Conflictoflaws

Further to my last post, I omitted to include a book review by Professor Gilles Cuniberti in the second issue of ICLQ for 2022 which is focused on essays written in honour of Emeritus Professor Adrian Briggs (QC), and the latest edition of his (Briggs’) book on Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements.

The book entitled Lessons on Private International Law published by DIKAIA is the result of a collective effort of some of the speakers who presented at a course organised by the Mexican Consejo de la Judicatura Federal (Council of the Federal Judiciary) and the Mexican Escuela Federal de Formación Judicial (Federal School of Judiciary Training) in 2021.

Basically, this book puts into writing some of the presentations relating to the general topics on Private International Law given at the course. It should be noted that this book has seen the light of day thanks to the devoted work of professors Jorge Alberto Silva Silva and Nuria González Martín, who were the editors / coordinators.

This book explains the basic and general concepts of Private International Law, in particular those concerning the Mexican legal system. In addition, this book deals with innovative and fairly unknown topics to the Mexican doctrine, such as extension rules and the concept of lex loci factum. A full table of contents is provided below. The book ends with an analysis of the case of Antenor Patiño vs. María Cristina de Borbón, which although a bit “ancient” (1955 – a divorce case), it reflects the problems which arise regarding conflicts of jurisdiction and conflicts of laws in a high-profile case.

This book is accessible online and may be purchased here.

AUTHORS

Elí Rodríguez Martínez

Francisco José Contreras Vaca

Jorge Alberto Silva Silva – Coordinator

Jorge Cicero Fernández

Karl August Prinz von Sachsen Gessaphe

Ligia Claudia González Lozano

Mario de la Madrid

Nuria González Martín – Coordinator

Rolando Tamayo y Salmorán

Rosa Elvira Vargas Baca

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CAPÍTULO 1

INTRODUCCIÓN AL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO / Jorge Alberto Silva Silva

1. PRELIMINARES
2. Conjunto normativo
3. Un orden jurídico de la comunidad internacional
4. Subordinación de todos los conjuntos jurídicos de la comunidad internacional a uno solo
5. ENTRAMADO DE NORMAS Y ORDENAMIENTOS JURÍDICOS

III. RELACIONES ENTRE LOS CONJUNTOS NORMATIVOS DE LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL

1. Conjuntos disjuntos
2. Conjuntos subordinados
3. Intersección de conjuntos
4. Vinculación unilateral de conjuntos
5. En resumen
6. LEX LOCI FACTUM
7. FUNCIÓN DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
8. PROBLEMAS DE TRÁFICO JURÍDICO INTERNACIONAL

VII. NATURALEZA Y CONTENIDO DEL DERECHO EXTRANJERO

VIII. MÉTODOS PARA RESOLVER PROBLEMAS DE TRÁFICO JURÍDICO INTERNACIONAL

1. Normas de aplicación inmediata o autolimitadas
2. Normas materiales o sustantivas
3. Normas de extensión
4. Normas de conflicto
5. Pasos o secuenciación en la elección del derecho designado
6. RAZONES PARA RECHAZAR O TOMAR EN CUENTA UN ORDEN JURÍDICO EXTRANJERO
7. Razones en contra
8. Razones a favor
9. Ejemplos de resoluciones mexicanas rechazando derecho extranjero
10. Ejemplos de resoluciones mexicanas aceptando el derecho extranjero
11. Tesis del universalismo multicultural

BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 2

SISTEMA CONFLICTUAL TRADICIONAL / Jorge Alberto Silva Silva

1. NORMA DE CONFLICTO TRADICIONAL
2. HACIA UN CONCEPTO DE LA NORMA DE CONFLICTO TRADICIONAL

III. ESTRUCTURA SINTÁCTICA DE LA NORMA DE CONFLICTO

1. Supuesto normativo
2. Orden jurídico por identificar
3. Punto de contacto o de conexión
4. LA NORMA CONFLICTUAL EN LA REVOLUCIÓN CONFLICTUAL
5. DIFERENCIA ENTRE UNA NORMA DE CONFLICTO Y UNA NORMA INCORPORANTE
6. PROBLEMAS QUE SURGEN CON EL ORDEN JURÍDICO DESIGNADO
7. Proceso de bilateralización
8. Falso conflicto

VII. NORMATIVIDAD MEXICANA

BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 3

FUENTES DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO / Rosa Elvira Vargas Baca

1. CONSIDERACIONES PREVIAS
2. FUENTES DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
3. Derecho de fuente interna relacionado con el Derecho Internacional Privado

III. FUENTES DE DERECHO EXTRANJERO RELACIONADOS CON EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO

1. Conferencias Diplomáticas y Congresos
2. Tratados
3. Jurisprudencia internacional
4. Costumbre internacional
5. Doctrina Internacional
6. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 4

FOROS INTERNACIONALES / Rosa Elvira Vargas Baca

1. ASPECTOS PRELIMINARES DE LOS FOROS INTERNACIONALES
2. Conferencia de La Haya
3. Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para el Derecho Mercantil Internacional
4. Instituto Internacional para la Unificación del Derecho Internacional Privado
5. Conferencias Interamericanas de Derecho Internacional Privado
6. Mecanismos de trabajo de los foros internacionales
7. FOROS NACIONALES
8. Seminario Nacional de Derecho Internacional Privado y Comparado
9. Talleres de cooperación procesal internacional

III. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 5

CALIFICACIÓN DEL SUPUESTO NORMATIVO / Mario de la Madrid Andrade

1. CONSIDERACIONES PRELIMINARES
2. EL CONCEPTO DE CALIFICACIÓN JURÍDICA

III. EL PROCESO DE CALIFICACIÓN Y SU RESULTADO

1. EL CONFLICTO DE CALIFICACIONES
2. LOS MÉTODOS DE CALIFICACIÓN
3. La calificación lex fori
4. La calificación lex causae
5. El método comparativo
6. LA CALIFICACIÓN EN MÉXICO

VII. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 6

CUESTIÓN ADYACENTE, PREVIA O INCIDENTAL. PLURALIDAD DE SUPUESTOS NORMATIVOS / Ligia Claudia González Lozano y Nuria González Martín

