Conflictoflaws

by Lukas Schmidt, Research Fellow at the Center for Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution (TCDR) of the EBS Law School, Wiesbaden, Germany.

Universal Music, a record company established in the Netherlands, acquired the Czech company B&M in the course of 1998. The contracts providing for the sale and delivery of B&M’s shares were drawn up by a Czech law firm. Because of negligence by an associate of the Czech law firm the contracts provided a much higher sale price for B&M shares than intended by Universal Music. This led to a dispute between Universal Music and B&M’s shareholders which was brought before an arbitration board in the Czech Republic, following a settlement between the parties in 2005. Because of this settlement Universal Music allegedly suffered financial damage of some 2.5 million EUR. Subsequently Universal Music has brought proceedings against the Czech lawyers before the Dutch courts. The Dutch courts have requested the CJEU to answer the question, whether Article 5 (3) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that the place where the harmful event occurred can be construed as being the place, in a Member State, where the damage occurred, if that damage consists exclusively of financial damage which is the direct result of an unlawful act committed in another Member State. However the only connecting factor to the Netherlands, besides Universal Music being established in that state, was that the bank account from which Universal Music paid the settlement amount was situated in Baarn (The Netherlands). Thus the CJEU now finds that such “purely financial damage which occurs directly in the applicant’s bank account can not, in itself, be qualified as a ‘relevant connecting factor’, pursuant to Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001”. Obviously in order not to contradict its ruling in „Kolassa“ (C-375/13) the CJEU clarifies that only where “other circumstances specific to the case also contribute to attributing jurisdiction to the courts for the place where a purely financial damage occurred, that such damage could, justifiably, entitle the applicant to bring the proceedings before the courts for that place”.  Referring to „Kronhofer“ the CJEU further states that the place where the harmful event occurred “does not refer to the place where the applicant is domiciled and where his assets are concentrated by reason only of the fact that he has suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of part of his assets which arose and was incurred in another Member State”. As a consequence the place where the loss of the claimant´s assets occurs and the place where his assets are concentrated only can be qualified as the place where the harmful event occurred, pursuant to Article 5 (3), if other circumstances specific to the case also contribute to attributing jurisdiction to the courts for these places.

The full judgment is available at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=180329&pageIndex=0&doclang=DE&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1

On 2 June 2016 the CJEU came down with its long awaited judgment in Nabiel Peter Bogendorff von Wolfersdorff v. Standesamt der Stadt Karlsruhe. Dealing (once more) with the question whether the freedoms conferred under Article 21 TFEU require Member States to recognize names of private individuals registered in another Member State the Court held that the refusal, by the authorities of a Member State, to recognise the forenames and surname of a national of that Member State, as determined and registered in another Member State of which he also holds the nationality, constitutes a restriction on the freedoms conferred under Article 21 TFEU on all citizens of the EU. However, the Court also found that such a restriction may be justified by considerations of public policy.

David de Groot from the University of Bern (Switzerland) has kindly prepared the following note:

Mr Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff was born as a German national named Nabiel Bagadi. After an adoption his name changed to Peter Nabiel Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff. He moved to Britain and acquired, while being habitually resident there, the British nationality and subsequently changed his name by deed poll to ‘Peter Mark Emanuel Graf von Wolffersdorff Freiherr von Bogendorff’. The German authorities did not want to recognise his new name as it contained the words ‘Graf’ and ‘Freiherr’, which used to be titles of nobility in Germany. According to Article 109 of the Weimar Constitution – which is still applicable based on Article 123 Basic Law – any creation of new titles of nobility is prohibited in Germany. However, the titles of nobility at the time of abolition became an integral part of the surname. Thus in Germany there are still persons who have a former title of nobility in their name. The same issue his daughter had where the German authorities did not want to recognise her name ‘Larissa Xenia Gräfin von Wolffersdorff Freiin von Bogendorff’. In that case, though, the Oberlandesgericht Dresden had decided that the German authorities had to recognise the name established in the United Kingdom.

The District Court of Karlsruhe referred the following question to the CJEU:

Are Articles 18 TFEU and 21 TFEU to be interpreted as meaning that the authorities of a Member State are obliged to recognise the change of name of a national of that State if he is at the same time a national of another Member State and has acquired in that Member State, during habitual residence, by means of a change of name not associated with a change of family law status, a freely chosen name including several tokens of nobility, where it is possible that a future substantial link with that State does not exist and in the first Member State the nobility has been abolished by constitutional law but the titles of nobility used at the time of abolition may continue to be used as part of a name?

