Flux européens

European Parliament on a civil liability regime for AI

European Civil Justice - Fri, 10/23/2020 - 00:03

On 20 October 2020, the European Parliament adopted a resolution with recommendations to the Commission on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence. These recommendations include a suggested regulation on liability for the operation of Artificial Intelligence-systems. Article 9 confirms the previous JURI Report (see this blog on 12 May 2020): “Civil liability claims brought in accordance with Article 8(1) shall be subject, in relation to limitation periods as well as the amounts and the extent of compensation, to the laws of the Member State in which the harm or damage occurred”.

Unfortunately, the exact nature of some key provisions such as Article 2, or the relationship between the suggested regulation as a whole and Rome II, remain unclear and different interpretations could usefully be clarified. It remains to be seen whether the European Commission will shed some light on this point when drafting the official proposal for the regulation.

See https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0276_EN.pdf

‘Amendment’ to the French version of Brussels II ter

European Civil Justice - Thu, 10/22/2020 - 23:36

A rather strange ‘amendment’ to the French version of Brussels II ter was published two days ago at the OJEU: Rectificatif au règlement (UE) 2019/1111 du Conseil du 25 juin 2019 relatif à la compétence, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière matrimoniale et en matière de responsabilité parentale, ainsi qu’à l’enlèvement international d’enfants, OJEU L 347, 20.10.2020, p. 52–160 (FR), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2020.347.01.0052.01.FRA&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2020%3A347%3ATOC

In reality, a new version of the entire Regulation is provided, far from the single amendment the title may suggest. As the readers from this blog will know, a few days ago, a corrigendum to Brussels I bis in some linguistic versions has been published. What’s next and why are the corrections only published now, even if later is better than never?

Philips v TCL. On lis alibi pendens /res judicata, and FRAND proceedings.

GAVC - Wed, 10/21/2020 - 01:01

In Koninklijke Philips NV v Tinno Mobile Technology Corporation & Ors [2020] EWHC 2553 (Ch) Mann J considers the English side of a licence on  ‘FRAND’ (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) terms.  In these English proceedings Philips seek inter alia, a declaration that the terms it has offered are FRAND, or alternatively that FRAND terms be determined. Its injunction claim accepts that the injunction will only come into force if a worldwide FRAND licence is not accepted by TCL, one of the defendants who is seeking the licence. TCL have commenced proceedings in France which, inter alia, seem to seek to have FRAND terms determined. Philips attempted to have those proceedings stayed pursuant to Article 29 Brussels Ia, but that attempt failed, as did an application for a stay under Article 30 BIa. In turn, not surprisingly, TCL seek a stay of the English proceedings, including, crucially, the vacation of a trial date in November which is intended to determine FRAND issues, in favour of its French proceedings pursuant to the same Articles 29 and/or 30 Brussels Ia.

Philips’ claim form says it is for infringement of two of its European patents, corresponding injunction (prohibiting further infringement) and damages or an account of profits, and other ancillary relief.

At 49 in assessing the impact of the French judgment and the scope of its res judicata, Mann J justifiable refers to C-456/11 Gothaer, that it is not just the ‘dispositif’ of a judgment which has res judicata, but also the core reasoning: at 40 of the CJEU judgment: ‘the concept of res judicata under European Union law does not attach only to the operative part of the judgment in question, but also attaches to the ratio decidendi of that judgment, which provides the necessary underpinning for the operative part and is inseparable from it …’

His enquiry of the dispositif and the French judge’s reasoning as well as, to a certain extent, the submissions of the parties, leads Mann J to conclude that the French judge did not hold that the French court was first seized of FRAND proceedings. Instead, she held that the proceedings in England and the proceedings in France did not (for the purposes of A29) have the same subject matter. That means that the question of first seised became irrelevant.

