The Court of Justice delivered on 9 December 2021 its judgment in case C‑242/20 (Hrvatske Sume), which is about Brussels I.
Context: “proceedings between, on the one hand, HRVATSKE ŠUME d.o.o., Zagreb, a company established in Croatia, successor in title to HRVATSKE ŠUME javno poduzeće za gospodarenje šumama i šumskim zemljištima u Republici Hrvatskoj p.o., Zagreb, and, on the other, BP Europa SE Hamburg, a company established in Germany, successor in title to Deutsche BP AG, in turn successor in title to The Burmah Oil (Deutschland) GmbH, concerning the recovery, on the basis of unjust enrichment, of an amount unduly paid in enforcement proceedings which were subsequently declared invalid”.
Decision: « 1. Article 22(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that an action for restitution based on unjust enrichment does not come within the exclusive jurisdiction provided for by that provision, even though it was brought on account of the expiry of the time limit within which restitution of sums unduly paid in enforcement proceedings may be claimed in the context of the same enforcement proceedings.
2. Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that an action for restitution based on unjust enrichment does not fall within the scope of the ground of jurisdiction laid down in that provision ».
Note paragraph 36 : « In the absence of any application for enforcement, an action for restitution based on unjust enrichment does not come within the scope of Article 22(5) of Regulation No 44/2001 ».
AG Saugmandsgaard Oe had previously, on 9 September 2021, delivered the following opinion: « Article 5(1) and Article 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 [..] must be interpreted as meaning that a claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment:
– is not a matter ‘relating to a contract’ within the meaning of the former provision, except where it is closely linked to a prior contractual relationship existing, or deemed to exist, between the parties to the dispute; and
– is not a matter ‘relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’ within the meaning of the latter provision » (https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=245764&mode=req&pageIndex=23&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=2104).
AG Campos Sanchez-Bordona delivered on 2 December 2021 his opinion in case C‑645/20 (V A), which is about the Succession Regulation.
Context: “1. The Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France) asks the Court of Justice whether the authorities of a Member State (2) in which the deceased has assets must establish of their own motion their jurisdiction to rule on the succession as a whole under Article 10 of Regulation No 650/2012.
2. The uncertainty has arisen in the course of a dispute over succession rights between the children of a deceased French citizen whose last habitual residence in France is contested, on the one hand, and the person who was the deceased’s wife (but not the mother of his children) at the time of his death, on the other.
3. None of the parties disputes the nationality of the deceased at the time of his death, or that he was the owner of a property situated in France. The disagreement lies only in where he was habitually resident when he died
4. At first instance, a French court declared that it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim brought by the deceased’s children, who had applied for the appointment of an administrator for the estate.
5. On appeal, however, the relevant court held that the French judicial authorities lacked jurisdiction over the succession as a whole, as the deceased’s last place of residence had been in the United Kingdom.
6. On appeal in cassation, the appellants claim that, in any event, the French courts should have declared that they had jurisdiction on their own initiative, which is the issue that forms the subject of the referring court’s question”.
Suggested response: “Article 10(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 […] must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case where the deceased did not have his last habitual residence in any Member State of the European Union, the court of a Member State in which a dispute in a matter of succession has arisen must declare of its own motion that it has jurisdiction to settle the succession as a whole if, in the light of facts alleged by the parties which are not in dispute, the deceased was a national of that State at the time of his death and was the owner of assets located there”.
On 25 November 2021, the CJEU delivered its judgment in case C‑289/20 (IB v FA), which is about Article 3 Brussels II bis.
Decision: “Article 3(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 […] must be interpreted as meaning that a spouse who divides his or her time between two Member States may have his or her habitual residence in only one of those Member States, with the result that only the courts of the Member State in which that habitual residence is situated have jurisdiction to rule on the application for the dissolution of matrimonial ties”.
