Flux européens

Commissioner of the Garda Síochána e.a
Rapprochement des législations
La Cour confirme que le droit de l’Union s’oppose à une conservation généralisée et indifférenciée des données relatives au trafic et à la localisation afférentes aux communications électroniques aux fins de la lutte contre les infractions graves

The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered this week (29 March) its judgment in case C-132/20 (BN and alii), which is about the Rule of Law and Fair Trail requirements for Courts composed for part of judges originally appointed under totalitarian (Communists) regimes or by a body created on the ground of legislation later declared unconstitutional. The judgment is currently available in selected EU official languages only (and therefore not in English). Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

“1) L’article 19, paragraphe 1, second alinéa, TUE, l’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne ainsi que l’article 7, paragraphes 1 et 2, de la directive 93/13/CEE du Conseil, du 5 avril 1993, concernant les clauses abusives dans les contrats conclus avec les consommateurs, doivent être interprétés en ce sens que la circonstance que la première nomination d’un juge dans un État membre à un tel poste ou sa nomination ultérieure dans une juridiction supérieure résulte d’une décision adoptée par un organe d’un régime non démocratique qu’a connu cet État membre avant son adhésion à l’Union européenne, y compris lorsque les nominations de ce juge dans des juridictions après que ce régime a pris fin étaient fondées notamment sur l’ancienneté acquise par ledit juge au cours de la période durant laquelle ledit régime était en place ou lorsqu’il a prêté le serment judiciaire uniquement lors de sa première nomination en tant que juge par un organe de ce même régime, n’est pas en soi de nature à susciter des doutes légitimes et sérieux, dans l’esprit des justiciables, quant à l’indépendance et à l’impartialité de ce même juge, ni, partant, à remettre en cause la qualité de tribunal indépendant et impartial, établi préalablement par la loi, d’une formation de jugement dans laquelle il siège.

2) L’article 19, paragraphe 1, second alinéa, TUE, l’article 47 de la charte des droits fondamentaux ainsi que l’article 7, paragraphes 1 et 2, de la directive 93/13 doivent être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils ne s’opposent pas à ce que soit qualifiée de tribunal indépendant et impartial, établi préalablement par la loi, une formation de jugement relevant d’une juridiction d’un État membre dans laquelle siège un juge dont la première nomination à un poste de juge ou sa nomination ultérieure dans une juridiction supérieure est intervenue soit à la suite de sa sélection comme candidat au poste de juge par un organe composé sur le fondement de dispositions législatives ultérieurement déclarées inconstitutionnelles par la juridiction constitutionnelle de cet État membre, soit à la suite de sa sélection comme candidat au poste de juge par un organe régulièrement composé mais au terme d’une procédure qui n’était ni transparente, ni publique, ni susceptible de faire l’objet d’un recours juridictionnel, dès lors que de telles irrégularités ne sont pas d’une nature et d’une gravité telles qu’elles créent un risque réel que d’autres branches du pouvoir, en particulier l’exécutif, puissent exercer un pouvoir discrétionnaire indu mettant en péril l’intégrité du résultat auquel conduit le processus de nomination et semant ainsi, dans l’esprit des justiciables, des doutes sérieux et légitimes quant à l’indépendance et à l’impartialité du juge concerné ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=768367F474045381829A4693E86C265D?text=&docid=256761&pageIndex=0&doclang=fr&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6822307

The Court of Justice delivered last week (24 March 2022) its judgment in case C‑723/20 (Galapagos BidCo. Sàrl), which is about the Insolvency bis Regulation:

“Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings must be interpreted as meaning that the court of a Member State with which a request to open main insolvency proceedings has been lodged retains exclusive jurisdiction to open such proceedings where the centre of the debtor’s main interests is moved to another Member State after that request has been lodged, but before that court has delivered a decision on it. Consequently, in so far as that regulation is still applicable to that request, the court of another Member State with which another request is lodged subsequently for the same purpose cannot, in principle, declare that it has jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings until the first court has delivered its decision and declined jurisdiction”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=256469&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6830618

I have just blogged on the Leuven public law blog, on the independent expert penal’s Ecocide proposal, here. I am reposting here for completeness’ purposes.

