Flux européens

Ryanair Designated Activity Company
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Un membre de la famille d’un citoyen de l’Union qui n’a pas la nationalité d’un État membre mais qui est titulaire d’une carte de séjour permanent est dispensé de l’obligation d’obtenir un visa pour entrer sur le territoire des États membres

Commission / Hongrie (Transparence associative)
Libre circulation des capitaux
Les restrictions imposées par la Hongrie au financement des organisations civiles par des personnes établies en dehors de cet État membre ne sont pas conformes au droit de l’Union

In Senior Taxi Aereo Executivo LTDA & Ors v Agusta Westland S.p.A & Ors [2020] EWHC 1348 (Comm) Waksman J discusses the same issues which I analysed in my review of Sabbagh v Koury (and he refers to that case at 51 ff). Proceedings arise out of the fatal crash of an Agusta Westland AW 139 twin turbine helicopter on 19 August 2011, during a flight from the Petrobras P-65 offshore oil platform in the Atlantic, west of Rio de Janeiro, to Macae Aerodrome in Brazil.

First and third defendant are an Italian company. Second defendant, AgustaWestland Ltd is an English company and the anchor defendant per A8(1) Brussels IA. At 32:

‘Defendants’ contention is that in order for Article 8 (1) to apply at all, the claim against the anchor defendant must at least be a sustainable one. I described this as “the Merits Test”. For present purposes, the requirement of sustainability can be equated with “viability”, “a real prospect of success”, a “serious issue to be tried” or a “good arguable case”. Neither party sought to argue that any fine point of distinction between these various expressions was relevant here.’

Reisch Montage and Freeport of course are CJEU authority referred to. As is Kolassa for the CJEU consideration of ‘merits review’ (particularly there: taking account of both defendant and claimant’s arguments) under A25 and A26 BIA) and CDC for the CJEU’s most recent proper discussion of the issue (at 86 Waksman J suggest CDC is not a ruling on the merits issue).

At 65 ff Waksman J follows the majority in Kabbagh, and not the dissent of Lady Justice Gloster – I as noted was more enclined to agree with her. Having confessed to his preference for there being a merits test, he then seeks to distinguish the CJEU in Reisch by focusing on the CJEU there finding on the basis of a ‘procedural bar’ in the Member State of the anchor defendant. At 83:

‘I do not find the reasoning of the CJEU here persuasive and I consider that the decision should be distinguished if possible. It can be distinguished because it is very clear from the judgments that the focus was on a national rule as to admissibility of the claim. Even allowing for differences of language, the expression “procedural bar” is not apt to include a lack of any substantive merit. Reisch is not therefore an obstacle to deciding that there is a Merits Test.’

And at 85:

‘that the reasoning of the court in Reisch was concerned more with what it simply saw as an illegitimate incursion of a domestic procedural rule (a bankrupt cannot without more be sued in ordinary litigation) into the operation of Article 6 (1). That, in and of itself decided the point. It was a question of form and not substance. But the Merits Test is a matter of substance.

Held: there is a Merits Test which must be satisfied before A8(1) can be invoked. That merits test is not met in casu.

A8(1)’s ‘so closely connected’ test clearly requires some appreciation of the facts and the legal arguments, as well as a certain amount of taking into account the defendant’s arguments. Yet this in my view does not amount to a merits test, and ‘sustainability’, “viability”, “a real prospect of success”, a “serious issue to be tried” or a “good arguable case” may well be synonyms – but there are not the same as an A8(1) merits test.

One to watch upon appeal.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.12.1

Includes challenge of the A8(1)BIa anchor jurisdiction.

Re fatal crash of Agusta Westland AW 139 helicopter on 19 August 2011, during a flight from the Petrobras P-65 offshore oil platform in the Atlantic, west of Rio de Janeiro, to Macae Aerodrome in Brazil. https://t.co/de4okNUMkY

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 13, 2020

A short note on Public Joint Stock Company (Rosgosstrakh) v Starr Syndicate Ltd & Ors [2020] EWHC 1557 (Comm) just to illustrate the complications for recognition and enforcement in the absence of a near-automated process such as under Brussels IA (the Hague Judgments Convention is meant to lubricate the process internationally). Claimant applies for summary judgment on its claim for recognition and enforcement of three judgments obtained in its favour in the Russian courts in 2015 and 2016.

