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The Court of Justice delivered yesterday (15 July 2021) its decision in case C‑30/20 (RH v AB Volvo, and alii), which is about Article 7(2) Brussels I bis and the private enforcement of competition law

“Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, within the market affected by collusive arrangements on the fixing and increase in the prices of goods, either the court within whose jurisdiction the undertaking claiming to be harmed purchased the goods affected by those arrangements or, in the case of purchases made by that undertaking in several places, the court within whose jurisdiction that undertaking’s registered office is situated, has international and territorial jurisdiction, in terms of the place where the damage occurred, over an action for compensation for the damage caused by those arrangements contrary to Article 101 TFEU”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=244190&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2220107

The Court of Justice delivered yesterday (15 July 2021) its decision in joined Cases C‑152/20 and C‑218/20 (DG, EH v SC Gruber Logistics SRL (C‑152/20), and Sindicatul Lucrătorilor din Transporturi, DT v SC Samidani Trans SRL (C‑218/20)), which is about the law applicable to employment contracts:

“1. Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 […]  must be interpreted as meaning that, where the law governing the individual employment contract has been chosen by the parties to that contract, and that law differs from the law applicable pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 or 4 of that article, the application of the latter law must be excluded with the exception of ‘provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement’ under that law within the meaning of Article 8(1) of that regulation, provisions that can, in principle, include rules on the minimum wage.

2. Article 8 of Regulation No 593/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that:

–  first, the parties to an individual employment contract are to be regarded as being free to choose the law applicable to that contract even if the contractual provisions are supplemented by national labour law pursuant to a national provision, provided that the national provision in question does not require the parties to choose national law as the law applicable to the contract, and

– secondly, the parties to an individual employment contract are to be regarded as being, in principle, free to choose the law applicable to that contract even if the contractual clause concerning that choice is drafted by the employer, with the employee merely accepting it”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=244192&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2220107

The CJEU held yesterday in C-30/20 Volvo Trucks. I reviewed Richard de la Tour AG’s Opinion here.

After having noted the limitation of the questions referred to locus damni [30]  (excluding therefore the as yet unsettled locus delicti commissi issues) the CJEU confirms first of all [33] that Article 7(2) clearly assigns both international and territorial jurisdiction. The latter of course subject to the judicial organisation of the Member State concerned. If locus damni x has no court then clearly the Regulation simply assigns jurisdiction to the legal district of which x is part. However the Court does not rule out [36] per CJEU Sanders and Huber that a specialised court may be established nationally for competition law cases.

The Court then [39] applies C‑343/19 Volkswagen (where goods are purchased which, following manipulation by their producer, are of lower value, the court having jurisdiction over an action for compensation for damage corresponding to the additional costs paid by the purchaser is that of the place where the goods are purchased) pro inspiratio: place of purchase of the goods at artificially inflated prices will be locus damni, irrespective of whether the goods it issue were purchased directly or indirectly from the defendants, with immediate transfer of ownership or at the end of a leasing contract [40].

The Court then somewhat puzzlingly adds [40] that ‘that approach implies that the purchaser that has been harmed exclusively purchased goods affected by the collusive arrangements in question within the jurisdiction of a single court. Otherwise, it would not be possible to identify a single place of occurrence of damage with regard to the purchaser harmed.’

Surely it must mean that if purchases occurred in several places, Mozaik jurisdiction will ensue rather than just one locus damni (as opposed to the alternative reading that locus damni jurisdiction in such case will not apply at all). However the Court then also confirms [41 ff] its maverick CDC approach of the buyer’s registered office as the locus damni in the case of purchases made in several places.

Here I am now lost and the simply use of vocabulary such as ‘solely’, ‘additionally’ or ‘among others’ would have helped me here. Are we now to assume that the place of purchase of the goods is locus damni only if there is only one place of purchase, not if there are several such places (leaving a lot of room for Article 7(2) engineering both by cartelists and buyers); and that, conversely, place of registered office as locus damni only applies in the event of several places of purchase, therefore cancelling out the classic (much derided) Article 7(2) Mozaik per Shevill and Bier – but only in the event of competition law infringement? This, too, would lead to possibility of forum engineering via qualification in the claim formulation.

I fear we are not yet at the end of this particular road.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.12.2.8.

Just out #CJEU Volvo Trucks https://t.co/fkCqdk015C
Location of damage in competition law follow-on damages suits: locus damni A7(2) BIa.
Seems to confirm AGs opinion which I reviewed here https://t.co/CvpU5bFR2U More analysis soon.

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 15, 2021

 

According to a press release, the EU Commission has proposed for the EU to join the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention. So far, the Convention has been signed, but not yet ratified, by three states (Israel, Ukraine, Uruguay).

The full statement reads as follows:

International Justice: The Commission proposes for the EU to join the Hague Judgments Convention

Today, the Commission has adopted a proposal for the EU’s accession to the Hague Judgement Convention, an international treaty that facilitates the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters in foreign jurisdictions. Didier Reynders, Commissioner for Justice, said: “Having one’s rights enforced in a country outside of the EU can be very cumbersome, both for private persons and for businesses. The EU joining the Hague Judgments Convention would improve legal certainty and save citizens and companies time and money. The average length of proceedings would decrease considerably.” Currently, EU citizens and businesses that want to have a judgment given in the EU to be recognised and enforced in a non-EU country face numerous legal issues due to the absence of an international framework. This legal uncertainty as well as the associated costs may cause businesses and citizens to give up on pursuing their claims or decide not to engage in international dealings altogether. The Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters, adopted in July 2019, offers a comprehensive legal framework with clear rules as to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The Commission’s proposal will now have to be adopted by the Council, with the European Parliament’s consent, for the EU to join the Convention. More information on the International Cooperation on Civil Justice is available here. (For more information: Christian Wigand – Tel.: +32 229 62253; Katarzyna Kolanko – Tel.: +32 229 63444; Jördis Ferroli – Tel.: +32 229 92729)

According to Frank Woud (e-CODEX Community and External Relations Manager, Ministry of Justice and Security, The Netherlands):

The full potential of the European e-commerce market has not yet been reached. While consumers feel safer buying from online stores within the borders of their own country rather than from other European countries, European traders experience a range of challenges of their own, such as the lack of a level playing field and the overwhelming complexity of the legal and judicial system. Justice is the sine qua non for trade, and e-commerce will only be able to reach its full potential in Europe when justice permeates the digital realm. e-CODEX, the digital platform for cross-border legal data exchange within the European Union (EU), plays an important role in this regard. The mission of e-CODEX is to make cross-border justice accessible for all citizens and businesses within the EU.

To further this pursuit, e-CODEX hosted on 25 November 2020 an online roundtable discussion about e-justice as an enabler for cross-border e-commerce in Europe. The webcast of the roundtable discussion can be viewed here.

The e-Commerce Meets Justice White Paper is a representation of the facts and opinions expressed by the panel members. The panel was composed of Margarita Touch (Information Officer at DG JUST), Luca Cassetti (Secretary General of Ecommerce Europe), Marco Velicogna (Researcher at Institute of Legal Informatics and Judicial Systems of the National Research Council of Italy), and Hans van Grieken (Senior Technology Researcher at Capgemini, Gartner and Deloitte).

