GAVC

In Chep Equipment Pooling BV v ITS Ltd & Ors [2022] EWHC 741 (Comm), Salter DJ untangles a myriad of jurisdictional gateways, partially tortious (with reference to UKSC Brownlie, and to CJEU Bier etc where relevant), partially contractual and subject to choice of court. A forum non challenge is rejected.

The choice of court discussion is interesting in particular for at 48 the judge mixes the forum prorogati rule of Article 25 BIa juncto its recital 20. One of the defendants claims the privilege of an A25 choice of court to establish compulsory Belgian jurisdiction. The judge notes that the agreement of which the clause is part, is governed by Belgian law and

The Audit Agreement, although in the English language, is governed by Belgian law. Rightly, neither party had tendered evidence of the principles of interpretation of jurisdiction clauses under Belgian law. At this stage of the proceedings, reliance on the presumption of similarity with English law is sufficient: see Brownlie (supra) at [157], per Lord Leggatt. In those circumstances, I must simply apply to this provision the principles of interpretation articulated in Fiona Trust and Holding Corpn v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40, [2007] Bus LR 1719.

This is a touch incorrectly formulated. Per BIa, the existence of consent and its expression are governed by A25, not by reference to any national law. The validity of consent by contrast does rely on national law however it is not the lex contractus of the underlying agreement which is relevant but rather the lex fori prorogati (also Belgian law), with renvoi. The judge in my view cannot rely on English law to judge the validity of choice of court at good arguable case level: once jurisdiction settled, it will not be allowed to be revisited. Even at this stage, therefore, per BIa the enquiry arguably must be made under Belgian law. Whether there was actually any suggestion that under Belgian (and subject to renvoi) law consent may not have been given, is not clear from the judgment.

Claimants tried to argue that the claim does not arise ‘out of or in connection with’ the Audit Agreement that contains choice of court however the judge disagrees. This part of the claim therefore must be litigated in Belgium (and an A8(1) anchor would of course not assist to keep the proceedings in England).

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.10.4.

Mix of jurisdictional arguments, partially related to Brussels Ia, partially English gateways and forum non conveniens

Chep Equipment Pooling BV v ITS Ltd & Ors [2022] EWHC 741 (Comm)https://t.co/HInLrba4IF

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 1, 2022

Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd & Ors v LG Display Co Ltd & Anor [2022] EWCA Civ 423 concerns follow-on damages claimed against non-EU based defendants. The European Commission had earlier found the existence of a cartel. The Court of Appeal confirms the refusal of service out of the jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds, holding, like the first instance judge, that England & Wales are clearly not the appropriate forum (Taiwan and /or South Korea are).

I report the case for it contains an interesting Ps on the confidentiality of the EC finding: Males LJ:

The parties were united in urging upon us that the Commission Decision is confidential and that reference to its recitals should not be made in open court. I have to say that, as a general proposition, this seems paradoxical. I find it hard to see how a Decision can at the same time be both confidential and binding in public follow-on proceedings. To that extent it appears that any requirement of confidentiality may be in tension with the fundamental constitutional principle of open justice. Moreover, this particular Commission Decision deals with events which are now in the distant past and has been extensively litigated in the years since it was made. It is hard to think that there is any real confidentiality left.

Nevertheless I have been careful to confine my citation from the Decision to what is necessary to explain the submissions made to us and the conclusions which I have reached. I have referred only to recitals which were alleged to explain and support the operative part of the Decision (cf. Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways Plc [2015] EWCA Civ, [2016] Bus LR 145 at [68]) and have omitted any reference to other participants in the cartel who were not represented before us.

This invites interesting reflections on the principles of open justice in EU competition law findings – a discussion I shall leave to others.

Geert.

Follow-on damages action re EC finding of cartel, viz non-EU defendants.
Refusal of service out confirmed, E&W clearly not the appropriate forum.
Interesting ps on confidentiality of EU decision

Samsung Electronics ea v LG Display ea [2022] EWCA Civ 423https://t.co/vmDSR5OvCC

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 1, 2022

A brief post on the judgment of the CJEU in C-561/20 United Airlines. The CJEU held that the EU flight delay compensation rules of Regulation 261/2004 apply to a flight operated by non-EU airline on behalf of EU airline, even when  the delay relates to flight segment outside the EU. On the issue of international jurisdiction, the Court engages with customary international law questions, referring ia to its C-366/10 ATAA judgment which I discussed here.

The CJEU firstly [51] repeats that since

a principle of customary international law does not have the same degree of precision as a provision of an international agreement, judicial review must necessarily be limited to the question whether, in adopting the act in question, the institutions of the European Union made manifest errors of assessment concerning the conditions for applying such a principle

I do not think its poor view on the lucidity of customary international law is justified, however its finding that only manifest errors may lead to illegality does of course mean the CJEU does not have to worry about all the nuts and bolts of territorial jurisdiction. It suffices [52] that there is a close connection with the territory of the EU since the Regulation specifies that connecting flights fall within the scope of that regulation on the ground that the passengers have started their journey from an airport located in a Member State. [53]:

The regulation applies to a long delay caused in a leg of a flight operated in a third country only in limited and clearly defined circumstances in which the flight concerned, taken as a whole, is operated from an airport located in the territory of a Member State. Such a flight and its passengers thus retain a close connection with the territory of the European Union, including for the leg of the flight operated outside the European Union.

Flights which are wholly operated in a third country or between two third countries, without any connection with EU territory [55].

Geert.

#CJEU: EU #flightdelay rules apply to flight operated by non-EU airline on behalf of EU airline, even when delay relates to flight segment outside the EU.

Once text of full judgment available, we can see how much the Court engages with AG discussion of territoriality, int law. https://t.co/rGqA1n2idi

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 7, 2022

BRG NOAL GP SARL & Anor v Kowski & Anor [2022] EWHC 867 (Ch) continues the current trend of forum non conveniens applications galore, following Brexit. In the case at issue, with Luxembourg suggested as the appropriate forum, applicable law determination, under (retained) Rome I’s ‘characteristic performance’ rule plays a core role.

