Droit international général

On 12 January 2024, the United Kingdom has signed the 2019 Judgments Convention (Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters), as announced in the press release of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.

This a milestone for private international law within the coming about of the worldwide framework for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and potentially a valuable instrument in the post-Brexit legal landscape.

This post is part of a series regarding Colonialism and the general structure of (German) Private International Law, based on a presentation I gave in spring 2023. See the introduction here.

As mentioned in the introduction, this series does not intent to automatically pass judgment on a norm or method influenced by colonialism as inherently negative. Instead, the aim is to reveal these influences and to initiate a first engagement with and awareness of this topic and to stimulate a discussion and reflection.

The first post (after the introduction) dealt with classic PIL and colonialism and already sparked a vivid discussion in the comments section. This second considered structures and values inherent in German or European law, implicitly resonating within the PIL and, thus, expanding those values to people and cases from other parts of the world.  The third category discusses an imagined hierarchy between the Global North and Global South that is sometimes inherent in private international law thinking, for instances where courts or legislators abstractly or paternalistically apply the public policy to “protect” individuals from foreign legal norms. This is especially evident in areas like underage marriages and unilateral divorce practices found inter alia in Islamic law.

1. The public policy exception – abstract or concrete control?

The public policy exception is intended to prevent the application of foreign law by way of exception if the result of this application of law conflicts with fundamental domestic values. Such control is necessary for a legal system that is open to the application of foreign law and, in particular, foreign law of a completely different character. German law is typically very restrictive in its approach: The public policy control refers to a concrete control of the results of applying the provisions in question. In addition, the violation of fundamental domestic values must be obvious and there must be a sufficient domestic connection. In other countries, the approach is less restrictive. In particular, there are also courts that do not look at the result of the application of the law, but carry out an abstract review, i.e. assess the foreign legal system in the abstract. For a comparison of some EU Member States see this article.

2. Explicit paternalistic rules

Furthermore, there are some rules that exercise an abstract control of foreign law. Article 10 of the Rome III Regulation contains a provision that analyses foreign divorce law in the abstract to determine whether it contains gender inequality. According to this (prevailing, see e.g. conclusions of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe) interpretation, it is irrelevant whether the result of the application of the law actually leads to unequal treatment. This abstract assessment assumes – even more so than a review of the result – an over-under-ordering relationship between domestic and foreign law, as the former can assess the latter as “good” or “bad”.

Even beyond the ordre public control, there has recently been a tendency towards “paternalistic rules”, particularly triggered by the migration movements of the last decade. The legislator seems to assume that the persons concerned must be protected from the application of “their” foreign law, even if they may wish its application. In particular, the “Act to Combat Child Marriage” which was only partially deemed unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court (see official press release and blog post), is one such example: the legislator considered the simple, restrictive ordre public provision to be insufficient. Therefore, it created additional, abstract regulations that block the application of foreign, “bad” law.

3. Assessment

In the described cases as a conceptual hierarchy can be identified: The impression arises that foreign legal systems, particularly from the “Global South”, are categorised in the abstract as “worse” than the German/EU legal system and that persons affected by it must be protected from it (“paternalistic norms”). As far as I can see there is a high consensus in the vast majority of German literature (but there are other voices) and also the majority of case law that the abstract ordre public approach should be rejected and that the aforementioned norms, i.e. in particular Art. 13 III EGBGB (against underage marriages) and Art. 10 Rome III-VO (different access to a divorce based on gender), should ideally be abolished. It would be desirable for the legislator to take greater account of the literature in this regard.

On 12 January 2024, the United Kingdom signed the Hague Convention of 2 July 2019 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters. As reported by Ugljesa Grusic on this blog, the UK government had announced some weeks ago its intention to move towards joining the Convention.

The next step will consist for the UK in ratifying the Convention.

The Convention will then enter into force for the UK pursuant to Article 28(2), that is, “on the first day of the month following the expiration of the period during which notifications may be made in accordance with Article 29(2)” with respect to the UK.

The notifications referred to in Article 29(2) are statements whereby a Contracting State may inform the depositary, within twelve months, that the ratification of another State (the UK, in the circumstances) “shall not have the effect of establishing relations between the two States pursuant to this Convention”. In practice, Contracting States may decide that they will not be bound by the Convention vis-à-vis any State that would later join the Convention. The Convention is currently in force for the European Union and Ukraine (since 1 September 2023), and is set to enter into force for Uruguay on 1 October 2024. None of the latter States is expected to make use of this opportunity as regards the UK.

The eighteenth annual bibliography of private international law, compiled by Symeon C. Symeonides, Willamette University, is now available.

The bibliography lists 124 books and 288 journal articles on private international law or conflict of laws and related fields, such as prescriptive jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, federal-state conflicts, as well as certain aspects of arbitration, the law of foreign relations, and international human rights.

The books and articles included in the list appeared in print in 2023, in English.

The bibliography has been posted on SSRN and can be found here.

