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ISS Publication: The Kafalah in comparative and transnational perspective

Conflictoflaws - Mon, 07/05/2021 - 10:39

The General Secretariat of the International Social Service (ISS) in Geneva has published an important bilingual study in English and French entitled:  “KAFALAH – Preliminary analysis of national and cross-border practices” – “La KAFALAH: analyse préliminaire de pratiques nationales et transfrontières” (2020).

For a general overview of the ISS and its relationship with PIL, see our previous post “The Role of the International Social Service in the History of Private International Law,” written by Roxana Banu.

Below is a summary of the publication “KAFALAH – Preliminary analysis of national and cross-border practices” based on the foreword drawn up by Hans van Loon, Member of the Institut de Droit International and Former Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, and Hynd Ayoubi Idrissi, Professor of Law at the Université Mohammed V and Member of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child. 

By way of background, please note the difference between adoption and kafalah. As stated in this publication: “the very essence of adoption is the creation of a stable legal and social filiation bond between the adoptee and his/her adoptive  parent(s)  and  (in  full  adoption)  the  cessation  of  the biological bond with the family of origin. From a Western perspective,  this  is  the  main  criterion  for  differentiating  between  adoption  and  kafalah.  From the perspective of countries whose legal systems are based on or influenced by Sharia, despite the specificities of each country, reference is often made to a common approach to adoption – that is, its prohibition.”  (p.15). As to its meaning, “Kafalah is a child protection measure in countries whose legal systems are based on or influenced by Islamic law (Sharia […]). Its effects vary greatly from one country to the next” (p. 4).

***

Despite its modest title, this publication covering 222 pages is a unique and undoubtedly one of the most extensive studies carried out on the institution of the kafalah (also spelled kafala). The kafalah is widely applied in countries whose legal system is based on or influenced by Sharia law. For those countries (except for a minority that also recognise adoption) kafalah is the preeminent child care measure for children without a family environment or with one that is at risk of breakdown. Although the kafalah increasingly interacts with the legal systems of Western countries, it is not well-known or understood in Europe, the Americas, Australia and New Zealand. The impetus of this study came from the practical experience of ISS’s International Reference Centre for the Rights of Children Deprived of the Family at the International Social Service (ISS/IRC), which showed that this lack of understanding can seriously affect children deprived of parental care in cross-border situations.

Following the introduction, Part I sets the international scene of kafalah. An important step to greater international recognition of this institution as an alternative care measure for children deprived of their families was the specific reference to kafalah in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), followed by its inclusion as a child protection measure in the Hague Child Protection Convention (1996) and the UN Guidelines on the Alternative Care of Children (2009). Part I then continues analyzing the various forms, structures and functions of kafalah, comparing it to other protection measures such as adoption, and noting the Western perspective on kafalah.

Part II provides an extensive and detailed overview of the implementation of kafalah and analogous institutions in countries whose legal system is based on or inspired by Sharia law, with in-depth studies on Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, Djibouti, Lebanon, Malaysia, and Tunisia, and practical comments and suggestions by ISS/IRC for each State.  It analyses the many social problems surrounding kafalah in these States, several of which have very large populations (e.g., Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran) or must deal with large numbers of displaced or refugee families and children (e.g., Iraq, Lebanon). Many of these countries are facing poverty, lack of adequate infrastructures for the protection of children and families, stigmatization of single mothers, child abandonment, and child labour, among others. A Technical Note provided by ISS/IRC mentions many ongoing efforts to regulate kafalah in order to better protect children’s rights, and suggests a number of issues to consider, offering practical tools to national stakeholders, including a compelling case study on “Preventing unjustified family separation”.

Part III addresses the recognition of kafalah and analogous institutions in “receiving States”. It starts with a Case Study on “The crucial questions to ask oneself as a professional in a receiving State”, when confronted with a kafalah issue, with alternative suggestions for possible approaches. Then follow: a discussion of the principle of subsidiarity in cross-border kafalah placements; “Considerations about the (non)-applicability of the 1993 Hague Convention to cross-border kafalah placements” by Laura Martínez-Mora (Secretary at the Hague Conference); and a discussion of the 1996 Hague Convention on Child Protection as an international framework for cross-border kafalah. See in particular the interview with Hans van Loon “4. The 1996 Hague Convention on Child Protection: An international framework for cross-border kafalah?,” which provides an insight into the interaction between Kafalah and the modern Hague Children Conventions (pp. 135-137).

Part III concludes with a comprehensive analysis of the treatment of kafalah in several receiving States: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States of America. Like Part II, Part III concludes with a Technical Note with a summary of positive trends as well as common challenges regarding the kafalah in receiving States, during the four different stages of (1) the pre-placement process; (2) the decision to establish a Kafalah; (3) the transfer of the child and immigration considerations; and (4) the treatment of the kafalah in the receiving State and post-placement considerations.

The study concludes with four Annexes and an extensive bibliography (see in particular Annex IV).

Annex I: Historical and contemporary considerations on Sharia Law, by M. Keshavje Mohammed, a renowned international specialist on cross cultural mediation, offers helpful background insights on the legal systems where kafalah is practiced.

Annex II: International case law relating to kafalah provides an overview and analysis of cases dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.

Annex III: EU l instruments applicable to kafalah, deals with the European Union Directives on Family Reunification Directive and the Citizens’ Rights Directive and presents case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Annex IV: Tools to foster strengthened cross-border cooperation. This Annex suggests and develops the possibility of strengthening cooperation between kafalah and non-kafalah States through a bilateral agreement. To that end it presents (1) a Checklist for the establishment of such a bilateral agreement: how to ensure better protection of children placed abroad under a kafalah in (and beyond) the context of the 1996 Hague Convention, and (2) a Model for the establishment of such an agreement regarding the cross-border placement of children in a foster family or institution, or their provision of care by kafalah or an analogous institution. It offers one Model for States that are both bound by the 1996 Hague Convention, and another, more extensive, one for States that are not both bound by the 1996 Hague Convention.

Annex IV concludes with a brief overview, written by Justice V. Bennett and M. MacRitchie, on the benefits of direct judicial communication and sharing the Australian experience on how direct judicial communication could be applied to cross-border kafalah placements

Roark v Bridgestone, Shandong et al. Contract fine-print and regulatory compliance determines minimum contacts in Washington.

GAVC - Mon, 07/05/2021 - 10:10

A short post for comparative conflicts purposes. Readers might be aware of the minimum contacts rule in US jurisdictional analysis.  Rice J excellently summarises the issues in his order denying a strike-out application (‘motion to dismiss’) on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.

‘Under the Due Process Clause, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant only where “the defendant ha[s] certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” [Picot v. Weston, 9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., [1945])….

Personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant may take two forms:
general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction requires connections with the forum “so continuous and systematic as to render the foreign corporation essentially at home in the forum State (Ranza). Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, may only be exercised “when a case aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”

Shandong essentially argue that they are kept at arm’s length from US jurisdiction because they are not the one importing the tires into the US: a separate corporation imported, a third distributed. The judge however (in the process dismissing Shandong’s assertion that the goods were shipped FOB – Free on Board), found that Shandong delivered tires into the stream of commerce, was involved, in consequence of its contractual duties, in shipping the tires to Washington ports, and has taken steps for creating tires compliant with state and federal law to arrive in Washington pursuant to the supply agreement.  This echoes the EU jargon of ‘directing activities at’ the state of Washington.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 2.460, para 4.48 ff.

Comparative law claxon, special jurisdiction, product liability
Court finds Shandong delivered tires into US commerce, was involved in shipping them to WASH ports, has undertaken to comply with US state, federal law per supply agreement with Bridgestonehttps://t.co/AcGzp4hw9D https://t.co/WkGT25CnGM pic.twitter.com/VDcxBGYTEm

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 14, 2021

Revue Critique de Droit International Privé: Issue 2 of 2021

EAPIL blog - Mon, 07/05/2021 - 08:00

The new issue of the Revue Critique de Droit International Privé (2/2021) is out.

It contains eight articles and numerous case notes.

The editorial by Horatia Muir Watt (Sciences Po), Dominique Bureau (University of Paris II) and Sabine Corneloup (University of Paris II) will soon be available in English on the Dalloz website (Devoir de réserve ?), as well as the first four articles which all deal with the reserved share in successions (réserve héréditaire) from an international perspective*.

*This subject is highly topical at this moment in France since a draft bill on the compliance with the Republican principles (projet de loi confortant le respect des principes de la République) is being debating by members of the National Assembly as well as senators. It contains a provision (see article 13) aiming at protecting French heirs regarding assets located in France, against any foreign law applicable to the succession which would not provide for a reserved shared for children (see article 912 of the French Civil Code). During its first reading in April the Senate deleted the provision (see here and here). A new reading has started in July before the National Assembly. To be continued!

The articles in the special issue are as follows:

  • Une ultime (?) bataille de la réserve héréditaire, by Paul Lagarde
  • Quelques observations relatives à la réserve héréditaire dans le projet de loi confortant le respect des principes de la République, by Cécile Pérès
  • Contre le retour du droit de prélèvement en droit français : une vue de la pratique du droit international, by Diane Le Grand de Belleroche
  • Le prélèvement compensatoire du projet d’article 913 du code civil à l’épreuve des exigences européennes et constitutionnelles, by Suzel Ramaciotti
  • Droit de prélèvement, réserve héréditaire, protection des héritiers contre les discriminations, quelle méthode ?, by Natalie Joubert

The last three articles are dealing with various PIL issues.

In the first article, Christelle Chalas and Horatia Muir Watt discusse the corporate environmental responsibility from the perspective of international jurisdiction (Vers un régime de compétence adapté à la responsabilité environnementale des entreprises multinationales ? Point d’étape post-Brexit – Affaires Municipio de Mariana v. BHP plc & BHP group Ltd ; Okpabi and others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and another).

The second article written by Vincent Richard presents the Recast Service Regulation (La refonte du règlement sur la notification des actes judiciaires et extrajudiciaires).

Regulation (EU) no 2020/1784, adopted on 25 november 2020, recasts Regulation (EC) no 1393/2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Under the recast, transmitting agencies shall transfer documents to receiving agencies through a decentralised IT system such as e-CODEX. The recast also encourages electronic service to the addressee where the latter agrees. The reform creates new responsibilities for receiving agencies without correcting some of the Regulation’s shortcomings.

Finally, in the third article, Christine Budzikiewicz introduces the reform of international adoption law in Germany (La réforme du droit de l’adoption internationale en Allemagne).

The full table of contents is available here.

Virtual Workshop (in German) on July 6: Hannah Buxbaum on Equivalence Regimes in Transnational Regulation: From Comparability to Convergence

Conflictoflaws - Sun, 07/04/2021 - 22:21

On Tuesday, July 6, 2021, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its twelfth monthly virtual workshop in private international law at, exceptionally, 15:00-16:30. Since January of this year, we have been alternating between English and German language. Hannah Buxbaum (Indiana University) will speak, in English, about the topic

Equivalence Regimes in Transnational Regulation: From Comparability to Convergence

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-uphere This is the twelfth such lecture in the series, after those by Mathias Lehmann in June, Eva-Maria Kieninger in JulyGiesela Rühl in SeptemberAnatol Dutta in OctoberSusanne Gössl in November, Marc-Philippe Weller in DecemberMacjiej Szpunar in January, Dagmar Coester-Waltjen in FebruaryHoratia Muir Watt in MarchBurkhard Hess in April, Marta Pertegas in May, and Tania Domej in June. The series will take a summer break in August and return in September. Stay tuned! If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de

 

 

 

 

Mixing the blank rounds with the live bullets. The Court of Appeal (obiter) on Article 33 Brussels Ia, forum non conveniens light, in Ness Global Services.

GAVC - Fri, 07/02/2021 - 18:06

In Perform Content Services Ltd v Ness Global Services Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 981 the Court of Appeal yesterday dismissed the appeal against the High Court judgment which I discussed here.

Two grounds of appeal were at play [34]:

(1) The Court was wrong as a matter of law to interpret Article 33 to mean that jurisdiction was not “based on” domicile by reason of a non-exclusive English court jurisdiction clause that conferred prorogated jurisdiction on the English Court pursuant to Article 25;

(2) The Court was wrong to conclude that a stay was not necessary for the proper administration of justice within the meaning of Article 33(1)(b). The court wrongly failed to place any or any sufficient weight on the fact that the NJ and English proceedings were mirror image proceedings giving rise to the risk of irreconcilable judgments, the core purpose of Article 33 and a core feature of the concept of the administration of justice under the Article. The court wrongly took account of the non-exclusive English court jurisdiction clause and/or an English governing law clause and/or wrongly took account of its assessment that the centre of gravity was Slovakia and/or failed to place any or any sufficient weight on the material connections between the parties and the United States and/or wrongly placed significant reliance on connections between the parties, the dispute and the UK.

On the first issue Flaux C refers ia to UCP and to Citicorp (the latter had not been referred to by the first instance judge, I suggested it could have been), to hold that choice of court under A25 BIa being exclusive or not has no relevance. Like the first instance judge, he rules that A33-34 cannot apply if choice of court has been made in favour of an EU court, exclusive or not.

