Flux européens

Aucrinde
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Avocate générale Ćapeta : la Charte n’interdit pas d’établir la paternité par prélèvement génétique post mortem

Bervidi
Politique sociale
Discrimination au travail : la protection des droits des personnes handicapées contre les discriminations indirectes s’étend aux parents d’enfants handicapés

MSIG
Principe ne bis in idem : une personne ne peut être poursuivie dans un État membre pour un acte de terrorisme lui ayant déjà valu une condamnation dans un autre État membre, bien que la qualification de l’infraction y soit différente

Banco Santander (Résolution bancaire Banco Popular III)
Libre circulation des personnes
Banco Popular : les droits découlant des actions en nullité et en responsabilité introduites avant la résolution de cette banque sont opposables à Banco Santander

Autriche / Commission (Centrale nucléaire Paks II)
Aide d'État
La Cour de justice annule la décision de la Commission approuvant l’aide de la Hongrie pour la centrale nucléaire Paks II

Positive Group / Conseil
Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune
Guerre en Ukraine : le Tribunal confirme les mesures restrictives contre Positive Group PAO, une entité active dans le secteur russe des technologies de l’information et titulaire d’une licence délivrée par les services de renseignement intérieurs russes

Meta Platforms Ireland / Commission
Rapprochement des législations
Règlement sur les services numériques : le Tribunal annule les décisions de la Commission fixant la redevance de surveillance applicable à Facebook, Instagram et TikTok

Autriche / Commission
Le recours de l’Autriche contre l’inclusion de l’énergie nucléaire et du gaz fossile dans le régime des investissements durables est rejeté

Advocate General Norkus opined early July in Case C-485/24 Locatrans Sarl v ES. At issue is the application of the protective regime for lex contractus viz employees under the Rome Convention (applicable ratione temporis in the case at issue).

The facts of the case echo, but with distinctions, CJEU Weber, Koelzsch, and  Voogsgeerd, as well as Nogueira (Ryanair). The novelty of the question in current case is the period of work to be taken into account in determining which law is applicable if the employee has worked for his or her employer in two separate stages: first, in several States and next, during the period preceding the end of the employment relationship, on a permanent basis in a single State, which parties clearly intend to be the new place of habitual performance.

The opposing views are summarised (23):

Referring to the judgment in Weber, Locatrans and the Czech Government submit, inter alia, that where the employee carries out the same activities for his or her employer in more than one State, account must be taken of the whole duration of the employment relationship in order to identify the place where the person concerned habitually worked and, consequently, the law applicable in the absence of a choice made by the parties. For its part, the French Government considers that, that being the case, the most recent period of work could be taken into account in order to determine, in the light of all of the relevant circumstances, the existence of closer connections with another country. By contrast, ES maintains, as a preliminary point, that, despite the wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling, he did not change his place of work during his employment relationship. He submits, therefore, that his situation is clearly distinguishable from that which gave rise to the judgment in Weber, where the worker had performed his duties successively in two different places of work. In any event, even if the judgment in Weber were to be held to be relevant to the present case, ES argues that reference must be made to the most recent period of work. For its part, the Commission maintains that, in a case such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which the dispute concerns the termination of the contract and where the relevant facts for the purposes of coming to a judgment arise at the end of the contract, account must be taken of the most recent period of work.

(36) the core rule per Koelzsch is

‘the country in which the employee habitually carries out his [or her] work in performance of the contract’ is that in which or from which, in the light of all of the factors which characterise that activity, the employee performs the greater part of his or her obligations towards his or her employer’

In footnote the AG adds that what must be at the heart of the national court’s assessment is the activity of the worker and not that of the employer (for which he refers to the Handbook, much obliged and humbly noted).