This interesting case comment has been kindly provided to the blog by Nicolás Zambrana-Tévar , LLM, PhD, KIMEP University

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has found in favor of Spain as defendant in a property case spanning several decades. A panel of three judges has unanimously ruled that, applying California conflict of law rules, Spain has a stronger interest than the claimants in the application of its own domestic law, including its own rules on prescriptive acquisition of property and the statute of limitations, thus confirming the ownership of a stolen painting, now owned by a Spanish museum.

1. Background information

In 1939, Lilly Cassirer traded a Pissarro painting to the Nazis in exchange for her family´s safe passage out of Germany. In 1954, a tribunal set up by the Allied forces established that the Cassirer family were the rightful owners of the painting. However, believing that the painting had been lost during the war, the family accepted 13,000 US dollars in compensation from the German government, which would be the equivalent of 250,000 US dollars today.
After the painting was looted, it found its way into the United States and, in 1976, Baron Hans Heinrich Thyssen-Bornemisza bought it from the Hahn Gallery of New York, where the painting was publicly in display, allegedly ignoring its origin. The Museum Thyssen-Bornemisza purchased the painting from the Baron in 1993. Claude Cassirer – the grandson of Lilly Cassirer – found out that the painting was being exhibited in Madrid and commenced proceedings under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in 2005. The Museum is the actual defendant in the suit but it is considered an instrumentality of the Kingdom of Spain.

2. Court decisions

In 2019, a US District Judge for the Central District of California, applying Spanish law, found that court filings did not demonstrate a “willful blindness” on the part of the Museum, when it added the painting to its collection. Moreover, the judge found that it could not force Spain or the Museum to comply with the “moral commitments” of international agreements concerning the return of works of art looted by the Nazis.
In 2020, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found in favor of Spain, again applying Spanish law. The court ruled that, regardless of the test applied by the district judge to determine the degree of care employed by the purchaser to determine the origin of the painting, both the Baron in 1976 and the Museum in 1993, lacked actual knowledge of the theft. It is important to note that both the district judge and the court of appeals determined the application of Spanish law because they were applying federal choice of law rules.
In 2022, the US Supreme Court ruled that this case did not involve any substantive federal law issues because it basically dealt with property law. Therefore, the choice of law rules that the district judge and the court of appeals should have applied were the conflict rules of the forum state, i.e. the conflict rules of California. The Supreme Court argued that Spanish law “made everything depend on whether, at the time of acquisition, the Foundation knew the painting was stolen”. On the other hand, the claimants argued that California conflict rules led to the application of California property law, in accordance with which “even a good-faith purchaser of stolen property cannot prevail against the rightful pre-theft owner.” Basically, the Supreme Court said that in an FSIA case, the foreign state defendant has to be treated like a private defendant and that if the Museum had been a purely private entity, it would have had to return the painting. The case was returned to the Court of Appeals.