A refusal by the authorities of a Member State to recognise a name of its national established while the person exercised his free movement rights in another Member State is likely to hinder the exercise of the free movement rights enshrined in Article 21 TFEU. Furthermore confusion and serious inconvenience at administrative, professional and private levels are likely to occur. This is due to the fact that the divergence between documents gives rise to doubt to the person’s identity and the authenticity of the documents and the necessity for the person to each time dispel doubts as to his identity. Therefore, it is a restriction of Article 21 TFEU which can only be justified by objective considerations which are proportionate to the legitimate objective of the national provisions.

The German authorities had brought several reasons to justify the restriction on the recognition of the name. The first justification brought forward was the immutability and continuity of names. The Court stated that although it is a legitimate principle, it is not a that important principle that it can justify a refusal to recognise a name established in another Member State. The second justification concerned the fact that it was a singular name change, meaning that the name changed independent of another civil status change. Therefore, the name change was dictated on personal reasons.

The Court referred to the case Stjerna v. Finland from the European Court of Human Rights of 1994 where it was stated that there may exist genuine reasons that might prompt an individual to wish to change his name, however that legal restriction on such a possibility could be justified in the public interest. The Court, however also stated that the voluntary nature of the name change does not in itself undermine the public interest and can therefore not justify alone a restriction of Article 21 TFEU. Concerning the personal reasons to change the name the Court also referred to the Centros ruling on abuse of EU law, but did not state whether it actually applied to the case. Concerning the German argument that the name was too long, the Court stated that “such considerations of administrative convenience cannot suffice to justify an obstacle to freedom of movement.”

The most important point made by the German authorities concerned the fact that the name established in the UK entailed former German titles of nobility. The Government argued that the rules on abolishment of nobility and therefore refusal to recognise new titles of nobility were a part of the German public policy and intended to ensure equal treatment of all German citizens. Such an objective consideration relating to public policy could be cable of justifying the restriction; however it must be interpreted strictly. This means that it can only apply when it is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society.

In Sayn-Wittgenstein the Court had held that it was not disproportionate for Austria to attain the objective of the principle of equal treatment “by prohibiting any acquisition, possession or use, by its nationals, of titles of nobility or noble elements which may create the impression that the bearer of the name is holder of such rank.” However the German legal system is different in that there is not a strict prohibition on maintaining titles of nobility as a part of the family name and it is also possible to acquire it through adoption. It would though not be in the interest of the German legislature if German nationals could under application of the law of another Member State adopt abolished titles of nobility and that these would automatically have to be recognised by the German authorities.The Court was though not sure whether the practice of the German authorities to refuse a name including former titles of nobility, while allowing some persons in Germany to bear such a name, is appropriate and necessary to ensure the protection of the public policy and the principle of equality before the law of all German citizens. As this is a question of proportionality it would be for the referring court to decide upon this.

The Court however marked certain factors that have to be taken into consideration while not being justifications themselves. First of all that Mr Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff exercised his free movement rights and holds double German and British nationality. Secondly, that the elements at issue do not formally constitute titles of nobility in either Germany or the United Kingdom. Thirdly, that the Oberlandesgericht Dresden in the case of the daughter of Mr Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff did not consider the recognition of a name including titles contrary to public policy. However, the court would also have to take into consideration that it concerned a singular name change which is based purely on personal choice and that the name gives impression of noble origins. The Court concluded, however, that even if the surname is not recognised based on the objective reason of public policy, it cannot apply to the forenames, which would have to be recognised.

As such it is not that much a surprise that the Court referred the case back as it concerned a matter of proportionality. But still the Court’s judgment is a bit disappointing as some issues of the referred question are unsolved. For example the Court did never go into the part of the referred question concerning “the future substantial link” of the British nationality. The Court states that Mr Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff is dual German and British national, but it could also have stated that the future substantial link does not matter due to the Micheletti case. Also Article 18 TFEU got lost after the rephrasing of the question and the Court then only concentrated on Article 21 TFEU.

