Conflictoflaws

Applications for the 2019 Nygh Hague Conference Internship Award close at the end of this month. The award contributes towards the costs of a student or graduate, of an Australian law school, working for up to six months at the Secretariat of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in the Netherlands.

The internship aims to foster Australian involvement in the work of the Hague Conference and is established in memory of the late Hon. Dr. Peter Nygh AM. The Australian Institute of International Affairs and the Australian Branch of the International Law Association sponsor the award.

The successful candidate is expected to start the internship in The Hague on 14 January 2019. Further details and information on how to apply is available here.

The Institute of German and International Procedural Law at the University of Bonn is looking for research fellows (Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin / Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) at the Chair of Prof. Dr. Matthias Weller on a part-time basis (50% and 25%).

Your task will include supporting the chair in research and teaching, especially in the areas of conflict of laws, international civil procedure, private law and cultural property law.

A candidate should hold a first law degree (i.e. the German First State Exam) above average (at least “vollbefriedigend”). A very good command of German is required, further language skills will be an asset.

The positions will be paid according to the salary scale E 13 TV-L. The contract period will be limited to 3 years (with a possibility of renewal). Supervision of a PhD in the research fields of the chair will be offered.

The University of Bonn aims at increasing the number of women in academia. Therefore, applications of qualified women are particularly welcome. Candidates with disabilities will be given preference in case of equal qualification.

If you are interested, please send your application per email to: Prof. Dr. Matthias Weller (weller@jura.uni-bonn.de).

For further information see here.

On Thursday 11 October 2018, the Maastricht Private Law Lecture, which is hosted by the Maastricht Department of Private Law, will take place at Maastricht University (Faculty of Law). This lecture will be delivered by Prof. dr. Symeon C. Symeonides and is entitled “The ‘Private’ in Private International Law”. An interactive seminar with PhD researchers will follow the next day. This event is open to everyone but registration is required and is free of charge. More information is available here.

Interested persons may also wish to read Prof. Symeonides’ excellent General Course given at the Hague Academy, which deals with this subject matter in greater depth: Symeon C. Symeonides, Private International Law: Idealism, Pragmatism, Eclecticism (General Course on Private International Law), Recueil des cours, tome 384, Brill/Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston, 2016 (see in particular Chapter IV pp. 100-130).

Registration for the XLI Seminar organised by the Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is now open, please click here. For background information, please see my previous post here.

By the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law

During the solemn ceremony celebrating its 125th Anniversary, the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) launched a new video “HCCH: Connecting. Protecting. Co-operating.”  In a visually appealing way, the video explains the work of the HCCH and the importance of the Organisation in a globalised world.

Yesterday, the UK government published new paper on the future of judicial cooperation in civil matters. It sets out the UK’s vision for the handling of civil legal cases if no Brexit deal can be reached.

The full paper is available here.

On 10 July 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rendered its judgment in the matter of Alan Philipps et al. v. the Federal Republic of Germany and the Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz.

This case involves a claim by heirs of Holocaust victims for restitution of the „Welfenschatz“ (Guelph Treasure), a collection of medieval relics and devotional art housed for generations in the Cathedral of Braunschweig (Brunswick), Germany. This treasure is now on display at the Kunstgewerbemuseum Berlin (Museum of Decorative Arts) which is run by the Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz. The value of the treasure is estimated to amount to USD 250 million (according to the claim for damages raised in the proceedings).

The appeal judgment deals with, inter alia, the question whether there is state immunity for Germany and the Stiftung respectively. Under the US Federal Sovereign Immunities Act, foreign sovereigns and their agencies enjoy immunity from suit in US courts unless an expressly specified exception applies, 28 U.S.C. § 1604.

One particularly relevant exception in Holocaust litigations relating to works of art is the „expropriation exception”, § 1605(a)(3). This exception has two requirements. Firstly, rights in property taken in violation of international law must be in issue. Secondly, there must be an adequate commercial nexus between the United States and the defendant:

„A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.“

According to the Court‘s recent judgment in Holocaust litigation against Hungary (Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, D.C. Cir. 2016), intrastate expropriations in principle do not affect international law but are internal affairs of the acting state vis-à-vis its citizens. However, if the intrastate taking amounts to the commission of genocide, such a taking subjects a foreign sovereign and its instrumentalities to jurisdiction of US courts (Simon v Hungary, op.cit.).

This leads to the question of what exactly is „genocide“ in this sense. The Court in Simon adopted the definition of genocide set forth in Article II lit. c of the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, (signed by the USA on 11 December 1948, ratified on 25 November 1988), i.e. „[d]eliberately inflicting“ on “a national, ethnical, racial or religious group … conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part“. Thus, the Court in Philipps, as it observed, was „asked for the first time whether seizures of art may constitute ‘takings of property that are themselves genocide‘ “. “The answer is yes“ (Philipps v. Germany, op.cit.).

