Flux des sites DIP

Golden Endurance v RMA, [2016] EWHC 2110 (Comm), illustrates the attraction of having a unified approach to submission (to jurisdiction), otherwise known as voluntary appearance. In current case, the judgment that needs to be recognised is ex-EU (Moroccan) hence the Brussels I Recast does not apply: English law does. This is in fact exactly why The Hague is working hard at its ‘Judgments’ Convention – not an easy project in my view. As helpfully summarised by Sam Goodman, the court held that a Moroccan judgment would not be recognised in England because the claimant had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Moroccan court. Although the claimant had appeared in the Moroccan proceedings, it had done so in order to ask the court to stay the Moroccan proceedings in favour of arbitration and had only engaged with the merits as it was obliged to do so under Moroccan law.

Of note is that Phillips J points out that under the relevant English statutory rules, the question arises as to when defending a case on its merits, at the same time as contesting jurisdiction, submission applies: a scenario for which the Brussels I Recast provides specifically in Article 26. An English court does not for this exercise rely on civil procedure rules in the country of origin of the judgment: this surely makes sense for otherwise it would encourage forum shopping by unscrupulous claimants. Instead, whether one has submitted is ‘a question of mixed law and fact’ (at 46) which in this case was decided in favour of the claimant in the English court, ‘the claimant, having requested the dismissal of the claim in Morocco in favour of arbitration proceedings and having done so continually and as its primary response, did not voluntarily appear in the Moroccan courts’ (at 47).(The remainder of the judgment relates to transport law: the ‘Hague Rules’).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.7.

This book authored by M.E. Ancel, P. Deumier and M. Lazzouzi, and published by Sirey, is the first manual written in French solely devoted to international contracts examined through the lens of judicial litigation and arbitration. It provides a rich and rigorous presentation in light of the legal instruments recently adopted or under discussion in France, as well as at the European and international levels.

After an introduction to  the general principles of the matter, the reader will be able to take cognizance of the regimes of the most frequent contracts in the international order: business contracts (sale of goods and intermediary contracts), contracts relating to specific sectors (insurance, transport), contracts involving a weaker party (labor and consumer contracts) or a public person.

Advanced students, researchers as well as practitioners will find in this volume the tools enabling them to grasp the abundant world of international contracts, to identify the different issues and to master the many sources of the discipline.

The ensemble is backed up by a highly developed set of case law and doctrinal references, updated on August 15, 2016.

Marie-Elodie Ancel is a professor at the University Paris Est Créteil Val de Marne (UPEC), where she heads two programs in International Business Litigation and Arbitration.

Pascale Deumier is a professor at the Jean Moulin University (Lyon 3), where she is a member of the Private Law Team and coordinates the research focus on the Sources of Law.

Malik Laazouzi is a professor at the Jean Moulin University (Lyon 3), where he heads the Master 2 of Private International and Comparative Law.

Aude Fiorini, The Protection of the Best Interests of Migrant Children – Private International Law Perspectives, forthcoming / di prossima pubblicazione in Giacomo Biagioni, Francesca Ippolito (eds), Migrant Children in the XXI Century. Selected Issues of Public and Private International Law, Editoriale Scientifica, available through / disponibile su Social Science Research Network.

Migration news stories have, in recent years, captured the world’s attention almost daily. Migration is not however a new phenomenon. The first wave of globalisation, between 1870 and 1914 saw as much as 10% of the world’s population move permanently to a new country. It is paradoxical therefore that, at the start of the new millennium, migration was still under-researched. The phenomenon may generally be divided into diverse categories: temporary labour migration or highly skilled and business migration; internal or international migration; legal or illegal migration; forced or chosen migration; family reunification migration, return migration… Such typology reflects an approach that largely sees migration as a challenge states and primarily considers it under the angle of international politics and security. Migration can though also be studied from the perspective of the individual migrant. In this whilst it is human rights law which immediately resonates, private international law also has a key role to play. The interface between human rights and private international law as regards issues of migration has not frequently been considered. And this is particularly the case as regards children. Can and do States achieve the protection of the best interests of migrant children in part through the framework of private international law? To answer this question, this article will consider first the relevance of private international law to migrants and migration. It then discusses whether the reliance on private international law rules, methods and approaches, including the increasingly popular connecting factor of habitual residence is adequate as a basis on which to protect the best interests of migrant children.