What is though very surprising is that the Court only mentions the case law on abuse of law, but then leaves it open whether it is applicable or not. Considering that Mr Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff lived in the United Kingdom for four years and even acquired British citizenship makes it rather doubtful whether one could consider it an abuse; especially if one compares it for example to the facts of the Torresi case.

It is thus now up to the national court to decide whether all German citizens are equal, or whether some are more equal than others – and all of these are former nobility.

 

 

The Jean Monnet Center of Excellence and the UNESCO Chair at the Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece, is organising a Summer academy on European Studies and Protection of Human rights in Zagora, on Mount Pelion, Greece, consisting of two summer schools in English. The academic faculty in both summer schools are University professors and experts from all over Greece and the EU (Great Britain, Spain and Poland).

The first summer school is on “Freedom, Security and Justice in the EU“.  It will  be held from Friday July 8, afternoon until Monday, July 11, 2016, afternoon. In particular, the summer school will last 25 hours.  The main areas of study will be:

• Institutional Structure and Development (EU institutions, Frontex, Eurojust, European Attorney) which will be analyzed by Prof. Chrysomallis,
• European Citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice by D. Anagnostopoulou,
• Internal and External Security by Prof. F. Bellou,
• Immigration and asylum policies by Prof. V. Hatzopoulos and I. Papageorgiou,
• EU Private International Law by M. Gardenes – Santiago (Autonomous University of Barcelona),
• European criminal law (N. Vavoula, Queen Mary)

For further information in this summer school click here.

The second summer school will begin on Thursday, July 14 afternoon and will end on Tuesday, July 19. It will last 40 hours with a focus on the protection of human rights in Europe:

• International human rights protection mechanisms (International Covenants and International Conventions), taught by f. Professor P. Naskou Perraki (University of Macedonia)
• European Convention on Human Rights by Dr. Dagmara Dajska, expert of the Council of Europe, who will discuss  the right for fair trial and the right to asylum,
• Freedom of Expression by Prof. I. Papadopoulos (University of Macedonia),
• Protection of Personal Data by Prof. E. Alexandropoulou (University of Macedonia),
• EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by Prof. L. Papadopoulou (Aristotle University of Macedonia),
• Prohibition of discrimination by Prof. D. Anagnostopoulou (University of Macedonia),
• LGBT Rights by Prof. Alina Tryfonidoy (Reading University),
• Protection of minorities and cultural rights by Dr. Nikos Gaitenidis, Head of the Observatory on Constitutional Values of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, and
• Workshop on intercultural skills by Prof. I. Papavasileiou (University of Macedonia)

For further information on this summer school click here.

A Certificate of attendance will be issued to all while a Certificate of Graduation will be awarded to all those passing a multiple choice examination.

For additional information and applications to any of the schools, please refer to the links below or contact:

Assistant Professor Despina Anagnostopoulou, danag@uom.gr

or Ms. Chrysothea Basia, chrybass@yahoo.com

An article by A. Anthimos, Czech Yearbook of International Law 2017 volume VIII (Forthcoming), accessible at SSRN.

Abstract. Fictitious forms of service have dominated for decades the notification of documents abroad. The insecurity caused by these means of service led to the ratification of the 1965 Hague Service Convention by a significant number of countries. Still, the problem has not been solved, because the Convention did not dare to take the steps towards abolition of fictitious service. The sole exception being, stipulated under Article 19, for documents instituting proceedings. The EU-Service Regulation followed the same path. For nearly 10 years, fictitious service was not discarded by national courts in all cases. However, a recent judgment of the ECJ interpreted the Service regulation as banning all forms of fictitious service. This ruling led to a shift in national jurisprudence. However, at the same time it triggered reactions.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the discussion surrounding the ECJ ruling, by highlighting its repercussions both within the framework of the Service Regulation, and potentially in the ambit of the multilateral Hague Service Convention.

In cooperation with the Centre de droit privé fondamental of the University of Strasbourg  and  the Centre d’études sur l’efficacité des systèmes juridiques continentaux of the University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, the Société de législation comparée organises an international conference entitled:

 The application of foreign law under constitutional and treaty-based review

 (Le droit étranger à l’épreuve des contrôles de constitutionnalité et de conventionnalité)

Scholars and practitioners in the fields of private international law from different backgrounds will meet in Paris to identify new models of control in the application of foreign law within Western legal systems and compare them with a view to understanding the place of the Otherness today in Europe and in Americas.