Applicable law needs to be determined essentially viz an undertaking as I understand it, by a, validly removed, investment fund General Partner, not to torpedo the subsequent orderly continuation of the fund. The core commitment reads

“I, [name], hereby acknowledge that [NOAL GP] is the managing general partner (“General partner”) of [the Fund] with effect from 27 August 2021 and unconditionally and irrevocably undertake (a) not to assert otherwise, or to induce or procure an assertion to the contrary or otherwise challenge or question the validity of its appointment or induce or produce such challenge or question, in any applicable forum and (b) to cooperate with and assist the General Partner in completing a full, orderly and timely transfer of the control of the Partnership and all of its assets and any obligations to the General Partner”.

Claimant [57] suggests the specific Undertaking in and of itself meets the CJEU Handte definition of a stand alone contractual obligation, however Smith J does not specifically hold on this for in her view even if this were correct, the overall contractual construction would have an impact on the applicable law consideration, seeing as in her view:

no choice of law was made; no default ‘passe partout’ contract as listed in A4(1) Rome I applies; A4(2) Rome I’s ‘characteristic performance’ test does not lead to an answer ([61]: there is no ‘characteristic performance’] and at any rate even if there were, the judge would have applied A4(3)’s escape clause to lead to Luxembourg law; and the ‘proper law of the contract’ per A4(4) Rome I ‘clearly’ [63-64] leads to Luxembourgish law.

In conclusion, a stay is ordered and the forum non application is successful. In my view the judge jumped too easily to Articles 4(3) and (4), denying Article 4(2)’s or even Article 3 choice of law’s effet utile. It is not unusual for judges to let their predetermination to apply A4(3) and /or (4) determine their A4(2) search for a lex contractus. Yet that frequency does not make the judgment right.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed, 2021, Heading 3.2.6.2.

Another extensively litigated forum non conveniens jurisdictional challenge, with core role for applicable law determination, retained A4 Rome I 'characteristic performance'
Stay in favour of Luxembourg proceedings

BRG NOAL v Kowski [2022] EWHC 867 (Ch) https://t.co/j3jAekQVXG

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 12, 2022

[contact-form]

When CJEU Bolagsupplysningen was held, I flagged immediately (I was not alone) that the judgment would necessarily create follow-up litigation.

At the level of the CJEU itself, Mittelbayerischer Verlag somewhat reigned in the consequences of Bier and Shevill, albeit not directly related to the discussions in Bolagsupplysningen. In Gtflix, the Court confirmed that each Member State where damage has occurred, will continue to have locus damni jurisdiction even if the claimant requests rectification of the information and the removal of the content placed online in another jurisdiction: one with full jurisdiction as either the Handlungsort or the place of the claimant’s centre of interests.

In England and Wales, Saïd v L’Express (a first instance case) held that it follows from Bolagsupplysningen that so far as internet publications are concerned, a claimant who is seeking injunctive relief (removal, correction in particular) may do so only in the places with full jurisdiction. This was implicitly confirmed in Napag, also a first instance case.

This conclusion has now been overturned by the Court of Appeal in Mincione v Gedi Gruppo Editoriale SPA [2022] EWCA Civ 557. This is a libel case brought by an Italian national with acquired British citizenship who is resident in Switzerland. He sues the Italian-domiciled publisher of a daily newspaper and weekly magazine, both of which are published predominantly in Italy and in the Italian language.

The first instance judge, Mincione v Gedi Gruppo Editoriale SpA [2021] EWHC 2006 (QB) had followed Said and Napag. The Court of Appeal notes that as a result of the Withdrawal Agreement it is bound by Bolagsupplysningen, it having been held before Brexit, and that it  ‘can have regard to’ ([65]) Gtlfix.

Warby J, seeking support in Gtflix, holds injunctive jurisdiction to restrain a harmful internet publication that has either occurred or “may occur”, does exist for the locus damni court yet only in respect of publication that may occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the court concerned. It can justify a domestic internet injunction, even for a ‘mosaic’ (locus damni) court, yet not to grant an injunctive remedy that would inevitably take effect extraterritorially.

The first instance judgment therefore is overturned on legal substance but  largely confirmed in practical reality: [72]. Current proceedings are largely held in substance, albeit not in form, to be a claim for a single and indivisible remedy. That is because a domestic internet injunction, prohibiting further publication, in this case however limited it might be in form, would, on the undisputed evidence, inevitably have extraterritorial effect. In future, technology might mean that an order framed as a domestic internet injunction would or could take territorial effect only. Yet in current technological reality, it is said that ordering removal would immediately have extraterritorial substantive effect. Those with knowledge of the technology may have more to say about this. Update 29 04 4:50 PM: the first instance judgment suggests this is related to the limited E&W jurisdiction, while the order would impact other parts of the UK, too: [98]: geo-blocking can only be done at a UK level, and the removal of a YouTube video can also be only done at a UK level (not: the E&W level).

The only part of the claim where jurisdiction for injunctive relief, if claimant is found at trial to have been libelled, will be possible, is for a so-called ‘section 12’ internet injunction: an order to publish a summary of the eventual judgment. That is because in the view of the the Court of Appeal, this relief can be targeted to the current subscriber basis of the publication outlets in England and Wales only.

Per Soriano, post Brexit a claimant will have to show that England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place to bring an action, with locus damni per  SC Brownlie the tort gateway. Bolagsupplysningen will therefore not echo for much longer in E&W, and I doubt therefore that the SC will hear an appeal if it were sought.

Geert.

EU private international law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.439 ff.

Court of Appeal overturns on the implications of #CJEU Bolagsupplysningen – jurisdiction to remove offensive articles published on the internet
Review on the blog shortly

Mincione v Gedi Gruppo Editoriale SPA [2022] EWCA Civ 557 https://t.co/UEZHfsSyy0

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 29, 2022

In JJH Enterprises Ltd (Trading As ValueLicensing) v Microsoft Corporation & Ors [2022] EWHC 929 (Comm) Picken J makes a debatable point in his discussion of a forum non conveniens application by defendants, Microsoft.

In the proceedings ValueLicensing claim damages arising from alleged breaches of competition law by Microsoft. The claim is a ‘stand alone’ one, not a ‘follow-on’ one. There is no underlying infringement decision of the European Commission (or any domestic competition regulator) on which ValueLicensing can rely to establish that an infringement of competition law has been committed.

