Flux européens

This post can be classified under ‘better late than never’. Thank you Irina Timp for flagging in December, Inversiones v Cancun at the Dutch Hoge Raad. The case concerned alleged dilution of one company’s (Inversiones) shareholding in another as a result of increased emission of shares orchestrated by another shareholder (Cancun). Note that exclusive jurisdiction under Article 24(2), justifiably, was not suggested.

The Hoge Raad focused on the discussion concerning (now) Article 8(3)’s provision for counterclaims: courts even if not the court of domicile of the defendant have jurisdiction ‘on a counter-claim arising from the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based, in the court in which the original claim is pending;’ C-185/15 Kostanjevec is the main reference. Of particular note was the language issue: the Dutch version of the text employs ‘rechtsfeit’: suggestion a narrower interpretation than the English version (‘facts’) just quoted. The Hoge Raad justifiably followed the linguistic implications of the majority of language versions (e.g “facts”, “Sachverhalt”. “fait”) and held in favour of jurisdiction on the basis of a counterclaim.

The result of that finding is that it did not further entertain the consequences of Universal Music on the location of the locus damni for diluted shareholdings: what other factors are needed to have the shareholder’s corporate domicile qualify for same?

Geert.

R O
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La notification, par le Royaume-Uni, de son intention de se retirer de l’UE n’a pas pour conséquence que l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen émis par cet État membre doive être refusée ou différée

González Castro
SOPO
Les travailleuses enceintes, accouchées ou allaitantes qui effectuent un travail posté se déroulant partiellement en horaire nocturne doivent être considérées comme exerçant un travail de nuit et bénéficient de la protection spécifique contre les risques que ce travail est susceptible de présenter

Commission / France et IFP Énergies nouvelles
Aide d'État
La Cour juge que le Tribunal de l’UE doit réexaminer si la Commission était fondée à qualifier d’aide d’État la garantie implicite illimitée accordée par l’État français à l’Institut français du pétrole

It is with great pleasure that I spread the word, at the request of my esteemed colleague prof em Herman Cousy, on the Grand Prix Jean Bastin – to the tune of €20,000.00 and therefore a rather prestigious prize indeed. Do visit the website for particulars: ‘thesis’ need not be, I understand, a PhD, although these I suspect will be the most obvious entries. Good luck.

Geert.

 

9th Grand Prix Jean Bastin 2019

The Fonds Scientifique Jean Bastin, a Belgian international non-profit association, will grant the Prize for an amount of 20.000 euros to the author of the best thesis published after 1 January 2016 or to be published, on one of the following matters:

The indebtedness and solvency of the States
The State in arbitration: international commercial arbitration and investment arbitration. Issue with the enforcement of arbitral awards against a State. Scope and limit of immunity from enforcement. Remedies. The issue of enforcement and post-arbitration mediation on the quantum of the conviction.
The State-debtor: issue of vulture funds, protective legislations. Debt market. Forum shopping. Enforcement of foreign arbitral decisions or awards.
The State in bankruptcy: problem of the public debt – IMF surveillance.
Granted for the first time in 1992, this Prize is one of the most prestigious in the legal and economical domain.
The thesis must be introduced, in conformity with the procedure set under the rules, by 30 November 2018 at the latest.
The Jury presided by Minister of State Mark Eyskens, is composed as follows :
Professor Kris Bernauw, university of Gent Professor emeritus Jean-Louis Duplat, university of Namur Professor emeritus Herman Cousy, university of Leuven Professor Frédéric Georges, university of Liège

For more details regarding the subjects and the participation rules: http://www.fsjb.be or contact info@fsjb.be.