Date: 23 September 2016

Venue: Cour de Cassation, Grand’Chambre, 5, Quai de l’Horloge, 75001 – Paris.

 

Conference Directors:

Gustavo Cerqueira, Senior Lecturer at the University os Reims (France)

Nicolas Nord, Senior Lecturer at the University of Strasbourg, Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Law (France)

 

With the participation of :

Bertrand Louvel, First-President of the French Cour de cassation

Dominique Hascher, Chairman of the Société de législation comparée

Jean Massot, Honorary Section’s President at the French Conseil d’Etat

Danièle Alexandre, Emeritus Professor at the University of Strasbourg

Paul Lagarde, Emeritus Professor at the University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Sylvaine Poillot-Peruzzetto, Councillor at the Cour de cassation in extraordinary service

Guillaume Drago, Professor of the University of Panthéon-Assas Paris II

 

Prolegomena :

Jean-Sylvestre Bergé, Professor at the University of Jean Moulin Lyon 3

Julien Boudon, Professor at the University of Reims, Dean of the Faculty of Law

 

French Perspectives :

Alice Meier-Bourdeau, Attorney at the French Conseil d’État and Cour de cassation

Hugues Fulchiron, Professor at the University of Jean Moulin Lyon 3

Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières, Professor at the University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

 

Comparative Perspectives :

Serena Forlati, Associate Professor at the University of Ferrara

Fernanda Munschy, Attorney at the Bar of Strasbourg

Gustavo Cerqueira, Senior Lecturer at the University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne

Alejandro Garro, Associate Professor at the University of Columbia

Patrick Kinsch, Professor at the University of Luxembourg

Gustavo Monaco, Professor at the University of São Paulo

Didier Opertti-Bádan, Former Ministry of Foreign Affaires of Uruguay

See whole program here.

No participation fee.

Registration and further information:

Gordon Choisel / gordon.choisel@legiscompare.com

The Estonian Riigikohus has requested, on 7 April 2016, a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on a case concerning violations of a legal person‘s rights committed on the internet: Bolagsupplysningen OÜ, Ingrid Ilsjan v. Svensk Handel AB, Case C-194/16). The Estonian court has asked the following questions:

1. Is Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters to be interpreted as meaning that a person who alleges that his rights have been infringed by the publication of incorrect information concerning him on the internet and by the failure to remove comments relating to that information can bring an action for rectification of the incorrect information and removal of the harmful comments before the courts of any Member State in which the information on the internet is or was accessible, in respect of the harm sustained in that Member State?

2. Is Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters to be interpreted as meaning that a legal person which alleges that its rights have been infringed by the publication of incorrect information concerning it on the internet and by the failure to remove comments relating to that information can, in respect of the entire harm that it has sustained, bring proceedings for rectification of the information, for an injunction for removal of the comments and for damages for the pecuniary loss caused by publication of the incorrect information on the internet before the courts of the State in which that legal person has its centre of interests?

3. If the second question is answered in the affirmative: is Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters to be interpreted as meaning that:

— it is to be assumed that a legal person has its centre of interests in the Member State in which it has its seat, and accordingly that the place where the harmful event occurred is in that Member State, or

— in ascertaining a legal person’s centre of interests, and accordingly the place where the harmful event occurred, regard must be had to all of the circumstances, such as its seat and fixed place of business, the location of its customers and the way and means in which its transactions are concluded?

Many thanks to Dr. Christina Mariottini (HCCH/ILA) and Meeli Kaur for the tip-off!

Under the State Immunity Act, foreign states are generally immune from being sued in Canada.  This includes being sued on a foreign judgment.  However, in 2012 Canada enacted legislation to give victims of terrorism the ability to sue a foreign state that sponsored the terrorism.  It also made it easier for foreign judgments against such a state to be enforced in Canada.

In Tracy v The Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, 2016 ONSC 3759 (released June 9, 2016; likely to be posted in the week of June 13, 2016, in CanLII) the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had to consider these legislative reforms and how they applied to a series of American judgments rendered against Iran in favour of American victims of terrorist acts which Iran was found to have sponsored.  The court held that Iran was not immune from the enforcement proceedings and that accordingly the American judgments were enforceable against certain assets of Iran in Ontario.

