Flux européens

NADA e.a.
Principes du droit communautaire PDON
Lutte contre le dopage et protection des données : l’avocate générale Ćapeta considère qu’une autorité nationale de lutte contre le dopage qui publie sur Internet des données à caractère personnel d’un sportif professionnel dopé ne viole pas le RGPD 

TGSS (Refus du complément de maternité)
Discrimination fondée sur le sexe en Espagne : les pères de deux enfants ou plus contraints d’aller en justice pour bénéficier d’un complément à leur pension d’invalidité ont droit à une indemnisation supplémentaire

Tuk Tuk Travel
Rapprochement des législations PROT
Résiliation de voyages à forfait en cas de circonstances exceptionnelles : une juridiction nationale peut, sous certaines conditions, informer d’office le voyageur de son droit de résiliation sans frais

Volkswagen Group Italia et Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Le principe ne bis in idem s’applique aux sanctions infligées en matière de pratiques commerciales déloyales qualifiées de sanctions administratives de nature pénale

Venezuela / Conseil
Relations extérieures
Le Tribunal rejette le recours du Venezuela contre les mesures restrictives de l’Union

I discussed Richard de La Tour AG’s Opinion in C-590/21 Charles Taylor Adjusting Limited v Starlight Shipping Company and Overseas Marine Enterprises Inc here.

The CJEU held last week, [27] qualifying as the AG did, the English orders as a quasi anti-suit injunction in the circumstances of the order (leaving some room for distinguishing).

Rather more so (and correctly so) than its AG, it [35] points to the nature of ordre public as expressed in (now) A45 BIa as being a concept of the national legal order of the Member States, even if [36] the origin of that rule may lie in EU law (such as here the rule [37] that “every court seised itself determines, under the applicable rules, whether it has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute before it”).

The CJEU’s reference to Meroni and its stating that a Member State “cannot, without undermining the aim of [Brussels Ia], refuse recognition of a judgment emanating from another Member State solely on the ground that it considers that national or EU law was misapplied in that judgment” [29], with reference ia to Liberato), imho mean that it does not push the principle of ‘non-review’ quite so emphatically as the AG did, however one cannot see in what circumstances an order such as this would survive (now) Article 45.

Finally, the CJEU does not discuss the AG’s ‘ ‘unless it gives effect to a decision which would have been prohibited in direct proceedings’, which I flagged in my earlier post.

The judgment is consistent with the (much contested) Turner and West Tankers approach, and it leaves some open questions on the qualification of orders as ‘quasi anti-suit’,  and the individual circumstances in which they might not clash with ordre public.

Geert.

(EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, ia 2.95 ff.

#CJEU European court confirms 'quasi anti-suit injunctions' (here ia related to cost order) may fall foul of BIa's recognition rules: MSs may use ordre public to refuse to enforce

C‑590/21 Charles Taylor Adjusting v Starlight Shipping re: The Alexandros Thttps://t.co/u5vT91nLjN

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) September 7, 2023

The Court of Justice delivered today (7 September 2023) its decision in case C‑832/21 (Beverage City & Lifestyle GmbH, MJ, Beverage City Polska Sp. z o.o., FE v Advance Magazine Publishers Inc.), which is about the conditions of application of Article 8 Brussels I bis:

“Article 8(1) of [Brussels I bis] must be interpreted as meaning that a number of defendants, domiciled in different Member States, may be sued in the courts for the place where one of them is domiciled before which, in the context of an infringement action, claims have been brought against all of those defendants by the proprietor of an EU trade mark where they are each accused of having committed a materially identical infringement of that trade mark and they are connected by an exclusive distribution agreement”.