Geert.

Procureur général près la cour d'appel d'Angers
DFON
Selon l’avocat général Rantos, l’autorité judiciaire d’exécution ne peut refuser d’exécuter un mandat d’arrêt européen au motif que certains des différents faits réprimés en tant qu’infraction unique dans l’État membre d’émission ne sont pas passibles d’une sanction pénale dans l’État membre d’exécution

Lombard Lízing
Rapprochement des législations
Prêts libellés en devise étrangère : l’avis non contraignant d’une juridiction suprême, indiquant aux juridictions inférieures l’approche à suivre pour déclarer un contrat de consommation comme étant valide lorsque ce contrat ne peut subsister en raison du caractère abusif d’une clause se rapportant à son objet principal, ne suffit pas à garantir aux personnes lésées par cette clause d’être pleinement protégées

CTS Eventim
Environnement et consommateurs RAPL
Achat en ligne de billets pour des événements culturels ou sportifs : la Cour de justice précise les cas dans lesquels il n’existe pas de droit de rétractation

RT France / Conseil
Opération militaire en Ukraine : le président du Tribunal rejette la demande de RT France visant à suspendre les sanctions adoptées par le Conseil

T-324/17 SAS Cargo Group e.a./Commission, T-325/17 Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij/Commission, T-326/17 Air Canada/Commission,
Concurrence
Entente sur le marché du fret aérien : le Tribunal se prononce sur les recours introduits par plusieurs compagnies aériennes

In Farrar & Anor v Miller [2022] EWCA Civ 295, the issue is whether a firm of solicitors which has been acting for a claimant in litigation pursuant to a damages-based agreement can validly take an assignment of their client’s cause of action.

It is the common law of champerty which militates against law firms acting ostentatiously as a party with a purely commercial interest in the litigation and it is their role as officers of the court which is cited as being core of the hesitation (see inter alia the EP study on third party litigation funding here). In England and Wales it was the rules against maintenance and champerty that, prior to 1990, led to solicitors ia not being able to conduct litigation pursuant to conditional fee agreements -CFAs.

Statute then intervened to change this in narrowly defined circumstances  (CFAs and damages-based agreements only) however that did not lift the common law’s general opposition to same and it is this opposition which both the first instance judge and the Court of Appeal refer to to reject the possibility of assignment: [52]

the Assignment is neither a conditional fee agreement nor a damages-based agreement: what section 58(1) and section 58AA(2) show is that Parliament, being well aware of the common law rules, decided to go so far towards relaxing them as sections 58 and 58AA provide and no further.

Permission to appeal with the Supreme Court is being sought.

Geert.

Litigation funding. common law principles of assignment, including champerty
Whether solicitors acting pursuant to damages-based agreement can validly take assignment of client's cause of action

Farrar & Anor v Miller [2022] EWCA Civ 295https://t.co/On1VyazyO8 pic.twitter.com/hvG1kU07bO

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 12, 2022

Getin Noble Bank
Rapprochement des législations
Le simple fait qu’un juge a été nommé à une époque où l’État membre dont il relève ne constituait pas encore un régime démocratique ne remet pas en cause l’indépendance ni l’impartialité de ce juge

I have reported on conflict of laws (jurisdictional and applicable law) angles to the EP’s draft proposals on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence before. As I discuss in those posts (more analysis is on NOVA’s site here), many of the suggested routes created more difficulties than they solved. In the eventual February proposal (with 71 recitals: that is poor legislative drafting), the conflict of laws ambitions are much reduced. Leigh Day have a good summary of the issues here. Thank you Jorian Hamster for poking me to put my thoughts to paper.