Their contributions to the White Paper discuss: e-commerce and developments triggered by the pandemic, the SMEs heavy reliance on platforms for cross-border e-commerce, the legal aspects of inter-European e-commerce, alternative dispute resolution means, and the role of e-justice in supporting cross-border e-commerce and building consumers’ trust.

More information on e-CODEX can be found here.

 

Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Mi?dzynarodowego is the leading Polish periodical in the field of private international law. While most of its articles are in Polish, Vol. 26 (2020) offers a treat to those of us not fluent in Polish: a collection of articles, most in English (one in French, three in Polish), by leading European scholars, and dedicated to one topic: EU Regulation 650/12 of 4 July 2012, the Succession Regulation. The contributions emerge from a conference held in Katowice in 2019 (a conference report is included). What makes the treat particularly sweet: the whole issue, as well as the individual articles, are available online!

Here is the table of contents:

 

Foreword Maciej Szpunar 7-8 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.01   PDF (English) STUDIA La réserve héréditaire dans le re`glement 650/2012 sur les successions Paul Lagarde 9-14 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.02   PDF (Français (France)) “Member States” and “Third States” in the Succession Regulation Jürgen Basedow 15-25 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.03   PDF (English) Application of the Succession Regulation by German courts — Selected Issues Christian Kohler 27-43 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.04   PDF (English) The Notion of “Court” under the Succession Regulation Michael Wilderspin 45-56 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.05   PDF (English) The Capacity and the Quality of Heir. Possible Interaction with Preliminary Questions Stefania Bariatti 57-70 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.06   PDF (English) The Regulation on Matrimonial Property and Its Operation in Succession Cases — Its Interaction with the Succession Regulation and Its Impact on Non-participating Member States Andrea Bonomi 71-89 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.07   PDF (English) The Influence of Bilateral Treaties with Third States on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Decisions in Matters on Succession — Polish Perspective Piotr Rylski 91-105 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.08   PDF (English) The Principle of a Single Estate and Its Role in Delimiting the Applicable Laws Krzysztof Pacu?a 107-123 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.09   PDF (English) Highlights and Pitfalls of the EU Succession Regulation Maksymilian Pazdan, Maciej Zachariasiewicz 125-187 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.10   PDF (English) Prawo w?a?ciwe dla czynno?ci prawnych zwi?zanych z zarz?dem sukcesyjnym Jacek Górecki 189-208 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.11   PDF GLOSY Glosa do postanowienia S?du Najwy?szego z dnia 23 marca 2016 r., sygn. akt: III CZP 112/15 Agata Kozio? 209-221 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.12   PDF Kolizyjnoprawna problematyka skuteczno?ci przelewu wierzytelno?ci wobec osób trzecich Glosa do wyroku Trybuna?u Sprawiedliwo?ci Unii Europejskiej z dnia 9 pa?dziernika 2019 r. w sprawie BGL BNP Paribas SA c/a TeamBank AG Nürnberg (C?548/18) Witold Kurowski 223-236 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.13   PDF VARIA Honorary Doctorate for Professor Paul Lagarde and the meeting of the European Group for Private International Law Maciej Szpunar, Maciej Zachariasiewicz, Krzysztof Pacu?a 237-240 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.14   PDF (English) Report from the conference ”Application of the Succession Regulation in the EU Member States”, Katowice 12 September 2019 Krzysztof Pacu?a 241-252 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31261/PPPM.2020.26.15   PDF (English)

 

Membership in the European Association of Private International Law entails the payment of a (small) annual fee. Fees are due on 31 January every year.

For more information (and practical details on how to pay), please visit this page.

Most of the 336 current members have already paid their fees for 2021. Those who haven’t are invited to do so as soon as practical. Thank you!

For any queries concerning the fees, please write an e-mail to the EAPIL Treasures, Apostolos Anthimos, at treasurer@eapil.org.

Matthias Lehmann (University of Vienna) has posted National Blockchain Laws as a Threat to Capital Markets Integration on SSRN. The paper, which appeared in the European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 2021, analyses the legislation adopted by a number of countries in Europe and the US for dealing with crypto assets and distributed ledger technology for investment purposes, the risks of fragmentation and divergent rules, and regional solutions towards a harmonised approach.

The abstract reads as follows:

Various states have started providing private law frameworks for blockchain transfers and crypto assets. The first acts have been adopted by France and Liechtenstein, while a commission of the British government sees no difficulties in extending property protection under the Common law to crypto assets. In the US, an amendment to the Uniform Commercial Code has been suggested, which has not stopped some States going their own, different way. The aim in all cases is to promote the use of modern distributed ledger technology and enhance investor protection. While these initiatives will increase legal certainty, they differ significantly. This has an important downside: there is a strong risk that the blockchain will be made subject to diverging legal rules. Similar to the world of intermediated securities, various national laws will need to be consulted to determine the rights and privileges of investors. This may increase transaction costs, thwart interoperability and produce thorny conflict-of-laws problems. Markets risk being fragmented into national segments, with an inevitable diminution of their depth and liquidity. As a remedy, this article suggests developing uniform rules for the blockchain. Before national legislators and judges once again divide the world through idiosyncratic rules, the private law of crypto assets should be harmonised to the highest degree possible. Uniform rules should ideally be forged at the global level, by fora like the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and the Hague Conference on Private International Law. In the absence of world-wide rules, uniformisation of private law should take place at the regional level, for instance by the European Union. The article makes specific suggestions as to how this can be achieved and what the content of those rules should be.

On Thursday, 15 July from 15.30-17.30 CET the seminar European Civil Justice in Transition: Past, Present & Future will take place, organized by Erasmus School of Law in the context of the ERC project Building EU Civil Justice. You can register here.

In this last seminar of a series of six, key experts on European civil justice will share their views on current and future issues, including digitisation, collective redress, the Brussels I-bis reform, private and public justice, the funding of civil justice and the role of civil justice in today’s society.

Thursday, 15 July (15.30-17.30 CET) – Program

15.15 Waiting room opens

15.30 Opening

15.35-15.45 Xandra Kramer (Erasmus University Rotterdam/Utrecht University)

Introduction – Past, present and future: Highlights of European civil justice

15.45-16.00 Burkhard Hess (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg )

Reforming the Brussels Ibis Regulation in January 2022 – taking up the next reform step

16.00-16.15 John Sorabji (University College London; Barrister, 9 St John Street)

Digitisation and the development of Integrated Dispute Resolution

16.15-16.30 Eva Storskrubb (Uppsala University/Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Trust and Quality in Civil Justice

16.30-16.45 Alan Uzelac (University of Zagreb)

It’s better to burn out than to fade away: is civil justice here to stay?

16.45-17.30 Comments & discussion (moderated by Xandra Kramer and Alexandre Biard, Erasmus University Rotterdam)

 

On 20 July 2021, the University of Milan will host the (on-line) Annual Conference of the EU-funded project Jean Monnet Module on Multilevel, Multiparty and Multisector Cross-Border Litigation in Europe.