The Court prepared this step in Simon v. Hungary:

„The Holocaust proceeded in a series of steps. The Nazis achieved [the “Final Solution“] by first isolating [the Jews], then expropriating the Jews’ property, then ghettoizing them, then deporting them to the camps, and finally, murdering the Jews and in many instances cremating their bodies“.

Therefore, actions taken on the level of first steps towards genocide are themselves genocide if later steps result in genocide even if these first measures as such, without later steps, would not amount to genocide. To put it differently, this definition of genocide includes expropriations that later were escalated into genocide if already these expropriations were „deliberately inflicted“ „to bring about … physical destruction in whole or in part“ (see again Art. II lit. c Prevention of Genocide Convention).

It will be a crucial question what the measures and means of proof for such an intent should be. In this stage of the current proceedings, namely on the level of appeal against the decision of first instance not to grant immunity, the Philipps Court explained, in its very first sentence of the judgment, that the claimants‘ submissions of facts have to be laid down as the basis for review:

„Because this appeal comes to us from the district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, we must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences from those allegations in plaintiffs’ favor.”

However, the position of the US Congress on the point is clear: As the Philipps Court explains,

“[i]n the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act (HEAR Act 2016), which extended statutes of limitation for Nazi art-looting claims, Congress ‘f[ound]’ that ‘the Nazis confiscated or otherwise misappropriated hundreds of thousands of works of art and other property throughout Europe as part of their genocidal campaign against the Jewish people and other persecuted groups’, see Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, § 2, 130 Stat. 1524, 1524.”

It will be another crucial question, what „expropriation“ exactly means in the context of the Holocaust. It is common ground that the unlawful taking of property from persecuted persons not only took place by direct taking but also and structurally through all sorts of transactions under duress. However, the exact understanding of what constitutes such “forced sales“ – and thereby “expropriation“ – seems to differ substantially. Some argue that even a sale of art works at an auction in a safe third state after emigrating to that state constitutes a forced sale due to the causal link between persecution, emigration and sale for making money in the exile. Under Art. 3 of the US Military Law No. 59 of 10 November 1947 on the Restitution of Identifiable Property in Germany, there was a „presumption of confiscation“ for all transfers of property by a person individually persecuted or by a person that belonged to class of persecuted persons such as in particular all Jews. This presumption could be rebutted by submission of evidence that the transferor received a fair purchase price and that the transferor could freely dispose of the price. It is not clear whether this standard or a comparable standard or another standard applies in the case at hand. Irrespective of this legal issue, the claimants submit on the level of facts that the purchase price was only 35% of the fair market value in 1935. This submission was made in the following context:

Three Jewish art dealers from Frankfurt am Main, ancestors to the claimants, acquired the Guelph Treasure in October 1929 from the dynasty of Brunswick-Lüneburg shortly before the economic crisis of that year. The agreed price was 7.5 million Reichsmark (the German currency of the time). The estimations of the value prior to the acquisition seem to have ranged between 6 and 42 million Reichsmark. The sales contract was signed by the art dealers „J.S. Goldschmidt“, „I. Rosenbaum“ und „Z.M. Hackenbroch“. These dealers and others formed a “consortium“ with further dealers to be able to raise the money (the whereabouts of the contract for this consortium and thus the precise structure of this joint-venture is unknown up to now).

According to the sales contract, the buyers were obliged to resell the Treasure and share profits with the seller if these profits go beyond a certain limit. The contract expressly excluded the possibility for the buyers to keep the Treasure or parts of it. Rather, the buyers were to take „every effort” to achieve a resale.

In the following years, the consortium undertook many steps to sell the Treasure in Germany and in the USA. However, according to the German Advisory Commission on the return of cultural property seized as a result of Nazi persecution, especially Jewish property (i.e. the alternative dispute resolution body established by the German government in order to implement the non-binding Washington Principles on Nazi Confiscated Art of 3 December 1998, on which 44 states, including Germany and the USA agreed), it was common ground that the economic crisis reduced means and willingness of potential buyers significantly. In 1930/1931, the dealers managed to sell 40 pieces for around 2.7 million Reichsmark in total. After displaying for sale in the USA, the remaining 42 items were stored in Amsterdam. In 1934, the Dresdner Bank showed interest as a buyer, acting on behalf of the State of Prussia. The bank apparently did not disclose this fact. In April of 1935, the consortium made a binding offer for 5 million Reichsmark, the bank offered 3.7 million, the parties ultimately agreed upon 4.25 million, to be paid partly in cash (3.37 million), partly by swap with other works of art to be sold abroad in order to react to foreign currency exchange restrictions. The sales contract was signed on 14 June 1935 by the dealers and the bank, acting on behalf of the State of Prussia whose Prime Minister was Hermann Göring at the time. In July 1935, (almost) the full price was paid (100.000 Reichsmark were kept as commission). The 42 objects were transferred to Berlin. The consortium seemed to have been able to freely dispose of the money that they received at that time and pay it out to the members of the consortium. Later, all but one of the dealers had to emigrate, the one remaining in Germany came to death later (apparently under dubious circumstances, as is submitted by the claimants).