 

****

 

 

9de Grote Prijs Jean Bastin 2019

Het Fonds Scientifique Jean Bastin, een internationale vereniging zonder winstoogmerk naar Belgisch recht, zal de Prijs toekennen van een bedrag van 20.000 euro
aan de auteur van het beste werk, uitgegeven na 1 januari 2016 of nog uit te geven, dat één van de volgende thema’s behandelt : De schulden en de solvabiliteit van Staten
– De Staat in arbitrage: internationale handels- en investeringsarbitrage. Problematiek van de tenuitvoerlegging van veroordelingen ten laste van een Staat. Reikwijdte en beperking van de uitvoeringsimmuniteit. Remedies. Het vraagstuk over de tenuitvoerlegging en de post-arbitrale bemiddeling over het kwantum van de veroordeling.
– De Staat-schuldenaar: de problematiek van aasgierfondsen, beschermende wetgeving. Schuldenmarkt. Forum shopping. Uitvoering van buitenlandse arbitrale beslissingen of vonnissen.
– De failliete Staat: problematiek van de overheidsschulden. Plaatsing onder het toeizcht van het IMF.

Deze Prijs, voor het eerst uitgereikt in 1992, is één van de meest prestigieuze prijzen in het juridische en economische domein.
De werken moeten worden ingediend tegen uiterlijk 30 november 2018, in overeenstemming met de procedure vastgesteld in het reglement.
De heer Minister van Staat Mark Eyskens is voorzitter van de Jury, die als volgt is samengesteld :
Professor Kris Bernauw, universiteit Gent Professor emeritus Jean-Louis Duplat, universiteit Namen Professor emeritus Herman Cousy, universiteit Leuven Professor Frédéric Georges, universiteit Luik

Voor meer details over de thema’s of het reglement van de prijs: http://www.fsjb.be of contacteer info@fsjb.be

 

***

 

9ième Grand Prix Jean Bastin 2019

Le Fonds Scientifique Jean Bastin, association internationale sans but lucratif de droit belge, accordera le Prix d’un montant de 20.000 euros
à l’auteur du meilleur ouvrage, paru après le 1ier janvier 2016 ou à paraître, traitant de l’un des sujets suivants :

L’endettement et la solvabilité des États
L’Etat en arbitrage : arbitrage commercial international et arbitrage d’investissement. Problématique de l’exécution des condamnations à charge d’un Etat. Portée et limite de l’immunité d’exécution. Remèdes. La question de l’exécution et la médiation post-arbitrale sur le quantum de la condamnation.
L’Etat-débiteur : problématique des fonds vautours, des législations protectrices. Marché de la dette. Forum shopping. Exécution des décisions ou sentences arbitrales étrangères.
L’Etat en faillite : problématique de la dette publique. Mise des Etats sous tutelle de la FMI.

Attribué pour la première fois en 1992, ce Prix est l’un des plus prestigieux dans les domaines juridique et économique.
Les ouvrages devront être introduits selon la procédure fixée au règlement, pour le 30 novembre 2018 au plus tard.
Le Jury est placé sous la présidence de Monsieur le Ministre d’Etat Mark Eyskens et composé comme suit :

Professeur Kris Bernauw, université de Gand Professeur émérite Jean-Louis Duplat, université de Namur Professeur émérite Herman Cousy, université de Louvain Professeur Frédéric Georges, université de Liège

Pour plus de détails par rapport au règlement : http://www.fsjb.be ou contacter info@fsjb.be

I reviewed Advocate-General Bobek’s Opinion in C-304/17 Löber v Barclays here. The following issues in particular were of note (I simply list them here; see the post for full detail): First, the AG’s view, coinciding with mine, that the CJEU’s finding in CDC that locus damni for a pure economic loss, in the case of a corporation, is the place of its registered office, is at odds with precedent (he made the same remark in flyLAL). Next, on locus delicti commissi, the AG suggests that despite Article 7(2)’s instruction, a single ldc within the Member State in the case at hand cannot be determined. Further, for locus damni, I disagree for reasons explained in the post with the AG’s  suggestions.

The Court held on Wednesday. At 26 it immediately cuts short any expectation of clarification on locus delicti commissi: ‘In the present case, the case in the main proceedings concerns the identification of the place where the damage occurred.’