The jurisdictional ambition is now merely expressed in terms of regulatory scope. On p.15 under the proportionality assessment, the proposal justifies its public international scope using the effects doctrine:

The EU turnover criterion for third-country companies creates a link to the EU. Including only turnover generated in the Union is justified since such a threshold, appropriately calibrated, creates a territorial connection between the third-country companies and the Union by the effects that the activities of these companies may have on the EU internal market, which is sufficient for the Union law to apply to third-country companies.

Proposed A2(1) focuses on ‘EU corporations’ (“companies which are formed in accordance with the legislation of a Member State) and proposed A2(2) looks at non-EU corporations (“companies which are formed in accordance with the legislation of a third country”), each with relevant thresholds distinguishing between quantitative (turnover) and qualitative (risk sectors: textiles, agriculture, extractive industries) criteria.

I am not sure why the lex incorporationis is preferred as the trigger criterion. Domicile as defined in Brussels Ia‘s Article 63 could be more attractive, seeing as it captures corporations with statutory seat outside of the EU but with their central administration or principal place of business here.

‘Turnover generated in the EU’ is bound to provoke some discussions however experience from in particular competition law should be able to help here.

The most obvious anchor point for applicable law is proposed A22. This sets out the requirement for Member States to define rules governing the civil
liability of the company for damages arising due to its failure to comply with the due diligence requirements, and then suggests in (5)

Member States shall ensure that the liability provided for in provisions of national law transposing this Article is of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the law of a Member State.

The intention of this Article is to make the national civil liability rules which Member States are due to ensure in follow-up of the future Directive, so-called ‘overriding mandatory law’ aka ‘lois de police’ aka ‘lois d’application immédiate’ under A16 Rome II. The challenge for the EU to harmonise private law, such as civil liability rules, shows in this formulation. The EC makes recourse to a Directive, not a Regulation, since (p.17)

The proposed instrument is a Directive, since Article 50 TFEU is the legal basis for company law legislation regarding the protection of the interests of companies’ members and others with a view to making such protection equivalent throughout the Union. Article 50 TFEU requires the European Parliament and the Council to act by means of directives.

Hence rather than formulating the future Directive’s liability provisions itself as of overriding EU law nature (a possibility expressly foreseen in Rome I’s rules on applicable law for contracts, but not impossible I believe within Rome II), the Directive will oblige Member States to ensure the lois de police character of their future rules implementing the Directive. I understand the difficulty yet I think the proposal could shortcut the discussion (and avoid difficulties in case a Member State fails to declare the lois de police nature) by declaring ‘Member States’ provisions of national liability law transposing this Article are of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the law of a Member State.’

(the latter part I believe is simply redundant).

In claims based on tortious liability, the Directive is most likely to be used to help establish fault (by action or omission). The remainder of the action (solidarity between various tortfeasors, damage calculation etc) will remain subject to the lex causae otherwise applicable. In claims based on unjust enrichment (a business and human rights route much worth exploring for supply chain cases) the Directive will most likely remain of smaller use seeing as these claims do not aim to establish liability, however the  paper trail which the Directive will ensure, may be of documentary use here, too.

Geert.

At first sight few conflict of laws anchors in EU's proposed due diligence law
EU turnover as threshold is reminiscent of EU competition law
Registered office as compliance anchor
A22 qualifies the Dir as lois de police viz Rome I, II
71 recitals – yukhttps://t.co/JV1dip9gfW pic.twitter.com/Obhkn3qXR8

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 23, 2022

Austro-Mechana
Liberté d'établissement
L’exception dite de « copie privée » au titre de la directive sur le droit d’auteur s’applique au stockage sur le nuage (cloud) d’une copie à des fins privées d’une œuvre protégée

Upfield Hungary
Agriculture
La liste des ingrédients d’une denrée alimentaire contenant une vitamine ne doit pas obligatoirement mentionner la formule vitaminique spécifiquement utilisée

Al Assam & Ors v Tsouvelekakis [2022] EWHC 451 (Ch) shows the way many claims involving EU Member States facts or defendants are likely to go, until the novelty of newly found forum non freedom wears off perhaps: with intensive forum non conveniens-based jurisdictional challenges.