This year’s topic, Incentives and Challenges to Transnational Access to Justice, will be discussed in the framework of two roundtables concerning, respectively, Third-party Funding in International Dispute Resolution and E-Justice in International Dispute Resolution.

The complete programme is available here. Registrations are open until 15 July 2021, through this form.

Eastern Pacific Chartering Inc v Pola Maritime Ltd [2021] EWHC 1707 (Comm) is a highly unusual case which shows that dormant Conventions can be awoken from their slumber.  I merely dabble in EU external relations law, I am no expert in it. The application of that law in the context of private international law is an issue I have tasked one or two students with – let’s just say they find it challenging.

On the specific issue at hand, parties agree that consequential to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (Gibraltar) Order 1997, matters of jurisdiction between the E&W Courts and the Supreme Court of Gibraltar are governed by the Brussels Convention 1968 and that this remains the case notwithstanding Brexit. That core issue of external relations law pre and post Brexit is therefore not sub judice. One imagines that had it been, it could have led to extensive to and fro, among others within the context of the UK having revoked the 1968 Convention per the jurisdiction and Judgments Exit Regulations SI 2019/479, and of the Withdrawal Agreement.

In July 2020, claimant had a ship arrested in Gibraltar, with the purpose to serve as security for claims under a charterparty between both, claims that were to be brought in London, consistently with an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the charterparty. Roberston DJ classifies that action as one for provisional measures under Article 24 Convention (35 of the Brussels Ia Regulation).  The legality of that arrest (which ended upon claimant releasing it) continues to be disputed (ia viz the actual ownership of the ship).

Claimant (not domiciled in a 1968 Convention Contracting State) now sues  in E&W (pursuant to the choice of court) Defendant (domiciled at Cyprus) for outstanding monies. In current proceedings it applies to dismiss and strike out that part of the Defendant’s counterclaim at the E&W courts which seeks to advance claims in tort based on the alleged wrongful Gibraltar arrest.  In essence claimant submits that the High Court court has no jurisdiction to try the Defendant’s tort claims and should decline jurisdiction in favour of the Supreme Court of Gibraltar.

After a swipe [18 ff] at both parties having engaged, without court approval, experts on Gibraltarian law (which, she holds, bear no relevance for the jurisdictional issues anyways), Roberston DJ proceeds to discuss the lis pendens issue.

Defendant’s primary case is that, on the facts of this case, Article 17 Convention (A25 BIa) applies to confer jurisdiction, because the exclusive jurisdiction clause is broad enough to cover the tort claims. The Defendant’s fallback position is that, if that is wrong, the Court nevertheless has jurisdiction in respect of its counterclaims, not on the basis of A5(3) Convention (the Claimant (defendant on the counterclaim) not being domiciled in a Convention State) either because that necessarily follows from the Claimant’s decision to litigate its own claims here, or because Claimant has taken steps since service of the Defence and Counterclaim which waived any right to object to jurisdiction in respect of the counterclaims.

The discussion revolves around the contractual and statutory interpretation of the action radius of choice of court. This also involves the classic issue of tort claims between contractual parties (compare Wikingerhof) with the judge opting for the one stop shop approach (distinguishing ia Ryanair Ltd v Esso Italiana Srl [2015] 1 All ER (Comm) 152): 42: ‘there is a clear causal connection [between the contractual and tort claims, GAVC], which seems to be sufficient for the purposes of a clause worded “in connection with“.’ In conclusion: [52]: ‘whether damages are recoverable for an allegedly wrongful arrest made in seeking security for claims under the charter, ..is a claim “in connection with” the charter’ hence the E&W courts have jurisdiction. [39]: this ‘allows a single accounting, as regards the overall financial position of the parties as a result of the legal relationship created between them by the charter, and their dispute about what rights and obligations properly flow from that legal relationship.’

Obiter jurisdiction on the alternative grounds, under English residual rules, is also accepted (with the interesting note of the absence, in the Convention, of a gateway for counterclaims, in contrast with Brussels I and Brussels Ia).

Coming then to lis pendens under Article 21 Convention, this is dismissed. [70] The arrest claim plainly does not involve either the same cause of action or the same object as the Defendant’s tort claims seeking to recover damages for wrongful arrest, which are advanced solely by way of counterclaim in E&W. The factual and legal foundation for that counterclaim needs, on any view, to travel substantially beyond the matters the Claimant relies on for its own cause of action and the object of the counterclaim is to recover damages.

Neither [73] is an acknowledgment of service in the Gibraltar arrest proceedings does not amount to a submission to that jurisdiction which would preclude the Defendant from raising its distinct tort claims in E&W.

A stay on ‘related proceedings’ (Article 22 Convention) is also rejected for the reasons listed at [83]. Core reference here is Research in Motion v Visto [2007] EWHC 900 (Ch).

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Chapter 1 Heading 1.7, Chapter 2 para 2.375, 2.469.

Eastern Pacific Chartering v Pola Maritime [2021] EWHC 1707 (Comm)
Interesting and unusual case involving the UK and Gibraltar and applying the 1968 Brussels Convention (!)
Lis pendens, choice of court (charterparty), whether issues arises out of samehttps://t.co/eNp2jpl4Zw

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 28, 2021

Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) can be defined as lawsuits intended to intimidate and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense, until they abandon their criticism or opposition.

Some jurisdictions have already passed anti-SLAPP laws. In its Action plan for democracy, of 2020, the Commission had already announced its intention to present an initiative to protect journalists and civil society against SLAPPs in 2021. An Expert group was created in December 2020.

The topic is of course not new. It has gained momentum again – possibly following the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia in October 2017- also at the Council of Europe, and within the civil society (see, for instance on the need for a EU legislative proposal to protect public watchdogs from legal harassment  here and here.)

On 5 July 2020, a study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee on SLAPP and PIL instruments was published, authored by J. Borg-Barthet (who is one of the members of the Expert Group mentioned above), Benedetta Lobina and Magdalena Zabrocka.

The document analyses legal definitions of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP), assesses the compatibility of anti-SLAPP legislation with EU law, and recommends that an anti-SLAPP Directive be adopted.

Of special interest for PIL is that it also recommends that the Brussels I bis Regulation and Rome II Regulation be recast to limit the incidence of SLAPPs. The final conclusion in this regard reads as follows:

In addition to the adoption of an anti-SLAPP Directive, it is recommended that the Brussels Ia Regulation be recast with a view to adopting a bespoke rule concerning defamation claims and thereby to distinguish jurisdiction in defamation cases from ordinary torts. To this end, it is recommended that jurisdiction should be grounded in the forum of the defendant’s domicile unless the parties agree otherwise. This would enable public interest speakers to foresee where they will be expected to defend themselves, and would be in keeping with the core values of the Brussels Ia Regulation, namely predictability and the limitation of forum shopping.
Greater predictability as to the outcomes of choice of law processes is also needed to dissuade meritless litigation intended to suppress public participation. Accordingly, it is recommended that a new rule be included in the Rome II Regulation which would harmonise national choice of law rules in defamation cases. It is recommended that this rule should focus on the closest connection with the publication and its audience, namely the law of the place to which the publication is directed.

