Flux européens

Intervyuirasht organ na DAB pri MS (Femmes victimes de violences domestiques)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Crime d’honneur, mariage forcé et violence domestique : l’avocat général Richard de la Tour précise les conditions dans lesquelles une ressortissante de pays tiers peut bénéficier de la protection internationale

Blue Air Aviation
Liberté d'établissement
La diffusion d’une œuvre musicale à des fins de musique d’ambiance dans un moyen de transport de passagers constitue une communication au public au sens du droit de l’Union

Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Commune de Ginosa)
Liberté d'établissement
Les concessions autorisant l’exploitation des plages italiennes ne peuvent pas être renouvelées automatiquement mais doivent faire l’objet d’une procédure de sélection impartiale et transparente

Afrin
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Regroupement familial : le droit de l’Union s’oppose à une réglementation nationale qui requiert sans exception que l’introduction d’une demande de regroupement familial se fasse en personne auprès d’un poste diplomatique compétent

E. D. L. (Motif de refus fondé sur la maladie)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Mandat d’arrêt européen : un risque de mise en danger manifeste de la santé de la personne recherchée justifie la suspension temporaire de sa remise et oblige l’autorité d’exécution à demander à l’autorité d’émission des informations relatives aux conditions dans lesquelles il est envisagé de poursuivre ou de détenir cette personne

I am on a break with the family until after Easter, hence only slowly treating myself to writing up blog posts. There are one or two in the queue, and I hope to be clearing them before long. ]

In C‑832/21 Beverage City & Lifestyle GmbH v Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. Richard de la Tour AG Opined a few weeks back. The claim is for trademark infringement between a US domiciled holder of an EU Trademark, and its EU suppliers in Poland and Germany. The AG suggest Article 8(1)’s joinder mechanism may apply in the case, provided the claimant in limine litis (at the start of proceedings) prove the anchor defendant’s role in the chain of infringements.

Background is the Union Trademark Regulation 2017/1001, which has separate rules on jurisdiction discussed in ia AMS Neve, however it leaves A8(1) Brussels Ia’s anchor defendant mechanism untouched.

(34) ff the AG uses the opportunity to clarify CJEU Nintendo,  with respect to Article 8)1)’s condition of ‘same situation in law’: the AG suggests the Court clarify that the application of different national laws as a result of intellectual property rights’ territorial scope, does not stand in the way of the situation being the same in law in the case of a Union trademark.

Next the AG discusses the issues also of relevance in ia CJEU C‑145/10 Painer, namely the question of sameness in fact, and argues for a flexible interpretation despite the defendants at issue not being contractually linked. He suggests inter alia that it would run against the intention of the Regulation to force the claimant into proving the anchor defendant be the main instigator of the infringement. Along similar lines, that the anchor defendant is not a corporation itself but rather one of its directors, with domicile in a different Member State, does not in the view of the AG prevent him being used as anchor defendant, provided (77) claimant prove at the start of proceedings that the director actively engaged in the infringement or should have known about it but did not stop it.

One can see merit in the AG’s approach in that it, as he also suggests, addresses the issue of abuse of the anchor defendant mechanism. On the other hand, this engagement with some of the merits of the case always raises the issue of how intensive that can /ought to be at the jurisdictional stage without leading to a ‘mini’ trial’. It may be preferable simply to hold that as a director of a corporation, one should not be surprised to be used as jurisdictional anchor for that corporation’s infringements, in one’s place of domicile.

Geert.

EU Private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.482 ff.

Opinion Richard de la Tour this AM re anchor defendants, Article 8(1) Brussel Ia, infringement of Community Trademark

C‑832/21 Beverage City & Lifestyle GmbH v Advance Magazine Publishers Inc.https://t.co/yjOXA6OrbR

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 23, 2023

Des modifications importantes des règles de procédure du Tribunal de l’Union européenne entreront en vigueur le 1er avril

Xella Magyarország
Libre circulation des capitaux
Avocate générale Ćapeta : le droit de l’Union ne s’oppose en principe pas à une législation nationale qui permet le filtrage des investissements directs étrangers en provenance de pays tiers, même si ces investissements sont réalisés par une société établie dans l’Union

Volkswagen Group Italia et Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Selon l’avocat général Campos Sánchez-Bordona, Volkswagen ne peut pas être sanctionnée en Italie en raison du « Dieselgate », après l’avoir été en Allemagne, si la coordination entre les procédures de sanction des deux États a été insuffisante

Green Network (Injonction de remboursement de frais)
Liberté d'établissement
Les autorités de régulation nationales de l’énergie peuvent avoir le pouvoir d’imposer aux entreprises d’électricité la restitution des sommes perçues en violation des exigences relatives à la protection des consommateurs

Hauptpersonalrat der Lehrerinnen und Lehrer
Principes du droit communautaire
La diffusion en direct par vidéoconférence des cours d’enseignement scolaire public tombe sous le coup du RGPD

UBS’ bailout of Credit Suisse, arguably strong-armed by the Swiss State, will have had countless lawyers phoning investors, and countless investors lawyering up. I am no expert in banking and finance law, I am of course like everyone else aware that the anger is most visible in so-called AT1 bondholders. This blog is interested in the dispute resolution fall-out likely to rain down on various dispute resolution avenues for some time to come.