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&docid=277065&part=1&doclang=EN&text=&dir=&occ=first&cid=478516

The Court of Justice delivered today (7 September 2023) its decision in case C‑590/21 (Charles Taylor Adjusting Ltd, FD v Starlight Shipping Co., Overseas Marine Enterprises Inc.), which is about a “quasi anti-suit injunction” and recognition and enforcement of judgments from other Member States:

“Article 34(1) of [Brussels I] read in conjunction with Article 45(1) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that a court or tribunal of a Member State may refuse to recognise and enforce a judgment of a court or tribunal of another Member State on the ground that it is contrary to public policy, where that judgment impedes the continuation of proceedings pending before another court or tribunal of the former Member State, in that it grants one of the parties provisional damages in respect of the costs borne by that party on account of its bringing those proceedings on the grounds that, first, the subject matter of those proceedings is covered by a settlement agreement, lawfully concluded and ratified by the court or tribunal of the Member State which gave that judgment and, second, the court of the former Member State, before which the proceedings at issue were brought, does not have jurisdiction on account of a clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction”.

One of the key points: “the judgment and orders of the High Court [of England and Wales] could be classified as ‘“quasi” anti-suit injunctions’. While the purpose of that judgment and those orders is not to prohibit a party from bringing or continuing legal action before a foreign court, they may be regarded as having, at the very least, the effect of deterring Starlight and OME, together with their representatives, from bringing proceedings before the Greek courts or continuing before those courts an action the purpose of which is the same as those actions brought before the courts of the United Kingdom, which matter is, in any event, for the referring court to determine” (paragraph 27). The Court adds, at paragraph 28, that “An injunction having such effects would not […] be compatible with Regulation No 44/2001”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=277063&mode=req&pageIndex=3&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=434606

Asociaţia "Forumul Judecătorilor din România"
Principes du droit communautaire
État de droit en Roumanie : la promotion de juges vers une juridiction supérieure, fondée sur une évaluation de leur travail et de leur conduite par des membres de cette juridiction, est compatible avec le droit de l’Union

Nexive Commerce e.a.
Liberté d'établissement
Coûts de fonctionnement de l’autorité réglementaire du secteur postal : une obligation de contribution peut être imposée aux acteurs du marché, en excluant tout financement par l’État

Lietuvos Respublikos generalinė prokuratūra
Rapprochement des législations
La directive « vie privée et communications électroniques » s’oppose à ce que des données recueillies pour lutter contre la criminalité grave soient utilisées dans le cadre d'enquêtes administratives relatives à la corruption dans le secteur public

The Court of Justice delivered on 13 July 2023 its judgement in case C‑87/22 (TT v AK), which is about the interpretation of Article 15 Brussels II bis:

“1. Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 […] must be interpreted as meaning that the court of a Member State, which has jurisdiction to rule on the substance of a case on the matter of parental responsibility under Article 10 of that regulation, may exceptionally request the transfer of that case, provided for by Article 15(1)(b) of the regulation, to a court of the Member State to which the child has been wrongfully removed by one of his or her parents.

2. Article 15(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that the only conditions to which the possibility for the court of a Member State with jurisdiction as to the substance of a case in matters of parental responsibility to request that that case be transferred to a court of another Member State is subject are those expressly set out in that provision. When examining those conditions in respect of, first, the existence in the latter Member State of a court better placed to hear the case and, second, the best interests of the child, the court of the first Member State must take into consideration the existence of proceedings for the return of that child which have been instituted pursuant to the first paragraph and point (f) of the third paragraph of Article 8 of the [1980 Hague] Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction […] and in which a final decision has not yet been delivered in the Member State to which that child was wrongfully removed by one of his or her parents”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=275389&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4466841

CEPD / Parlement et Conseil
Droit institutionnel
Le recours du Contrôleur européen de la protection des données (CEPD) contre le règlement Europol modifié est irrecevable

WS e.a. / Frontex
Droit institutionnel
Operations de retour : le recours en indemnité de plusieurs réfugiés syriens contre Frontex après leur refoulement de la Grèce vers la Turquie est rejeté

Pumpyanskiy / Conseil
Relations extérieures
Guerre en Ukraine : le Tribunal rejette les recours de M. Dmitry Alexandrovich Pumpyanskiy et de Mme Galina Evgenyevna Pumpyanskaya contre les mesures restrictives adoptées par le Conseil

Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet (Perte de la nationalité danoise)
Citoyenneté européenne
Le Danemark peut faire dépendre le maintien de la nationalité danoise de l’existence d’un lien de rattachement effectif avec ce pays