The decision is reasonably detailed.  It involves interpretation of the State Immunity Act and the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.  It also considers issues relating to the limitation period and the enforcement of punitive damages awards (in this case, in the hundreds of millions of dollars).  Not all of the analysis resonates as convincing and there is considerable scope for a possible appeal.  For example, Iran’s argument that the loss or damage suffered by the victim had to have been, on the language of s 4(1) of the JVTA, suffered after January 1, 1985, did not prevent the enforcement of American decisions in respect of acts of terror which happened before that date because, the court held, the victims continued to suffer harm on an ongoing basis.  This seems vulnerable to challenge.  In addition, the court’s reasoning as to why the enormous punitive damages awards were not contrary to public policy is extremely brief.

However, on any appeal, Iran does have a significant procedural problem to overcome.  It did not defend the enforcement actions when they were initially brought in Ontario.  All of the immunity arguments were canvassed by the court as part of Iran’s motion to have the resulting default judgments set aside, on the issue of whether Iran might have a viable defence on the merits.  But at no point did Iran offer any explanation for the initial failure to defend.  While not conclusive, this weighs against setting the judgments aside even if Iran can show merit to its position on immunity.

The timing of the court’s decision against Iran could pose challenges for the current Canadian government, which is currently working to re-engage with Iran after the previous government cut ties in 2012 (see news story here).  In addition, a Montreal-based professor has recently been jailed in Iran and this has caused considerable concern in Canada (see news story here).

The University of Lucerne and the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) will be co-organizing a conference on the implementation of the Hague Choice of Law Principles ( “Towards a Global Framework for International Commercial Transactions: Implementing the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts”) on 8/9 September 2016. The conference serves to  analyze the impact and prospects of the 2015 Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (the Hague Principles)  in the context of other relevant legal instruments applicable to international commercial transactions. It brings together distinguished academics, experts, private practitioners and representatives from various international institutions.

Scholars and practitioners in the fields of private international law and commercial law and dispute resolution are encouraged to participate.

Conference Directors: Prof. Dr. Daniel Girsberger, University of Lucerne (Switzerland), Dr. Christophe Bernasconi, Secretary-General (HCCH)

Venue: University of Lucerne, Auditorium 9, Frohburgstrasse 3, CH-6002 Lucerne (Switzerland)

Speakers: Jürgen Basedow, Neil B. Cohen, Andrew Dickinson, Roberto Echandi, José Angelo Estrella Faria, Franco Ferrari, Lauro Da Gama e Souza Jr, Thomas Kadner Graziano, Peter Mankowski, Jan L. Neels, Emily O’Connor, J.A. Moreno Rodríguez, Geneviève Saumier, Linda Silberman, Renaud Sorieul

Participation fee: CHF 250.– (including documentation, catering and dinner on Thursday, 8 September 2016; accommodation not included)

Registration and further information: https://regis.buchertravel.ch/event/HCCH_2016

Contact: Mrs. Lisbeth Meule (lisbeth.meule@unilu.ch)

 

by Lukas Schmidt, Research Fellow at the Center for Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution (TCDR) of the EBS Law School, Wiesbaden, Germany.

UNCITRAL Working Group V (Insolvency Law) has issued a report on the work of  its forty-ninth session, which took place in New York from 2 – 6 May 2016. The Working Group continued its deliberations on the cross-border insolvency of multinational enterprise groups, the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-derived judgments and the obligations of directors of enterprise group companies in the period approaching insolvency. Furthermore the report communicates that a meeting of an open-ended informal group established to consider the feasibility of developing a convention on international insolvency issues has taken place. This is rather exciting, as the development of an international insolvency convention by UNCITRAL would constitute the next big step in international insolvency law leaving behind the defiencies of soft law. The report is available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/5Insolvency.html.

The ILA reminds you to join the celebration of yet another landmark – the Seventy7th Biennial International Conference 2016 – which is set to take place from the 7-11 August 2016 in Sandton, South Africa.

Come join an illustrious panel of distinguished local and international speakers, fellow law professionals, business leaders, academics, as well as young scholars from different parts of the world.

Judge Navi Pillay, who will participate in the panel on international criminal law, and former UN High Commissionar for Human Rights, will deliver the key note address at the opening session of the conference.