Moulder J first discussed the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the Russian courts and she finds at 93 after consideration that the discussions to and fro, and the evidence of Russian experts for each of the parties, necessitates proper discussion with oral evidence of the contractual construction, under Russian law, of the relevant choice of court clauses. Of course under BIa and other regimes operating with a certain amount of mutual trust, second-guessing jurisdiction is not part of the assessment.

Next, the allegations of bias are also discussed, with at 126 ia reference to an interference by President Putin, and at 138 a solid set of reasoning for Moulder J to dismiss the potential for summary judgment on this point, too. Of course bias is an ordre public issue which even under BIa’s rules for recognition of judgments from other Member States, might justify refusal of recognition.

Geert.

 

Application for summary judgment re recognition and enforcement of 3 Russian judgments refused.
I.a. allegations of bias require proper assessment. https://t.co/nfVLicgsQQ

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 17, 2020

 

 

International comity underlies the rule of both Ralli Brothers v Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar (‘Ralli Bros’) [1920] 2 KB 287 and Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470, jointly known as ‘illegality under foreign law’. They both engage lois de police of the place of performance, and the English courts’ attitude towards not assisting with contractual performance that would go against such lois. Per Cockerill J in Magdeev v Tsvetkov [2020] EWHC 887 at 307:

“The Foster v Driscoll and Ralli Bros principles differ in this way: the latter is concerned only with whether the contract between the parties necessarily involves performance of an act which is illegal by the law of the place of performance, irrespective of the object and intention of the parties; the former is only concerned with whether the object and intention of the parties is to perform their agreement in a manner which involves an illegal act in the place of performance, and is not concerned with whether the contract necessitates the undertaking of such an act…’

At issue in Colt Technology Services v SG Global Group SRL [2020] EWHC 1417 (Ch), is an injunction to restrain SGG (of Italy) from presenting a winding-up petition against it. SGG claims that Colt UK is indebted to it in the sum of US$4,936,619.93 plus interest. Colt UK contends that the debt is bona fide disputed on substantial grounds, such that the Companies Court is not an appropriate forum to determine the dispute and the presentation of a winding-up petition would be an abuse of process. Colt UK says that SGG was not the true supplier of the services under the relevant agreement, but was a shell company acting as a front for another supplier and was engaged in a form of VAT “missing trader” fraud with the Italian authorities as victims.

After due consideration Wicks J holds that Colt UK has a properly arguable illegality defence to the sums claimed by SGG, based on the Ralli Bros principle. Held: the presentation of a winding-up petition against Colt UK would be an abuse of process and in all the circumstances it is right to restrain SGG from taking that step.

Another interesting example of international comity in private, commercial litigation.

Geert.

Fasken alerted me to, and have good review of Newfoundland and Labrador (Attorney General) v Uashaunnuat (Innu of Uashat and of Mani‑Utenam) 2020 SCC 4. The Canadian Supreme Court held that Quebec has jurisdiction over aboriginal rights claims in a neighburing province. This assertion of jurisdiction hinges on the qualification of rights under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the section which deals with aboriginal and treaty rights) as rights sui generis. A qualification as rights in rem erga omnes, as the dissenting opinion suggested, would have kept the case outside of Quebec jurisdictional reach.

The case came a week after the decision of the High Court of Australia in Love v Commonwealth[2020] HCA 3 which as Michael Douglas analyses here, is a case about personal status and whether an aboriginal may be considered an ‘alien’ for immigration purposes. Judges split as to the required approach to the issue.

Indigenous rights and conflict of laws for sure will continue to exercise one or two minds (ia in view of the UNSDGs) and these two cases seem to anchor a number of issues. Not something a short blog post can do justice to.