Having summarised the relevant case-law, (51) the Opinion takes a decisive turn when the AG refers to the need to interpret the regime with stability in mind:

[I] would point out that, in so far as the employment relationship is a permanent one, the elements characterising that relationship, such as the performance of work, the place of performance of the work or the remuneration, may change. In particular, in a cross-border employment situation, the country where the employee ‘habitually carries out his [or her] work’ may also change depending on changes in objective circumstances. In other words, the law applicable in the absence of a choice made by the parties may change due to the very nature of the employment relationship, which continues over time. However, since one of the objectives of the Rome Convention is to fortify confidence in the stability of the relationship between the parties to the contract, a change in the applicable law resulting from changes in factual circumstances must also be the result of a clear intention on the part of the parties. That change must not affect legal relationships which arose prior to that change, so that, rationae temporis, the dispute remains governed by the law applicable at the time those circumstances arose (tempus regit actum). (footnotes omitted)

Tempus regit actum is a principle with direct appeal and application for procedural law, for issues of intertemporary law (scope of application ratione temporis, particularly of statute) and for formal validity in private international law. Its application for substantive provisions in private international law is less obvious (there are traces of it of course in Rome I’s Article 3(2) on voluntary change of applicable law, Article 11’s formal validity, and Article 13 incapacity).

For employment contracts, in my opinion the very first agreed “place from where the employee habitually carries out his work” must be seen as an implicit mutual choice of law, and any mutually agreed (or at least  transparent and uncontested) change in said place, as an implicit change in that choice of law. Article 3(2) must then be applied mutatis mutandis

The parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law other than that which previously governed it, whether as a result of an earlier choice made under this Article or of other provisions of this Regulation. Any change in the law to be applied that is made after the conclusion of the contract shall not prejudice its formal validity under Article 11 or adversely affect the rights of third parties.

(52) the AG follows a similar approach focused on deciding what it is the parties are actually litigating about, to then fix the lex causae applicable to the claim, to the relevant, mutually agreed, place of habitual employment in force at the time:

In the light of the foregoing, the essential question is what is, in the present case, the relevant criterion for determining, in concreto, the point in time at which the subject matter of the dispute arose in order to identify the place where the employee habitually carried out his work and, consequently, the law applicable in the absence of a choice made by the parties.

(54) the AG like the Commission identifies the nature of the claim as one in which the employee’s dispute concerns the termination of the contract. The facts relevant to the determination of that dispute in casu it seems arise at the end of that contract, hence the most recent period of employment (with fixed place of employment in France) should be taken into account to determine the lex causae. (57) Gleichlauf is mentioned as one of the reasons for suggesting so.

If followed by the CJEU, a sophisticated litigant could of course abuse this approach to formulate their claim in such a way as to lead to an attractive applicable law. However as a general rule the approach seems a solid one to me.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed 2024, 3.39 ff.

Opinion Norkus AG this morningFavor laboris in Rome Convention, applicable lawPlace of habitual place of employment must focus on most recent period if place has become fixed, by mutual agreementC‑485/24 Locatrans curia.europa.eu/juris/docume… (citjng ia your truly – sincerely humbled)

— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-07-03T11:57:31.029Z

Puigdemont i Casamajó e.a. / Parlement (Levée de l’immunité parlementaire)
L’avocat général Szpunar propose de rejeter trois moyens du pourvoi introduit par M. Antoni Comín contre l’arrêt du Tribunal rejetant son recours contre la levée de son immunité par le Parlement européen

Shipov
Avocat général Richard de la Tour : l’État membre d’origine d’une personne transgenre a l’obligation de délivrer des documents d’identité conformes à l’identité de genre vécue

Safi
Avocate générale Ćapeta : la citoyenneté de l’Union englobe le droit de ne pas circuler

C.J.
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Une autorité judiciaire ne peut pas refuser d’exécuter un mandat d’arrêt européen et prendre en charge elle-même l’exécution de la peine sans le consentement de l’État qui a émis ce mandat

AW "T"
Principes du droit communautaire
Une juridiction nationale est tenue de considérer comme non avenu l’arrêt d’une juridiction de rang supérieur qui ne constitue pas un tribunal indépendant, impartial et établi préalablement par la loi

