Secretary of the Conference, and Ning Zhao, Senior Legal Officer at the Conference’s Permanent Bureau.

See here for more information available.

The editorial team in charge of the EAPIL blog is delighted to announce that a new editor has joined the team.

Her name is Anna Wysocka-Bar, and she teaches Private International Law at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków.

Her first post has just been published.

Welcome on board, Anna!

The Polish periodical Problemy Współczesnego Prawa Międzynarodowego, Europejskiego i Porównawczego (Review of International, European and Comparative Law – PWPM) launched an international competition for original papers in the field of international law, European law or comparative law, written in English by scholars aged 35 or less.

The deadline for submissions is 15 November 2020.

The winning papers will be published on the journal  and the authors of the two best articles will receive cash prizes of 500 and 300 Euros, respectively. 

On a more general note, the journal is currently calling for paper from any scholars to be published in  volume XVIII (2020), which will be out in Spring 2021. Here, again, the deadline is 15 November 2020. 

PWPM is one of the leading legal periodicals in Poland. It is a peer-reviewed, open-access academic journal based at the Institute of European Studies of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. While focuses on international, European and comparative law, the journal also covers other areas of law, including private international law.

More details on the competition and the journal are available here.

The Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb will hold a conference on Applicable Law in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings on 18 and 19 September 2020. Those interested in attending the conference may do so either in person or online.

Speakers include Paul Omar (INSOL Europe), Ignacio Tirado (Secretary-General UNIDROIT), Miha Žebre (European Commission), Andreas Piekenbrock (University of Heidelberg), Jasnica Garašić (University ofZagreb), Francisco Garcimartín (Autonomous University of Madrid), Edward Janger (Brooklyn Law School), John Pottow (University of Michigan), Bartosz Groele (Tomasik & Pakostewicz & Groele), Zoltan Fabok (DLA Piper Posztl, Nemescsói, Györfi-Tóth & Partners), Miodrag Đorđević (Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia), Leif M. Clark (former US Bankruptcy Judge), Simeon Gilchrist (Edwin Coe LLP), Renato Mangano (University of Palermo), Rodrigo Rodriguez (University of Lucerne) and Gerry McCormack (University of Leeds).

In the context of the 2020 Annual Conference of the European Law Institute, the feasibility study on EU Conflict of Laws for Companies: The Acquis and Beyond will be presented by Chris Thomale (proposer), Luca Enriques, Jessica Schmidt and Georg Kodek (Chair) today, 11 September 2020, from 15:15 until 16:15 CET.

International company mobility as well as regulatory competition of company laws depend on clearly cut out rules designating the applicable substantive company law. It would thus seem an integral part of a functioning internal market to provide such conflict of laws rules. Regrettably, however, a ‘Rome IV’ Regulation, ie an EU conflict of laws code for companies, despite manifold initiatives, has not been adopted yet. Instead, the stage has been left to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which in well-rehearsed case law from the Daily Mail (C-81/87) until the Polbud (C-106/16) decisions has developed a certain framework for corporate mobility, culminating, of late, in Directive 2019/2121 on cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions. One big shortcoming of the European status quo is that the piecemeal harmonisation acquired through these developments still leaves a fundamental question unanswered: which company law regime by default is applicable to a given company?

This feasibility study will aim at laying the foundations for a prospective project that fully restates EU law on the matter implicit in conflict of laws legislation on adjacent topics like contract, tort, successions, insolvency and capital markets. Further, it will aim at foundations that go beyond CJEU case law and include national adjudicative practice and academic research into the picture. Based upon this acquis communautaire, the project of a future Rome IV Regulation can be investigated, notably putting to use techniques of private international law in order to address Member State reticence towards such an instrument as expressed hitherto.

To register for the webinars free of charge, please contact the ELI Secretariat at secretariat@europeanlawinstitute.eu.

A new monograph written in German deals with cross-border insurance brokerage in the Single Market (Christian Rüsing, Grenzüberschreitende Versicherungsvermittlung im Binnenmarkt, 2020). The monograph is aimed at practitioners, national and European supervisory authorities as well as academics dealing with private international law, its relationship to international supervisory law and insurance law.

This book complements studies on the single market in insurance, which the EU has strived to establish for decades. EU institutions have primarily facilitated cross-border business of insurers by implementing rules on international supervisory law in the Solvency II Directive and on private international law for insurance contracts in Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation. The study focuses on intermediaries, such as insurance brokers and agents.

While intermediaries play a vital role in the cross-border distribution of insurance products, clear conflict-of-law rules for insurance intermediation are missing. The Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD), which intends to promote cross-border activities of intermediaries, focuses on the harmonisation of the substantive law on insurance intermediation, apart from provisions on international administrative cooperation. Furthermore, it has not fully harmonised national laws. Insurance intermediaries providing services in other countries are therefore still required to be aware of the relevant national regulatory requirements and private laws they have to comply with.

