Flux des sites DIP

Il fascicolo di gennaio 2016 della rivista La Ley: Unión Europea contiene alcuni contributi su temi internazionalprivatistici.

In particolare, Angel Espiniella Menéndez è autore di uno scritto, dedicato al regolamento 2015/2421, che modifica il regolamento n. 861/2007, sulle controversie di modesta entità, intitolato La reforma de los procesos europeos monitorio y de escasa cuantía.

Appaiono altresì un commento di Santiago Álvarez Gonzáles alla sentenza pronunciata dalla Corte di giustizia il 19 novembre 2015 nella causa C-455/15, PPU, intitolato Traslado ilícito de menores, competencia judicial internacional y orden público, e un commento di María Jesús Elvira Benayas alla sentenza Corte di giustizia del 16 settembre 2015 nella causa C-519/13, Alpha Bank, intitolata El uso de los formularios (en la notificación internacional conforme al Reglamento 1393/2007) y la tutela judicial efectiva.

L’indice completo della rivista è disponibile qui.

The following announcement has been kindly provided by Dr. Susanne Lilian Gössl, LL.M., University of Bonn:

Call for Papers

On 6th and 7th April 2017, for the first time a young scholars’ conference in the field of Private International Law (PIL) will be held at the University of Bonn.

The general topic will be

Politics and Private International Law (?)

We hereby invite interested junior researchers to send us their proposals for conference papers. We envisage presentations of half an hour each in German language with subsequent discussion on the respective subject. The presented papers will be published in a conference transcript by Mohr Siebeck.

Procedure

If we have stimulated your interest we are looking forward to your application to

nachwuchs-ipr(at)institut-familienrecht.de

until 30 June 2016, 12 a.m. CET (deadline!).

The application shall include an exposé of maximum 1,000 words in German language and shall be composed anonymously that is without any reference to the authorship. The author including his/her position or other affiliation shall be identifiable from a separate file.

Selection decisions will be communicated in October 2016.

For organisational reasons, a preliminary version of the paper (to measure 35,000 to 50,000 characters including footnotes) and the core statements must be received by not later than 31 March 2017.

Topic:

For our purposes, we explicitly understand PIL in a broader sense: international jurisdiction and procedure, the law of the international settlement of disputes (including ADR) as well as uniform law and comparative law and the comparison of legal cultures are included insofar as they allude to cross-border questions.

Ever since Savigny, conflict of laws rules have traditionally been perceived as “unbiased” or “value-neutral” in Central Europe as they are solely supposed to coordinate the applicable substantive law. However, during the second half of the past century the opinion that conflict of law rules may also strengthen or prevent certain results of substantive law has become prevalent. In the U.S., such discussion led to a partial abolition of the “classical” PIL in favour of balancing the individual governmental interests as to the application of their respective substantive law provisions (so called governmental interest analysis). But other legal systems have also explicitly or indirectly restricted classical PIL in some areas in favour of governmental interests. Our conference is dedicated to the various possibilities and aspects of this interaction between PIL and politics as well as to the advantages and disadvantages of this interplay.

Possible topics or topic areas are:

General questions:

• “Politicisation” of PIL on the national, European and international level, or the political target of “value-free” PIL rules (?)
• “Politicisation” of comparative law (?)
• Convergence of PIL and Public International Law, especially the protection of fundamental rights and human rights by means of PIL
• Uniform applicable law or harmonisation of PIL
• PIL in day-to-day application of law – theory and reality (?)
• General instruments of PIL to enforce political targets: overriding mandatory rules, public policy, forum non conveniens, extensive/narrow jurisdiction …
• Allocative functions of PIL and International Civil Procedure Law
• Users, stakeholders and their interests in cross-border questions: parties, attorneys, judges, notaries, experts etc.
• Protection by formal requirements or third parties’ obligations to cooperate (e.g. notarial recording of the choice of law agreement)
• Parties’ or courts’ expenses due to the application of foreign law
• Regulatory competition, e.g. in order to establish a national venue of arbitration
• Forum shopping and locational advantages through low standards of protection (e.g. regarding data protection law, copyright law, family law or consumer protection law)
• Issues of competences as regards European PIL rules
• Extraterritorial application of national (private) law (Kiobel, Bodo Community)

Business Law:

• Financial crisis, e.g. resolution of globally operating banks
• Gender Quotas of in Corporate Law, e.g. application of German law on foreign companies or comparison between international regulatory models
• Protection of competition in case of worldwide groups operating, e.g. Google antitrust proceedings by FTC and EU Commission
• Law on co-determination within the European context, e.g. questions referred for a preliminary ruling by KG (Court of Appeal in Berlin) and LG Frankfurt
• Worker protection

Family and Inheritance Law:

• Protection of minors, i.e. regarding repatriation of children or international adoptions: successful legal unification (?)
• Cross-border protection of adults
• Application of religious law and judgements of religious courts

Consumer protection:

• Consumer protection and market freedom (i.a. in the Internet)
• Special jurisdiction, party autonomy and the enforcement of minimum standards in substantive law

Internet and new media:

• Territoriality of rights to ubiquitous goods (e.g. copyright law and data protection rules) and cross-border trade
• Copyright Law and “Fair Use”
• Data protection/privacy and freedom of information

Other recent focal points:

• Migration and refugee crisis, e.g. the determination of the law of the person between integration or preservation of cultural identity
• Environmental protection, e.g. enforcement of titles from class actions or international litigation regarding mass damages
• Protection of cultural property – issues regarding ownership and repatriation

For more information, please visit https://www.jura.uni-bonn.de/en/institut-fuer-deutsches-europaeisches-und-internationales-familienrecht/pil-conference/.

If you have any further questions, please contact Dr. Susanne Gössl, LL.M. (sgoessl(at)uni-bonn.de).

We are looking forward to thought-provoking and stimulating discussions!

Yours faithfully,

Susanne Gössl
Rafael Harnos
Leonhard Hübner
Malte Kramme
Tobias Lutzi
Michael Müller
Caroline Rupp
Johannes Ungerer

Julia Alma Schünemann has authored a book entitled “Die Firma im internationalen Rechtsverkehr. Zum Kollisionsrecht der Firma unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Rechts der Europäischen Union” (Company Names in Cross-Border Transactions. The Applicable Law to the Name of a Company in the European Union). The Volume has been published in German by Mohr Siebeck.

The official abstract reads as follows:

Does an English Limited need to adapt its company name in order to operate in Germany? Julia Alma Schünemann designs an overall concept for dealing with this rarely discussed interface between private and public international and EU law.

More information is available on the publisher’s website.

In Vizcaya v Picard, the Privy Council considered the issue of consent to a choice of court clause in the event no such choice has been made verbatim. It was alleged that choice of court had been made implicitly but clearly by reference to an applicable law agreement in the underlying contract. RPC have a review of the case on their blog and I am grateful to them for bringing it to my attention.

The case is a fall-out of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme, carried out through Mr Madoff’s company Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”), a New York corporation. After Madoff’s fraud came to light in 2008, Irving Picard (“the trustee”) was appointed as trustee in BLMIS’s liquidation in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (“the New York BankruptcyCourt”). The trustee commenced proceedings under the anti-avoidance provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code against investors who had been repaid before the fraud was discovered, including the appellant, Vizcaya Partners Limited (“Vizcaya”), a BVI (British Virgin Islands) company which carried on business as an investment fund, and which invested about US$328m with BLMIS between January 2002 and December 2008, but was repaid US$180m before the fraud was discovered.

The Appeal before the Privy Council concerns primarily the content and scope of the rule in common law that a foreign default judgment is enforceable against a judgment debtor who has made a prior submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign court (as distinct from a submission by appearance in the proceedings).  Brussels I or the Recast was not applicable to the case. In that Regulation (Article 25), the expression of consent with choice of court must take one of thee forms: essentially: written (or oral but confirmed by written agreement); in accordance with lex mercatoria; or in accordance with established business practice simply between the parties.

The question in the case at issue is whether the agreement to submit must be express, or can also be implied or inferred. The Privy Council settled the uncertainty which would seem to have existed for some time in the common law, in favour of an answer in the affirmative. Consent to jurisdiction can be implied. What needs to be shown though is real ‘agreement’, or ‘consent’ (in European private international law with respect to the similar discussion re choice of law (Rome I) I would say the test is one of ‘clearly established’), quod non in casu. Choice of law (here: in favour of New York law) can be a factor but not a solely determinant one. Moreover, choice of court viz one’s business transactions does not imply automatic extension to insolvency proceedings.

Crucial precedent, it would seem. Geert.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.9

Johannes Schilling, Das Internationale Privatrecht der Transportverträge, Mohr Siebeck, 2016, pp. XXXV+468, ISBN 9783161542534, € 79,00

[Dal sito dell’editore] – Das internationale Transportrecht ist durch eine unübersichtliche Anzahl von materiellen Einheitsrechtsakten gekennzeichnet. Während im Gütertransport die völkerrechtlichen Konventionen, wie die CMR oder das MÜ, zum Tragen kommen, werden bei der Personenbeförderung in erster Linie die europäischen Fahrgastrechteverordnungen relevant. Mittlerweile ist auch das für Beförderungsverträge maßgebliche Kollisionsrecht auf europäischer Ebene vereinheitlicht, und zwar in Art. 5 Rom I-VO. Angesichts dessen geht Johannes Schilling der Frage nach, welches Recht auf internationale Beförderungsverträge Anwendung findet. Im Fokus stehen dabei sowohl die Auslegung als auch das praktische Anwendungsfeld des neuen europäischen IPR für Beförderungsverträge. Darüber hinaus wird das supranationale Kollisionsrecht zu dem internationalen Einheitsrecht der Güter- und Personenbeförderung ins Verhältnis gesetzt.