Note: the Court has clearly indicated, in the preceding paragraphs, the particular State it believes the spouse to be resident in (subject to the national court’s assessment):
“59 In the present case, as is apparent from the documents before the Court, it is common ground that IB, a national of the Member State of the national court seised, satisfied the condition – laid down in the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 – of having resided in that Member State for at least six months immediately before lodging his application for the dissolution of matrimonial ties. It is also established that, since May 2017, IB has been carrying out, on a stable and permanent basis, a professional activity of indefinite duration in France during the week, and that he stays in an apartment there for the purposes of that professional activity.
60 That evidence indicates that IB’s stay in the territory of that Member State is stable and also shows, at the very least, IB’s integration into a social and cultural environment within that Member State”.
On 25 November 2021, the CJEU delivered its judgment in case C‑25/20 (NK, acting as liquidator in the insolvency of Alpine BAU GmbH) :
« Article 32(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 […], read in conjunction with Articles 4 and 28 of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that the lodging, in secondary insolvency proceedings, of claims already submitted in the main insolvency proceedings by the liquidator in those proceedings is subject to the provisions relating to time limits for the lodging of claims and to the consequences of lodging such claims out of time, laid down by the law of the State of the opening of those secondary proceedings ».
AG Campos Sanchez-Bordona delivered on 28 October 2021 his opinion in case C‑498/20 (ZK). The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version).
Suggested decision: “1) L’article 1er, paragraphe 2, sous d), du règlement (CE) no 864/2007 […] doit être interprété en ce sens qu’il exclut de son champ d’application les obligations non contractuelles résultant d’un manquement au devoir de diligence des associés ou des organes lorsque la loi rend ceux-ci responsables d’un tel manquement à l’égard des tiers pour des raisons propres au droit des sociétés. La responsabilité découlant de la violation du devoir général de diligence n’est pas exclue du champ d’application du règlement.
2) L’article 4, paragraphe 1, du règlement Rome II doit être interprété en ce sens que “le lieu où le dommage survient” est le lieu où est établie la société, lorsque le préjudice subi par ses créanciers est la conséquence médiate de pertes économiques subies en premier lieu par la société elle-même. La circonstance que les actions soient exercées par un curateur, au titre de sa mission légale de liquidation de la masse active, ou par une personne assurant la défense collective d’intérêts pour le compte de (mais, non pas, au nom de) l’ensemble des créanciers est sans incidence sur la détermination de ce lieu. Le fait que le domicile de certains créanciers soit situé en dehors de l’Union européenne n’est pas davantage pertinent.
3) L’article 4, paragraphe 3, du règlement Rome II doit être interprété en ce sens qu’une relation préexistante entre l’auteur d’un dommage et la victime directe (telle que, par exemple, une convention de financement, pour laquelle les parties ont choisi la loi applicable) est un élément qui doit être mis en balance avec les autres circonstances afin d’établir s’il existe un lien manifestement plus étroit entre le fait dommageable et un pays déterminé qu’entre ce même fait et le pays dont la loi serait applicable en vertu de l’article 4, paragraphes 1 ou 2, dudit règlement”.
AG Szpunar delivered on 28 October 2021 his opinion in case C‑421/20 (Acacia Srl v BMW AG). The opinion is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version). The issue requires a clarification of the articulation between the 3 Regulations: “1. Le noyau dur du droit international privé de l’Union est composé des règles de compétence et des règles de conflit figurant, respectivement, dans le règlement (UE) no 1215/2012et les deux règlements jumeaux sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles et non contractuelles, à savoir les règlements (CE) nos 593/2008 et 864/2007.
2. Ces règlements ont des champs d’application particulièrement larges. Cela étant, l’application des règles de compétence du règlement no 1215/2012 requiert l’existence d’un élément d’extranéité qui se traduit par le caractère international du rapport juridique en cause découlant de l’implication de plusieurs États. Pareillement, les règles de conflit des règlements Rome I et Rome II s’appliquent dans les situations comportant un conflit de lois.
3. Par ailleurs, sans préjudice de ces exigences relatives à l’existence d’un élément d’extranéité, les règlements no 1215/2012 et Rome II prévoient des exceptions en faveur des dispositions particulières du droit de l’Union en donnant une priorité, notamment, à celles du règlement (CE) no 6/2002.