Following a report issued by the Commission in March 2016, the Council of the European Union adopted on 8 December 2016 its Conclusions on the European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters.

The Council, among other things, calls on Member States to ‘promote the use of the expertise of other legal practitioners by involving relevant professional associations more closely in the Network’s activities’  and to ‘encourage interaction at national level to share knowledge and gather information on the practical application of the EU instruments in civil and commercial matters’, including, where appropriate, by establishing ‘national networks bringing together the national contact points, Network members and other legal practitioners’.

Facendo seguito a una relazione presentata dalla Commissione nel marzo del 2016, il Consiglio ha adottato, l’8 dicembre 2016, le sue Conclusioni sulla Rete giudiziaria europea in materia civile e commerciale.

Il Consiglio, tra le altre cose, sollecita gli Stati membri a “promuovere l’uso delle conoscenze specialistiche di altri operatori della giustizia coinvolgendo più strettamente i pertinenti ordini professionali nelle attività della rete” e a “incoraggiare l’interazione a livello nazionale per condividere conoscenze e raccogliere informazioni sull’applicazione pratica degli strumenti dell’UE in materia civile e commerciale”, considerando, tal fine, “l’eventualità di istituire, ove opportuno, reti nazionali che riuniscano i punti di contatto nazionali, i membri della rete e altri operatori della giustizia”.

A conference on Parental responsibility and children protection in cross border situations, in the light of the 1996 Hague Convention will take place in Florence on 12 December 2016. The programme is available here. 

Lunedì 12 dicembre 2016, si terrà a Firenze un incontro intitolato Responsabilità genitoriale e protezione dei minori in contesto transfrontaliero anche alla luce dell’entrata in vigore della convenzione dell’Aja 1996. Il programma integrale è consultabile a questo indirizzo.

Apologies for late posting. I had tweeted and linked and done all sorts of other things when the judgment came out but as readers tell me, that is not quite the same as a review on this blog.

Walker J decided Peralla v Codere [2016] EWHC 1182 (Comm) at the end of July. His views on Article 25 and exclusivity in the event of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses, are very much dicta. On their neutralising effect under Article 31, he suggested obiter. Let me explain. The jurisdiction clause which Perella alleged to have been breached by Codere comprises a single sentence of a clause of their letter of engagement. That sentence states:

“[Codere] agrees for the benefit of [Perella] that the courts of England wil have non-exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute which may arise in connection with this engagement.”

Codere sued in Spain alleging breach of contract. Perella countersues in England. The English proceedings are very much necessitated by one or two awkward consequences of the wording of Article 31 of the Brussels I Recast. This Article was specifically included to neutralise the torpedo which the Court of Justice had armed in its Gasser judgment, C-116/02: following Gasser, lis alibi pendens applies even if there is exclusive choice of court and a court other than the court assigned in that clause, has been seized. The Brussels I Recast neutralises the torpedo but only if there is exclusive court of choice, and if the court designated by that clause has been seized.

The first consideration in the case was whether the clause was exclusive. It was pertinently not. Perella suggested the language indicates that the benefit to be conferred upon Perella is an entitlement to insist that Codere must regard itself as bound by the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. Walker J (at 30) rejects this justifiably: it would have been simplicity itself verbatim to indicate exclusivity. As Ken Kaar notes, the inclusion of ‘for the benefit of’ is an old, now redundant boilerplate provision in choice of court: in the original Brussels and Lugano Conventions, ‘If the agreement conferring jurisdiction was concluded for the benefit of only one of the parties, that party shall retain the right to bring proceedings in any other court which has jurisdiction by virtue of this Convention.’ This proviso meant there was plenty of discussion in court whether only one party had procured such benefit, lest one state in so many words that it had. The current version of the Brussels I Recast (and the 2001 version before it) and Lugano 2007 have both dropped the provision, and it would be best dropped from the boilerplate clause, too.