CEPD / CRU (Notion de données à caractère personnel)
La Cour de justice précise la portée de la notion de « données à caractère personnel » dans le contexte d’un transfert de données pseudonymisées à des tiers

Latombe / Commission
Principes du droit communautaire
Protection des données : le Tribunal rejette le recours visant à l’annulation du nouveau cadre de transfert de données à caractère personnel entre l’Union européenne et les États-Unis

Zalando / Commission
Rapprochement des législations
Le Tribunal rejette le recours de Zalando contre la désignation de sa plate-forme éponyme comme une très grande plate-forme en ligne

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

DHV v Motor Insurers’ Bureau (Rev1) [2025] EWHC 2002 (KB) is an interesting case to discuss statutory construction of EU law, specifically (and this is mostly how it ended up on the blog) with respect to Rome II’s ‘evidence and procedure’ carve-out and the impact of its recital 33 on same.

Those interested in the use of experts in proceedings generally, may want to read the first 80 or so paras of the judgment as well, for the account by Dias J of the various experts and their credibility is most informative, as is [45]

Two accident reconstruction experts gave live evidence: …..The factual conclusions the court reaches must be based on the totality of evidence, combining expert and all other relevant evidence. The court is not bound by the conclusions of any expert if it offends logic and common sense. We do not have trial by experts. This principle applies with equal force to the other pairs of experts, on Spanish law, actuarial evidence and medico-legal matters. I will not repeat that important warning and qualification. (emphasis added)

Now, to the conflict of laws issues at hand:

The judgment on this issue kicks off with general observations on determining applicable law, and the precise implications of ‘foreign law as fact’ with [82] reference ia to Lambert v MIB as well [83 ff] as how exactly that foreign law needs to be applied: entirely as it has been done by the relevant foreign courts (possibly all the way up to their supreme court), or, if their is evidence (provided by the experts) that these foreign courts have not actually properly applied their own laws, by the English court’s ‘proper’ reading of those laws.

[85] ff then discuss Rome II’s ‘evidence and procedure’ carve-out, which I review in the handbook with reference to all authorities reviewed in current case. Pro memoria, relevant statutory provisions are

Article 1(3)

This Regulation shall not apply to evidence and procedure,
without prejudice to Articles 21 and 22.

Note ! this is a proper and entire carve-out altogether from the scope of the Regulation, different from Article 1(2) which excludes certain issues which as a result of Article 1(1) are within its scope, but are then excepted.

(Articles 21 and 22 are of no relevance to the case at issue; see on those Articles eg Quilombola, X v Y (parental responsibility) or X v Y ( monies viz real estate transaction).

Article 15 ‘Scope of the law applicable’

Article 15
Scope of the law applicable
The law applicable to non-contractual obligations under this Regulation shall govern in particular:
(a) the basis and extent of liability, including the determination of persons who may be held liable for acts performed by them;
(b) the grounds for exemption from liability, any limitation of liability and any division of liability c) the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or the remedy claimed;
(d) within the limits of powers conferred on the court by its procedural law, the measures which a court may take to prevent or terminate injury or damage or to ensure the provision of compensation;
(e) the question whether a right to claim damages or a remedy may be transferred, including by inheritance;
(f) persons entitled to compensation for damage sustained personally;
(g) liability for the acts of another person;
(h) the manner in which an obligation may be extinguished and rules of prescription and limitation, including rules relating to the commencement, interruption and suspension of a period of prescription or limitation.

Of further relevance is recital 33

According to the current national rules on compensation awarded to victims of road traffic accidents, when quantifying damages for personal injury in cases in which the accident takes place in a State other than that of the habitual residence of the victim, the court seised should take into account all the relevant actual circumstances of the specific victim, including in particular the actual losses and costs of after-care and medical attention.

Wall v Mutuelle of course is the core reference employed although as I have said before, it is wrong to suggest such as the judge does here [87] that “While [the evidence and procedure carve-out] is a derogation from article 15, it must be narrowly construed”.