Ulteriori informazioni sono disponibili qui.

The Private International Law Interest Group of the American Society of International Law invites submissions for this year’s ASIL Private International Law prize. The prize is given for the best text on private international law written by a young scholar. Essays, articles, and books are welcome, and can address any topic of private international law, can be of any length, and may be published or unpublished, but not published prior to 2015. Submitted essays should be in the English language. Competitors may be citizens of any nation but must be 35 years old or younger on December 31, 2014. They need not be members of ASIL. This year, the prize will consist of a $400 stipend to participate in the 2016 ASIL Annual Conference, and one year’s membership to ASIL. The prize will be awarded by the Private International Law Interest Group based upon the recommendation of a Prize Committee. Decisions of the Prize Committee on the winning essay and on any conditions relating to this prize are final. Submissions to the Prize Committee must be received by June 1, 2016. Entries should be submitted by email in Word or pdf format. They should contain two different documents: a) the essay itself, without any identifying information other than the title; and b) a second document containing the title of the entry and the author’s name, affiliation, and contact details. Submissions and any queries should be addressed by email to Private International Law Interest Group Co-Chair Cristian Gimenez Corte (cristiangimenezcorte@gmail.com). All submissions will be acknowledged by e-mail.

The following announcement has been kindly provided by Béligh Elbalti, Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University.

Since 2008, the Research Unit on International Private Relations, Commerce, Arbitration and Migrations of the Faculty of Legal, Political and Social Sciences of Tunis (Carthage University) has been organizing the “journées Mohamed Charfi de droit international privé” colloquium which address various Private International Law issues. These colloquiums are organized on the memory of the late Dr. Mohamed Charfi, an eminent and leading Tunisian scholar specialized in the field of family law, human rights and private international law.

On April 2016, the Research Unit will organize its fourth journées Mohamed Charfi de droit international privé under the theme of international contracts and private international law. The colloquium will be held at the Faculty of Legal, Political and Social Sciences of Tunis on the 13 and 14 April 2016. Eminent and distinguished professors, as well as leading Tunisian law professors and private international law specialists will take part in this event.

The program will be as follow:

First Day : 13 avril 2016 (Wednesday) :
Les tendances générales dans le droit du contrat international

Morning Sesseion

8h30 – 9h15: Welcome Speech

9h15 – 9h30: Ali MEZGHANI (Professeur, Faculté de Droit des sciences juridiques, politiques et sociales de Tunis)
Présentation générale du colloque : « À propos du contrat international »

9h30 – 10h : Pierre MAYER (Professeur émérite, École de Droit de la Sorbonne)
Rapport introductif : « L’internationalité du contrat »

10h -10h30 : Jean-Michel JACQUET (Professeur, Institut des Hautes études internationales et du développement de Genève)
« Sanctions économiques internationales et contrats internationaux »

10h30-11h : Coffee Break

11h – 11h30 : Souhayma BEN ACHOUR (Professeur, Faculté de Droit et des sciences politiques de Tunis)
« L’essor de l’autonomie de la volonté en Droit international privé tunisien »

11h30 – 12h : Salma TRIKI (Maitre-assistante, Institut supérieur des études juridiques et politiques de Kairouan)
« La hiérarchie des normes dans le droit du commerce international »

12h – 12h30 : Debate

Afternoon Session

15h – 15h30 : Imed BÉJAOUI (Maitre-assistant, École supérieure de commerce de Sfax)
« La pérennité du contrat international entre pacta sunt servanda et rebus sic stantibus : réflexions au regard du pouvoir interprétatif de l’arbitre»

15h30 – 16h : Donia ALLANI (Assistante, Faculté des sciences juridiques, politiques et sociales de Tunis)
« La loi applicable au contrat d’après l’article 62 du Code tunisien de droit international privé »

16h-16h30 : Coffee Break

16h30h-17h: Thouraya AHMADI (Assistante, Faculté des sciences juridiques, politiques et sociales de Tunis)
« Les lois de police étrangères et le contrat international »

17h-17h30 : Debate

Second Day : 14 avril 2016 (Thursday) :
De quelques solutions particulières dans le droit du contrat international

Morning Session

9h – 9h30 : Lotfi CHEDLY (Professeur, Doyen de la Faculté de Droit des sciences juridiques, politiques et sociales de Tunis)
« La protection du consommateur en Droit international privé tunisien »

9h30 – 10h : Fatma BOURAOUI (Maitre assistante, Faculté de Droit des sciences juridiques, politiques et sociales de Tunis)
« Les contrats de transmission des créances en droit international privé »

10h – 10h30 : Rym BEN KHELIFA (Maitre-assistante, Faculté de Droit et des sciences politiques de Tunis)
« L’impact des traités relatifs à la protection des investissements sur les contrats conclus entre États-hôtes et investisseurs étrangers »

10h30 – 11h : Coffee Break

11h – 11h30: Jallel BACCAR (Maitre-assistant, École supérieure de commerce de Sfax)
« Le crédit documentaire international »

11h30 – 12h : Inès YOUSSEF (Maitre-assistante, Faculté des sciences juridiques, économiques et de gestion de Jendouba)
« Le payement d’un contrat international par crédit documentaire »

12h – 12h30: Debate

12h30 : End of the Colloquium

All presentations are in French. Participation to this event is free of charge and no prior reservation is required.