1. CONCEPTO, CUESTIONAMIENTOS Y ORÍGEN
2. IDENTIFICACIÓN DE LA CUESTIÓN PRINCIPAL U ORIGINAL Y DE LA ADYACENTE

III. SISTEMAS DE RESOLUCIÓN DE LA CUESTIÓN ORIGINAL Y ADYACENTE

1. Independencia o autonomía de la cuestión previa
2. Absorción o dependiente
3. Armonización y mayor proximidad
4. PROBLEMAS Y ARGUMENTOS
5. ¿Subsunción o autonomía?
6. Posibilidades argumentativas a tomarse en cuenta
7. POSIBLES ESCENARIOS SEGÚN MÉTODO QUE SE APLIQUE
8. REGLAMENTACIÓN MEXICANA

VII. CONCLUSIÓN

VIII. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 7

EL REENVÍO Y SU REGULACIÓN EN EL DERECHO CIVIL MEXICANO / Francisco José Contreras Vaca

1. INTRODUCCIÓN
2. ORIGEN DEL REENVÍO

III. CONCEPTO DE REENVIO

1. TRATAMIENTODEL REENVÍO EN LA LEGISLACIÓN CIVIL FEDERAL MEXICANA Y LA APLICABLE EN LA CIUDAD DE MÉXICO.
2. CRITICAS A LA REGULACIÓN DEL REENVIO EN MÉXICO.
3. CONCLUSIONES

VII. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 8

VULNERACIÓN DEL ORDEN PÚBLICO / Elí Rodríguez Martínez

1. INTRODUCCIÓN
2. UN VISTAZO RÁPIDO A LA HISTORIA

III. CONCEPTO

1. EL ORDEN PÚBLICO EN EL “DERECHO PÚBLICO” Y EN EL “DERECHO PRIVADO”
2. El orden público en el derecho público
3. El orden público en el derecho privado
4. CONCEPTOS SIMILARES
5. Leyes de orden público
6. Normas de orden público
7. Excepción de orden público
8. CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL ORDEN PÚBLICO INTERNACIONAL

VII. EFECTOS DEL ORDEN PÚBLICO INTERNACIONAL

1. Efectos con respecto a la ley aplicable
2. Efectos con relación el grado de incompatibilidad con las normas del foro

VIII. EL ORDEN PÚBLICO Y LAS NORMAS DE POLICÍA

1. EL ORDEN PÚBLICO INTERNACIONAL EN EL DERECHO MEXICANO
2. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 9

INSTITUCIONES IDÉNTICAS, ANÁLOGAS Y DESCONOCIDAS / Karl August Prinz von Sachsen Gessaphe

1. INTRODUCCIÓN
2. INTERPRETACIÓN DEL ART. 14 Fracc. III CCFED
3. Aplicabilidad de la norma
4. Carácter de la norma

III. INSTITUCIONES O PROCEDIMIENTOS DESCONOCIDOS

1. Instituciones desconocidas
2. Procedimientos desconocidos
3. INSTITUCIONES O PROCEDIMIENTOS ANÁLOGOS
4. Método funcional
5. Aplicación a ejemplos
6. IMPEDIMENTO AL FALTAR INSTITUCIONES ANÁLOGAS
7. RESUMEN
8. Instituciones y procedimientos desconocidos
9. Instituciones análogas en derecho mexicano
10. Consecuencia al faltar instituciones análogas
11. Delimitación de la contrariedad al orden público

VII. CONCLUSIÓN

VIII. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 10

FRAUDE A LA LEY / Nuria González Martín

1. ELEMENTOS PRELIMINARES
2. MANIPULACIÓN DE LOS PUNTOS DE CONTACTO

III. PRECISIÓN DEL CONCEPTO DE FRAUDE A LA LEY

1. Fraude como delito
2. Simulación
3. Vulneración del orden público
4. ELEMENTOS CARACTERÍSTICOS DEL FRAUDE A LA LEY
5. ELEMENTOS ESPECIALES A TOMAR EN CUENTA
6. Evasión artificiosa
7. Evasión de los principios fundamentales del orden jurídico
8. Determinar la intención fraudulenta
9. SANCIÓN PARA QUIEN DEFRAUDE A LA LEY
10. Nulidad del acto extranjero
11. No reconocimiento de efectos

VII. EJEMPLOS ILUSTRATIVOS

1. Caso Bauffremont-Bibescu
2. Divorcios al vapor

VIII. REGLAMENTACIÓN MEXICANA

A MODO DE CONCLUSIÓN

BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 11

DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO Y DERECHOS HUMANOS. CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE SU INTERACCIÓN A FAVOR DE LA PERSONA, LA NIÑEZ Y LA FAMILIA / Jorge Cicero Fernández

1. INTRODUCCIÓN
2. LOS TRATADOS SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS

1 Su naturaleza y alcances

2. Derechos protegidos y deberes estatales

III. TRATADOS DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO “CONCERNIENTES A LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS”

1. EL CONSEJO DE EUROPA

1 Desarrollos normativos

2. La Jurisprudencia del TEDH
3. LA JURISPRUDENCIA Y LA PRÁCTICA JUDICIAL MEXICANAS

CONCLUSIÓN

BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA […]

CAPÍTULO 12

APLICACIÓN ARMÓNICA Y ADAPTACIÓN DE ORDENAMIENTOS INTERPRETACIÓN ENANTEOTÉLICA E INTERPRETACIÓN EQUITATIVA / Rolando Tamayo y Salmorán

I PRELIMINARIA

1. Prudentia y prudentia iuris

III. LA PROFESIÓN JURÍDICA

1. ¿CÓMO SE CONOCE EL DERECHO?
2. Genesis iurisprudentiæ
3. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 13

INTERPRETACIÓN Y REFORMULACIÓN DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO / Jorge Alberto Silva Silva

1. INTRODUCCIÓN
2. RESUMIENDO LOS CAPÍTULOS ANTERIORES

III. EXPRESIONES Y CONCEPTOS

1. LA TAREA DEL JUEZ
2. EL DIPR ES UNA DISCIPLINA DIFÍCIL
3. LA LEGISLACIÓN COMO UN CAOS FENOMÉNICO

VII. PROBLEMAS DE APLICACIÓN Y DECISIÓN

VIII. UN ACERCAMIENTO A LA ACTIVIDAD REFORMULATORIA

1. PROCESO INTELECTUAL
2. Reformulación a partir de textos legislados
3. Reformulación a partir de ausencia de textos legislados
4. MANIPULACIÓN CONFLICTUAL
5. CONCLUSIONES

XII. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 14

EXÉGESIS DEL DERECHO CONVENCIONAL INTERNACIONAL. CONVENIOS EN VIGOR RELACIONADOS CON LA PARTE GENERAL DEL DIPr / Nuria González Martín