A first bone of contention is whether Rome II applies at all to the case. It’s probably me who does not quite see how that argument is made. The question in the end is not all that relevant given the answer to the second issue: whether recital 33 has a substantive impact on the case. The judge held it does not.

I have not recently looked at Recital 33, nor done a detailed study of its travaux. That word in fact gives the recital too much credit: a recital can be part of the travaux of a statutory provision. It does not have its own travaux, given that recitals plainly are not EU statutory law. In the case of current recital, it was a plaster to sooth the European Parliament’s failure to introduce what would have been in effect a harmonisation of substantive law on full compensation (the restitutio in integrum principle; the judge here refers ia to prof Dickinson’s discussion of the recital).

Dias J also discusses Halsbury on EU statutory law as a general background to the application of EU law. He is wrong in my opinion to [114] suggest that “the current national rules on compensation” as used in recital 33, are a reference to the applicable lex causae (which he incompletely refers to as the ‘lex loci’: ‘damni’ should be added to that). ‘The current national rules’ refers to ius commune as eg the French version shows: ‘En vertu des règles nationales existantes en matière d’indemnisation des victimes d’accidents de la circulation routière.’

Conclusion [127]: recital 33 is not a legal rule. At the most it may be of relevance in an A4(3) ‘more closely connected’ scenario – which is not the case here.

A case of interest for Rome II. Another example, too, of where continental courts in all likelihood would not have allowed the arguments to run quite to the intensity they were argued here (contributing of course to the costs of proceedings in English courts).

Geert.

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

In  SC Commercial Bank Privatbank v Kolomoisky & Ors [2025] EWHC 1987 (Ch), Trower J covers a lot of ground (2025 paras of ground).

At the time of the events with which these proceedings are concerned, claimant Privatbank (‘the Bank’) was Ukraine’s largest bank.  It was declared insolvent by the National Bank of Ukraine on 18 December 2016 and was nationalised over the course of the following days.  These proceedings have been brought by the Bank against two of its founding shareholders, first defendant Igor Kolomoisky and second defendant Gennadiy Bogolyubov (the ‘individual defendants’) and six companies (‘the corporate defendants) said to be owned or controlled by them seeking compensation for harm caused by what the Bank alleges to have been their participation in a fraudulent scheme carried out prior to nationalisation. The Bank also claims in unjust enrichment against a number of defendants.

Of relevance to the blog is the discussion of Article 10 (assimilated) Rome II on unjust enrichment, viz a number of restitution claims, and application of Article 26 Rome II on limitation periods and public policy.

Firstly, on Article 10 Rome II: the law applicable to the claim in unjust enrichment.

The Bank contends that its claims against the Corporate Defendants in unjust enrichment are governed by Ukrainian law per A10(2) and (4) Rome II. The Corporate Defendants contend that any claims against them in unjust enrichment are governed by Cypriot law and they rely on A10(2) Rome II.

For ease of digesting this post: Article 10 Rome II reads

1. If a non-contractual obligation arising out of unjust enrichment, including payment of amounts wrongly received, concerns a relationship existing between the parties, such as one arising out of a contract or a tort/delict, that is closely connected with that unjust enrichment, it shall be governed by the law that governs that relationship.

2. Where the law applicable cannot be determined on the basis of paragraph 1 and the parties have their habitual residence in the same country when the event giving rise to unjust enrichment occurs, the law of that country shall apply.

3. Where the law applicable cannot be determined on the basis of paragraphs 1 or 2, it shall be the law of the country in which the unjust enrichment took place.

4. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the non-contractual obligation arising out of unjust enrichment is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, the law of that other country shall apply.

[1581] The language of A10 requires the court first to consider whether the non-contractual obligation concerns a relationship existing between the Bank and the Corporate Defendants, which is closely connected with the unjust  enrichment.  If it does, the law that governs that relationship must be applied unless A10(4) is engaged.  The Bank submitted that its restitutionary claim against the Corporate Defendants engaged A10(1) because it concerned the relationship arising out of its tortious claim under Ukrainian law against the Corporate Defendants.