On the merits, the courts will have to take a decision on the central point of this case whether these facts, as amended/modified in the further proceedings, amount to “expropriation” and, if so, whether this expropriation was intended to „deliberately inflict … conditions of life calculated to bring about … physical destruction in whole or in part” (see once more Article II lit. c of the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide).

On a principal level, the Federal Republic of Germany argued that allowing this suit to go forward will “dramatically enlarge U.S. courts’ jurisdiction over foreign countries’ domestic affairs” by stripping sovereigns of their immunity for any litigation involving a “transaction from 1933–45 between” a Nazi-allied government and “an individual from a group that suffered Nazi persecution.” In addition to that, the principal line of argument would certainly apply to other cases of genocide and preparatory takings of property. The Court was not impressed:

“Our conclusion rests not on the simple proposition that this case involves a 1935 transaction between the German government and Jewish art dealers, but instead on the heirs’ specific—and unchallenged—allegations that the Nazis took the art in this case from these Jewish collectors as part of their effort to drive [Jewish people] out of their ability to make a living.”

Even then, the enlargement of jurisdiction over foreign states by widening the exceptions to state immunity under the concept of genocide by expropriation appears to be in contrast to the recent efforts by US courts to narrow down jurisdiction in foreign-cubed human rights litigations under the ATS and in general.

However, the Federal Republic of Germany does no longer need to worry: The Court held that the second requirement of the expropriation exception is not fulfilled because the Guelph Treasure is not present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on by the foreign state in the United States. In fact, it is not present in the USA at all but still in Berlin.

Yet, in respect to the Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz, the suit will continue: For a state agency it seems sufficient that the property in question is owned or operated by that agency or instrumentality of the foreign state if that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity (not necessarily in connection with the property in question) in the United States. The ratio of this rule is difficult to understand for outsiders and appears not to be in line with the overall developments of (personal) jurisdictional law in the USA, and if at the end of the day there is a judgment against the Stiftung to return the Treasure there will of course be the issue of recognition and enforcement of that judgment in Germany – including all political implications and considerations of public policy.

The parties may want to think about arbitration at some point. That was the way out from lengthy court proceedings and delicate questions on all sorts of conflicts of laws in the famous case of Maria Altmann v. Republic of Austria that likewise turned, inter alia, on issues of state immunity for foreign states and their agencies or instrumentalities. In general, it seems that arbitration could play a larger role in art-related disputes (see e.g. the German Institution for Arbitration’s Autumn Conference on 26 September 2018 in Berlin).

By the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law

On 12 September 1893, Tobias Asser, Dutch Jurist, Scholar and Statesman, realised a vision: he opened the first Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH). Today, exactly 125 years later, the HCCH celebrates Asser’s vision and the occasion of this First Session with a solemn ceremony in the presence of his Majesty The King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands.

Believing passionately that strong legal frameworks governing private cross-border interactions among people and businesses not only make a life across borders easier, but are also apt to promote peace and justice globally, Asser conceived the HCCH as multilateral platform for dialogue, discussion, negotiation and collaboration. Asser organised this first Session to canvass issues relating to general civil procedure and jurisdiction. More specifically, delegates, who hailed from 13 States, dealt with subject matters comprising marriage, the form of documents, inheritance/wills/gifts and civil procedure.  The First Session was a great success producing the Hague Convention on Civil Procedure. This instrument was adopted during the Second Session in 1894 and signed on 14 November 1896. Its entry into force on 23 May 1899 coincided with the first Hague Peace Conference – another of Asser’s great visions. The global community honoured the enormous value of Asser’s vision in 1911, bestowing upon him the Nobel Peace Prize for instigating the First Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to “prepare the ground for conventions which would establish uniformity in international private law and thus lead to greater public security and justice in international relations.” (J G Løvland, Chairman of the Nobel Committee, Presentation Speech, Oslo, 10 December 1911).