Having held that the clause was not exclusive, the Court could have stopped there. Obiter however Walker J offered his view on whether Article 31(2)’s protection extends to asymmetric choice of court clauses – the notion of which I have reported on before. Walker J (at 18) suggests that it does. The party invoking Article 31(2) pointing to an exclusive forum which the counterparty who is suing elsewhere, had committed itself to, need not be itself subject to a symmetric duty only to sue in that court. The point has not been argued before the CJEU yet, but I agree that the High Court’s position is the correct one, with the important caveat of course that such clause needs to be valid in accordance with the lex fori prorogati. This also means that asymmetric clauses where such lex cannot be identified, would have trouble disarming the recalcitrant party’s torpedo.

Well, we are going to miss this type of judgment following Brexit. Better make conflict of laws part of the continuing relations with the UK.

Geert.

Grundfragen des Europäischen Kollisionsrechts, edited by / a cura di Stefan Arnold, Mohr Siebeck, 2016, pp. 167, ISBN 9783161539794, EUR 54.

Das Europäische Kollisionsrecht dient der europäischen Idee eines Raums der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts ohne Binnengrenzen. Diese Aufgabe kann es nur erfüllen, wenn sich die Akteure des Rechts immer wieder von Neuem seinen Grundfragen stellen. Sie betreffen zunächst die politischen, ökonomischen und gesellschaftlichen Hintergründe, die für das Europäische Kollisionsrecht von herausragender Bedeutung sind. Dazu zählen der rechtspolitische Kontext seiner Entwicklung ebenso wie der gesellschaftliche Wandel des Familienbegriffs oder die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Kollisionsrecht und religiösem Recht. Zu den Grundfragen des Europäischen Kollisionsrechts gehören aber auch die Gründe und Grenzen zentraler Institute der kollisionsrechtlichen Dogmatik. Welche Ordnungsaufgabe kommt etwa der Parteiautonomie, dem ordre public oder dem Renvoi im Europäischen Kollisionsrecht zu? Die hier zusammengeführten Beiträge einer Tagung in der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften nähern sich diesen Grundfragen an.

With contributions by / Con scritti di: Christoph Althammer, Stefan Arnold, Gerald Mäsch, Mathias Rohe, Michael Stürner, Rolf Wagner, Marc-Philippe Weller.

The BIICL is seeking to appoint three Research Assistants on a 0.8 FTE basis for paid internships of four months each, with the possibility of extension for a further month.

Research Assistants are expected to undertake various core tasks, including:

*           Assisting in the coordination and organisation of research activities;

*          Contributing to the production of high quality research in their areas including, where appropriate, assisting with desk-based research, literature reviews, data analysis, drafting of proposals and submissions, report writing and drafting of articles, social media content etc.

*         Assisting in the management and co-ordination of events;

*         Attending meetings with external groups/partners, including government, legal profession and NGOs; and

*         Working as part of a team with other researchers.

Research Assistants will each be assigned to a Supervisor in their legal areas. For this round of applications, we are particularly looking to appoint in the areas of:

*       Public International Law;

*       Private International Law and/or Competition Law; and

*       Rule of Law

Lawyers who speak both Spanish and English may be interested in a new book written by Professors S.I. Strong of the University of Missouri, Katia Fach Gómez of the University of Zaragoza and Laura Carballo Piñeiro of the University of Santiago de Compostela. Comparative Law for Spanish-English Lawyers: Legal Cultures, Legal Terms and Legal Practices / Derecho comparado para abogados anglo- e hispanoparlantes: Culturas jurídicas, términos jurídicos y prácticas jurídicas (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2016), is an entirely bilingual text that seeks to help those who are conversationally fluent in a second language achieve legal fluency in that language. The book, which is aimed primarily at private international and comparative lawyers, is appropriate for both group and individual study, and provides practical and doctrinal insights into a variety of English- and Spanish-speaking jurisdictions. The book is available in both hard copy and electronic form, and Elgar is currently offering a discount on website sales. See here for more information.