The defendant is domiciled in England and Wales. The claimants are the settlors of 2 Cypriot trusts who claim for the losses suffered in connection with the trusts’ investments. The trusts were both established under the International Trusts Law of the Republic of Cyprus.

As in Klifa v Slater, the forum non test, following Spiliada and VTB v Nutritek, [12] involves two limbs: Under limb 1 of the test, the Defendant must establish that the courts of Cyprus are both (i) “available” and (ii) are clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English courts as a forum for determining the dispute. If the Defendant can establish that limb 1 of Spiliada is satisfied, it becomes necessary to consider limb 2. Limb 2 requires a consideration of whether, even if the courts of Cyprus are an available forum that is clearly or distinctly more appropriate for the trial of the action than the courts of England, justice nevertheless requires that a stay of the English proceedings should not be granted.

On availability, there is a bit of to and fro and each other’s Cypriot law legal experts, particularly on the territorial jurisdiction under residual Cypriot rules. However the conclusion [26] is that the Cypriot courts are ‘available’.

Obiter, Richards DJ discusses whether if there is no availability under Cypriot law, there might be availability if there is a submission to jurisdiction and/or an agreement /choice of court.

Discussion here was first whether A26 Brussels Ia could remedy the lack of territorial jurisdiction under Cypriot law. Unlike A25 choice of court, A26 does not include language making the defendant’s domicile in the EU a precondition for its application. At [32] the conclusion for the purpose of these proceedings is that there is a real risk that the Cypriot courts will not have jurisdiction on the basis of A26.

The discussion then [33ff] turns to the Cypriot courts being the clearly or distinctly a more appropriate forum with the conclusion being in the negative.

Helpfully, and suggested by counsel, the judge puts the following structure to the analysis:

a) personal connections ([39]: defendant’s residence in England remains a relevant factor pointing towards the English courts being the appropriate forum);

b) factual connections (held: correspondence between the parties will be of more relevance than the physical location of parties in Cyprus);

c) evidence/convenience/expense (conflicting factors here but none leading overwhelmingly to Cyprus);

d) applicable law (most likely Cypriot law for many of the claims however ia given the similarity with English law, this is not an overwhelmingly relevant issue [56] and some Swiss law will have to be applied anyways); and

e) the “overall shape of the litigation”, held [59] not to be Cypriot.

Limb 2, the requirements of justice, is considered obiter under two angles [61]: delays and the possibility of statutes of limitation kicking in. On the delays, [67] comity and caution to express chauvinistic views upon a friendly jurisdiction argue against a finding of unavailability of justice on this ground, particularly as the experts’ views on this were inconclusive; the possibility of statute of limitation is held [68] largely to be of the claimants’ own making (ia because they had started but discontinued proceedings in Cyprus. Limb 2 therefore, had it mattered, would not have been satisfied and had limb 1 been met, a stay of the proceedings in England would have been ordered.

Geert.

Defendant domiciled in E&W. Claimants (settlors of 2 Cypriot trusts sue for losses suffered in connection with Trusts' investments. Forum non argument dismissed. Another lengthy discussion following Brexit

Al Assam ea v Tsouvelekakis [2022] EWHC 451 (Ch) https://t.co/Sd7TJSkG3k

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 8, 2022

Many thanks indeed Hélène Péroz for flagging Sherpa & Les Amis de la terre France v Perenco ECLI:FR:CCASS:2022:C100199. The issue concerns what law applies to the issue of standing of NGOs in making recourse to France’s action for preserving evidence, in this case evidence relating to a future claim that France’s Perenco is liable for environmental damage in Congo.

The Court of Appeal had held that the issue of standing is subject to lex causae, which under the Rome II Regulation it had identified as the laws of Congo (whether this judgment included discussion of Article 7 Rome II on environmental damage, I do not know) and had declared the claim inadmissible.