3. Conflict-of-law analysis

On 9 January 2024, the US Court of Appeals ruled that, even applying California choice of law rules, Spanish law was applicable. The court came to this conclusion applying the “governmental interest approach”. In accordance with this approach, the court first had to ascertain that the two laws in conflict – Spain and California law – were different. They were because the Spanish law provision that the defendant was relying on was article 1955 of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides that “Ownership of movable goods prescribes by three years of uninterrupted bona fide possession. Ownership of movable goods also prescribes by six years of uninterrupted possession, without any other condition”. Therefore, in accordance with Spanish law “three years of uninterrupted possession in good faith” are enough for the acquisition of title whereas California law has not expressly adopted a doctrine of adverse possession for personal property – such as works of art – and, moreover, “thieves cannot pass good title to anyone, including a good faith purchaser”. Besides, California law extends to six years the statute of limitations for claims involving the return of stolen property and Cassirer brought the claim only five years after it discovered the painting hanging at the Museum in Madrid.
Having determined that the laws in conflict were different, the court of appeals then examined and agreed that both jurisdictions – Spain and California – “have a legitimate interest in applying their respective laws on ownership of stolen personal property”. “Spanish law assures Spanish residents that their title to personal property is protected after they have possessed the property in good faith for a set period of time, whereas California law seeks to deter theft, facilitate recovery for victims of theft, and create an expectation that a bona fide purchaser for value of movable property under a ‘chain of title traceable to the thief,’ … does not have title to that property.” Therefore, there was a true conflict of laws, as both jurisdictions had real and legitimate interests in applying their respective law. Additionally, the court had to determine which jurisdiction’s interest “would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state.” Otherwise said, “which jurisdiction should be allocated the predominating lawmaking power under the circumstances of the present case”.
To do this, the interests of each jurisdiction were to be measured based on “the circumstances of the particular dispute, not the jurisdiction’s general policy goals expressed in the laws implicated”. The factors to be taken into consideration in this analysis were the “current status of a statute… the location of the relevant transactions and conduct… and the extent to which one jurisdiction’s laws either impose similar duties to the other jurisdiction’s laws, or are accommodated by the other jurisdiction’s laws, such that the application of the other jurisdiction’s laws would only partially—rather than totally—impair the interests of the state whose law is not applied”.
With respect to the first factor, the court said that it was inappropriate to judge which law is better. Also, in reply to the alleged archaism of the Spanish rule, that says that property is acquired after six years of possession, regardless of the stolen nature of the asset, the court replied that the defendant was relying on the possession with good faith during three years.
With respect to the second factor, the court of appeals reasoned that, in accordance with several precedents from the Supreme Court of California, a “jurisdiction ordinarily has the predominant interest in regulating conduct that occurs within its borders”, i.e. on Spanish territory, whereas “where none of the relevant conduct occurs in California, a restrained view of California’s interest in facilitating recovery for one of its residents is warranted.” In the case at hand, “California’s sole contact to the dispute was the happenstance of the plaintiff’s residence there.” Similarly, “California’s governmental interest rests solely on the fortuity that Claude Cassirer moved to California in 1980, at a time when the Cassirer family believed the Painting had been lost or destroyed.” Therefore, “California’s interest in facilitating recovery for that resident was minimal and the extraterritorial reach of its laws was restrained.” Since “no relevant conduct with respect of the Painting occurred in California, the impairment of California’s interest that would result from applying Spanish law would be minimal.”
The court went on to say that, in contrast, “applying California law would significantly impair Spain’s interest in applying Article 1955 of the Spanish Civil Code. For one, because the relevant conduct [the purchase of the painting] occurred in Spain” so that “Spain has the “predominant interest in applying its laws to that conduct.” Furthermore, “applying California law would mean that Spain’s law would not apply to property possessed within Spain’s borders, so long as the initial owner (1) happened to be a California resident (a fact over which… the defendant has no way of knowing or controlling…, and (2) the California resident did not know where the property is located and who possessed it. Applying California law based only on Claude Cassirer’s decision to move to California would strike at the essence of a compelling Spanish law.”
With respect to the third factor and also in accordance with past precedents of the California Supreme Court, “the court should look to whether one jurisdiction’s laws accommodate the other jurisdiction’s interests or imposes duties the other jurisdiction already imposes… A state’s laws can more readily be discarded if the failure to apply its laws would only partially—rather than totally—impair the policy interests of the jurisdiction whose law is not applied…. Here, the failure to apply California’s laws would only partially undermine California’s interests in deterring theft and returning stolen art to victims of theft, which provides further support for limiting the extraterritorial reach of California’s laws to this dispute.
On the other hand, “applying Spanish law would only partially undermine California’s interests in facilitating recovery of stolen art for California residents. California law already contemplates that a person whose art—or other personal property—is stolen may eventually lose the ability to reclaim possession: namely, if the person fails to bring a lawsuit within six years after he discovers the whereabouts of the art… Similarly, Article 1955 of the Spanish Civil Code accommodates California’s interest in deterring theft. As we have explained, Spanish law makes it more difficult for title to vest in an “encubridor,” which includes, “an accessory after the fact,” or someone who “knowingly receives and benefits from stolen property…. If the possessor is proven to be an encubridor, Spanish law extends the period in which the property must be possessed before new prescriptive title is created.”

4. Concluding remarks

This complex and interesting case seems to be coming to an end. In brief, and despite the complexity of the application of the theory of interest analysis, it seems that the US court has given the same solution which a civil court would have given, applying the usual rule that the law applicable to property rights is the law of the place where the property is located at the time of the transfer. So far, it appears that the increasing sensitivity towards cultural property and towards unraveling war crimes has not fully displaced this conflicts rule.

An unintended consequence of the war in Ukraine is that a number of Ukrainian surrogate mothers have travelled to other countries to give birth.

The French press has reported that surrogate mothers who had entered into agreements with French residents were repatriated to France to give birth there.

The problem is that surrogacy is prohibited in France. This is why the French Court of Cassation initially ruled that the entire enterprise aimed at evading French law, and that the parenthood resulting from the surrogacy should thus be denied recognition in France. But, as readers will know, the ECtHR ruled that this result violates the child’s right to respect for private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Does the fact that the birth takes place in France as opposed to a country where surrogacy is legal change anything?

Establishing Parenthood

The first problem arising in this case scenario is that French law (obviously) does not establish the parenthood of the intended mother and cancel the parenthood of the surrogate mother. Quite to the contrary, if a Ukrainian woman gives birth in France, she is automatically the mother.

As a consequence, the intended parents put in place the following scheme:

1. The intended (and typically biological) father recognised the child before birth, in accordance with French law and before a French authority.
2. The surrogate mother gave birth after declaring that she does not want to be on record and wants to remain anonymous. This is allowed under French law, and should normally lead to the child being adopted by one of the many couples waiting for this. But here, the father is known.
3. The partner of the father, typically the intended mother, files an application to adopt the child.

Is This Still a Foreign Surrogacy?

An interesting question is whether one could still claim that the surrogacy was validly constituted abroad.

Two major differences between this case scenario and the more traditional one is that the birth occurred in a country were surrogacy is illegal, and that no foreign document establishes the parenthood of the intended mother. It is therefore difficult to say that the issue is one of ‘recognition’ of a foreign situation, or of a foreign official act.