Since this First Session, the HCCH has gone forth to develop an array of private international law instruments in the areas of international child protection and family law, international civil procedure and legal cooperation as well as international commercial and finance law. It is the pre-eminent international organisation for the development of innovative, global solutions in private international law. The HCCH remains steeped in Asser’s vision. It continues to connect, protect, and cooperate. Since 1893.

The Final Conference of the Jean Monnet Module on European Civil Procedure will take place in Milan on the 4th and 5th October.

Details about the event and the conference agenda can be found here.

19-20 November 2018, Civil Justice Conference in Rotterdam – Registration is open.

As announced earlier, the conference Challenge Accepted! Exploring Pathways to Civil Justice in Europe will take place at Erasmus School of Law on 19-20 November. You are warmly invited to join us. Find the info and a call for posters below. See also our project website www.euciviljustice.eu.

Access to civil justice is of paramount importance for enforcing rights of citizens and ensuring the rule of law. Key issues in the current efforts to improve access to justice at the EU and national levels regard the digitisation of justice and the use of artificial intelligence in dispute resolution, the privatisation of justice and the multiplication of alternative dispute resolution schemes, the increased possibility of self-representation, and the ever-increasing specialisation of court systems. Each of these trends greatly influences the emerging EU civil justice system but also raises a number of questions and doubts. On 19 and 20 November 2018, policymakers, practitioners, academics from all over Europe will meet in Rotterdam to exchange and reflect on innovating pathways to civil Justice. Together, we will work on defining a sustainable framework for a 21st century EU civil justice system.

The flyer can be found here. More information about the programme and registration is available here.

Young researchers will also have the possibility to present and discuss their work during a Poster Presentation that will take place on Tuesday 20 November. Posters should focus on the topics of the conference, and show originality. We invite PhD researchers or young academics to present their research in a poster format. The three best posters will be awarded a prize during the closing cocktail.

More information on submitting a poster proposal can be found here.

This conference is organised by Erasmus School of Law at Rotterdam University under the ERC project ‘Building EU Civil Justice’ (www.euciviljustice.eu).

For more information, do not hesitate to contact us at hoevenaars@law.eur.nl (Jos) or biard@law.eur.nl (Alexandre).

By Prof. Dr. Peter Mankowski, Universität Hamburg

Sometimes the unexpected simply happens.  Rome I aficionados will remember that the entire Rome I project was on the brink of failure since Member States could not agree on the only seemingly technical and arcane issue of the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims. An agreement to disagree saved the project in the last minute, back then. Of course, this did not make the issue vanish – and this issues concerns billion euro-markets in the financial industry. In the spring of this year the Commission finally ventured to table a Proposal COM (2018) 96 final for a separate Regulation. This was the result of extensive preparation – and does yet deviate in important respects from the majority results reached in a very prominently staffed expert commission. The Commission proposes a compromise and combined model. Regardless of the degree to which one agrees or disagrees with this proposal (for discussion see Peter Mankowski, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft [RIW] 2018, 488; Andrew Dickinson, IPRax 2018, 337; Michael F. Müller, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht [EuZW] 2018, 522; Leplat, Petites Affiches n° 155, 3 août 2018, 3), one thing should be clear: The proposed model does definitely not form part of the still lex lata.

And now enter the surprise guest. Astonishingly, for ten years after the implementation of Rome I not a single reference to the CJEU had been made on the relevance which Art. 14 Rome I might have in the said regard. But once the Proposal is out, the Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken (decision of 8 August 2018, case 4 U 109/17) simply did it. The decision is excellently structured and well researched. The questions submitted to the CJEU are pin-point accurate. They follow a strict line. In the author’s translation they read:

1. Is Art. 14 Rome I Regulation applicable to the third-party effects of multiple assignments of the same claim by the same assignor?
2. If the first question is to be answered in the affirmative: Which law is applicable to such third-party effects?
3. If the first question is to be answered in the negative: Is Art. 14 Rome I Regulation to be applied per analogiam?
4. If the third question is to be answered in the affirmative: Which law is applicable to such third-party effects?

Multiple assignments of the same claim by the same assignor are particularly a field where applying the law of the assignor’s habitual residence scores and applying the lex causae of the claim assigned fares not too badly whereas applying the law governing the relation between assignor and assignee fails.

But the more interesting question of course is whether the recent reference will interfere with the progress which the Commission Proposal might make. Will Council and Parliament wait for the CJEU to point into any direction for the lex lata? And if the CJEU will utter an opinion as to substance, which influence will it exert on the substance of a possible lex ferenda?