A quick flag that those considering litigation, will have a range of issues to ponder. Who to sue, for starters. The Swiss authorities might be a target, leading of course to considerations of immunity and, give the close involvement of the Swiss authorities in the rescue, of the qualification of the claims as ‘civil and commercial’ (echoes here of CJEU Kuhn etc, now under the Lugano Convention).

What litigation avenue to pursue, next: the bond holders will be subject to dispute resolution clauses, one imagines either with choice of court for Switzerland or providing for commercial arbitration. Depending on time and avenue of acquisition of the bonds, the holders may well argue they are not bound by such clauses, Further, a potential to use the route typically favoured by Swiss-headquartered multinationals, against other States: ISDS. Investor-State Dispute Settlement (with their ‘fork in the road’ provisions).

(Digital) Rolodexes the world over will be spinning by now. As and when this leads to litigation as suggested above, the blog will be reporting.

Geert.

 

 

On 21 April, Louvain-La-Neuve will be hosting a conference in honour of prof emeritus Marc Fallon. The general concept of the conference is included below (summary provided by prof Stéphanie Francq, one of the main organisers of the event). More info with full program and link for registration is here. This will be a thoughtFest for all interested in EU private international law and with working languages both English and French, it speaks to a broad audience.

Get thee to Louvain. Geert.

 

Why and for what purpose should European private international law be codified? This twofold question will be at the heart of the discussions on April 21, 2023, during a colloquium paying tribute to the remarkable work of Professor Marc Fallon in the fields of private international law and European law, and in particular to his involvement in the Belgian and European codification of private international law. How did we come to envisage a European codification of private international law? What do we expect from it? Does an EU codification have the same ambitions as national codifications? Do these ambitions not vary according to the place, the time and the context of international constraints imposed on the legislator? Does a codification at the European level, and at the present time, imply specific needs, challenges and consequences, even dangers, for both the national and the European legal orders? And above all, does it offer new prospects or hopes for the European project and for the discipline of private international law?

Wizz Air Hungary / Commission (Blue Air; Covid-19 et aide au sauvetage)
Aide d'État
Le recours contre la décision de la Commission approuvant l’aide de la Roumanie à la compagnie aérienne Blue Air dans le contexte de la pandémie de Covid-19 est rejeté dans son intégralité

Syndicat Uniclima
Environnement et consommateurs
Sécurité contre les risques d’incendie dans les établissements recevant du public : les États membres ne peuvent imposer des exigences supplémentaires pour des équipements sous pression disposant du marquage CE, aux fins de leur mise à disposition sur le marché national

Jalla & Anor v Shell International Trading and Shipping Company Ltd & Anor [2023] EWHC 424 (TCC) is a follow-up of earlier, procedural (including jurisdictional) issues which I discuss here.

[1]-[2] The 2011 Bonga Spill emanated from an offshore floating production, storage and off-loading facility (“the Bonga FPSO”), located approximately 120 kilometres off the Nigerian coastline of Bayelsa State and Delta State within the Nigerian Exclusive Economic Zone. The Spill was caused by a rupture of one of the pipelines connecting the Bonga FPSO to a single point mooring system (“SPM”), both of which were operated and controlled by one of the defendants, Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Ltd (“SNEPCo”), a Nigerian company regulated by the Nigerian governmental authorities. The technical manager of the vessel, the MV Northia, that was loading from the Bonga FPSO at the time of the spill was another defendant, Shell International Trading and Shipping Company Ltd, (“STASCO”), a company domiciled and registered in the UK.

Anchor defendant is STASCO. SNEPCo is co-defendant.

The High Court had determined that the claims for damage caused by the Spill  could not constitute a continuing nuisance until any pollution was remedied, so as to extend the limitation period and defeat the defendants’ limitation defence; it held claimants each had a single claim in nuisance in respect of any damage caused by the Bonga Spill, such cause of action accruing when their land and/or water supplies were first impacted by the oil. Claimants’ appeal against that part of the judgment as I reported earlier was dismissed by the Court of Appeal [2021] EWCA Civ 63  and this “Continuing Nuisance Appeal” is now being appealed to the Supreme Court.

[4] Current case is to determine the date on which actionable damage, if any, was suffered by the claimants as a result of the Bonga Spill, for the purpose of deciding whether any of the claims against the anchor defendant, STASCO, are statute-barred for limitation and, therefore, whether E&W courts have jurisdiction to determine the substantive claims. 

[39] Stuart-Smith J (as the then was), alongside the jurisdictional challenges, had further held that the High Court had no discretion to allow, or would refuse, amendment of the claim form to join STASCO and the amendment to add allegations against STASCO, if and to the extent that the applications were made after the expiry of the relevant limitation period. The allegations against STASCO in respect of its responsibility for the  were deemed by the court not to have been made until 2 March 2020.