Parlement / Commission (Exemption de visa pour les ressortissants des États-Unis)
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
La Commission n’était pas tenue de suspendre l’exemption de l’obligation de visa pour les ressortissants des États-Unis en raison d’un manque de réciprocité en la matière

In Crane Bank Ltd & Ors v DFCU Bank Ltd & Ors [2023] EWCA Civ 886 core issue is the scope and application of the foreign act of state rule and of the limitations and exceptions to which it is subject. The foreign act of state rule in its narrow sense essentially holds that courts should not question the validity of acts taken by a foreign government within that government’s territory – see Reliance. [2] the facts:

The first appellant, Crane Bank Limited (“CBL”), was formerly a major commercial bank in Uganda. The second to seventh appellants are shareholders in CBL. In these proceedings the appellants assert that from about Spring 2016 senior Ugandan government officials and officials of the Bank of Uganda (“the BoU”) engaged in a corrupt scheme to take control of CBL, making improper use of statutory and regulatory powers to do so, and then to sell its assets for the benefit of the parties to the scheme. The appellants allege that the first respondent (“DFCU Bank”), another Ugandan commercial bank, joined the corrupt scheme as purchaser of CBL’s assets from the BoU (acting as receiver of CBL), that purchase being at a gross undervalue. DFCU Bank’s holding company (the second respondent) and certain current and former executives and directors of DFCU Bank (the third to fifth respondents) are also alleged to have joined the scheme

[5] appellants contend that the first instance Judge should have found that there was at least a serious issue to be tried (for the purpose of founding jurisdiction) that:

i) the sale by the BoU (as receiver) to DFCU Bank was commercial rather than sovereign in character, therefore falling outside the foreign act of state rule (“the Commercial Activity Exception”); and/or

ii) all of the executive acts in question engaged the English public policy of combatting and not giving legal protection to bribery and corruption, therefore falling outside the foreign act of state rule (“the Public Policy Exception”); and/or

iii) investigating the acts of bribery and corruption alleged against DFCU Bank in paragraph 69(m) of the Amended Particulars of Claim (“the APoC”) did not require the Court to inquire into or adjudicate on the legality of executive acts of the Ugandan state, and so would not infringe the foreign act of state rule (“the Kirkpatrick Exception”); and/or

iv) the application of the foreign act of state rule in this case would be incompatible with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and therefore contrary to s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the Article 6 issue”).

The Foreign Act of State rule is expressed [13] as that courts “will not adjudicate or sit in judgment on the lawfulness or validity under its own law of an executive act of a foreign state, performed within the territory of that state”. It is different from foreign sovereign immunity:“Whereas immunity bars an otherwise good legal claim against a specific person, the foreign act of state rule provides that a claim which falls within it is not a good claim at all as a matter of English law, no matter the identity of the defendant” ([69]).

For his definition, Lord Justice Philipps refers to the Supreme Court in “Maduro Board” of the Central Bank of Venezuela v “Guaidó Board” of the Central Bank of Venezuela [2023] AC 156. Futher reference is made [14] to Yukos Capital for the exceptions:

Yukos Capital (No. 2) [2014] QB 458 at [68]-[115]. For the purposes of the appeal, the following are relevant:

(i) the Public Policy Exception:

“”[T]he doctrine will not apply to foreign acts of state which are in breach of clearly established rules of international law, or are contrary to English principles of public policy, as well as where there is a grave infringement of human rights”. (Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249, 277–278, per Lord Cross; Kuwait Airways Corpn v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] 2 AC 883; Yukos Capital (No 2), paras 69-72.)”

(ii) the Commercial Activity Exception:

“The doctrine does not apply where the conduct of the foreign state is of a commercial as opposed to a sovereign character. (Empresa Exportadora de Azucar v Industria Azucarera Nacional SA (The Playa Larga) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 171; Korea National Insurance Corpn v Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty AG [2008] EWCA Civ 1355; [2008] 2 CLC 837; Yukos Capital (No 2), paras 92-94.)”