If one dares to employ the crystal maze and to conduct some Kirchberg astrology the most likely outcome of the reference procedure might be that the CJEU will answer the first and third questions submitted in the negative thus rendering any answer to the second and fourth questions obsolete. In the light of the drafting history how Art. 14 Rome I Regulation was rescued in the last minute (see the dramatic account by the Dutch delegate, Pauline van der Grinten, in: Westrik/van der Weide (eds.), Party Autonomy in International Property Law [2011] p. 145, 154-161) this would be a sound way out for the CJEU leaving all liberty and leeway possible for Commission, Council and Parliament.

Alex Mills, University College London, has written a book on party autonomy in private international law which has just been published by Cambridge University Press. The author has kindly provided us with the following summary:

This book provides an unprecedented analysis and appraisal of party autonomy in private international law – the power of private parties to enter into agreements as to the forum in which their disputes will be resolved or the law which governs their legal relationships. Such agreements have become an increasingly important part of cross-border legal relations, but many aspects of party autonomy remain controversial and contested. This book includes a detailed exploration of the historical origins of party autonomy as well as its various theoretical justifications. It also provides an in-depth comparative study of the rules governing party autonomy in the European Union, the United States, common law systems, and in international codifications, with particular consideration of some other important jurisdictions including China and Brazil. It examines party autonomy in both choice of forum and choice of law, including arbitration agreements and choice of non-state law. It also examines the effectiveness of party choice of forum and law not only for contractual disputes, but also for a variety of non-contractual legal relations.

The book focuses its analysis around five questions of consistency in party autonomy – consistency between party autonomy in choice of forum and choice of law, consistency in the treatment of party autonomy in contractual and non-contractual relations, consistency between the choice of state and non-state forums or law, consistency between party autonomy in theory and practice, and consistency between different legal systems in relation to the effects of (and limits on) exercises of party autonomy. This analysis demonstrates that while an apparent consensus around the core principle of party autonomy has emerged, its coherence as a doctrine is open to question as there remains significant variation in practice across its various facets and between legal systems.

More information is available here.

I am currently looking for a research assistant / doctoral student to work at my Chair at the University of Jena as of 1 November 2018. The position is part-time (50%) and paid according to the salary scale E 13 TV-L.

In addition to writing an excellent doctoral dissertation in your field of interest (and my field of expertise) tasks associated with the position include, among others, independent teaching in German private law (contracts, torts, property: 2 hours per week in German).

The successful candidate holds an excellent first law degree and has a particular interest in private international law and international civil procedure. A very good command of German and English is required, additional languages will be an advantage.

If you are interested, please send your application (cover letter, CV, copies of relevant certificates in one pdf)  to my secretary, Regina Franzl: r.franzl@recht.uni-jena.de. Deadline for applications is 14 September 2018.

The full job advert is available here (in German).

(Only) last week, the government of the Netherlands – the depositary of the Convention – has informed the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law that Montenegro ratified the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention on 18 April 2018, with the Convention entering into force for Montenegro on 1 August 2018. This brings the number of Contracting Parties to 32 (the EU, all member states (since 30 May 2018 including Denmark), Mexico, Singapore, and Montenegro), with three others (China, Ukraine, and the United States) having signed but not ratified the Convention.

Pursuant to its Articles 1(1), 3(a), and 16(1), exclusive choice-of-court agreements designating Montenegro concluded after 1 August 2018 must be given effect under the Convention by all Contracting States (except Denmark, for which it only enters into force on 1 September 2018). Montenegro must give the same effect to all such agreements designating other Contracting States as long as they have been concluded after the Convention entered into force for the designated state (EU and Mexico: 1 October 2015; Singapore: 1 October 2016; Denmark: 1 September 2018).

The Convention has repeatedly been mentioned as an option for the UK to maintain a minimum of cooperation in the area of civil justice with the EU, should a more comprehensive agreement not be reached (see Dickinson ZEuP 2017, 539, 560–62; Rühl (2018) 67 ICLQ 127–28; Sonnentag, Die Konsequenzen des Brexits (Mohr 2017), 89–91). It should be noted, though, that even if the UK ratified the Convention the very day of its withdrawal from the EU on 29 March 2019, it would only enter into force three months later, on 1 July 2019 (see Art 31(1)).

By the Swiss Association SVIR/SSDI (“Schweizerische Vereinigung für Internationales Recht – Société suisse de droit international“)

The Swiss Association SVIR/SSDI offers since this year a 3,000 CHF grant to support researchers who wish to complete an internship with an international organisation. For the year 2018/19, the award will support a post-graduate student or graduate of a Swiss Law School to undertake a (4- to) 6-month internship at the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) by providing a financial contribution to cover the costs of travel to the Netherlands and a contribution towards living expenses.

Applications should be submitted via the SVIR Grant website no later than Friday 31 August 2018. The internship at the Permanent Bureau will commence as of mid-January 2019.

