Droit international général

The new issue of the Revue Critique de Droit International Privé (3/2022) is out.

It contains three articles relating to the French project of PIL codification (of which readers of the blog are well informed, see here and here), as well as numerous case notes.

The editorial by Horatia Muir Watt (Sciences Po Law School), Dominique Bureau (University of Paris II) and Sabine Corneloup (University of Paris II) will soon be available in English on Dalloz website (De codice ferendo ?)

In the first article, Dominique Foussard (Avocat au Conseil d’Etat et à la Cour de cassation, Paris Bar), Marie-Laure Niboyet (University of Paris-Nanterre) and Cyril Nourissat (University of Lyon 3), all members of the working group on the (French) PIL codification, present the main results of the draft code under a methodological perspective (Réflexions méthodologiques sur le projet de code de droit international privé). 

On March 31, a draft code of private international law (of 207 articles) was submitted to the French Minister of Justice. It was drawn up by a working group, headed by President Jean-Pierre Ancel. The French Ministry of Justice has now decided to submit the draft code for public consultation. The editorial staff of the Revue critique has opened its columns to three members of this group, to supplement with methodological reflections the analysis of the main provisions of the draft which can already be found in the accompanying explanatory report. These reflections are based on four observations : large parts of the discipline are still governed by national law ; conversely, when it is attested, the growth of international conventions and European Union law reveals the need for national norms of reference or adaptation to facilitate their application ; many rules of positive law should be reformed or completed in an overall vision of the discipline, and not on a piecemeal basis, on the occasion of a special law ; the increase in the international movement of persons accentuates the need for practitioners to have a complete corpus for the exercise of their activities, both as litigators and as advisors. Based on these findings, the draft has endeavored to respond to three essential challenges, namely the synergy of the sources of the subject-matter, the predictability of the rules enacted and the satisfaction of the objectives of private international law.

In the second article, Stefan Leible (University of Bayreuth) and Felix M. Wilke (University of Bayreuth) analyse the French draft PIL code from a German perspective (Le Projet de code de Droit International Privé. Une vue d’Allemagne, soon available in English on Dalloz website). Some elements of this analysis have already been shared with the readers of this blog here.

From a German perspective, there is much in the French Draft Code of Private International Law (“Draft Code”) to be appreciated ; in part, one can even be envious. Not only is there still room for a national PIL codification, but it can also enhance legal clarity, even where it only refers to applicable EU regulations. It is user-friendly to combine rules on procedure with conflict-of-laws provisions in one instrument and sensible to devote one part of the Draft Code to general provisions. The rules of the Draft Code on the PIL of contractual and non-contractual obligations as well as on companies in particular by and large could serve as models for German legislation. Conversely, here and there, German PIL rules might provide some inspiration for (minor) adjustments of and additions to the Draft Code. Some of the proposed rules, however, seem less than ideal. To allow renvoi only where at least one of the parties so demands neither serves legal clarity nor always makes life easier for the judge. The rule on lois de police could cause or perpetuate misunderstandings about their legal nature. It is doubtful whether a provision on fraude à la loi is truly necessary. To keep nationality as a connecting factor for jurisdiction can be considered particularly exorbitant. Yet all of this should not detract from the impressive and thought-provoking achievement that is the Draft Code.

In the third article, Paul Lagarde brings his extensive transnational experience and expertise to develop a challenging analysis of the draft PIL code (Quelques remarques sur le projet de codification du droit international privé français).

At a time when private international law in force in France comprises, for the most part, European law, whether it be European Union Regulations or the case law of the European Court of justice and sometimes indeed the European Court of Human Rights, the notion that French private international law should be codified independently of these other sources is both a source of astonishment and the cause for regret for the lost opportunity of a systemization of European conflicts of laws.This criticism is of particular relevance, moreover, in respect of what is known in continental legal terms as the general part of our discipline, such as the provisions on the duties of the court with regard to foreign law or the sanction applicable to various abusive strategies (playing the system or “fraude à la loi”). Furthermore, independently of any value judgment on the proposed texts, they are likely to be difficult to handle for the very non-specialists for whose benefit the project was intended.

More information is available here.

The author of this post is Francesca Maoli, who is a Researcher at the University of Genova.

The Brussels II ter Regulation on matrimonial matters, matters of parental responsibility and child abduction has become fully applicable on 1 August 2022, meaning that legal proceedings instituted on or after that date, as well as authentic instruments and agreements registered on that date or afterwards, must, in all EU Member States (excluding Denmark), be dealt with in accordance with the Recast Regulation, rather than its predecessor, the Brussels II bis Regulation

The process that eventually resulted in the adoption of the Recast Brussels II Regulation was launched on the assumption that, overall, the old Brussels II bis Regulation had functioned reasonably well. The 2014 European Commission’s Report on the operation of the latter Regulation stressed that the system was in need of improvement, rather than radical change.

The existing rules have undergone several changes. Some amount to simple refinements and fixings. Others are more meaningful.

The most prominent innovation brought about by the Brussels II ter Regulation is, arguably, the abolition of exequatur for all decisions on parental responsibility. The two-track system envisaged in Brussels II bis, however, remains in place. While the general discipline is now contained in Article 30 and following of the Brussels II ter regulation, ‘override’ return orders and access orders (which the old regime already regarded as ‘privileged’ decisions) keep on benefiting from a special regime. Recognition and enforcement of the latter orders can be refused if they are irreconcilable with a later decision relating to parental responsibility concerning the same child, provided that such a later decision was given (i) in the Member State where recognition is invoked, or (ii) in another Member State or in the non-Member State of the habitual residence of the child, provided that the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State are met.

This post does not purport to analyse the new rules in details (a wealth of literature has been produced on the topic: see here for some references). It merely intends to ‘zoom in’ a selection of issues of special practical importance.

The European Commission set itself the object of retaining the status quo as concerns matrimonial matters (this was, actually, the preferred policy according to the 2016 Recast Proposal). The Recast Regulation has nevertheless introduced, also in this area, some significant innovations.

One such innovation is about ‘private divorces’, i.e., divorces that fundamentally occur out of court, based on an agreement between the spouses.

The Brussels II ter Regulation comes with a definition of authentic instruments and agreements, respectively in Article 2(2) and (3). Authentic instruments and agreements in matrimonial matters, if they are given binding legal effects in the Member State of origin, benefit from recognition ‘without any special procedure being required’ (Article 65(1)), unless one of the grounds for refusal of recognition provided by Article 68(1) apply. The same is true of authentic instruments and agreements in matters of parental responsibility (Article 65(2)).

In practice, as clarified in Recital 70, authentic instruments and agreements are to be treated as equivalent to decisions. For this, they must have been formally drawn up or concluded in a Member State that would have had jurisdiction according to the regulation (Article 64). Where this is not the case, they may still circulate across Member States under domestic PIL provisions, or otherwise.

The EU decided to adopt rules on private divorces in light of developments that have arisen, recently, in domestic legislations. When the Brussels II bis Regulation was adopted, the laws of the Member States did not contemplate out-of-court divorces. This is why the Regulation itself failed to include provisions in this regard. This state of affairs has proved problematic. A case is currently pending before the ECJ (C‑646/20, Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport), concerning a dissolution of marriage by joint declaration of the spouses before an Italian civil registrar, whose duty is to assess whether the conditions for an out-of-court divorce are met (Article 12 of the Italian Decree Law No 132/2014 requires, inter alia, that the spouses do not have minor children). While noting that ‘Regulation No 2019/1111 is inapplicable to the present case ratione temporis’, being therefore ‘not possible to draw any conclusions from it for the purposes of interpreting Regulation No 2201/2003’, AG Collins suggested in its Opinion that Articles 2 and 21(1) of the Brussels II bis Regulation be given a broad interpretation, thereby concluding that Italian private divorces should be treated as ‘divorce judgments’ for the purpose of the Brussels II bis Regulation (just like they will do under the Recast Regulation).

The most significant changes brought about by the Brussels II ter Regulation concern children. One key goal of the Regulation is to enhance the protection of their fundamental rights, as enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter oof Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Specifically, Article 24 of the Charter creates a link between children’s rights – as protected by universal and regional systems – and the EU legal order.

The Regulation fosters the principle of the best interests of the child, which underlies both the general ground of jurisdiction of the habitual residence of the child (Recital 20) and the rules on the recognition and enforcement of judgments (Recital 55).