Geert.

Most interesting. Indigenous rights and conflict of laws.
CAN SC finds Québec has jurisdiction to hear Innu claims re land in Newfoundland, Labrador
Aboriginal rights are sui generis, neither personal rights or real rightshttps://t.co/DPQBZk2byC

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 10, 2020

In T‑574/18 Agrochem-Maks the General Court at the end of May upheld the Commission Regulation not extending market authorisation for the active substance oxasulfuron, a pesticide. The EC Regulation noted that EFSA, the European Food Safety Authority, had identified a large number of data gaps resulting in the inability to finalise the risk assessment in several areas and that ‘in particular, the available information on oxasulfuron and its metabolites did not allow finalising the assessment of the overall consumer exposure, the groundwater exposure, the risk to aquatic organisms, earthworms, soil macro and microorganisms and non-target terrestrial plants’. Since  ‘it has not been established with respect to one or more representative uses of at least one plant protection product that the approval criteria provided for in Article 4 of Regulation … No 1107/2009 [on plant protection products; see here, GAVC] [were] satisfied’, authorisation was not renewed.

The case at issue is brought by a small Croatian, family-owned company. That is a change from the classic pattern in this kind of cases, with large bio-agricultural industry routinely taking cases to the CJEU in laser-shoot fashion, hoping they might hit the target once or twice.

The General Court extensively outlines the procedure foreseen in the relevant EU laws, thereby identifying the core issue in near all of these cases held under the precautionary principle: the EU courts do not carry out a merits review; rather, they assess whether holes have emerged in the preparation of a decision, which could mean that the Institutions could not reasonably have come to the decision they came to.

That is no different here: at 62: ‘the EU Courts must verify that the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, that the facts admitted by the Commission have been accurately stated and that there has been no manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers’. At 65, per CJEU T-13/99 Pfizer: ‘a scientific risk assessment carried out as thoroughly as possible on the basis of scientific advice founded on the principles of excellence, transparency and independence is an important procedural guarantee whose purpose is to ensure the scientific objectivity of the measures adopted and preclude any arbitrary measures.’

Specifically for current Regulation: at 66: ‘the burden of proving that the conditions for approval or renewal under Article 4 of Regulation No 1107/2009 are met lies, in principle, with the notifier.’ At 67 per CJEU T-584/13 BASF Agro: ‘it is the person seeking approval who must prove that the conditions of such approval are met in order to obtain it, and not the Commission which must prove that the conditions of approval are not met in order to be able to refuse it’.

The General Court then at length considers the procedure followed, including the reasons for the identified gaps, and then assesses the application of the precautionary principle to same: at 109 ff with reference to the 2000 Communication on the Precautionary Principle, COM(2000)1. Crucially, at 121, as noted ‘(u)nder Regulation 1107/2009 when the applicant words its renewal application, it bears the burden of proving the efficacy and safety of the substance in question.’ ‘Since it did not discharge that burden, the approval of the active substance could not be renewed.’

The case highlights once again the crucial nature of administrative compliance with the rulebooks under EU regulatory law. Many of us will have sat through presentations by EFSA or EC officials outlining the rules in excruciating and yes, not very sexy detail. Yet to follow procedure to a tee is crucial to ensure defence against corporations taking issue with the findings at the CJEU.

The case also emphasises the importance of burden of proof and, preferably, the ‘no data, no market’ rule in EU regulatory law.

There might of course still be an appeal with the Court.

Geert.

EU environmental law (with Leonie Reins), Edward Elgar, 2018, p.28 ff.

Precautionary principle, standard of proof, standards of judicial review. https://t.co/gHDzyIQS1u pic.twitter.com/R1Z1qCy4qq

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 29, 2020

Must Article 107 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that a system whereby a private, non-profit eco-body, approved by the public authorities, receives contributions from those who place on the market a particular category of product and who enter into a contract with it to that effect, in return for a service consisting in the organisation on their behalf of the treatment of the waste from those products, and redistributes to operators responsible for the sorting and recovery of that waste, subsidies the amount of which is set out in the approval, in the light of environmental and social targets, is to be regarded as State aid within the meaning of that provision?