For further details, please refer to the SVIR Grant website at http://www.svir-ssdi.ch/de/svir-preise/svir-grant/ (click “Ausschreibung”, description in English).

The proceedings of the conference Crisi transfrontaliera di impresa: orizzonti internazionali ed europei, held in Rome on 3 and 4 November 2017 at the LUISS University (advertised here on this blog) have recently been published, edited by Antonio Leandro, Giorgio Meo and Antonio Nuzzo.

Authors include experts on insolvency, cross-border insolvency and private international law. The contributions – some in Italian, others in English – address international and European policies on business crisis and failure, the innovations brought about by Regulation (EU) 2015/848 and the interplay of that instrument with other European texts relating to judicial cooperation in civil matters.

The book also discusses the challenges faced by the on-going reform of insolvency law in Italy, in light of regional and international developments.

The table of contents is available here.

It doesn’t happen too often that a Member State refuses enforcement judgment rendered in another Member State for violation of the ordre public. But in a decision published yesterday exactly this happened: The German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH) refused to recognize and enforce a Polish judgment under the Brussels I Regulation (before the recast) arguing that enforcement would violate the German public policy, notable freedom of speech and freedom of the press as embodied in the German Constitution. In so doing the highest German court adds to the already difficult debate about atrocities committed by Germans in Poland during WW II.

The facts of the case were as follows:

In 2013, the ZDF (Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen) one of Germany’s main public-service television broadcaster announced the broadcasting of documentary about the liberation of the concentration camps Ohrdruf, Buchenwald and Dachau. In the announcement, the camps Majdanek and Auschwitz were described as “Polish extermination camps”. Following a complaint by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Berlin, the defendant changed the text of the announcement to “German extermination camps on Polish territory”. At the same time, the applicant, a Polish citizen and former prisoner of the Auschwitz-Birkenau and Flossenbürg concentration camps, complained to the ZDF claiming that his personal rights had been violated and demanded, among other things, the publication of an apology.

In 2013, the ZDF apologized to the applicant in two letters and expressed its regret. In spring 2016 it also published a correction message expressing its regret for the “careless, false and erroneous wording” and apologising to all people whose feelings had been hurt as a result. At the end of 2016, on the basis of an action he had brought in Poland in 2014, the applicant obtained a second instance judgment of the Cracow Court of Appeal requiring the ZDF to publish an apology on the home page of its website (not just anywhere on the website) for a period of one month expressing its regrets that the announcement from 2013 contained “incorrect wording distorting the history of the Polish people”. The ZDF published the required text of the judgment on its home page from December 2016 to January 2017, however, only via a link. The applicant considered this publication to be inadequate and, therefore, sought to have the Polish judgment enforced in Germany.

The Regional Court Mainz as well as the Court of Appeal Koblenz declared the judgment enforceable under the Brussels I Regulation (Reg. 44/2001). The German Federal Supreme Court, however, disagreed. Referring to Article 45 Brussels I Regulation, the Court held that enforcement of the judgment would result in a violation of the German ordre public because the exercise of state power to publish the text of the judgment prepared by the Cracow Court of Appeal would clearly violate the defendant’s right to freedom of speech and freedom of press as embodied in Article 5(1) of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz – GG) as well as the constitutional principle of proportionality.

The Court clarified that the dispute at hand did not concern the defendant’s original announcement – which was incorrect and, therefore, did not enjoy the protection of Article 5(1) GG, but only the requested publication of pre-formulated text. This text – which the defendant, according to the Cracow court, had to make as its own statement – represented an expression of opinion. It required the defendant to regret the use of “incorrect wording distorting the history of the Polish people” and to apologize to the applicant for the violation of his personal rights, in particular his national identity (sense of belonging to the Polish people) and his national dignity. To require the defendant to published a text drafted by someone else as its own opinion would, therefore, violate the defendant’s fundamental rights under Article 5(1) GG. In addition, it would violate the constitutional principle of proportionality. The defendant had corrected the disputed wording “Polish concentration camps”, which had been available for four days, on the day of the objection by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland. Even before the decision of the Court of Appeal, the defendant had personally asked the applicant for an apology in two letters and also published an explanatory correction message with a request for apology addressed to all those concerned.

The official press release is available here. The full German decision can be downloaded here.

What are the consequences of Brexit for Private International Law and International Civil Procedure Law? In the very first monograph in German concerning the legal ramifications of Brexit, Michael Sonnentag discusses these questions (Die Konsequenzen des Brexits für das Internationale Privat- und Zivilverfahrensrecht, Mohr Siebeck, 2017).