The SC correctly in my mind holds that the issue of standing falls under the evidence and procedure carve-out of Rome II and is subject to lex fori, French law. However seeing as that law in the case of public interest litigation such as here requires the claimant to have included the broad purpose of the sector at issue within its scope of activities under its by-laws, the SC also holds that whether a particular claim is within the NGO’s scope, needs to be determined in accordance with its lex societatis.  This leads to the interesting conclusion (of little relevance in casu) that a foreign NGO’s action remit will have to be determined by foreign lex societatis, and that those foreign laws which have a less broad view of corporate scope, may put a spanner in the works of cross-border business and human rights litigation. (Quite easily circumvented one assumes by involving NGOs of an ‘attractive’ jurisdiction).

The SC nota bene does not specify whether its views on corporate (here: NGO) action radius are a result of the corporate carve-out in Rome II.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 4.79 ff.

 

Must read this properly tomorrow for currently on cooking duty. (All under control. Nothing burning).
Potentially quite exciting. French SC on the applicable law for capacity to represent a (Congolese) NGO re a #bizhumanrights environmental claim. https://t.co/ZP4IxXAzWi

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 9, 2022

In Klifa v Slater & Anor [2022] EWHC 427 (QB), concerning a ski accident in Courchevel, France, the Claim Form was issued on 14 January 2021, just within the three year limitation period of England and Wales but just after the Brexit “Exit Day” also know as IP day (Brexit implementation day) (of 31 December 2020). Defendants take advantage of that to argue a forum non conveniens defence (which readers will know would have been impossible under Brussels Ia). France is suggested to be the ‘most appropriate forum’.

The skiing accident took place on 27 January 2018 and when (and as still is the case) the Claimant was domiciled and resident and habitually resident in France, the First Defendant was domiciled and resident (they being on holiday) in England & Wales, and the Second Defendant (the insurance company) was domiciled in England & Wales. Under Rome II, French law is the applicable law, other than for procedural law, including as to recovery of legal and other costs of the litigation, which is subject to English law, lex fori.

That latter element returns (with reference to ia Wall v Mutuelle de Poitiers) [25] as part of the forum non conveniens assessment, seeing as (Dagnall M) ‘in consequence of the difference in their methods of adducing expert evidence, the English & Welsh jurisdiction procedural approach is likely to be considerably more expensive than that in France, and which is reflected in the costs rules and approach of each country.’

At [40] Master Dagnall sums up the many issues leading to the case being very ‘French’ in nature, deciding on balance however [42] that the defendants have not met the (high hurdle) of proving that France is “distinctly” or “clearly” the more appropriate forum.

At [44] ff he holds obiter that even if they had met that test, a stay in favour of proceedings in France would not assist with “achieving the ends of justice”L the second part of the forum non test. At [48] two factors are singled out: enforcement will have to take place in England; and a lot of work prior to the claim form being issued was carried out prior to IP day, when forum non was not an issue. Recovering those costs would be impossible in France.

The point has been made ad nauseam by many and this case is a good illustration: post Brexit, forum non is back with a vengeance and it is a time-consuming and costly business.

Geert.

Evidence & procedure, quantification of damages under French law, impact on forum non conveniens (denied on the facts) in case of tort which occurred whilst Brussels Ia applied but with claim brought after Brexit
Klifa v Slater & Anor [2022] EWHC 427 (QB) https://t.co/xCfJYJws2f

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 8, 2022

bpost, Nordzucker e.a
DFON
Cumul de poursuites et de sanctions de nature pénale en droit de la concurrence : la Cour précise la protection qu’offre le droit de l’Union contre la double incrimination

Prokurator Generalny (Chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême - Nomination)
Principes du droit communautaire
La Cour déclare irrecevable la demande de décision préjudicielle d’une juridiction polonaise, visant à savoir si le droit de l’Union lui confère le pouvoir, qu’elle ne détient pas en vertu du droit polonais, de constater que la relation de travail d’un juge est inexistante en raison de vices entachant l’acte de nomination de celui-ci