Mann J then holds himself that the English court was first seized of the FRAND issue and consequently has no power under A30 BIa to stay its proceedings. It was suggested in vain by counsel for the defendants that Articles 29 and 30 are not acte clair on the point of new actions arising in an existing action, given a distinction between the word “proceedings” in Article 29 and “actions” in Article 30 at least in the English version of those Articles.

The jurisdictional challenge was rejected and the relief granted. Geert. (Handbook of) European Private International Law – 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.14.5. Third edition forthcoming February 2021. https://twitter.com/GAVClaw/status/1309481362186031105

The French Supreme Court confirms English law denial of adopted’s right to confirm simultaneous descent from adopted parents and biological father.

GAVC - Tue, 10/20/2020 - 06:07

A quick note for archival purposes on the French Supreme Court judgment earlier this month in which it upheld the lower courts’ decision (which had been reversed upon appeal) that European Convention rights do not trump the impossibility under English law, which is the law under which the claimant had been adopted, for the adopted to confirm descent from both the adopted parents and the biological father.

It is important to keep in mind the specific circumstances of the case in which the Supreme Court let the stability of family relations prevail over ECHR rights. The adoption went back to 1966 (the UK birth to 1958). The true identity of the father seemingly had always been known to the applicant. The mother (1963) and the suspected biological father (2011)  have passed away, the real issue would seem to be inheritance related.

Geert.

 

Interesting French supreme court judgment upholding finding under applicable English law that descendance following adoption trumps later attempt to establish blood descendance
Preference for stability of family relations found not to infringe adopted's A8 #ECHR rights @ECHR_CEDH https://t.co/Gtht0d8YgH

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 15, 2020

Corrigendum to Brussels I bis in some linguistic versions

European Civil Justice - Sat, 10/17/2020 - 00:50

A corrigendum to Brussels I bis in some linguistic versions has been published yesterday (15 October 2020) in the OJEU (L 338). It relates to the Czech, French and Polish versions of the Regulation. Here is the French version:

« Page 23, article 34, paragraphe 1, point c):

au lieu de: «c) la juridiction de l’État tiers concernée est convaincue que le sursis à statuer est nécessaire pour une bonne administration de la justice.»

lire: «c) la juridiction de l’État membre est convaincue que le sursis à statuer est nécessaire pour une bonne administration de la justice ».

It is an alignment with other linguistic versions.

Source : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2020.338.01.0013.01.FRA&toc=OJ:L:2020:338:TOC

Sappi Austria: CJEU tries to keep a common sense approach to supporting the circular economy and maintaining the objectives of EU waste law.

GAVC - Fri, 10/16/2020 - 08:08

Case C‑629/19 Sappi Austria Produktions-GmbH & Co. KG and Wasserverband ‘Region Gratkorn-Gratwein’ v Landeshauptmann von Steiermark in which the CJEU held on Wednesday is in my off the cuff view (I did not research it in the recent case-law) the first case where the CJEU specifically mentions the objectives of the circular economy to support its interpretation of the core definition of ‘waste’ in the Waste Framework Directive 2008/98.

Sappi operate a large industrial paper and pulp production plant in Gratkorn (Austria). On that site is also a sewage treatment plant, operated jointly by Sappi and the Wasserverband, which treats waste water from paper and pulp production as well as municipal waste water. During the treatment of that waste water, which is required by national law, the sewage sludge in question in the main proceedings arises. That sludge is therefore made up of both substances from industrial waste water and substances from municipal waste water. Sewage sludge which is produced in the sewage treatment plant is then incinerated in a boiler of Sappi and in a waste incineration plant operated by the Wasserverband, and the steam reclaimed for the purposes of energy recovery is used in the production of paper and pulp.  hat authority found that, admittedly, the majority of the sewage sludge used for incineration, namely 97%, originated from a paper production process and that this proportion could be regarded as having ‘by-product’ status within the meaning of Paragraph 2(3a) of the AWG 2002. However, that does not apply to the proportion of sewage sludge arising from municipal waste water treatment. That sewage sludge remains waste. Since there is no de minimis limit for the classification of a substance as ‘waste’, the authority assumed that all the sewage sludge incinerated in the industrial plants of Sappi and of the Wasserverband must be classified as ‘waste’.