While the overall regime of jurisdiction in parental responsibility matters is left substantially unaltered, some significant revision occurred concerning choice of court. Article 10 of the Brussels II ter Regulation provides the formal and substantial condition that an agreement of the parties must fulfil to be effective: those conditions reflect, in general, a concern for the best interests of the child. Among the other requisites, a ‘substantial connection’ must exist between the child and the State of the chosen forum. The new provision expands the cases in which the aforementioned connection is deemed to exists, thus creating more possibilities to exercise party autonomy. In addition, the choice of court results now disconnected from the existence of a proceeding concerning the dissolution of marriage (even if Recital 23 still mentions this circumstance). Finally, ‘persons who become parties to the proceedings after the court was seised may express their agreement after the court was seised’, with the specification that such acceptance of jurisdiction during the proceedings may also be implicit (Article 10(2)).

Child participation is another key issue. Recital 2 states that the Regulation ‘clarifies the child’s right to be provided with an opportunity to express his or her views in proceedings to which he or she is subject’, thus recognizing the already existing obligations stemming from international and EU law. The hearing of the child finds a comprehensive discipline in Article 21, which sets out a general obligation to hear the child in all proceedings on parental responsibility, in line with Article 12 UNCRC. The same obligation is stated in Article 26 in the context of child abduction proceedings.

All in all, a decision relating to a child may not be enforced if the child concerned was not given the opportunity to express their views in accordance with Article 21 (unless specific circumstances occur, as specified by Article 39(2)). As to ‘privileged decisions’, namely, overriding orders and orders concerning the rights of access, the violation of Article 21 prevents the issuance of the certificate aimed at facilitating recognition and enforcement (Article 47(3)(b)).

In spite of the foregoing, the opportunity for the child to be heard is still subject to ‘the national law and procedure’. Therefore, it remains unclear to what extent national practices of the Member States will be affected by the new provisions. The importance of the described innovations should, however, not be underestimated. The Regulation has built a solid link between EU proceedings on parental responsibility, on the one hand, and the obligations arising from international texts in this area. Against this background, in order for the child to be given a ‘genuine and effective opportunity to be heard’ (Articles 21 and 26), other aspects should be considered, such as the right of the child to receive adequate information, as suggested, inter alia, by the Guidelines of the Council of Europe on Child-Friendly Justice and the recent work of the Committee of experts on the rights and the best interests of the child in parental separation and in care proceedings (CJ/ENF-ISE).

The focus on the child’s best interests is further witnessed by Article 56 of the Recast Regulation. This provides that the enforcement of a decision may be suspended if it ‘would expose the child to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm due to temporary impediments which have arisen after the decision was given, or by virtue of any other significant change of circumstances’. According to Recital 69, this may take the form of a manifest and strong objection of the child voiced after the adoption of the decision (Recital 69).

Chapter III of Brussels II ter is about international child abduction. The new instrument confirms the intention to enhance the operation of the 1980 Hague Convention with respect to intra-EU abductions. The overriding mechanism or trumping order, which consents the court of the Member State of habitual residence of the child before the abduction to the return of the child despite a contrary decision issued in the State of refuge, is still operating. However, the recourse to the overriding mechanism is permitted only when the decision of non-return has been issued pursuant Article 13(1)(b) (grave risk of harm) and 13(2) (objection of the child) of the 1980 Hague Convention. Moreover, the court of the child’s habitual residence can issue such a decision only in the context of a proceedings on the merits of parental responsibility, thus reaching a stable assessment on the future of the child. Therefore, the risk of multiple transfers is mitigated.

On other aspects, the discipline is more detailed. Some innovations, inspired to the will to give substantial content to the child’s best interests, are to be welcomed.

The whole Article 24 of the Regulation is dedicated to the celerity of return proceedings: a term of six week after the lodgment of the application is prescribed at each instance, unless ‘exceptional circumstances’ make it impossible to respect this time limit. As concerns appeal proceedings, the term starts to run at the moment in which ‘the required procedural steps have been taken and the court is in a position to examine the appeal’. Similar obligations are placed upon Central Authorities, which shall act expeditiously in processing return applications. The same purpose inspires the possibility to declare return orders provisionally enforceable, notwithstanding any appeal (Article 27(5)). The enforcement proceedings themselves must be fast (Article 28).

The Regulation also provides that the requested court may invite the parties to consider mediation or other ADRs, unless it would result contrary to the best interests of the child, not appropriate in the particular case or would unduly delay the proceedings (Article 25). The explicit mention of this possibility follows the specific attention that the family law scholars and practitioners are devoting to mediation, the potentialities of which are undoubtful. For this reason, the recast could have devoted even more structured discipline to mediation, currently mentioned only in the Chapter dedicated to international child abduction.

The best interests of the child also play a crucial role when it comes to provisional measures aimed at ensuring a contact between the child and the person seeking the return of the child (Article 27(2)). The requested court, while deciding on the return, may also adopt provisional, including protective, measures that are  recognized and enforced in all other Member States until the court with jurisdiction as to the substance intervenes (as results from Articles 27(5), 35(2) and 36(1)(c), as well as Recitals 30, 44-46 and 59).

Overall, the approach of the EU lawmaker with the Brussels II ter Regulation has resulted in the will to balance the enhancement of party autonomy, the need to grant judicial and non-judicial authority a certain degree of flexibility and the protection of the fundamental rights of the child.

As already mentioned, the latter has inspired some detailed obligations concerning, inter alia, the hearing of the child and a specific attention towards the discipline of international child abduction proceedings. While party autonomy has been empowered also in the context of parental responsibility, through the new discipline on choice of court agreements and implicit acceptance of jurisdiction, those rules have been surrounded by safeguards aimed at protecting the child’s best interests. The same reasoning applies to authentic instruments and agreements circulating according to Article 65(2) of the regulation, which are subject to the grounds for refusal of recognition or enforcement provided by Article 68(2) and (3). Specific reference is made to the possibility for the child to express his or her own views, which may result compressed in the context of out-of-court proceedings or private arrangements.

At the same time, the objective of protect children and their best interests has sustained the introduction of a certain degree of flexibility to national authorities: for instance, the possibility to issue cross-border protective orders pending an international child abduction proceedings, or to suspend the enforcement of a decision when the physical or the psychological wellbeing of the child is at risk.

In this context – and with a view to those objectives – the new provisions of the regulation dedicated to cooperation are of particular interests. Direct cooperation and communication between courts and between Central Authorities are now subject to a more detailed discipline and, therefore, encouraged. Chapter V is entirely dedicated to the role and obligations of Central Authorities, when cooperating between themselves and with courts. Other provisions are to be found in other parts of the regulation. Article 86 concerns direct judicial communication and provides that courts from different Member States should cooperate and communicate directly in all cases that are appropriate (for instance, when a court takes provisional or protective measures, it shall inform the court of another Member State having jurisdiction). The dialogue between judicial authorities can effectively contribute to the good administration of cross-border situations, as well as support swifter procedures, with positive repercussions on children. Of course, it could provide specialized training for judges, who need to be acquainted with this possibility and perhaps acquire new skills.

Those and other provisions contribute to a more fragmented discipline compared to the Brussels II bis regulation. On the other hand, if well applied, they may contribute to a better enhancement of the child’s best interests in the EU judicial space. As always, the application of the tool in practice will show its fruits.

The Nigeria Group on Private International Law “(NGPIL”) invites submissions for the annual NGPIL Conflict of Laws’ Competition. The winner will be awarded for the best essay on any aspect of Nigerian conflict of laws. Entries will be accepted from the following: an undergraduate and/or postgraduate scholar studying in Nigeria, or any Nigerian lawyer five years call or below practising and residing in Nigeria. The essay should be unpublished at the time of submission. Submitted essays should be in the English language. Submitted essays should also be within five to eight thousand words. Competitors may be citizens of any nation, age or gender but must be an undergraduate and/or postgraduate scholar studying in Nigeria, or any lawyer below five years post-call experience practising and residing in Nigeria.

The first prize is ?120,000 Naira (NGN), and the winner of the competition will be encouraged to publish the paper in any high-quality peer reviewed journal on private international law (conflict of laws). The second prize is ?80,000 Naira (NGN), and third prize is ?50,000 Naira (NGN). The prize is sponsored by and will be awarded by NGPIL.

Submissions to the Prize Committee must be received no later than January 9, 2023. Entries should be submitted by email in Word or pdf format. The winner will be announced no later than 2 months after the deadline. Decisions of the NGPIL on the winning essay and on any conditions relating to this prize are final. Submissions and any queries should be addressed by email to ngpilaw@gmail.com. All submissions will be acknowledged by e-mail.

A monograph titled Cross-Border Recognition of Formalized Same-Sex Relationships. The role of ordre public, written by Laima Vaige, a senior lecturer in law at Örebro University (Sweden),  was published recently by Intersentia. It is included, as volume 53, within the renowned European Family Law series.