I  expect comments – here or elsewhere- to both proposals and their underlying rationale.

The first impression is a little bit disappointing. The proposal regarding the applicable law is a general one for defamation cases, i.e., it is not SLAPP-specific. On jurisdiction, I would be cautious to spouse the assertion on page 39:

(…), the Court of Justice has developed a body of case law whose net effect is to afford further opportunities for forum shopping and vexatious litigation strategies in defamation cases, particularly where the claimed defamatory content is posted online.

Moreover  a solution which entails giving up eDate and Martinez looks unrealistic to me (in this regard, though, C-800/19 is worth considering; the Opinion was available in February 2021). Vexatious claims have always existed. The lis pendens and related actions rules provide a solution at the jurisdictional level for a plurality of claims within the EU: a word on why they would (or not) be fit in an anti-SLAPP scenario is missing. In addition, and more important, the Brussels regime does not prevent reacting against vexatious claims with the procedural tools available at the national level, such as abuse of process. That is why I am not convinced either by the following sentence, on page 42:

‘In particular, judgments concerning the deployment of antisuit injunctions reveal a Court that is reluctant to replace the ex ante general analysis deployed by the legislator with its, or a national court’s, judgement of the merits of jurisdictional justice in individual cases‘

Even if the bottom line was correct, antisuit injunctions would not have provided the pertinent example.

Beyond the EU borders, with the exception of Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels I bis Regulation, which have no parallel in the Lugano Convention, the situation is left to the Member States; simultaneous proceedings before the courts of the UK and the USA is simply a situation that cannot be solved by the European lawmaker.

There is indeed a need to balance the interests of the claimants and of the defendant (the target of the strategic lawsuit) also in relation to international jurisdiction and to the conflict of law rule.

In my opinion, achieving the goal requires a more grounded examination; also, and mainly, to acknowledge that the problem is to be addressed at a different level – something that the Study does in its 5th part devoted to an anti-SLAPP directive.

But, just like the authors say, the adoption and implementation of such a directive may take too long. The time to react is now, and it is not imperative (not even for reasons of distribution of competences) to wait for Brussels to take the lead.

(Photo: The use of SLAPPs © Image used under the license of Adobe Stock)

This post was contributed by Alexia Pato, who is Postdoc Research Fellow at the University of McGill (Montreal, Canada).

The present post provides an overview of the legal initiatives on artificial intelligence (AI) recently launched at the EU level and the questions they generate from a private international law (PIL) perspective.

The analysis starts with the 2021 Proposal for a Regulation on harmonised rules on AI and continues with the EU Parliament’s detailed recommendations for drawing up a Regulation on liability for the operation of AI systems.

Overview of the Proposed AI Regulation

On 21 April 2021, the EU Commission published its much-awaited Proposal for a Regulation laying down harmonised rules on AI, following explicit requests from the Council and the Parliament (see, in particular, the AI-related resolutions of the Parliament of October 2020 on ethics, civil liability and intellectual property). The proposed Regulation’s goal is to promote the free movement of AI-related goods and services, while ensuring the protection of fundamental rights.

If enacted, the Regulation would create a horizontal regulatory framework for the development, placement on the market and use of AI systems in the Union, depending on the risks that those systems generate for people’s health and safety or fundamental rights. In particular, Article 5 forbids AI practices which create an unacceptable risk (some exceptions may nevertheless apply). The prohibition extends to AI systems deploying subliminal techniques beyond a person’s consciousness to induce a particular behaviour and to those exploiting the vulnerabilities of a group of people (e.g., a doll integrated with a voice assistant that encourages children to play dangerous games in order to maximise their fun).

Real-time remote biometric identification (e.g., facial recognition) and social scoring are deemed to create an unacceptable risk as well. As regards high-risk AI systems (Title III), they must undergo an ex ante conformity assessment in order to be placed on the EU market (Articles 19 and Title III, Chapter 5).

The proposed Regulation imposes a series of requirements in relation to data, documentation and recording keeping, transparency and information to users, human oversight, robustness, accuracy and security (Articles 8 to 15). Examples of high-risk AI systems include medical assistants (e.g., IBM’s Watson assistant), chatbots and automated recruitment applications. Lastly, AI systems which create a low or minimal risk are permitted.

For a general assessment of the Proposal, see the CEPS Think Thank with Lucilla Sioli (DG CONNECT) available here, as well as the Ars Boni podcast available here.

The Extraterritorial Reach of EU law

As Article 2 of the proposed AI Regulation would confer the Regulation an extraterritorial reach, PIL questions emerge. In particular, the EU rules on AI are meant to apply to (1) providers placing AI systems on the EU market or putting them into service there, irrespective of their place of establishment; (2) users located in the EU; (3) providers and users located in a third state, when the output produced by the AI system is used – but not marketed – in the EU.

Remarkably, Article 2 bypasses the traditional choice of law methodology and unilaterally delineates the Regulation’s territorial scope of application.

This legislative technique has been used on other occasions: the most recent example is perhaps Article 3 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Literature on the latter provision shows that the extraterritorial application of laws creates a fertile ground for overlaps and high compliance costs. The same observation could apply to AI if other states chose to exercise their (legislative) jurisdiction extraterritorially. How private (or public) international law will tackle that concern remains to be seen.

Moreover, interpretative issues are likely to arise, as the wording of Article 2 is vague. In particular, when is a user “located” in the EU – does the temporary presence on the territory trigger the application of the Regulation? What is the “output” of an AI system? And finally, when is an AI system “placed on the EU market” or “put into service” there?

The Law Applicable to Civil Liability

It is acknowledged that the misuse of AI systems may be harmful, despite the great potential of technologies to significantly improve our lives in many sectors. Traffic accidents involving either autonomous – i.e. driverless – or driver-assist vehicles are a telling example in that regard.

Currently, the law applicable to civil liability in such a scenario essentially depends on the actors involved – the driver, the manufacturer of the car, the designer of the software, etc. Several PIL systems applying different connecting factors might come into play, namely the Rome II Regulation, the 1971 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents and the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability. Considering the fact that national civil liability regimes vary (sometimes significantly) from one state to another, the outcome of a case might be different depending on the court seized.

For a thorough PIL analysis, see T. Kadner Graziano, “Cross-Border Traffic Accidents in the EU – The Potential Impact of Driverless Cars” (Study for the JURI Committee, 2016), available here.

The EU Commission announced that a new piece of legislation addressing civil liability should soon complement the proposed AI Regulation, following the EU Parliament’s detailed recommendations for drawing up a regulation on liability for the operation of AI systems. If followed by the Commission and adopted, the text would partially harmonise national laws on civil liability in the EU. These shall however not be replaced; only adjustments would be provided.

The object of the future Regulation is to hold the operators of high-risk AI systems strictly liable, while operators of other AI systems would be subject to a fault-based liability regime. Finally, the drafting of the future Regulation should go hand in hand with the necessary review of the Product Liability Directive in order to build up a consistent liability framework in the EU.