Some of the Microsoft entities firstly seek summary dismissal of the case against them, arguing they cannot be held liable for an alleged infringement of either Article 101 or 102 TFEU as a result of an overall Microsoft ‘campaign’ in which they did not demonstrably take part. Here [31] ff there is interesting discussion ia of Provimi (Roche Products Ltd. & Ors v Provimi Ltd [2003] EWHC 961 (Comm)), which held that an entity that implements an agreement in breach of A101 to which a member of the same undertaking is a party can be held liable for the infringement even though the implementer itself does not know of the infringement. Specifically, whether Provimi was wrongly decided following from Cooper Tire Europe Ltd v Bayer Public Co Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 864  – this is an issue for which CJEU referral is not possible post Brexit.

The judge however refers to the broader concept of ‘undertaking’ in the A101-102 sense following eg CJEU C-882/19 Sumal SL v Mercedes Benz Trucks Espana SL. Sumal, Picken J holds [44], is relevant authority both pre and post Brexit.

Quite how parties see a difference in the lex causae for the competition law infringement pre and post Brexit is not clear to me. Post Brexit it is said to be ‘English law’ (held to include 101-102 TFEU prior to Brexit), full stop, while post Brexit that law is said to be determined by (retained) Article 6 Rome II, which for same of the claim will be English law as being one of the ‘affected markets’ per A6 Rome II.

It is in the forum non application that the judge posits [78] that an important consideration of England as the more appropriate forum, is

it is clear that Microsoft UK’s position at trial will be that in certain material respects English law has taken a divergent path from EU law. In such circumstances, it would be wholly inappropriate, and certainly undesirable, for a court in Ireland to be determining whether Microsoft UK is right about this. On the other hand, there would be no difficulty with the Court here applying EU competition law, either as part of English law (in respect of the pre-Brexit period and, if that is what the Court determines is the case, also in respect of the post-Brexit period) or as part of the laws of other EU/EEA member states, since the Court here is very experienced in doing just that.

If it is true that under forum non, only English courts can be held properly to determine the direction of English law post Brexit, the hand of many a claimant in forum non applications will surely be strengthened.

Geert.

Forum non conveniens
Interesting point [75] that E&W are the most appropriate forum, given that it must be EN courts determining whether EN law differs substantially from EU law post #Brexit

JJH Enterprises (ValueLicensing) v #Microsoft [2022] EWHC 929https://t.co/XP3z4nX8KV

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 19, 2022

In Amir Soleymani v Nifty Gateway LLC [2022] EWHC 773 (Comm) Abrose J largely rejected jurisdiction for the English courts in a claim following auction brought by a UK-based digital artwork collector. Another part of the claim was stayed pending arbitration in New York.

Faced with a clause in Nifty’s general terms and conditions that provide for binding arbitration in New York and for New York law to be the governing law of the contract, claimant seeks a declaration that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to it being unfair under the UK Consumer Rights Act 2015. Alternatively, he argued the governing law clause is invalid on the same statutory ground, and that a contract arising from the auction is void for illegality pursuant to the UK Gambling Act 2005.

Of note is that the US based arbitrator, in the proceedings initiated by Nifty, is considering himself (with procedural and discovery orders having been issued) broadly similar issues under consumer protection provisions of the ADR provider.

At [34] the qualification of NFTs as ‘art’ or merely ‘technology’ [‘the nature of NFTs as assets, and whether they are artwork, with the Claimant’s position being that he was trading in digital art whereas the Defendant maintained that an NFT is merely a unique string of code stored on a blockchain ledger that makes a digital artwork accessible, and marks authenticity’] is announced as potentially relevant for substance but not for current application.

The discussion largely takes place under retained EU law (s15b of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (as amended)). The judge holds [55] that the claim falls within the arbitration exception of (retained) Brussels Ia seeing as, as she qualifies it

The principal focus and subject matter of Mr Soleymani’s claim is whether he is legally obliged to arbitrate.

Recital 12 BIa is called upon in support. Claimant ([49]-[50] in particular are a good summary of the position) essentially argues such a view is incompatible with the effet utile of the consumer title. I believe that point has merit and one imagines it will be on this point that appeal will be sought (Bitar v Banque Libano-Francaise was offered in some support).

Whether the contract is a ‘consumer’ contract is still discussed [62] ff viz the claim for declaratory relief regarding the unfairness of the arbitration clause under the Gambling Act. The judge holds [79] that on the evidence put forward, Claimant has the better of the argument as to whether the Defendant was directing commercial activities to England (and the UK more generally). However she decides to grant the defendant a stay (which would not have been possible pre-Brexit) in favour of the unfairness issues being discussed in the New York arbitration. (These issues may later return to a UK court in the shape of an ordre public opposition to enforcement of the award in the UK).

I will of course notify if and when permission to appeal will have been granted.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.3.2, and 2.2.9.2.

No doubt permission to appeal will be sought in this case involving unfair commercial practices act, consumer protection, #arbitration exception of Brussels Ia https://t.co/aGB7eReFQU

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 6, 2022

I reviewed Pikamae AG’s Opinion in C-568/20 J v H Limited here. The issue is whether, exequatur having been abandoned in Brussels Ia, arguments as to whether the a judgment issued in a third, non EU Member, State of origin be at all covered by Brussels Ia may be raised by way of an Article 45 objection to recognition and enforcement.

The CJEU has now held and first of all clarifies its findings in C-129/92 Owens Bank. [36]: Owens Bank does not mean that a decision adopted on the basis of a judgment emanating from a third State, in accordance with the rules on jurisdiction and procedure of a Member State, may never fall within the scope of that regulation. [26] it is sufficient (but also necessary, GAVC) that they be judicial decisions which, before their recognition and enforcement are sought in a State other than the State of origin, have been, or have been capable of being, the subject, in that State of origin and under various procedures, of an inquiry in adversarial proceedings. This re-emphasises the audi alteram partem principle such as emphasised eg in CJEU Zulikarpašić. It also means that ‘exequatur sur exequatur ne vaut‘ is not quite dead, as has been suggested – a mere confirmative order of an ex-EU judgment without adversarial proceedings would not enjoy free movement.