International Supervisory Law

With regard to international supervisory law, the author analyses where intermediaries have to be registered and which regulatory requirements they have to meet when exercising activities in another member state by using freedom to provide services or the freedom of establishment. One of the key findings is that although the IDD is partly based on the country of origin principle, intermediaries must comply with stricter national provisions protecting general interests of the host member state, irrespective of whether they serve consumers or professionals as policyholders.

Applicable Rules of Private International Law

Concerning private international law, the author analyses the intermediaries’ relationships with customers and insurers. A comparative legal analysis reveals that these relationships are based on contract in some member states and on tort in others. Therefore, it is even unclear whether the Rome I or the Rome II Regulation has to be applied. The author calls for an autonomous interpretation of the regulations’ scope of application, which also solves the problem of concurring claims. He suggests that the Rome I Regulation must be applied irrespective of whether the intermediary is an agent or a broker.

Rome I Regulation

Applying the Rome I Regulation to the relationship between intermediaries and customers leads to further difficulties. On the one hand, it is unclear whether the conflicts rule for insurance contracts in Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation can be applied to intermediation services. On the other hand, it is also uncertain whether Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the Rome I Regulation are applicable without modification given that the IDD uses different connecting factors with regard to international supervisory law rules. The author argues that certain IDD “flexibility clauses” constitute special conflict-of-law rules in the sense of Article 23 of the Rome I Regulation and therefore partially supersede Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the same Regulation.

With regard to the relationship between intermediaries and insurers, the author analyses whether Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation can be used to apply the law governing the insurance contract or the relationship between intermediaries and customers. He stresses that the parties must be aware of the customs they have to comply with and of certain mechanisms protecting insurance agents, which might include mandatory provisions.

Conclusion

This is a complex area, and the author has to be complemented for having taken a broad perspective, which combines international supervisory law and private international law. The study concludes with an assessment of the extent to which the current state of the law promotes cross-border activities of intermediaries. Particular attention is paid to the importance and legal framework of digital insurance intermediaries, which are also dealt with separately in each chapter.

The new issue of the Revue Critique de Droit International Privé (2/2020) is out. It contains three articles and numerous case notes.

In the first article, Sabine Corneloup (University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas) and Thalia Kruger (University of Antwerp) give a comprehensive overview of the new Brussels II ter Regulation (Le règlement 2019/1111, Bruxelles II : la protection des enfants gagne du ter(rain))

After a long legislative process, Regulation 2019/1111 or “Brussels II ter” has replaced the Brussels II bis Regulation (n° 2201/2003). The new Regulation will only become fully applicable on 1 August 2022. This article gives an overview of the most important changes even though it is impossible to discuss all of them. In the domain of parental responsibility Brussels II ter brings more clarity on choice of forum and lis pendens. It insertsa general obligation to respect the child’s right to be heard. For child abduction cases, the second chance procedure is retained but its scope is limited. The legislator places emphasis on mediation. The Regulation brings a general abolition of exequatur, similar to that of the Brussels I Regulation (n° 1215/2012). However, decisions concerning visitation and the second chance procedure (for which Brussels II bis already abolished exequatur) retain their privileged character and slightly different rules apply. Brussels II ter moreover harmonises certain aspects of the actual enforcement procedure. A final important change, especially for France, is a new set of rules on the recognition and enforcement of authentic instruments and agreements, such as private divorces. The legislator did not tackle the bases for jurisdiction for divorce, which is a pity. The authors conclude that, even though it is not perfect and certain issues still need the legislator’s attention, Brussels II ter has brought many welcome improvements, particularly in protecting the rights of children involved in cross-border family disputes.

In the second article, Christine Bidaud (University of Lyon 3) addresses the issue of the international circulation of public documents under French law from a critical perspective (La transcription des actes de l’état civil étrangers sur les registres français. Cesser de déformer et enfin réformer…)

Although the transcription of foreign civil-status records in french registers has long been qualified as a publicity operation, distortions of this notion has been made by the legislator and the case law. A reform in this field is imperative in order to guarantee the coherence of the system of reception in France of foreign civil-status records and, beyond that, of the international circulation of personal status.

Finally, the third article explore the theme of international circulation of personal status from a different perspective. Sylvain Bollée (University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) and Bernard Haftel (University of Sorbonne Paris Nord) discuss the sensitive topic of international surrogacy under the light of the recent case law of the French Supreme Court in civil and criminal matters.

In two judgments handed down by its First Civil Chamber on 18 December 2019, the Court of Cassation seems to have concluded a particularly spectacular case law saga relating to the reception in France of surrogate motherhood processes occurred abroad. Its position has evolved from a position of extreme closure to one that is diametrically opposed, now accepting full and almost unconditional recognition, out of step not only with its recent case-law, but also with domestic law that maintains a firm opposition to any surrogate motherhood process. This evolution is to be considered from the perspective of concrete solutions and, more fundamentally, of the place that the Court of Cassation intends to give in this area to its own case-law within the sources of law.

The full table of contents is available here.