According to Article 2 of the Parliament’s Draft Proposal, the liability rules enacted at the EU level would apply “on the territory of the Union where a physical or virtual activity, device or process driven by an AI system has caused harm or damage to the life, health, physical integrity of a natural person, to the property of a natural or legal person or has caused significant immaterial harm resulting in a verifiable economic loss”.

I find the wording of this provision unclear: shall the future Regulation apply where a court of a Member State is seized with a dispute involving damages caused by AI systems (as the terms “on the territory of the Union” suggests) or must the damage, the operator, the activity or the victim additionally be located in the EU?

Additionally, even though the future Regulation bypasses the Rome II Regulation according to Article 27 of the latter, traditional choice of law rules would still be needed to designate the law applicable to questions falling out of the future Regulation’s scope (such as the law applicable to multiple liability where non-operators are involved, just to mention one example). Fragmentation would therefore not be completely avoided.

For an analysis of the Draft Proposal from a PIL perspective, see J. von Hein, “Liability for Artificial Intelligence in Private International Law” (online presentation, 25 June 2020), available here.

Conclusion

The interaction of AI with the PIL field brings interesting research questions on the table for legal scholars. As things currently stand, however, the EU’s legislative initiatives do not overcome the sempiternal difficulties experienced in PIL, namely the fragmented application of laws, and the difficulty to manage interactions between multiple legal texts because of their overlapping and extraterritorial effect.

The last issue of the Revue Critique de Droit International Privé has been released. It contains eight articles and several case notes.

The editorial (authored by Horatia Muir Watt, Dominique Bureau and Sabine Corneloup) and five of the articles deal with the reserved share (réserve héréditaire) in international successions. These five articles are authored by: Paul Lagarde (« Une ultime (?) bataille de la réserve héréditaire »), Cécile Pérez (« Quelques observations relatives à la réserve héréditaire dans le projet de loi confortant le respect des principes de la République »), Diane Le Grand de Belleroche (« Contre le retour du droit de prélèvement en droit français : une vue de la pratique du droit international »), Suzel Ramaciotti (« Le prélèvement compensatoire du projet d’article 913 du code civil à l’épreuve des exigences européennes et constitutionnelles »), and Nathalie Joubert (« Droit de prélèvement, réserve héréditaire, protection des héritiers contre les discriminations, quelle méthode ? »).

The sixth article, authored by Christelle Chalas and Horatia Muir Watt deals with the international jurisdiction of courts in matters relating to the environnemental responsibility of multinational companies.

In the seventh article, Vincent Richard presents the recast of the regulation on the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents.

The eighth article, by Christine Budzikiewicz, discusses the reform of international adoption law in Germany.

A full table of contents is available here.

In recent years, the debate surrounding consensual justice and party autonomy has received increasing attention in the national and international arenas and has raised a broad array of questions. In the pressing need to observe this phenomenon from different perspectives lies the rationale behind a newly founded biannual journal, Giustizia consensuale. The journal, founded and directed by Prof. Silvana Dalla Bontà and Prof. Paola Lucarelli, features contributions in both Italian and English.

By adopting an interdisciplinary and holistic approach, the journal aims to investigate the meaning of consensual justice, its relation with judicial justice, and the potential for integrating – rather than contrasting – these two forms of justice. This investigation is premised on the relationship between justice and private autonomy as well as forms of integrative, participatory, and restorative justice. By being particularly suited for meeting the needs of an increasingly complicated and multi-faceted society, these forms of justice ultimately promote social cohesion and reconciliation. Against this backdrop, Giustizia consensuale strives to make a valid contribution to the discourse on conflict and the meaning of justice by fostering an interdisciplinary dialogue which encompasses both theory and practice.

The first issue of Giustizia Consensuale has just been released and it features:

Silvana Dalla Bontà (University of Trento), Giustizia consensuale (‘Consensual Justice – A Foreword’; in Italian)

Paola Lucarelli (University of Firenze), Mediazione dei conflitti: una spinta generosa verso il cambiamento (Conflict Mediation: A Push for Cultural Change; in Italian)

From the Italian Recovery and Resilience Plan to the guidelines of the Italian Ministry of Justice, the urgency of a reform to strengthen out-of-court dispute resolution procedures clearly emerges. Recovery and resilience become fundamental objectives. Conflict mediation is the path chosen to achieve social cohesion and reconciliation. Promoting and strengthening this dispute resolution mechanism is important not only to reduce the judicial backlog, but also to empower the parties to self-tailor the solution of their conflict with the assistance of their attorneys. By fostering responsibility, self-determination, awareness and trust, mediation makes citizens and professionals protagonists in the process of change that combines judicial and consensual justice.

Francesco P. Luiso (University of Pisa), La «proposta» del mediatore (The Mediator’s ‘Dispute Settlement Offer’; in Italian)

The Italian Legislative Decree No. 28 of 4 March 2010 – implementing the Directive 2008/52/EC – enables, in certain conditions, the mediator to submit a settlement offer to the conflicting parties. In the case that the mediation fails, the judge, in the subsequent court proceedings, might sanction the non-accepting party when allocating procedural costs. Nonetheless, the aforementioned Legislative Decree does not compel the mediator to submit such a settlement offer. However, the mediation rules of some institutions oblige the mediator to make a settlement offer to the parties. Against this background, when ordering the parties to attempt mediation, some courts require them to file their mediation application with a mediation institution allowing the mediator to submit a settlement offer to the parties. In this article, the author argues that these court orders are against the above-mentioned Legislative Decree. In fact, this does not permit the judge to make any particular determination regarding the mediation procedure, the parties, or the mediator themselves. Furthermore, the author underlines how the judge could never take the mediator’s settlement offer into consideration in the pending proceedings. While the judge grounds their decision on what is right and what is wrong, the mediator’s settlement offer revolves around the needs and interests of the conflicting parties, thus impeding any comparison between their contents.

Antonio Briguglio (University of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’), Conciliazione e arbitrato. Conciliazione nell’arbitrato. Appunti sparsi fra diritto, psicologia e prassi (Conciliation and Arbitration. Conciliation in Arbitration. Notes on Law, Psychology, and Practice; in Italian)

The article deals with the relationship between conciliation and arbitration within the overall ADR system. It first analyses the conceptual, legal and systematic differences between conciliation and arbitration, with references to some areas of partial overlap (such as, for example, the one now opened by the Singapore Convention of 2019). The author then takes into consideration the parties’ and adjudicators’ different approaches to conciliation both in in-court proceedings and arbitration. Subsequently, the attention is focused on the attempt of conciliation in the course of the arbitral proceedings; on the so-called multi-step clauses that provide for a mandatory attempt of conciliation before the commencement of arbitration; and on the ‘award by consent’ in the practice of international arbitration.