At [29] the Court moreover instructs, with reference to the principle of mutual trust, that the courts in the State of recognition, must not apply the definition restrictively. In the case at issue [32] the High Court order at issue in the main proceedings was, at the very least, the subject of a summary hearing in the Member State of origin, hence it qualifies as a ‘judgment’.

While the Court effectively acknowledges that this amounts to Brussels Ia-sanctioned recognition and enforcement of non-EU judgments through the backdoor (‘on the substance, that [UK, GAVC] order was made so as to give effect to judgments delivered in a third State which are not, as such, enforceable in the Member States’: [33]), A45’s grounds of refusal, including infringement of ordre public, remain available: [45]

Such an infringement may, inter alia, lie in the fact that the party against whom enforcement is sought was not able to defend him or herself effectively before the court of origin and to challenge the decision sought to be enforced in the Member State of origin

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed 2021, 2.573.

CJEU this morning, Brussels Ia, recognition and enforcement by EU MS of money judgment issued in third State, may only constitute 'judgment' enjoying Part III recognition & enforcement if audi alteram partem principles are methttps://t.co/HldcLYDgSZ

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) April 7, 2022

Clarke v Kalecinski & Ors [2022] EWHC 488 (QB) concerns a claim for damages for personal injury sustained during cosmetic surgery undergone by claimant on 7 January 2015. Claims is against the surgeon (domiciled and habitually resident in Poland; but also registered with the UK General Medical Council) who performed the breast and thigh procedures in Poland, and against the Clinic (a company incorporated in Poland in which  the surgeon and his wife are the sole shareholders and directors), where the operations were carried out and she received pre-and post-operative treatment. Claimant also sues the insurer of the Clinic.

Jurisdiction is not disputed. Both surgeon and clinic are being sued under the consumer title of Brussels Ia. The insurance company is being sued under CJEU Odenbreit: subject to the applicable law of the tort and the existence under same of a direct right of action against an insurer, section 3 BIa gives claimant a right to sue in claimant’s domicile.

Claimant sues both surgeon and clinic, both in contract and in tort. She seeks to hold the clinic either directly or vicariously liable for the failures of the surgeons who treated her – one other Polish surgeon was involved in her care – and the nurses who cared for her at the clinic in Poland. Total potential liability for the insurance company, under the indemnity of the clinic (they do not insure the surgeon) is limited to approximately £38,500.

Proper law of the contract is English law, per A6(1) of the consumer title of Rome I. This is not disputed. It had been anticipated by claimant until trial that it was also a matter of agreement that the proper law of the claim in tort was Polish law, per Rome II. However in its skeleton argument, for the first time, the insurer raised an issue about the adequacy of claimant’s pleading arguing they had failed to plead the Polish law upon which they relied, so the proper law of the tortious claim was by default, English law.  That was rejected by the judge on the basis of the exchange between parties.

At [104] ff Foster J discussed the application of A17 Rome II: the judge must take into account as a matter of fact, the rules of safety and conduct in force at the place and time of the event, i.e. Poland. However [107] the judge insists on the importance of the English standard of care

where it is a term of the contract that the first defendant would operate to the same standard as a UK surgeon, skilled in this specialism, and registered with the GMC, it is that standard, that applied to the activities in issue here. The care offered by the clinic likewise. [emphasis in the original]

Those terms of the contract were deduced by the judge [77]:

[claimant] does not allege that she signed any contract or document, save for a consent form which the court has not seen. However, in my judgement the substance of the representations on the website upon which Ms Clarke clearly relied, were incorporated into the contract between her and the clinic together with Mr Kaleciński. In my judgement this was one contract but involving both parties: the surgeon and all the other care givers at the clinic, by means of the clinic (Noa Clinic Uslugi Sp. z o.o), those incorporated representations were to the following effect. The first defendant would carry out the surgery and he would carry it out to the standard to be expected of a GMC registered surgeon proficient in plastic surgery.

This emphasis by the judge imparts once again the relevance of language, no doubt for marketing purposes, for the consequential legal obligations. Foster J moreover holds [108]

That standard applies to the tortious duty also by reason of the  representations made to which reference is made above.

and [109] she holds

the findings of [the expert] are couched in such stringent terms that they cover any surgical and indeed clinical practice whether governed by local Polish customs or not. The conclusions of [the expert] put paid to any subtlety of distinction between local custom and English practice that might … in other circumstances be considered relevant. What took place fell so far below acceptable standards I cannot accept the contention that local standards or practices might have rendered the egregious failings in this case acceptable as a matter of contractual or tortious obligation.

The judge’s findings on A17 Rome II are interesting. Yet I find her conclusions on website representations even more relevant.

Geert.

1/2 Medical wrongdoing
Claim v two defendants under consumer title, one Odenbreit claim [action v wrongdoer's insurer], insurance title Brussels Ia
Applicable law in contract Rome I, tort Rome II, issue ia re A17 RII: standards of performance expected of Polish professionals

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 9, 2022

The Dutch court of first instance held at the end of March (English version of the judgment is here) on the merits of Esther Kiobel’s case against Shell, proceedings which she unsuccessfully tried to bring in the US under the ATS and then pursued in The Netherlands as I reported at the time.

In my earlier post I pointed out that the Dutch court narrowly construed the case that could be pursued in the Netherlands: Only limited claims, of the Nigerian daughter’s involvement in the bribing of witnesses, were allowed to continue. Those claims have now been dismissed.

The judgment is fairly succinct, many points having discussed at length in the interim jurisdictional and case-management decision. Witnesses’ recent interviews (by the Dutch courts, but without cross-examination. Not because it was not offered but because counsel did not feel the need to proceed with it) were cross-checked against earlier statements which had been entered as evidence in the US proceedings. The court [2.26] holds that

the alleged involvement of the SPDC in witness bribery is not proven with the statements of the witnesses produced by the claimants. This is also true when viewing these witness statements in conjunction.

As I pointed out here in reply to Lucas Roorda, if I were claimant’s counsel looking for appeal grounds, I would study the Dutch court’s application of Nigerian common law evidentiary standards for upholding civil liability.