1. NOTA PRELIMINAR
2. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE NORMAS GENERALES DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO

III. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE DOMICILIO DE LAS PERSONAS FÍSICAS EN EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO

1. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE CONFLICTOS DE LEYES EN MATERIA DE ADOPCIÓN DE MENORES
2. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE PERSONALIDAD Y CAPACIDAD DE LAS PERSONAS JURÍDICAS EN EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
3. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE CONFLICTOS DE LEYES EN MATERIA DE LETRAS DE CAMBIO, PAGARÉS Y FACTURAS

VII. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE CONFLICTO DE LEYES EN MATERIA DE SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES

VIII. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE PRUEBA E INFORMACIÓN ACERCA DEL DERECHO EXTRANJERO

APÉNDICE

ANÁLISIS DEL CASO ANTENOR PATIÑO VS. MARIA CRISTINA DE BORBÓN: UNA RELECTURA / Francisco José Contreras Vaca

1. INTRODUCCIÓN
2. PLANTEAMIENTO DE LA CONTROVERSIA.

III. ESTUDIO DE LA LITIS

1. El problema de reconocimiento de validez y ejecución de sentencias dictadas por tribunales extranjeros.
2. El problema de la litispendencia y conexidad en la esfera internacional.
3. Consideraciones generales.
4. CONCLUSIÓN

 

Under the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, maintenance obligations are governed by the law of the State of habitual residence of the creditor, save where the Protocol itself provides otherwise [Article 3(1)]. Echoing the issues pertaining to the so-called conflit mobile, the Protocol provides also that in the case of a change in the habitual residence of the creditor, the law of the State of the new habitual residence is to apply as from the moment when the change occurs [Article 3(2)].

If the creditor is a child, does a wrongful removal – followed by an order commanding to return the child to the State in which he/she habitually resided immediately prior to the wrongful removal – constitute an obstacle to the acquisition of a new place of habitual residence by the creditor? This is the legal issue that the Court addresses in its judgment handed down this Thursday in the case W.J., C-644/20.

The Court decided to answer the preliminary question without first requesting its Advocate General to present an Opinion. It did so in a negative: the fact that a court of a Member State has ordered, in separate proceedings, the return of that child to the State in which he/she was habitually resident immediately before his/her wrongful removal is not sufficient to prevent that child from acquiring new habitual residence in the Member State to which the child was removed.

In brief, its reasoning may be summarized as follows:

• also for the purposes of the Hague Protocol, the notion of ‘habitual residence’ calls for it autonomous interpretation (paragraph 62);

  interestingly, while the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the Protocol and does so with a binding effect with regards to the Member States, the Protocol is also binding for non-Member States; that being said, the plead for autonomous interpretation seems justified also from the perspective of extra-EU parties to the Protocol, although it is yet to be seen whether they will align with the interpretation provided for by the Court, its methods of said interpretation and references to Charter).

• the habitual residence of the maintenance creditor is that of the place where on the facts his or her habitual centre of life is located, taking into account his or her family and social environment (paragraph 66),
• as a connecting factor for determination of law applicable to maintenance obligations, the notion of ‘habitual residence’ is heavily factual – it is the presence with a territory of a particular State that matters the most; as a consequence, it is only in the context of an assessment of all the circumstances of the case before it that, while taking into due consideration the best interests of that child, the national court hearing the case may find it necessary to take into account the potentially wrongful nature of the removal or retention of that child and conclude that the degree of stability of presence within the territory of a Member State does not allow to conclude that the child habitual resides in that State (paragraph 73).

The judgment is available here, in French. A press release in English can be found here.

Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter has been a divisive event. Commenting on the response on Twitter and elsewhere, Musk tweeted:

The extreme antibody reaction from those who fear free speech says it all

>

By “free speech”, I simply mean that which matches the law.

I am against censorship that goes far beyond the law.

If people want less free speech, they will ask government to pass laws to that effect.

Therefore, going beyond the law is contrary to the will of the people.

Ralf Michaels quote-tweeted perceptively: ‘But which law?’

Twitter and the conflict of laws

By their very nature, digital platforms like Twitter present a variety of conflict of laws issues.

‘Twitter’ is not a monolithic entity. The functionality of the social media platform with which readers would be familiar is underpinned by a transnational corporate group. Twitter, Inc is incorporated in Delaware, and has various subsidiaries around the world; Twitter International Company, for example, is incorporated in Ireland and responsible as data controller for users that live outside of the United States. The business is headquartered in San Francisco but has offices, assets, and thousands of staff around the world.

The platform is populated by 400 million users from all over the world. After the US, the top 5 countries with the most Twitter users are comprised of Japan, India, the UK and Brazil. The tweets and retweets of those users may be seen all over the world. Users have wielded that functionality for all sorts of ends: to report on Russia’s war in real-time; to coordinate an Arab Spring; to rally for an American coup d’état; to share pictures of food, memes, and endless screams; and to share conflict of laws scholarship.

Disputes involving material on Twitter thus naturally include foreign elements. Where disputes crystallise into litigation, a court may be asked to consider what system of law should determine a particular issue. When the issue concerns whether speech is permissible, the answer may be far from simple.

Free speech in the conflict of laws

The treatment of freedom of speech in the conflict of laws depends on the system of private international law one is considering, among other things. (The author is one of those heathens that eschews the globalist understanding of our discipline.)

Alex Mills has written that the balance between free speech and other important interests ‘is at the heart of any democratic political order’.[1] Issues involving free speech may thus engage issues of public policy, or ordre public,[2] as well as constitutional considerations.

From the US perspective, the ‘limits of free speech’ on Twitter is likely to be addressed within the framework of the First Amendment, even where foreign elements are involved. As regards private international law, the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage (SPEECH) Act 28 USC 4101- 4105 (‘SPEECH Act’) is demonstrative. It operates in aid of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and provides that a US ‘domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation unless the domestic court determines that’ the relevant foreign law would provide the same protections for freedom of speech as would be afforded by the US Constitution.[3]

Other common law jurisdictions have approached transnational defamation issues differently, and not with explicit reference to any capital-c constitutional rights. In Australia, the High Court has held that the lex loci delicti choice-of-law rule combined with a multiple publication rule means that defamation is determined by the law of the jurisdiction in which a tweet is ‘available in comprehensible form’: the place or places it is downloaded.[4] In contrast, where a claim concerns a breach of confidence on Twitter, an Australian court is likely to apply the equitable principles of the lex fori even if the information was shared into a foreign jurisdiction without authorisation.[5] In either case, constitutional considerations are sidelined.