The abstract of the monograph reads as follows:

Same-sex relationships have successively qualified for formalization through marriage or registered partnership in many European countries. However, some EU Member States still refuse to give them any form of recognition or only allow very limited legal effects. The irregular speed of development in domestic family laws in EU Member States results in “limping family” relations, that is, family relations that are recognised as creating a formal civil status in many EU Member States, but not in all of them. The ordre public safeguard of private international law has widely been used to justify why a same-sex marriage or registered partnership cannot be recognised. The pretext tends to be that national identity, allegedly, becomes threatened. Nevertheless, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of European Union provides new standards for recognition, which create legal obligations for EU Member States.

The author focuses on the interaction between human rights standards and private international law, carrying out a deft investigation of the impact of “Europeanization” on this interaction, analysing legal effects of same-sex marriages and registered partnerships in the Baltic States and Poland in a cross-border context. The central theme in this book is the elusive and ever-changing concept of ordre public, and the interplay between its understanding(s) at the national and European levels.

The aim of this book is to evaluate the impact of culture in this area of study, within the context of the analysed States’ recent histories, societal developments, and religions. This book is published at a time of clashes between traditional family values and gender equality in Europe. In States like Lithuania and Poland, the heterosexual nature of marriage is considered to be a fundamental component of the State’s national identity and public policy. Nevertheless, the book reveals how different legal understandings of national identity, ordre public, and the family can co-exist in parallel.

Table of contents is available here, and the book, also as an e-book, may be purchased here.

The second issue of Journal of Private International Law  for 2022 was released today. It features the following interesting articles:

T Kruger et. al., Current-day international child abduction: does Brussels IIb live up to the challenges?

Regulation 2019/1111 tries to tackle the new challenges arising from societal changes and legal developments in international child abduction. The result is a sophisticated set of rules centred on the child and aimed at enhancing their protection. The Regulation provides for the hearing of the child and for speedy and efficient proceedings. In it the EU acknowledges its role in the protection of human and children’s rights and sets goals towards de-escalating family conflicts. The new EU child abduction regime is at the same time more flexible than its predecessor allowing consideration of the circumstances characterising each single case in the different stages of the child abduction procedure

O Vanin, Assisted suicide from the standpoint of EU private international law

The article discusses the conflict-of-laws issues raised by such compensatory claims as may be brought against health professionals and medical facilities involved in end-of-life procedures. The issues are addressed from the standpoint of EU private international law. The paper highlights the lack of international legal instruments on assisted-suicide procedures. It is argued that the European Convention on Human Rights requires that States provide a clear legal framework concerning those procedures. The author contends that the said obligation has an impact on the interpretation of the relevant conflict-of-laws provisions of the EU.

S Avraham-Giller, The court’s discretionary power to enforce valid jurisdiction clauses: time for a change?

The paper challenges the well-rooted principle in the Anglo-American legal tradition that courts have discretion whether they should enforce a valid jurisdiction clause. The paper highlights the ambiguity and uncertainty that accompany this discretionary power, which raises a serious analytical problem. The paper then analyses two factors that shaped this discretionary power – jurisdictional theories and the general principle of party autonomy in contracts. Based on the analysis, the paper argues that the time has come to end the courts’ discretionary power with respect to the limited context of the enforcement of valid jurisdiction clauses. The proposal relies on a number of foundations: contractual considerations that relate to autonomy and efficiency; jurisdictional and procedural considerations, including the consent of a party to the jurisdiction of the court by general appearance; the increasing power of parties to re-order procedure; the more appropriate expression of the forum’s public interests and institutional considerations through overriding mandatory provisions; and finally the legal position regarding arbitration agreements and the willingness of a common law legal system such as the United Kingdom to accede to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.

TT Nguyen, Transnational corporations and environmental pollution in Vietnam – realising the potential of private international law in environmental protection

Many transnational corporations have been operating in Vietnam, contributing to economic and social development in this country. However, these actors have caused a number of high-profile environmental incidents in Vietnam through the activities of their local subsidiaries, injuring the local community and destroying the natural ecosystem. This paper discloses the causes of corporate environmental irresponsibility in Vietnam. Additionally, this paper argues that Vietnam’s private international law fails to combat pollution in this country. To promote environmental sustainability, Vietnam should improve ex-ante regulations to prevent and tackle ecological degradation effectively. Additionally, this paper suggests that Vietnam should remedy its national private international law rules to facilitate transnational liability litigation as an ex-post measure to address the harmful conducts against the natural ecosystem of international business.

D Levina, Jurisdiction at the place of performance of a contract revisited: a case for the theory of characteristic performance in EU civil procedure

The article revisits jurisdiction in the courts for the place of performance of a contract under Article 7(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. It proposes a new framework for understanding jurisdiction in contractual matters by offering a comparative and historical analysis of both the place of performance as a ground for jurisdiction and its conceptual counterpart, the place of performance as a connecting factor in conflict of laws. The analysis reveals that jurisdiction in the courts for the place of performance is largely a repetition of the same problematic patterns previously associated with the place of performance as a connecting factor. The article asserts that the persisting problems with Article 7(1) of the Brussels Ia Regulation are due to the inadequacy of the place of performance as a ground for jurisdiction and advocates for the transition to the theory of characteristic performance in EU civil procedure.

The article discusses the enforcement of foreign judgments within the European Union and the public policy (ordre public) exception. It is mainly focused on some recent judgments of Polish and German courts. On 22nd December 2016 and 23rd of March 2021 rulings in cases of infringement of personality rights were issued by the Court of Appeal in Cracow (ordering an apology and correction). The enforcement of the former ruling was dismissed by the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) (IX ZB 10/18) on 19th July 2018. The non-enforcement was justified by invoking German ordre public and “freedom of opinion” as a constitutional right stipulated in Article 5 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). A reference to the CJEU ruling of 17 June 2021 is also presented.

After presenting the issue of ordre public in the context of enforcement of foreign judgments within the EU, the authors evaluate as questionable the argumentation of the BGH in its 2018 judgment. The Polish ruling ordering the defendant to correct and apologise for the false statement was included by the BGH in the category of “opinion” (Meinung) protected by the German Constitution. Enforcement of the judgment of the Polish court in Germany was held to be contrary to this German constitutional right and the enforceability of the Polish judgment was denied as being manifestly contrary to German public policy.

The authors support the functioning of the ordre public clause in intra-EU relations. It is justified inter alia by the large differences in EU legal systems and future possible changes. However, the common standards of the ECHR should be particularly taken into consideration when applying the public policy clause, because they co-shape the EU legal systems.

Private international lawyers and the ECJ are bound by a love-hate relationship: one single judgment delivered by the latter may sometimes give rise to a fully-fledged conference where, at the end of a lively discussions, the former express harsh criticisms, tepid approval or high praise towards the solution shaped by the Luxembourg Court. But while PIL scholars usually tend to dissect every substantive aspect of the Court’s ruling, little attention is usually paid to the ‘procedural’ context in which such decision has been reached. I admit that, before coming to Luxembourg, I myself took little notice of details such as the existence (or lack of) an AG’s Opinion, the reporting judge assigned to the case or the judicial formation having rendered the decision. However, these arguably are important indicators of the way in which a question concerning EUPIL is treated – both procedurally and substantively – by the Luxembourg Court.

Against this backdrop, it could be interesting, if not useful, to take a broader look at the relationship between the ECJ and EUPIL, going beyond the individual judgment and aimed at assessing preliminary rulings on this subject as a systemic phenomenon. The purpose of this analysis is twofold.

Firstly, it serves to disprove the belief – still held dear by some scholars – that PIL issues are ‘merely technical’ in nature. In fact, these are seldom treated as such in Luxembourg, as evidenced by the overwhelming majority of cases assigned to Chambers of five rather than to a Chamber of three. Moreover, since an Opinion of the AG is delivered in more than half of PIL cases, these often raise ‘new questions of law’, in the sense of Article 20 of the ECJ’s Statute. This finding holds true also with respect to instruments – such as the Brussels Regulations – that are of long-standing application in national courts and frequently interpreted in Luxembourg, thus confirming that, in PIL cases, facts and legal rules tend to combine in ever-changing constellations of interactions.