But even this is not so, which law should a French court apply to determine the validity of the surrogacy? To my knowledge, this is an issue of first impression, but one would tend to think that the choice of law applicable to parenthood should be applied. This would lead, in France, to the application of the national law of the mother. Although the relevant provision does not define the concept of mother, it seems clear that the French lawmaker had in mind the biological mother. Thus, Ukrainian law might apply, and the surrogacy might be foreign irrespective of where the birth took place.

The next steps of the reasoning would then be whether the result would comport with French public policy, and whether you would need to determine separately the applicable law to the parenthood of the intended parent.

Does it Matter?

Maybe not, at least from the perspective of PIL.

The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly insisted that the fundamental right of the children demand some form of acceptance of surrogacy. And it does not seem that the court has limited the scope of this right to cases where the surrogacy was validly constituted abroad.

Why should it, after all? The problem of the children is not fundamentally different if the parents acted illegally.

What about Criminal Law?

The issue might be different from the perspective of criminal law. It is easier to argue that a surrogacy eventually resulting in a birth in France falls within the territorial scope of French criminal law than a surrogacy organised from France by the intended parents.

The French press has reported that a French organisation has informed prosecutors in five different cities, and that one prosecutor has initiated criminal investigations in one of them. There are a number of French criminal offences which might apply to the process of surrogacy: “provocation à l’abandon d’enfant”, “entremise entre un couple et une personne acceptant de porter l’enfant”, “substitution volontaire, simulation ou dissimulation ayant entraîné une atteinte à l’état civil d’un enfant”.

The prosecutor, however, closed the case in October 2023. Remarkably, he did so on the ground that the surrogacy was “carried out” in a country where it is legal, and that the constitutive elements of the offences had thus taken place abroad. The French criminal code provides that it is enough that one constitutive element of the offence took place in France for French criminal law to apply. It is hard to see how the birth could not be one of the constitutive elements of all of these offences.

Is the case law of the ECtHR relevant in this context? Probably not: the criminal consequences of the actions of the parents will be personal, and will not directly affect the children.

Should French Social Security Pay for the Costs of the Delivery?

Two hospitals where Ukrainian surrogate mothers gave birth have sent an invoice to the intended parents for the costs of the delivery.

French social security covers the medical costs of birth for women entitled to such benefit. The French couples who organised Ukrainian surrogacies would likely be entitled to see most of the costs of their delivery being paid by social security, but not women covered by a foreign social security (although there might be rules for covering emergency birth on French territory: comments from specialists of international social security law welcome).

Several French intended parents have refused to pay the invoice, and have announced that they will challenge the decision of the hospitals to issue the invoices in administrative courts. Will French courts accept that evasion of French law should be funded by French taxpayers?

On 11 January 2024, the Apostille Convention entered into force for Canada. The accession of Canada to the Apostille Convention on 12 May 2023 was a milestone for the Apostille Convention and it is perhaps a development that has gone under the radar.

Considering that the Apostille Convention was adopted in 1961 (EIF: 24-I-1965), one may wonder why Canada took so long to join the Apostille Convention. This is primarily because there is no statutory requirement for the legalisation of incoming public documents in Canada. In its response to the 2021 Questionnaire, Canada indicated:

“There is no Canadian statutory requirement to legalise foreign public documents. In some cases, Canadian public authorities have the discretion to determine the applicable authentication requirements. These authorities could require these documents to be legalised.

“In Québec, Article 2822 of the Civil Code of Québec (CCQ) exempts foreign public documents from legalisation by providing that neither the quality nor the signature of a foreign officer issuing a document need [to] be proved. The presumption of authenticity provided by article 2822 CCQ is rebuttable as prescribed by article 2825 CCQ.

“Private-sector organisations and individuals may require legalised foreign public documents, as no law prevents them from doing so. While not a requirement under Canadian law, Canadian embassies and consulates legalise foreign public documents when requested to do so.”

 

Nevertheless, Canadian – and other – citizens needed to overcome the obstacle of getting Canadian public documents legalised (e.g. by Global Affairs Canada, Authentication Services Section in Ottawa, plus a foreign mission in Canada). What in the lingo is referred to as “outgoing public documents”. This system will continue to operate when the receiving State is not a Contracting Party to the Apostille Convention or in the – rare – case that the public document falls outside the scope of the Apostille Convention e.g. documents executed by diplomatic and consular agents (Art. 1(3)(a) of the Apostille Convention).

No declarations were filed by Canada (apart from the designated Competent Authorities). As expected, no Contracting Party objected to the accession of Canada.

I take the opportunity to also make reference to another milestone for the Apostille Convention: the recent accession of the People’s Republic of China. The People’s Republic of China acceded to the Convention on 8 March 2023 and entered into force on 7 November 2023.

The Apostille Convention has continued to apply to both the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao given the declarations of the People’s Republic of China. The Apostille Convention first applied to Hong Kong (EIF-1965) and Macao (EIF-1969) when they were both under the international responsibility of the United Kingdom and Portugal, respectively.