The court’s approach to the witness statements is that they cannot sustain SPDC bribery involvement. The evidence of SPDC staff presence at relevant meetings (often in police stations) is, when not held to be factually (albeit on minor points) contradicted by earlier statements (going back 20 years for some of them), found to be circumstantial only. Witnesses point to people that were referred and /or pointed to when Shell-related employment (as a reward) was discussed, briefcases held by people with the outward, corporate appearance of Shell staff, people driving off in cars with corporate stickers formerly used by Shell. None of this satisfied the court’s evidentiary requirements without however proper discussion of what, under Nigerian law, that standard would require.

Geert.

Dutch court holds #Shell is not complicit in Nigerian security forces treatment of Esther Kiobel and others’ family members.
An issue of evidence rather than grand #bizhumanrights legal principle. https://t.co/z1rn2akUVc

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 23, 2022

I have just blogged on the Leuven public law blog, on the independent expert penal’s Ecocide proposal, here. I am reposting here for completeness’ purposes.

Geert.

In Farrar & Anor v Miller [2022] EWCA Civ 295, the issue is whether a firm of solicitors which has been acting for a claimant in litigation pursuant to a damages-based agreement can validly take an assignment of their client’s cause of action.

It is the common law of champerty which militates against law firms acting ostentatiously as a party with a purely commercial interest in the litigation and it is their role as officers of the court which is cited as being core of the hesitation (see inter alia the EP study on third party litigation funding here). In England and Wales it was the rules against maintenance and champerty that, prior to 1990, led to solicitors ia not being able to conduct litigation pursuant to conditional fee agreements -CFAs.

Statute then intervened to change this in narrowly defined circumstances  (CFAs and damages-based agreements only) however that did not lift the common law’s general opposition to same and it is this opposition which both the first instance judge and the Court of Appeal refer to to reject the possibility of assignment: [52]

the Assignment is neither a conditional fee agreement nor a damages-based agreement: what section 58(1) and section 58AA(2) show is that Parliament, being well aware of the common law rules, decided to go so far towards relaxing them as sections 58 and 58AA provide and no further.

Permission to appeal with the Supreme Court is being sought.

Geert.

Litigation funding. common law principles of assignment, including champerty
Whether solicitors acting pursuant to damages-based agreement can validly take assignment of client's cause of action

Farrar & Anor v Miller [2022] EWCA Civ 295https://t.co/On1VyazyO8 pic.twitter.com/hvG1kU07bO

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 12, 2022

I have reported on conflict of laws (jurisdictional and applicable law) angles to the EP’s draft proposals on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence before. As I discuss in those posts (more analysis is on NOVA’s site here), many of the suggested routes created more difficulties than they solved. In the eventual February proposal (with 71 recitals: that is poor legislative drafting), the conflict of laws ambitions are much reduced. Leigh Day have a good summary of the issues here. Thank you Jorian Hamster for poking me to put my thoughts to paper.

The jurisdictional ambition is now merely expressed in terms of regulatory scope. On p.15 under the proportionality assessment, the proposal justifies its public international scope using the effects doctrine:

The EU turnover criterion for third-country companies creates a link to the EU. Including only turnover generated in the Union is justified since such a threshold, appropriately calibrated, creates a territorial connection between the third-country companies and the Union by the effects that the activities of these companies may have on the EU internal market, which is sufficient for the Union law to apply to third-country companies.

Proposed A2(1) focuses on ‘EU corporations’ (“companies which are formed in accordance with the legislation of a Member State) and proposed A2(2) looks at non-EU corporations (“companies which are formed in accordance with the legislation of a third country”), each with relevant thresholds distinguishing between quantitative (turnover) and qualitative (risk sectors: textiles, agriculture, extractive industries) criteria.

I am not sure why the lex incorporationis is preferred as the trigger criterion. Domicile as defined in Brussels Ia‘s Article 63 could be more attractive, seeing as it captures corporations with statutory seat outside of the EU but with their central administration or principal place of business here.

‘Turnover generated in the EU’ is bound to provoke some discussions however experience from in particular competition law should be able to help here.

The most obvious anchor point for applicable law is proposed A22. This sets out the requirement for Member States to define rules governing the civil
liability of the company for damages arising due to its failure to comply with the due diligence requirements, and then suggests in (5)

Member States shall ensure that the liability provided for in provisions of national law transposing this Article is of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the law of a Member State.

The intention of this Article is to make the national civil liability rules which Member States are due to ensure in follow-up of the future Directive, so-called ‘overriding mandatory law’ aka ‘lois de police’ aka ‘lois d’application immédiate’ under A16 Rome II. The challenge for the EU to harmonise private law, such as civil liability rules, shows in this formulation. The EC makes recourse to a Directive, not a Regulation, since (p.17)

The proposed instrument is a Directive, since Article 50 TFEU is the legal basis for company law legislation regarding the protection of the interests of companies’ members and others with a view to making such protection equivalent throughout the Union. Article 50 TFEU requires the European Parliament and the Council to act by means of directives.

Hence rather than formulating the future Directive’s liability provisions itself as of overriding EU law nature (a possibility expressly foreseen in Rome I’s rules on applicable law for contracts, but not impossible I believe within Rome II), the Directive will oblige Member States to ensure the lois de police character of their future rules implementing the Directive. I understand the difficulty yet I think the proposal could shortcut the discussion (and avoid difficulties in case a Member State fails to declare the lois de police nature) by declaring ‘Member States’ provisions of national liability law transposing this Article are of overriding mandatory application in cases where the law applicable to claims to that effect is not the law of a Member State.’

(the latter part I believe is simply redundant).

In claims based on tortious liability, the Directive is most likely to be used to help establish fault (by action or omission). The remainder of the action (solidarity between various tortfeasors, damage calculation etc) will remain subject to the lex causae otherwise applicable. In claims based on unjust enrichment (a business and human rights route much worth exploring for supply chain cases) the Directive will most likely remain of smaller use seeing as these claims do not aim to establish liability, however the  paper trail which the Directive will ensure, may be of documentary use here, too.

Geert.

