Droit international général

The following announcement has been kindly provided by Professor Dr. Stephan Lorenz, LMU Munich.

It was in 1916 that Ernst Rabel founded the ‘Institute of Comparative Law’ at Munich University – the first of its kind in Germany. The 100th Anniversary of the Institute, which still persists as a department of the Institute of International Law at Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, gives reason to review the influence of Ernst Rabel on both, sales law and conflict of laws and to take a current view on recent developments in these fields. As is well-known, Rabel’s work on sales law was highly influential for the development of the Hague Uniform Sales Law of 1964, the precursor of the CISG of 1980. The latter had a formative impact on EU consumer sales law and subsequently on the proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL). But also the current contractual conflict of laws of the EU as the Rome I-Regulation would not exist in its current form without the fundamental contributions of Ernst Rabel. The presentations of the conference cover the entire range of these topics from the beginnings of comparative law and its early years until its most recent developments:

• Dean’s Greeting, Prof. Dr. Martin Franzen
• Introductory Speech, Prof. Dr. Peter Kindler
• The History of the Institute of Comparative Law, Prof. Dr. Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, München/Göttingen
• Welcome and Introduction, Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Hans Jürgen Sonnenberger, München
• Ernst Rabel – The Munich Years, Archivdirektor a.D. Hans-Joachim Hecker, Stadtarchiv München
• Karl Neumeyer as a Pioneer of Comparative Law in the field of Public Law, Prof. Dr. Peter Huber, Judge at the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), München
• Rabel’s Influence on the CISG and the Development of European Sales Law, Prof. Dr. Ulrich Magnus, Hamburg
• The Distinction between Digital and Analogous Goods – How fit for the Future are the Commission’s Proposals for a Law of Contracts in the Digital Interior Market?, Univ.-Prof. Dr. Christiane Wendehorst, LL.M. (Cambridge), Wien
• International Contract Law and CISG, Prof. Dr. Andreas Spickhoff, München
• Transaction-like Party Autonomy, Prof. Dr. Marc-Philippe Weller, Heidelberg
• Conclusions, Prof. Dr. Stephan Lorenz, München

Participation in the Conference requires prior registration here.

The American Branch of the International Law Association has issued a call for papers.  See here for more details.

From the Private International Law Interest Group of the American Society of International Law:

We are pleased to present the second issue of “Commentaries on Private International Law,” the newsletter of the American Society of International Law Private International Law Interest Group.

You may find it here and here.

Professor Anthony Colangelo of the SMU Dedman School of Law has just posted a new article entitled A Systems Theory of Fragmentation and Harmonization.  It blends public and private international law and has a strong dose of conflict of laws.  It is well worth the read!

Also, as a friendly reminder, there is a wonderful SSRN eJournal on Transnational Litigation/Arbitration, Private International Law, and Conflict of Laws that is available here.

General Principles of European Private International Law, a cura di Stefan Leible, Kluwer Law International, 2016, p. 416, ISBN: 9789041159557, Euro 145.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – European private international law, as it stands in the Rome I, II, and III Regulations and the recent Succession Regulation, presents manifold risks of diverging judgments despite seemingly harmonised conflict of law rules. There is now a real danger, in light of the rapid increase in the number of legal instruments of the European Union on conflict of laws, that European private international law will become incoherent. This collection of essays by twenty noted scholars in the field sheds clear light on the pivotal issues of whether a set of overarching rules (a ‘general part’) is required, whether an EU regulation is the adequate legal instrument for such a purpose, which general questions such an instrument should address, and what solutions such an instrument should provide. In analysing the possible emergence of general principles in European private international law over the past years, the contributors discuss such issues and factors as the following: a) the relationship between conflict of laws and recognition; b) the room for party autonomy; c) the concept of habitual residence; d) adaptation when interplay between different laws leads to deadlock; e) public policy exceptions; f) the desirability of a general escape clause; g) the classic topics of characterisation, incidental question, and renvoi; and h) right to appeal in case of errors in the application of foreign law. Practitioners dealing with these notoriously difficult cases will welcome this in-depth treatment of the issues, as will interested policymakers throughout the EU Member States and at the EU level itself. Scholars will discover an incomparable comparative analysis leading to expert recommendations in European private international law, opening the way to an effective European framework in this area.

Ulteriori informazioni  e il sommario del volume sono disponibili qui.

Chris Thomale from the University of Heidelberg has written  a private international critique of surrogate motherhood (Mietmutterschaft, Mohr Siebeck, 2015, X+ 154 pages). Provocatively entitled “mothers for rent” the book offers a detailed and thorough (German language) analysis of the ethical and legal problems associated with gestational surrogacy.