The CJEU first of all holds that there is no relevant secondary law which provides the kinds of qualitative criteria for sewage sludge to meet with the objectives of the WFD. If there were such laws, and the sludge meets their requirements, it would be exempt form the WFD. It then reminds the referring court, of course, of the extensive authority on the notion of waste (most recently C-624/17 Tronex) yet is happy to provide the national Court with input into the application in casu.

In principle, the sludge is waste, the Court holds: it is a residue from waste water treatment and it is being discarded.

However, the referring judge suggests that the sludge may meet the requirements of A6(1) WFD as being fully ‘recovered’ before it is used in the incineration process. It is there that the CJEU refers to the circular economy: at 68:

it is particularly relevant that the heat generated during the incineration of the sewage sludge is re-used in a paper and pulp production process and that such a process provides a significant benefit to the environment because of the use of recovered material in order to preserve natural resources and to enable the development of a circular economy.

Per C‑60/18 Tallinna Vesi, the recovery of sewage sludge entails certain risks for the environment and human health, particularly linked to the potential presence of hazardous substances. For the sludge at issue here not to be waste, presupposes that the treatment carried out for the purposes of recovery makes it possible to obtain sewage sludge with a high level of protection of the environment and human health, such as required by the WFD, which is, in particular, free from any dangerous substance. For that purpose, it is necessary to ensure that the sewage sludge in question in the main proceedings is harmless (at 66). The CJEU concludes, at 67

It is for the referring court to determine whether the conditions laid down in Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/98 are already met before the sewage sludge is incinerated. It must in particular be determined, as appropriate, on the basis of a scientific and technical analysis, that the sewage sludge meets the statutory limit values for pollutants and that its incineration does not lead to overall adverse environmental or human health impacts.

There are as yet no EU standards for the full recovery of sewage sludge, hence the ball of end of waste status is once again in the Member States’ court.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Waste law, 2nd ed. 2015, Oxford, OUP, Chapter 1, 1.149 ff.

132/2020 : 15 octobre 2020 - Conclusions de l'Avocat général dans les affaires C-562/19 P,C-596/19 P

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - Thu, 10/15/2020 - 10:01
Commission / Pologne
Selon l’avocate générale Kokott, l’impôt polonais dans le secteur de la vente au détail et la taxe hongroise sur la publicité ne violent pas le droit de l’Union en matière d’aides d’État

Categories: Flux européens

No instant forum coffee. Selecta: Some more substantial reflection on jurisdiction for schemes of arrangement.

GAVC - Thu, 10/15/2020 - 08:08

In Selecta Finance UK Ltd, Re [2020] EWHC 2689 (Ch) Johnson J considered the jurisdictional issues for schemes of arrangement in a touch more detail than recently has been the regular method in both convening and sanctioning hearings.

Selecta Finance UK Limited is a most recent addition to the ‘Selecta’ group , having been established only on 13 August 2020. (Selecta is said to be the leading provider of unattended self-service coffee and convenience food in Europe).  The Scheme concerns three series of senior secured Notes (“the Existing SSNs“), which have an aggregate principal amount of €1.24 billion plus CHF 250 million. The Existing SSNs were issued originally not by the Company but by Selecta Group BV, its parent company incorporated in the Netherlands. They were issued pursuant to a Trust Deed dated 2 February 2018 , and were originally governed by New York law and subject to a provision for the New York Courts to have exclusive jurisdiction.