That is the question as phrased in C‑556/19 Société Eco TLC and on which Pitruzzella AG Opined on 28 May. TLC stands for Textiles, Lignes de maisons, and chaussures (textiles, household linen and shoes). Producers or as the case may be first importers pay a fee to the collective body in lieu of their personal commitments under extended producers responsibility per Waste Framework Directive 2008/98.

The AG of course revisits the definition of ‘State Aid’ under CJEU C-379/98 Preussen Elektra, on which more here and here. Preussen Elektra remains controversial for it would seem to give Member States quite a bit of room for manoeuvre to reach the same result as direct State Aid more or less simply by inserting a private operator who receivs funds directly from private operators however in line with direct State instructions on level and modalities of payment.  The AG opines that in the case at issue there is no State Aid however he directs further factual lines of enquiry (ia re the State control over payments by the collective body to recyclers.

Geert.

Handbook of EU Waste law, 2nd ed. 2015 OUP, para 4.116 ff.

 

State Aid, collective #waste recycling bodies. https://t.co/UaPdf4T69b

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 29, 2020

TÜV Rheinland LGA Products et Allianz IARD
DISC
L’interdiction générale de discrimination en raison de la nationalité ne peut être invoquée pour contester une clause, contenue dans un contrat conclu entre un fabricant de dispositifs médicaux et une compagnie d’assurances, limitant territorialement la couverture d’assurance de responsabilité civile

Alianța pentru combaterea abuzurilor
Environnement et consommateurs
La protection stricte de certaines espèces animales prévue par la directive « habitats » s’étend aux spécimens qui quittent leur habitat naturel et se retrouvent dans des zones de peuplement humain

Prezident Slovenskej republiky
Liberté d'établissement
Le fait que, en Slovaquie, le pouvoir de nommer et de révoquer le président de l’autorité de régulation nationale est passé du président de la République au gouvernement ne constitue pas, en soi, une violation de la directive sur le marché de l’électricité

ratiopharm
Rapprochement des législations
Les entreprises pharmaceutiques ne peuvent pas distribuer gratuitement aux pharmaciens des échantillons de médicaments délivrés uniquement sur ordonnance

Transportes Aéreos Portugueses
Transport
Le comportement perturbateur d’un passager aérien peut constituer une « circonstance extraordinaire » susceptible d’exonérer le transporteur de son obligation d’indemnisation pour l’annulation ou le retard important du vol concerné ou d’un vol suivant opéré par lui-même au moyen du même aéronef

Commission / Dôvera zdravotná poistʼovňa
Aide d'État
La Cour confirme la décision de la Commission selon laquelle les organismes d’assurance maladie opérant sous le contrôle de l’État slovaque ne relèvent pas des règles du droit de l’Union en matière d’aides d’État

In La Micro Group (UK) Ltd & Anor v La Micro Group, Inc & Ors[2020] EWHC 1405 (Ch) 1st Claimant, LA Micro Group (UK) Ltd (“LA (UK)”), is an English company. It was incorporated in 2004 and acquired by the 2nd Claimant, Mr David Bell, a British citizen resident in England. It now has two issued shares, one in the name of Mr Bell, and one in the name of the 3rd Defendant, Mr Arkadiy Lyampert. Mr Bell and Mr Lyampert are also the two directors of the company. The substantive question raised in the action is as to the beneficial ownership of LA (UK). The position of the Claimants is that Mr Bell and Mr Lyampert are not only the legal owners of the two issued shares but also the beneficial owners, and that they are each entitled to 50% of the distributable profits of the company by way of dividends. Mr Lyampert’s position is the same, although he has indicated that he does not intend to take any active part in the proceedings. All defendants are resident in California.