The author has kindly provided us with the following abstract:

Surrogacy constitutes an intricate ethical controversy, which has been heavily debated for decades now. What is more, there are drastic differences between national surrogacy rules, ranging from a complete ban including criminal sanctions to outright legalisation. Hence, on the one hand, surrogacy constitutes a prime example of system shopping. On the other hand, however, we are not simply dealing with faits accomplis but rather enfants accomplis, i.e. we find it hard to simply undo the gains of system shopping at law as the “gain” levied by the parties is in fact a party herself, the child.

In his new book, “Mietmutterschaft – Eine international-privatrechtliche Kritik” (Mohr Siebeck Publishers, 2015), Chris Thomale from the University of Heidelberg, Germany, provides a fully-fledged analysis of surrogacy as a social and legal phenomenon. Starting from an ethical assessment of all parties’ interests (p. 5-18), the treatment of foreign surrogacy arrangements before the courts of a state banning surrogacy is discussed both on a conflict of laws level (p. 19-40) and at the recognition stage with respect to foreign parental orders based on surrogacy contracts (p. 41-52). The essay follows up with investigating the implications of EU citizenship (p. 53-58) and human rights (p. 59-72) for the international legal framework of surrogacy, ensued by a brief sketch of the boundaries of judicial activism in this regard (p. 73-80). Finally, proposals for legislative reform on an international, European and national level are being developed (p. 81-99).

Thomale looks at both the empirical medical background of surrogacy and the economic, political and ethical arguments involved. It is from this interdisciplinary basis that he engages the legal questions of international surrogacy in a comparative fashion. His main conclusion is that surrogacy in accordance notably with human rights and recent jurisprudence by the European Court of Human Rights as well as the principle of the superior interest of the child can and should be banned at a national level. At the same time, according to Thomale, national legislators should reform their adoption procedures, building on the well-developed private internatioal law in that field, in order e.g. to offer an adoption perspective also to couples who cannot procreate biologically, such as notably gay couples. In the essay, recent international case-law on surrogacy, including notably Mennesson et Labassée and Paradiso et Campanelli (both ECHR), is discussed in great detail.

A longer title than readers are used to from this blog. However judgment itself is also an unusually long 163 pages. In Banco Santander Totta, the High Court was asked whether snowball interest rates swaps in loan agreements between a Portuguese Bank and four Portuguese public transport companies, should be declared invalid under Portuguese ‘mandatory’ law, applicable by use of the corrective mechanism of Article 3(3) Rome I.

The Transport Companies do not assert that BST wrongly advised them to enter into the swaps, or misrepresented the swaps to them. Rather,  defences raised by the Transport Companies are that:

(1) under Portuguese law, each company lacked capacity to enter the swaps which are therefore void; this is on the basis (among other reasons) of an assertion that the swaps were speculative transactions; this defence applies regardless of the law applicable to the swaps; it is common ground that, if correct, it is a complete answer to the claim;

(2) although English law governs the Master Agreements, this is subject to Art. 3(3) of the Rome Convention; this provides that where all the elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice of law are connected with one country only, the choice does not prejudice the application of rules of the law of that country which cannot be derogated from by contract (“mandatory rules”). Portuguese mandatory rules apply to the swaps, giving rise to two defences: a) under rules dealing with gaming and betting and ordre public, the swaps are void for being unlawful “games of chance”, alternatively speculations; b) seven of the nine swaps are liable to be terminated under rules dealing with an “abnormal change of circumstances” (which termination takes effect as though the swaps were void); this is on the basis that since 2009 (following the financial crisis), the reference interest rates relating to the swaps (EURIBOR and LIBOR) have been close to zero (and remain so at the time of this judgment);

(3) in presenting the swaps to the Transport Companies, the bank acted in breach of its duties under provisions of the Portuguese Securities Code which implement relevant European Union legislation; these apply to the bank as a financial intermediary and relate to the protection of the legitimate interests of the Transport Companies as clients, and to conflicts of interest; the breach is said to entitle the Transport Companies to damages thereby extinguishing their liabilities under the swaps.

Knowles J reviews precedent (European (limited, mostly related to the preparatory works), English and Portuguese (likewise limited) and decides against the engagement of Article 3(3). I will not regurgitate all of the analysis: readers are best referred to the judgment, in particular p.65 onwards, and the decision at 411, where Knowles J concludes

because of the right to assign to a bank outside Portugal, the use of standard international documentation, the practical necessity for the relationship with a bank outside Portugal, the international nature of the swaps market in which the contracts were concluded, and the fact that back-toback (sic) contracts were concluded with a bank outside Portugal in circumstances in which such hedging arrangements are routine, the court’s conclusion is that Art. 3(3) of the Rome Convention is not engaged because all the elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice were not connected with Portugal only. In short, these were not purely domestic contracts. Any other conclusion, the court believes, would undermine legal certainty.  