At first sight few conflict of laws anchors in EU's proposed due diligence law
EU turnover as threshold is reminiscent of EU competition law
Registered office as compliance anchor
A22 qualifies the Dir as lois de police viz Rome I, II
71 recitals – yukhttps://t.co/JV1dip9gfW pic.twitter.com/Obhkn3qXR8

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 23, 2022

Al Assam & Ors v Tsouvelekakis [2022] EWHC 451 (Ch) shows the way many claims involving EU Member States facts or defendants are likely to go, until the novelty of newly found forum non freedom wears off perhaps: with intensive forum non conveniens-based jurisdictional challenges.

The defendant is domiciled in England and Wales. The claimants are the settlors of 2 Cypriot trusts who claim for the losses suffered in connection with the trusts’ investments. The trusts were both established under the International Trusts Law of the Republic of Cyprus.

As in Klifa v Slater, the forum non test, following Spiliada and VTB v Nutritek, [12] involves two limbs: Under limb 1 of the test, the Defendant must establish that the courts of Cyprus are both (i) “available” and (ii) are clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English courts as a forum for determining the dispute. If the Defendant can establish that limb 1 of Spiliada is satisfied, it becomes necessary to consider limb 2. Limb 2 requires a consideration of whether, even if the courts of Cyprus are an available forum that is clearly or distinctly more appropriate for the trial of the action than the courts of England, justice nevertheless requires that a stay of the English proceedings should not be granted.

On availability, there is a bit of to and fro and each other’s Cypriot law legal experts, particularly on the territorial jurisdiction under residual Cypriot rules. However the conclusion [26] is that the Cypriot courts are ‘available’.

Obiter, Richards DJ discusses whether if there is no availability under Cypriot law, there might be availability if there is a submission to jurisdiction and/or an agreement /choice of court.

Discussion here was first whether A26 Brussels Ia could remedy the lack of territorial jurisdiction under Cypriot law. Unlike A25 choice of court, A26 does not include language making the defendant’s domicile in the EU a precondition for its application. At [32] the conclusion for the purpose of these proceedings is that there is a real risk that the Cypriot courts will not have jurisdiction on the basis of A26.

The discussion then [33ff] turns to the Cypriot courts being the clearly or distinctly a more appropriate forum with the conclusion being in the negative.

Helpfully, and suggested by counsel, the judge puts the following structure to the analysis:

a) personal connections ([39]: defendant’s residence in England remains a relevant factor pointing towards the English courts being the appropriate forum);

b) factual connections (held: correspondence between the parties will be of more relevance than the physical location of parties in Cyprus);

c) evidence/convenience/expense (conflicting factors here but none leading overwhelmingly to Cyprus);

d) applicable law (most likely Cypriot law for many of the claims however ia given the similarity with English law, this is not an overwhelmingly relevant issue [56] and some Swiss law will have to be applied anyways); and

e) the “overall shape of the litigation”, held [59] not to be Cypriot.

Limb 2, the requirements of justice, is considered obiter under two angles [61]: delays and the possibility of statutes of limitation kicking in. On the delays, [67] comity and caution to express chauvinistic views upon a friendly jurisdiction argue against a finding of unavailability of justice on this ground, particularly as the experts’ views on this were inconclusive; the possibility of statute of limitation is held [68] largely to be of the claimants’ own making (ia because they had started but discontinued proceedings in Cyprus. Limb 2 therefore, had it mattered, would not have been satisfied and had limb 1 been met, a stay of the proceedings in England would have been ordered.

Geert.

Defendant domiciled in E&W. Claimants (settlors of 2 Cypriot trusts sue for losses suffered in connection with Trusts' investments. Forum non argument dismissed. Another lengthy discussion following Brexit

Al Assam ea v Tsouvelekakis [2022] EWHC 451 (Ch) https://t.co/Sd7TJSkG3k

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 8, 2022

Many thanks indeed Hélène Péroz for flagging Sherpa & Les Amis de la terre France v Perenco ECLI:FR:CCASS:2022:C100199. The issue concerns what law applies to the issue of standing of NGOs in making recourse to France’s action for preserving evidence, in this case evidence relating to a future claim that France’s Perenco is liable for environmental damage in Congo.

The Court of Appeal had held that the issue of standing is subject to lex causae, which under the Rome II Regulation it had identified as the laws of Congo (whether this judgment included discussion of Article 7 Rome II on environmental damage, I do not know) and had declared the claim inadmissible.

The SC correctly in my mind holds that the issue of standing falls under the evidence and procedure carve-out of Rome II and is subject to lex fori, French law. However seeing as that law in the case of public interest litigation such as here requires the claimant to have included the broad purpose of the sector at issue within its scope of activities under its by-laws, the SC also holds that whether a particular claim is within the NGO’s scope, needs to be determined in accordance with its lex societatis.  This leads to the interesting conclusion (of little relevance in casu) that a foreign NGO’s action remit will have to be determined by foreign lex societatis, and that those foreign laws which have a less broad view of corporate scope, may put a spanner in the works of cross-border business and human rights litigation. (Quite easily circumvented one assumes by involving NGOs of an ‘attractive’ jurisdiction).

The SC nota bene does not specify whether its views on corporate (here: NGO) action radius are a result of the corporate carve-out in Rome II.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 4.79 ff.

Must read this properly tomorrow for currently on cooking duty. (All under control. Nothing burning).
Potentially quite exciting. French SC on the applicable law for capacity to represent a (Congolese) NGO re a #bizhumanrights environmental claim. https://t.co/ZP4IxXAzWi

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 9, 2022

In Klifa v Slater & Anor [2022] EWHC 427 (QB), concerning a ski accident in Courchevel, France, the Claim Form was issued on 14 January 2021, just within the three year limitation period of England and Wales but just after the Brexit “Exit Day” also know as IP day (Brexit implementation day) (of 31 December 2020). Defendants take advantage of that to argue a forum non conveniens defence (which readers will know would have been impossible under Brussels Ia). France is suggested to be the ‘most appropriate forum’.

The skiing accident took place on 27 January 2018 and when (and as still is the case) the Claimant was domiciled and resident and habitually resident in France, the First Defendant was domiciled and resident (they being on holiday) in England & Wales, and the Second Defendant (the insurance company) was domiciled in England & Wales. Under Rome II, French law is the applicable law, other than for procedural law, including as to recovery of legal and other costs of the litigation, which is subject to English law, lex fori.