Neil Andrews (University of Cambridge), Procedure, Party Agreement, and Contract (in English)

In this piece the author considers three points of interaction between agreement and procedure. (1) The parties might consensually choose the applicable procedure, notably the choice between (a) judicial proceedings and (b) arbitration. If they have chosen (a), the parties might stipulate which court and in which jurisdiction the matter will be litigated. Having chosen instead (b) arbitration, the parties will normally make explicit the ‘seat’ (London, Milan, New York, etc) and the size of the arbitral tribunal (one, three, five, etc). Also falling within (1), there is possibility that the parties will agree to impose on themselves preliminary ‘negotiation agreements’ and/or mediation agreements. (2) The parties can take a further step and specify or modify the elements of the relevant formal process (whether that process is court proceedings or arbitration). This modification of the default elements of the procedure will involve a ‘bespoke’ or ad hoc agreement, rather than simply adopting national or institutional procedural rules. However, this is less common. Most parties adopt without modification the relevant procedure ‘off the peg’. (3) Settlement is the consensual disposal or narrowing of the dispute. In practice, this is the most important way in which agreement and procedure interact. Settlement can occur before or after court or arbitration proceedings have commenced. It is also possible that settlement might occur even after the first-instance judgment has been obtained, for example, when appeal or enforcement proceedings are pending.

Margherita Ramajoli (University of Milan), Per una giustizia amministrativa alternativa con particolare (anche se non esclusivo) riguardo alle transazioni pubblicistiche (For an Alternative Administrative Justice: Focusing on Public Dispute Settlements; in Italian)

The use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in public interest litigation brings both substantial and procedural advantages. They may improve the quality of public decision-making, foster the adoption of shared solutions, re-establish dialogue between parties whose relations are bound to last over time, contribute to moralisation by making clear agreements otherwise not intended to emerge, and finally, make the administrative judicial review more efficient by directing the demand for justice elsewhere. In addition, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are in tune with the current changes in administrative law; there is a deep link between droit souple and justice douce, between soft law and ADR, between non-traditional substantive law and alternative administrative judicial review. However, alternative justice is a phenomenon not yet sufficiently developed in public litigation, because of some debated issues in its use. Specifically, it is not easy to harmonise the very purpose of ADR to definitively settle a dispute with the perpetual protection of public interest institutionally entrusted to administrative authorities, as demonstrated by how the latter use the settlement. The introduction of a framework law on ADR in public interest litigation could solve some of the most dramatic issues, naturally maintaining the indispensable flexibility.

Teresa Arruda Alvim (Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo) and Márcio Bellocchi (Universidade de São Paulo), Mediazione. Il frutto di un buon esercizio del diritto (Mediation. The Result of a Mindful Exercise of Rights; in Italian)

In the last few decades, even civil law jurisdictions have witnessed an increase in the promotion of alternative dispute resolution. Among various reasons for its adoption, ADR affords the parties the possibility to self-tailor a solution to their conflict while significantly diminishing the case overload of the judiciary. Nevertheless, just as varied are the obstacles to the diffusion of ADR, ranging from the lack of preparation of mediators to the traditional adversarial approach of attorneys. The authors examine each of these profiles in the perspective of the Brazilian legal system, analysing the reasons behind the promotion of ADR, its practical implications, and the future outlook on a multi-door justice.

Colin Rule (University of Stanford), Reinventing Justice with Online Dispute Resolution (in English)

Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) is the study of how to use technology to help parties resolve their disputes. Originally created to help e-Commerce companies build trust with their users, ODR is now being integrated into the courts to expand access to justice and reduce costs. With the expansion of artificial intelligence and machine learning, ODR has the potential to play a major role in the justice systems of the future, but there are many questions that still need to be answered. This article outlines the need for ODR, provides a short history of its development, and describes some of the challenges that could accompany its expansion.

Silvana Dalla Bontà (University of Trento), Una giustizia «co-esistenziale» online nello spazio giuridico europeo? Spunti critici sul pacchetto ADR-ODR per i consumatori (‘Co-Existential’ Online Justice within the EU Judicial Area? Some Constructive Criticism on the Consumer ADR/ODR Package; in Italian)

Since the 1990s, the European Community, now the European Union, has shown particular regard to the matter of extra-judicial settlement of civil and commercial disputes. The European Union recognized the added value brought by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in answering the problems posed by cross-border litigation and thus facilitating the creation of the Single Market. The Community’s attention first focused on consumer disputes (Recommendations 98/257/EC and 2001/310/EC); it subsequently extended its reach to all civil and commercial disputes (Directive 2008/52/EC); ultimately, it reverted its focus back to consumer disputes with the Directive on consumer Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and the Regulation on consumer Online Dispute Resolution (ODR),  both adopted in 2013. This article proposes an in-depth analysis of the objectives, the scope, and the application of the two above-mentioned legal acts composing the so-called ADR/ODR package for consumers, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. In particular, the discussion focuses on the ODR Platform for the resolution of consumer-to-business disputes launched by the European Union in 2016. In reviewing its functioning through the statistical data collected by the European Union, the author inquires whether the ODR Platform provides for the creation of a ‘co-existential justice’ in the European legal area or whether other complementary instruments should be implemented to grant a high standard of protection for consumers as the European Treaties impose.

 

EFFORTS (Towards more EFfective enFORcemenT of claimS in civil and commercial matters within the EU) is an EU-funded Project conducted by the University of Milan (coord.), the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law, the University of Heidelberg, the Free University of Brussels, the University of Zagreb, and the University of Vilnius.

The third EFFORTS Newsletter has just been released, giving access to up-to-date information about the Project, save-the-dates on forthcoming events, conferences and webinars, and news from the area of international and comparative civil procedural law.

Regular updates are also available via the Project’s website, and  LinkedIn and Facebook pages.

Project JUST-JCOO-AG-2019-881802
With financial support from the Civil Justice Programme of the European Union

(This post is provided by Zeyu Huang, who is an associate attorney of Hui Zhong Law Firm based in Shenzhen. Mr. Huang obtained his LLB degree from the Remin University of China Law School. He is also a PhD candidate & LLM at the Faculty of Law in University of Macau. The author may be contacted at the e-mail address: huangzeyu@huizhonglaw.com)

