Agrégateur de flux

En application de l’article 36 de l’accord de coopération en matière de justice du 24 avril 1961 liant la France et le Burkina Faso, une décision prononcée dans ce pays ne peut pas obtenir l’exequatur en France dès lors que le contrat litigieux comportait une clause attributive de juridiction désignant un tribunal français et que le juge burkinabé était donc dépourvu de compétence indirecte.

en lire plus

Erasmus School of Law (under the ERC project Building EU Civil Justice) in collaboration with the Max Planck Institute for Procedural Law Luxembourg, and the Montaigne Centre for Rule of Law and Administration of Justice (Utrecht University) are hosting the seminar ‘Innovating International Business Courts: A European Outlook’ that will take place in Rotterdam on 10 July 2018.

In relation thereto Erasmus Law Review invites submissions for its upcoming special issue on International Business Courts – a European and Global Perspective on topics relating to court specialization, specifically relating to the development of international business courts in Europe and beyond, and focusing on justice innovation and their relevance for access to justice and the judicial system, including the challenges they may pose for judicial administration, litigants and other stakeholders. Contributions can be theoretical, empirical as well as policy oriented. Interdisciplinary approaches are especially encouraged. The issue will also include papers focusing on the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (England and Wales), France, Germany, and Belgium, and deriving from the seminar.

Authors of selected papers will be exempt from registration fees for the seminar and will have the opportunity to present a poster during the drinks after the seminar.

Please submit an abstract in English of no more than 500 words to Erlis Themeli (themeli@law.eur.nl) and Alexandre Biard (biard@law.eur.nl) before 10 June 2018. Please include your name, affiliation, and a link to your research profile. You will be informed on the outcome on 24 June 2018 at the latest. Responsible issue editors are Xandra Kramer (Erasmus University Rotterdam/Utrecht Utrecht) and John Sorabji (University College, London).

The final paper should be 8,000-12,000 words in length (including footnotes) and must comply with the Erasmus Law Review’s Authors Guidelines. Selected papers will go through the regular double-blind peer review process and publication is subject to the outcome of this review process. The deadline for submission of the paper is 1 October 2018.

For more information see the Call for Papers.

I reported earlier on Sulamerica and the need properly and preferably, expressly to provide for choice of law vis-a-vis arbitration agreements, in particular vis-a-vis three elements: lex arbitri, lex curia, lex contractus. In Shagang the High Court added its view on the possible relevance of a fourth factor: the geographical venue of the arbitration, and its impact in particular on the curial law: the law which determines the procedure which is to be followed.

Atlas Power Ltd -v- National Transmission and Despatch Co Ltd  [2018] EWHC 1052 is another good illustration of the relevance (but in practice: rarity) of the proper identification of all four factors.

Bracewell excellently identify the four take away points from Atlas Power:

1. It is the seat of arbitration that determines the curial law of the arbitration, not the governing law of the contract.
2. (To English Courts) the choice of the seat of arbitration is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of the place designated as the seat of the arbitration having the supervisory role over the arbitration.
3. The English courts can and will use their powers to grant anti-suit injunctions to prevent a party from commencing foreign proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement.
4. Complex drafting increases the risk of satellite litigation and the accompanying delay and expense.

The core point which Atlas Power illustrates is that specific identification of arbitration venue, curial law, lex contractus and lex arbitri is best done in simple terms. Overcomplication, particularly variance of any of these four points, is a truly bad idea. Specifically: the arbitration clause in the contracts between the parties (text from Bracewell’s overview)

1. Started by providing that the “arbitration shall be conducted in Lahore, Pakistan”.
2. Then stated that if the value of the dispute was above a certain threshold or fell within a certain category, either party could require that the arbitration be conducted in London.
3. Finally, the clause provided that, notwithstanding the previous sentences, either party may require that the arbitration of any dispute be conducted in London, provided that if the dispute did not satisfy the threshold or category requirements set out earlier in the clause the referring party would pay the costs of the arbitration incurred by the other party in excess of the costs that would have been incurred had the arbitration taken place in Pakistan.

 

Various procedural events led to Phillips J essentially having to decide: whether the parties had validly and lawfully chosen London as the seat of the arbitration (answer: yes); and whether, in light of Pakistani law (which was the law governing the contracts), the choice of London as the seat of arbitration did not result in the English courts having exclusive supervisory jurisdiction with the effect that the courts of Pakistan had at least concurrent jurisdiction (answer: no, for this would result in an unsatisfactory situation where more than one jurisdiction could entertain challenges to an award)

Variation of any litigation relevant articles really does open all sorts of cans of worms.

Geert.

 

Professor Hannah Buxbaum has recently published an important report (see here), prepared for the International Academy of Comparative Law’s International Congress, on forum selection clauses.  Below is the abstract.