He then deals obiter, like the judge had done, with the issue whether an A33-34 stay would have been in the interest of the sound administration of justice. He emphasises [66] the wide catchment area of ‘all the circumstances of the case’ per recital 24, and suggests this must potentially also include the connections which the case has with the EU Member State and indeed the specific court (per the choice of court clause) concerned.

On that he is right. But he is wrong in my view to support Turner J’s analysis at [67] in Municipio, without any nuance.

Turner J and Flaux C are both right that, the fact itself that the factors which a judge considers in holding that the proper administration of justice does not require a stay, might theoretically have also been relevant in a common law forum non conveniens exercise, does not invalidate the judge’s approach under A33-34. However the problem with the judge’s A33-34 analysis in Municipio is,

Firstly, that it is a case of the tail wagging the dog. The proper administration of justice analysis, exclusively populated by forum non criteria indeed with full reference to that forum non analysis, was put to the front without proper engagement with the substantive conditions for A33-34 to apply at all.

Further, the DNA of A33-34 as I have reported before ( I am preparing an overview for publication), is much, much different from the forum non DNA. By cutting and pasting of the criteria indeed by cross-reference to the forum non criteria without further ado, the A33-34 analysis is irreparably broken. It becomes a case of mixing the blank rounds with the live bullets.

It is worth emphasising that the limited A33-34  analysis are obiter findings only.

Geert.

European Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.539 ff.

Perform Content Services v Ness Global Services [2021] EWCA Civ 981
Appeal dismissed in an A33-34 BIa, forum non conveniens (light) case
For the High Court judgment see https://t.co/z75qFQafqg
More soonhttps://t.co/CJhGxsamFQ

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 1, 2021

Video Recording of the Nigeria Group on Private International Law Inaugural Lecture

Conflictoflaws - Fri, 07/02/2021 - 16:55
The Nigeria Group on Private International Law held its inaugural lecture on June 21, 2021. The video recording of the event is now available on the Group’s website: here  

IPRax: Issue 3 of 2021

EAPIL blog - Fri, 07/02/2021 - 14:00

This post was drafted by Paul Lorenz Eichmüller, Vienna.

This year’s third issue of the German journal “Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts” (IPRax) contains two articles and several other case discussions of interest for European private international law. 

In the first article, Andrew Dickinson (University of Oxford) discusses the applicable national and international rules of private international law that have been in force in the UK since the end of the transition period on 1 January 2021. He focuses primarily on jurisdiction matters and the recognition of foreign judgements, as well as choice of law for contract and tort claims. 

The abstract reads: 

At 11pm (GMT) on 31 December 2020, the United Kingdom moved out of its orbit of the European Union’s legal system, with the end of the transition period in its Withdrawal Agreement and the conclusion of the new Trade and Cooperation Agreement. This article examines the impact of this realignment on private international law, for civil and commercial matters, within the legal systems of the UK, the EU and third countries with whom the UK and the EU had established relationships before their separation. It approaches that subject from three perspectives. First, in describing the rules that will now be applied by UK courts to situations connected to the remaining EU Member States. Secondly, by examining more briefly the significance for the EU and its Member States of the change in the UK’s status from Member State to third country. Thirdly, by considering the impact on the UK’s and the EU’s relationships with third countries, with particular reference to the 2007 Lugano Convention and Hague Choice of Court Convention. The principal focus will be on questions of jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of judgments and choice of law for contract and tort.  

The second article by Susanne Zwirlein-Forschner (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich) concerns itself with the issue of foreign road charge claims brought in front of German courts. Particular emphasis is placed on questions of private international law.  

The abstract reads (translated from German): 

Tolling of public roads has experienced a renaissance in Europe for reasons of equivalence and climate protection. In some Member States, the modern toll systems are designed in such a way that the recovery of unpaid fees is carried out before civil courts. If such an action for payment of a foreign toll is brought before a German court, complex problems of PIL and international civil procedure arise, which will be examined in this article. 

Among the case discussions, two judgments by the CJEU shall be pointed out: firstly, the contribution by Wiebke Voß (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Procedural Law) on the decision C-215/18, Primera Air Scandinavia, which dealt with the delineation of contract and tort claims; and secondly, the case note by Chris Thomale (University of Vienna) on the decision C-433/19, Ellmes Property Services, which has already been discussed on this blog

A full table of contents can be found here

Interaction between Family Law, Succession Law and Private International Law

EAPIL blog - Fri, 07/02/2021 - 08:00

Jens M. Scherpe and Elena Bargelli are the editors of a collection of essays titled The Interaction between Family Law, Succession Law and Private International Law, recently published by Intersentia.

The blurb reads:

There can be no doubt that both substantive family and succession law engage in significant interaction with private international law, and, in particular, the European Union instruments in the field. While it is to be expected that substantive law heavily influences private international law instruments, it is increasingly evident that this influence can also be exerted in the reverse direction. Given that the European Union has no legislative competence in the fields of family and succession law beyond cross-border issues, this influence is indirect and, as a consequence of this indirect nature, difficult to trace.

This book brings together a range of views on the reciprocal influences of substantive and private international law in the fields of family and succession law. It outlines some key elements of this interplay in selected jurisdictions and provides a basis for discussion and future work on the reciprocal influences of domestic and European law. It is essential that the choices for and within certain European instruments are made consciously and knowingly. This book therefore aims to raise awareness that these reciprocal influences exist, to stimulate academic debate and to facilitate a more open debate between European institutions and national stakeholders.

The authors of the contributions are Elena Bargelli (Univ. Pisa), Anne Barlow (Univ. Exeter), Elena D’Alessandro (Univ. Turin), Elise Goossens (KU Leuven), Nigel Lowe (Cardiff Univ.), Robert Magnus (Univ. Bayreuth), Maire Ni Shuilleabhain (Univ. College Dublin), Walter Pintens (KU Leuven), Pablo Quinza Redondo (Univ. Valencia), Lukas Rass-Masson (Univ. Toulouse), Anne Sanders (Univ. Bielefeld), Jens M. Scherpe (Univ. Cambridge), Wendy Schrama (Utrecht Univ.) and Denise Wiedemann (MPI Hamburg).

Further information, including the table of contents can be found here.