Albert Henke (University of Milan) has been awarded the EU-funded Jean Monnet Module on ‘Multilevel, Mutiparty and Multisector Cross-Border Litigation in Europe’. The three-year teaching and research project will run from 2021 to 2023 and will focus on three main areas: relations and conflicts between national courts, European courts and international tribunals; cross-border collective redress; procedural issues arising out of litigating cross-border commercial, financial, competition, IP, labour, consumers and family law disputes.

Civil litigation in a cross-border dimension presents greater complexity than domestic litigation, due to differences in legal traditions and regimes, as well as in cultural and social values among jurisdictions. A recent EU Study (JUST/2014/RCON/PR/CIVI/0082) shows that EU Member States’ procedural law regimes are still far from being harmonized, what negatively impacts on free circulation of judgments, equivalence and effectiveness of procedural protection and the functioning of the internal market.

The module is proposed to Italian and foreign under- and postgraduate students, as well as to practitioners. It will identify the main procedural issues deriving from a lack of harmonization among EU jurisdictions, contribute to the academic debate at national and European level, produce a series of academic outputs and set the basis for future academic cooperation, also in view of international joint research projects.

The teaching staff includes Alan Uzelac (University of Zagreb), Diego P. Fernández Arroyo (Sciences Po, Paris), Gilles Cuniberti (University of Luxembourg), Fernando Gascón-Inchausti (Complutense University of Madrid), Maria Teresa Carinci (University of Milan), Francesco Rossi dal Pozzo (University of Milan), Stefaan Voet (Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven), Francesca Marinelli (University of Milan), Pietro Ortolani (Radboud University, Njimegen) and Apostolos Anthimos (European University, Cyprus).

For information, please contact Prof. Albert Henke at albert.henke@unimi.it.

On 27 September 1968, the (then) six member States of the European Communities signed the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of this milestone, the European Court of Justice and the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg held an international conference on the most important developments, achievements and challenges in European civil procedural law since that date.

A book collecting most of the presentations, edited by Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Burkhard Hess and Prof. Dr. Koen Lenaerts, with Dr. Vincent Richard as coeditor, has just been published by Nomos Verlag, in the Studies of the Max Planck Institute for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law series.

The book includes contributions on the Brussels regime authored by members of the European Court of Justice, established academics and young researchers, illustrating the dialogue between the Court of Justice and the national courts on the interpretation of European civil procedural law, and how it has impacted on the Europeanization of private international law. Moreover, it reflects on the future of European civil procedural law and on the suitability of the Brussels regime today.

The French Committee of Private International Law has published a book presenting portraits of 15 former presidents of the Committee since it was established in 1934.

As the goal of the Committee has been to establish a bridge between the bench, the bar and the academy, the presidents have been essentially academics (Batiffol, Goldman) and judges (Bellet, Ponsard, Dray), but also members of the bar (Decugis).

Each of the portraits attempts to assess the contribution of the president to the development of the field, but also to present his personal history.

The foreword and table of contents of the book can be accessed here. More information is available here.

It is widely known that disputes related to sports are most of the times referred to arbitration. Football is of course in the forefront. Usually cases referred to either the CAS or the FIFA Dispute Boards lead to an award. Not so in the case at hand. As a result, the creditor was left with the sole option, i.e. to return civil litigation. However, the road was not paved with roses…

1. The facts

The Appellant, a resident of the Netherlands, is a professional football player’s agent of Dutch nationality, licensed by the Royal Dutch Football Association. The Respondent is a Greek football société anonyme, which runs a professional football team participating in the Greek Super League. The Club is affiliated with the Hellenic Football Federation (the “HFF”), which in turn is a member of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”). It has its seat in Thessaloniki, Greece.

In May 2012, the Appellant represented the professional football coach D. and three coach assistants as their agent in the contractual negotiations with the Respondent. In this context, the Parties signed a Private Agreement setting out, in essence, the terms and conditions on which the Respondent should pay the Appellant for his services in facilitating the signing of the contracts between the Respondent and the Coach, and the Assistant Coaches.

The Agreement stated, inter alia, the following: ‘the parties also expressly agree that the competent Committee of FIFA will have jurisdiction to decide for any and all disputes that might arise from or in relation to the present agreement and that the FIFA Regulations will apply to any such dispute’.

Owed to a negative result, the Team lost its chance to qualify for the Greek cup final. As a consequence, a clash was provoked between the Team and the Coach, which resulted in the discontinuation of their cooperation, and the non-payment of the second tranche to the Agent by the Team.

Stage A: FIFA

On September 2014, the Appellant filed his claim with FIFA, claiming the Respondent’s payment of 70.000 € in accordance with the Agreement. FIFA informed the Appellant of the following:

We would like to draw your attention again to art. 1 of the Players’ Agents Regulations, which stipulates that “These regulations govern the occupation of players’ agents who introduce players to clubs with a view to negotiating or renegotiating an employment contract or introduce two clubs to one another with a view to concluding a transfer agreement within one association or from one association to another”. Moreover, art. 1 par. 2 of the Regulations stats that “The application of the regulations is strictly limited to players’ agents activities described in the paragraph above”. In light of the aforementioned and by way of clarification, it would rather appear that your claim lacks legal basis, since the services provided by you and which are object to your claim i.e. providing services on behalf of the coaching staff are outside the scope of the abovementioned provisions’.