Venerdì 8 aprile 2016, si terrà a Firenze un corso di aggiornamento su I titoli esecutivi ‘europei’: procedure a confronto, organizzato dal Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche dell’Università di Firenze, in collaborazione con la Fondazione per la Formazione Forense dell’Ordine degli Avvocati di Firenze.

[Descrizione del corso] – Il corso si propone di fornire ai partecipanti gli strumenti teorici e pratici necessari ai fini di garantire una corretta ed agevole tutela del credito in Europa. L’Unione europea prevede la facoltà, in capo a società e individui, di ricorrere a strumenti di diritto internazionale privato e processuale volti a facilitare il recupero del credito all’interno degli Stati membri, consentendo, da una parte, di attribuire “carattere europeo” alle decisioni interne relative a crediti non contestati (regolamento (CE) n. 805/2004 istituivo di un titolo esecutivo europeo per i crediti non contestati) ed istituendo, dall’altra, veri e propri procedimenti europei per il recupero transfrontaliero del credito e per controversie di modesta entità (regolamenti (CE) nn. 1896/2006 e 861/2007). Tali regolamenti pongono questioni di coordinamento con altri strumenti dell’Unione, in particolare con il recente regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 (c.d. “Bruxelles I-bis”), che ha sostituito il regolamento n. 44/2001 (“Bruxelles I”), in un quadro frammentario e settoriale che richiede un’approfondita conoscenza del settore della cooperazione giudiziaria in materia civile promossa dall’Unione (articoli 67 e 81 del TFUE). La peculiarità che caratterizza tutte queste procedure di recupero del credito risiede nell’eliminazione della procedura di exequatur. Le decisioni emesse nel quadro di ciascuno dei suddetti regolamenti, infatti, circolano in Europa attraverso un canale preferenziale che, attraverso un efficace sistema di formulari reperibili on-line, semplifica, accelera e riduce i costi dei procedimenti: tali provvedimenti sono dunque eseguiti nello Stato membro richiesto alla stregua delle decisioni emesse dai giudici interni, senza necessità di alcun previo procedimento volto a dichiararne l’esecutività. Secondo la Relazione della Commissione europea, presentata al Parlamento europeo il 13 ottobre 2015, recante una statistica dell’applicazione, negli Stati membri, del regolamento (CE) n. 1896/2006 istitutivo di un procedimento europeo di ingiunzione di pagamento, l’Italia si colloca tra gli ultimi posti. Ciò, afferma la Commissione, è dovuto essenzialmente alla mancata consapevolezza, da parte degli operatori giuridici, dell’esistenza di tali meccanismi e del funzionamento delle rispettive procedure. Così, la mancata o errata conoscenza di strumenti concepiti per agevolare la circolazione delle decisioni – e, pertanto, per promuovere i rapporti transfrontalieri e la circolazione delle persone in Europa – pregiudicandone i rispettivi obiettivi, finisce col realizzare un risultato del tutto opposto, frustrando le aspettative dei creditori e le prospettive di futuri rapporti transnazionali. Inoltre, il 24 dicembre 2015 è stato pubblicato sulla Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea il regolamento (UE) 2015/2421 del 16 dicembre 2015, che ha apportato rilevanti modifiche ai regolamenti n. 861/2007 e n. 1896/2006. Il corso fornirà ai partecipanti le conoscenze necessarie alla “gestione” delle procedure di recupero del credito istituite dai regolamenti menzionati. All’illustrazione del quadro normativo esistente, sarà affiancata una metodologia didattica di carattere pratico, ricorrendo a tal fine all’esame della giurisprudenza dell’Unione ed interna, nonché all’illustrazione dei metodi di reperimento e compilazione dei moduli.

Interverranno come relatori Francesco Salerno (Univ. Ferrara), Olivia Lopes Pegna (Univ. Firenze), Elena D’Alessandro (Univ. Torino) ed Ester di Napoli (Univ. Magna Graecia Catanzaro).

Le domande dovranno essere inviate (compilando questo modulo) all’indirizzo perfezionamenti@adm.unifi.it entro il 1° aprile 2016.

Il programma completo del corso ed ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili qui e qui.

Financial technology (Fintech) describes the way in which technological innovations transform financial services. Examples are bitcoin, PayPal or crowdfunding. These new phenomena not only raise important regulatory concerns, but also difficult conflict-of-laws questions. They will be addressed at a conference hosted by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) and organized by Eva Lein. It will take place today, 16 March 2016, from 5 to 7 PM, at Charles Clore House, Russell Square (London). The line-up of speakers includes Daniel Awrey (Oxford University), Tetsuo Morishita (Sophia University, Tokyo), and Matthias Lehmann (University of Bonn). Registration information and further details are available here.