AG De La Tour on the Successions Regulation (Article 3)

European Civil Justice - Thu, 07/01/2021 - 23:19

AG De La Tour delivered today his opinion in case C‑277/20 (UM), which is about the Successions Regulation. The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 3, paragraphe 1, sous b), du règlement (UE) no 650/2012 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que relèvent de la notion de « pacte successoral » les actes de donation entre vifs en vertu desquels le transfert, au profit du donataire, de la propriété d’un bien ou des biens qui constituent même partiellement le patrimoine successoral du donateur n’intervient qu’à son décès ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=243669&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=23944552

CJEU on the European Certificate of Succession

European Civil Justice - Thu, 07/01/2021 - 23:16

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑301/20 (UE, HC v Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypothekenbank AG, intervening parties: Estate of VJ), which is about the Successions Regulation:

“1. Article 70(3) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that a certified copy of the European Certificate of Succession, bearing the words ‘unlimited duration’, is valid for a period of six months from the date of issue and produces its effects, within the meaning of Article 69 of that regulation, if it was valid when it was presented to the competent authority;

2. Article 65(1) of Regulation No 650/2012, read in conjunction with Article 69(3) of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that the effects of the European Certificate of Succession are produced with respect to all persons who are named therein, even if they have not themselves requested that it be issued”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=4EB7F36D35D24BF4E135A4654D292A60?text=&docid=243642&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=23943665

CJEU on the effects of European Certificate of Succession and its certified copy in the case Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypotheken-Bank, C-301/20

Conflictoflaws - Thu, 07/01/2021 - 13:18

Back in April we reported about the Opinion delivered by AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona in the case Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypotheken-Bank, C-301/20, which revolves around the effects produced by an European Certificate of Succession and its certified copy, time-wise (first and third questions) as well as ratione personae, by reason of the person concerned (second question). At the request of the Court, the Opinion covered only the third preliminary question. In today’s judgment, the Court addresses all three questions.

In brief, the case concerned a certified copy of an European Certificate of Succession, which bore a marking ‘unlimited’ in the ‘Valid until’ field (element linked to the first and third questions). Moreover, the certified copy in question was issued on the application of only one of the two heirs concerned by the main proceedings emanating from Austria (element linked to the second question).

 

First and third questions, effects time-wise

The Court considered that the first and third question should be examined jointly; for the Court, by these two questions the referring court sought to establish whether a certified copy of an European Certificate of Succession which bears a marking ‘unlimited’ is valid and produces its effects (described in Article 69 of the Succession Regulation) with no further limitation, as long as this copy was valid when it was first submitted to the concerned authority (paragraph 20).

According to the Court’s answer, such certified copy is valid for six month following its issuance and continues to produce its effects, in the sense of Article 69 of the Regulation, if it was valid when it was first submitted to the competent authority (paragraph 37).

 

Second question, effects by reason of the person concerned

By its second question, the referring court sought to establish whether an European Certificate of Succession produces its effects only in favour of the person who has applied for it (under this hypothesis, only that person could use the certificate and rely on its effects) or it produces such effects in favour of all persons who are mentioned in its content by name as heirs, legatees, executors of wills or administrators of the estate, regardless whether they applied for it.

The Court clearly approved the second hypothesis; the European Certificate of Succession produces its effects in favour of all persons mentioned in it, whether they have applied for the issue of certificate or not (paragraph 45).

 

The judgment can be consulted here (in French).

HCCH Monthly Update: June 2021

Conflictoflaws - Thu, 07/01/2021 - 10:28
Conventions & Instruments  

On 31 May 2021, Georgia deposited its instrument of accession to the HCCH 1965 Service Convention and the HCCH 1970 Evidence Convention. With the accession of Georgia, the Service Convention now has 79 Contracting Parties. It will enter into force for Georgia on 1 January 2022, subject to the Article 28 procedure. For the Evidence Convention, with the accession of Georgia it now has 64 Contracting Parties. The Convention will enter into force for Georgia on 30 July 2021. More information is available here.

Meetings & Events 

On 1 June 2021, the HCCH and the Asian Business Law Institute co-hosted the webinar “HCCH 1970 Evidence Convention and Remote Taking of Evidence by Video-link”, part of the ongoing celebrations of the Evidence Convention’s golden anniversary. More information is available here.

On 1 June 2021, the HCCH participated in a virtual Regional Discussion on Children’s Rights and Alternative Care, organised by the Council of Europe in preparation to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child Day of General Discussion on this theme. More information is available here.

On 21 June 2021, the HCCH participated in the virtual inaugural event of the Nigeria Group on Private International Law. The recording of the event is available here.

 

Vacancy: The HCCH is currently seeking an Assistant Legal Officer. The deadline for the submission of applications is 23 July 2021 (00:00 CEST). More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

UK Supreme Court Rules on Dispensing service in exceptional circumstances under the State Immunity Act

EAPIL blog - Thu, 07/01/2021 - 08:00

On 25 June 2021, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom issued a ruling in General Dynamics United Kingdom Ltd (Respondent) v State of Libya (Appellant) [2021] UKSC 22 on the right of the claimant to dispense service to a foreign State, by invoking exceptional circumstances. The court ruled that in proceedings to enforce an arbitration award against a foreign State under the 1996 Arbitration Act, the State Immunity Act (SIA) requires the arbitration claim form or the enforcement order to be served through the Foreign, Commonwealth (and Development) Office (“FCO”) to the State’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus excluding the application of pertinent CPR rules.

Background

General Dynamics United Kingdom Ltd (“GD”) is part of the General Dynamics group, a global defense conglomerate. Libya is a sovereign state which, at the time of these proceedings, had two competing governments. A dispute arose between the parties over a contract for the supply of communications systems. In January 2016, an arbitral tribunal in Geneva made an award of approximately £16 million (plus interest and costs) in favor of GD. The Award remains unsatisfied, but GD wishes, and has attempted, to enforce it in England and Wales. In July 2018, the High Court made an order which, amongst other things, allowed GD to enforce the Award, dispense with the requirement on it to serve a claim form or any associated documents on Libya and provided for Libya to be notified of the order (as the initial hearing had been held without notice).

Subsequently, Libya applied to the High Court to set aside those parts of the initial order dispensing with service. It referred to section 12(1) of the SIA, which requires service of ‘any writ or other document required to be served for instituting proceedings against a State’ to be transmitted to that state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the FCO. It asserted that, as no service in this manner either of the arbitration claim form or of the High Court’s order giving permission to enforce the Award had occurred, the order had to be set aside and the Award could not be enforced. Accordingly, it argued, any assets of Libya in the jurisdiction could not be used to satisfy the Award. The High Court’s initial order was therefore overturned. However, the Court of Appeal restored the High Court’s initial order finding that it was not mandatory for the arbitration claim form or order permitting enforcement to be served through the FCO ([2019] EWCA Civ 1110). The State of Libya appealed.

Ruling

The Supreme Court was called to address the following issues:

Issue 1: In proceedings to enforce an arbitration award against a foreign State under section 101 of the 1996 Act, does section 12(1) of the SIA require the arbitration claim form or the enforcement order to be served through the FCDO to the State’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

Issue 2: Even if section 12(1) applies, in exceptional circumstances, can the court dispense with service of the enforcement order under rules 6.16 and/or 6.28 of the CPR?