Secondly, the discussion may be useful in view of eventual future reforms of the ECJ’s internal structure and/or working methods. This Institution is presently coming under growing pressure owing to the ever-increasing number of cases introduced before it on a yearly basis. In 2021, this rise was deemed ‘significant’ and affected mostly the Court of Justice (see the Report ‘Year in Review’, p. 28). The reasons behind this surge of cases are, on the one hand, an increase in the appeals brought against rulings of the General Court (ibid, p. 28) and, on the other hand, the ever-growing number of preliminary references filed by national courts (in 2021, they accounted for the largest share (68%) of new cases brought before the Court: Management Report 2021, p. 6). According to President Lenaerts, the Court is currently engaged in ‘a reflection on how to achieve a rebalancing of the workload between the Court of Justice, composed of one judge per Member State, and the General Court, which, since September, has two judges per Member State’ (Report ‘Year in Review’, p. 5). Since the Court has already tackled – at least partially – the ‘appeals problem’ by introducing a filtering mechanism, this further ‘rebalancing’ might include, in theory, the transfer to the latter of some of the functions currently performed by the former, such has the delivery of preliminary rulings, following a sectoral approach limited to certain subject-matters. The question (purely hypothetical at present) as to whether – and to what extent – the field of civil cooperation in civil matters should be touched by this eventual ‘rebalancing’ should be addressed based on said systemic analysis of the relationship between the ECJ and EUPIL. Its aim is to identify trends – if any – in the adjudication of these cases and to decipher their meaning.

The two objectives stated above can be best served with the assistance of empirical legal research. To my knowledge, there is no existing data (institutional or otherwise) that specifically concerns PIL cases brought before the ECJ. The Charts appearing in the following sections are therefore drawn from a repository of cases I compiled myself based on the information which is publicly available on EUR-LEX and Curia, or was made public at the hearing. This repository puts together the requests for preliminary rulings filed and/or decided with respect to EUPIL instruments from January 2015 to August 2022.

For the purposes of this research, ‘EUPIL’ is understood as encompassing the Brussels-Lugano Regime (Regulations 44/2001 and 1215/2012 as well as the Lugano II Convention), the Brussels II Regime (limited to Regulation 2201/2003, since there are presently no cases on Brussels II-ter), the Rome Regulations (593/2008, 864/2007 and 1259/2010); the Succession Regulation and the ‘smaller’ Regulations (EAPO, EPO, EEO, ESC, Service and Evidence I Regulations). The Regulations on matrimonial and registered partnership property issues have been taken into account, but there is currently no request for interpretation concerning them.

The selected time-frame (2015-2022) has been identified based on the (debatable) assumption that the last 7 years could provide for ‘meaningful’ empirical evidence concerning the application of all the above mentioned instruments, including the eldest, the Brussels I Regulation (which still applies to legal proceedings instituted, to authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settlements approved or concluded until 9 January 2015).

The numerical labels appearing in the Charts refer not to the number of cases filed with the ECJ, but to the number of preliminary references raised with respect to each instrument (e.g. if one case raised questions concerning two different EUPIL instruments, it was counted twice).

Overall, there are 245 preliminary references concerning EUPIL instruments in the selected timeframe. Unsurprisingly, the Brussels-Lugano regime accounts, alone, for more than 50% of the total references submitted to the ECJ, followed by Reg. 2201/2003 as a far second (12 %). The Rome Regulations, taken together, make up for another 12 % of the total cases.

A closer look at the geographical origin of the preliminary references confirms that EUPIL preliminary references are not equally distributed across the Member States.

National courts in Germany and Austria have indisputably acquired a leading role as triggers of EUPIL case law and of its evolution over the past 7 years. Rather surprising is the data concerning Luxembourg, where the ‘cross-border dimension’ of cases is almost a daily occurrence. This suggests that there is no necessary correlation between the application rate of EUPIL instruments and the number of preliminary references submitted to the ECJ.

Data from the last seven years shows that a generous majority of EUPIL cases commands an Opinion of the AG. The percentages shown in Chart 5, below, are based on aggregated data concerning all EUPIL instruments, as defined above sub A.

In actual truth, there are perceivable sectoral variations, across the several instruments, with this percentage hovering between a maximum rate of 80 % in the Succession Regulation to a minimum of 33% under the EEO Regulation (except, of course, for the 0% rate that characterizes the Evidence and the ESC Regulations). The Charts below give a good idea of such sectoral variations.

Another good indicator of the relative ‘weight’ of EUPIL cases (and of the importance of the legal questions raised therein) is the number of preliminary references that, owing to their difficulty, their importance for Union Law or the particular circumstances surrounding them, are assigned to the Grand Chamber (cf Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court).

In this respect, it is apparent from the Charts below that the field of EUPIL is characterized by a relatively low number of Grand Chamber cases (6 cases in total over the last 7 years, ie 3 %). As a reminder, these Grand Chamber cases are:

• Concerning Reg. 1215/2012, C-194/16, Bolagsupplysningen, C-59/19, Wikingerhof (the object of an online symposium on this blog, with comments by Matthias Lehmann, Adrian Briggs, Gilles Cuniberti and Peter Mankowski); C-251/20 Gtflix Tv (commented on this blog by Marco Buzzoni);
• Concerning Reg. 44/2001, C-700/20, London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association (the object of another symposium on this blog, with comments by Adrian Briggs, Gilles Cuniberti, Antonio Leandro and François Mailhé).
• Concerning Reg. 593/2008, C-135/15, Nikiforidis
• Concerning Reg. 2201/2003, C-646/20, Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport, pending.

The vast majority of cases remains assigned to Chambers of five, which is the ordinary formation of the Court. Chambers of three, which are reserved to cases that are either highly technical in nature or of straightforward solution, are less frequent in EUPIL, accounting for around one quarter of the total cases. These are relatively more common under the Brussels I and Ibis Regulation, possibly because of the existence of a long-standing and well-developed body of case law that may better contribute to the straightforward solution of the case.

Interestingly, there is a certain number of cases assigned to a Chamber of three but decided with the support of an AG Opinion. This may, at first (and only at first), seem like a contradiction in terms. As mentioned above, the Opinion of the AG should, in principle, be delivered solely in cases that raise ‘new questions of law’. In practice, however, it is apparent that Opinions have been asked under other circumstances, presumably to help the drafting of the future judgment, or because different approaches to the solution of a case could easily be envisioned. Hence, it is not inconceivable that a case may be, at once, highly technical in nature – thus justifying the deferral to a Chamber of three – and open to different alternative solutions, calling therefore for the advisory assistance of the AG (as it was the case in C-214/17, where AG Szpunar explicitly evokes the doubts expressed by the referring court concerning two alternative approaches to the solution of the question raised, §21-23). Similarly, a case can present a question which is at the same time highly technical in nature, but ‘novel’ in the sense of Article 20 of the Statute, as it might have been the case in C-555/18, concerning the weight to be attached to the requirement of enforceability for the purposes of the uniform definition of ‘authentic instrument’ under the EAPO Regulation (there was, in that case, a target Opinion by AG Szpunar).

Another and more significant pointer to the ‘novelty’ of the legal questions raised by EUPIL cases is the form taken by the decision finally delivered by the ECJ.

It should be reminded that the ECJ usually rules through judgments (arrêts, in French), but it can exceptionally adopt a ‘reasoned order’ where (a) a question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling is identical to a question on which the Court has already ruled ; or (b) where the reply to such a question may be clearly deduced from existing case-law ; or (c) where the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling admits of no reasonable doubt (Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure). Moreover, where it is clear that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a case or where a request or an application is manifestly inadmissible, the Court can decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings (Article 53 (2) Rules of Procedure).

Against this backdrop, the more surprising result is not so much the high number of judgments delivered in EUPIL matters, but rather the extremely low number of Article 99 Orders, even more so with respect to the Brussels I Regulation, which has by now undergone almost two decades of application and interpretations by the Luxembourg Court, and could itself profit from the interpretive rulings previously rendered under the 1968 Brussels Convention according to the 1971 Protocol.

Considering the high recurrence rate of questions concerning the interpretation of certain specific provisions of the Brussels Regulations, such as those dealing with the heads of jurisdiction in contractual matters and torts, consumer contracts and exclusive or prorogated jurisdiction, the low number of Article 99 Orders means, in practice, that the application of such provisions to concrete facts continues to give rise to new scenarios, with respect to which existing case law provides for an answer that is either partial, incomplete or open to further interpretation.

The final aspect considered by this empirical research relates to the (only apparent) lack of internal specialization within the ECJ, in the sense that this Institution is not formally divided into Chambers dedicated to specific subject-matters. Each of the Chambers of the Court, whatever the judicial formation, can in fact hear cases relating to any matter that falls within the jurisdiction thereof. Considering the wide scope of EU law and in the light of the current challenges brought by the inflating number of new cases, this lack of specialization of the Court’s Chambers could be seen as a hindrance to the Institution’s efficiency. Again, this conclusion must be nuanced, if not completely set aside, based on the analysis of the Court’s case law. Despite the lack of institutional specialized Chambers, the Court has developed an internal system for the allocation of cases among reporting judges and AGs which favours, at once, informal specialization and flexibility. Concerning the latter, the internal allocation of cases must be flexible enough to accommodate the contingent organizational needs of an Institution of such size, such as, for example, the need of ensuring an equal distribution of cases and expedited treatment of PPU cases or of avoiding national or other kinds of bias. Concerning specialization, existing case law clearly shows that certain judges and AGs that have been consistently entrusted, over the time, with EUPIL cases.