If you’ve not yet registered, please see the programme online and join us in Sandton. Should you have registered already, additional speaker sessions have been added and high profile speakers confirmed!The regular registration closes 30 June 2016.

Register, by clicking here.

The EBS Law School in Wiesbaden, Germany, is looking for a highly skilled and motivated research fellow on a part-time basis (50%).

The position will entail research within the team of the Chair for Civil Law, Civil Procedure and Private International Law (Prof. Dr. Matthias Weller, Mag.rer.publ.) and within the EBS Research Center for Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution (TCDR) on a number of new and ongoing projects focusing on Private International Law, Transnational Commercial Law and International Civil Litigation.

The position includes teaching and programme management for the “EBS Law Term” on Transnational Commercial Law, an intense academic programme in English from September to December each year for incoming international students from all over the world, mainly from the partner law faculties of the EBS Law School. For further information on this programme: http://www.ebs.edu/lawterm.

Requirements: 

• a university law degree (e.g. JD, preferably the German “Erste Juristische Prüfung”)
• qualifications or at least substantial interest in Private International Law and Transnational Commercial Law
• excellent English language skills

The position is limited to two years but can be prolonged. The work location is Wiesbaden, a city close to Frankfurt, Germany. The work involves 19,75 hours per week (50%). The payment is subject to negotiations with the University, depending on the level of qualifications, but will not be lower than the average payment for research fellows (Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter) there. The faculty offers to obtain a doctoral degree on the basis of a thesis (Dissertation) if the faculty’s requirements for admission are met.

How to Apply:

Please send your application with reference to “ZRV_WiMi_Law Term” via email to antonella.nolten@ebs.edu. The application should include a cover letter, a CV containing, if applicable, list of publications and/or teaching evaluations and electronic copies of all relevant certificates. Please do not hesitate to contact Antonella Nolten in case of further questions.

We are looking forward to hearing from you!

 

by Lukas Schmidt, Research Fellow at the Center for Transnational Commercial Dispute Resolution (TCDR) of the EBS Law School, Wiesbaden, Germany.

Claudia Pechstein, an internationally successful ice speed skater, claims damages against the International Skating Union (ISU) because of a two-year-suspension for doping. The essential question was whether an arbitration agreement signed by Pechstein is effective. This agreement includes amongst other things the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne. Pechstein claimed that the arbitration agreement was invalid under § 19 GWB (German Antitrust Legislation) because the ISU (nationally and internationally only the ISU organizes competitions in ice speed skating) has abused its dominant position. Pechstein had to sign the arbitration agreement to be admitted to the competition. She claimed that the list of arbitrators of the CAS, from which the parties must each select an arbitrator, has not been prepared impartially because the sports federations and Olympic committees have a clear predominance in creating the list.

However, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) does not agree with these propositions. The Court, by its decision of 7 June 2016, docket no. KZR 6/15, ruled that the action is inadmissible because of the arbitration agreement. The Court held that the ISU is indeed dominant in the organization of international speed skating competitions, but has shown no abusive conduct because the associations and the athletes do not confront each other as guided by fundamentally conflicting interests. There was no structural imbalance in the composition of the tribunal ruling on Pechstein‘s  suspension. Furthermore, in the Court’s view,  Pechstein has signed the agreement voluntarily in the sense of Art. 19 GWB, even if she otherwise could not have participated in the contest. A consideration of the mutual interests justifies the application of the arbitration clause. However Pechstein is entitled to invoke the internationally competent Swiss courts following the arbitral procedure.

 

Despite the fact that thousands of legal persons and personal relations are subject to Liechtenstein Private International Law, Liechtenstein law has retained some unique features.  Whether the unique features should be maintained, or provide the reasoning for a reform agenda, will be discussed at the 2nd Liechtenstein Conference on 30 June 2016 organised by the Propter Homines Chair for Banking and Securities Law at the University of Liechtenstein.

The presentations will deal with Liechtenstein international company, foundation and trust law,  conflicts of law relating to banks, prospectus liability and collectus investment schemes, as well as matters of succession and the potential of Liechtenstein as an arbitration venue. All presentations will be held in German.

Please find further information here.