Stage B: CAS

On December 2014, the Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Arbitration for Sport. He sought, inter alia, to: (1) set aside the decision issued on by the FIFA; (2) issue a (new) decision condemning Respondent to pay Appellant an amount of 70.000 € on outstanding commissions.

The Sole Arbitrator noted that Article R47 of the CAS Code states as follows: ‘An appeal against the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may be filed with CAS if the statutes or regulations of the said body so provide or if the parties have concluded a specific arbitration agreement and if the Appellant has exhausted the legal remedies available to it prior to the appeal, in accordance with the statutes or regulations of that body’.

Based on the foregoing, the Sole Arbitrator stated that it is undisputed that the CAS has jurisdiction to hear appeal cases only under the condition that a ‘decision’ has been rendered, in which connection the Appellant argued that the FIFA Letter satisfies the requirement for constituting a ‘decision’, whereas the Respondent denied that this is the case.

The Appellant did not deny the accuracy of FIFA’s (alleged) decision regarding lack of jurisdiction and did not really want to have this issue verified by the CAS. As stated in the appeal that he rather sought ‘an award on the basis of the merits and essentials of the case here presented, despite the fact that the appealed decision did not entail an elaboration on the essential content of the dispute’.

The Arbitrator regarded the appeal as an attempt to circumvent FIFA’s lack of jurisdiction – which was not contested by the Parties – and, in this manner, to make the CAS, as an appeals body, hear and decide on the substantive aspects of the dispute, notwithstanding that FIFA, as the first-instance body chosen by the Appellant, did not consider itself to have jurisdiction. Since it neither is, nor should be possible to circumvent a first-instance judicial body’s undisputed lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide on a substantive issue by merely attempting to refer such a decision to the CAS through a more or less fictitious appeal, the Sole Arbitrator ruled that the CAS had no jurisdiction to hear the ‘appeal’. In addition, the Arbitrator stated that an appeal to the CAS filed under the rules governing appeal proceedings set out in the Code therefore cannot merely be ‘transformed’ into a request for arbitration.

Based on the above, the Sole Arbitrator found that the CAS did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the present dispute.

Stage C: Swiss Supreme Court

In accordance with the CAS Statutes, the agent challenged the CAS ruling before the Swiss Supreme Court. However, the latter did not render a ruling, because the agent requested discontinuance of the proceedings. Hence, the CAS decision became final and conclusive.

Stage D: Thessaloniki Court of 1st Instance

As a consequence, the agent returned to the path of ordinary civil and commercial court jurisdiction. He filed a claim before the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance. The team challenged the jurisdiction of Greek courts, invoking the arbitration clause stipulated in the agreement. In a rather superficial fashion, the Thessaloniki court ordered the stay of proceedings, and referred the case to the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber. The agent lodged an appeal.

2. The Ruling of the Thessaloniki Court of Appeal of 7 May 2020

The Thessaloniki Court of Appeal quashed the first instance judgment by applying domestic rules of arbitration. It considered that, under the circumstances above, the arbitration clause has lost its validity.

In addition, it dismissed a fresh plea by the Team, by virtue of which the dispute should be tried by the Financial Dispute Resolution Committee of the Hellenic Football Federation (HFF). The court invoked Article 1 Para 3 of the HFF Football Agents Statutes, which has a similar wording to that of Art. 1 of FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations (see above under I).

As a next line of defence, the Team pleaded a set off the claim by way of defence with respect to two costs orders issued against the agent by the CAS and the Swiss Supreme Court respectively. The Thessaloniki CoA dismissed the defence, stating that a set off is not possible, because the orders were not declared enforceable in Greece. Following the above, the court examined the case on the merits, applying Greek law. It recognized that the Team ought to compensate the Agent in full satisfaction of the claim.

3. Remarks

Notwithstanding that, in light of the evidence produced, the outcome of the judgment was correct, the court started and finished its examination by omitting any reference to provisions of International Commercial Arbitration and Private International Law. This proves yet another time that courts prefer to stick to their national comfort space, defying any international rules applicable in Greece by virtue of ratification or direct application.

In particular, the court failed to refer to the rules of the 1999 Greek law on International Commercial Arbitration, i.e. the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration, although the case was falling under its scope.  In addition, the reasoning concerning the costs orders is not free of doubt: Incidental recognition of foreign judgments is regulated under the Lugano Convention; hence, the Swiss Supreme Court costs order should have been taken into account. Things are a bit complicated in regards to the CAS costs order. Incidental recognition of foreign arbitral awards is not regulated in the 1958 New York Convention. However, Article III of the Convention states that ‘Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon’. Article 903 Greek Code of Civil Procedure states that a foreign arbitral award is recognized automatically, if the requirements set for recognition are met. Hence, incidental recognition of the CAS costs order was also possible.