Abstract

A forum selection clause is a form of contractual waiver. By this device, a contract party waives its rights to raise jurisdictional or venue objections if a lawsuit is initiated against it in the chosen court. The use of such a clause in a particular case may therefore raise a set of questions under contract law. Is the waiver valid? Was it procured by fraud, duress, or other unconscionable means? What is its scope? And so on. Unlike most contractual waivers, though, a forum selection clause affects not only the private rights and obligations of the parties, but something of more public concern: the jurisdiction of a court to resolve a dispute. The enforcement of such a clause therefore raises an additional set of questions under procedural law. For instance, if the parties designate a court in a forum that is otherwise unconnected to the dispute, must (or should) that court hear a case initiated there? If one of the parties initiates litigation in a non-designated forum that is connected to the dispute, must (or should) that court decline to hear the case?

This report, prepared for the International Academy of Comparative Law in connection with its XXth International Congress, analyzes the approach to these questions in the United States. The bottom line is straightforward: almost always, in consumer as well as commercial contracts, forum selection clauses will be enforced. Navigating the array of substantive, procedural, and conflicts rules whose interplay yields that result, though, is far less straightforward. That is the task of this report. Following a short background, it surveys current state law on their use, in consumer as well as commercial contracts. The report then discusses the interpretation and enforcement of forum selection clauses in both state and federal courts. It analyzes their effect on jurisdiction as well as on doctrines involving venue, such as removal and forum non conveniens. The report also covers choice of law problems, particularly as they arise in the course of litigation in federal courts.

Pourvoi c/ Tribunal de police de Paris, 28 novembre 2017

To celebrate its 30th Private International Law Day, the SICL is holding a conference devoted to the new challenges of what is sometimes described as the “collaborative” or “sharing” economy. It will take place in Lausanne on 28th June 2018.

The concept of economy includes crowdfunding, “Uberisation” and all other intermediary activities using a digital platform. These mass phenomena, witnessed on a global scale, put in question the very notion of the territorial division of state borders. Is the digital space in which these platforms operate a true space, capable of being delineated and regulated at the national level, and which falls into the territorial scope of application of a law? Or is it rather a volatile cloud, globalised, delocalised, incapable of being pinned down on such a territorial basis? Is it still possible for nation states to guarantee their citizens and/or residents legal protection with regard to the intermediaries who employ them or who offer them their services? Or has it not become essential, even urgent, that a supranational law be devised and placed in the same cloudy skies in which the platform operates? Further still: is it possible to require platforms and their operators to be measured against the particular requirements of a state, notably those concerning the protection of workers and consumers? What role can contemporary private international law play in this regard?

All these questions present a challenge to the supposed neutrality sought by private international law and bring to the fore its potential political and protective role. In this respect, the state can use private international law in order to guarantee cross border protection to the weakest actors in the marketplace – notably, workers and consumers – who reside within its territory (and/or its citizens). On the other hand, however, it may be argued that state interference aimed at constraining those who operate in the digital economy may lead to harmful distortions of the global market. In this regard, what guarantees should be afforded to the freedom of the internet and, at the same time, to that of workers, whose decisions to join and work with a digital platform are made of their own free will? These considerations therefore demand that we draw on the traditional principles of party autonomy and decisional harmony. Speakers include Janine Berg, ILO Genève, Andrea Bonomi, Université de Lausanne, Miriam Cherry, University of St. Louis, Valerio De Stefano, KU Leuven, Marie-Cécile Escande Varniol, Université Lumière, Lyon II, Pietro Franzina, Università degli Studi di Ferrara, Ljupcho Grozdanovski, Université de Genève, Florence Guillaume, Université de Neuchâtel, Tobias Lutzi, University of Oxford, Anne Meier, MSS Law, Edmondo Mostacci, Università Bocconi, Etienne Pataut, Université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, Ilaria Pretelli, Institut suisse de droit comparé, Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Gian Paolo Romano, Université de Genève, et Gerald Spindler, Georg-August-Universität.

Click here for whole program and further information.

The European Commission has published yesterday two communications, proposing the amendment of the Evidence and Service Regulations (1201/2000 & 1393/2007 respectively).

The texts can be retrieved here  & here.

The key amendments suggested by both proposals have been summarized by Prof. Emmanuel Guinchard here & here.

‘Reading’ Arica Victims v Boliden Mineral (I have a copy of the case, but not yet a link to ECLI or other database; however there’s a good uncommented summary of the judgment here] leaves me frustrated simply for my lack of understanding of Swedish. Luckily Matilda Hellstorm at Lindahl has good review here (including a hyperlink to her earlier posting which alerted me to the case in 2017).

Boliden Mineral exported toxic waste to Chile in the ’80s, prior to either Basel or EU or OECD restraints (or indeed bans) kicking in. A first issue for consideration was determination of lex causae. Rome II does not apply ratione temporis (it only applies to tortious events occurring after its date of entry into force) – residual Swedish private international law applies, which determined lex causae as lex loci damni. The Court found this to include statute of limitation. This would have been 10 years under Swedish law, and a more generous (in Matilda’s report undefined) period under Chilean law. Statute of limitation therefore following lex causae – not lex fori.

Despite this being good for claimants, the case nevertheless failed. The Swedish court found against liability (for the reasons listed in Matilda’s report). (With a small exception seemingly relating to negligence in seeing waste being uncovered). Proof of causality seems to have been the biggest factor in not finding liability.