Issue 3: Must section 12(1) be construed as allowing the court to make alternative directions as to service in exceptional circumstances where the claimant’s right of access to the court would otherwise be infringed?

The court summarised the judgment as follows.

Issue 1

The majority of the Court allowed Libya’s appeal on the first issue. They considered that a broad reading of section 12(1) of the SIA is appropriate, on account of the considerations of international law and comity which are in play. The words “other document required to be served for instituting proceedings against a State” in section 12(1) are wide enough to apply to all documents by which notice of proceedings in this jurisdiction is given to a defendant State. In the particular context of enforcement of arbitration awards against a State, the relevant document will be the arbitration claim form where the court requires one to be served, or otherwise will be the order granting permission to enforce the award. In cases to which section 12(1) applies, the procedure which it establishes for service on a defendant State through the FCO is mandatory and exclusive, subject only to the possibility of service in accordance with section 12(6) in a manner agreed by the defendant State.

The minority would have dismissed Libya’s appeal on the first issue. They considered that that Parliament intended the applicability of section 12(1) of the SIA to depend on what was required by the relevant court rules. If, as in this case, the operation of the relevant rules does not require service of the document instituting proceedings, then that document will fall outside section 12(1) of the SIA. Documents which do not institute proceedings, such as the enforcement order, fall outside the scope of section 12(1) of the SIA entirely. Where section 12(1) of the SIA does not apply, the status quo of State immunity provided for in section 1 of the SIA must prevail.

Issue 2

The majority’s answer to this question is “No”. Lord Lloyd-Jones explained that section 12(1) of the SIA does not require the court to refer to the CPR to determine whether a document is one which is required to be served. Rule 6.1(a) of the CPR also makes clear that in this instance the CPR do not purport to oust the requirements of section 12(1) of the SIA. The CPR cannot give the court a discretion to dispense with a statutory requirement in any event.

The minority’s answer to this question is “Yes”. Lord Stephens considered that, if the court exercises a discretion to dispense with service in exceptional circumstances, then the relevant document is no longer a document that is “required to be served” for the purposes of section 12(1) of the SIA. In his view, this interpretation gives effect to the underlying purpose of the legislation because it facilitates the restrictive doctrine of State immunity.

Issue 3

General Dynamics argued that the service requirements in section 12(1) of the SIA may prevent a claimant from pursuing its claim, which would infringe article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) as well as the constitutional right of access to the court. It therefore contended that section 12(1) should be construed, pursuant to section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) and/or common law principles, as allowing the court to make alternative directions as to service in exceptional circumstances.

The majority of the Court rejected this argument. They held that the procedure prescribed by section 12(1) of the SIA is a proportionate means of pursuing the legitimate objective of providing a workable means of service which conforms with the requirements of international law and comity, in circumstances of considerable international sensitivity. The procedure cannot therefore be considered to infringe article 6 of the ECHR, or to engage the common law principle of legality. The court cannot therefore interpret section 12 of the SIA as (for example) permitting substituted service, given that a fundamental feature of the provisions is their mandatory and exclusive nature.

The minority would interpret section 12(1) of the SIA as allowing the court to make alternative directions as to service if the claimant’s right of access to the court would otherwise be infringed. They considered that denying access to a court in circumstances where diplomatic service is impossible or unduly difficult would not be proportionate to the legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations between States.

Assessment

The case concerns the application of internal rules of the UK. We will therefore refrain from any comment on the domestic landscape, and approach the issue from a broader perspective.

Some clarifications first:

  1. The case falls outside the scope of the EU Service Regulation: Service of process was supposed to take place outside the boundaries of the European Union.
  2. The case falls outside the scope of the 1965 Hague Service Convention: The State of Libya is not a signatory of the convention aforementioned.
  3. There is no bilateral convention between the UK and the State of Libya in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters.
Efforts to notify the defendant

As evidenced from the text of the Court of Appeal judgment, the Claimant had permission to dispense with service of the Arbitration Claim Form dated 21 June 2018, any Order made by the Court and other associated documents, pursuant to Civil Procedure Rules 6.16 and 6.28. The Claimant was allowed to courier the Arbitration Claim Form, the Order and the associated documents to the following addresses:

  1. Interim General Committee for Defence, Ghaser Bin Gashour, Tripoli, Libya;
  2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ash Shatt St, Tripoli, Libya; and
  3. Sefrioui Law Firm, 72 Boulevard de Courcelles, 75017 Paris, France.

All three addresses were associated with the Government of National Accord, the recognised government of Libya. The Defendant could, within two months of the date of this order, apply to set aside this Order and the Award could not be enforced until after the expiration of that period, or, if the Defendant applied to set aside this order within two months of the date of this Order, until after the application has been finally disposed of.

The proceedings did come to the attention of Libya which has applied (within the specified two-month period) to set aside paragraphs 4 and 5 of the order and to vary paragraphs 6 and 7 so that the period for any application to set aside paragraphs 1 to 3 will run from the date of service of the order pursuant to section 12 of the State Immunity Act.

Hence, the question was not whether the State of Libya was aware of the proceedings; it was rather whether the notification met with the requirements of UK law, i.e. with section 12 of the State Immunity Act.

European and global good practices

In the EU context, we could refer to Article 19(1)b of the Service Regulation, which reads as follows:

  1. Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document has had to be transmitted to another Member State for the purpose of service under the provisions of this Regulation and the defendant has not appeared, judgment shall not be given until it is established that:

 b the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by another method provided for by this Regulation;

and that in either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend.

The same rule applies in the field of the 1965 Hague Service Convention. Article 15(1)b states that,

Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under the provisions of the present Convention, and the defendant has not appeared, judgment shall not be given until it is established that –

  1. b)  the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by another method provided for by this Convention,

and that in either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend.

Violation of the defendant’s procedural rights?

In light of the factual situation, it is substantially improbable that the procedural breach has caused an essential injury to the appellant’s defense rights. The State of Libya filed timely an application to set aside the arbitral award, apparently because it received the courier in one of the addresses aforementioned.

Formal service prevails over actual knowledge of the proceedings?

As a conclusion, we wish to underline that the State of Libya was not deprived of its rights to challenge the award. Admittedly, GD could have attempted to serve the documents pursuant to the SIA, before opting for notification by courier. It did so, because it was given the right by the High Court order. In addition, GD attempted subsequently to serve the documents, by following the requirements of section 12 of the SIA, however to no avail.

And now what?