[1583] Trower J follows Tear J in Banque Cantonale de Geneve v. Polevent:  it is insufficient that, after the tort had been committed, there was a relationship between victim and tortfeasor “with legal consequences”, to engage A10(1).

Pro memoria: Article 10(1) reads

“If a non-contractual obligation arising out of unjust enrichment, including payment of amounts wrongly received, concerns a relationship existing between the parties, such as one arising out of a contract or a tort/delict, that is closely connected with that unjust enrichment, it shall be governed by the law that governs that relationship”

A relationship “existing” between the parties, it is held, must be one that existed prior to the events giving rise to the claim.

A10(2) was not argued by the parties, nor in fact was A4. This leaves the question, first, of the identification of the country in which enrichment took place, and second, whether by application of A10(4), the laws of that country might be displaced by the laws of another country that is manifestly more closely connected to the non-contractual obligation.

On the first issue [1585]: the locus of the enrichment:

… the country in which the unjust enrichment took place for the purpose of determining the effect of Article 10(3).  There is no real dispute about this. The relevant country is Cyprus, because the Bank’s allegation is that the Corporate Defendants were enriched by acquiring property in the form of prepayments under the RSAs in circumstances in which they have never complied with their purported obligations under the RSAs or returned the Unreturned Prepayments.  It is therefore the Bank’s case that the enrichment comes from the acquisition of property in the form of money which occurred with the crediting of the Corporate Defendants’ accounts at the Cyprus branch of the Bank.

Here Trower J [1593] sides with the bank, not readily it seems but firmly nevertheless.

[1586-1587] the Bank’s arguments are outlined (these have a strong Universal Music echo – of course that case was jurisdictional, not applicable law):

[the Bank argues] the only relevant factor which connects the claim in unjust enrichment to Cyprus is the location of the Corporate Defendants’ bank accounts, which adds nothing because that is no more than the justification for applying Article 10(3) in the first place.  The Bank also submitted that Cyprus as a location was of no particular significance, because the Corporate Defendants could equally have had their accounts with another non-Ukrainian subsidiary of the Bank (e.g., in Latvia).  The only point which mattered was that the destination of the funds should be outside Ukraine.

More positively, Ukraine was said to be manifestly more closely connected to the restitutionary obligation than Cyprus, because the Corporate Defendants received the Unreturned Prepayments as part of a fraudulent scheme controlled by two Ukrainian oligarchs with the purpose and effect of misappropriating funds from a Ukrainian Bank.  The Bank also relied on the fact that the scheme was actually implemented by and with the involvement of a number of individuals, including people said to be the UBOs of the Corporate Defendants, who were based in Ukraine (…).  It also relied on the fact that the Corporate Defendants knew that the Unreturned Prepayments were funded by fraudulent loans from the Bank in Ukraine and the whole structure was designed to conceal breaches of Ukrainian currency control regulations.

[1588] are the defendants’ arguments:

it  could not possibly be said that the connections to Cyprus were not real and substantial.  The Corporate Defendants were not themselves Ukrainian (they were incorporated in England and the BVI) and they were managed by Cypriot professional directors; indeed it was the Bank’s own case that the Individual Defendants’ control of and influence over the Corporate Defendants was through Primecap, a Cypriot corporate services provider established by Cypriot lawyers.  [It was also argued] that Cyprus was the country in which the money which was the subject of the Bank’s claim continued to be located when it was transferred on by the Corporate Defendants.  Another factor which counted against a manifestly closer connection to Ukraine was that the prepayments were received by the Corporate Defendants in US$ rather than UAH.