(***Note of the Author: data about Reporting Judges are incomplete, as this information is not disclosed with respect to cases that have been withdrawn and removed from the register. The Order of the President only mentions the designated AG***)

Obviously, this is not to say that the final decision on the case will reflect exclusively or even predominantly the individual views of these judges. Rather, this decision will always be the result of the collective will emerged from the discussion within the Chamber (of five or of three judges). This informal specialization of the Reporting Judge and of the AGs ensures nonetheless the efficient working of the Institution at the initial stage of the proceedings, concerned with the preliminary analysis of the case geared towards the identification of the appropriate judicial formation and of other procedural needs (eg. the need for further written clarifications or for an oral hearing). It could also favour, over time, a certain consistency in the (procedural and substantive) approach adopted with respect to recurrent issues, thus enhancing the overall coherence of the Court’s case law in EUPIL.

Building on the very successful conferences held in Aberdeen (2005), Birmingham (2007), New York (2009), Milan (2011), Madrid (2013), Cambridge (2015), Rio (2017) and Munich (2019), we are pleased to announce that the Journal of Private International Law will be holding its 9th Conference at the Singapore Management University from 3 to 5 August 2023.

We now invite abstracts for the conference. Please submit an abstract if you would like to make a presentation at the conference and you are willing to produce a final paper that you will submit for publication in the Journal. Abstracts should be up to 500 words in length and should clearly state the name(s) and affiliation(s) of the author(s).

They can be on any subject matter that falls within the scope of the Journal and can be offered by people at any stage of their career, including postgraduate students. Presentation at the conference will depend on whether your abstract is selected by the Editors of the Journal (Professor Jonathan Harris KC of King’s College, London and Professor Paul Beaumont FRSE of the University of Stirling) and the conference organiser (Associate Professor Adeline Chong, Singapore Management University). The subsequent article should be submitted to either of the editors of the Journal before the end of 2023. Publication in the Journal will be subject to the usual system of refereeing by two experts in the field.

There will be a mixture of plenary (Friday) and parallel panel sessions (Thursday afternoon and Saturday morning). Please indicate on the abstract whether you are willing to present in either or are only willing to do so in one or the other. A willingness to be flexible maximises our ability to select your paper.

The Conference will be held in the Yong Pung How School of Law, Singapore Management University. Please see here for up-to-date information on travel requirements to enter Singapore.

Speakers will not be expected to pay a conference fee but will be expected to pay their expenses in relation to their attendance at the conference in Singapore. Details about options for accommodation and the conference dinner on the Friday evening will be made available on the conference webpage . Please send your abstract to the following email address by Friday 16 December 2022: jpil2023@smu.edu.sg.

Today (16 September 2022) the Russian Federation has ceased to be a High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This means, inter alia, that applications against the Russian Federation will no longer be entertained by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

However, the Resolution of the ECtHR of 22 March 2022 clarified that “The Court remains competent to deal with applications directed against the Russian Federation in relation to acts or omissions capable of constituting a violation of the Convention provided that they occurred until 16 September 2022.” To view the full resolution, click here. The news item is available here.

The Russian Federation had ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022. See here.

We have previously reported on the increasing interaction between the ECHR and Private International Law. This is particularly so in surrogacy and international child abduction cases. See for example a judgment regarding international child abduction rendered by the ECtHR earlier this year, where no violation of article 8 of the ECHR was found against Russia: Case of P.D. v. Russia (Application no. 30560/19). But see Thompson v. Russia (Application no. 36048/17) where a violation of article 8 of the ECHR was indeed found.

For more information about this interaction, click here.

Undoubtedly, today is a sad day for human rights law.

Olaf Meyer (Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences) edited a book titled Public Policy and Private International Law – A Comparative Guide with Edward Elgar Publishing, part of the Elgar Comparative Guides.

Bearing in mind that the public policy exception in private international law is designed to provide a national backstop in the application of foreign laws, this book provides detailed and practical comparative coverage of the use of public policy in the context of private international law across a number of important jurisdictions spanning three continents. As well as explaining the basic theoretical framework of the public policy exception in private international law, this book drills down into the practical application of such rules, giving an overview of these jurisdictions’ legal and policy stances on current issues including: punitive damages, surrogacy, same-sex marriage, gender-based discrimination, Islamic law, and adoption to name a few. This approach serves to highlight both the differences and the similarities in approach.

Contributors include John F. Coyle, Luís de Lima Pinheiro, Anita Duraković, Pietro Franzina, Andreas Furrer, Florian Heindler, Madina Kassenova, Svenja Langenhagen, Qiao Liu, Peter Mankowski, Ulf Maunsbach, Louise Merrett, Zlatan Meškić, Olaf Meyer, Alberto Muñoz Fernández, Cécile Pellegrini, Réka Somssich, Dirk Trüten, Bea Verschraegen, Wolfgang Wurmnest, Candan Yasan-Tepetaş, Fang Yu, Maciej Zachariasiewicz and Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar.

For further information, see here.

Under the auspices of the EU Justice project E-training on EU Family Property Regimes, shortly known as EU-FamPro, the project partners organise a conference COUPLES’ PROPERTY WITH CROSS-BORDER IMPLICATIONS: Uniting Academic Discussions and Practical Concerns, followed by the seminar on Practical Challenges in the Application of the Twin Regulations. The conference and the seminar are due to take place on 19 September 2022 at the University of Almeria, Spain.

The programme of the event is now available here.

The event will be held in hybrid format. You may join the event via Zoom by clicking on this link.

Some of our readers will be interested to know that University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law announced this year’s call for applications to the Rijeka Doctoral Conference: RIDOC 2022. Receiving applications on any legal or related topic of doctoral research, the conference traditionally hosts at least one session in private international law. Applications should be sent to ridoc@pravri.hr by 5 October. The conference is scheduled for 9 December 2022 in the hybrid format, but hopefully many of the participants will be able to attend onsite.

Georgina Garriga Suau and Christopher Whytock have recently published a paper on SSRN, entitled “Choice of Law for Immovable Property Issues: New directions in the European Union and the United States”.

Building on a comparative assessment of recent developments in US and EU private international law (PIL), the paper address the changing fate of lex rei sitae conflict-of-law rule, which went from being the cornerstone of the PIL regime for issues about immovable property to see its scope of application substantially reduced over the last years.

In the US, the current drafts of the Third Restatement limits the scope of application of the lex rei situs to “core immovable property issues”, to the exclusions of other ancillary matters that were subsumed under this rule according to the First and Second Restatement, such as succession and matrimonial property issues involving immovables, and even issues concerning contracts for the transfer of immovable property interests. Behind the retrocession of this rule lies a different and more holistic approach to the appraisal of the policies underpinning the laws governing matrimonial property regimes, successions and contracts: these are usually not policies about immovables as such, meaning a State other than that where the immovables are located will likely have a stronger interest in having its law applied to these issues, considered as an inseparable whole.

The authors give evidence of a similar trend in EU PIL. Although the lex rei sitae conflict-of-law rule is maintained, in principle, by the Rome I Regulation with respect to contracts relating to a right in rem in immovable property, later on it did not find its way in either the Succession Regulation or the Matrimonial Property Regulation, both axed on the connecting factor of habitual residence.

Similarly, the Registered Partnership Regulation does not adopt the lex rei sitae conflict-of-law rule, even when the issues covered by it arise in relation to immovable property. All these Regulations favour the unity of the applicable law, extending their conflict-of-law rules to the issues that are within their scope regardless of the property’s location and regardless of whether it is characterized a movable or immovable property.

They do, nonetheless, indirectly allow for the “survival” of the lex rei sitae conflict-of-law rule, insofar as they exclude from their scope (and delegate to national PIL) certain core immovable property issues, namely, the nature of rights in rem  and the recording o immovable property rights in a register, including the legal requirements for recording and the effects of recording or failing to record. Such exclusions (which are narrowly interpreted by the ECJ) pose the problem of defining such “core immovable property issues”.