GD is obliged to follow the conditions stipulated in Section 12 SIA. According to the most favorable estimates, evidenced in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, service will be effected no sooner than a year following transmission. Of course, it may not be excluded that service will not take place at all. This will be the moment when article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights comes into play.

 

Abusive forum shopping in defamation suits. The Parliament study on SLAPPs.

GAVC - Wed, 06/30/2021 - 17:05

Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation – SLAPPs (I look at them comparatively in my Monash Strategic and Public Interest Litigation Unit, LAW5478) are a well-known tool to silence critics. Based on defamation, they (or the threat with them) aim to shut down the voice of opposition. Not many find the energy, financial resources and nerves to fight a protected libel suit in court.

The EP recently published the study led by Justin Borg-Barthet and carried out by him and fellow researchers at the University of Aberdeen. At the substantive level, distinguishing between SLAPPs and genuine defamation suits is not straightforward. As Justin et al point out, there is an important private international law element to the suits, too. Clearly, a claimant will wish to sue in a claimant-friendly libel environment. Moreover, where a deep-pocketed claimant can sue in various jurisdictions simultaneously, this compounds the threat.

The Brussels and Lugano regime is particularly suited to the use of SLAPPs as a result of the CJEU case-law on Article 7(2) forum delicti. The Handlungsort /Erfolgort distinction as such already tends to add jurisdictional gateways. In more recent years this has been compounded by the additional ‘centre of interests’ gateway per CJEU e-Date and Bolagsupplysningen – even if this was recently somewhat contained by the Court in Mittelbayerischer Verlag. As I have flagged before, Brussels Ia’s DNA is not supportive of disciplining abusive forum shopping, as illustrated ia in competition law and intellectual property law cases.

For these reasons, the report (Heading 4, p.33 ff) suggests dropping the availability of Article 7(2) and sticking to Article 4 domicile jurisdiction, supplemented with (unlikely) choice of court.

The European Parliament more than the European Commission has picked up the defamation issues both for BIa and for applicable law under Rome II (from which the issue is hitherto exempt; the report reviews the applicable law issues, too). It remains to be seen whether with this report in hand, Parliament will manage to encourage the EC to pick up the baton.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 2.431 ff, 4.24 ff.

 

Is the 2005 Hague Choice-of-Court Convention Really a Threat to Justice and Fair Play? A Reply to Gary Born

EAPIL blog - Wed, 06/30/2021 - 08:00

In a series of posts published at the Kluwer Arbitration Blog, Gary Born argues that States Should Not Ratify, and Should Instead Denounce, the Hague Choice-Of-Court Agreements Convention.

At the invitation of the Editors of the EAPIL Blog, Trevor Hartley, Professor emeritus at the London School of Economics, replies.

Gary Born starts by saying that the 2005 Hague Choice-of-Court Convention gives choice-of-court agreements the same enforceability and effect as arbitration agreements. This, he argues, is wrong because, while the parties to an arbitration agreement can choose the individual arbitrators, the parties to a choice-of-court agreement can only choose the country, or the court, from which the judges will be drawn: they cannot choose the individual judges. The reason he finds this objectionable is that the judges in many countries are corrupt or incompetent. He cites various statistics to show this. He names a number of countries which he says are especially bad: Russia, China, Venezuela, Iran, the Congo and Nicaragua. However, none of these countries is a Party to the Hague Convention; so choice-of-court agreements designating their courts would not be covered.

There can be no doubt that corrupt, biased or incompetent judges do exist, as do corrupt, biased or incompetent arbitrators. However, even though the parties to a choice-of-court agreement cannot choose the individual judges who will hear their case, they can choose the country the courts of which will hear it. They can even choose the particular court: Article 3(a) of the Convention. And since there are many countries where the judges are not corrupt, biased or incompetent—several EU countries, as well as the United Kingdom, spring to mind—the parties can, if they choose, ensure that the judges hearing their case are unbiased, competent and impartial. If the parties insist on choosing the courts of a country where judicial corruption is a problem, they have only themselves to blame.

Moreover, it cannot be said that the Convention does not deal with this problem. Article 6(c) provides that the obligation of a court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court to suspend or dismiss proceedings covered by an exclusive choice-of-court agreement does not apply  if giving effect to the agreement ‘would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the court seised.’ While Article 9(e) provides that recognition and enforcement of  a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice-of-court agreement may be refused if it would be ‘manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the requested State, including situations where the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible with fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State.’

Born tries to argue that the grounds for refusing to recognize a judgment under the Hague Convention are insufficient compared with those applicable to arbitration awards under the New York Convention. Little would be gained by a detailed analysis of the two sets of provisions. However, it can be said that the grounds in the Hague Convention are wide ranging—Article 9 has seven paragraphs, each setting out a different ground—and they provide ample opportunities for any court willing to use them to refuse recognition. The same courts will decide on recognition of judgments under the Hague Convention as on the recognition of arbitration awards under the New York Convention. There is no reason to believe that they will be less willing to refuse recognition in the former case than in the latter. In any event, if parties think that their rights will be better protected under an arbitration agreement than under a choice-of-court agreement, there is nothing to stop them from opting for the former. To deprive them of that choice by denouncing the Hague Convention would not enhance party autonomy: it would seriously limit it.

It should finally be said that the provisions on recognition and enforcement in the Hague Convention are very similar to those of the Brussels Regulation and the common law. The Brussels Regulation, rather than the New York Convention, was in fact the model for the Hague Convention. The most important difference between the two is that the grounds for non-recognition are considerably more extensive under the Hague Convention than under the Brussels Regulation. Both the Brussels Regulation and the common law seem to have operated satisfactorily for many years now.

Series: Webinar climate change litigation – 1 July

Conflictoflaws - Tue, 06/29/2021 - 23:48

The ERC Building EU Civil Justice team in Rotterdam is running a series of seminars, covering a variety of topics in the field of European civil justice and international litigation.

On Thursday 1 July, 16-18 hrs CET, the webinar is dedicated to the topic Representing Future Generations: Private Law aspects of Climate Change Litigation. Speakers are Chantal Mak, Geert Van Calster and Sanne Biesmans, and the panel is moderated by Jos Hoevenaars. They will address the relationship between climate litigation, fundamental rights and the role of European judges; private international law aspects of climate litigation and strategic aspects; and liability aspects of climate litigation and implications of the recent Dutch Shell judgment (see our earlier blogpost).

Participation is free of charge. You can register here at Eventbrite.