Of note in the judge’s analysis (which of course kicks off [1589] with the observation that ‘all circumstances’ and ‘manifestly’ mandate a high bar for A10(4)) are

• [1589] the comparison is between countries, not laws: “the court’s task is to ascertain whether there is a country, which has a manifestly closer connection to the restitutionary obligation – i.e., the focus is on the country not the law.  In the present case, the exercise required by Article 10(4) is a comparison of the connection between the restitutionary obligation and Cyprus on the one hand and between the restitutionary obligation and Ukraine on the other.”
• [1590] “The comparison is between connections to Cyprus and connections to Ukraine.  Connections to third countries may go to show that not every factor apart from the place of receipt points inexorably to Ukraine, but if they do not point to Cyprus, their usefulness is limited”. (Unless of course, one assumes, if they were to point to a third country hence also its applicable law altogether, but that does not seem to be the case here).

I do not think this is correct. Those wishing to show that A10(3) is to be dislodged by application of A10(4), need to show that that the obligation in unjust enrichment, is manifestly more closely connected to another country, following from all circumstances of the case. Arguably the connections to third countries undermine the A10(4) analysis and therefore are most useful: even if they do not point to the A10(3) country. Of note in this context is that A10(3) is not the result of a most closely connected analysis: it is simply a vector introduced for predictability and certainty. I imagine this may have featured in permission to appeal.

• [1591]: control over Primecap’s activities was exercised by individuals in Ukraine, both generally and for the specific transactions concerned. “The connection to Cyprus is in fact and substance more limited than the place of its establishment and operations might otherwise indicate.  The enrichment occurred in Cyprus (a factor which will always of course be present where it said that Article 10(4) should displace the prima facie rule in Article 10(3)), but the expense was sustained by the Bank in the Ukraine.  I also think that, because steps which gave rise to an unjust enrichment were component parts of a fraud practised on a Ukrainian bank, structured in the way that it was to avoid Ukrainian currency control obligations, and closely interrelated to torts governed by Ukrainian law in which the loss was sustained in Ukraine, points to a very close connection to Ukraine.”

The finding in favour of engaging A10(4) comes despite what the judge [1592] called an argument “with real substance”: the DNA of the whole scheme:

“a transfer out of Ukraine, and (more importantly for the claim in unjust enrichment) a receipt by a recipient outside Ukraine, was an essential element of what all parties accept (for different reasons) was a loan recycling scheme intended to avoid Ukraine’s currency control regulations.  I agree that the fact that it was necessary for any enrichment to occur outside Ukraine, detracts from any connection between the restitutionary obligation and Ukraine, and makes it more difficult for the Bank to say that the connection to Ukraine is manifestly closer than Cyprus.”

All in all it is the ‘control’ element it seems which swayed the judge. If that finding stands, it would be useful eg in the Dyson claims.

Next, on the application of Article 26 Rome II on limitation periods and public policy.

The findings on A26 were made obiter [1995] ff, and with reference ia to the Court of Appeal in Begum v Maran: in essence, Trower J notes the very high bar for Article 26 and would have held that that bar has not been reached in casu.

If and when I hear of an appeal, I shall update.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed, 2024, Chapter 4.

Consideration ia of A10 Rome II: law applicable to unjust enrichmentSC Commercial Bank Privatbank v Kolomoisky & Ors [2025] EWHC 1987 (Ch) http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWH…

— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-08-06T10:16:52.929Z

[If you do use the blog for research, practice submission or database purposes, citation would be appreciated, to the blog as a whole and /or to specific blog posts. Many have suggested I should turn the blog into a paid for, subscription service however I have resisted doing so. Proper reference to how the blog is useful to its readers, will help keeping this so.]

Cathay Biotech Inc v Wegochem Europe BV ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2025:3091 is a judgment of relevance to the meaning of ‘arising from’, used frequently in Rome II, Regulation 864/2007; as well as a salutary lesson in how not to apply Article 4 Rome II.

First, on the issue of ‘arising from’ in Article 8.

An alternative to ‘arising from’ used in Rome II is ‘arising out’, for instance in Article 7’s environmental claims: see e.g. Begum v Maran and see my paper on A7 here.

In China, patent infringement judgments have been issued regarding the production of nylon. PRC infringement continues by other entities that have also been held to account by Chinese courts. In current proceedings the patent holder sues a Dutch buyer of the nylon for unlawful conduct, arguing it knew or consciously accepted the significant risk that it was trading in infringing products.