The balance to be struck between free speech on the one hand, and so-called ‘personality rights’ on the other, is a controversial issue within a legal system, let alone between legal systems. So for example, the choice-of-law rule for non-contractual obligations provided by the Rome II Regulation does not apply to personality rights, as a consensus could not be reached on point.[6] Similarly, defamation and privacy are excluded from the scope of the HCCH Judgments Convention by Art 2(1)(k)–(l).

There is a diversity of approaches to choice of law for cross-border infringements of personality rights between legal systems.[7] But the ‘law applicable to free speech on Twitter’ is an issue that goes far broader than personality rights. It touches on as many areas of law as there are aspects of human affairs that are affected by the Twitter platform. For example, among other things, the platform may be used to:

• spread misrepresentation about an election, engaging electoral law;
• influence the price of assets, engaging banking and finance law; or
• promote products, engaging consumer law.

Issues falling into different areas of law may be subject to different choice-of-law rules, and different systems of applicable law. What one system characterises as an issue for the proper law of the contract could be treated as an issue for a forum statute in another.

All of this is to say: determining what ‘the law says’ about certain content on Twitter is a far more complex issue than Elon Musk has suggested.

The law applicable to online dignity

Key to the divisiveness of Musk’s acquisition is his position on content moderation. Critics worry that a laissez-faire approach to removing objectionable content on the platform will lead to a resurgence of hate speech.

Musk’s vision for a freer Twitter will be subject to a variety of national laws that seek to protect dignity at the cost of free speech in various ways. For example, in April, the European Parliament agreed on a ‘Digital Services Act’, while in the UK, at the time of writing, an ‘Online Safety Bill’ is in the House of Commons. In Australia, an Online Safety Act was passed in 2021, which provided an ‘existing Online Content Scheme [with] new powers to regulate illegal and restricted content no matter where it’s hosted’. That scheme complements various other national laws, like our Racial Discrimination Act 1975, which outlaws speech that is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of people, and was done because of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of the person or group.

When a person in the United States posts content about an Australian that is permissible under US law, but violates Australian statute, the difficulty of Musk’s position on the limits of censorship becomes clear. Diverse legal systems come to diverse positions on the appropriate balance between allowing online freedom and protecting human dignity, which are often struck with mandatory law. When your platform is frequented by millions of users all over the world, there is no single ‘will of the people’ by which to judge. Perhaps Musk will embrace technological solutions to give effect to national standards on what sort of content must be censored.

A host of other conflicts issues

Musk-era Twitter is likely to pose a smorgasbord of other issues for interrogation by conflict of laws enthusiasts.

For example: legal systems take diverse approaches to the issue of whether a foreign parent company behind a platform like Twitter can be imposed with liability, or even criminal responsibility, for content that is on the platform. While conservatives in America consider the fate of s 230 of the Communications Decency Act—a provision that means that Twitter is not publisher of content they host—other countries take a very different view of the issue. Litigation involving the companies behind Twitter is likely to engage courts’ long-arm jurisdiction.

Perhaps the thorniest conflicts problem that may emerge on Musk’s Twitter is the scope of national laws that concern disinformation. In an announcement on 25 April, Musk stated:

‘Free speech is the bedrock of a functioning democracy, and Twitter is the digital town square where matters vital to the future of humanity are debated’.

Recent years have shown that the future of humanity is not necessarily benefited by free speech on social media. How many lives were lost as a result of vaccine-scepticism exacerbated by the spread of junk science on social media? How many democracies have been undermined by Russian disinformation campaigns on Twitter? The extraterritorial application of forum statutes to deal with these kinds of issues may pose a recurring challenge for Musk’s vision.[8] I look forward to tweeting about it.

Michael Douglas is Senior Lecturer at UWA Law School and a consultant in litigation at Bennett + Co, Perth.

 

[1] Alex Mills, ‘The Law Applicable to Cross-border Defamation on Social Media: Whose Law Governs Free Speech in “Facebookistan”?’ (2015) 7 Journal of Media Law 1, 21.

[2] See, eg, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 19(3).

[3] SPEECH Act s 3; United States Code, title 28, Part VI, § 4102. See generally Lili Levi, ‘The Problem of Trans-National Libel’ (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 507.

[4] Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575.

[5] But see Michael Douglas, ‘Characterisation of Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Tort in Private International Law’ (2018) 41 UNSW Law Journal 490.

[6] Art 4(1); see Andrew Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2008).

[7] See generally Symeon C Symeonides, Cross-Border Infringement of Personality Rights via the Internet (Brill, 2021) ch VI; Tobias Lutzi, Private International Law Online: Internet and Civil Liability in the EU (Oxford University Press, 2020) ch 4.

[8] See generally Matthias Lehmann, ‘New Challenges of Extraterritoriality: Superposing Laws’ in Franco Ferrari and Diego P Fernández Arroyo (eds), Private International Law: Contemporary Challenges and Continuing Relevance (Edward Elgar, 2019) ch 10.

The Pax Moot Borrás Round of 2022 took place in Paris on 4 to 6 May. The preliminary rounds and semi-finals were held at the Universities of Sciences-Pio and Paris-Dauphine; the finals took place at the Commercial Court on the Quai de la Corse.

The University of Ljubljana won the oral rounds, with the University of Ghent as runner-up.

For the written memorials two teams share the winning position: the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano and the Universität Wien.

Santiago García Parga, from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid won the prize for the best pleader.

The European Commission co-funds the moot court.