Il fascicolo 2/2015 della rivista Contratto e Impresa / Europa ospita una serie di contributi dedicati all’introduzione del certificato successorio europeo, istituito dal regolamento n. 650/2012, dall’angolatura di alcune esperienze giuridiche nazionali.

Il certificato successorio, come si dice all’art. 63, par. 1, del predetto regolamento, “è destinato a essere utilizzato dagli eredi, dai legatari che vantano diritti diretti sulla successione e dagli esecutori testamentari o amministratori dell’eredità che, in un altro Stato membro, hanno necessità di far valere la loro qualità”. Il suo compito è, in sostanza, quello di agevolare l’esercizio delle prerogative spettanti ai soggetti sopra indicati in uno Stato membro diverso da quello in cui il certificato è stato rilasciato.

Questi gli scritti raccolti nel fascicolo: Paul Lagarde, Le certificat successoral européen dans l’ordre juridique français (p. 405 ss.); Heinrich Dörner, Il certificato successorio europeo da un punto di vista tedesco. Disposizioni attuative e questioni aperte (p. 424 ss.); Patrick Wautelet, Elise Goossens, Le certificat successoral européen – Perspective belge (p. 434 ss.); Francisco Lledo Yagüe, Arantzazu Vicandi Martínez, Il certificato successorio europeo e la sua applicazione in Spagna: l’ordinamento giuridico spagnolo è pronto? (p. 449 ss.); Salvatore Patti, Il certificato successorio europeo nell’ordinamento italiano (p. 466 ss.).

L’indice completo del fascicolo è disponibile a questo indirizzo.

Matthias Klöpfer has authored a book entitled “Missbrauch im Europäischen Zivilverfahrensrecht” (Abuse of Procedure in European Civil Procedural Law). The book has been published in German by the German publishing house Mohr Siebeck.

The official abstract reads as follows:

There are times when European civil procedural law seems to actually encourage abuse of law and circumvention strategies. Matthias Klöpfer examines if and how Europe’s so-called prohibition of abuse of law principle can serve as a union-wide approach to regulate abuse of procedure.

More information is available on the publisher’s website.

Nella sentenza 26 febbraio 2016, n. 3802, le Sezioni unite della Corte di cassazione si sono pronunciate sull’interpretazione dell’art. 5 n. 1 del regolamento n. 44/2001 concernente la competenza giurisdizionale, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale (Bruxelles I), e sulla rilevanza, in rapporto ad essa, dell’art. 31 della Convenzione di Vienna del 1980 sulla compravendita internazionale di beni mobili (CISG).

La prima delle norme richiamate, oggi sostituita dall’art. 7 n. 1 del regolamento n. 1215/2012 (Bruxelles I bis), istituisce un foro speciale delle liti in materia contrattuale, concorrente con il foro generale del domicilio del convenuto. In forza di tale disposizione, il convenuto, domiciliato in uno Stato membro, può essere attratto, in un diverso Stato membro, dinanzi al giudice del luogo in cui l’obbligazione dedotta in giudizio è stata o deve essere eseguita (locus solutionis), con la precisazione, indicata al primo trattino della lett. b) della norma, che, in caso di compravendita di beni, tale luogo deve intendersi coincidere con quello in cui i beni “sono stati o avrebbero dovuto essere consegnati in base al contratto”.

La Convenzione di Vienna, recante norme materiali internazionalmente uniformi in tema di vendita internazionale di merci, nel dettare la disciplina delle obbligazioni del venditore, precisa all’art. 31 che, quando la vendita implichi il trasporto dei beni, il venditore assolve il suo obbligo di consegna — in mancanza di diverse pattuizioni — rimettendo le merci al primo vettore.

Nella fattispecie si faceva questione di un contratto di somministrazione concluso fra una società italiana e una società spagnola. I beni forniti da quest’ultima alla società italiana erano stati rimessi a un vettore in Spagna per essere fatti pervenire alla società italiana. La consegna, agli effetti della Convenzione di Vienna, doveva quindi ritenersi perfezionata in quel paese.

La Cassazione, rifacendosi alla propria giurisprudenza e a quella della Corte di giustizia (segnatamente, per quest’ultima, alla sentenza Car Trim), ha affermato che in assenza di uno specifico accordo sul luogo della consegna, tale luogo dev’essere identificato, ai fini della giurisdizione, nel luogo di destinazione finale delle merci, quello in cui l’acquirente consegue o dovrebbe conseguire la disponibilità materiale, e non soltanto giuridica, dei beni. Le regole sostanziali applicabili al contratto sono, in questo caso, prive di rilievo ai fini dell’individuazione del locus solutionis.