With reference to authority, Johnson J accepts that the relevant parties in interest who qualify as the Scheme Creditors are the ultimate beneficial owners of the Existing SSNs. By 14 September 2020, the Existing SSN Holders holding a majority by value of the Existing SSNs had provided their consent to (among others) the following key changes to the terms of the SSNs:  i) Amendment of the governing law provisions of the Trust Deed so that the Existing SSNs are governed by English rather than New York law. ii) Amendment of the jurisdiction provisions of the Trust Deed so that the Existing SSNs are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English Court in relation to any proceedings commenced by an obligor of the Existing SSNs, and the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the English Court in relation to other proceedings; iii) Accession of the Company to the Trust Deed as a co-issuer of the Existing SSNs.

At 18 it is said that an expert report on US and New York law confirms that the amendments to the governing law and jurisdiction clauses of the Trust Deed are valid under New York law and would be regarded as effective in any United States court applying that law.

The relevance of that finding for unwilling SSNs beneficiaries, I would argue, is not undisputedly established under Article 10 and Article 3(2) Rome I.

 

The Company then entered into a Supplemental Trust Deed on 14 September 2020 and thereby became a co-issuer of the Existing SSNs under the Trust Deed. As Johnson J notes at 44: it is only by means of the Supplemental Trust Deed that the Company became co-issuer of the Existing SSNs, and that the governing law and jurisdiction provisions were changed so as to refer to English law and jurisdiction.

It is clear that a jurisdictional link with England & Wales has been established specifically for the purpose of a company taking advantage of the scheme provisions in English law. With reference to Newey J in Re Codere Finance (UK) Ltd [2015] EWHC 3778 (Ch) which I reviewed here, this is held to be ‘good forum shopping’.

Article 25 Brussels Ia jurisdiction is only possible by means of the amendments to the Trust Deed effected via the Supplemental Trust Deed, as I also noted above. As I suggest there, had there been recalcitrant minority Note holders objecting to the change in court and law clause, I think the Scheme would not have been jurisdictionally home and dry on A25 choice of court grounds.

The next classic consideration is under Article 8(1)’s anchor defendant mechanism seeing as jurisdiction against the company is established per Article 4.

At 53 reference is made to Snowden J. who in Van Gansewinkel has suggested that in determining whether A8(1) applies, the Court is required to consider whether the “numbers and size of the scheme creditors domiciled in [the UK]” are “sufficiently large“: the result of that instruction is that applicants tend to point out the (debt) size of the creditors so domiciled, even if in DTEK Newey J held that size and number are irrelevant, ditto in Lecta Paper and Swissport Fuelling.

At 54 comes Johnson J’s obiter, useful finding:

Speaking for myself, I incline to the view that the presence of a single creditor is a necessary, but not of itself a sufficient, condition to the operation of Art. 8. I say that because in terms the power conferred by Art. 8 is engaged where “any one of” a number of defendants is domiciled in England & Wales, but even then the power is to be exercised only in cases where the language of the proviso in Art. 8 is satisfied – i.e., where the claims against the various defendants are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. I did not hear detailed argument on the meaning of this language, and in any event the application before me was uncontested, and so I express my view on it somewhat tentatively; but tentatively it seems to me that the question of expediency posed by the proviso is rather less about the geographical distribution in terms of number and size of the prospective defendants, and is rather more about the expediency in case management terms of connected claims being resolved in one place, even if only one anchor defendant is domiciled there. The argument in this case is that it is expedient for the claims against all EU domiciled Scheme Creditors to be resolved in one place, i.e. in England & Wales, because such claims all relate to the reorganisation of their indebtedness vis-à-vis the Company, and these Courts are best placed to resolve such questions given the separate jurisdiction they exercise over the Company under CA Part 26. Indeed, they may be uniquely placed to do so.

Opposition to the Scheme’s jurisdiction tends to evaporate once it gets to the convening and hearing stage. This is typically because the opposing creditors tend to by that stage be converted to the necessity of restructuring and the unattractiveness of having to pursue debt collection against a corporation in serious financial difficulty. As a result nearly all precedent is first instance only.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd edition 2016, Chapter 2, Chapter 5. Third edition forthcoming February 2021.