This preliminary issue is one of jurisdiction given claimants seek permission to serve out of jurisdiction. There are a variety of proceedings in California: disputes between Mr Frenkel and Mr Lyampert in 2010 led to Mr Frenkel and some of LA Inc’s other employees, including Mr Gorban, leaving LA Inc and starting a competing business called IT Creations, Inc (“ITC”). In the words of the Court of Appeal of California, “a profusion of lawsuits followed”.

It is i.a. argued by defendants that it would an abuse of process for LA Inc to relitigate the same issues as were decided by that judgment, even if the CAL judgments do not strictly give rise to res judicata given the differences between parties.

At 49 Nugee J holds on that particular issue that the relevant CAL Judgment did not decide anything about whether LA Inc had lost its rights to a beneficial interest in LA (UK), and the findings of fact on which the Claimants rely were not necessary to the English court’s decision on any of the matters that were in issue.

Of specific interest to the blog is the forum non conveniens application at 58 ff., with at 68 ff consideration of whether one of the pending CAL proceedings is the mirror image of the English ones, which would count heavily in a forum non consideration given the English law’s preference for the whole issue to be submitted to one tribunal. At 78 Nugee J  sums up the core issue:

The choice is between (i) allowing the English proceedings to continue so that a definitive answer can be given to one discrete question (has LA Inc lost its beneficial interest?) which will then enable the Californian court to proceed on a correct understanding of what has been decided in England rather than on what is said to be a misapprehension; or (ii) requiring the Claimants, unless they are willing to abandon their claims, to go to California to argue matters that on the view I take are matters of English law and largely concern acts taking place in England.

At 77 Nugee J expresses strong support for Gleichlauf:

(T)here are many advantages in questions of law being decided by a home court rather than a foreign court. Evidence and cross-examination is not required, which is likely to make resolution of the point both quicker and cheaper. And the court is familiar with its own law, in a way that it is not with foreign law, which means that the court’s resolution of the issues is likely to be both easier and more soundly based. Other things being equal, I have no doubt that it is preferable, both in terms of practical convenience and in terms of the ends of justice, for questions of English law to be argued in England as questions of law rather than for them to be argued in California as questions of fact on expert evidence (and possibly, although I have no evidence as to whether this would be the case, before a jury).

He concludes at 92:

England is the most appropriate forum for those matters to be decided; but even in relation to the declarations in respect of Mr Lyampert’s share, leaving the parties to litigate in California has a mix of advantages and disadvantages and there is not in my judgment sufficient to displace England as the forum in which the dispute can most suitably be tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice.

Nugee J does not therefore give Gleichlauf preponderant weight ab initio. Yet all other things being equal, Gleichlauf in this case pushed back a finding of forum non.

Geert.

Application for stay on forum non conveniens grounds. Dismissed.
Nugee J: 'Leaving parties to litigate in CAL has mix of (dis)advantages, not sufficient to displace EN as forum in which dispute can most suitably be tried for the interests of all parties and for ends of justice. https://t.co/Rm3i16dEPg

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 3, 2020

Graham Woloff eaor Calzaturificio Zengarini eaor re Akkurate Ltd, [2020] EWHC 1433 (Ch) concerns the question whether the court has the power under section 236(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 to require persons resident in the EU to produce books and papers and an account of their dealings with a company being compulsorily wound up in England and Wales (it is not disputed that Akkurate’s centre of main interests (“COMI”) was in England and Wales under the European Insolvency Regulation EIR).

EIR 2000 applies to this case, because the winding up of Akkurate was before 26 June 2017, however the issue is not materially different in the new Regulation. There are inconsistent first instance decisions which Vos C reviews ia at 27 ff and at 54 after consideration, he considers s236(3) does not have extraterritorial effect on the basis of what he considers to be the binding authority of Re Tucker (a bankrupt) [1990] Ch. 148. however that following the EIR 2000 (unchanged in EIR 2015) the European regime can and does extend the territoriality of purely domestic insolvency provisions. CJEU authority cited is in particular C-339/07 Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium (at 58 ff) – which I find may be a bit optimistic. Vos C also decides that he can and should apply his discretion to grant orders as formulated at 68.