According to the authors, these include, that these issues include, at a minimum, issues about permissible interests in immovable property and about the requirements for and effects vis-à-vis third parties of recording immovable property transfers in immovable property registries. On this point, there is certainly room for enhancing coherence among the several EU Regulations and improving legal certainty as concerns the EU’s understanding of “rights in rem in immovable property”. This challenge is currently being tackled by several academic initiatives, that are briefly discussed by Garriga Suau and Whytock.

The authors conclude that the comparative analysis of EU and US PIL reveals that similar reasons lie behind the “shrinking” scope of application of the lex rei sitae conflict-of-law rule, relating mostly to the objective of avoiding fragmentation a corpus of property in the case of matrimonial property/succession issues, and in those contexts as well as in the context of contractual matters, avoiding the need to characterize issues as involving either immovable property or movable property. Another underlying reason is, in both legal systems, a shift in the interest analysis that underpins the conception of conflict-of-law rules in those matters, which now tends to attach less weight to the sheer location of property, to the benefit of other interests that can usually be better ensured through the application of a law other than the lex rei sitae.

From the intersection of conflict of laws, archaeology, and indigenous studies, this multidisciplinary webinar will explore legal and practical challenges and solutions in repatriating cultural heritage in Australia, China, the EU, and the USA.

Examples include an Australian repatriation project with the Anindilyakwa Land Council and Traditional Owners on Groote Eylandt, the world-wide Return of Cultural Heritage (RoCH) program established by the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, legal battles in repatriating the Chinese statue of Zh?ng G?ng Z? Sh? (a budda statue with a mummy inside), sovereign immunity issues in recovery of World War II-era stolen art and other heritage, and participation of local communities in protecting and repatriating cultural heritage.

Speakers (listed in the surname alphabetic order):

• Dr. Evelien Campfens, member of the International Law Association Cultural Heritage Law Committee based at Leiden University, the Netherlands, and former director to the Dutch Restitutions Committee for Nazi looted art
• Professor Anne (Annie) Clarke, Chair of Archaeology Discipline and Member of Museum and Heritage Studies Program, the University of Sydney, Australia
• Professor Zheng Xin Huo, China University of Political Science and Law, China
• Professor Charles T. Kotuby Jr., University of Pittsburgh School of Law and Honorary Professor of Law, Durham Law School, the USA and UK
• Mr. Craig Ritchie, an Aboriginal man of the Dhunghutti and Biripi nations and the Chief Executive Officer at the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS), Australia

Moderator:

• Associate Professor Jie (Jeanne) Huang, the University of Sydney Law School and Co-Director of Center for Asian and Pacific Law

Webinar via Zoom: Wednesday 21 September 6.00-7.15 pm (AEST)

Once registered, you will be provided with Zoom details closer to the date of the webinar.

If interested, please register here.

This webinar is jointly presented by the American Society of International Law Private International Law Interest Group, Centre for Asian and Pacific Law and the Center for International Law at the University of Sydney Law School.

The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) and the Australian Branch of the ILA are pleased to present the 2022 Peter Nygh Hague Conference Internship. The award will support a postgraduate student or graduate of an Australian law school to undertake an internship with The Hague Conference on Private International Law in the Netherlands by providing funds to cover the cost of travel to the Netherlands and a contribution towards living expenses.

Applications for the 2023 Nygh Internship are now open, and will close on 30 September 2022. More information about the award and how to apply is available here, and below.

The Internship

The award will provide a postgraduate student or graduate with the opportunity to work with some of the leading private international law practitioners in the world. With over 80 members (including the European Union) representing all major regions and legal systems, The Hague Conference is a global intergovernmental organisation that aims for the ‘progressive unification’ of the various State private international law rules.

Activities of The Hague Conference are coordinated by a multinational Secretariat – the Permanent Bureau – located in The Hague. The successful intern will work for 5 to 6 months under the direction of the Secretariat, assisting with research, translation and preparation of meetings in accordance with the needs of the lawyers of the Permanent Bureau.

How to apply

Please send a letter of application addressed to the Peter Nygh Hague Conference Internship Board (nygh.internship@internationalaffairs.org.au) or to c/- Ms Nicola Nygh, Resolve Litigation Lawyers, level 18, 126 Phillip Street, Sydney NSW 2000.

The letter should include:

• the applicant’s reasons for applying for the Peter Nygh Hague Conference Internship;
• the benefits which the applicant expects are to be derived from the internship and the contribution which the applicant expects to make to the work of The Hague Conference;
• the applicant’s career ambitions and how the internship will relate to those ambitions;
• a description of the applicant’s current research, if applicable; and
• the dates when the applicant would be available to undertake the internship (Note: The applicant must be available to undertake the internship for 5 to 6 months. The preferred start date is the beginning of January 2023 and the preferred end date is the end of June 2023. The start date, and indeed whether the internship can be undertaken in 2023, may vary depending on what travel restrictions are in place at the time).

The award is for a lump sum amount, and the successful candidate will need to accept the risks and increased costs of travelling during the COVID-19 pandemic, including limited and more expensive flights (in particular into and out of Australia), government restrictions on travel, and quarantine regimes for travellers.

Please also enclose the following:

• the applicant’s up-to-date résumé;
• the applicant’s most recent academic transcript;
• two letters of reference for the applicant (including at least one academic reference), with contact details of referees;
• a copy of research work by the applicant in a field relevant to the work of The Hague Conference; and
• any other proof of the applicant’s legal and linguistic abilities and knowledge. Knowledge of French would be an asset but is not required. Knowledge of any other languages may also be an advantage.

The Hon Dr Peter Nygh AM

The Peter Nygh Hague Conference Internship has been established in memory of the late Hon Dr Peter Nygh AM, a leading international lawyer, former judge of the Family Court of Australia and former President of the ILA (Australian Branch). Dr Nygh began his 25 year association with The Hague Conference as a member of Australia’s delegation in 1975. During this time, Dr Nygh helped to draft the Convention on the Celebration and Recognition of the Validity of Marriages as well as the Convention on the Law Applicable to Matrimonial Property Regimes, work which contributed to his appointment to the Family Court of Australia. After his retirement from the bench, Dr Nygh returned to The Hague Conference and between 1994 and his death in 2002 he contributed in many ways, including serving as co-rapporteur on The Hague ‘judgments project’ from 1996 and representing Australia in the negotiations that led to the Convention on the Protection of Children. In his later years Dr Nygh spent extended periods in The Hague without remuneration or payment of his expenses, yet his work did not go unrecognised. He was awarded the Centenary Medal by the Australian Government as well as the Order of Australia, partly in recognition of his outstanding and longstanding contribution to private international law, and in particular his representation of Australia at The Hague Conference.

The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) is offering several three- to six-month legal internships at its office in the Hague from January to June 2023.

The selected interns are expected to conduct research together with the HCCH legal team the following areas of activity of the organisation:

Family and Child Protection Law (at least three interns):

• 2000 Protection of Adults Convention and 2007 Child Support Convention and Protocol
• 1993 Adoption Convention and Parentage / Surrogacy Project
• 1980 Child Abduction Convention (incl. Malta Process and related Working Party on Mediation) and 1996 Child Protection Convention

Transnational Litigation, Legal Cooperation, and Commercial and Financial Law (at least three interns):

• 1961 Apostille Convention (incl. e-APP)
• 1985 Trusts Convention, 2006 Securities Convention and Digital Economy (incl. DLT) Project
• 2005 Choice of Court Convention, 2019 Judgments Convention, Jurisdiction Project, and 2015 Choice of Law Principles
• 1965 Service Convention, 1970 Evidence Convention, and 1980 Access to Justice Convention

The HCCH Internship Programme is open to those currently studying law at the Bachelor, Masters, J.D, and PhD. level and to those who have already been awarded a law degree or Masters.

The intern should speak at least one of the two official languages of the HCCH, English and French. Knowledge of the other official language is an asset. Knowledge of any other languages may also be an advantage.

Prospective applicants should complete an online application form (available here) and submit the following supporting documentation:

1. a letter of motivation (two pages maximum)
2. a curriculum vitae (CV)
3. a transcript of academic records or statement of academic results
4. an academic writing sample (an excerpt of any of your essays or papers in either English or French)
5. at least one letter of recommendation

The applications can be submitted until 18.00 hours (CEST), Friday 23 September 2022.

More information about the internship and the application and selection process can be found here.

QBE Europe SA/NV v Generali Espana De Seguros Y Reaseguros [2022] EWHC 2062 (Comm) is not a surprising judgment of course. I flagged it on Twitter early August and I post it here for the sake of blog completeness.

The judgment grants an urgent anti-suit injunction (ASI) to restrain proceedings brought by the Defendant (Generali) against QBE UK in Spain, and to prevent Generali from commencing similar proceedings against QBE Europe. The proceedings in Spain assert a direct claim against QBE UK under a Spanish statute, by reference to a liability insurance policy. The judgment is exactly the kind of ASI outlawed by CJEU West Tankers and will reinforce the position of London in the arbitration market.