Finally, bearing in mind the cross-border nature of the dispute, the court could have examined the issue of applicable law under the scope of the Rome I Regulation. In fact, Article 4(1)(b) provides that, in similar cases, the law applicable is the law of the country of the habitual residence of the service provider. However, it appears that both litigants referred to provisions of Greek law in their briefs. Hence, the court considered that the parties tacitly agreed for the application of domestic law.

Vesna Rijavec, Katja Drnovsek, C.H. van Rhee have edited Cross-border enforcement in Europe: national and international perspectives, published by Intersentia.

The volume addresses the enforcement of judgments and other authentic instruments in a European cross-border context, as well as enforcement in a selection of national European jurisdictions. The volume is divided into two parts. Part I on ‘Cross-border Enforcement in Europe’ opens with a contribution comparing the European approach in Brussels I Recast with the US experience of enforcement in the context of judicial federalism. This is followed by two contributions concentrating on aspects of Brussels I Recast, specifically the abolition of exequatur and the grounds for refusal of foreign judgments (public order and conflicting decisions). The two concluding texts in this part deal with the cross-border enforcement of notarial deeds and the sister regulation of Brussels I Recast, Brussels II bis (jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility). Part II is devoted to aspects of (cross-border) enforcement in a selection of European states (Poland, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Slovenia and the Republic of North Macedonia). The topics discussed include the authorities entrusted with enforcement, judicial assistance and the national rules relevant from the perspective of Brussels I Recast. 

The book’s table of contents can be found here. See here for further information.

 

Holidays are over, it is time for all the services of the Court to resume full activity.

As regards private international law, September 2020 will start with the delivery, on Thursday 3, of the 1st Chamber (Bonichot, Safjan, Bay Larsen, Toader, Jääskinen) judgment in C-186/19, Supreme Site Services e.a.: a request for a preliminary ruling from the Netherlands on the
interpretation of Article 1(1), and Article 24(5) of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

The request was made in the course of an application brought by an international organisation for the adoption of interim measures to lift an interim garnishee order levied on an escrow account by his opponent. In support of its action, the organisation had relied on immunity from execution under international law. The referring court’s doubts on Article 1(1) of Brussels I bis stem from that fact.

AG Oe’s Opinion was delivered on 2 April 2020 (see here). He was asked to address only the questions on Article 1(1) of the Regulation.

On the same day, an order is expected in C-98/20, mBank, on Article 17(1)(c) and Article 18(2) of the same Brussels I bis Regulation. The request was referred by the Obvodní soud pro Prahu 8 (Czech Republic), who had doubts about the relevant date of domicile for the consumer section to apply.

On Thursday 10, AG Oe will deliver his Opinion on C-59/19,Wikingerhof. The request, from the Bundesgerichtshof, addresses the divide between Article 7(1) and (2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. The question reads:

‘Is Article 7(2) … to be interpreted as meaning that jurisdiction for matters relating to tort or delict exists in respect of an action seeking an injunction against specific practices if it is possible that the conduct complained of is covered by contractual provisions, but the applicant asserts that those provisions are based on an abuse of a dominant position on the part of the defendant?’

It actually looks as a follow up to Brogsitter (C-548/12), except that this time the Grand Chamber will decide (Lenaerts, Silva de Lapuerta, Bonichot, Arabadjiev, Prechal, Safjan, Rodin, Xuereb, Rossi, von Danwitz, Toader, Šváby, Jürimäe, Lycourgos, Piçarra), and an AG’s Opinion has been deemed necessary.

On the same day, a hearing will take place on case C-709/19, Vereniging van Effectenbezitters: again a preliminary reference from the Netherlands, this time in relation to Article 7(2) of Brussels I bis, going to the core of the ‘holistic approach’. The Dutch referred four (de facto, five) questions to the CJEU:

‘1.   (a)   Should Article 7(2) … be interpreted as meaning that the direct occurrence of purely financial damage to an investment account in the Netherlands or to an investment account of a bank and/or investment firm established in the Netherlands, damage which is the result of investment decisions influenced by globally distributed but incorrect, incomplete and misleading information from an international listed company, constitutes a sufficient connecting factor for the international jurisdiction of the Netherlands courts by virtue of the location of the occurrence of the damage (‘Erfolgsort’)?

(b)   If not, are additional circumstances required to justify the jurisdiction of the Netherlands courts and what are those circumstances? Are the additional circumstances referred to [in point 4.2.2. of the request for a preliminary ruling] sufficient to found the jurisdiction of the Netherlands courts?