Isn’t it just a perfect exam question for a graduate course, nay this question involves so many issues it could arguably serve as one single exam for a whole law degree: such is the intensity of legal areas at issue: constitutional law, international law, international trade, regulatory law and risk analysis, intellectual property law…

Discuss why the Court of Appeal for England and Wales denied Government wrongdoing in plain packaging, while the German Bundesverfassungsgericht rejected an argument of expropriation in Energiewende yet held that German Government must nevertheless pay compensation to the energy companies involved (E.ON, RWE and Vatenfall).

Source tip: you may want to consult my former student Dr Catherine Banet’s excellent analysis on the Vatenfall issue.

Issues tip: a good way to go about it would be to draft a table of issues that both cases have in common and those which they do not (eg the Court of Appeal’s review of intellectual property). A discussion of the precautionary principle would not go amiss (in the plain packaging case: specifically whether precaution applies to uncertainty as to efficiency of remedies rather than uncertainty as to a phenomenon). A point of discussion may also be why the CA refers profusely to European precedent while the Bundesverfassungsgericht does not. Finally, any consideration of the link between the latter proceedings and the concurrent ISDS procedure, will gain you brownie points.

To fellow faculty out there: if you do use this exam Q, please do share good student answer copies.

Geert.

archa joint seminar of the Child & Family Law Quarterly and Cambridge Family Law

27 March 2017, at Trinity College, University of Cambridge

The withdrawal of the UK from the European Union will precipitate important change in the field of international family law. EU law has increasingly come to define key aspects of both jurisdiction and recognition & enforcement of judgments on divorce, maintenance, and disputes over children, including international child abduction, and provided new frameworks for cross-national cooperation. At this seminar, international experts and practitioners will discuss the impacts of ‘Brexit’ on family law, from a range of national and European perspectives, and reflect on the future of international family law practice in the UK.

Booking will open soon. CPD points will be available.

Please visit www.family.law.cam.ac.uk/ to join the Cambridge Family Law mailing list in order to receive an email when booking opens.

I have in the past reported fleetingly about the Trafigura litigation, in which the company is and has been pursued in various jurisdictions for the environmental and public health damage resulting from the dumping in Abidjan, Ivory Coast’s capita, of toxic waste originating from the Probo Koala. I discuss the corporate social responsibility implications of conflict of laws ia here.

The case has led ia to the so-called ‘Leigh Day settlement’ in the United Kingdom (representing 30.000 victims) and to a 2007 ‘Protocole d’Accord’ between Trafigura and Ivory coast.

Current judgment was issued on 30 November and involves Stichting Union des Victimes de Déchets Toxiques D`Abidjan et Banlieues, a foundation set up in accordance with Dutch law, claiming to represent victims not yet represented in the Leigh Day settlement.

The Dutch court first of all swiftly rejects any impact of the choice of court clause included in the 2007 protocol. This discussion could have been quite interesting, however the Court suffices with a reference to the narrow formulation of the clause. It refers to any and all issues arising out of the validity, application and interpretation of the agreement. The agreement being a contractual arrangement and the suit here being based on liability in tort, in an action started by victims not party to the agreement, the court at Amsterdam suffices with the remark that current case is evidently not covered by the clause.

This leaves aside the discussion on the merits with respect to that choice of court. The 2007 protocol was signed by Ivory Coast ‘for and on behalf of all victims of the toxic wastes’. Whether the State can legitimately bind all those victims, particularly since presumably not all of them are Ivory Coast nationals, requires a lex causae to settle. Were this to follow the Brussels I Recast rule (the case looks to have been introduced after January 2015), this would imply a discussion on the inclusion of choice of court ex-EU. Over and above that discussion, the Court at Amsterdam would then have to discuss whether perhaps ordre public protests against allowing a State to represent all victims in cases such as these.

Having dismissed (again, all too briefly) choice of court, the court subsequently upholds jurisdiction on the basis of Article 4 Brussels I Recast: the Dutch domicile of Trafigura Beheer BV.

In the remainder of the assessment of jurisdiction and standing, the Court applies Dutch law (de Stichting has been set up under Dutch law) and finds ultimately that the personal, business interests of its creator are not sufficiently split from the interests of the victims which the foundation purports to represent. The court adds that the Stichting would not seem properly to manage its documentation etc., leaving doubt as to whether it is properly equipped to attain its objective.