Scheme of arrangement. Rare more detailed consideration of A8(1) BIA jurisdiction (upheld) by Johnson J.
Conclusions on A25 'good forum shopping' remain shaky in my view given change of choice of court and law provisions from New York to English law and court. https://t.co/yL2edW1tMc

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 14, 2020

Lange v Lange. The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010’s equivalent of CJEU’s Webb v Webb, Schmidt v Schmidt etc.

GAVC - Wed, 10/14/2020 - 15:03

As I seem to be in a comparative mood today, thank you Jan Jakob Bornheim for flagging [2020] NZHC 2560 Lange v Lange. The case is further discussed by Jack Wass here – at the time of writing I only have Jack’s review to go on for the actual decision appears to be as yet unpublished.

TTPA 2010 follows the model of the more recent Hague Judgments Convention: recognition and enforcement of a judgment may be refused if it infringes jurisdictional rules detailed in the Act. For the case at issue, s 61(2)(c) of the TTPA is engaged. It requires the court to set aside registration of a judgment if it was “given in a proceeding the subject matter of which was immovable property” located outside Australia.

The determining concern is whether the New Zealand property was “in issue” (the words which Jack uses and which presumably Gault J employed; the Act itself uses ‘proceeding subject matter of which is’; compare with Brussels Ia’s ‘proceedings which have as their object’) in the proceedings. Gault J, citing authority, finds that a judgment setting aside a fraudulent disposition is not rendered unenforceable simply because the debt concerned the sale of New Zealand land. (A further appeal to ordre public was refused; for that to be successful, the result of recognition must, Jack notes, “shock the conscience” of the ordinary New Zealander” (Reeves v OneWorld Challenge LLC [2006] 2 NZLR 184 (CA) at [67].

Obvious comparative pointers with EU conflicts law are Webb v Webb, Weber v Weber, Schmidt v Schmidt, Komu v Komu etc.: readers will know that Article 24(1) Brussels Ia typically involves feuding family members.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6 . Third edition forthcoming February 2021.

Travelport. This one’s for comparative lawyers: Covid19, Pandemics and Material Adverse Effect, the LVMH /Tiffany acquisition and English cq Delaware law.

GAVC - Wed, 10/14/2020 - 11:11

A short note for the benefit of comparative contract lawyers who may find some interesting material when looking into the failed LVMH /Tiffany acquisition. That acquisition agreement (see SEC filing here)  is subject to the laws of Delaware other than claims against the financiers which are subject to the laws of New York (s.10.5). As readers might be aware, LVMH would seem to argue not that the Pandemic is a Material Adverse Effect which invalidates the merger. Rather, that Tiffany’s handling of its business in the pandemic is a MAE.

Of interesting comparative note therefore is Travelport Ltd & Ors v WEX Inc [2020] EWHC 2670 (Comm) where Cockerill J preliminarily discusses  the proper construction of, and burden of proof in relation to, the MAE definition contained in a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) dated 24 January 2020. The substantive issues will be dealt with before her at a later stage.

Geert.

(Preliminary) findings of comparative relevance to #LVMH #Tiffany merger (which is subject to the laws of Delaware: see https://t.co/uxmBf2XeSY)
Proper construction of, and burden of proof re definition of Material Adverse Effect contained viz #Covid19 in SPA under English law. https://t.co/8l6N42YyTZ

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) October 12, 2020

Council Conclusions on “Access to Justice – Seizing the Opportunities of Digitalisation”

European Civil Justice - Wed, 10/14/2020 - 00:58

The Council has made available today its 8 October 2020 Conclusions “Access to Justice – Seizing the Opportunities of Digitalisation”. There are attached to this post.

council-conclusions-access-to-justice-e28093-digitalisationDownload

Tanchev AG in Esso supports broad application of animal welfare to REACH chemicals registration process.