As indicated in its declaration, the Apostille Convention will not be applicable between the People’s Republic of China and those Contracting States that China does not recognize as sovereign states (i.e. no bilateral application) and understandably, no list was provided. India objected to the accession of the People’s Republic of China in accordance with Article 12 of the Apostille Convention, and as a result, the Convention will not apply between these two States.

With the accession of both Canada and the People’s Republic of China, the Apostille Convention applies in -an additional- area of approximately 19 million square kilometers. These developments and the existence of the e-APP (electronic Apostille Programme) show that the Apostille Convention remains relevant and continues to grow from strength to strength.

 

 

An international symposium on the circulation of personal status be held on January 19, 2024 at the Italian Court of Cassation.

The symposium is organized by the Société de législation comparée (Section méthodologie comparée du droit civil), the Associazione Civilisti Italiani, the International Commission on Civil Status in collaboration with the Law Faculty of the Université Côte d’Azur.

The significance of this topic is paramount in light of the growing international mobility of individuals and families. For this reason, the conference will address key aspects of personal status, including civil status, personal identification, the union of persons, parenthood, and nationality.

The approach is decidedly comparative and internationalist, as evidenced by the diverse panel of speakers (and chairs):

• Claudio Scognamiglio (Chairman, Associazione Civilisti Italiani),
• Gustavo Cerqueira (Chairman, Section méthodologie comparée du droit civil de la SLC),
• Nicolas Nord (Secretary General of the International Commission on Civil Status),
• Francesco Salerno (Università degli Studi di Ferrara),
• Marion Ho-Dac, Professeur (Université d’Artois),
• Camille Reitzer (Deputy Secretary General of the International Commission on Civil Status),
• Giovanni Di Rosa (Università di Catania),
• Fernanda Munschy (Lawyer at the Strasbourg Bar & Université Haute-Alsace),
• Francesca Bartolini (Università degli Studi Link di Roma),
• Michele Sesta (Università di Bologna),
• Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler (Institut suisse de droit comparé),
• Alessandra Spangaro (Università di Bologna),
• Enrico Al Mureden (Università di Bologna),
• Ilaria Pretelli (Institut suisse de droit comparé),
• Renzo Calvigioni (Associazione Nazionale Ufficiali di Stato Civile e d’Anagrafe, ANUSCA),
• Gordon Choisel (Université Paris Panthéon-Assas),
• Mirzia Bianca (Università di Roma La Sapienza),
• Sylvain Bollée (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne),
• Roberto Senigaglia (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia),
• Hugues Fulchiron (Conseiller extraordinaire à la Cour de cassation, France),
• Sabine Corneloup (Université Paris Panthéon-Assas),
• Liliana Rossi Carleo (Università di Roma Tre).

Presentations will be held in French and Italian.

Those interested in attending can do so either in-person or on-line.

Attendance is free, but prior registration is required by January 17, 2024, through segreteria.civilistiitaliani@gmail.com.

Remote participation is also possible; the link for connecting to the platform will be made available by January 17, 2024, and will be communicated to anyone who requests it.

Additional information, including the full programme of the conference, can be found here or here.

Symposium Directors:

• Enrico Al Mureden (Università di Bologna)
• Gustavo Cerqueira (Université Côte d’Azur ; Chairman, Section Méthodologie comparée du droit civil de la SLC)
• Nicolas Nord (Secretary General of the International Commission on Civil Status)
• Claudio Scognamiglio (Università di Roma Tre; Chairman, Associazione Civilisti Italiani)
• Roberto Senigaglia (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia)

This is possibly the longest title of any of my posts and rightly so for the issues in current judment are extensive. Bourlakova & Ors v Bourlakov & Ors (Rev1) [2023] EWHC 2233 (Ch) is a follow-up to Bourlakova v Bourlakov [2022] EWHC 1269 (Ch) which I discuss here; in the meantime Mr Bourlakov has passed away, leaving the other defendants.

Claimants ask for permission to amend their PoC (Particulars of Claim) including the proposed joinder of an additional claimant. Some of the Defendants have themselves made three related applications, namely (a) to adjourn the hearing of the Claimants’ amendment applications (b) for permission to rely on further evidence and (c) for a stay under A33 or 34 Brussels Ia of such amended claims for which the Claimants may be given permission.

The case first of all raises an interesting discussion on applicable limitation periods (attached to Panama law as the lex causae under Rome II) as compared to carved-out procedural issues under Rome II (and English residual conflicts law), subject to English law as lex fori. It then discusses a number of jurisdictional issues.

First, on the limitation periods, discussed by Smith J [56] ff against the background of the Panamian Penal Code (‘PC’). Of note is that defendants only have to raise a reasonably arguable limitation defence in relation to these new damages claims (hence the discussion need not contain the Alfa and Omega of the issues) and it is worthwhile to see the competing arguments in full [64] ff (footnotes omitted):

Panamanian law admits of a civil claim in damages for those guilty of a criminal offence. The specific offences relied upon by the Claimants are those identified in Articles 220, 243 and/ or 253 PC. Although the route by which this is achieved is contentious, it is common ground that Panamanian law governs the question of any available limitation defence to claims brought under these articles. It is also common ground that the damages claims could be brought in Panama in different ways, namely

(i) within criminal proceedings;

(ii) before the civil courts without awaiting the outcome of any criminal trial; or

(iii) before the civil courts after the criminal court has issued its final liability ruling.