It is interesting to imagine the legal position in Lambert v Motor Insurers’ Bureau (Rev1) [2022] EWHC 583 (QB) in a scenario of retained EU law post Brexit, rather than firmly within the scope of the Brussels Ia Regulation and applicable law under Rome II. By the mechanisms of EU consumer law and EU insurance law, mixed with the finest legal machinery in the area of subrogation, a UK resident party injured in a motor accident (here: at a private racing circuit in Spain) abroad is entitled to claim compensation from the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (‘MIB’) in certain circumstances, clarified by the UKSC in Moreno v MIB [2016] UKSC 52. Crowther DJ summarises these circumstances as [6]

broadly speaking, that the guarantee fund of the member State in which the accident occurred would be liable to compensate the injured person on the facts of the individual case, when applying the rules of the local law which govern such actions by injured persons against the local guarantee fund. In other words, if Mr Lambert can show that the Spanish guarantee fund would have been liable to him in respect of the accident, he can claim such compensation from the MIB as would have been payable by the local guarantee fund. It is common ground in this case that the scope of the insurance obligation for use of motor vehicles under Spanish law extended to cover participation in the track event, notwithstanding the fact that it was not on a road or other public place.

The latter element is unlike the UK where seemingly third party motor insurance for motor sport is not commercially available.

The law applicable to the claim is agreed to be English law. While not specified in the judgment, this is presumably because of Article 4(2) Rome II (where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply): both Mr Lambert, claimant, and Mr Prentice, said to be responsible for the accident, were participants in a track event, organised by a UK based track day operating outfit called Track Sense; both travelled to Spain from the UK.

Spanish law however determines the preliminary issue as highlighted by the Supreme Court, Spanish law being the law which would have been applicable to any hypothetical claim which Mr Lambert might have brought against the Spanish guarantee fund. This is where things get interesting. The Motor Insurance Directives support a direct claim against one’s national MIB, subject to the law of the MS where the accident happened, sustaining liability in the circumstances. However Rome II somewhat curtails its action radius by declaring that it does not apply to ‘evidence and procedure’. This is a carve-out which is problematic in specific instances as I explain ia here. On such instance are issues of limitation however these it seems ([14)] were not pursued.

In the case at issue, parties’ agreement ([9]) is that by analogy to A1(3) Rome II, matters of evidence and procedure are outside the scope of the material substantive law and fall to be determined in accordance with English law as the law of the forum (lex fori in principle determines issues of evidence and procedure). Equally, on an analogous basis to A22(1) Rome II, parties agree that Spanish law will apply insofar as it contains rules which raise presumptions of law or determine the burden of proof.

The common law treating foreign law as fact, means the content of that foreign law is established often with the help of parties (if need be cross-examined) experts however [17] is for the English judge to determine. The remainder of the case therefore is spent discussing the expert evidence (with the judge doing some fine distinguishing of the case-law both experts referred to) together with the factual elements, to conclude [94]

Mr Lambert’s actions were 25% causative of the accident and Mr Prentice’s 75%. It follows that Mr Lambert’s claim for damages against MIB succeeds to the extent of 75% of his loss or damage.

Lest my understanding of the insurance Directives fails me (which it could well do), this means that claim on 75% of the damage remains to be judged under English  tort law. With presumably a repeat of the causation test, this time under English law.

A clearly written judgment which no doubt benefitted from the considerable practice experience of the judge on the matters at hand.

Geert.

 

Applicable law, accident at motorcycle track event
Rome II evidence, procedure exception mutatis mutandis (per motor insurance regulations), and approach to Spanish law as a matter of fact
Judgment by @sarahcrowtherqc
Lambert v [MIB] [2022] EWHC 583 (QB)https://t.co/OhVSZ1ljt0

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 16, 2022