2. Would the answer to Question 1 be different in the case of a claim brought under Article 3:305a of the BW (Burgerlijk Wetboek: Netherlands Civil Code) by an association the purpose of which is to defend, in its own right, the collective interests of investors who have suffered damage as referred to in Question 1, which means, among other things, that neither the places of domicile of the aforementioned investors, nor the special circumstances of individual purchase transactions or of individual decisions not to sell shares which were already held, have been established?
3. If courts in the Netherlands have jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation to hear the claim brought under Article 3:305a of the BW, do those courts then, on the basis of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, also have international and internal territorial jurisdiction to hear all subsequent individual claims for compensation brought by investors who have suffered damage as referred to in Question 1?
4. If courts in the Netherlands as referred to in Question 3 above have international, but not internal, territorial jurisdiction to hear all individual claims for compensation brought by investors who have suffered damage as referred to in Question 1, will the internal territorial jurisdiction be determined on the basis of the place of domicile of the misled investor, the place of establishment of the bank in which that investor holds his or her personal bank account or the place of establishment of the bank in which the investment account is held, or on the basis of some other connecting factor?’

In the light of the facts of the case (summary here), some of them might be declared inadmissible, though. The reference has been assigned to the 1st Chamber (Bonichot, Safjan, Bay Larsen, Toader, Jääskinen), with Judge Safjan as reporting judge. Mr. Campos Sánchez-Bordona is the designated AG.

One week later the 1st Chamber will read the judgments in C-540/19, Landkreis Harburg (Subrogation d’un organisme public au créancier d’aliments), on the Maintenance Regulation. AG Sánchez-Bordona’s Opinion was published on 18 June 2020 (see here). The question referred reads

‘Can a public body which has provided a maintenance creditor with social assistance benefits in accordance with provisions of public law invoke the place of jurisdiction at the place of habitual residence of the maintenance creditor under Article 3(b) of the European Maintenance Regulation  in the case where it asserts the maintenance creditor’s maintenance claim under civil law, transferred to it on the basis of the granting of social assistance by way of statutory subrogation, against the maintenance debtor by way of recourse?’.

The judgment corresponds to the 3rd Chamber (Prechal, Lenaerts, Rossi, Biltgen, Wahl), with Ms. Rossi as reporting judge.

Albeit not directly on PIL issues: several hearings will take place in relation to the independence of the judiciary in Poland. AG Bobek will publish as well his Opinion on several cases regarding Romania, also connected to the independence of judges.

Recently, a (widely reported in the media) request for a PPU has been filed by the Rechtbank Amsterdam under Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA; thr underlying question is whether (all) Polish judges do still qualify as such for the purposes of the Framework Decision. If they don’t: should a similar conclusion apply to civil cooperation matters?

A Chinese divorce judgment delivered on 20 December 2013 by a court from Beijing was recognised by a French court in South Western France (Bergerac) in several decisions made in 2014 and 2016.

As will be explained below, the reason why the court had to rule twice on the issue is that each of its judgments was challenged before the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux and ended up before the French supreme court for civil and commercial matters (Cour de cassation).

Eventually, after the Cour de cassation set aside the second judgment of the Bordeaux Court of Appeal and sent back the parties before the Court of Appeal of Paris, the plaintiff gave up and never petitioned the Paris court. As a result, the first instance judgment now stands.

For years, the world has been following closely instances of enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments in the People’s Republic of China (China) and Chinese judgments abroad. This is because the default regime of judgments in China is based on reciprocity. A Chinese court will only enforce a foreign judgment if the state of origin enforced a Chinese judgment before. A more liberal regime applies to the recognition in China of judgments in family matters involving at least one Chinese national.

Bilateral Treaties

However, China has entered into bilateral treaties on judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters, which provide for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, with 39 states, including quite a few European states (see the list here). France was one of the first to enter into such a bilateral treaty with China in 1987. The treaty applies not only to commercial matters, but also to family matters.

The main consequence of the existence of a bilateral treaty is that it fulfills (or replaces) the requirement of reciprocity. Chinesejusticeobserver has reported that there are several cases where Chinese courts have enforced French judgments in recent years, and it does not seem that the absence of prior enforcement of a Chinese judgements in France was an issue.

Parallel Divorce Proceedings

In the particular case, two spouses initiated parallel divorce proceedings in the contracting states. The wife, who was an English national, first sued in Beijing in December 2012. The husband, who was a French national, then initiated proceedings in Bergerac, France, in July 2013. The Beijing court delivered its judgment first and granted divorce in December 2013.

In the French proceedings, the lawyer for the wife first challenged the jurisdiction of the French court on the ground of lis pendens. Under the French common law of lis pendens, French courts may decline jurisdiction if they find that the foreign judgment is likely to be recognised in France. The French court applied the 1987 Bilateral Treaty with China and ruled that the Chinese judgment, once final, would be recognised. The court thus declined jurisdiction.

As will become clearer below, it is important to note that the wife had also made a subsidiary argument based on the res judicata of the Chinese judgment.

The husband appealed. Higher courts got involved. Not for the better.

Nationality Requirement in Bilateral Treaties?

Proceedings were first brought before the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux. In a judgment of 18 November 2014, the Court allowed the appeal and ruled that the French first instance court should have retained jurisdiction on the ground that the Chinese judgment did not fall within the scope of the bilateral treaty. This decision was wrong for two reasons.