The two remaining sessions of the series are dedicated to:
  • The Arbitralization of Courts – Friday, 2 July (09:30-11:30 CET), with Georgia Antonopoulou and Masood Ahmed as speakers and moderated by Xandra Kramer (register)
  • European Civil Justice in Transition: Past, Present & Future Thursday 15 July  (15.30-17.30 CET) with Alan Uzelac, Burkhard Hess, John Sorabji and Eva Storskrubb, moderated by Alexandre Biard and Xandra Kramer (register)

CJEU Rules on Jurisdiction in Violation of Personality Rights Claim, C-800/19

EAPIL blog - Tue, 06/29/2021 - 14:00

This post was written by Edyta Figura-Góralczyk, University of Economics in Kraków (Poland).

On 17 June 2021 the Court of Justice of the EU pronounced a judgment in case C‑800/19 Mittelbayerischer Verlag KG v. SM. At the time of writing this post, the text of the judgment was available only in Polish and French.

The preliminary question originates from a Court of Appeal in Warsaw and concerns jurisdictional rules for online infringements of personality rights according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. The opinion in this case was prepared by AG Bobek.

Comments concerning this judgments have already been posted by Tobias Lutzi and Geert van Calster. The case was also discussed on this blog by Marta Requejo Isidro.

Background

The plaintiff (SM) based the lawsuit on Polish material law – Article 23 and 24 of Polish Civil Code. The broad understanding of personality rights under those articles of Polish law causes qualification of the national identity and national dignity to be protected by such rights.

SM is a Polish national, lives in Poland and is a former prisoner of Auschwitz extermination camp during World War II. The online article was published by Mittelbayerischer Verlag KG, having the title: “Ein Kämpfer und sein zweites Leben” (The Warrior and His Second Life) in Germany on the website that was accessible in Poland. This article presented in German language the pre- and post-war life of Israel Offman, a Jew who survived the Holocaust. The online article included the statement  that Israel Offman’s sister ‘was murdered in the Polish extermination camp Treblinka [(im polnischen Vernichtungslager Treblinka ermordet worden war)]’ instead of informing that she ‘was murdered in Nazi German extermination camp Treblinka’. SM belongs to group of former prisoners of Nazi German extermination camps. SM claims that the words ‘Polish extermination camp Treblinka’ that were used in online article instead of ‘Nazi German extermination camp’  infringed national identity and dignity of SM what according to Polish material law causes the infringement of personality rights.

Polish courts have already issued judgments in similar cases without having doubts about the basis for jurisdiction (here and here). However this time Court of Appeal in Warsaw raised the question, if Polish courts have jurisdiction in such cases on the basis of Article 7 (2) Brussels I bis Regulation.

Limits to ‘Centre of Life Interests’ – Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation

The CJEU ruled in this case that Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation:

should be interpreted in this way that the court in which jurisdiction is the centre of life interests of the person alleging infringement of its personality rights by the content published on the website, has jurisdiction to hear – with regard to all harm suffered and damages suffered – an action for damages brought by that person, only if the content contains objective and possible elements to be verified allowing for the direct or indirect individual identification of that person.

As already mentioned above, the case concerns the jurisdiction of the court of Member State based on ‘centre of life interests’ of the person that personality rights were infringed by the online publication (Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation).

The CJEU already ruled the similar case – in eDate judgment and confirmed this judgment in Bolagsupplysningen. However, the specificity of the case C-800/19 is that the plaintiff (SM) is not addressed in person (name or surname) in the online article. On the contrary, in this case the plaintiff belongs to the group addressed in the article (the group of prisoners of Nazi German extermination camps). SM also has habitual residence in Poland. SM filed the lawsuit with claims that are ‘indivisible’ (e.g. the claim for publishing apology of the plaintiff for the false statement). In order to judge such claims the Polish court should have the jurisdiction based on the ‘centre of life interests’ according to Article 7 (2) Brussels I bis Regulation as it was introduced in eDate case.

According to the opinion of AG Bobek, the jurisdiction of the  courts in such cases based on the ‘centre of life interests’ doesn’t require that the allegedly harmful online content names a particular person.  However there should occur a close connection between that court and the action at issue, thus ensuring the sound administration of justice. On the contrary the Commission argued, in essence, that a person whose personal rights, according to its claim, would be infringed, should be able to bring an action before the court having jurisdiction in the centre of life interests, if this person was mentioned by name in the publication in question.

Moreover AG Bobek has proposed after AG Cruz Villalón in eDate opinion, the  proportionality test that should clarify the jurisdiction in online infringements of personality rights.

The ‘centre of gravity’ test [should] to be composed of two cumulative elements, one focusing on the claimant and the other on the nature of the information at issue. The courts of a Member State would have jurisdiction only if that were the place of the claimant’s centre of interests and if ‘the information at issue [was] expressed in such a way that it may reasonably be predicted that that information is objectively relevant in [that Member State]’. (para 64 of AG Bobek opinion).

As a result of this test AG Bobek arrives at the following assessment:

indeed [it is] difficult to suggest that it would have been wholly unforeseeable to a publisher in Germany, posting online the phrase ‘the Polish extermination camp of Treblinka’, that somebody in Poland could take issues with such a statement. It was thus perhaps not inconceivable that ‘the place where the damage occurred’ as a result of that statement could be located within that territory, especially in view of the fact that that statement was published in a language that is widely understood beyond its national territory. Within that logic, while it is ultimately for the national court to examine all those issues, it is difficult to see how jurisdiction under Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 could be axiomatically excluded. (para. 74 of AG Bobek opinion)

However CJEU in the discussed judgment didn’t follow the proposed centre of gravity test. The Court stated that the sound administration of justice requires such interpretation of basis of jurisdiction in Article 7(2) Brussels I bis Regulation that the centre of life interests is located in the country foreseeable for the defendant. This requires the clarification of the previous judgments of CJEU (e.g. eDate).

The CJEU introduced this clarification in such a way that the connection of the plaintiff with the alleged online material should be based on objective and verifiable elements that allow the person to be identified, directly or indirectly, individually. The CJEU stated in the analysed case that SM (plaintiff) was clearly not directly or indirectly identified individually in the content published on the Mittelbayerischer Verlag website. The plaintiff bases the claim of an infringement of its personal rights due to the fact that SM belongs to the Polish nation and was the prisoner of extermination camp. The CJEU states that in such a situation, there is no particularly close connection between the court in which area of jurisdiction lies the centre of the life interests of the person claiming infringement of the personality rights and the dispute in question (para 45). Therefore, that court does not have jurisdiction to hear all ‘indivisible’  dispute claims on the basis of Article 7(2) Brussels I bis Regulation.

Assessment

The CJEU limited the interpretation of ‘centre of life interests’ in Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation by invoking that the online content should contain objective and possible elements to be verified allowing for the direct or indirect individual identification of the person infringed.  However the CJEU didn’t limit the possibility to sue on the basis of jurisdiction from Article 7(2) in case of claims that may be ‘divided’ between the territories of the counties (mosaic principle) – e.g. the claim for compensation.