The referring court’s questions were much wider, asking for clarification on ‘jurisdiction’ full stop. Yet the Court must have derived from the file that only locus damni was in dispute. A missed opportunity for as I noted, Bobek AG’s views on that locus delicti commissi are not obvious.

On locus damni then, I may be missing a trick here but the Court simply does not answer the referring court’s question. As the AG notes, Ms Löber in order to acquire the certificates, transferred the corresponding amounts from her current (personal) bank account located in Vienna, to two securities ‘clearing’ accounts in Graz and Salzburg. Payment was then made from those securities accounts for the certificates at issue. The Court refers to Kolassa and to Universal Music, to reiterate that the simple presence of a bank account does not suffice to establish jurisdiction: other factors are required, such as here, at 33,

‘besides the fact that Ms Löber, in connection with that transaction, had dealings only with Austrian banks, it is furthermore apparent from the order for reference that she acquired the certificates on the Austrian secondary market, that the information supplied to her concerning those certificates is that in the prospectus which relates to them as notified to the Österreichische Kontrollbank (Austrian supervisory bank) and that, on the basis of that information, she signed in Austria the contract obliging her to make the investment, which has resulted in a definitive reduction in her assets.’

The Court concludes that ‘taken as a whole, the specific circumstances of the present case contribute to attributing jurisdiction to the Austrian courts.’

That however was not seriously in doubt: the more specific question is which one: Vienna? (which had rejected jurisdiction) Graz and /or Salzburg? Article 7(2) requires identification of a specific court (which the AG had identified in his opinion: I may not follow his argumentation, but it did lead to a specific court): not merely a Member State, and the Oberster Gerichtsthof had specifically enquired about the need for centralisation of the claim in one place.

All in all a disappointing judgment which will not halt further questions on jurisdiction for prospectus liability.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.7

 

Ahmed
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Une personne ne peut pas être exclue du bénéfice de la protection subsidiaire si elle est considérée avoir « commis un crime grave » sur la seule base de la peine encourue selon le droit de l’État membre concerné

NK Rosneft e.a. / Conseil
Relations extérieures
Le Tribunal de l’UE confirme les mesures restrictives adoptées par le Conseil à l’encontre de plusieurs banques et entreprises pétrolières et gazières russes dans le cadre de la crise de l’Ukraine

Wind Tre
Liberté d'établissement
La mise sur le marché de cartes SIM contenant des services payants préinstallés et préalablement activés constitue une pratique commerciale agressive déloyale lorsque les consommateurs n’en sont pas informés préalablement

UBS Europe e.a.
MARI
Les autorités nationales de surveillance financière peuvent devoir donner accès à des informations relevant du secret professionnel pour garantir les droits de la défense ou bien aux fins de leur utilisation dans le cadre d’une procédure civile ou commerciale

I shall be posting perhaps tomorrow on yesterday’s CJEU judgment in Löber v Barclays (prospectus liability – see my review of Bobek AG’s Opinion here), but as a warming-up for comparative purposes, a note on [2018] SGHC 123 IM Skaugen v MAN. I have not been able to locate copy of the judgment (I am hoping one of my Singaporean followers might be able to send me one) so I am relying entirely on the excellent post by Adeline Chong – indeed in general I am happy largely to refer to Adeline’s post, she has complete analysis.

The case concerns fraudulent misrepresentation of the fuel consumption of an engine model sold and installed into ships owned by claimants (Volkswagen echo alert). Defendants are German and Norwegian incorporated companies: leave to serve out of jurisdiction needs to be granted. Interesting comparative issues are in particular jurisdiction when only indirect damage (specifically: increased fuel consumption and servicing costs with downstream owners who had purchased the ships from the first owners) occurs there; and the relevance of European lis alibi pendens rules for forum non conveniens purposes.