Dr Sophie Duroy and Dr Rishi Gulati, both presently members of the KFG Berlin Potsdam Research Group ‘The International Rule of Law – Rise or Decline?’, will be hosting a virtual half-day webinar titled “Global Security and the International Rule of Law: Interdisciplinary Perspectives” on 30 May 2022. The event is free to attend. A program and link to registration is below:

https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/global-security-and-the-international-rule-of-law-tickets-331724325387

Two recent private international law articles were published by International and Comparative Law Quarterly:

B Marshall, “Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses and the Anomaly created by Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation”

The English Court of Appeal and German Bundesgerichtshof recently decided that Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies to asymmetric jurisdiction clauses. This article contends that while this conclusion is sound, separating the ‘clause’ into two ‘agreements’ to reach it is not. This disaggregation prevents a solution to the anomaly that Article 31(2) creates for asymmetric clauses, where a lender sues under its option and the borrower subsequently sues in the anchor court. This article proposes a solution, based on a uniform characterisation of the clause as a whole, which protects the lender’s option and mitigates the risk of parallel proceedings

TD Grant, “Arbitration, Corruption and Post-Award Control in French and English Courts”

In September 2021, the French Cour de Cassation reversed the annulment that the Paris Cour d’appel earlier had granted in regard to an arbitral award in Alexander Brothers v Alstom on grounds of corruption. This brought French courts in line with their English counterparts, at least in that one case, the latter having accepted the Alexander Brothers award as enforceable. Noteworthy beyond the welcome consistency that the recent French judgment imparts in one case, that and other recent judgments cast light on several issues in international arbitration, including the arbitrability of allegations of fraud or corruption, the relevance of evidence of corruption ‘downstream’ from a contract, and the legal effects (if any) on third parties of internal compliance regimes that enterprises adopt in response to national regulatory and enforcement actions in respect of corruption.

 

(This post is provided by Zeyu Huang & Wenhui Chi. Mr. Huang practises law as a Shenzhen-based associate at Hui Zhong Law Firm. He holds LLB (Renmin U.), LLM & PhD (Macau U.). Ms. Chi is now working as a legal counsel at the Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA) and the South China International Arbitration Center (Hong Kong) (SCIAHK). She holds BA (PKU), LLM & JD (PKU School of Transnational Law). The authors may be contacted at huangzeyu@huizhonglaw.com or chiwenhui@scia.com.cn.)

 

The People’s Republic of China (hereinafter “China” or “PRC”) deposited its instrument of ratification for the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (hereinafter “CISG”) on 11 December 1986. Since its entry into force in 1988, it is beyond doubt that CISG applies to the territory of Mainland China albeit with some reservations and/or declarations (e.g. Article 96). However, businesspeople, courts, practitioners and scholars are split, uncertain and inconsistent over the issue whether the CISG should extend to Hong Kong and Macau after their returns respectively in 1997 and 1999. [1]

 

This issue stemed from the unclear intentions of China when it submitted the diplomatic notes to the United Nations, which purported to inform the Secretary-General of the status of Hong Kong and Macau in relation to deposited treaties. [2] However, China did not mention CISG in the Diplomatic Notes at all. As a result, whether China had expressed its intention of extending or excluding CISG to Hong Kong and Macau has been subject to inconsistent interpretations and enquires conducted by different non-Hong Kong fora. [3]

 

To solve this problem, China, after seeking the views of Hong Kong SAR Government, determined to actively remove the uncertainty by depositing a declaration of extension of the territorial application of CISG to Hong Kong on 5 May 2022. [4] On and after 1 December 2022, CISG will apply to both Hong Kong and Mainland China. It should be noted that the declaration that China is not bound by Article 1(1)(b) CISG does not apply to Hong Kong. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the Macau SAR government will follow suit on this matter, requesting the Central Government to extend the application of CISG to Macau.

 

Extension of International Treatises Ratified by China to Hong Kong and Macau

 

The issue of whether international treaties ratified by China ‘automatically’ applies to the territory of the Hong Kong and Macau SARs was once hotly debated in the investor-State arbitration cases of Tza Yap Shum v. Peru [5] and Sanum v. Laos-I [6]. Contrary to international tribunals and the Court of Appeal of Singapore’s confirmative and liberal stances, Chinese government and commentators said no. [7] They all insist that China has made its intentions clear in the Diplomatic Notes that the treaty to which China is or will become a party applies to Hong Kong and Macau only after China has decided so and carried out separately the formalities for such application. [8] Moreover, the extension of territorial application to Hong Kong and Macau must be in line with the “One Country, Two Systems” policy and the Basic Laws of Hong Kong and Macau. [9] Accordingly, the PRC Central People’s Government in Beijing has the final say over whether the international treaty to which China is or will be a party applies to Hong Kong and Macau after consulting with the two SARs’ governments.

 

The same problem stays with the applicability of CISG in the Hong Kong and Macau SARs. On the one hand, no mention of CISG in the Diplomatic Notes submitted by China, at least on the side of Hong Kong, demonstrates China’s true intentions in public international law that the CISG shall not apply in the SAR. [10] In this view embraced by some French and US courts, China’s Diplomatic Notes not mentioning CISG qualify as Article 93(1) CISG reservation indicating that CISG does not apply to Hong Kong and Macau. [11] On the other hand, some other foreign courts considered the Diplomatic Notes did not constitute an Article 93(1) CISG reservation and therefore the default rule in Article 93(4) applies, saying that CISG ‘automatically’ applies to all territorial unites of China. [12] This interpretive approach is similar to the confirmative and liberal approach adopted by the tribunals in Tza Yap Shum v. Peru and Sanum v. Laos-I on the issue whether Chinese investment treaty absent in the Diplomatic Notes extends to territory of the Hong Kong and Macau SARs. However, such approach was often criticized as contrary to China’s expressed intentions. [13]

 

What Does It Mean for Hong Kong?

 

Legally speaking, the act of China’s depositing the declaration of extension of CISG to Hong Kong has three implications.

 

Firstly, and most obviously, on and after 1 December 2022 it would be correct for any foreign court or international tribunal to hold that CISG applies to Hong Kong. This will wipe out the “confusion and conflict as to whether or not China’s diplomatic notes for Hong Kong and Macao, deposited in 1997 and 1999 respectively, are sufficient to exclude the application of the CISG” to Hong Kong and Macau under Article 93 CISG. [14] Indeed, they are sufficient; but China has now decided to reverse its previous intention.

 

Secondly, China has impliedly confirmed that the Diplomatic Notes qualify as Article 93(1) CISG reservation, which means CISG would not automatically apply to territorial units of China such as Hong Kong and Macau unless China has determined so. In other words, China’s Central People’s Government has the final say on whether a Chinese international treaty applies to Hong Kong and Macau or not.

 

Thirdly, any construction of the Diplomatic Notes by foreign courts or arbitral tribunals which leads to the ‘automatic’ application of CISG or other international treaties (including Chinese investment agreements) to Hong Kong and Macau would be incorrect and in disregard of China’s true intentions expressed in the Diplomatic Notes. This will possibly prevent foreign courts or investment arbitration tribunals from easily reaching the decision that CISG or Chinese international investment agreement ‘automatically’ applies to Hong Kong and Macau. It also means Hong Kong might need seek the views of Central People’s Government on whether or not to extend Chinese international investment agreement to the Hong Kong SAR, especially in cases where the Hong Kong investors intend to rely on these international instruments to safeguard their rights and interests in investments made overseas.