The latter element is quite important. Referring in particular to Briggs (at 374), the Court holds that the uncertainty of the rule of Article 3(3) should lead to its narrow interpretation. I agree. With party autonomy the core consideration of the Regulation, standard recourse to Article 3(3) [or 3(4) for that matter) under the pretext for instance of a general campaign against fraus legis is most definitely not warranted.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.8, Heading 3.2.8.1

Thank you, Matthias Storme, for alerting me late last night that judgment was issued in Case C-483/13 KA Finanz AG. The CJEU is asked to clarify the ‘corporate exception’ to the Rome Convention and subsequent Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations. The two main questions ask whether the ‘company law’ excepted area includes (a) reorganisations such as mergers and divisions, and (b) in connection with reorganisations, the creditor protection provision in Article 15 of Directive 78/855 concerning mergers of public limited liability companies, and of its successor, Directive 2011/35. I have a little more on the background in previous posting and I expressed my disappointment with Bot AG’s Opinion here.

The Court, like the AG, justifiably rejects a great deal of the questions as inadmissible, mainly due to the secondary law, interpretation of which is sought, not applying ratione temporis, to the facts at issue. It then in essence simply turns to European company law, in particular Directive 2005/56, to settle the issue. Why exhaust oneself with analysis of the corporate exception, if a different piece of EU law exhaustively regulates the issue? At 56 ff

It is stated in Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2005/56 that a merger by acquisition is an operation whereby one or more companies, on being dissolved without going into liquidation, transfer all their assets and liabilities to another existing company, namely the acquiring company.

As regards the effects of such an operation, it is stated in Article 14(2)(a) of Directive 2005/56 that a cross-border merger brings about, from the date when the merger takes effect, the transfer of all the assets and liabilities of the company being acquired to the acquiring company.A merger by acquisition therefore entails the acquisition by the acquiring company of the company being acquired in its entirety, without extinguishing the obligations that a winding-up would have brought about, and, without novation, has the effect of substituting the acquiring company for the company being acquired as party to all of the contracts concluded by the latter. Consequently, the law which was applicable to those contracts before the merger continues to be applicable after the merger. It follows that EU law must be interpreted as meaning that the law applicable following a cross-border merger by acquisition to the interpretation of a loan contract taken out by the acquired company, such as the loan contracts at issue in the main proceedings, to the performance of the obligations under the contract and to how those obligations are extinguished is the law which was applicable to that contract before the merger.

(here: German law).

I appreciate the narrow set of facts upon which the CJEU holds allows one to distinguish. The spirit of the Court’s judgment in my view must however be what I have advocated for some time. Other than for a narrow set of issues immediately surrounding the very creation, life and death of the merged company, for which lex societatis applies, European private international law upholds lex contractus (often: lex voluntatis: the law so chosen by the parties) for the considerable amount of contractual satellites involving a merger and similar operations. Rome I is fully engaged for these contracts, including its provisions on third party impact of a change in governing law (this is relevant where the parties to the merger, decide to amend applicable law of the inherited contracts).

Geert.

 (Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.5, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.2 .

In a recent order of 14 September 2015 – 1 BvR 1321/13, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has held that the right to effective judicial protection (Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 20(3) of the German constitution) is violated if, in a cross-border case, a court fails to investigate the facts of the case by using possibilities that have good prospects of success, in particular if it does not take into account specific institutionalised facilities and measures of judicial assistance, such as those offered by the European Evidence Regulation, the Hague Evidence Convention and the European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters. In the case before the Court, a Romanian national had sued a widow of Romanian nationality for a share of the inheritance of her deceased husband based on the assertion that the couple had adopted him. Although it remained controversial whether such an adoption had actually taken place in Romania, the Municipal Court (Amtsgericht) did not request the Romanian adoption files for consultation by way of judicial cooperation. According to the Constitutional Court, the Amtsgericht ought to have considered whether the EU Evidence Regulation or the Hague Evidence Convention permit a German court to request the original case files from another Member State. An English abstract of the decision is available here.

I shall keep this post short for otherwise it risks developing into a book. In a week which also saw the Panama papers blow a hole in the use of tax havens for individuals, the collapse of the Pfizer Allergan merger may be the beginning of the end for the Irish (and similar) corporate tax Nirvana. The US treasury’s new rules on outgoing corporate mobility mean re-incorporation in Ireland has become an awful lot less attractive.

I realise there are caveats and one may be comparing cheese and chalk. Also, tax lawyers no doubt will have to chew over this, yet: may this not also be the moment for the EC to reconsider similar issues in EU law, kicked off some time back by the Daily Mail case?