On the former, Singaporean CPR rules would seem to be prima facie clearer on damage not having to be direct for it to establish jurisdiction; a noted difference with EU law and one which also exercised the UK Supreme Court in Brownlie. Note the consideration of locus delicti and the use of lex fori for same (a good example in my view of the kind of difficulties that will arise if when the Hague Judgments project bears fruit).

On forum non conveniens, Spiliada was the main reference. Of interest here is firstly the consideration of transfer to the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC); and the case-specific consideration of availability of forum: the Norwegian courts had been seized but not the German ones; Germany had been identified by the Singaporean High Court as locus delict: not Norway; yet under the Lugano Convention lis alibi pendens rule, the German courts are now no longer available.

Geert.

 

Harms
Transport
En cas d’annulation d’un vol, la compagnie aérienne doit aussi rembourser les commissions perçues par les intermédiaires lors de l’achat de billets, pour autant qu’elle en a eu connaissance

Access to information ironically is subject to a myriad of rules and regulations at the EU level: some of a general nature (particularly: Regulation 1049/2001), some lex specialis (such as Directive 2003/35 and Regulation 1367/2006), but with a complex relationship between lex generalis and lex specialis. Add to the mix in the environmental field, public international law in the form of the Aarhus Convention and, well, what you get is an awful lot of regulatory intransparency. Leonie and I have made an attempt succinctly to summarise same in Chapter 5 of our Handbook on EU environmental law.

In C‑57/16 P Client Earth v EC, the CJEU’s Grand Chamber set aside a General Court judgment which had earlier sided largely with the EC viz two requests of information: the first of those requests sought access to the impact assessment report drawn up by the Commission on the implementation of the ‘access to justice’ pillar of the Aarhus Convention, while the second sought access to the impact assessment carried out by the Commission on the revision of the EU legal framework on environmental inspections and surveillance at national and EU level. Both were refused on the ground for exception provided in Regulation 1049/2001, that ‘access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.’

The Grand Chamber essentially held that access should be granted: core of its reasoning is at para 92: ‘Although the submission of a legislative proposal by the Commission is, at the impact assessment stage, uncertain, the disclosure of those documents is likely to increase the transparency and openness of the legislative process as a whole, in particular the preparatory steps of that process, and, thus, to enhance the democratic nature of the European Union by enabling its citizens to scrutinise that information and to attempt to influence that process. As is asserted, in essence, by Client Earth, such a disclosure, at a time when the Commission’s decision-making process is still ongoing, enables citizens to understand the options envisaged and the choices made by that institution and, thus, to be aware of the considerations underlying the legislative action of the European Union. In addition, that disclosure puts those citizens in a position effectively to make their views known regarding those choices before those choices have been definitively adopted, so far as both the Commission’s decision to submit a legislative proposal and the content of that proposal, on which the legislative action of the European Union depends, are concerned.‘

Essentially: a true transparent policy process requires citisens to be able to impact the flow of the water before it disappears under the bridge.

EC Institutions continue to fight rearguard actions against transparency, which subsequently have to be addressed by the likes of Client Earth. The CJEU could not be clearer in highlighting the patch access to EU policy should continue to follow.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Environmental Law, first ed.2017, Chapter 5. (With Leonie Reins).

Advocate-General Bot opined on 6 September in C-386/17 Liberato. (Not as yet available in English). The case is slightly complicated by the application of not just former Regulation 44/2001 (Brussels I) but indeed a jurisdictional rule in it (5(2)) on maintenance obligations, which even in Brussels I had been scrapped following the introduction of the Brussels IIa Regulation.

The Opinion is perhaps slightly more lengthy than warranted. Given both the Brussels I and now the Brussels I Recast specific provisions on refusal of recognition and enforcement, it is no surprise that the AG should advise that a wong application by a court of a Member State (here: Romania) of the lis alibi pendens rules, does not justify refusal of recognition by other courts in the EU: the lis alibi pendens rules do not feature in the very limited list of possible reasons for refusal (which at the jurisdictional level lists only the protected categories, and the exclusive jurisdictional rules of Article 24), and it was already clear that misapplication of jurisdictional rules do not qualify for the ordre public exception.