The suit is therefore dismissed on standing.

An interesting judgment to kick-start all sorts of issues of relevance to corporate social responsibility.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9.2, Chapter 8, Heading 8.3.

I’ve come across this piece of news by Stacie I. Strong, and found it worth to be shared.

On Friday, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon to address the question of whether the Hague Service Convention authorizes service of process by mail.

Click here to get to the initial submissions on whether the matter should be addressed by the SC.

On 16 December 2016, the University of Verona will host a seminar held by Robert Bray – Head of Unit at the Secretariat of the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs – on The immunities of the Members of the European Parliament. Ruggiero Cafari Panico (Univ. Milan) will intervene as discussant. The flyer of the event is available here.

Il 16 dicembre 2016 l’Università degli Studi di Verona ospita un seminario di Robert Bray – capo unità del Segretariato della Commissione per gli Affari giuridici del Parlamento europeo – dedicato a Le immunità dei membri del Parlamento europeo. Interverrà come discussant Ruggiero Cafari Panico (Univ. Milano). Per maggiori informazioni si veda qui.

Brussels Ibis Regulation – Changes and Challenges of the Renewed Procedural Scheme – Short Studies in Private International Law,

is the title of a book just released, edited by Vesna Lazic and Steven Stuij.

The book focuses on major amendments introduced in the Brussels I regulatory framework. The contributions scrutenise the changes introduced in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, a legal instrument that presents a core of the unification of private international law rules on the European Union level. It is one of the first publications addressing all the changes in the Brussels I regulatory scheme, which takes into consideration relevant CJEU case law up to July 2016.
The texts, written by legal scholars who have published extensively in the field of private international law and international civil procedure, will add to the development of EU private international law. In addition, the authors’ critical analysis may open further discussions on the topic and so benefit a consistent and harmonised application of the Regulation. In this respect the book takes a different approach than the commentaries which have so far been published.
It is primarily meant for legal academics in private international law and practitioners who are regularly engaged in cross-border civil proceedings. It may also be of added value to advanced students and to those with a particular interest in the subject of international litigation and more generally in the area of dispute resolution.

Vesna Lazic is a Senior Researcher at the T.M.C. Asser Instituut, an Associate Professor of Private Law at Utrecht University and Professor of European Civil Procedure at the
University of Rijeka.
Steven Stuij is an expert in Private International Law and an external Ph.D. candidate at Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam.

In Philipp Plein, the court at Rotterdam held against the applicability of contractual choice of court to cases involving (alleged) unfair trading practices /infringement of competition law. (The judgment is not entirely clear on how the alleged tort needs to be qualified). I should also rephrase: I am assuming the case involves clothing chain Philipp Plein (‘PP’): this party’s name (albeit with presumably a typoo reported as ‘Philipp Klein’) is mentioned once in the judgment, probably because redacting missed this one particular reference. I find this process of anonimisation rather tiring: I fail to understand why in issues of commercial law, companies should at all be offered anonymity in public recording of the case. But I digress.

PP is domiciled at Lugano. The court is not entirely clear in its distinction between the Brussels I Recast Regulation and the Lugano Convention 2007. Domicile of the defendant in Switzerland was already immaterial under the Brussels I Regulation, given that one of the parties is domiciled in The Netherlands. The court applies Brussels I Recast and Lugano 2007 more or less jointly, given their similar outcome for the case at issue. Given this parallel application it is quite remarkable that no reference is made to CDC, which emphasised that extension of choice of court to non-contractual liability cannot be assumed. Instead the court here reviews how other parts of PP’s standard terms and conditions are formulated and what impact this has on the clause at issue.

It decides the choice of court clause (which read ‘“If both parties are businessmen, then the place of jurisdiction […] is Nuremberg, Germany”.’) does not extend to non-contractual liability. Parties seemingly agreed that in the event of non-applicability of choice of court, the Court at Rotterdam can hear the case on the basis of Article 5(3) Lugano 2007 (similar to now Article 7(2) Brussels I Recast).

I agree with Bas Braeken and Marianne Meijssen: A good result but an awkward way to go about it.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Prviate International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9, Heading 2.2.9.7.