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law 2nd ed 2016 Chapter 7.

The following announcement has been kindly provided by Mihail Buruiana, Senior Lecturer, State University of Moldova.

The Faculty of Law of Moldova State University in Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, will host an international conference dealing with “Recent Developments in Private International Law” on Thursday, 20 October, and Friday, 21 October 2016. Prospective speakers are kindly invited to submit abstracts of not more than 500 words (in Word) addressing any aspect of the Conference theme. The abstracts should include the name(s) and affiliation(s) of the author(s) and should be submitted before Saturday, 10 May 2016. The Programme of the Conference will consist of a mix of plenary sessions and parallel sessions. The topics of the sessions will include, inter alia: Theory of Private International Law; Choice of Law and Choice of Law Clauses; Jurisdiction and Forum Clauses; Natural Persons in Private International Law; Legal Persons in Private International Law; Family (Children and Adults); Succession; Contract; Insolvency; Tort; Recognition and Enforcement; Arbitration. The languages at the Conference will be Romanian and English (with simultaneous translation). Further information is available at the Conference website here.

Guest post by Asma Alouane, PhD candidate at Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) University on Private international law to the test of the right to respect for private and family life.

On February 11 and 12 2016, the Academy of European law (ERA) hosted in Strasburg a conference on Recent Case law of the European Court of Human Rights in Family law matters. The Court’s evolutive interpretation of the notion of family life combined with its controversial understanding has created a long series of new challenges in the field of Family law. The conference participants discussed these issues, as well as the difficulties that States may face in complying with their obligations under the Convention.

The purpose of this post is to give a succinct overview of the presentations, which were of interest from a conflicts-of-law perspective.

1. Evgueni Boev, Setting the scene: Private and family life under the Convention

Setting the scene of the conference, Evgueni Boev’s presentation provided an answer to the question of What is a family according to Court Cases?  Whereas the term family is mentioned in several provisions (art 8, art 12, art 5 of Protocol 7…), most of the cases are examined under the concept of family life of art 8. Article 12 and Protocol 7’s article 5 appear as the lex specialis regarding marriage and equality within a married couple. Thus, article 8 is the pillar of the case law of the Court regarding family matters.

From the broad perspective of the ECtHR cases, Boev demonstrated that the concept has expanded in two different directions: in a horizontal way between partners and in a vertical way between parent and child. In both directions, only the substantive reality matters. For instance, in the relationship between partners, family life exists regardless of whether there is legal recognition of the situation (e.g. Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom). The extension of the concept of family life to same-sex de facto couples in the Schalk and Kopf v. Austria case is another illustration of the broad scope of the family life. In the other direction, between parent and child, what matters most is not the biological link and in these cases too the Court emphasises the substantive relationship (e.g. Nazarenko v. Russia).

Thus, only the substantive situation is relevant. However, the recognition of family life does not necessarily lead to a right to respect such family life. The questions of whether there is an interference with or a failure to comply with art 8 obligations are linked to the particular circumstances of the case, especially through the proportionality test.

As pointed out by Boev, the broad understanding of what is a family gives rise to new trends regarding for instance the recognition of non-traditional forms of family life or the international dimension of family ties, especially as in matters of child care. The following presentations focused on these two broad topics.

2. Thalia Kruger, International Child Abduction

Thalia Kruger showed in her presentation how the goals of the international child abduction instruments are disturbed when put to the test of the human rights perspective. Following the assumption that it is in the interest of the child not to be abducted, the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the Brussels II bis Regulation (No. 2201/2003) aim to facilitate the return of the child to his or her habitual residence. A return order must be issued within a period of six weeks. Only exceptional circumstances allow the State of the retention of the child not to order the return. Moreover, article 11 of Brussels II bis permits a second chance procedure to obtain return. Looking at the situation from the perspective of human rights, the Court considered that national authorities have to look into the particular situation of the child (see Neulinger v. Switzerland). Thus, the Court makes the best interests of the child the leading principle. The Court shifts from an in abstracto conception of the best interests of the child to an in concreto appreciation. Even though the Court explained later that it is possible to read the Hague Convention and the ECHR as aligned (X. v. Latvia), Kruger noted that the ECHR cases create sensitive dilemmas for the contracting States, for instance how to comply with the speedy proceeding obligation while taking into account all issues raised with respect to the best interests of the child.

According to Kruger, the Court’s interpretation also shows that the Brussels II bis enforcement rules may not be compatible with the best interests of the child.

The Bosphorus doctrine assumes compatibility of EU law with the ECHRs, but this applies only when courts have no discretionary power (for instance the abolition of exequatur; see Povse v. Austria). The application of the Bosphorus doctrine in the current context is problematic. Kruger concluded by noting that the on-going recast of Brussels II bis and the continuing efforts of the Hague Conference, such as its promotion of mediation, may provide a way to ensure the compatibility of the child abduction goals and the human rights standard.