In the first part, the author analyses the possible options after Brexit: the Norwegian model (leaving the EU, but re-joining the EEA); the Swiss model (tailor-made solutions in all fields); the Turkish model (staying in the Customs Union); the Canadian model (free trade agreement); and finally the no-deal Brexit. It is also pointed out that with the British exit from the EU, not only will the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and that of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) no longer be in force in the UK, but regulations and directives will also follow suit. Only in the exceptional case where directives have been implemented in UK Law by acts of Parliament, shall they stand after Brexit. In contrast, it is shown that, if directives have been implemented by Statutory Instruments, the SI’s will fall with Brexit, because the European Communities Act 1972 as their legal basis will cease to exist.

Concerning Private International Law, the Rome I as well as the Rome II Regulations will end in the UK after Brexit since they are EU-law irrespective of whether they are kept in force as part of British law. Sonnentag goes on to explain how, in the case of a hard Brexit, there will be an impact on the field of International Company Law: British companies will not benefit from freedom of movement anymore. Therefore, a limited company which had been founded in the UK, but moved its headquarters to Germany – whose courts traditionally apply the so-called seat theory – risks not being recognised in this Member State; consequently, the owner or shareholders could be personally liable for the debts of the company.

In the field of International Civil Procedure Law, the Brussels Ia, the Brussels IIa and the Maintenance Regulations will fall in the UK with Brexit. Sonnentag explains that the Brussels Convention will not be revived after Brexit. Furthermore, the Lugano Convention will not be applicable anymore; the UK could join it, but only as a Member State of EFTA or following an invitation by Switzerland, with support from the other Member States. In contrast, the UK could – and should – join the Hague Choice of Court Convention of 2005. Moreover, the effects on exorbitant jurisdiction, jurisdiction agreements and recognition and enforcements of judgments are described in detail. Not only does the monograph outline which rules will be applicable in Germany, but also in the UK.

Sonnentag evidences that many benefits in the fields of Private International Law and International Civil Procedure Law will end with Brexit. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that all possible Brexit scenarios will have drawbacks in comparison to a no-Brexit situation. Therefore, according to the author, the best solution for both sides would be the avoidance of Brexit altogether.

On 25 June 2015, the Insolvency Regulation Recast entered into force, though it (mostly) became applicable as of 26 June 2017. The series Short Studies on Private International Law, published by Asser Press, will publish an issue focusing on the particular features of this Regulation. Therefore, it welcomes any paper concerning the private international law aspects of the Insolvency Regulation Recast. Topics that may be addressed are possibly, but not exclusively:

– forum shopping for the most favourable insolvency regime;
– characterisation and the Insolvency Regulation Recast;
– detrimental acts and the applicable law;
– consistency of the Insolvency Regulation Recast with insolvency regimes in relation to third states.

Please note that the issue will cover private international law aspects. The editors retain the right to reject publications that predominantly cover matters not related to private international law, such as substantive law.

Please send your abstract (in UK English) of about 350 words by 30 September 2018 to v.lazic@uu.nl (subject: “Short Studies 2018 Insolvency”).

After a pre-selection, the applicants will finally receive their confirmation or rejection by 31 October 2018. When selected, papers should be submitted by 31 December 2018. A language review will not be part of the editorial process; this remains the responsibility of the applicants.

In IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2018] SGHC 123, the Singapore High Court had the occasion to discuss and resolve various meaty private international law issues. The facts concerned the alleged negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation by the defendants on the fuel consumption of a specific model of engine that was sold and installed into ships owned by the plaintiffs. The issue before the court was whether the Singapore courts had jurisdiction over the misrepresentation claim. The defendants were German and Norwegian incorporated companies so the plaintiffs applied for leave to serve the writ out of Singapore. This entailed fulfilling a 3 stage process, following English common law rules: (1) a good arguable case that the case falls within one of the heads set out in the Rules of Court, Order 11, (2) a serious issue to be tried on the merits, and (3) Singapore is forum conveniens on applying the test set out in The Spiliada [1987] AC 460. Stages (1) and (3) were at issue in the case.

The judgment, by Coomaraswamy J, merits close reading. The main private international law issues can be summarised as follows:

(a) Choice of law is relevant when assessing the heads of Order 11 of the Rules of Court.

The plaintiffs had relied on Order 11 rule 1(f) and rule 1(p). Rule 1(f) deals with tortious claims and the court proceeded by ascertaining where the tort was committed. According to the court, this question was to be answered by the lex fori. If the tort was committed abroad, the court held that choice of law for tort then came into play: the court must then determine if the tort satisfied Singapore’s tort choice of law rule, ie the double actionability rule. It should be noted that the Court of Appeal in Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 had held that the double actionability rule will apply even in relation to local torts (as the flexible exception may displace Singapore law to point to the law of a third jurisdiction). The double actionability rule thus remains relevant when assessing Order rule 1(f) whether the tort is committed abroad or in Singapore.