GAVC - Tue, 10/13/2020 - 12:12

In Case C‑471/18 P in which Tanchev AG Opined last month, Germany is asking the CJEU to set aside judgment in  T‑283/15 Esso Raffinage ECHA by which the General Court annulled entitled a European Chemical Agency (‘ECHA’)  letter entitled ‘Statement of Non-Compliance following a Dossier Evaluation Decision under  [REACH]’. The letter concerned the outcome of ECHA’s compliance check of Esso Raffinage’s registration dossier for a particular chemical substance. The main thrust of its appeal is that the REACH Regulation does not provide for further examination by ECHA of the conformity of the information submitted with the first compliance check decision, and that this matter falls within the competences of the Member States pursuant to the REACH enforcement provisions. In support of its position, it argues that a registrant must conduct animal testing specified in the Evaluation Decision, and cannot submit adaptations at that stage.

Esso and ECHA find themselves in an unusual alliance with animal rights activists who argue that a registrant must be able to submit adaptations in lieu of performing animal testing specified in a first compliance check decision.

The case mostly concerns the respective competences of Member States and ECHA under Reach, I highlight it here for the AG’s emphasis on the relevance of animal welfare in the Regulation: consideration of animal welfare through the reduction of animal testing is one of the objectives pursued by the REACH Regulation. At 158: ‘Viewed more broadly, as indicated by Esso Raffinage and [NGO], the promotion of animal welfare and alternative methods to animal testing in the REACH Regulation reflects Article 13 TFEU, pursuant to which, in formulating and implementing the European Union’s policies, the European Union and the Member States are to pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals.’

Animal welfare has come a long way since Michael Rose and I submitted it in CJEU C-1/96 Compassion in World Farming.

Geert.

 

For those interested in #AnimalWelfare & #REACH
Tanchev AG Opinion yday re allocation of competences between #ECHA and MS in assessing conformity of registration dossiers with #REACH.
Broader implications for the promotion of animal welfare under EU lawhttps://t.co/wxaJIxOfV1

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) September 25, 2020

French neonicotinoids measures and administrative compliance under EU law. The CJEU takes a view protective of Member States’ room for manoeuvre.

GAVC - Fri, 10/09/2020 - 07:07

The ‘transparency’ or ‘notification’ Directive 2015/1535 (the successor to Directive 98/34) featured twice at the CJEU yesterday. In Case C‑711/19 Admiral Sportwetten, the Court held that a national tax rule that provides for taxation of the operation of betting terminals does not constitute a ‘technical regulation’ that needs to be notified under the Directive. In Case C-514/19 Union des industries de la protection des plantes it held more directly than Kokott AG had opined, that France had validly informed the Commission of the need to take measures intended, in particular, to protect bees by banning the use of 3 active substances of the neonicotinoid family which had been authorised for use under the relevant EU procedure. That procedure is regulated by Directive 1107/2009 on plant protection products.

The complication in the case in essence is a result of the dual procedure for national safeguard measures as a result of the existence of both the PPP and the notification Directive. May a communication of a Member State under the Notification Directive, double as notification of emergency measures under the PPP Directive? The CJEU held it can, provided the notification contains a clear presentation of the evidence showing, first, that those active substances are likely to constitute a serious risk to human or animal health or to the environment and, second, that that risk cannot be controlled without the adoption, as a matter of urgency, of the measures taken by the Member State concerned, and where the Commission failed to ask that Member State whether that communication must be treated as the official provision of information under the regulation.

The Court referred to its findings in C-116/16 Fidenato, that a Member State’s power, provided by an EU act, to adopt emergency measures requires compliance with both the substantive conditions and procedural conditions laid down by that act (a requirement, I would add, which conversely also applies to the European Commission), but adds that a notification to the Commission under Article 71(1) of Regulation 1107/2009 requires only that the Member State concerned ‘officially informs’ that institution, without having to do so in a particular manner.