That latter element returns (with reference to ia Wall v Mutuelle de Poitiers) [25] as part of the forum non conveniens assessment, seeing as (Dagnall M) ‘in consequence of the difference in their methods of adducing expert evidence, the English & Welsh jurisdiction procedural approach is likely to be considerably more expensive than that in France, and which is reflected in the costs rules and approach of each country.’

At [40] Master Dagnall sums up the many issues leading to the case being very ‘French’ in nature, deciding on balance however [42] that the defendants have not met the (high hurdle) of proving that France is “distinctly” or “clearly” the more appropriate forum.

At [44] ff he holds obiter that even if they had met that test, a stay in favour of proceedings in France would not assist with “achieving the ends of justice”L the second part of the forum non test. At [48] two factors are singled out: enforcement will have to take place in England; and a lot of work prior to the claim form being issued was carried out prior to IP day, when forum non was not an issue. Recovering those costs would be impossible in France.

The point has been made ad nauseam by many and this case is a good illustration: post Brexit, forum non is back with a vengeance and it is a time-consuming and costly business.

Geert.

Evidence & procedure, quantification of damages under French law, impact on forum non conveniens (denied on the facts) in case of tort which occurred whilst Brussels Ia applied but with claim brought after Brexit
Klifa v Slater & Anor [2022] EWHC 427 (QB) https://t.co/xCfJYJws2f

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 8, 2022

It is interesting to imagine the legal position in Lambert v Motor Insurers’ Bureau (Rev1) [2022] EWHC 583 (QB) in a scenario of retained EU law post Brexit, rather than firmly within the scope of the Brussels Ia Regulation and applicable law under Rome II. By the mechanisms of EU consumer law and EU insurance law, mixed with the finest legal machinery in the area of subrogation, a UK resident party injured in a motor accident (here: at a private racing circuit in Spain) abroad is entitled to claim compensation from the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (‘MIB’) in certain circumstances, clarified by the UKSC in Moreno v MIB [2016] UKSC 52. Crowther DJ summarises these circumstances as [6]

broadly speaking, that the guarantee fund of the member State in which the accident occurred would be liable to compensate the injured person on the facts of the individual case, when applying the rules of the local law which govern such actions by injured persons against the local guarantee fund. In other words, if Mr Lambert can show that the Spanish guarantee fund would have been liable to him in respect of the accident, he can claim such compensation from the MIB as would have been payable by the local guarantee fund. It is common ground in this case that the scope of the insurance obligation for use of motor vehicles under Spanish law extended to cover participation in the track event, notwithstanding the fact that it was not on a road or other public place.

The latter element is unlike the UK where seemingly third party motor insurance for motor sport is not commercially available.

The law applicable to the claim is agreed to be English law. While not specified in the judgment, this is presumably because of Article 4(2) Rome II (where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply): both Mr Lambert, claimant, and Mr Prentice, said to be responsible for the accident, were participants in a track event, organised by a UK based track day operating outfit called Track Sense; both travelled to Spain from the UK.

Spanish law however determines the preliminary issue as highlighted by the Supreme Court, Spanish law being the law which would have been applicable to any hypothetical claim which Mr Lambert might have brought against the Spanish guarantee fund. This is where things get interesting. The Motor Insurance Directives support a direct claim against one’s national MIB, subject to the law of the MS where the accident happened, sustaining liability in the circumstances. However Rome II somewhat curtails its action radius by declaring that it does not apply to ‘evidence and procedure’. This is a carve-out which is problematic in specific instances as I explain ia here. On such instance are issues of limitation however these it seems ([14)] were not pursued.

In the case at issue, parties’ agreement ([9]) is that by analogy to A1(3) Rome II, matters of evidence and procedure are outside the scope of the material substantive law and fall to be determined in accordance with English law as the law of the forum (lex fori in principle determines issues of evidence and procedure). Equally, on an analogous basis to A22(1) Rome II, parties agree that Spanish law will apply insofar as it contains rules which raise presumptions of law or determine the burden of proof.

The common law treating foreign law as fact, means the content of that foreign law is established often with the help of parties (if need be cross-examined) experts however [17] is for the English judge to determine. The remainder of the case therefore is spent discussing the expert evidence (with the judge doing some fine distinguishing of the case-law both experts referred to) together with the factual elements, to conclude [94]

Mr Lambert’s actions were 25% causative of the accident and Mr Prentice’s 75%. It follows that Mr Lambert’s claim for damages against MIB succeeds to the extent of 75% of his loss or damage.

Lest my understanding of the insurance Directives fails me (which it could well do), this means that claim on 75% of the damage remains to be judged under English  tort law. With presumably a repeat of the causation test, this time under English law.

A clearly written judgment which no doubt benefitted from the considerable practice experience of the judge on the matters at hand.

Geert.

Applicable law, accident at motorcycle track event
Rome II evidence, procedure exception mutatis mutandis (per motor insurance regulations), and approach to Spanish law as a matter of fact
Judgment by @sarahcrowtherqc
Lambert v [MIB] [2022] EWHC 583 (QB)https://t.co/OhVSZ1ljt0

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 16, 2022

Zubaydah v Foreign And Commonwealth Office & Ors [2022] EWCA Civ 334  discusses the same issue as Rahmatullah and Ali v MOD and FCO which I review here (and in which I later inserted the High Court judgment in current case).

What law is applicable to torts allegedly committed by the UK Security Services against a detainee subjected to “enhanced interrogation techniques” by the US CIA. The essence of the claimant’s claim is that the Services were aware that the claimant was being subjected to extreme mistreatment and torture at secret CIA “black sites” in six different countries, but nevertheless sent numerous questions with a view to the CIA eliciting information from him, expecting and intending (or at any rate not caring) that the claimant would be subject to such mistreatment and torture at interrogation sessions conducted for the purpose of attempting to obtain this information.

The first instance judge had refused to overturn the mosaic of six applicable laws (of the countries involved: Thailand, Poland, the US’ base at Guantanamo Bay, Morocco, Lithuania and Afghanistan) which follows from the standard application of the residual English conflict of laws rules (the EU Rome II Regulation does not apply): these point to lex locus damni. Males LJ to my mind unconvincingly does overturn that general rule, with  some reliance on the Supreme Court in VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek. 