In case of interests please contact: nadja.dobler@uni.li

The new 2007 Lugano Convention, establishing parallelism with the Brussels I Regulation (Reg. 44/2001), had just entered into force in Switzerland in 2010 when it faced a new challenge in the form of the Recast Regulation (Reg. 1215/2012). Therefore, in 2014, CIVPRO (University of Bern), CCR (University of Luzern) and the Swiss Institute for Comparative Law (Lausanne) invited professors, researchers, civil officers and practitioners from all over Europe to discuss the future of European civil procedure with a special focus on Lugano and third states. Alexander Markus (Bern), Andreas Furrer (Luzern) and Ilaria Pretelli (Lausanne) have now published the (English/German) volume containing the keynote speeches and the subsequent contributions to this conference as well as the reports on the discussion in the various panels. This book presents and analyzes the past, the present and the alternative conceivable futures of the Lugano model of a “parallel” convention. For further information, click here.

This post has kindly been provided by Dr. Susanne Gössl, LL.M.

“This post is meant to remind that the deadline for applications for the Young PIL Scholars’ Conference in Bonn, Germany, in April 2017 is approaching.

We accept applications of junior researchers to present a paper until 30 June 2016. The topic is “Politics and Private International Law (?)”. We envisage presentations of half an hour each in German language with subsequent discussion on the respective subject. The presented papers will be published in a conference transcript by Mohr Siebeck.

Please send an exposé of maximum 1,000 words to nachwuchs-ipr(at)institut-familienrecht.de. The exposé shall be in German language and composed anonymously that is without any reference to the authorship. The author including his/her position or other affiliation shall be identifiable from a separate file.

Additional information can be found at https://www.jura.uni-bonn.de/en/institut-fuer-deutsches-europaeisches-und-internationales-familienrecht/pil-conference/call-for-papers/

If you have any further questions, please contact Dr. Susanne Gössl, LL.M. (sgoessl(at)uni-bonn.de).”

On 25 May 2016, the European Commission presented its long-awaited proposal for a regulation on addressing geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market (COM[2016] 289 final).

In the Commission’s words, “[t]he general objective of this proposal is to give customers better access to goods and services in the Single Market by preventing direct and indirect discrimination by traders artificially segmenting the market based on customers’ residence. Customers experience such differences in treatment when purchasing online, but also when travelling to other Member States to buy goods or services. Despite the implementation of the non-discrimination principle in Article 20(2) of Directive 2006/123/EC 3 (“Services Directive”), customers still face refusals to sell and different conditions, when buying goods or services across borders. This is mainly due to uncertainty over what constitutes objective criteria that justify differences in the way traders treat customers. In order to remedy this problem, traders and customers should have more clarity about the situations in which differences in treatment based on residence are not justifiable. This proposal prohibits the blocking of access to websites and other online interfaces and the rerouting of customers from one country version to another. It furthermore prohibits discrimination against customers in four specific cases of the sale of goods and services and does not allow the circumventing of such a ban on discrimination in passive sales agreements. Both consumers and businesses as end users of goods or services are affected by such practices and should therefore benefit from the rules set out in this proposal. Transactions where goods or services are purchased by a business for resale should, however, be excluded in order to allow traders to set up their distribution systems in compliance with European competition law.”

From a conflicts perspective, the question that is most interesting is how the prevention of geo-blocking and similar techniques will relate to the “directed-activity”-criterion that the European legislature has used both in the Rome I Regulation (Article 6(1)(b)) and in the Brussels I (recast) Regulation (Article 17(1)(c)). In a series of cases starting with the Alpenhof decision of 2011 (ECLI:EU:C:2010:740) the CJEU has developed a formula for determining the direction of a trader‘s activity by focusing on its subjective intention to deliver goods or services to consumers in a certain country, i.e. that it “should be ascertained whether, before the conclusion of any contract with the consumer, it is apparent from those websites and the trader’s overall activity that the trader was envisaging doing business with consumers domiciled in one or more Member States, including the Member State of that consumer’s domicile, in the sense that it was minded to conclude a contract with them.” If standard techniques of geo-blocking or the use of different sets of general conditions of access to their goods or services are now banned as discriminatory, how will this affect the test developed by the CJEU; in other word, is it reasonable to infer that a trader has actually been “minded to conclude a contract” and consented to being sued in the state of the consumer’s domicile if the trader has no legal option not to offer goods or services to the customer? The drafters have noticed this obvious problem and inserted a pertinent clause into Article 1 no. 5 of the proposal, which reads:

“This Regulation shall not affect acts of Union law concerning judicial cooperation in civil matters. Compliance with this Regulation shall not be construed as implying that a trader directs his or her activities to the Member State where the consumer has the habitual residence or domicile within the meaning of point (b) of Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 and point (c) of Article 17(1) of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012.”