More generally, the Court emphasises the principle of sound administration imposed upon the EC, which explains its insistence on the EC having proactively to ensure the Member State concerned be aware of its obligations under the EU law concerned or indeed adjacent law. A certain parallel here may be made with the rules of civil procedure which require from those soliciting the courts that they approach the court with clean hands.

The Court in essence, I submit, finds that, the consequences for the Member State concerned in failing to meet the requirements for it to be able to make use of a safeguard provision in secondary law being so great, the conditions imposed on them must be met by a strict due diligence on behalf of the European Commission.

Of note is that the judgment does not entail any finding on the substantive legality of the French ban.

Geert.

 

 

131/2020 : 8 octobre 2020 - Ordonnance de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-201/20 P(R)

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - Thu, 10/08/2020 - 13:17
Junqueras i Vies / Parlement
Droit institutionnel
Le pourvoi contre l’ordonnance du vice-président du Tribunal rejetant la demande de référé de M. Junqueras i Vies est aussi rejeté

Categories: Flux européens

130/2020 : 8 octobre 2020 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-360/19

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - Thu, 10/08/2020 - 09:56
Crown Van Gelder
Liberté d'établissement
Un client peut introduire un recours contre le gestionnaire du réseau national à la suite d’une panne d’électricité

Categories: Flux européens

129/2020 : 8 octobre 2020 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-514/19

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - Thu, 10/08/2020 - 09:56
Union des industries de la protection des plantes
Rapprochement des législations
La France a valablement informé la Commission de la nécessité d’adopter des mesures visant notamment à protéger les abeilles

Categories: Flux européens

128/2020 : 6 octobre 2020 - Audience solennelle.

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - Tue, 10/06/2020 - 16:23
Entrée en fonctions des nouveaux membres à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne
Entrée en fonctions des nouveaux membres à la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne

Categories: Flux européens

PJSC Tatneft v Bogolyubov. Privilege under English law as lex fori.

GAVC - Tue, 10/06/2020 - 14:02

PJSC Tatneft v Bogolyubov & Ors [2020] EWHC 2437 (Comm) is another example of a case where privilege is firmly considered to be subject to lex fori, like in the New York courts but unlike the approach of the Dutch courts. Moulder J did discuss the extent to which the rule applies to foreign unregistered, in-house lawyers. However she does this purely from the English point of view and without any consideration of either Rome I or Rome II. That is not very satisfactory in my view. As I have signalled before, one can discuss whether privilege is covered by the evidence and procedure exception in the Rome Regulations, however it must be discussed and cannot be just brushed under the carpet.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Chapter 4.

(3rd ed forthcoming February 2021).

 

127/2020 : 6 octobre 2020 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans les affaires jointes C-245/19,C-246/19

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - Tue, 10/06/2020 - 09:50
État luxembourgeois (Droit de recours contre une demande d’information en matière fiscale)
DFON
Le droit à un recours effectif garanti par la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne impose de permettre aux personnes qui sont détentrices d’informations dont l’administration nationale demande la communication, dans le cadre d’une procédure de coopération entre États membres, de former un recours direct contre cette demande. En revanche, les États membres peuvent priver d’une telle voie de recours direct le contribuable visé par l’enquête fiscale et les tiers concernés par les informations en cause, dès lors qu’il existe d’autres voies de recours permettant à ces derniers d’obtenir un contrôle incident de ladite demande

Categories: Flux européens

126/2020 : 6 octobre 2020 - Arrêt de la Cour de justice dans l'affaire C-181/19

Communiqués de presse CVRIA - Tue, 10/06/2020 - 09:50
Jobcenter Krefeld
Libre circulation des personnes
Un ancien travailleur migrant et ses enfants bénéficiant d’un droit de séjour au titre de la scolarisation des enfants ne peuvent pas être automatiquement exclus de prestations sociales de base prévues par le droit national au motif que ce travailleur est tombé au chômage

Categories: Flux européens

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