The first was that the court held that the bilateral treaty only applied to disputes between Chinese and French nationals. In this case, the wife was an English national. As we shall see, the French Supreme Court would eventually rule that there is no such requirement in the relevant treaty, which applies irrespective of the nationality of the parties.

The second mistake was that the court did not care to examine whether the Chinese judgment could be recognised under the French common law of judgments. It simply concluded that the judgment could not be recognised outside of the scope of the treaty, and that no lis pendens exception could thus be raised.

The wife appealed to the Cour de cassation, arguing that the Court of Appeal had failed to apply the bilateral treaty.

Useless Appeals

Most unfortunately, the Cour de cassation dismissed the appeal on disciplinary grounds. In a judgment of 25 May 2016, the Court held that the argument of the appeal that the bilateral treaty had been violated was a pretext, and that what the appelant was really criticising was that the lower court had failed to respond to the subsidiary res judicata argument of the wife, which could be directly addressed by a request directed to the lower court.

The judgment was difficult to interpret. Was it saying anything, even implicitly, on the conditions for applying the Bilateral treaty? Probably not, but when the case was sentback to lower courts, they understood it differently.

The case came back to the first instance court in Bergerac, which was understandably puzzled. It decided that the 2016 judgment of the Cour de cassation had two consequences: 1) French courts had jurisdiction, and 2) the Bilateral Treaty did not apply.

The Bergerac judge retained jurisdiction, but then declared the claim inadmissible. It applied the French common law of judgments and recognised the Chinese divorce judgment in France, ruling that the Chinese judgment was res judicata, and made the claim of the husband inadmissible. The Court of Appeal of Bordeaux confirmed the first instance ruling in a judgment of September 2016.

The husband appealed to the Cour de cassation and argued that the conditions for the recognition of judgments under the French common law of judgments had been wrongly applied.

Astonishingly, the Cour de cassation informed the parties that it intended to raise ex officio the issue of the applicability of the Bilateral Treaty and, after hearing them on that point, allowed the appeal on the ground that the lower courts had failed to apply the 1987 Bilateral Treaty. Two year after failing itself to respond to an argument related to the proper application of the Bilateral Treaty, the Cour de cassation disciplined the lower courts for misunderstanding that the argument that it had neglected was excellent.

The case was sent back to the Court of Appeal of Paris so that it would apply properly the Bilateral Treaty. But it seems that the husband was exhausted: he never initiated the proceedings before the Paris court.

This case was handled pathetically by the Cour de cassation, which has probably eventually exhausted financially the plaintiff who gave it up. What matters is that, eventually, the Cour de cassation made clear that 1) the 1987 Bilateral Treaty should be applied, and 2) the Chinese judgment was recognised.

More details on this case can be found here.

On 10 August 2020, the European Commission launched a public consultation on Regulation 805/2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (“the EEO Regulation”).

The consultation is carried out in the framework of an ongoing evaluation of the EEO Regulation.

In this context, the European Commission “seeks opinions on how the Regulation is working, also with regard to the revised Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 1215/2012). It also aims to collect practical experiences with the EEO Regulation, and attitudes towards its use in the future”.

The consultation is open until 20 November 2020 (midnight Brussels time) and can be found here.

As reported in this blog, the CJEU gave on 9 July 2020 its long-awaited judgment in VKI v Volkswagen (Case C-343/19). It ruled that the buyers of VW cars equipped with emissions test defeat devices can sue the manufacturer at the place where they had purchased the cars.

This result, which is broadly in line with the conclusions of the Advocate General, was hardly surprising. Nevertheless, a number of questions remain.

Where is the “Place of Purchase”?

The first and most urgent of these is what the CJEU means by the “place of purchase”. The Austrian court that submitted the reference for a preliminary ruling had identified three different places that could meet this description: (1) the place where the contract to purchase  the cars had been concluded, (2) the place where the purchase price had been paid, and (3) the place where the transfer or delivery of the vehicles had taken place (see para 10 of the judgment). In the dispute at hand, all three places happened to be located in the same district, but this will not be the case universally. In cases where they are different, which of these three places is the CJEU referring to?

What is the Role of the Place of Marketing?

The second question relates to the extent to which competent court will be foreseeable. The CJEU reasoned that the manufacturer must have anticipated that damage will occur at the place of purchase, as it knowingly contravened the statutory requirements imposed on it at this location (para 37). But this place of damage is foreseeable only on the assumption that VW will always market the vehicles in the country of purchase. That the place of acquisition and the place of marketing can differ is illustrated by Article 5(1)(b) Rome II Regulation.

Proximity of Tribunal or Protection of Tort Victims?

Third, one may harbour doubts about the CJEU’s argument that the tribunal at the place of purchase is best placed to carry out the assessment of damage (para 38). Proximity and the sound administration of justice would rather have suggested concentrating all cases in the court of the place of the manufacturer. The Court passed in silence over the main justification for locating jurisdiction over the tort in Austria; namely, the advantage to the tort victims in sparing them and their assignee the need to bring their claims in the home jurisdiction of the manufacturer, i.e. in Germany.