Chiara Ghionni, Adozione internazionale e diritto alla famiglia, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2016, pp. 192, ISBN 9788849532098, EUR 23.

Nel volume si esamina il tema dell’adozione nella sua evoluzione normativa e applicativa, dal contesto internazionale ed europeo a quello interno, assumendo come filo conduttore la ricerca dei diritti del minore e la loro effettività. Il declino della c.d. famiglia tradizionale e la parallela emersione di nuovi, e diversi, modelli genitoriali obbligano ad un’attenta riflessione e ad una prudente valutazione delle situazioni inedite e complesse che la vita contemporanea propone, al fine di selezionare adeguatamente i valori guida cui affidare la soluzione delle questioni di disciplina. Un discorso sull’adozione internazionale, dunque, diventa un banco di prova per testare il grado di resistenza dei principi generali nell’attuale trasformazione che coinvolge i diritti della persona, i diritti fondamentali e gli istituti posti a fondamento della società, quali sono la famiglia e i rapporti di filiazione.

The author of this entry is Dr. Arantxa Gandía Sellens, senior research fellow at the MPI Luxembourg.

Yesterday the UK government announced that it is proceeding with preparations to ratify the Unified Patent Court Agreement. Following the Brexit vote, this piece of news is not only relevant for the patent world, but also for the future Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU (art. 50 Treaty of the European Union).

Here I will focus on the implications of this decision on the unitary patent system.

A brief explanation of the unitary patent system

The European patent with unitary effect –thus different from the «classic» European patent– was introduced by Regulation (EU) no. 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection (hereinafter, Regulation 1257/2012).

According to its art. 2 (c), the European patent with unitary effect is a «[…] European patent which benefits from unitary effect in the participating Member States by virtue of this Regulation». Furthermore, its arts. 5 (1) and 1 (1) establish that the so-called unitary effect of this kind of patent consists of the protection provided throughout the territories of the Member States participating in the enhanced cooperation authorized by Decision 2011/167/EU. The unitary patent protection may be requested for any European patent granted on or after the date of application of Regulation 1257/2012 (art. 18.6), which is linked to the date of entry into force of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (hereinafter, UPC Agreement), following its art. 18 (2).

The object of the UPC Agreement is to establish a Unified Patent Court for the settlement of disputes relating to European patents and European patents with unitary effect (art. 1). The Agreement requires for its entry into force the ratification of at least thirteen Member States, including the three Member States in which the highest number of European patents had effect in 2012 (art. 89 (1)). At the moment, eleven States have ratified the convention, and only one of them is among those three States whose ratification is mandatory, namely France.

Who can sign and ratify the UPC Agreement?

According to art. 84 of the UPC Agreement, it is open for signature by any Member State. Regarding ratification, the same requirement applies: “This Agreement shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the respective constitutional requirements of the Member States. […]”.

Thus, while the UPC Agreement is not an EU instrument but a classical international convention, only Member States of the European Union can sign and ratify the UPC Agreement.

Notwithstanding the Brexit vote, the UK remains for the moment a Member State of the European Union; therefore, at this time the requirements established by the UPC Agreement for ratification are met. However, the UK government is determined to proceed to Brexit and to become a non-EU country. Therefore, the ratification could create a measure that is contrary to the European Treaties to which the UK is still bound. According to art. 4.3 of the Treaty on European Union a Member State “shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”.

Consequences of the UK’s ratification of the UPC Agreement

Ratification of the UPC Agreement, followed by exit from the EU would create a series of consequences that would have to be dealt with:

1. The unitary patent cannot cover the territory of a third State. According to art. 3 of Regulation 1257/2012, the unitary patent shall have equal effect in all the participating Member States, meaning that States without the status of “Member State” are excluded. In that scenario, the unitary patent would not have effect in the UK, unless the necessary modifications are made in the legal instruments that constitute the so-called “unitary patent package”.
2. Both Regulation 1257/2012 and the UPC Agreement use the terms “participating Member States” or “Contracting Member States” when referring to the States taking part in the system. This wording is a reaction to the ECJ’s Opinion 1/09, which dealt with the question of the compatibility of the failed agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation System with EU law (open also to third States). The ECJ opposed the participation of third States in that convention, as the referral of preliminary questions on EU law could not be guaranteed. Moreover, a third State cannot refer preliminary questions on EU law to the ECJ. This means that a non-member State would not be able to comply with Art. 21 of the UPC Agreement, titled “Requests for preliminary rulings”: “[…] the Court shall cooperate with the Court of Justice of the European Union to ensure the correct application and uniform interpretation of Union law […]”.