[Defendants] say that if, as here, a claim for civil damages arising from alleged criminal acts under Articles 128 and 129 PC is filed without a criminal conviction having first been obtained or in the absence of criminal proceedings, this would have to be submitted as an extra-contractual or tortious claim under Article 1644 of the Civil Code (CC) which provides that:-

“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, through fault or negligence, is bound to repair the damage caused. If the act or omission is attributable to two or more persons, each of them shall be jointly and severally liable for the damage caused.“

[Defendants] also say that the relevant limitation period for such a claim is one year by operation of Article 1706 CC which provides:-

“The civil action to claim indemnification for slander or insult or to demand civil responsibility for the obligations resulting from guilt or negligence to which Article 1644 refers, shall prescribe in the term of one (1) year, counted from the moment in which the victim knew.

If criminal or administrative action is timely initiated for the facts foreseen in the previous paragraph, the prescription of the civil action shall be counted from the moment when the criminal judgment or the administrative resolution became firm, as the case may be.

For the recognition of the civil claim, in no case is the intervention of the criminal jurisdiction essential.”

The Claimants disagree with this analysis. They say that a claim for civil damages for an alleged criminal act may be brought directly under Articles 128 and 129 PC (without regard to Article 1644 CC) by operation of Article 977 CC which provides that :-

“Civil obligations arising from crimes or offences shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.”

The Claimants say that the applicable limitation period for a claim under Articles 128 and 129 PC is seven years by operation of Article 1701 CC which provides that:-

“Actions in personam for which there is no special limitation period shall prescribe in seven years.”

This is where the Rome II procedural carve-out becomes relevant, and I will limit the discussion here to the Rome element: [71]

Before which court in Panama any claim could be asserted is a matter of procedure (whether considered under Rome II or the common law). According to Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (16th ed., at [4-074]), this includes the question whether a civil action can be brought in respect of alleged criminal acts before criminal proceedings have been taken. Since the English court is only concerned with the relevant foreign law as it applies to matters of substance, the Claimants are entitled to rely on the limitation period which remains available under Article 116 PC even if criminal proceedings have not begun and may not yet eventuate.

[72 [Defendants] say that there is a world of difference between the English court ignoring as a bar to recovery a procedural requirement for criminal proceedings prior to the commencement of a civil action (a proposition from which they do not demur) and the broader proposition (from which they do) that, where multiple potential routes for bringing civil damages claims are available locally, it matters not which particular procedural route the claimant has, in fact, adopted. The Claimants have brought a claim where there has been no criminal conviction as they were entitled to do so under Panamanian law. Having done so, the limitation period is one year. No question of having or failing to comply with local procedural requirements arises.

[73]

I understand the logic of the Claimants’ position that, being a matter of procedure, it is irrelevant which particular course the Claimants may, in fact, have pursued in this case. However, it seems to me that the distinction between the position indicated in Dicey, where the need for a criminal conviction is a bar to the commencement of a civil action, and the position here, where multiple routes are potentially available, may, in fact, be more meaningful than the Claimants suggest. I am therefore unable to say, without more direct authority on the point at least, that the [defendants’] limitation defence falls short of the reasonably arguable threshold on this account.

yet on the point of the actual damages sought, and other elements of the claim, the defence does fall short and the eventual conclusion is that the limitation defence fails. The judgment is a bit dense to read on the factual elements of the various claims however its overall emphasis on procedure v lex causae is really quite relevant.

The judgement subsequently discusses the jurisdictional issues with given the amendment of the claims, a shift from the alternative Monegask forum before Trower J, to [107]Panama or Florida now the suggested alternative fora to England.

[108] The jurisdictional issues arising on these amendment applications are whether:-

(i) despite the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, the Brussels Recast (including Article 8(1)) applies to the proposed new claims against the Kazakovs and Mr Anufriev;

(ii) in relation to the Claimants’ proposed new claims subject to the common law regime, England, Panama or Florida is clearly and distinctly the appropriate forum;

(iii) the Claimants’ proposed new claims against the ‘anchor defendant’, Leo Holding, are artificial and abusive such that the amendment applications fail for lack of jurisdiction, whether through their inability to invoke Article 8(1) of the Brussels Recast or the relevant jurisdictional gateway at common law;

(iv) Gatiabe is a ‘necessary or proper’ party with respect to the proposed new claims concerning the ownership of that company; and

(v) if the EU jurisdictional regime does apply to the Kazakovs, whether a stay should be granted under Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Recast of any new claims the Claimants might be permitted to advance.