Purely Financial Loss or Not?

Fourth, it is unclear why the CJEU spent so much effort diffusing the referring court’s idea that the damage was “purely financial”. The Court of Justice was at great pains to make clear that the present case concerns material damage because the buyers received a vehicle with a defect (paras 32-35). Yet it did not draw any conclusions from this characterisation; in particular, it did not locate the damage at the place where the car had been used or registered. Instead, the Court abstracted from the vehicles and referred to the place of purchase, where the only loss incurred was…ehm…financial.

Parallel to Unfair Competition?

Fifth, it is a mystery why the CJEU – in holding that the damage occurred at the place of purchase for the purposes of Article 7 no 2 Brussels I bis Regulation – drew an analogy to the rules on unfair competition in Article 6(1) Rome II Regulation (para 39). The present case was not about unfair competition. Instead, the claimant brought a number of damages claims for defective vehicles.

Similarly, the situation was also quite different from the case of VKI v Amazon to which the Court of Justice referred. In that case, VKI had claimed in its own right when it applied for an injunction to restrain the use of unfair contract terms under the national law transposing Directive 2009/22/EC; whereas in the present case, it now brought a number of individual claims that had been assigned to it. It is true that the CJEU had ruled in VKI v Amazon that collective and individual claims must be treated under the same law. Yet this statement was made in the context of the validity of standard contract terms; it does not nearly have the same force with regard to damages claims. Even under the Court of Justice’s own standard in the new VW case, the latter will be judged under different laws and by different courts, depending on the country in which the vehicles were purchased.

An Alternative Proposal

The place of purchase that the CJEU identifies as the place where the damage occurred may be fortuitous, is subject to possible manipulation, and can hardly be determined in the case of e-commerce. It would have been more convincing to take into account other circumstances, such as the place of habitual residence of the purchasers, the place where they used the vehicle, and the place of marketing, as already suggested in this blog. Advocate General Sánchez Bordona had also suggested a combination of the place of purchase and the place of marketing. Only a holistic approach can properly balance the interests of the claimant and the defendant.

Trevor Hartley (London School of Economics) has published the 3rd edition of his textbook on International Commercial Litigation.

The book combines extensive texts presenting the topics discussed and extracts from cases and legislative materials (European regulations, international conventions, national acts). It is a mix of a textbook and a casebook.

As its title suggests, the focus of the book is on international civil procedure. It presents in depth issues of jurisdiction and foreign jugdments, but also freezing assets and the taking of evidence abroad. As its title does not suggest, the last part of the book also covers choice of law, and offers an in depth treatment of choice of law in contracts, torts and property.

The book is remarkable by the comparative stance that it takes on all the topics that the covers. It systematically presents the position in the EU, in England and in the U.S. It also sometimes includes cases and materials from other common law jurisdictions such as Canada.

Taking a fresh and modern approach to the subject, this fully revised and restructured textbook provides everything necessary to gain a good understanding of international commercial litigation. Adopting a comparative stance, it provides extensive coverage of US and Commonwealth law, in addition to the core areas of English and EU law. Extracts from key cases and legislative acts are designed to meet the practical requirements of litigators as well as explaining the ideas behind legal provisions. Significant updates include coverage of new case-law from the Court of Justice of the European Union. Of particular importance has been a set of judgments on jurisdiction in tort for pure financial loss, many of which have involved investment loss. New case law from the English courts, including the Supreme Court, and from the Supreme Court of the United States, is also covered.

Mark C. Weidemaier (University of North Carolina School Law) and G. Mitu Gulati (Duke Law School) have posted Unlawfully-Issued Sovereign Debt on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

In 2016, its economy in shambles and looking to defer payment on its debts, the Venezuelan government of Nicolás Maduro proposed a multi-billion dollar debt swap to holders of bonds issued by the government’s crown jewel, state-owned oil company Petroleós de Venezuela S.A. (“PDVSA”). A new government now challenges that bond issuance, arguing it was unlawful under Venezuelan law. Bondholders counter that this does not matter—that PDVSA freed itself of any borrowing limits by agreeing to a choice-of-law clause designating New York law.

The dispute over the PDVSA 2020 bonds implicates a common problem. Sovereign nations borrow under constraints imposed by their own laws. Loans that violate these constraints may be deemed invalid. Does an international bond—i.e., one expressly made subject to the law of a different jurisdiction—protect investors against that risk? The answer depends on the text of the loan’s choice-of-law clause, as interpreted against the backdrop of the forum’s rules for resolving conflict of laws problems.

We show that the choice-of-law clauses in many international sovereign bonds—especially when issued under New York law—use language that may expose investors to greater risk. We document the frequent use of “carve outs” that could be interpreted to require the application of the sovereign’s local law to a wide range of issues. If interpreted in this way, these clauses materially reduce the protection ostensibly offered by an international bond. We explain why we think a narrower interpretation is more appropriate.