Clearly, post Brexit, the situation will revert to Tucker. Which would make the English courts less attractive than their continental counterparts – although of course one would have to wait for CJEU authority to confirm the issue less equivocally.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5,

 

EU #Insolvency Regulation 1346/2000. Whether EN court has power to require persons resident in EU to produce documents re company with COMI in EN.

Held, considering CJEU authority: Yes. https://t.co/0dcgtOc7fF

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 4, 2020

Mad Atelier International BV v Manes [2020] EWHC 1014 (Comm) engages among others Articles 29-30 BIa on lis alibi pendens and its relation with issue estoppel. Stewart Chirnside has analysis here and  I am happy to refer. The judgment itself is not straightforward for Bryan J had much to decide – I agree with his conclusion at 124 on A29-30 BIa related issues that he is

‘satisfied that the French Civil Proceedings does not give rise to any issue estoppel because, for the reasons that I have given: (1) The decision of the Paris Commercial Court on such issues is not final or conclusive; (2) The parties to both proceedings are not privies; (3) The issues identified by Mr Manès were not issues concluded by the court, but rather comments on the state of the evidence, and (4) The issues in the English Proceedings are significantly broader than the issues in the French Civil Proceedings. Each of these is, in and of itself, fatal to the contention that an issue estoppel arises from the Paris Judgment, and I find that no issue estoppel arises.’

Geert.

 

 

 

Recognition and enforcement. Res judicata. Issue estoppel. https://t.co/yJDw3uHMD6 https://t.co/ACwZWMB6Wg

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 1, 2020

The Court of Justice delivered this week, on 4 June 2020, its judgment in case C‑41/19 (FX v GZ, represented for legal purposes by her mother), which is about the Maintenance Regulation.

Context: “By decision of the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Regional Court, Krakow, Poland) of 26 May 2009, FX was ordered to make monthly maintenance payments of around EUR 100 for the benefit of his daughter GZ, a minor, retroactively from June 2008.

20 Further to GZ’s application of 20 July 2016, the Amtsgericht Köln (Local Court, Cologne, Germany), by order of 27 July 2016, decided that an order for enforcement was to be issued in respect of the aforementioned decision of the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Regional Court, Krakow).

21 On the basis of that order declared enforceable, GZ, represented for legal purposes by her mother, initiated enforcement proceedings against FX in Germany. Challenging those proceedings, FX lodged before the Amtsgericht Köln (Local Court, Cologne) on 5 April 2018 an application opposing enforcement, pursuant to Paragraph 767 of the ZPO.

22 In support of his application, FX submits that the maintenance debt at issue in the main proceedings was discharged either directly until 2010 or, since December 2010, through the Maintenance Fund (Poland), to which FX claims to have reimbursed the sums paid to GZ to the extent of his financial capacity. FX maintains that, in any event, the debt has been predominantly settled”.

Issue: “The referring court has doubts, in the first place, as to whether the application opposing enforcement that FX lodged before it falls within its international jurisdiction.

24 On the one hand, the referring court states that if that application is to be treated as a matter relating to maintenance obligations within the meaning of Article 1 of Regulation No 4/2009, it has no international jurisdiction under that regulation and accordingly the Polish courts would have exclusive jurisdiction to examine FX’s objection that the maintenance debt at issue in the main proceedings has been discharged.

25 In that regard, the referring court notes that part of the German literature takes the view that an application opposing enforcement under Paragraph 767 of the ZPO is in fact to be treated as a matter relating to maintenance obligations within the meaning of Regulation No 4/2009 in so far as the objections raised in such an application, in particular those relating to the fulfilment or subrogation of that claim, are ultimately directed against the order for enforcement as such rather than the manner of the enforcement, which is to be assessed purely under enforcement law. Similarly, the referring court points out that that application opposing enforcement functionally corresponds to an application seeking reduction of the maintenance claim in respect of which an order for enforcement has been issued, which modification application, under Article 8 of Regulation No 4/2009, is subject to the jurisdictional principles set out therein. In the referring court’s view, that interpretation, which is supported by part of the German literature and which the referring court is inclined towards, is the only one compatible with the objective pursued by that regulation, namely guaranteeing the protection and jurisdictionally privileged status of the maintenance creditor, without, accordingly, the creditor having to defend himself, before the courts of the Member State of enforcement of the claim for which an order of enforcement has been issued, against an application opposing enforcement concerning substantive objections to that claim.