(b) ‘damage’ for the purposes of Order 11 rule 1(f)(ii) is not limited to direct damage.

Order 11 rule 1(f)(ii) is in these terms: ‘the claim is wholly or partly founded on, or is for the recovery of damages in respect of, damage suffered in Singapore caused by a tortious act or omission wherever occurring.’ The court held that ‘damage’ for the purposes of rule 1(f)(ii) included the increased fuel expenditure and reduction in capital value of the ships due to the fuel inefficient engines suffered not just by the original owners of the ships at the time of the misrepresentation, but also the subsequent purchasers of the ships. On the facts, the court held that the damage suffered by the subsequent purchasers arose directly from the misrepresentation as the misrepresentation was also intended to be relied upon by them. Further, the court held that, even if that had not been the case, direct damage is not required under rule 1(f)(ii). The difference in wording between Order 11 rule 1(f) and the UK CPR equivalent (CPR PD6B para 3.1(9)) makes the decision on this point less controversial than the reasoning in Four Seasons v Brownlie [2017] UKSC 80, [2018] 1 WLR 192.

(c) The test used to ascertain whether ‘the claim is founded on a cause of action arising in Singapore’ for the purposes of Order 11 rule 1(p) differs from the substance test which applies to determine the loci delicti in a multi-jurisdictional tort situation for the purposes of the double actionability rule.

The former test derives from Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Thompson [1971] AC 458. The court observed that the Distiller’s test is more plaintiff-centric compared to the substance test used for the purposes of the double actionability rule because Order 11 rule 1(p) ‘requires the court to view the facts of the case through the cause of action which the plaintiff has sought to invoke.’ Whereas, the latter test is ‘the more general and more factual question “where in substance did the tort take place.”’ (para [166], emphasis in original). This point will likely be revisited by the Court of Appeal, not least because it had, in JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises [2011] 1 SLR 391, cited the Distillers test as authority for the substance test.

(d) Whether Singapore is forum conveniens for the purposes of a setting aside application and whether Singapore is forum non conveniens for the purposes of a stay application should be assessed with reference to current facts.

Norway and Germany were potential alternative fora for the action. After leave had been given to serve out of jurisdiction in the ex parte hearing, the plaintiffs commenced proceedings in Norway as a protective measure. No proceedings were commenced in Germany. This meant that, under the Lugano Convention, the Norwegian courts had priority over the German courts. The court treated this as indicating that the courts of Germany ceased to be an available forum to the parties. This was significant, given that the court had earlier held that the loci delicti was Germany. The defendants argued that the commencement of Norwegian proceedings was to be ignored and the application to set aside service out of jurisdiction was to be assessed solely with reference to the facts which existed at the time when leave to serve out of jurisdiction was granted. The effect of the defendants’ argument would be that the setting aside application would be determined on the basis that Germany was an available forum, while their alternative prayer for a stay would be determined on the basis that Germany was an unavailable forum. The potential for wastage in time and costs is clear on this argument and the court rightly took a common sense and practical approach on this issue.

(e) The possibility of a transfer of the case from the Singapore High Court (excluding the SICC) to the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) is a relevant factor in the Spiliada analysis.

This had previously been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Rappo, Tania v Accent Delight International Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 265. The SICC is a division of the Singapore High Court which specialises in international commercial litigation. Its rules allow for a question of foreign law to be determined on the basis of submissions instead of proof. Further, the bench includes International Judges from not only common law but also civil law jurisdictions. The court held that the specific features of the SICC and the possibility of the transfer of the case to the SICC weighed in favour of Singapore being forum conveniens compared to Norway and Germany.

(f) In a setting-aside application, where the plaintiffs have succeeded in showing that Singapore is the prima facie natural forum in the first stage of the Spiliada test, the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to show why they would suffer substantial injustice if the action were to proceed in Singapore.

In an Order 11 case, the second stage of the Spiliada test usually operates to give the plaintiffs a second bite of the cherry should they fail to establish Singapore is the natural forum under the first stage of the test. The plaintiffs are allowed to put forward reasons why they would suffer substantial injustice if trial takes place in the natural forum abroad. Very interestingly, the court held that where, as on the facts of the case, the plaintiff had already satisfied the burden of showing that Singapore is the natural forum under the first stage of the Spiliada test, the burden then shifts to the defendants to show why they would suffer substantial injustice if trial took place in Singapore.

The case is on appeal to the Court of Appeal. Its judgment is eagerly anticipated.