 

In parallel with the ongoing Reform and Opening-up within and beyond China, China’s accession to CISG has fundamentally shaped the legislative and judicial landscape of codifying Chinese contract law. It is believed that the Ordinance [15] implementing the CISG in Hong Kong would for sure reshape the legislative and judicial landscape of Hong Kong law. [16]

 

Conclusion: Shall Macau Follow Suit?

 

The answer is of course yes. As another major player in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Greater Bay Area (GBA) in China, Macau is now confronted with the same “confusion and conflict” issue once faced by Hong Kong before 5 May 2022. As mentioned earlier, such “confusion and conflict” as to whether the Diplomatic Notes are sufficient to exclude the application of CISG and other international treaties not mentioned therein to Hong Kong and Macau has been removed. China impliedly reiterated itself through this act of extending CISG to Hong Kong that the Diplomatic Notes are sufficient to do so.

 

Hence, whether CISG or Chinese investment treaty extends to Macau is likewise subject to the final decision of China’s Central People’s Government. Despite divergent opinions and interpretations, Chinese government’s stance has been consistent – CISG or Chinese international investment agreement outside the Diplomatic Notes does not ‘automatically’ applies to Hong Kong and Macau, and such extension needs the Central People’s Government’s final approval. Therefore, according to Article 138(1) of the Macau Basic Law, Macau should follow up on future consultations with the Central People’s Government in Beijing to decide whether the CISG (and Chinese investment treaty) should apply to the Macau SAR, and if so, how they should apply. It is foreseeable that China would probably also deposit another separate instrument of extending the application of CISG to Macau. By then, perhaps we can see the dawn of unifying the sales law as key part of inter-regional private laws within the PRC. 

 

——

Endnotes

[1] See the Department of Justice of Hong Kong, Consultation Paper titled “Proposed Application of The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” (hereinafter “Consultation Paper”), Consultation Period expired by 30 December 2020, paras. 3.33-3.44. It is available at https://www.gov.hk/en/residents/government/publication/consultation/docs/2020/CISG.pdf.

[2] See United Nations, ‘Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General’ (hereinafter “Diplomatic Notes”), China: Notes 2 and 3, which informed the Secretary-General of the status of Hong Kong and Macau in relation to treaties deposited with the Secretary-General. The diplomatic notes laid out the deposited treaties that would respectively apply to Hong Kong and Macau.

[3] See Consultation Paper, supra note 1, paras. 3.38-3.39.

[4] For Press Release, see https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2022/unisl327.html.

[5] See Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Award, 7 July 2011, where a Hong Kong resident having Chinese nationality relied upon the Peru-China BIT 1994 to bring the ICSID arbitration against Peru.

[6] See Sanum Investments Ltd. v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PCA Case No. 2013-13, Decision on Jurisdiction of 13 December 2013, where a Macau-based company invoked the China-Laos BIT 1993 to initiate the UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration administered by PCA against Laos.

[7] See e.g., PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on October 21, 2016’, available at https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cegv//eng/fyrth/t1407743.htm; An Chen, ‘Queries to the Recent ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction Upon the Case of Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru: Should China-Peru BIT 1994 Be Applied to Hong Kong SAR under the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy?’ (2009) 10 Journal of World Investment & Trade 829, at 832-844.

[8] See Diplomatic Notes, supra note 2.

[9] See Article 153 of the Hong Kong Basic Law and Article 138 of the Macau Basic Law.

[10] See Consultation Paper, supra note 1, paras. 3.42 (“While it is not disputed that in Hong Kong at least, the CISG should not apply ….”).

[11] See ibid, at para. 3.38. The Consultation Paper cited the following cases: Telecommunications Products Case, Cour de Cassation, Case No. 04-117726, 2 April 2008 (France); Innotex Precision Ltd v Horei Image Products, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (2009) (US); America’s Collectibles Network Inc. v Timlly (HK) Ltd., 746 F. Supp. 2d 914 (2010) (US); Wuhan Yinfeng Data Network Co. Ltd. v Xu Ming (19 March 2003), Hubei High People’s Court (China).

[12] See ibid, at para. 3.39. The Consultation Paper cited the following cases: CNA Int’l Inc. v Guangdong Kelon Electronical Holdings et al. Case No. 05 C 5734 (2008) (US); Electrocraft Arkansas, Inc. v Super Electric Motors Ltd. (2009) 4:09 CV 00318 SWW (US).

[13] See Consultation Paper, supra note 1, para. 3.42. See also Mahdev Mohan & Siraj Shaik Aziz, ‘Construing A Treaty Against States Parties’ Expressed Intentions: Sanum Investments Ltd v Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic’ (2018) 30 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 384.

[14] See Consultation Paper, supra note 1, para. 3.42.

[15] https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap641!en.

[16] For comparison between the CISG and Hong Kong law, see Consultation Paper, supra note 1, para. 2.8.

Invitation by Pietro Franzina

On 29 April 2022, Germany filed an application against Italy before the International Court of Justice. Germany complains that Italy is allowing its courts to entertain claims for compensation for prejudice resulting from war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated between 1943 and 1945 by the Third Reich’s forces in Italy.

Recalling the ruling given by the International Court of Justice itself in 2012, in the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Germany contends that the conduct of Italian authorities amounts to a violation of jurisdictional immunity of Germany as a sovereign State (for a more detailed account of the case, see this post on the EAPIL blog).

A webinar in English, organised by the University of Ferrara and the Catholic University of Milan, will take place on 11 May 2022, between 10.30 am and 12.30 pm, via GoogleMeet, to discuss the various issues surrounding the case.

The speakers include Giorgia Berrino (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia), Serena Forlati (University of Ferrara), Pietro Franzina (Catholic University of the Sacred Geart, Milan), Karin Oellers-Frahm (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law  and International Law, Heidelberg), Riccardo Pavoni (University of Siena), and Pierfrancesco Rossi (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome).

Attendance is free. See here for further details.