In light of the highly controversial experience with similar reservations – it suffices to think of Article 1(4) of the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) or Recital 10 of the recently withdrawn CESL proposal (COM[2011]635 final) –, I have doubts whether the separation between the two areas of law will work as smoothly as the Commission seems to imagine: if a trader is legally coerced to serve consumers in a certain state, any test aimed at determining his or her “state of mind” to do so necessarily becomes moot – which, on the other hand, may be a good opportunity for the CJEU to rethink its frequently criticized approach. Considering the (non-)treatment of Recitals 24 and 25 of the Rome I Regulation in Emrek (ECLI:EU:C:2013:666), however, I am inclined not too expect much deference from the Court to interpretative guidance provided by the European legislators…

Many thanks to Dr Eva Lein, Herbert Smith Freehills Senior Research Fellow in Private International Law, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, who has shared this information and provided the link below. 

Are there general principles of European conflict of laws? Looking at the myriad of EU regulations in the area, one may well doubt it. And this explains why a new book edited by Stefan Leible is so topical. It addresses themes and concepts that reoccur across different conflicts regulations, but so far have not yet come under detailed scrutiny as to whether they follow a coherent approach. Among them are the usual suspects such as preliminary questions, characterisation, renvoi, party autonomy, the determination of habitual residence and the application of overriding mandatory rules, to name but a few. They are complemented by broader topics such as the role of recognition as a substitute for conflict of laws and economic efficiency in European private international law. The idea of treating those themes in one volume chimes with Leible’s idea of a ‚Rome 0’ Regulation, which he has expounded earlier together with Michael Müller (14 (2012/13) Yearbook of Private International Law 137). The book is a logical follow-up on this proposal. It analyses issue by issue whether there is indeed enough material that deserves to be treated in a ‘General Part’ of European private international law. The authors of the book are well-known experts in the field, such as Peter Mankowski, Heinz-Peter Mansel and Jan von Hein. The only criticism one may level is that they are almost exclusively from Germany. It would be interesting to see how lawyers from other countries react to the – quite Germanic – idea of an ‘Allgemeiner Teil’ for the European conflict of laws.

Find the table of contents here.

Veerle Van Den Eeckhout has written a working paper version of an article on the Proposed  Revision of the Posting Directive. It is written in Dutch.  The working paper is entitled “Toepasselijk arbeidsrecht bij langdurige detachering volgens het voorstel tot wijziging van de Detacheringsrichtlijn. Enkele beschouwingen vanuit Ipr-perspectief bij het voorstel tot wijziging van de Detacheringsrichtlijn” (in English: “The Law Applicable to Long-Term Postings According to the Proposal for a Directive Amending the Posting Directive. Some Reflections from a Private International Law Perspective on the Proposal for a Directive Amending the Posting Directive”).

In this contribution, the author formulates some reflections from the perspective of Private International Law on the proposal for a revision of the Posting Directive, focusing on the issue of the law applicable to long-term postings.

You can download Prof. Van Den Eeckhout’s paper here.

Professor Dr. Matthias Weller, European Business Law School-University of Wiesbaden (Germany), has edited and co-authored a new volume on European Conflict of Laws (in German): Europäisches Kollisionsrecht (Nomos; Baden-Baden, 2016). The volume contains contributions by Weller himself (on the general principles of European private international law), by Dr. Carl Friedrich Nordmeier (on Rome I, marital property and succession) and by Dr. David Bittmann (on Rome II and III as well as on the Maintenance Regulation and the Hague Protocol). The Book provides the reader with a survey on the current state of the art in European choice of law that is both up-to-date and analytical. Weller’s introduction in particular offers a fascinating treatment of the emerging general part of European PIL. Highly recommended!

For further information, click here.

Meik Thöne has authored a book on the abolition of exequatur proceedings under the new Brussels I-Regulation (“Die Abschaffung des Exequaturverfahrens und die EuGVVO”, Mohr Siebeck, 2016, IX + 289 pages). The volume is forthcoming  in German. A German abstract is available on the publisher’s website.