Tale modo di intendere il concetto di luogo di consegna, ha ribadito la Corte, non è solo il più idoneo al soddisfacimento dell’obiettivo di prevedibilità. Garantendo una stretta correlazione tra il contratto e il giudice chiamato a pronunciarsi su di esso, esso risponde altresì al principio di prossimità, soddisfacendo in tal modo un altro obiettivo del regolamento Bruxelles I.

Ripercorrendo, infine, in chiusura, le argomentazioni del giudice comunitario relative al caso Electrosteel, la Corte ha sottolineato come, per verificare se le parti abbiano contrattualmente concordato il luogo di consegna delle merci, occorra aver riguardo a tutti i termini e a tutte le clausole rilevanti del contratto, compresi termini e clausole generalmente riconosciuti e sanciti dagli usi del commercio internazionale, quali gli Incoterms della Camera di commercio internazionale.

Non rinvenendosi nella specie pattuizioni di questo genere, la Corte ha rigettato il ricorso e dichiarato la giurisdizione del giudice italiano.

The University of Maribor (Slovenia) is organizing the Central European Law Conference for Students (CELCOS). It will take place in Maribor from 31 March to 2 April 2016. CELCOS will be the first large international student event in Central and Southeastern Europe to reflect current issues of EU law.
The main concept of this Jean Monnet project is to gather over 50 law doctoral students from universities across Europe for a three-day conference at the University of Maribor (Slovenia), where the doctoral students will be the main actors and about 30 experts, i.e. professors of EU law, judges, prosecutors and policy-makers at the national and EU level will give impulses to the discussion about selected areas of EU law by commenting on the students’ contributions.
The aim of this conference is to analyze current topics of EU law, especially in light of the importance that EU law has for establishing the rule of law in Central and Southeastern Europe. Moreover, it aims at promoting fresh ideas and proposals for the future development of the EU legal system in general.

The conference will be divided into nine sessions dealing with the following topics:

Session 1: Triangle of cooperation between courts – ECtHR, CJEU and national courts.

Session 2: Managing migration in Europe – between economic feasibility and protection of human rights.

Session 3: Market integration through law: reforming legal foundations for a stable EU market.

Session 4: Effective enforcement of data protection law in Europe.

Session 5: EU Consumer protection – the current challenges.

Session 6: From transnational principles to European rules of civil procedure.

Session 7: Common EU standards on rights of suspects, the accused and victims in criminal proceedings.

Session 8: Integration of environmental protection into EU policies.

Session 9: Democracy and rule of law in Central and Southeastern Europe.

CELCOS is co-financed by the EU Commission – Erasmus programme – Jean Monnet Project. Further information is available at the Conference homepage. A detailed description of the sessions may be found here.

Marshall v MIB [2015] EWHC 3421 (QB) involved a road traffic accident that occurred in France. On 19th August 2012 an uninsured Peugeot motor car registered in France driven by Ms Bivard, a French national, hit Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard, both British nationals, as they were standing behind a Ford Fiesta motor car and its trailer, while it was being attended to by a breakdown recovery truck on the side of a motorway in France. The Ford Fiesta motor car was registered in the UK and insured by Royal & Sun Alliance (“RSA”), and the recovery truck was registered in France and insured by Generali France Assurances (“Generali”). The Peugeot then collided with the trailer shunting it into the Ford Fiesta which in turn was shunted into the vehicle recovery truck. Mr Pickard suffered serious injuries. Mr Marshall died at the scene.

This case raises points about among others (1) the law applicable to an accident involving a number of persons and vehicles; and (2) the application of the French Loi Badinter to the facts of this case, if French law applies: The second main issue is if French law applies, whether the Ford Fiesta motor car and recovery truck are “involved” within the meaning of the Loi Badinter, which it is common ground is the applicable French statute. If those vehicles are “involved” it is common ground that RSA, as insurer of the Ford Fiesta, and Generali, as insurer of the recovery truck, are liable to Mrs Marshall, and that Generali, as insurer of the recovery truck, is liable to Mr Pickard.

Two actions were commenced. The first by Mrs Marshall (Mr Marshall’s widow) against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (“the MIB”). Mrs Marshall relied on relevant English 2003 Regulations. The 2003 Regulations make the MIB liable in respect of liabilities of compensation bodies in other EEA states for losses caused by uninsured drivers. The relevant compensation body in France responsible for such losses is the Fonds de Garantie (“FdG”). The MIB denied liability, contending that the FdG would not be liable to Mrs Marshall because under the Loi Badinter Mr Pickard and RSA, as driver and insurer of the Ford Fiesta, and Generali, as insurers of the recovery truck, were liable. The second action was brought by Mr Pickard against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau relying on the 2003 Regulations. The MIB deny liability and contend that Generali, as insurers of the recovery truck, are liable to Mr Pickard.

The High Court was asked (1) what law applies per Article 4 Rome II, and (2) whether under the circumstances, Article 4(3) Rome II might have any relevance.