When confronted with international parallel proceedings due to the existence of a competent foreign court having adjudicative jurisdiction, the seized foreign court located in common law jurisdictions seems to see it as no offence to Chinese courts by granting anti-suit injunctions to restrain Chinese proceedings. This is because the common law court believes that “An order of this kind [anti-suit injunction] is made in personam against a party subject to the court’s jurisdiction by way of requiring compliance with agreed terms. It does not purport to have direct effect on the proceedings in the PRC. This court respects such proceedings as a matter of judicial comity”. [1] However, the fact that the anti-suit injunction is not directly targeted at people’s courts in the PRC does not prevent Chinese judges from believing that it is inappropriate for foreign courts to issue an anti-suit injunction restraining Chinese proceedings. Instead, they would likely view such interim order as something that purports to indirectly deprive the party of the right of having access to Chinese court and would unavoidably impact Chinese proceedings.
The attitude of Chinese courts towards the anti-suit injunction – a fine-tuning tool to curb parallel proceedings – has changed in recent years. In fact, they have progressively become open-minded to resorting to anti-suit injunctions or other similar orders that are issued to prevent parties from continuing foreign proceedings in parallel. Following that, the real question is whether and how anti-suit injunction is compatible with Chinese law. Some argued that Article 100 of the PRC CPL provides a legal basis for granting injunctions having similar effects with anti-suit injunction at common law. [2] It provides that:
“The people’s court may upon the request of one party to issue a ruling to preserve the other party’s assets or compel the other party to perform certain act or refrain from doing certain act, in cases where the execution of the judgment would face difficulties, or the party would suffer other damages due to the acts of the other party or for other reasons. If necessary, the people’s court also could make a ruling of such preservative measures without one party’s application.” [3]
Accordingly, Chinese people’s court may make a ruling to limit one party from pursuing parallel foreign proceedings if such action may render the enforcement of Chinese judgment difficult or cause other possible damages to the other party.
In maritime disputes, Chinese maritime courts are also empowered by special legislation to issue maritime injunctions having anti-suit or anti-anti-suit effects. Article 51 of the PRC Maritime Special Procedure Law provides that the maritime court may upon the application of a maritime claimant issue a maritime injunction to compel the respondent to do or not to do certain acts in order to protect the claimant’s lawful rights and interests from being infringed. [4] The maritime injunction is not constrained by the jurisdiction agreement or arbitration agreement as agreed upon between the parties in relation to the maritime claim. [5] In order to obtain a maritime injunction, three requirements shall be satisfied – firstly, the applicant has a specific maritime claim; secondly, there is a need to rectify the respondent’s act which violates the law or breaches the contract; thirdly, a situation of emergency exists in which the damages would be caused or increased if the maritime injunction is not issued immediately. [6] Like the provision of the PRC CPL, the maritime injunction issued by the Chinese maritime court is mainly directed to mitigate the damages caused by the party’s behaviour to the other parties’ relevant rights and interests.
In Huatai P&C Insurance Corp Ltd Shenzhen Branch v Clipper Chartering SA, the Maritime Court of Wuhan City granted the maritime injunction upon the claimant’s application to oblige the respondent to immediately withdraw the anti-suit injunction granted by the High Court of the Hong Kong SAR to restrain the Mainland proceedings. [7] The Hong Kong anti-suit injunction was successfully sought by the respondent on the grounds of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. [8] However, the respondent did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Mainland maritime court over the dispute arising from the contract of carriage of goods by sea. Therefore, the Maritime Court of Wuhan City held that the respondent had submitted to its jurisdiction. As a result, the application launched by the respondent to the High Court of the Hong Kong SAR for the anti-suit injunction to restrain the Mainland Chinese proceedings had infringed the legitimate rights and interests of the claimant. In accordance with Article 51 of the PRC Maritime Special Procedure Law, a Chinese maritime injunction was granted to order the respondent domiciled in Greece to withdraw the Hong Kong anti-suit injunction (HCCT28/2017). [9] As the maritime injunction in the Huatai Property case was a Mainland Chinese ruling issued directly against the anti-suit injunction granted by a Hong Kong court, it is fair to say that if necessary Chinese people’s court does not hesitate to issue a compulsory injunction “which orders a party not to seek injunction relief in another forum in relation to proceedings in the issuing forum”. [10] This kind of compulsory injunction is also called ‘anti-anti-suit injunction’ or ‘defensive anti-suit injunction’. [11]
When it comes to civil and commercial matters, including preserving intellectual property rights, the people’s court in Mainland China is also prepared to issue procedural orders or rulings to prevent the parties from pursuing foreign proceedings, similar to anti-suit injunctions or anti-anti-suit injunction in common law world. In Guangdong OPPO Mobile Telecommunications Corp Ltd and its Shenzhen Branch v Sharp Corporation and ScienBiziP Japan Corporation, the plaintiff OPPO made an application to the seized Chinese court for a ruling to preserve actions or inactions.[12] Before and after the application, the defendant Sharp had brought tort claims arising from SEP (standard essential patent) licensing against OPPO by commencing several parallel proceedings before German courts, a Japanese court and a Taiwanese court. [13] In the face of foreign parallel proceedings, the Intermediate People’s Court of Shenzhen City of Guangdong Province rendered a ruling to restrain the defendant Sharp from pursing any new action or applying for any judicial injunction before a Chinese final judgment was made for the patent dispute. [14] The breach of the ruling would entail a fine of RMB 1 million per day. [15] Almost 7 hours after the Chinese ‘anti-suit injunction’ was issued, a German ‘anti-anti-suit injunction’ was issued against the OPPO. [16] Then, the Shenzhen court conducted a court investigation to the Sharp’s breach of its ruling and clarified the severe legal consequences of the breach. [17] Eventually, Sharp choose to defer to the Chinese ‘anti-suit injunction’ through voluntarily and unconditionally withdrawing the anti-anti-suit injunction granted by the German court. [18] Interestingly enough, Germany, a typical civil law country, and other EU countries have also seemingly taken a U-turn by starting to issue anti-anti-suit injunctions in international litigation in response to anti-suit injunctions made by other foreign courts, especially the US court. [19]
In some other IP cases involving Chinese tech giants, Chinese courts appear to feel more and more comfortable with granting compulsory rulings having the same legal effects of anti-suit injunction and anti-anti-suit injunction. For example, in another seminal case publicized by the SPC in 2020, Huawei Technologies Corp Ltd (“Huawei”) applied to the Court for a ruling to prevent the respondent Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. (“Conversant”) from further seeking enforcement of the judgment rendered by the Dusseldorf Regional Court in Germany. [20] Before the application, a pair of parallel proceedings existed, concurrently pending before the SPC as the second-instance court and the Dusseldorf Regional Court. On the same date of application, the German regional court delivered a judgement in favour of Conversant. Within 48 hours after receiving the Huawei’s application for an anti-suit injunction, the SPC granted the injunction to prohibit Conversant from applying for enforcement of the German judgment; if Conversant failed to comply with the injunction, a fine (RMB 1 million per day) would be imposed, accumulating day by day since the date of breach. [21] Conversant applied for a reconsideration of the anti-suit injunction, and it was however rejected by the SPC eventually. [22] The SPC’s anti-suit injunction against the German regional court’s decision compelled both parties to go back to the negotiating table, and the dispute between the two parties striving for global parallel proceedings was finally resolved by reaching a settlement agreement. [23]
The SPC’s injunction in Huawei v. Conversant is commended as the very first action preservation ruling having the “anti-suit injunction” nature in the field of intellectual property rights litigation in China, which has prematurely established the Chinese approach to anti-suit injunction in judicial practice. [24] It is believed by the Court to be an effective tool to curb parallel proceedings concurrent in various jurisdictions across the globe. [25] We still wait to see Chinese court’s future approach in other civil and commercial matters to anti-suit injunction or anti-anti-suit injunction issued by itself as well as those granted by foreign courts.