4. Le présent renvoi préjudiciel donne à la Cour l’occasion de clarifier l’articulation entre ces trois règlements en ce qui concerne les situations visées à l’article 82, paragraphe 5, du règlement no 6/2002, à savoir celles dans lesquelles une action en contrefaçon est portée devant les tribunaux de l’État membre sur le territoire duquel le fait de contrefaçon a été commis ou menace d’être commis”.
Suggested decision: “1) L’article 1er, paragraphe 1, du règlement (CE) no 864/2007 […] et l’article 88, paragraphe 2, et l’article 89, paragraphe 1, sous d), du règlement (CE) no 6/2002 du Conseil, du 12 décembre 2001, sur les dessins ou modèles communautaires doivent être interprétés en ce sens que, lorsqu’un tribunal d’un État membre est saisi au titre de l’article 82, paragraphe 5, de ce dernier règlement d’une action en contrefaçon d’un titulaire établi dans cet État membre contre un auteur de contrefaçon établi dans un autre État membre, qui vise la proposition à la vente et la mise sur le marché de ce premier État membre des produits en cause, il s’agit d’une situation comportant un conflit de lois au sens de l’article 1er, paragraphe 1, du règlement no 864/2007 et, en conséquence, l’article 8, paragraphe 2, de ce règlement désigne la loi applicable aux demandes annexes visant le territoire de cet État membre.
2) L’article 8, paragraphe 2, du règlement no 864/2007 doit être interprété en ce sens que, en ce qui concerne la détermination de la loi applicable aux demandes annexes à cette action en contrefaçon, la notion de « pays dans lequel il a été porté atteinte à ce droit », au sens de cette disposition, vise le pays du lieu où l’acte de contrefaçon initial, qui est à l’origine du comportement reproché, a été commis”.
The CJEU held yesterday in Grand Chamber in C-251/20 GtflixTV – for the facts see my initial flag of the case here. I reviewed the Opinion of Hogan AG here. The AG need not have bothered for the Court entirely ignores the Opinion.
The AG had predicted, as had I, that the CJEU would not heed his calls (joining those of plenty of AGs before him) that the Article 7(2) CJEU Bier introduced distinction between Handlungsort and Erfolgort be abandoned or at least curtailed. The CJEU however also dismisses his suggestion that the case at issue, which involves defamation of competitors over the internet, does not engage the Bolagsupplysningen case-law (infringement of personality rights over the internet) but rather Tibor Trans on acts of unfair competition.
I do not see quite clearly in the Grand Chamber’s mention [28] that Gtlix did not request inaccessibility of the information in France: for Gtflix did request retraction.
Instead of qualifying locus damni jurisdiction, the CJEU squarely confirms its faith in the Mosaic consequences of Article 7(2) locus damni jurisdiction. Each court in whose district damage has occurred, will continue to have locus damni jurisdiction even if the claimant requests rectification of the information and the removal of the content placed online in the Handlungsort or centre of interests jurisdiction. Locus damni jurisdiction in my view extends only to the damage occurring in that district (for Article 7(2) determines territorial, not just national jurisdiction), albeit in current, internet related case the CJEU [38] would seem to speak of ‘national’ jurisdiction, linked to accessibility in the Member State as a whole.
Those courts’ locus damni jurisdiction is subject to the sole condition that the harmful content must be accessible or have been accessible in that Member State. Per CJEU Pinckney, an additional direction of activities to that Member State is not required (the recent High Court approach in Mahmudov on which I shall blog shortly, is at odds with that approach nota bene).
Grand Chamber judgments must not only be expected in cases where earlier authority is radically changed or qualified. It can also occur in cases where the CJEU wishes to reconfirm a point earlier made but stubbornly resisted in scholarship and lukewarmly embraced in national court practice.
Geert.
#CJEU Gtflix. Insulting comments viz competitor do fall within A7(2) Brussels Ia forum delicti. Aggrieved claimant may sue for damages in every jurisdiction where the publication was accessible. Court confirms Mozaik jurisdiction https://t.co/dhz5AlGJ9A https://t.co/GOwADA02Wu
— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) December 21, 2021
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