Save for Mrs Marshall’s claim for dependency which if English law applies is under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (“FAA 1976”), it is common ground that the direct damage occurred in France for all of the claims, including Mrs Marshall’s claim on behalf of Mr Marshall’s estate. In respect of the FAA 1976 claim, RSA (Mr Marshall’s insurers) submits that the direct damage occurred in the location where Mrs Marshall has suffered her loss of dependency, which is in England and Wales. Dingemans J resolves this issue of ricochet damage with reference to the AG’s Opinion in Lazar: the CJEU’s judgment in same was issued about a month after the High Court’s judgment in Marshall. The Advocate General, having regard to the relevant principles of consistency, foreseeability and certainty, in his opinion considered that “the damage occurs” for the purposes of a claim such as an FAA 1976 claim where the relevant death occurs. The AG noted that different EEA states took different approaches to the characterisation of a dependency claim. For example in both England and Italy it is considered that the damage for a loss of dependency occurs in the country where the dependant is situated, but that this is not a European wide approach. The opinion, Dingemans J notes, shows that the Advocate General was influenced by the need to avoid different Courts in different EEA states adopting different solutions to applicable law in fatal accident cases, which would lead to a diversity of approach in different jurisdictions.

The action between Mrs Marshall and Mr Pickard triggers Article 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation, identifying as applicable law the law of the country were both the ‘person’ claimed to be liable and the ‘person’ sustaining damage, are habitually resident at the time the damage occurs. Dingemans J rightly (at 17) dismisses the suggestion (made in scholarship) that the moment more than two ‘persons’ are involved, Article 4(2) becomes inoperable.

Turning then to Article 4(3), the escape clause of a ‘manifestly closer connection’. Dingemans J entertains the interesting proposition that Article 4(3) has to lead to a law different from the law which would be applicable per Article 4(1) or (2). This in particular would mean that once Article 4(2) is engaged, it cannot be undone by recourse to Article 4(3). Dingemans J insists that Article 4(3) must be employed generally, even if it leads to a resurrection of Article 4(1), and goes on to find French law to be applicable (at 19-20):

In my judgment this case provides an illustration of when French law is provided as the governing law under article 4(1), excluded (for part of the claims) under article 4(2), and then required again under article 4(3).

It is also common ground that article 4(3) imposes a “high hurdle” in the path of a party seeking to displace the law indicated by articles 4(1) or 4(2), and that it is necessary to show that the “centre of gravity” of the case is with the suggested applicable law. In this case there are a number of circumstances which, in my judgment, make it clear that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with France than England and Wales. These are: first that both Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard were hit by the French car driven by Ms Bivard, a national of France, on a French motorway. Any claims made by Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard against Ms Bivard, her insurers (or the FdG as she had no insurers) are governed by the laws of France; secondly the collision by Ms Bivard with Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard was, as a matter of fact and regardless of issues of fault or applicable law, the cause of the accident, the injuries suffered by Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard and the subsequent collisions; and thirdly any claims that Mr Marshall and Mr Pickard have against Generali, as insurers of the vehicle recovery truck, are also governed by the laws of France.

This judgment to my knowledge, with Winrow v Hemphill  is one of few discussing Article 4(3)’s escape clause in such detail. (The add-on being that in Marshall Article 4(3) was found as being able to override Article 4(2). A judgment which, like Winrow, does justice to both the exceptional nature of the provision, and the need to consider all relevant factors.

Geert.

Ps very soon the Supreme Court will hear further argument on the application of the Rome II Regulation in Moreno v MIB.

A report issued by the European Commission on 10 March 2016 analyses the functioning of the European Judicial Network in civil and commercial matters (COM(2016) 129 final).

The Network was set up by Council Decision No 2001/470/EC and operates in accordance with the latter Decision, as amended by Decision No 568/2009/EC (see here for the consolidated text of the Decision). It ensures direct contacts and case-handling between national Network contact points, facilitates cross-border access to justice through information given to practitioners and the general public and evaluates and shares experience on the operation of specific Union law instruments in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters.

The report identifies a number of issues on which action should be taken to improve the Network’s functioning.

These issues relate, inter alia, to the resources and support given to contact points at national level, the synergies of the Network with other European networks pursuing similar aims, the visibility of the Network, including in the national websites of the institutions to which Network members belong to, and the Network’s role “in the full ex post evaluation of existing instruments”, which should be “further developed through the identification and collection of key statistical data based on national data collection mechanisms”.

As already announced on this blog, a conference is scheduled to take place in Bonn on 6 and 7 April 2017, under the title Politics and Private International Law (?). The aim of the initiative is to improve the exchange between young scholars of private international law.

A call for papers has now been issued to select the speakers.

The call may be found here (in German) and here (in English).

The deadline for submissions is 30 June 2016.

It has already been reported on this blog that the Council of the European Union was expected to authorise Austria to sign and ratify, and Malta to accede to, the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, “in the interest of the Union”.

A decision to this effect has in fact been adopted on at the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 10 March 2016, accompanied by a statement of the German government.