(i) Application of Brussels Ia at all following the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement: “legal proceedings instituted before the end of the transition period”

Article 67.1(a) WA provides that “in respect of legal proceedings instituted before the end of the transition period and in respect of proceedings or actions related to such legal proceedings pursuant to Articles 29, 30 and 31 of [the Brussels Recast]”, the provisions of the Brussels Recast shall continue to apply. Are permitted amendments caught by ‘proceedings instituted’? [116-117] the judge, referring to Simon v Taché, that Article 67 WA preserves the applicability of Brussels Recast to “proceedings” and not to particular claims or, here, unamended claims in proceedings.

(ii) and (iii) Abuse of the anchor defendant mechanism

The judge [128] sees no reason under BIa to conclude that claimants’ claims against Leo Holding are artificial, abusive or do not reflect a genuine intention to sue the ‘anchor defendant’, and repeats that [134] conclusion under the obiter English gateway.

(iv) a lengthy and largely obiter forum non conveniens discussion ends [212] with both Florida and Panama being rejected  as a more appropriate forum, and (v) [213] the A33-34 stay was not discussed at hearing but, it seems, may be revived at a later stage (which would be highly relevant) and therefore [223] has been deferred.

Quite the judgment.

Geert.

Various EU law jurisdictional issues
Incl application of Brussels A ratione temporis given WA; abuse of anchor defendant mechanism; application of A33-34 'forum non light'
More on the blog soon

Bourlakova & Ors v Bourlakov & Ors [2023] EWHC 2233 (Ch)https://t.co/ixIzSCt20c

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) September 11, 2023

The second issue of 2023 of the open-access journal Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional has been released. As usual, it contains studies (Estudios) and notes (Varia), in Spanish and in other languages.

A selection kindly provided by the editorial team of the journal include the following studies.

Alfonso Luis Calvo Caravaca/Javier Carrascosa González, Ley aplicable a los regímenes económicos matrimoniales y Reglamento 2016/1103 De 24 Junio 2016. Estudio técnico y valorativo de los puntos de conexión (Law Applicable to Marriage Property Regimes in Regulation 2016/1103 of June 24, 2016. A Technical and Value Analysis of the Connecting Factors)

The purpose of this study is to explore the system of connections to determine the Law applicable to the matrimonial property regime in Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of the Council of June 24, 2016 establishing reinforced cooperation in the field competition, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of resolutions in matrimonial property regimes. Not only are the connecting factors in the Regulation analyzed through a technical examination, but also using a value focused test. From a technical point of view, some solutions could have been presented with greater transparency and coherence with other European regulations. On the contrary, from a value view, it should be highlighted that the connecting factors used lead to efficient, predictable and clear solutions that favour proper management of matrimonial assets in our current social scenario, in which the spouses frequently change their country of habitual residence and nationality and in which the assets linked to the matrimonial economy are usually scattered throughout several countries.

Briseida Sofía Jiménez-Gómez, Distributed Ledger Technology in Financial Markets: The European Union Experiment (La tecnología de registro descentralizado en los mercados financieros: el experimento de la Unión Europea) 

 The European Union Regulation 2022/858 of 30 May 2022 establishes a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology. The Pilot Regulation is part of the 2020 Digital Finance Strategy whose objective is for the European Union to embrace the digital revolution and to benefit consumers and business. This article analyses the reasons of this new regulatory option and why this represents a different paradigm of legislation, considering first some advantages, risks and challenges that applying distributed ledger technology in financial markets can encounter. Moreover, this article examines the content of the EU Pilot Regulation with a critical perspective, comparing the previous proposal of Regulation with the current Pilot Regulation which enters into force mainly in March 2023. Significance of this Pilot Regulation could be enhanced if it coordinates with other policy goals such as sustainability and transparency set by the EU legislator. Lacking that coordination, this Pilot Regulation could be perceived as a miss opportunity to foster a digital and green financial markets transition.

 Juliana Rodríguez Rodrigo, La publicidad de l@s influencers. (Influencer marketing)

Studies show that surreptitious advertising is a common practice carried out by influencers. This behaviour is an attack on the followers and on the advertiser’s competitors. In relation to the former, because it is not clear about the commercial nature of the influencer’s message and may make them think that they are dealing with a personal opinion of their leader. Regarding the latter, because, with it, they are making the brand compete unfairly with the rest of the competitors in the market. It is important, therefore, to identify when the advertising carried out by influencers is illegal because it is covert. There are two elements that must be present in order to reach this conclusion. Firstly, there must be a commercial purpose, which can be proven by the existence of a remuneration. And, secondly, this promotional purpose of the influencer does not appear clear and unequivocal to the user. In relation to the latter, the follower cannot deduce this commercial character either from the content of the message or from its location and, on the other hand, the influencer has not incorporated the necessary information to make it known.

The notes, instead, include the following.