Geert.

Move over CJEU West Tankers….
Anti-suit injunction viz Spanish proceedings granted to protect #arbitration in London. Discusses ia nature of claim in SP proceedings

QBE Europe SA/NV v Generali Espana De Seguros Y Reaseguros [2022] EWHC 2062 (Comm) https://t.co/LwzrDzzNXv

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) August 1, 2022

This post was contributed by Thomas Mastrullo, who is an Associate Professor of Commercial Law at the University  of Luxembourg. It is the fifth in a series of posts on the French draft code of private international law of March 2022 (the previous posts in the series gave a German perspective and discussed the issues of renvoi, foreign law and the recognition of marriages celebrated abroad). 

Title II of Book II of the French Draft Code of Private International Law is devoted to legal persons.

This Title II is divided into two chapters which deal with two major questions of international company law: the first chapter pertains to the recognition of companies (Art. 85), while the second chapter concerns the conflict-of-law rule in corporate matters, through the determination (Art. 86) and the scope (Art. 87) of lex societatis.

By the rules it proposes, the French Draft PIL Code undoubtedly promotes the modernization of French international company law.

Article 85 of the French Draft PIL Code lays down the principle of recognition in France of the legal personality of companies formed in accordance with the law of a foreign State.

The proposed article 85 reads :

L’existence et les effets de la personnalité morale ou de la capacité juridique des sociétés dont le siège statutaire est situé hors du territoire français et qui ont été régulièrement immatriculées sur un registre public d’un État étranger sont reconnus de plein droit sous réserve de la fraude aux droits des tiers.

The Draft PIL Code thus adopts the liberal theory of incorporation with regard to the recognition of foreign companies: as soon as a company is validly incorporated in a foreign State, where by hypothesis it has fixed its statutory seat or registered office, it must be recognised in French territory.

Such a rule “codifies” the traditional position of French law on this subject. Indeed, since the 19th century, it has been accepted in French law that “la régularité de la constitution selon la loi de l’État d’immatriculation est suffisante pour que la société soit reconnue en France” (M. Menjucq, Droit international et européen des sociétés, LGDJ, “Précis Domat”, 6th ed., no. 58), as long as it is established that the company enjoys legal personality in its State of incorporation (See CA Paris, 30 Apr. 1997, BJS 1997, p. 778, note M. Menjucq). Moreover, the solution adopted by the Draft is in line with the jurisprudence of the CJEU, and in particular with Überseering judgment (see here) according to which:

the refusal by a host Member State to recognize the legal capacity of a company formed in accordance with the law of another Member State in which it has its registered office on the ground (…) constitutes a restriction on freedom of establishment” and, even worst, an “outright negation of the freedom of establishment.

Beyond these general remarks, three points on the text may be underlined.

Firstly, recognition relates to the “existence and effects” of legal personality. This expression refers to the French doctrinal position which defines recognition as “l’admission sur le territoire nationale de l’existence et des effets d’une personne juridique (physique ou morale) étrangère” (L. Lévy, La nationalité des sociétés, LGDJ, 1984, p. 51). This definition gives precedence to the fiction theory of legal personality, considering that, whatever personality a company enjoys abroad, it is not imposed on the State of recognition, which remains free to decide on its existence. We know that other authors, inspired by the reality theory, define recognition more strictly as “l’autorisation accordée par l’État à la société d’exercer une activité sur son sol” (P. Mayer et V. Heuzé, Droit international privé, LGDJ, « Précis Domat », 11th ed., no. 1106 et s.). The approach adopted by the Draft has the merit of grasping the whole issue of recognition in corporate matters: the recognition of the existence of a foreign company as a legal person logically implies the recognition of the effects resulting from this personality… And it is difficult to imagine that a foreign company whose existence is recognised in a State could be outright refused authorization to carry on its business there.

Secondly, the Draft PIL Code pertains to the recognition of the companies’ “legal personality” but also of the companies’ “legal capacity”. A simple legal capacity granted in the foreign State of incorporation is therefore sufficient to recognize a company’s legal personality in France. Indeed, the condition that the company must have legal personality in its State of incorporation in order to be recognized in France is interpreted broadly. Even if it does not have legal personality in its State of incorporation, a company which enjoys a capacity equivalent to that conferred on companies which have legal personality in France may be recognized as a legal person on French territory, as was decided in the case of a German Offene Handelsgesellschaft (see CA Versailles, 14 janv. 1999, BJS 1999, § 97, p. 466, note M. Menjucq).

Thirdly, the Draft PIL Code provides that recognition can be rejected in case of fraud against the right of third parties. This could be the hypothesis of a letter-box company without any effective connection to the State in which it has its statutory seat or registered office. This international company law’s classic limitation is to be welcomed, especially as it is compatible with EU law. Indeed, it follows in particular from the Inspire Art (see here) and Polbud (see here) CJEU’s judgements that fraud against the rights of third parties may constitute a limit on the companies’ freedom of establishment, provided that such fraud is assessed on a case-by-case basis and in a punitive manner (see Th. Mastrullo in Traité de droit du commerce international, M. Menjucq et J. Béguin (dir.), LexisNexis, 3rd ed., no 711). Obviously, the characterisation of fraud will always be based on an assessment of the facts of the case.

The French Draft Code of Private International Law adopts the theory of incorporation and the criterion of the statutory seat or registered office as a connecting factor for determining the lex societatis.

The proposed Article 86 reads :

Les sociétés immatriculées au registre du commerce et des sociétés au titre de leur siège statutaire sont soumises aux dispositions de la loi française.

Les sociétés dont le siège statutaire est situé hors du territoire français sont soumises aux dispositions du droit des sociétés de l’État dans lequel elles sont immatriculées dans un registre public ou, à défaut d’immatriculation, de l’État où est situé le siège statutaire.

The first paragraph uses the unilateralist method, and states the French law’s will to be applicable to companies whose statutory seat or registered office is in France, while the second paragraph contains a bilateral conflict-of-laws rule according to which, when its statutory seat is not in France, the company is ruled by the law of the State where it is incorporated or has its statutory seat.

As the Legal High Committee for Financial Markets of Paris (“Haut Comité juridique de la Place Financière de Paris” – HCJP) which has published a report on the applicable law to companies  (Rapport sur le rattachement des sociétés – see here) on 31 March 2021, the French Draft PIL Code adopts a liberal approach of companies’ connecting factor.

Several arguments may be advanced in support of this proposition.

Firstly, the connecting factor relying the statutory seat or registered office is simpler and, as a consequence, more favorable to legal certainty. Indeed, on the one hand, it eliminates the touchy question of the place of the real seat and, on the other hand, it guarantees respect for the operators’ choice of the law to rule their company. Thus, this connecting factor might reinforce France’s attractiveness. Secondly, the solution is inspired by the comparative private international law which reveals a strong tendency towards the generalization of the incorporation theory or connecting criterion by the statutory seat or registered office. In Belgium, for instance, the connecting criterion by the real seat, which had prevailed since 1873, has been abandoned by the law of 23 March 2019 in favour of the connecting criterion by the statutory seat, the new Article 110 of the Belgian Code of Private International Law now providing that « La personne morale est régie par le droit de l’État où se situe son siège statutaire ». Thirdly, the solution is more suited to the development of EU law which, through the jurisprudence of the CJEU – and in particular the Centros (see here), Überseering (see here), Inspire Art (see here), and Polbud (see here) judgments – and some regulations – such as European Regulation n° 2157/2001 on SE (see here) or Directive (UE) 2019/2121 amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions (see here), tends to promote the statutory seat or registered office as a connecting factor.

It is regrettable that the proposed Article 86 does not provide for the limit of fraud against the rights of third parties, as it is expressly provided for in relation to recognition. One can think, however, that the limit of fraud could be implemented in order to apply the law of the real seat instead of the law of the statutory seat, either on the basis of Article 85, which rejects the recognition of legal personality’s “effects” in case of fraud against the right of third parties (lex societatis may be considered as one of these “effects”), or on the basis of common private international law, knowing that such a limit is envisaged by European case law (see already above).