Leave for appeal has been applied for.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8.

 

 

Non lieu à renvoi

Non lieu à renvoi

Chambre de l'instruction de la cour d'appel de Lyon, 27 mars 2018

Engagement solennel devant la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne de quatre nouveaux membres de la Cour des comptes européenne

Valcheva
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La notion de « droit de visite » comprend le droit de visite des grands-parents à l’égard de leurs petits-enfants

Wegener
Environnement et consommateurs
Le droit à indemnisation pour retard important d’un vol s’applique aussi aux vols avec correspondances vers un État tiers faisant escale en dehors de l’UE

Hassan
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Lorsqu’une personne se rend dans un État membre après avoir introduit une demande de protection internationale dans un autre État membre, le premier État membre ne peut pas décider de la transférer vers le second État membre avant que celui-ci n’ait donné son accord à la demande de reprise en charge

Korwin-Mikke / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
Le Tribunal annule les décisions du bureau du Parlement européen infligeant des sanctions à l’eurodéputé Korwin-Mikke en raison de propos tenus dans l’hémicycle

I promised a post on C-560/16 E.ON v Dědouch sooner than I have been able to deliver – I have reviewed Wathelet AG’s Opinion here. I do not evidently hold the magic key to the optimal interpretation of Article 24(2) Brussels I Recast’s. Yet regular readers of the blog indeed my students will know I  am not much of a fan of Article 24 full stop – let alone its extensive interpretation.

Briefly, the facts. By a resolution of 8 December 2006, the general meeting of the company incorporated under Czech law, Jihočeská plynárenská, established in the Czech Republic, decided on the compulsory transfer of all the participating securities in that company to its principal shareholder E.ON, established in Munich (Germany). A group of minority shareholders contest not the validity of the sale, but purely the price paid. Czech law moreover holds that any finding on the reasonableness of the price paid cannot have an impact on the very validity of the transfer.

Lower Czech courts consecutively entertained and accepted cq rejected jurisdiction on the basis of Article 6(1) [no details are given but presumably with Jihočeská plynárenská as the anchor defendant, 24(2) (but then presumably with , 7(1) [again no details given but presumably a consequence of the purchase of shares by the minority shareholders]. Both Wathelet AG suggests, and the CJEU holds that the action for review of the reasonableness of the consideration that the principal shareholder of a company is required to pay to the minority shareholders of that company in the event of the compulsory transfer of their shares to that principal shareholder, comes within the scope of application of (now) Article 24(2). Both refer extensively to C‑372/07 Hassett and Doherty, among others.

The general line of interpretation is: secure Article 24’s effet utile, but apply restrictively (like all other exceptions to the actor sequitur forum rei rule).  I do not think that the CJEU honours restrictive interpretation in E.ON. Readers best consult the (fairly succinct – ditto for the Opinion) judgment in full. A few observations.

In the majority (not quite all) of the cases of exclusive jurisdictional rules,  Gleichlauf is part of the intention. That generally is a proposition which goes against the very nature of private international law and should not in my view be encouraged. Particularly within the EU there is not much reason not to trust fellow courts with the application of one’s laws – indeed quite regularly these laws may be better applied by others.

Generally at least three of Article 24 Jurisdictional rules (rights in rem; the corporate exception; and IPR) refer at least in part to the issue of publicity (of public records) and their availability in the Member States whose courts haven been given exclusive jurisdiction. That argument in my view is sooo 1968 (which indeed it is). I see little reason to apply it in 2018.

Further, in accordance with the Jenard report, the principal reason for Article 24(2) is to avoid conflicting decisions of EU courts on the existence of the company or the validity of the decisions of its organs. This goal of course may be equally met by the lis alibi pendens rule – Article 24 does not play a unique role here.

Finally the CJEU remarks at 34 ‘In the present case, while it is true that, under Czech law, proceedings such as those at issue in the main proceedings may not lead formally to a decision which has the effect of invalidating a resolution of the general assembly of a company concerning the compulsory transfer of the minority shareholders’ shares in that company to the majority shareholder, the fact nonetheless remains that, in accordance with the requirements of the autonomous interpretation and uniform application of the provisions of Regulation No 44/2001, the scope of Article 22(2) thereof cannot depend on the choices made in national law by Member States or vary depending on them.’ To cross-refer to the aforementioned Jenard Report: if Article 24(2)’s goal is to avoid conflicting decisions on life and death etc. And if that life and death of a national company depends on the applicable national law as the Court acknowledges here and ditto in Daily Mail and Cartesio/Polbud), then of course the lex causae must have an impact on the application of Article 24(2) .

The Court’s finding on 24(2) meant it did not get to the Article 7 analysis – which I did review in my post on the AG’s Opinion.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private international law, 2nd ed. 2016. Heading 2.2.6.5.

 

Chambre de l'instruction de la cour d'appel de Douai, 13 avril 2018

Conseil de prud'hommes de Clermont-Ferrand, 14 mai 2018