The second issue of the Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly for 2022 was just published. It features the following case notes, articles and book review on private international law:

David Capper, Proving Dissipation in Freezing Orders

J Atmaz Al-Sibaie, Foreign Claims and Foreign Laws

P Devonshire, Clearing the Decks: The Siskina in the Privy Council

M Paterson, Finally laying The Siskina to rest? and expanding the court’s power to grant freezing injunctions

M Teo, Foreign Act of State: Comity or Certainty

A Dickinson, W(h)ither Unjust Enrichment? Border Disputes in the Conflict of Laws (Again)

C Proctor, Book Review on INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. Benjamin Geva, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, and Sagi Peari, UWA Law School, University of Western Australia. ISBN 978-0-19-882868-6. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2020) xxxi and 252 pp., plus I p. Appendix and 12 pp. Index. Hardback £110.

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on 12 May 2022 at 1:00 pm (Mexico City time – CDT), 8:00 pm (Europe, CEST time). The purpose of this webinar is to showcase the book entitled Private International Law: Practical Cases Resolved and Explained, and will be presented by professors David Carrizo Aguado, María del Carmen Chéliz Inglés and Lucas Andrés Pérez Martín in Spanish.

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88944671902?pwd=SHdQSGVFOGZHWjl4TDdJTmJ6bUc1dz09

Meeting ID: 889 4467 1902

Password: BMAAMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX

On Tuesday, May 10, 2022, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its 22nd monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 17:00-18:30 CEST. Kermit Roosevelt (University of Pennsylvania) will speak, in English, about the topic

“The Third Restatement of Conflict of Laws: Origins and Aspirations“.

During the middle of the twentieth century, American judges and law professors reacted against the territorialist rigidity of the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, ushering in the chaos of the choice-of-law revolution. The Second Restatement, completed in 1971, won wide acceptance by courts but found less favor with law professors and has not brought order to the field. In 2014, the American Law Institute decided to try again, beginning work on the Third Restatement. What lessons can be learned from the history of American choice of law, and how can those lessons inform the drafting of a new Restatement? Kermit Roosevelt, the Reporter for the Third Restatement, will offer an overview of the current draft that seeks to situate it within the history of American choice of law and suggest the reasons that it takes the form it does.

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

The Early Bird Registration for the 80th Biennial Conference of the International Law Association in Lisbon (19–23 June 2022) will close on 13th May 2022.

The programme includes sessions of the ILA Committees and Study Groups and a set of parallel panels where the main issues affecting the current status of International Law will be discussed. Information on the programme is available here. Kindly register as soon as possible to secure your place. Online registration is available here.

This book presents a new explanation as to the conflict-of-law rule in the field of intellectual property. In addition, it also provides new insights into the history of the conflict-of-laws, aliens law and their relationship.

The book focusses on the difficult question whether the Berne Convention (on copyright) and the Paris Convention (on industrial property) contain a conflict-of-law rule. Opinions differ widely on this matter today. However, in the past, for the nineteenth-century authors of these treaties, it was perfectly self-evident that these treaties contain a conflict-of-law rule, namely in the ‘principle of national treatment’ as it is called. How is that possible? These are the fundamental questions at the heart of this book: does the principle of national treatment in the Berne Convention (article 5(1)) and the Paris Convention (Article 2(1)) contain a conflict-of-law rule? And if so, why do we no longer understand this conflict-of-law rule today?

The study reveals a ground-breaking new explanation why the principle of national treatment in these treaties contains a conflict-of-law rule: the lex loci protectionis.

Key to understanding is a paradigm shift. The principle of national treatment was developed as a doctrine-of-statute solution addressing a doctrine-of-statute problem. In that way of thinking, it is self-evident that the principle of national treatment contains a conflict-of-law rule. However, today we have started to think differently, i.e. within the paradigm of Von Savigny. This causes a problem: we look at an old, statutist solution through Savignian glasses, and as a result the conflict-of-law rule in the principle of national treatment is out of the picture. Meanwhile, we are not even aware that we are looking through Savignian glasses and that these glasses narrow our field of vision – and as a result, this conflict-of-law rule is beyond our reach. The explanation in this book results in a comprehensive and consistent interpretation of the respective provisions in these treaties, and it explains why we no longer understand this conflict-of-law rule today (see especially paragraph 5.1.2).

The search for this new explanation has, in addition, generated several new insights into the history of the conflict of laws in general (see especially paragraph 5.2.3), aliens law, and the relationship between these two fields of law.

Finally, the book is also detailed and authoritative explanation of the intersection of the conflicts of law and intellectual property law, providing a full and detailed analysis of the current state of affairs of the intersection of these fields of law. It also deals with less common themes such as material reciprocity (Chapter 6).

This book is an English translation of Sierd J. Schaafsma’s book, which appeared in Dutch in 2009, and is now updated with the most significant case law and legislation.

Elgar, 2022; see Elgar website.

Conventions & Instruments

On 8 April 2022, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia deposited its instrument of accession to the HCCH Apostille Convention. The Convention will enter into force for Saudi Arabia on 7 December 2022. With this accession, the Apostille Convention now has 122 Contracting Parties. More information is available here.

Meetings & Events

From 28 March to 1 April 2022, the Experts’ Group on Parentage / Surrogacy met for the eleventh time. The Group discussed the content of the final report that is to be presented to the Council on General Affairs and Policy (CGAP) at its 2023 meeting. More information is available here.

The Permanent Bureau has announced that the inaugural CODIFI Conference will be held online from 12 to 16 September 2022. CODIFI will examine issues of private international law in the Commercial, Digital, and Financial (CODIFI) sectors, highlighting developments in the digital economy and fintech industries as well as clarifying the roles of core HCCH instruments: the 1985 Trusts Convention, the 2006 Securities Convention, and the 2015 Choice of Law Principles. More information is available here.

 

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

Milieu Consulting is conducting a study on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels Ia Regulation) on behalf of the European Commission (DG JUST).

As part of this study, Milieu developed a technical survey that targets legal practitioners (i.e. judges; lawyers; notaries; bailiffs), academia (i.e., scholars in private international law and relevant sectors, such as consumer protection or business and human rights), and national authorities (i.e., ministries of justice, ministries in charge with consumer protection, ministries of economy) in EU Member States.

Readers are invited to participate (by 22 May) at https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/BrusselsIatechnicalsurvey

 

Just this week, the Supreme Court decided an important conflict of laws question in Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (S. Ct. 2022).

We have discussed this case on this site before, but the facts deserve restating. Paul Cassirer was a German Jew who owned an art gallery who owned Pissarro’s Rue Saint-Honoré in the Afternoon, Effect of Rain . Paul’s heir, Lilly Cassirer, inherited the painting and hung it in her Berlin home. In 1939, she gave the paintings to the Nazis in return for an exit visa. She later came to the United States with her grandson, Claude, the plaintiff in this case.