In determining applicable law under Rome II, Cathay Biotech argue A4 is engaged; Wego Europe suggests A8(1) applies:

Article 8
Infringement of intellectual property rights
1. The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of an intellectual property right shall be the law of the country for which protection is claimed.
2. In the case of a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of a unitary Community intellectual property right, the law applicable shall, for any question that is not governed by the relevant Community instrument, be the law of the country in which the act of infringement was committed.
3. The law applicable under this Article may not be derogated from by an agreement pursuant to Article 14.

The court sides with Cathay Biotech: [5.6]:

The court agrees with Cathay Biotech that it bases its claim on unlawful conduct by Wego Europe… Although this alleged unlawful conduct by Wego Europe originates from the theft of trade secrets by third parties and (subsequent) patent infringements committed by third parties, this does not mean that there is an obligation between Wego Europe and Cathay Biotech ‘arising from’ an infringement of an intellectual property right as referred to in [A8(1) Rome II]. After all, the focus is on the unlawful conduct of Wego Europe described above, not on the question of whether Wego Europe (itself) infringes Cathay Biotech’s Chinese patents. The invocation of a patent right is therefore not the core of the dispute. The scope of the Rome II Regulation and Article 8 means that the aforementioned article only concerns claims relating to a non-contractual infringement of these (intellectual property) rights.

I disagree. Cathay’s claim as it is summarised in 4.4 walk and talks intellectual property rights infringement:

Cathay Biotech bases its claim, in summary, on the following. Wego Europe acts unlawfully towards Cathay Biotech by importing and distributing [long chain dicarboxylic acid] LCDA from the Facility in Europe, while knowing that the production of these LCDA by Hilead and the Users infringes Cathay Biotech’s Chinese patents and that many Chinese court rulings in this regard are being systematically ignored. Wego Europe facilitates the unlawful actions of Hilead and the Users by creating a market for these parties and knowingly profits from their unlawful conduct.

Patent infringement is not a context for Cathay’s claim against Wego: it is its roots and branch. The statutory construction of both ‘arising from’ and ‘out’ (similarly, see Lliuya v RWE where no time was wasted at all on whether climate claims ‘arise out’ of environmental damage) instruct a causal link at the lower level of causal intensity.  Cathay’s claim and its formulation approaches that of conspiracy to cause or at the very least purposedly profit from patent infringement. That in my view must fall within Article 8.

Once Article 8 so dismissed, the court then goes off the rails in its Article 4 locus damni analysis. [5.7 and 5.8]

• it links A4 Rome II squarely to A7(2) Brussels Ia, recalling that Article’s split between Handlungsort and Erfolgort.
• It then squarely suggests that within the A4 Rome II analysis, claimant may chose either Handlugsort or Erfolgort as determining the applicable law (plainly wrong);
• it identifies each distribution center within the EU as a Handlungsort. This is as such an interesting proposition, echoing my suggestions for competition law; yet it is completely out off place in the A4 Rome II analysis.
• it considers Chinese law as applicable law under the Handlungsort analysis (although this would require Cathay’s economic loss (its consolidated accounts are in China) to be considered as ‘direct’ damages per A4, instead of eg the place of the loss of market share in the EU Member States as places of direct damage);
• it finally ends up [5.10] in Dutch law as applying to the claim as a whole under A4(3)’s escape clause, in essence because The Netherlands is held to be the locus delicti commissi: Wego is held to have organised its nylon distribution entirely from The Netherlands.

The judgment amounts to very poor engagement with Rome II.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed. 2024. Chapter 4.

Applicable law, patent infringement claimInteresting judgment on (non)application of A8 Rome II viz EU-domiciled purchaser of product made following patent violationMeaning of 'arising from' IPR infringementCathay Biotech v Wegochem ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2025:3091 deeplink.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak?id…

— Geert Van Calster (@gavclaw.bsky.social) 2025-05-27T07:00:33.048Z