[40] ff

The issue of jurisdiction as against SNEPCo, a Nigerian corporation, is dependent on there being a valid claim against STASCO, a UK corporation. The court rejected other jurisdictional challenges made by the defendants but was unable to finally dispose of the challenge to jurisdiction because it was subject to the outstanding issue as to whether the claims against STASCO were statute-barred. If the claims against STASCO, the anchor defendant, were statute-barred, there would be no basis on which service out of the jurisdiction against SNEPCo could be permitted and the court would have no jurisdiction to determine any of the claims.

Given the significance of the limitation issue, the court ordered that there should be a trial of preliminary issues to determine in respect of all claimants the date on which they suffered damage, the appropriate limitation period and limitation as a defence to the claims.

Parties agree that Nigerian Law applies to the claims relating to the spill, including the limitation period applicable to the claims (the case therefore does not engage with the outstanding issue of the treatment of limitation under Rome II, discussed most recently in Bravo v Amerisur Resources (Putumayo Group Litigation). The issue between the parties is whether the applicable limitation period is six years, as submitted by the claimants, or five years, as submitted by the defendants.

O’Farrell J holds that given the date of damage, none of the claims in these proceedings was made against STASCO within any applicable limitation period. Obiter, she holds on the limitation issue anyway.

The relevant law that applies in Nigeria is the (English) Limitation of Actions Act 1623 which provides for a limitation period of six years for claims that would amount to tortious claims. The National Assembly for the Nigerian Federation has not enacted any general limitation statute and no such provision is made in the Constitution. The State legislature for Delta State however has enacted a general limitation statute. Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Delta State 2006 (“the Delta State Limitation Law”) provides for a limitation period of five years for claims in tort. 

[306] Claimants’ position is that the limitation period applicable to their claims is the six-year period provided for by the 1623 Act. In the absence of specific federal legislation on this issue, they argue this residual provision is the limitation law generally applicable in Nigeria, including at a federal level, by virtue of section 32(1) of the Interpretation Act 1964; further, that the Delta State Limitation Law is inapplicable in the Federal High Court; only federal legislation can apply, irrespective of where the Federal High Court sits.

Further, [307], claimants argue they are entitled by Article 7 Rome II  to choose the law applicable in the Nigerian Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”) as the lex causae governing their claims for environmental damage, as the country where the event giving rise to the damage occurred, the locus delicti commissi, Handlungsort. The EEZ falls within the control of the Federal Government of Nigeria; as such, it would be subject to the Nigerian Federal law of torts and the residual 1623 Act limitation period.

[308] Defendants’ position is that the limitation period applicable to the claims is the five-year period provided for by the Delta State Limitation Law. The relevant Federal High Court for the claims would be the Federal High Court in Delta State, as the place where the alleged damage occurred. They suggest Nigerian authorities on limitation confirm that if a local limitation law exists in the relevant state, that law applies to the claim; and the limitation statute of each state is territorial in scope. On that basis, the Delta State Limitation Law applies to any action brought in the territorial area of Delta State, including the Federal High Court in Delta State.

[309] viz A7 Rome II they argue the Nigerian EEZ is not a “country” for the purpose of Article 25(1) Rome II [‘“Where a State comprises several territorial units, each of which has its own rules of law in respect of non-contractual obligations, each territorial unit shall be considered as a country for the purposes of identifying the law applicable under this Regulation”], that it has no applicable limitation law and that it would not override the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to determine the claims in these proceedings.

The judge [336] ff holds the country in which the alleged damage occurred is Delta State, making the law of Delta State the default choice of law under Article 4(1) Rome II; that although the claims are for environmental damage, and the event giving rise to the alleged damage occurred at the FPSO within the Nigerian EEZ, the EEZ is not a country within the meaning or A25(1): Nigeria is a Federation with 36 states plus the FCT of Abuja. The EEZ is not a territorial unit and does not comprise one of those states; and the EEZ does not have its own rules of law in respect of non-contractual obligations.

The remainder of the judgment deals with issues of proof of foreign customary law.

Interesting!

Geert.

 

Follow-up to https://t.co/XHZRWI7jOt
Considers limitation periods in Rome II (and impact on E&W jurisdiction), choice of lex causae in A7 Rome II (environmental damage), Nigerian regions as 'countries' under A25 Rome II

Jalla v Shell [2023] EWHC 424 (TCC)https://t.co/T8z2ERNUjd

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 7, 2023

Daimler (Responsabilité des constructeurs de véhicules munis de dispositifs d’invalidation)
Environnement et consommateurs
L’acheteur d’un véhicule à moteur équipé d’un dispositif d’invalidation illicite bénéficie d’un droit à réparation de la part du constructeur automobile lorsque ledit dispositif a causé un dommage à cet acheteur

Saatgut-Treuhandverwaltung (KWS Meridian)
Agriculture
Protection des obtentions végétales : pas de fixation d’une indemnisation forfaitaire minimale

SCHUFA Holding e.a. (Scoring)
Principes du droit communautaire
Avocat général Pikamäe : l’établissement automatisé d’une probabilité sur la capacité d‘une personne à honorer un prêt constitue un profilage selon le RGPD

Colt Technology Services e.a.
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