The Cassirer family initially brought proceedings in the United States Court of Restitution Appeals under the assumption that the painting had been lost or destroyed—but it wasn’t destroyed. The Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (TBC)—a public foundation and an agency or instrumentality of the Kingdom of Spain—purchased it in 1993. After TBC refused to return it to the Cassirer’s, Claude filed suit against Spain and TBC in 2005. Spain was voluntarily dismissed as a party in 2011, and after his death, Claude’s heir’s continued the case.

The Courts determined in 2011 that TBC was not immune from suit because the painting had been taken in violation of international law. The case then proceeded to trial on the merits. The plaintiffs argued that California law should govern, while TBC argued that Spanish law should govern. The judge, citing Ninth Circuit precedent, decided that federal common law provided the conflict of laws rule that should be used to decide what law substantively governed the claim, and that under federal common law conflicts principles, Spanish law governed. TBC prevailed at trial, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. The plaintiffs sought Supreme Court review only on the question whether federal common law should govern the conflicts analysis, or whether the court should instead have applied California’s conflict of laws rules.

Many commentators wrote—and I agree—that the case is pretty straightforward. The FSIA (28 U.S.C. § 1606) provides that in any case where the foreign sovereign defendant is not immune from jurisdiction, “the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” So, if TBC had not been an instrumentality of the Spanish state, California conflict of laws rules would have governed (because the case is pending in a federal court in California and does not arise under federal law). Justice Kagan’s unanimous opinion agreed. In light of § 1606, the courts could not apply a rule to the foreign sovereign defendant different from the rule it would have applied to a private defendant. Once a plaintiff overcomes the jurisdictional hurdles of foreign sovereign immunity, the foreign sovereign has to be treated like any other litigant.

As a result of the decision, the judgment will be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. The lower courts, applying California’s conflict of laws rules, could again conclude that Spanish law should govern, or it could decide that California law should govern, in which case maybe a new trial will be necessary. Lots a litigation left, in the end.

Is a foreign arbitral award granting damages in bitcoin compatible with substantive public policy? The Western Continental Greece Court of Appeal was recently confronted with this question. Within the framework of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, it ruled that the recognition of a US award runs contrary to Greek public order. Cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin, favors tax evasion and facilitates economic crime, causing insecurity in commercial transactions to the detriment of the national economy.

FACTS

The applicant, a German national, was a member of a website, governed by a US company. The website was a platform through which members could conclude credit contracts in cryptocurrency (bitcoin). The applicant agreed with a resident of Greece to finance his enterprise by providing a credit of 1.13662301 bitcoin. The Greek debtor failed to fulfill his obligations, and he refused to return the bitcoin received. On the grounds of an arbitration agreement, an award was issued by an online arbitration court, located in the USA. The debtor appeared in the proceedings and was given the right to challenge the claim of the applicant. The court of first instance decided that the arbitral award may not be recognized in Greece for reasons of substantive public policy (CFI Agrinio 23.10.2018, unreported). The applicant lodged an appeal.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT APPEAL

The appellate court began with a short description on the nature of bitcoin. It then mentioned the position of the European Central Bank with respect to the same matter. It concluded that the use of bitcoins endangers transactions both for the parties involved and the state. This comes from the fact that any income resulting from the use of cryptocurrency is tax-free, given that this kind of transactions are not regulated in Greece. Hence, importing capital in bitcoins and generally any kind of cryptocurrency, irrespective of the type of legal matter, infringes the domestic legal order, because it favors tax evasion and facilitates economic crime, causing insecurity in commercial transactions to the detriment of the national economy.

As a result of the above, the recognition of an award which recognizes bitcoin as a decentralized currency unit (peer to peer), and orders the payment of a certain debt in bitcoins, runs contrary to public policy, i.e., to fundamental rules and principles of Greek legal order in present times, reflecting predominant social, financial, and political values.

Finally, by enhancing transactions in bitcoin and promoting its equalization to legal currency, the recognition of such an award in Greece would essentially disturb prevailing standards of the country, given bitcoin’s sudden and unpredictable fluctuations [Western Continental Greece Court of Appeal 27.09.2021, unreported].

 COMMENT

Unlike the profound analysis of the first instance court, the appellate court confirmed the judgment mechanically, with zero references to legal scholarship and case law. The developments in the subject matter between 2018 (publication of the first court’s ruling) and 2021 (publication of the appellate court’s judgment) were not taken into account. The Hellenic Republic has transposed crucial directives related to cryptocurrency (see DIRECTIVE (EU) 2019/713 of 17 April 2019 on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA). New income tax rules and regulations focusing on cryptocurrency are prepared by state authorities. Even now, i.e., without a special law on cryptocurrencies, bitcoin profits must be declared for taxation purposes. Bitcoin exchange offices are active in the country. To conclude, the judgment seems to be alienated from contemporary times.

Referring to the judgment of the CJEU in the case Skatteverket / David Hedqvist (C-264/14), the first instance ruling underlined that the decision focused on the Swedish economic environment, which may not be compared to the situation in Greece. Therefore, and in light of recent developments in the country, we may hope that the courts will soon shift course towards a more pragmatic approach.

[Many thanks to Professor Euripides Rizos, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, for his valuable insight into the field of cryptocurrencies]

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) is holding a webinar on 28 April 2022 at 3:00 pm (Mexico City time – CDT), 10:00 pm (CEST time). The topic of the webinar is International co-operation in child abduction and the rights of the child and will be presented by judge mag. Óscar Gregorio Cervera Rivero, professor Nuria González Martín and Luz Elena López Rodea (in Spanish).

The details of the webinar are:

Link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88059270915?pwd=QnFGVnBWQ2xiSGFhSjJja2lUOThSUT09

Meeting ID: 880 5927 0915

Password: BMAAMEDIP

Participation is free of charge.

This event will also be streamed live: https://www.facebook.com/AmedipMX

 

At its conference of Thursday, 19 May 2022, the Association pour le droit des étranger (ADDE) and its partners (Agentschap Integratie en Inburgering and University of Liege) will address the reform of the civil status in Belgian law and its international issues. The Conference will be held in Brussels in French.

Speakers will address, among others, the reform of the civil status and the civil registry;  actors of the civil registry; rectification, modification and cancellation of civil status documents; receipt of a foreign civil status document; cases where civil status is unclear or uncertain.

See the program and practical information and the registration form.