3. Marilisa D’Amico and Costanza Nardocci, LGBT rights and the way forward:

From the perspective of the Oliari v. Italy case and the specific Italian experience, Costanza Nardocci presented an overview of the LGBT family rights. The last step in a long series of cases, Oliari illustrates the long path of same-sex couples before the ECtHR. A significant step was accomplished in 2010 with Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, when the Court recognized that same-sex couples are just as capable of enjoying family life as opposite-sex couples. The Court found that article 12 could be applicable to same-sex couples, but that at this stage the question of whether same-sex couples can marry is left to regulation by national law. However, referring to the large margin of appreciation of contracting States, it considered that there is no positive obligation to introduce same-sex marriage. Then, in 2013, embracing this new interpretation, the Court considered in Vallianatos and Others v. Greece that opening civil unions to opposite-sex couples only was a violation of articles 8 and 14. In the Oliari case, the Court held that there was a violation of article 8. It considered that Italy had violated its positive obligation to grant legal protection to same-sex couples. Recalling the specific situation of LGBT rights in Italy, Nardocci emphasized the contrast between the lack of legislative activity and the judicial and administrative activism for the recognition of same-sex couples, if only in a symbolic way. Thus, the condemnation of the Italian government in the Oliari case was not unexpected considering the previous warnings of by the Constitutional Court, which had urged the legislator to intervene. Although Oliari is specific to the Italian situation, it has to be considered an important step for same-sex couples in their pursuit of legal recognition. In other words, since the Oliari case the contracting States are now compelled to ensure a core legal protection for same-sex couples in a stable committed relationship.

However, as pointed out by Nardocci, the progress of same-sex couples’ right to family life has not gone hand in hand with similar advances for transgender persons. Even though the recognition of a positive obligation to provide legal protection is a huge step forward compared to past cases, the absence of a positive obligation to enact same-sex marriages could adversely affect transgender persons’ right to family life. As in Hämäläinen v/ Finland, transgender individuals still have to choose between their former marital life and the legal recognition of the new gender. Nardocci considered that a better use of the distinguishing technique between positive and negative obligations could provide more flexibility and lead to better protection of transgender persons.

4. Michael Wells-Greco, Spectrum of Reproductive Rights and the Challenges

Reproductive rights are one of the most sensitive and challenging topics the Court has had to deal with. The increasing use of medical technology in Europe has led to the emergence of a discussion as to their influence on reproductive choices The spectrum of reproductive rights is wide: it encompasses such issues as abortion (A.B. C; v. Ireland), home birth (Ternovszky v. Hungray; Dubskà and Krejzovà v. Czech Republic), embryo donation for scientific research (Parrillo v. Italy) and surrogacy (Mennesson and Labassée v. France; Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy). In the ECHR, reproductive rights fall within the right to respect of private life. Considering the diversity of national policies and the ethical and moral issues these questions may raise, there is no consensus between contracting States. As a result, the Court generally leaves States a wide margin of appreciation.

Surveying each of these topics in turn, Michael Wells-Greco considered the existence of emerging trends. He showed that the Court has made a gradual evolution: an isolated national position regarding one issue does not necessarily come into conflict with the ECHR, as reproductive rights are deeply connected to national identities. However, once a contracting State takes the step to grant more rights in this field, it has to respect certain procedural guaranties (e.g. A.B.C. v. Ireland). Wells-Greco criticized this “all or nothing approach” that leaves no room for a potential future consensus and widens even more the divisions between contracting States. Conversely, it appears that the margin of appreciation is smaller when it comes to cross-border situations (e.g. Mennesson and Labassée v. France). How     ever, as the PIL response may not take into consideration the human rights response, Wells-Greco advocates resorting to soft law to address the diversity of reproductive rights.

5. Klaudiuz Ryngielewicz, Contents of an individual application

Concluding the Conference, Klaudiuz Ryngielewicz explained the correct way to lodge an application (see the video) especially with regards to the new formalistic article 47 of the Rules of the Court (see the Report on the revised rule). The increasing number of applications have forced the Court to set strict criteria. After explaining how to fill in the application form, Ryngielewicz insisted on the fact that only a valid application can interrupt the 6-month time-limit set in article 35 of the Convention.

The 23rd International Conference of Europeanists, organised by the Council for European Studies at Columbia University (CES), will be devoted to the topic Resilient Europe?, and will take place in Philadelphia from 14 to 16 April 2016.

One of the panels is titled Do we trust in ‘mutual trust’? Current challenges to mutual recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as a benchmark for Europe’s resilience. 