3. A seat of the central division cannot be located in a third State. Art. 7.2 of the UPC Agreement establishes that the central division shall have its seat in Paris, with sections in London and Munich. Although the UPC Agreement does not require that the sections of the central division must be located in a Contracting Member State (paradoxically, this requisite does exist for the local and regional divisions, so that it could also be argued that it applies to the central division, mutatis mutandis), the question is not clear cut in light of the EU’s constitutional framework, which includes the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Two options for the unitary patent system after the Brexit vote

Taking into consideration that the UK will have the status of a non-EU country (third State), two options remain open to proceed with the establishment of the system following the Brexit vote:

First option) Maintaining the status quo. As discussed above, if the UK ratifies now the UPC Agreement, the other Member States might rely on art. 4.3 EU Treaty in order to block that ratification. Once the UK’s ratification is blocked –and the wording of the UPC Agreement remains– the process for the start-up of the unitary patent system will be delayed until the negotiations following the exit declaration (art. 50 EU Treaty) are concluded.

If, after the negotiations, it is agreed that the unitary patent system should be established without the UK, the UPC Agreement will have to be modified, at least regarding the seat of the UPC central division in London (art. 7.2 of the UPC Agreement).

Second option) Including the UK in the unitary patent system. If the UK ratifies the UPC agreement and the other Member States do not rely on art. 4.3 EU treaty, the setting up process will continue as it has been foreseen.

At the moment, as the UK is still an EU Member State, its active participation in the unitary patent system does not entail any problem, formally speaking. On the contrary, the UK is one of the three Member States in which the highest number of European patents had effect in 2012, which makes its ratification a condition for the setting up of the system (art. 89 of the UPC Agreement). However, when the UK loses its status as EU Member State, some modifications to the UPC Agreement will have to be made. Those modifications will have: 1) to make sure that third States are invited to take part in the system, provided that they oblige themselves to respect EU law and refer questions to the ECJ (in light of the Opinion 1/09); and 2) to change Regulation 1257/2012, in order that the unitary patent system can cover the territory of third States. This might also entail the participation in the system not only by the UK, but also by other interested third States.

The biggest disadvantage of this option is the risk of endangering the application and interpretation of EU law, as already pointed out in the ECJ’s Opinion 1/09. The ECJ will have to be consulted on the possibility of the inclusion of third states if those third States are willing to respect the primacy of EU law, referring preliminary questions to the ECJ when necessary. This would be a new feature in comparison to the failed agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation System, where the referral of preliminary questions to the ECJ was not guaranteed.

A public meeting was held on 15 November 2016, in Washington, under the auspices of the US Department of State, to obtain the views of interested stakeholders on the current draft provisions of the Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, presently under discussion within the Hague Conference on Private International Law (regarding the Judgments Project, see further here; as concerns the draft text of the Convention, see here). A text resuming the outcome of the Washington meeting is available here.

Il 15 novembre 2016 si è svolto a Washington, con il patrocinio del Dipartimento di Stato americano, un incontro pubblico volto a conoscere le opinioni degli interessati circa il progetto di una Convenzione a vocazione universale sul riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni straniere, attualmente in discussione in seno alla Conferenza dell’Aja di diritto internazionale privato (sul Judgments Project della Conferenza, si veda qui; quanto alla bozza della Convenzione, si veda qui). Un resoconto dell’incontro di Washington è disponibili a questo indirizzo.

According to a press release of 28 November 2016, the UK government is proceeding with preparations to ratify the Unified Patent Court Agreement.

Secondo un comunicato stampa del 28 novembre 2016, il Governo britannico sta procedendo alla preparazione della ratifica dell’Accordo relativo a un Tribunale Unificato dei Brevetti.