In the statement, Germany expresses its doubts as to whether the decision in question “falls within the exclusive external competence of the European Union”.

It is not clear, the statement observes, “why the future application of the Hague Service Convention to Austria and Malta could affect common rules on judicial cooperation between Member States in civil matters or alter their scope (Article 3(2) TFEU)”, since the Hague Service Convention applies in relation to third countries, whereas between European Union Member States, Regulation No 1393/2007 “clearly takes precedence over that Convention”.

In the view of the German government, the decision “should therefore not be used as a model for and should be without prejudice to any other measures in which the exclusive external competence of the European Union may play a role which may be taken by the European Union to resolve other similar cases”.

I have earlier reported on the referral in Universal, Case C-12/15. Szpunar AG opined today, 11 March (the English text of the Opinion is not yet available at the time I write this post) and suggests (at 37) that the Court not apply its Erfolgort /Handlungsort distinction per Case 21/76  Bier /Minnes de Potasse. He reminds the Court of Bier’s rationale: a special link between the Erfolgort and the case at hand, so as to make that place, the locus damni, the place where the damage arises, well suited to address the substantive issues raised by the claim. (He also reminds the Court, at 30, that the language of what is now Article 7(2) only refers to the harmful event; not in the slightest to damage).

In cases where the only damage that arises is purely economic damage, the locus damni is a pure coincidence (in the case of a corporation suffering damage: the seat of that corporation), bearing no relation to the facts of the case at all (lest it be entirely coincidental). The Advocate General skilfully distinguishes all relevant CJEU precedent and in succinct yet complete style comes to his conclusion.

The Court itself embraces its Bier ruling more emphatically than its AGs do (see the similar experience of Cruz Villalon AG in Hejduk).  That Universal Music is quite clearly distinguishable from other cases may sway it to follow the AG in the case at issue. However its fondness of Bier (judgment in 1976; it had been a hot summer that year) may I fear lead it to stick to its fundamental twin track of Erfolg /Handlungsort no matter the circumstances of the case.

Geert.

By a ruling of 8 March 2016, the German Federal Supreme Court declared that claims brought by German holders of Greek bonds against Greece, for damages suffered as a result of the Greek debt restructuring, were barred on grounds of State immunity (a press release may be found here, pending the publication of the full text of the decision).

The following is an excerpt of the report posted by Peter Bert at Dispute Resolution in Germany.

The bonds that the claimants had acquired – in Germany and through German Banks – where governed by Greek law. They did not contain collective action clauses. This notwithstanding, the terms of the bonds were subsequently amended by a majority vote of the bondholders and these amendments were declared binding upon all bondholders by laws passed by the Greek parliament. The measures that were implemented contained both a 53.5% haircut and an extension of the duration of the bonds.

Today, the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the actions as inadmissible (unzulässig). The Hellenic Republic was protected by the principle of sovereign immunity against these lawsuits in Germany. The international public law concept of sovereign immunity is recognized in German law (Sec. 20 para. 2 Courts Constitution Act; Art. 25 Basic Law; GG)

Raising capital by issuing bonds, according to the court, is per se not itself an sovereign act (nicht-hoheitliches Handeln; acta iure gestionis). However, whether the Hellenic Republic was protected by sovereign immunity was not only determined by the legal nature of the relationship between the parties, but also by the nature of the acts of state which are in dispute between the parties.

Accordingly, in the case at hand, it is not the issuance of bonds or the contractual relationship between the bondholders and Greece which is relevant for decision on immunity, but the legal nature of the acts that Greece took in order to restructure its debt. In particular, the dispute between the parties centred on the validity of the Greek law 4050/2012 of February 23, 2012 and the decisions of the Greek Council of Ministers dated March 9, 2012. These were the legal acts that declared the majority vote of the bondholders binding on all bondholders, and they clearly were sovereign acts (acta iure imperii).

In the words of the court, the very idea behind the concept of sovereign immunity is to prevent one state from ruling on the legality of sovereign acts of another state (“Der Grundsatz der Staatenimmunität will gerade Entscheidungen eines Staates über die Rechtmäßigkeit der hier maßgeblichen hoheitlichen Maßnahmen eines anderen Staates verhindern.”). But this is exactly what the German courts would have to do, were they to decide these disputes on the merits.

Thanks to Peter Bert for giving permission for the reproduction of his post.

Our co-editor Tanja Domej from University of Zurich has authored a monograph entitled “Internationale Zwangsvollstreckung und Haftungsverwirklichung am Beispiel der Forderungspfändung” (International Execution and the Implementation of Liability). The volume has been published by Mohr Siebeck. It is written in German.

The official abstract reads as follows:

Tanja Domej retraces the debates over the relevancy and meaning of the principle of territoriality for the cross-border attachment of debts from a comparative perspective. On the basis of an interest analysis, she presents perspectives for an appropriate approach to dealing with issues of cross-border attachment of incorporeal assets.

More information is available on the publisher’s website.