[Summary] – The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) encompasses crucial policy areas for European integration. Mutual recognition is the driving engine for the EU action in these fields and a cornerstone of the AFSJ. Yet, it is also a complex principle. Since mutual recognition does not produce common substantive rules, it would seem to be less problematic than other methods of integration (e.g. approximation or harmonisation) in terms of interference with the Member States’ legal orders. In reality, mutual recognition presupposes a certain degree of openness to and tolerance of the diversity characterizing each national legal system. In fact, its root is mutual trust between the Member States. “Resilience” is not a recurrent notion in legal studies on mutual recognition. Nevertheless, the academic debate, the case law of European and national courts, but also dramatic events such as the migrants crisis, have pointed to different challenges – legal, political and societal – that surround the application of mutual recognition in the AFSJ matters. These challenges affect the trust between the Member States, and the trust of the Member States and individuals towards the Union. In this sense, the capacity to react constructively to such challenges is a proxy to test Europe’s resilience. Accordingly, the five presentations within this panel provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of current shortcomings of mutual recognition in the AFSJ. Their common purpose is to provoke a constructive discussion on possible solutions to improve the principle’s functioning and its contribution to European integration.

The panel will be articulated in the following speeches: Mutual Recognition As a Governance Strategy for Civil Justice, Eva Storskrubb (Univ. Uppsala); Mutual Recognition in Civil Matters: An Appraisal Between (partial) Achievements and New Challenges, Ornella Feraci (Univ. Florence); Mutual Recognition in Criminal Justice: Towards Order and Method?, Maria Bergstrom (Univ. Uppsala); Mutual Trust As a Stumbling Block to the Accession of the EU to the Echr?, Nicole Lazzerini (Univ. Parma). The session will be chaired by Nicolò Nisi (Univ. Bocconi, Milan) and discussed by Ester di Napoli (Univ. Magna Graecia of Catanzaro).

The full programme of the conference can be downloaded here. For more information see here.

In November 2014 scholars from all over Europe met at the University Verona to discuss the impact of the Brussels I Recast on cross-border litigation in Europe (see our previous post). The conference volume, edited by Franco Ferrari (NYU Law School/University of Verona) and  Francesca Ragno (University of Verona), has now been published by Wolters Kluwer Italy (Cross-border Litigation in Europe: the Brussels I Recast Regulation as a panacea?).

The table of contents reads as follows:

Sergio M. CARBONE – Chiara E. TUO, Non-EU States and the Brussels I Recast Regulation: New Rules and Some Solutions for Old Problems

Martin GEBAUER, A New Head of Jurisdiction in relation to the Recovery of Cultural Objects

Ruggero CAFARI PANICO, Enhancing Protection for the Weaker Parties: Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment

Giesela RÜHL, The Consumer’s Jurisdictional Privilege: on (Missing) Legislative and (Misguided) Judicial Action

Peter MANKOWSKI, The Role of Party Autonomy in the Allocation of Jurisdiction in Contractual Matters

Francesca C. VILLATA, Choice-of-Courts Agreements and “Third Parties” in light of Refcomp and beyond

Peter Arnt NIELSEN, The End of Torpedo Actions?

Francisco GARCIMARTÍN, The Cross-Border Effectiveness of Inaudita Parte Measures in the Brussels I Recast Regulation: an Appraisal

Thomas PFEIFFER, The Abolition of Exequatur and the Free Circulation of Judgment

Luigi FUMAGALLI, Refusal of Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions under the Brussels I Recast Regulation: where the Free Circulation meets its Limits

Francesca RAGNO, The Brussels I Recast Regulation and the Hague Convention: Convergences and Divergences in relation to the Enforcement of Choice-of-Courts Agreements

Fabrizio MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, The Brussels I Recast Regulation and the Unified Patent Court Agreement: towards an Enhanced Patent Litigation System

The following announcement has been kindly provided by Vasil Savov, CDC, Brussels.

The European University Institute (EUI) Law Department in Florence, Italy, has just released a comparative study on the calculation of interest on damages resulting from antitrust infringements. It is highly topical, as the EU Member States are in the process of implementing Directive 2014/104/EU into their national laws. This “Damages Directive” seeks to facilitate private antitrust enforcement and, in particular, to ensure full compensation for victims. Due to the duration of antitrust infringements, the accrual of interest from the occurrence of the harm is essential to achieve full compensation. This study samples thirteen national laws and assesses how far they are consistent with the requirements to be found in EU law. It has been supported by Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) SCRL, Brussels.
The first part of the study elucidates the principles and requirements of EU Law relevant to interest calculation on damages caused by antitrust infringements. It further contains a high level assessment of the compliance of the surveyed Member States’ legal regimes.
It is followed by 13 country reports, written by national experts, all answering standardised questions concerning the subject of the study. The questions cover a range of material and procedural law aspects and include calculations for a hypothetical case.
The present EUI study is an in-depth and comparative treatment of this technical, yet significant, aspect of antitrust damages claims. For claimants and practitioners, the study offers a systematic and practical account of interest rules in a number of jurisdictions, for judges and lawmakers, the study provides analysis and recommendations for the proper application of interest rules and advice on principles that should inform the implementation of the Damages Directive.
The full text of the study is available here.