It would not hurt having the CJEU confirm same.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.16.1.3, 2.2.16.1.4.

 

 

I have reported earlier on Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc & Alexander Vik [2017] EWHC 459 and Dennis v TAG Group [2017] EWHC 919 (Ch).

The Court of Appeal has now confirmed in [2018] EWCA Civ 2011 Vik v Deutsche Bank that permission for service out of jurisdiction is not required for committal proceedings since the (now) Article 24(5) rule applies regardless of domicile of the parties. See my posting on Dar Al Arkan and the one on Dennis .

Gross LJ in Section IV, which in subsidiary fashion discusses the Brussels issue, confirms applicability to non-EU domicileds however without referring to recital 14, which confirms verbatim that indeed non-EU domicile of the defendants is not relevant for the application of Article 24.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.8.

IR
SOPO
Le licenciement d’un médecin-chef catholique par un hôpital catholique en raison de son remariage après un divorce peut constituer une discrimination interdite fondée sur la religion

In this post I, unusually, offer questions rather than tentative answers. I hope you’ll enjoy the pondering and of course I have ideas of my own on all of these issues. Thank you Michiel Poesen for alerting me to Carles Puigdemont et al’s case in the Belgian civil courts.

The case is not about trying to employ the Belgian courts to have a Spanish Supreme Court judge removed from the case. (Contrary to what De Standaard report in their title – in an otherwise informative piece). Pablo Llarena had commented on the case (specifically: rejecting an argument raised by the defence) at an academic  conference. Rather, as I understand the case (public detail is scant), applicants suggest the alleged violation of impartiality infringes their right to such impartiality which in Belgium at least, is a civil right, constitutionally guaranteed.

The case therefore is one in tort. The exact request to the court is as yet unknown: provisional measures? damages? One assumes the very finding by a Belgian court of a finding of partiality and hence infringement of fundamental rights, will be employed in any future trials in Spain.

So far a little context. Here are the questions:

• What kind of law is engaged here?: is this private international law? Is it public international law? (see prof Hess’ contribution to the Recueil, on the private /public divide).
• Are the proceedings ‘international’ enough to trigger the application of private international law; are they simply ‘Spanish’ and what impact does that have on the jurisdiction  of the Belgian courts;
• Are such proceedings ‘civil and commercial’ within the meaning of the Brussels regime; specifically, what is the impact of a Supreme Court judge spending much of their time engaging in what has to be considered a ‘public’ function, now speaking at an academic conference. (Think Kuhn, Fahnenbrock etc.).
• If the Brussels I regime is triggered, what type of provisional measures is possible?
• If the Brussels I regime is triggered, how does Article 7(2) apply; where is the locus delicti commissi and where the locus damni; how does e-Date apply if at all;
• Along similar lines: how does applicable law apply given that defamation is exempt from Rome II; (see Belgium’s regime in Articles 99-100 WIPR in particular); and
• What is the impact, if any, of chances of enforcement of the judgment in Spain.

These are the issues I suspect will be of some relevance in the conflicts field. Happy pondering.

Geert.

 

Many of you will have already seen (e.g. via Giesela Ruehl) the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH)’s refusal to recognise and enforce a Polish judgment under the Brussels I Regulation (application was made of Brussels I but the Recast on this issue has not materially changed). The BGH argued that enforcement would violate German public policy, notable freedom of speech and freedom of the press as embodied in the German Constitution.

Giesala has the necessary background. Crux of the refusal seemed to be that the Court found that to require ZDF to publish by way of a correction /clarification (a mechanism present in all Western European media laws), a text drafted by someone else as its own opinion would violate ZDF’s fundamental rights.