Generally, this judgment is a step forward to clarification of the broad basis for jurisdiction of ‘centre of life interests’ in case of online personality rights infringements. However the CJEU didn’t conduct the overall analysis but pronounced the sentence of the judgment based on the specificity of the analysed case.

The future will show how this criteria (the online content should contain objective and possible elements to be verified allowing for the direct or indirect individual identification of the person infringed) is to be applied further (e.g. in the pending Gtflix case).

Representing Future Generations: Private Law aspects of Climate Change Litigation Seminar

EAPIL blog - Tue, 06/29/2021 - 08:00

On 1 July 2021, the ERC Building EU Civil Justice team at Erasmus University will be organising an online seminar (the fourth in a series of seminars dedicated to EU Civil Justice) that will be discussing the private law aspects of climate litigation touching upon the recent case law such as milieudefensie/Shell case. This case marks a turn in climate change litigation by targeting mainly the responsibilities of governments in curtailing the effects of climate change to suing corporations.

The seminar moderated by Jos Hoevenaars will bring together renown speakers on the topic Prof. Chantal Mak, Prof. Geert van Calster and Sanne Biesmans. They will discuss the implications of recent climate litigation in the context of private international law, fundamental rights and corporate liability.

Click here to register. More information on the coming two seminars can be found here.

The Antwerp court of first instance in CMB (Bocimar NV), ‘The Mineral Water’: In dubio pro reo or a perfect excuse for forum shopping?

GAVC - Mon, 06/28/2021 - 13:01

The Antwerp court of first instance (criminal section) has held last Friday, 25 June (I have copy of the judgment (in Dutch) on file) in the prosecution against CMB (an Antwerp based shipowner; specifically: Bocimar NV) and a number of individuals for the alleged illegal transport of waste, in the shape of the discarded ship the Mineral Water, destined for beaching at Chittagong, Bangladesh (the same location of relevance in Begum v Maran).

The Mineral Water was built in 1999, bought by CMB in 2007. A decision was made ‘end 2015’ (the judgment does not clarify specific date and /or circumstance of that decision) to sell  her, with a view to recycling. That sale was approved on 19 January 2016 by Bocimar Board Decision, to a cash buyer based on the British Virgin Islands, when the ship was anchored at Fangcheng, China. Actual transfer of the ship happened at Malaysia a few weeks later. The ship’s registry was changed from Antwerp to Niue after the transfer and she was beached at Chittagong in February.

The case is a criminal prosecution which of course carries with it a high burden of proof. Seeing as the ship sailed under Belgian flag, the principled application of Belgian and EU law was not as such disputed. Neither do the original owners dispute that at the time of the January 2016 decision, the ship met with the definition of waste ia per CJEU Shell. However defendants argue the EU Waste Shipments Regulation – WSR does not apply for, they argue, the Mineral Water never sailed in European waters and was not physically exported from the EU with a view to recycling (p.5 in fine).

[The court later (p.8) notes this is not quite correct: occasionally EU ports were used for (un)loading and in 2015 there was rare bunkering at Malta].

The court held for the defence. Core to the decision is Article 2, 30 31 and 32: the definitions of ‘import’, ‘export’, ‘transfer’. The prosecutor seeks support in Article 2.22: ”country of dispatch’ means any country from which a shipment of waste is planned to be initiated or is initiated’. The court however held that neither the place of decision nor the flag State is of relevance to the territorial scope of application of the WSR. (Note the contrast on that point with the Ships Recycling Regulation – SRG 1257/2013, not applicable to the facts at issue).

One imagines more on that issue can and should be said upon appeal.

The countries of dispatch, transfer and destination of the ship are all ex-EU. Importantly, at p.8 the court notes there is no indication that the owners would have gamed the system to ensure the ship lay outside EU territorial waters at the time of the decision to discard.

The case shows the importance of the flag State in the SRG (itself not free of difficulties; the IMO Hong Kong Convention should avoid gaming). Of note is also that the place of decision-making (relevant for conflict of laws: locus delicti commissi, eg under A7 Rome II as discussed in Begum v Maran) did not play a  role. The crucial element was the almost complete lack of physical contact between the ship and the EU.

One assumes the prosecution will appeal.

Geert.

Handbook of EU Waste law, 2015, Chapter 3.

Ships dismantling, beaching in Bangladesh
Update – Belgian court last week reportedly held https://t.co/XFFcwWXqZa #CMB intent to discard only materialised late in the chain, in PRC, making EU rules in force at the time inapplicable.
Am chasing copy of judgment. https://t.co/sT3unlCehg pic.twitter.com/WCn1FvgX6x

— Geert van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 28, 2021

Just published: Cerqueira’s article on “International Commission on Civil Status. A unique, exemplary and necessary International Organization” translated into German

Conflictoflaws - Mon, 06/28/2021 - 09:29

The summary below has been kindly provided by the author:

The International Commission on Civil Status has been working for seventy years for international cooperation in the field of civil status. In this period, 34 Conventions and 11 Recommendations were adopted. Notably, the Commission developed innovative methods, for example, multilingual Forms and Coding of entries in order to overcome translation problems related to civil status documents. Its results are remarkable to a point that some of its instruments serve as a model specially for the European Union.

Despite all the work already accomplished and the many projects still existing, the International Commission on Civil Status is now in risk of vanishing, mainly because of France and Germany’s recent withdrawal.

Still, its know-how is vital in the face of the new challenges posed by changes in the civil status of persons: same-sex marriage, medically assisted reproduction, surrogate motherhood, etc. In this context and for the common interest of present and future generations, rather than abandoning the Commission and the question of civil status in the international arena, it is more than ever time to get involved, by joining it and actively participating in its work.

In that perspective, the article constitutes a plea intended to convince the German authorities of course, but also those of other States, former members of the International Commission on Civil Status or not, to invest in it in order to save an institution which works in an essential field for private relations of an international character.

Such an investment would be all the more appropriate given that the International Commission on Civil Status has fundamentally changed its statutes and its mode of operation in recent years. For example, English is now the second official language of the Commission beside French.

These efforts must henceforth be accompanied. If this were not the case, the risk of losing all the patiently drawn up normative acquis which goes well beyond civil status in the strict sense but also affects family and nationality law exists.

The article is part of an awareness campaign carried out by eminent Authors for several months now.

 

Source: G. Cerqueira, « Internationale Kommission für das Zivilstandswesen. Eine einzigartige, beispielhafte und notwendige internationale Organisation», StAZ Das Standesamt, n. 6, Juni, 2021, p. 169-170.

 

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