In Winkler v Shamoon [2016] EWHC 2017 Ch Mr Justice Henry Carr broadly follows Mrs Justice Susan Carr in Sabbagh v Khoury (which I have reviewed earlier) on the interpretation of the ‘wills and succession’ exception in the Brussels I Recast (and the Lugano convention). [The Justices themselves, incidentally, are neither related nor married, I understand]. In so doing, Sir Henry follows Dame Susan’s approach vis-a-vis the exclusions in the Brussels I Recast.

Ms Alexandra Shamoon accepts that she is domiciled in the UK for the purposes of the Brussels Regulation.  However, she applies for an order on essentially the same basis as that set out above, contending, in particular, that the claim relates to succession and therefore falls outside the scope of the Brussels Regulation. Brick Court have summary of the case and hopefully do not mind me borrowing their heads-up of the facts:

the case concerns the estate of the late Israeli businessman, Sami Shamoon.  Mr Shamoon owned and controlled the Yakhin Hakal Group of Israeli companies and was known in his lifetime as one of the wealthiest men in Israel.  The claim was brought by Mr Peretz Winkler, formerly the Chief Financial Officer and manager of Yakhin Hakal, against Mrs Angela Shamoon and Ms Alexandra Shamoon, the widow and daughter respectively of Mr Shamoon and the residuary legatees under his will.  In his claim Mr Winkler alleged that prior to his death Mr Shamoon had orally promised to transfer to him certain shares worth tens of millions of dollars.  On the basis of the alleged promise Mr Winkler claimed declarations against Angela and Alexandra Shamoon as to his entitlement to the shares (which they are due to receive under Mr Shamoon’s will).  Angela and Alexandra challenged the jurisdiction of the English Court to hear the claim on the basis that it was a matter relating to “succession” within article 1(2)(a) of the Brussels Regulation and therefore fell outside its scope (and that England was not the natural or appropriate forum for the dispute).

If the claim does fall within the scope of the Regulation, jurisdiction is quite easily established on the basis of the defendant’s domicile – albeit with contestation of such domicile in the UK by Mr Shamoon’s widow and daughter.

Carr J held that the claim was one relating to succession and therefore fell outside of the Brussels I Recast (at 53 ff). While I may concur in the resulting conclusion, I do not believe the route taken is the right one. Sir Henry follows Mrs Justice Carr’s approach in applying the excluded matters of the Brussels I Recast restrictively. I disagree. Exclusions are not the same as exceptions: Article 24’s exclusive rules of jurisdictions are an exception to the main rule of Article 4; hence they need to be applied restrictively. Article 1(2)’s exclusions on the other hand need to be applied solely within the limits as intended. Lead is also taken from Sabbagh v Koury with respect to the role of the EU’s Succession Regulation. Even if the UK is not party to that Regulation, both justices suggest it may still be relevant in particular in assisting with the Brussels I Recast ‘Succession’ exception. If the approach taken in Winkler v Shamoon is followed it leads to a dovetailing of the two Regulations’ respective scope of application. Not a conclusion I think which is necessarily uncontested.

The High Court concludes (at 72) ‘this claim is excluded from the Brussels Regulation and the Lugano II Regulation as its principal subject matter is “succession” within the meaning of Article 1(2)(a).  In particular, it is a claim whose object is “succession to the estate of a deceased person” which includes “all forms of transfer of assets, rights and obligations by reason of death”. It is a succession claim which concerns “sharing out of the estate”; and it is a claim within the definition of “succession as a whole” in Article 23 of the Succession Regulation, as a claim whose principal subject matter concerns  “the disposable part of the estate, the reserved shares and other restrictions on the disposal of property upon death”: Article 23(h); and an “obligation to …account for gifts, …when determining the shares of the different beneficiaries”: Article 23(i).

Intriguingly, of course, had the UK be bound by the Succession Regulation, and given the dovetailing which the judgment suggest, the next step after rejection of jurisdiction on the basis of the Brussels I Recast, would have been consideration of jurisdiction following the Succesion Regulation. It is ironic therefore to see the Regulation feature as a phantom piece of legislation. Now you see it, now you don’t.

Geert.

(Handbook EU Private international law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.2.10).