Article 87 of the French Draft Code of Private International Law is dedicated to the scope of application of the lex societatis. The inspiration of this text can be found in Swiss law. The aim is to increase the readability and, as a result, the attractiveness of French law. A list of elements falling within the scope of lex societatis is drawn, this list being non-exhaustive as suggested by the use of the French adverb “notamment” (which can be translated by “in particular”).The list of elements falling within the scope of the lex societatis is not surprising and, mostly, “codifies” the French doctrinal positions and case law’s solutions.For example, the assertion that the lex societatis determines the acquisition and loss of the status of shareholder takes up the solution of the famous Royal Dutch judgment of 17 October 1972 (see here), in the same way that the Africatours judgment of 1st July 1997 admitted the application of the lex societatis with regard to the liability of managers towards third parties (see here).

In conclusion, the project seems relevant to meet the challenges created by the development of freedom of establishment in the European Union and to strengthen the competitiveness of French company law.

Florence Guillaume and Swen Riva (University of Neuchatel) have posted Blockchain Dispute Resolution for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations: The Rise of Decentralized Autonomous Justice on SSRN.

For the past twenty years, the use of the Internet has facilitated international commercial relations between people who do not know each other and who are geographically distant. Disputes resulting from e-commerce have undermined the supremacy of state courts, which have proved unable to provide an appropriate response to small claims arising in an international context and raising delicate questions as to jurisdiction and applicable law. The length, cost and complexity of the procedure, as well as the risk associated with the international enforcement of the judgment are deterrent factors that led e-commerce platforms to develop online dispute resolution (ODR).

Thanks in part to the removal of intermediaries, the transfer of cryptocurrencies and other crypto assets using blockchain technology has further facilitated international commercial relations. The decentralized and distributed characteristics of blockchain technology and the pseudonymity of its transactions has led to a new economy growing independently from nation states. This technology has brought an additional degree of complication in the application of private international law (PIL) rules by removing the illusion that online transactions can be linked to the territory of a state. Smart contracts also allow the creation of digital entities that can enter into commercial relations. The first decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) was the source of a resounding dispute between parties with diverging interests, which had to be urgently resolved without any access to state courts or a dispute resolution mechanism. This case revealed the risk of disputes in the blockchain environment and the resulting legal uncertainty, and led to the emergence of various models of blockchain dispute resolution (BDR) mechanisms (BDRs) inspired by the solutions developed in e-commerce.

This chapter deals with the application of PIL rules to the resolution of disputes involving DAOs. The authors first analyze what is a DAO and whether DAOs legally qualify as companies. What is at stake is the legal personality of DAOs and their capacity to conduct legal proceedings. The authors then examine whether disputes involving DAOs may be brought before state courts. This analysis highlights the problems related to the location, pseudonymity, and uncertainty regarding the legal personality of the participants of the blockchain environment, which challenge the jurisdiction of state courts in case of a dispute. The authors then draw on the experience acquired in the field of e-commerce to examine the advisability of setting up alternative dispute resolution mechanisms available to the actors of the blockchain environment. Based on an analysis of existing BDRs, the authors examine whether and how BDRs are likely to avoid a denial of justice and bring legal certainty to disputes related to contractual relationships with DAOs formalized through smart contracts as well as disputes related to the governance of DAOs. The authors find that a BDR decision which can be directly enforced through smart contracts confers effective justice to the actors of the blockchain environment. Finally, the authors address the more delicate issue of the enforcement of a BDR decision on non-crypto assets. This approach shows that a type of justice based on cryptoeconomic incentives challenges the concept of fair justice. This could be an impediment to obtaining the assistance of state authorities for the enforcement of a BDR decision outside of the blockchain environment as this type of decision could be considered contrary to public policy.

The analysis is mostly based on Swiss private international law and major private international law conventions. In this chapter, the authors outline the contours of a new private justice system designed to provide decentralized autonomous justice to the actors of the crypto economy.

The paper is forthcoming in Bonomi and Lehmann (eds), Blockchain and Private International Law (Brill Nijhoff 2022)

Cross-Border Litigation in Central Europe – EU Private International Law Before National Court, is the tile of a collection of essays, edited  by Csongor István Nagy and just published by Kluwer.

Cross-Border Litigation in Central Europe, an indispensable reference book, provides a detailed understanding of the process of seeking justice in cross-border disputes in Central Europe. It is the first of its kind to offer a comprehensive and analytical overview of the judicial practice in the region and to make this case law accessible in English.

The book provides a critical insight into the case law of ten Central European States relating to various fields of EU private international law (general civil and commercial, insolvency, family and succession matters).

The contributions were written by Dora Zgrabljic Rotar, Tena Hosko, Katazyna Bogdzevic, Pavle Flere, Lucia Gandzalova, Justyna Gumula-Kedracka, Monika Jagielska, Elena Judova, Inga Kacevska, Wojciech Klyta, Vadim Mantrov, Gabor Palasti, Magdalena Sobas, Janos Szekely, Dace Trupovniece, Jiri Valdhans, Emod Veress, and Lucie Zavadilova.

Meanwhile, a paper issued from the research on which the book builds has appeared on SSRN. It is authored by Csongor Nagy and is titled EU Choice-Of-Law Rules before Hungarian Courts: Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations.

The abstract reads as follows:

This article is based on the Hungarian strand of the multiyear CEPIL project carried out with the generous support of the European Commission Directorate General Justice and Consumers. One of the leading considerations behind the CEPIL project was that the value of private international law unification can be preserved only if EU private international law instruments are applied correctly and uniformly, hence, the European endeavours in the field should not and cannot stop at statutory unification but need to embrace the judicial practice and make sure that besides the vertical communication between the CJEU and national courts, there is also a horizontal communication between national courts, authorities and the legal community in general. The purpose of this publication is to contribute to this horizontal communication between Member State courts by providing an analytical insight into the Hungarian case-law on the Rome I and the Rome II Regulations.

Additional information on the edited book, including the table of contents, is available here.

Lydia Lundstedt has prior review of the judgment in CJEU C-399/21 IRnova AB v FLIR Systems AB (who had been business partners in the past) here. Swedish courts are clearly busy referring the private international law elements of patent cases to the CJEU.

Of particular note is that a 3 judge chamber would seem to have ruled out reflexive effect as casually as if it were swatting a fly.

On 13 December 2019, IRnova brought an action before the Patent and Market Court seeking, inter alia, a declaration that it had a better right to the inventions covered by international patent applications, subsequently supplemented by European, US and Chinese patent applications deposited by FLIR in 2015 and 2016, and by US patents granted to FLIR on the basis of those latter applications. In support of that action, IRnova had stated, in essence, that those inventions had been made by one of its employees, meaning that that employee had to be regarded as their inventor or, at the very least, as their co-inventor. IRnova therefore argued that, as the inventor’s employer and thus successor in title, it had to be regarded as the owner of the inventions. However, FLIR, without having acquired those inventions or otherwise being entitled to do so, deposited the applications in its own name.

The court had dismissed jurisdiction viz the Chinese and US patent applications, and the US patents, on the ground, in essence, that it regarded the action concerning the determination of the inventor as being linked to the registration and validity of the patents, and it applied A24(4) BIa reflexively. The Appeals Court referred the issue on reflexive effect to the CJEU, in the following terms:

‘Is an action seeking a declaration of better entitlement to an invention, based on a claim of inventorship or co-inventorship according to national patent applications and patents registered in a non-Member State, covered by exclusive jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 24(4) of [the Brussels Ia Regulation]?’

however the CJEU reformulated [22-24] the case as not concerning reflexive effect at all, rather, enquiring about the scope of the A24(4) gateway.

The Court first of all [25] ff makes a point of confirming its broad reading of the ‘international’ element required to trigger European private international law, referring to CJEU Owusu.

It then [35] would seem to rule out reflexivity in a very matter of factly way (and as Lydia also noted, without AG Opinion):

as has already been pointed out in paragraph 26 of the present judgment, the patent applications at issue in the main proceedings were deposited and the patents concerned were granted not in a Member State, but in third countries, namely the United States and China. As Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ia Regulation does not envisage that situation, however, that provision cannot be regarded as applicable to the main proceedings.

This may have already answered a core question in  BSH Hausgeräte v Aktiebolaget Electrolux .

[36] ff it refers ia to CJEU Hanssen and to the exceptional nature of A24 [39]. It holds that [42]

the main proceedings relate not to the existence of the deposit of a patent application or the grant of a patent, the validity or lapse of a patent, or indeed an alleged right of priority by reason of an earlier deposit, but to whether FLIR must be regarded as being the proprietor of the right to the inventions concerned or to a portion of them.

[47] it refers ia to the fact that fact that

an examination of the claims of the patent or patent application at issue may have to be carried out in the light of the substantive patent law of the country in which that application was deposited or that patent was granted [however it ] does not require the application of the rule of exclusive jurisdiction laid down in Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ia Regulation

Much relevant and surprisingly succinct on the reflexivity issue.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.208 and 2.548.