26 On the other hand, the referring court observes that the German legislature, conversely, is evidently of the opinion that the courts of the Member State of enforcement of a maintenance claim have jurisdiction to adjudicate on an application opposing enforcement, such as that provided for in Paragraph 767 of the ZPO, in which the debtor is authorised to raise objections to the claim itself. According to the referring court, the prevailing view in Germany is furthermore that such an application opposing enforcement does not come under matters relating to maintenance obligations within the meaning of Regulation No 4/2009 on the ground that, inter alia, the legal protection objective sought is directed solely against the enforcement of the claim, whereas the continuance of the original order remains untouched.

27 If that second position is to prevail, the referring court asks, in the second place, whether FX’s application opposing enforcement is then to be treated as ‘proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments’ within the meaning of Article 24(5) of Regulation No 1215/2012.

28 According to the referring court, the judgments of 4 July 1985, AS-Autoteile Service (220/84, EU:C:1985:302) and of 13 October 2011, Prism Investments (C‑139/10, EU:C:2011:653) are not capable, by themselves, of providing an answer to that question. Indeed, they were delivered in the regulatory framework preceding the entry into force of Regulation No 4/2009. In addition, pursuant to Article 1(2)(e) of Regulation No 1215/2012, that regulation does not apply to maintenance obligations”.

Question: “By its questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether an application opposing enforcement lodged by a maintenance debtor against the enforcement of a decision given by a court of the Member State of origin and which established that claim falls within the scope of Regulation No 4/2009 or that of Regulation No 1215/2012 and the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State of enforcement”.

Response from the Court of Justice: “Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 […] is to be interpreted as meaning that an application opposing enforcement brought by the maintenance debtor against enforcement of a decision given by a court of the Member State of origin and which established that debt, which has a close link with the procedure for enforcement, falls within its scope and is within the international jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State of enforcement.

Pursuant to Article 41(1) of Regulation No 4/2009 and to the relevant provisions of national law, it is for the referring court, being a court of the Member State of enforcement, to adjudicate on the admissibility and the validity of the evidence adduced by the maintenance debtor, seeking to support the submission that he has predominantly discharged his debt”.

Source: here

Many thanks indeed Kevin La Croix for flagging the suit brought in New York by a group of Bayer AG shareholders, against Bayer (with seat at Leverkusen, Germany), concerning the not altogether successful purchase of Monsanto by Bayer. Kevin has excellent analysis and I am happy to refer.

Claimants of course pre-empt arguments of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and, subsidiarily, forum non conveniens – please refer to Kevin’s overview for the arguments to and fro. Most interesting. It brought back to me echoes of the Australian case of Tiger v Morris, not because the subject-matter is similar (it is not) but because in this increasingly globalised world (despite Covid19), courts everywhere are increasingly asked to consider the reach of their courts in cases with competing local and foreign interests. Comity considerations underlying the historic roots of conflict of laws are being brought back to the fore, no doubt also partially as a result of the impact of third party financing, contingency fees etc.

One to keep an eye on. One wonders whether Bayer might be launching a related case in Germany, then triggering A33/34 considerations.

Geert.

 

 

Forum shopping, corporate law. Lex causae undoubtedly German law. Shareholder seeking to take advantage in particular of procedure.

via @alahav https://t.co/TBcKULJIQc

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 18, 2020

Lundbeck / Commission
Concurrence
L’avocate générale Kokott propose à la Cour de justice de valider l’amende de près de 94 millions d’euros infligée au groupe pharmaceutique Lundbeck dans le cadre de l’entente visant à retarder la commercialisation de génériques de son médicament antidépresseur citalopram