On 15 April 2016, the Faculty of Law of the University of Santiago de Compostela will host a conference on Security rights and the European Insolvency Regulation: From Conflicts of Laws towards Harmonization.

Speakers include Paul Beaumont (Univ. of Aberdeen), Francisco Garcimartín Alferez (Autonomous Univ. of Madrid), Anna Gardella (European Banking Authority), Wolf-Georg Ringe (Copenhagen Business School), Françoise Pérochon (Univ. of Montpellier) and Paul Omar (Nottingham Trent University).

The conference is part of the SREIR project, coordinated by Gerard McCormack, Reinhard Bork, Laura Carballo Piñeiro, Marta Carballo Fidalgo, Renato Mangano and Tibor Tajti.

The full programme is available here.

Attendance to the conference is free, but registration prior to 10th April is required.  For this, an e-mail with name and ID card must be sent to marta.carballo@usc.es or laura.carballo@usc.es.

On 15 April 2016, the Faculty of Law of the University of Santiago de Compostela will host a conference on Security rights and the European Insolvency Regulation: From Conflicts of Laws towards Harmonization.

Speakers include Paul Beaumont (Univ. of Aberdeen), Francisco Garcimartín Alferez (Autonomous Univ. of Madrid), Anna Gardella (European Banking Authority), Wolf-Georg Ringe (Copenhagen Business School), Françoise Pérochon (Univ. of Montpellier) and Paul Omar (Nottingham Trent University).

The conference is part of the SREIR project, coordinated by Gerard McCormack, Reinhard Bork, Laura Carballo Piñeiro, Marta Carballo Fidalgo, Renato Mangano and Tibor Tajti.

The full programme is available here.

Attendance to the conference is free, but registration prior to 10th April is required.  For this, an e-mail with name and ID card must be sent to marta.carballo@usc.es or laura.carballo@usc.es.

Karen Birch and Sarah Garvey from Allen & Overy have published two papers dealing with the likely/possible effects of the UK leaving the European Union on choice of law clauses in favor of English law and jurisdiction clauses in favor of English courts. The authors essentially argue that Brexit would not make a big difference and that commercial parties could (and should) continue to include English choice of law and jurisdiction clauses in their contracts: English courts (as well as other Member States’ courts) would continue to recognize and enforce such clauses. And English judgments would continue to be enforced in EU Member States (even though the procedure might be more complex in some cases).

In essence, the authors thus argue that giving up the current unified European regime for choice of law, jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, service of process, taking of evidence would not matter too much for commercial parties. I am not convinced.

The papers are available here.

The University of Missouri and Marquette University announce a student writing competition in associated with the University of Missouri’s upcoming symposium “Moving Negotiation Theory from the Tower of Babel: Toward a World of Mutual Understanding.” The competition offers a $500 first prize and $250 second prize.

Submissions must relate to one or more problems with negotiation theory, broadly defined, and should suggest a solution to the problem(s). Students are encouraged to consider sources in the symposium reading list, though they are not required to discuss or cite any of these sources.

The competition is open to all persons enrolled during calendar year 2016 in a program of higher education leading to any degree in law or a graduate degree (including but not limited to the J.D., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D., M.A. or Ph.D.). Applicants may be of any nationality and may be affiliated with a degree-providing institutions located in any country.

Papers that have been published or accepted for publication are not eligible for the writing competition.

Submission Requirements

Submissions must be in English and between fifteen (15) and twenty-five (25) pages in length, including footnotes. The text of the paper must be typed and double spaced pages in 12 point Times New Roman font (or similarly readable typeface) with 1-inch margins on all sides. Footnotes should preferably appear in Bluebook form, although papers using other established systems of legal citation will be accepted.

The title of the paper must appear on every page of the submission. The author’s name must not appear anywhere on the submission itself.

A separate document should be provided including (1) the author’s full name, address, telephone number and email address; (2) the degree-granting institution where the author is or was enrolled in 2016, as well as the degree sought and the (anticipated) year of graduation; (3) the title of the submission; and (4) the date of the submission.

Failure to adhere to these requirements may lead to disqualification of the submission.

Papers must be electronically submitted to: Laura Coleman, University of Missouri School of Law, colemanl@missouri.edu

Submissions must be received no later than 11:59 p.m., Central time, on Monday, October 17, 2016.

Criteria

Submissions will be judged based on the following factors:

· Quality, thoroughness, and persuasiveness of analysis

· Value to scholars, faculty, students, and/or practitioners

· Contribution to the scholarship in the field.

Submissions may be considered for publication in the Journal of Dispute Resolution. The sponsors reserve the right not to name a winner if a suitable submission is not entered into the competition.

Questions should be directed to Professor John Lande at landej@missouri.edu. More information is available here.