Refusal of course is rare and in this case, too, one can have misgivings about its application. The case however cannot be decoupled from the extremely strong sentiment for freedom of speech under German law, for obvious reasons, and the recent controversy surrounding the Polish law banning the use of the phrase ‘Polish concentration camps’.

I am very pleased to have been given approval by professor Burkhard Hess to publish the succinct comment on the case which he had sent me when the judgment was issued. I have included it below.

Geert.

European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, 2.2.16.1.1, 2.2.16.1.4

 

The German Federal Civil Court rejects the recognition of a Polish judgment in a defamation case under the Brussels I Regulation for violation of public policy

 

Burkhard Hess, Max Planck Institute Luxembourg

 

In 2013, the German broadcasting company ZDF (a public body) broadcast a film about Konzentrationcamps. In the film, it was (incorrectly) stated that Auschwitz and Majdanek were “Polish extermination camps”. Further to the protests made by the Polish embassy in Berlin, ZDF introduced the necessary changes in the film and issued an official apology. However, a former inmate of the KZ, brought a civil lawsuit in Poland claiming violation of his personality rights. With his claim he sought remedy in the form of the broadcasting company (ZDF) publishing on its Internet home page both a declaration that the history of the Polish people had been falsified in the film and a statement of apology. Ultimately, the Cracow Court of Appeal ordered the publication of the declaration on the company’s home page. While ZDF published the text on its website visibly for one month, it did not post it on its home page.

Consequently, the plaintiff sought the recognition of the Polish judgment in Germany under the Brussels I Regulation. However, the German Federal Court denied the request for recognition on the grounds that it would infringe on German public policy (article 34 No 1 Regulation (EU) 44/2001). In its ruling, the Court referred to the freedom of the press and of speech (article 5 of the Constitution) and to the case-law of the Constitutional Court. The Court stated that the facts had been incorrectly represented in the film. However, it held that, under German law, ordering a declaration of apology qualifies as ordering a declaration of opinion (Meinungsäusserung) and that, according to the fundamental freedom of free speech, nobody can be obliged to make a declaration which does not correspond to his or her own opinion (the right to reply is different as it clearly states that the reply is made by the person entitled to the reply). As a result, the Polish judgment was not recognized.

BGH, 19 July 2018, IX ZB 10/18, The judgment can be downloaded here.

To my knowledge, this is one of the very rare cases where a foreign judgment was refused recognition in Germany under article 34 no 1 of the Brussels I Regulation (now article 45 (1) (a) Brussels Ibis Regulation) because substantive public policy was infringed.

Speaking frankly, I’m not convinced by the decision. Of course, the text  which the ZDF, according to the Cracow court, had to make as its own statement represented a so-called expression of opinion. Its imposition is not permissible under German constitutional law: requiring the ZDF-television to making this expression its own would have amounted to an infringement of the freedom of speech as guaranteed by article 5 of the Constitution.

However, it corresponds to well settled principles of the recognition of judgments to substitute the operative part of the foreign judgment by a formula which comes close to it. This (positive) option is totally missing in the formalistic judgment of the Federal Civil Court. In this respect I’m wondering why the BGH did not simply order that the operative part of the Polish judgment as such was declared enforceable. My proposed wording of a declaration of enforceability would be drafted as follows: “According to the judgment of the Appellate Court of Krakow the ZDF is required to publish the following decision:…”

This solution would have solved the problem: No constitutional conflict would have arisen and the political issues would have mitigated. Seen from that perspective, the judgment appears as a missed opportunity.

Alpenrind e.a.
Libre circulation des personnes
Un travailleur détaché relève du régime de la sécurité sociale du lieu de travail lorsqu’il remplace un autre travailleur détaché, même si ces travailleurs n’ont pas été détachés par le même employeur

Juliana
SERV
Un véhicule qui n’est pas retiré officiellement de la circulation et qui est apte à circuler doit être couvert par une assurance responsabilité civile automobile même si son propriétaire, qui n’a plus l’intention de le conduire, a choisi de le stationner sur un terrain privé