The Court holds [37] that the judge had failed to focus on the tort allegedly committed by the UK Services (with too much emphasis on the treatment of claimant in the six countries, by the CIA); [38] wrongly discounted the reasons advanced by claimant for saying that the factors connecting the tort with the Six Countries were of reduced significance (this includes the fact that the claimant had no control whatever over his location and in all probability no knowledge of it either; and that there was a (jurisdictional) forum shopping element in the transfers to the 6 countries: keeping him away from jurisdictions with less forgiving rules on the practices concerned); and [40] the fact that the actions taken by the Services were undertaken “for the perceived benefit of the UK”, that is to say in the interests of this country’s national security.

The reasonable expectations of claimant play a big role in the analysis: claimant could have expected [41] that the conduct of any country’s security services having to do with him would be governed by the law of the country concerned. As for the Services, they would reasonably have expected that their conduct here would be subject to English law.

Throughout the judgment Males LJ puts great emphasis on what he notes [22] as an overarching aim of the relevant Act, which is ‘the reasonable and legitimate expectations of the parties to a transaction or an occurrence.’ However that is the Law Commission’s view on the raison d’être of conflict of laws full stop. I am not so sure it can serve as a determinative principle in the application of a specific rule of the Act.

I am not saying that the outcome of the case is wrong. Yet the judgment gives the impression of a correction of the judge’s factual balancing act between the different factors, rather than an error of law, and the emphasis on legitimate expectations feels a bit artificial in the circumstances. Add to this that [35] nobody suggested on the facts of this case that one applicable law might apply to the tort of misfeasance in public office and another to the tort of false imprisonment. Both parties proceeded on the basis that the law applicable to the claimant’s claims as a whole was either English law or the law of the Six Countries, and so did the Court of Appeal. This, too, may make the judgment’s authority limited.

Finally Males LJ holds obiter [51 ff] and correctly that it is too early to decide whether the application of the foreign laws, had they been applicable, would have had to be set aside on the basis of ordre public: while some evidence on the law of the 6 countries had been presented, there had not yet been proper discussion of same.

Geert.

See my analysis of an earlier, similar High Court case with different outcome here https://t.co/NRZYDLJjZJ (Rome I does not apply). https://t.co/N3bKc7g3gm

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 16, 2022

The London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v The Kingdom of Spain M/T “PRESTIGE” (No. 5) [2022] EWCA Civ 238 is an appeal against The London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v The Kingdom of Spain [2020] EWHC 1920 which I reported on here.

The issue on this appeal (tag ‘Prestige’ on this blog and ‘Prestige(@GAVClaw)’ on Twitter search will give you plenty of returns) is the very reference of the judge to the CJEU. At Kirchberg the case is known under reference C-700/20 and the hearing was held a few weeks back.

At issue is essentially whether the judge should have made reference to the CJEU at all, hence querying the ‘necessity’ of a reference to the CJEU including in this particular context of Brexit (with the Court of Appeal now longer being able to refer to Luxembourg by the time the case would have reached it).

Phillips LJ holds [47] that the reference was not necessary in light of CJEU authority on that element of necessity and that the judge should not have made it. Yet under the EU rule of law, a Court of Appeal cannot set aside the reference: [56] all the CA can do is ask the judge to reconsider, with [60] a call for fast-tracking in the event the CJEU might  rule before the judge withdraws the reference: if that latter is what he would be minded to do.

An interesting EU institutional law issue.

Geert.

1/2 EU rule of law
LDN Steam-Ship Owners' Mutual Insurance v Spain re Prestige [2022] EWCA Civ 238
Held CJEU referral should not have been made and judge must reconsider his reference to Luxembourghttps://t.co/tIAj7hmU8o
For judgment appealed see https://t.co/LgOFOXsRmo

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 4, 2022

Suppipat & Ors v Siam Commercial Bank Public Company Ltd & Ors [2022] EWHC 381 (Comm) repeats (and indeed refers to) the inadequate discussion of applicable law and privilege in PJSC Tatneft v Bogolyubov which I discuss here.

The application is for an order prohibiting respondents from using or deploying in these proceedings certain documents covered by legal professional privilege and/or containing confidential information, copies of which the respondents obtained pursuant to subpoenas in Thailand.

It is not in dispute apparently [26] and in any event Pelling J would have concluded that whether a document is capable of being privileged is a question to be determined as a matter of English conflicts law by the lex fori, which in this case is English law. That follows not undisputedly from the Rome Regulation which applies to the proceedings as either acquired or retained EU law (it is not clear when the claim form was issued).

The next question that arises is whether the Documents should be treated as privileged in this litigation notwithstanding that they have been obtained by the respondents lawfully by operation of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction in Thailand. This question is discussed as one of an alleged breach of an obligation of confidence (the subpoena in Thailand does not mean that the documents have entered the public domain) and the law that should apply to that obligation which both parties suggest must be discussed under Rome II. Thai law according to the defendants ([38-39] an unjust enrichment /restitution claim under Article 10; alternatively locus damni under the general rule of Article 4 with Thailand as the locus damni, it being the place of disclosure) , however claimants maintain that the issue is to be resolved applying English law for essentially all the reasons set out in the authorities deciding that English law applies to the question whether a particular document is privileged or not.

Pelling J [40] ff agrees with the claimants and holds that even if Rome II were to apply, both A16 Rome II’s overriding mandatory law rule and A26’s ordre public rule would trump Thai law given the robust nature of legal advice privilege in English law. That statement leads to an incorrect application of both Articles (for starters, A26 requires case-specific, not generic application).

The Rome II discussion cuts many corners and is certainly appealable. The judge’s views put the horse before the cart. Neither Article 16 nor Article 26 are meant to blow a proper Rome II analysis out off the water. Nor as I flagged, does the judgment do justice to the proper application of A16 and 26.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 4.81.

Documents must be treated as privileged under English lex fori notwithstanding they were obtained lawfully by court order of competent jurisdiction in Thailand
Considers comity and extraterritoriality

Suppipat v Siam Commercial Bank [2022] EWHC 381 (Comm)https://t.co/dJivtUuef4

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 4, 2022