———-

1. See Impala Warehousing and Logistics (Shanghai) Co Ltd v Wanxiang Resources (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2015] EWHC 811, para.144.
2. See Liang Zhao, ‘Party Autonomy in Choice of Court and Jurisdiction Over Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Disputes in China’ (2019) 15 Journal of Private International Law 541, at 565.
3. See Article 100, para.1 of the PRC CPL (2017).
4. See Article 51 of the PRC Special Maritime Procedure Law (1999).
5. See Article 53 of the PRC Special Maritime Procedure Law (1999).
6. See Article 56 of the PRC Special Maritime Procedure Law (1999).
7. See Huatai Property & Casualty Insurance Co Ltd Shenzhen Branch v Clipper Chartering SA (2017) E 72 Xing Bao No.3 of the Maritime Court of Wuhan City.
8. See HCCT 28/2017 of the High Court of the Hong Kong SAR.
9. See (2017) E 72 Xing Bao No.3.
10. See Andrew S. Bell, Forum Shopping and Venue in Transnational Litigation (Oxford University Press 2003), at 196.
11. See ibid.
12. See (2020) Yue 03 Min Chu No.689-1.
13. See ibid.
14. See ibid.
15. See ibid.
16. See ibid.
17. See ibid.
18. See ibid.
19. See Greta Niehaus, ‘First Anti-Anti-Suit Injunction in Germany: The Costs for International Arbitration’ Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 28 February 2021.
20. See Huawei Technologies Corp Ltd and Others v Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. (2019) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No.732, No.733, No.734-I.
21. See ibid.
22. See Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v Huawei Technologies Corp Ltd and Others, (2019) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No.732, No.733, No.734-II.
23. See Case No.2 of the “10 Seminal Intellectual Property Right Cases before Chinese Courts”, Fa Ban [2021] No.146, the General Office of the Supreme People’s Court.
24. See ibid.
25. See ibid.

Earlier this year, Charlotte Guillard defended her dissertation at the University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas on Conflict justice and material justice : pertinence and sustainability of the distinction. Study in private international family law (Justice matérielle et justice conflictuelle : pertinence et pérennité de la distinction en droit international privé).

The author has provided the following  summary in English:

The distinction between conflict of laws justice and substantive justice has its origin in an academic attempt to foster an idea that has proved crucial to the general theory of private international law. This idea builds on the intuition that private international relations need to be processed specifically by the law, which implies in turn a customized conception of justice, namely conflict of laws justice. In this perspective, conflict of laws justice aims at fulfilling the diverse interests at stake in a private international relation: the interests of the different parties involved and the interests of the domestic legal systems. In the context of conflict of laws, conflictual justice manifests itself methodologically through the classical (“savignian”) conflict of laws rule, a rule that purports to accommodate those interests, without taking into account the substantive aspects of the situation. As an exception, conflictual justice may give way to substantive considerations. In that case, another conception of justice, one that is substantive, takes precedence.

The methodological manifestations of substantive justice are varied. It is usually associated with tools that seek to defend or promote imperative values within each State’s legal order, such as the exception of public policy of the forum (“exception d’ordre public international”).

This articulation of the different conceptions of justice is usually presented as following a principle/exception organization, thus providing a framework for private international law. The borderland between the two conceptions of justice muddled, however, as a result of an evolution in the field of private international law.

The change in the field that is most striking lies with its materialization. Overriding mandatory rules, fundamental rights, as well as the development of conflict of laws rules that achieve substantive aims are obvious examples.

Increasingly, the diverse methods of regulation specific to this legal field have been seen to borrow routinely from both conceptions of justice, shaking the classical distinction.

This research explores the remaining pertinence of the framework provided by the distinction between conflict of laws justice and substantive justice, and the appropriateness of its conservation in the field of contemporary private international law.

The study was conducted within the scope of private international law relating to family and personal matters. It is indeed within this restricted field that the questions raised are most sensitive, owing to continuing legal particularisms and national specificities, a natural breeding ground for the materialization of PIL.

As an outcome, this study shows the many weaknesses in the classical representation of the distinction between the two conceptions of justice. The actual meaning of each conception remains elusive and their mutual articulation according to a principle/exception organization is no longer reflected in positive law. Further, this study purports to offer an articulation of the two conceptions of justice that would better serve current PIL.

In this perspective, it appeared necessary to shed two commonly accepted ideas which have unnecessarily confined PIL until now. The first one relates to the conception of conflictual justice as being neutral. The second one seeks to limit substantive justice to the internal conceptions of each legal order.

This study purports to redefine the distinction between the two conception of justice while still conceptualizing their articulation according to a principle/exception organization, in which the conflictual conception of justice features as principle. This private international law conception of justice should ideally result in the conciliation of the diverse interests at stake, in order to achieve international legal harmony (of solutions) with regards to private international relations.

Whenever such an outcome appears unachievable (or merely irrelevant), substantive justice shall step in to ensure that one interest prevails over the others, without any predetermined preference. There is something to gain in such a reconfiguration. Namely, it would allow for a more satisfying distribution of PIL methods between the two conceptions of justice. This would be particularly beneficial regarding fundamental rights, whose role remains a thorny methodological issue in PIL. The proposed reconfiguration could create an opportunity to see them not merely as an expression of substantive justice (in keeping with the majority view) but also in relation to the private international law conception of justice.

Through this reconceptualization, the distinction between the two conceptions of justice may aspire to be more than abstract academic construction. It indeed appears as a useful tool in the organization of the methodological pluralism in private international law. This can prove critical to help authorities dealing with PIL questions to better handle their task in choosing the right method and reaching the right solution.

Dr. Guillard presented her study in a conference in Paris in March 2021 which can be watched here (in French).

Advocate General M Szpunar delivered today his opinion in case C‑422/20 (RK v CR), which is about the Succession Regulation. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 6, sous a), et l’article 7, sous a), du règlement (UE) nº 650/2012 […] doivent être interprétés en ce sens que la juridiction de l’État membre dont la compétence est censée résulter d’un déclinatoire de compétence de la juridiction préalablement saisie n’est pas habilitée à vérifier, premièrement, si la juridiction préalablement saisie a, à juste titre, considéré que la loi de cet État membre a été choisie ou est réputée avoir été choisie pour régir la succession, deuxièmement, si l’une des parties à la procédure a présenté une demande au titre de l’article 6, sous a), de ce règlement devant la juridiction préalablement saisie et, troisièmement, si la juridiction préalablement saisie a, à juste titre, considéré que les juridictions dudit État membre sont mieux placées pour statuer sur la succession, lorsque ces trois conditions ont été vérifiées par la juridiction préalablement saisie ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=243877&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=499554

Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered today his opinion in case C‑289/20 (IB v FA), which is about Brussels II bis.  The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 3, paragraphe 1, sous a), du règlement (CE) no 2201/2003 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que, aux fins de l’attribution de compétence, chaque conjoint ne peut se voir reconnaître qu’une résidence habituelle.

Quand un conjoint partage sa vie entre deux ou plusieurs États membres de telle sorte qu’il n’est aucunement possible de considérer l’un de ces États comme étant celui de sa résidence habituelle au sens de l’article 3, paragraphe 1, sous a), du règlement no 2201/2003, la compétence judiciaire internationale doit être déterminée conformément à d’autres critères prévus par ce règlement et, le cas échéant, conformément aux critères résiduels en vigueur dans les États membres.

Dans ce même cas de figure, la compétence peut être exceptionnellement attribuée aux juridictions des États membres d’une résidence non habituelle d’un conjoint, lorsque l’application du règlement no 2201/2003 et des fors résiduels ne fait ressortir la compétence internationale d’aucun État membre ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=243875&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=499554