(iii) the Kirkpatrick Exception:

“The doctrine does not apply where the only issue is whether certain acts have occurred, as opposed to where the court is asked to inquire into them for the purpose of adjudicating on their legal effectiveness. (Kirkpatrick (1990) 493 US 400; Yukos Capital (No 2), paras 95-104.)”

The appeal was not allowed on the latter exception but it was on the other two, with Phillips LJ giving complete yet concise analysis of such good quality that there is little point in trying to summarise it here: please refer to the judgment.

I will say a little more about the A6 ECHR argument. The discussion here echoes the discussion in SKAT on Dicey Rule 3 and substantive v jurisdictional rules, and Belhaj v Straw [2017] UKSC 3: where Phillips LJ refers to distinction between domestic laws which excluded liability (which do not engage Article 6) and procedural bars (which do). [71] it is held that the result of foreign act of State is that  domestic law provides a complete defence to what would otherwise be an actionable (therefore A6 ECHR kosher) claim and [72] that, if a proportionality test were to be introduced in foreign act of State (so as to meet alleged A6 ECHR standards), “it would have a major impact on the rule and its applications”. That latter statement I would suggest does not cut much ice in light of a potential ECHR incompatibility.

There is undoubtedly more to be said however seeing as the appeal was largely successful, no more is to be expected from appellants at least on these issues.

Geert.

! scope & application of foreign act of state rule and of the limitations and exceptions to which it is subject.
Ia whether there is impact from A6 ECHR rights

Crane Bank Ltd & Ors v DFCU Bank Ltd & Ors [2023] EWCA Civ 886https://t.co/26BU9W9fOs

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) July 27, 2023

As Peter Bert reports here, the German Federal Supreme Court or Bundesgerichtshof has held in Case v-ZR-112.22 X v Trustees of Max Stern estate, a case related to ‘Lost art’, that Article 26 Brussels Ia applies to claims against a non-EU domiciled defendant. The trustees had  objected to jurisdiction in first instance but had not formally repeated that upon appeal.

[9] the court finds support first of all in CJEU C-412/98 Group Josi Reinsurance in particular para [44] of that judgment: “Admittedly, under Article 18 of the Convention [=A26 BIa, GAVC], the voluntary appearance of the defendant establishes the jurisdiction of a court of a Contracting State before which the plaintiff has brought proceedings, without the place of the defendant’s domicile being relevant.”

Group Josi however concerned the position of the claimant: [33]: ‘whether the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Convention apply where the defendant has its domicile or seat in a Contracting State, even if the plaintiff is domiciled in a non-member country.” In the discussion that followed, the CJEU emphasised the general absence in the Convention of attention being paid to the claimant’s domicile (let alone nationality), pointing out that instead the Convention focuses on the defendant’s domicile in a Convention State, with then [44] the concession that (now) Article 26 exceptionally does not pay any attention to the defendant’s domicile. That does not imply however that the CJEU dropped any condition for Convention-States domicile in Article 26. The Bundesgerichthof’s “Der Gerichtshof der Europäi-schen Union hat deshalb – wenngleich nicht tragend – schon in Bezug auf Art. 18 Satz 1 EuGVÜ angenommen, dass es auf den Wohnsitz des Beklagten nicht ankomme” lifts para 44 of Group Josi out off its context.

[10] the Bundesgerichtshof acknowledges that A6(1) BIa refers to A25 but not to A26: “1.   If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall, subject to Article 18(1), Article 21(2) and Articles 24 and 25, be determined by the law of that Member State.” It suggests however a close relationship between A25 and A26, referring to CJEU Taser to emphasise A26’s character as impromptu choice of court, and focuses on the party autonomy element of both A25 and 26.

[11] BIa’s DNA of predictability is said to support a wide catchment area for A26, and [12] all of this is said to be acte claire hence not requiring CJEU referral.

Given the clear language of A6(1), I am not convinced.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.211. Fourth ed. forthcoming 2024.

Nb judgment is here https://t.co/6bg2FHOHaV pic.twitter.com/0dXjQdrSnL

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) August 4, 2023

Lin
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Lutte contre la fraude aux intérêts financiers de l’Union européenne : les règles nationales de prescription pénale doivent permettre une prévention et une répression effectives