Isabel Antón Juárez, Louboutin vs. Amazon: ¿Un litigio más sobre la responsabilidad de las plataformas digitales en el uso de una marca?. Comentario de la sentencia del TJUE de 22 de diciembre de 2022, asuntos C-148/21 y C-184/21 (Louboutin vs. Amazon: One more litigation about the liability of digital platforms in the use of a trademark? Commentary on the ECJ ruling of 22 December of 2022, cases C-148/21 and C-184/21)

The aim of this paper is the analysis of the ECJ ruling of 22 of December of 2022. The question that is resolved in the ruling we analyze is whether the fact that a third party that uses Amazon as a means to advertise and market counterfeit products can imply that the platform itself is directly liable for said infringement. It must be kept in mind that this direct responsibility of the platform would only be possible if it is considered that the platform itself uses another’s trademark within the meaning of art. 9.2 letter a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001. The study of this matter is necessary because it implies a greater precision even we can consider a change in the case law of the ECJ on the direct trademark liability of platforms. Following this ruling, a platform can be considered to use a trademark if, based on the perception of the average user who uses the platform, a link can be established between the trademark and the platform due to aspects such as (1) the way in which the platform offers the products (ad ex. in a homogeneous manner without differentiating between its own products and those of its sellers) and (2) the complementary services that the platform itself offers to its sellers.

Fernando Díez Estella, De nuevo la batalla por la cuantificación del daño y la estimación judicial: La STJUE tráficos Manuel Ferrer (Again, the battle of harm quantification and judicial estimation: the CJEU ruling tráficos Manuel Ferrer)

Almost a decade after the approval of Directive 2014/104/EU on damages arising from anticompetitive offenses, although the principles that inspire it are now firmly established, its practical application has encountered a myriad of problems, both substantive and procedural. The main obstacle faced today by those who exercise their right to compensation is undoubtedly the quantification of the damage. Together with the tools of access to the sources of evidence, or the presumptions to redistribute the burden of proof in the process, the possibility of judicial estimation of the compensable damage has been configured. This commentary analyzes this novel figure, following the CJEU Judgment in the Tráficos Manuel Ferrer case, as well as the Spanish jurisprudence in this respect, such as the emanating from the Commercial Court nº 3 of Valencia, and essentially the landmark Supreme Court’s sentences of June 2023. Although there are still some aspects to be defined, all these pronouncements have delimited when it is possible and when it is not possible to make use of this capacity.

Vegesentials Ltd & Anor v Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank Ltd [2024] EWHC 7 (Ch) is a judgment, as Matthew Hoyle also notes, without reference to authority, and it surprisingly succinctly deals with the applicable law issue for misrepresentation under the Rome II Regulation (readers will be aware that Rome II is what used to be called retained EU law and is now ‘assimilated’ law).

Claimants seek damages from the defendant bank for fraudulent misrepresentations set out in a letter signed and stamped by the bank’s former corporate banking relationship manager of the Chung-Li Branch in Taiwan, to the effect that potential investors had free funds to invest £20 million in a new product, ‘FibreWater’ (chicory inulin, with testified health effects; FibreWater does not need to be chilled, and has a longer shelf life, and higher margins, than fruit and vegetable drinks) which the first claimant was developing. The second claimant was incorporated for the purpose of this claim, and was assigned the first claimant’s rights in the product. Claimant also entered into a sponsorship agreement with the tennis player Sir Andy Murray for him to sponsor FibreWater.

It is now conceded by the defendants that those investors, companies incorporated in Hong Kong and Anguilla respectively, had no such funds and that the manager made the fraudulent misrepresentations knowing them to be false and intending that it should be relied upon by the claimant. No funds were forthcoming, and FibreWater did not proceed. The claimant says that had the misrepresentations not been made, it would have continued to engage with alternative investors, and there was a real chance that investment would have been secured so as to allow the product to be successfully produced, marketed and sold and to become profit making.

Fraudulent misrepresentations are conceded, liability is not. The bank raises issues as to the applicable law, whether the claimant in fact relied on the misrepresentation, whether the bank is vicariously liable, as to causation and as to quantum.

Article 4 Rome II reads

“1. Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur.

2. However, where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply.

3. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply. A manifestly closer connection with another country might be based in particular on a pre-existing relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with the tort/delict in question.”

Claimant submits that the damage it claims to have suffered occurred in E&W because the share purchase agreement was governed by the law of England and Wales and provided for the payment of monies into the claimant’s bank account with Barclays in E&W. Any monies paid by the investors would also have been paid into that account. The claimant is incorporated in E&W and conducted most of its business there. Most of the lost profits claimed arise from the supply to UK retailers. Finally the sponsorship agreement with Sir Andy Murray is governed by English law.

Claimant also submits that the default rule is not displaced by A4(3), because the fraud relied on is not “manifestly more closely connected” with Taiwan. The claimant had no pre-existing relationship with the bank.

The bank submits that the fraud was part of a larger scheme and was planned, orchestrated, and implemented in Taiwan, and there are indications of such a larger scheme in the subsequent criminal proceedings against the manager. Jarman J [32] dismisses the relevance of this, pointing out that “it is not clear precisely who was involved in planning the scheme or where they were located at the time. All that is clear is that [the manager’s] involvement was at a time when he was based in Taiwan.” The bank further submits that the core misrepresentative Letter was concerned with a bank account in Taiwan. The judge again dismisses this, saying [32] “However, the ultimate purpose of [the letter] was to confirm the ability of the investors, incorporated elsewhere, to transfer monies in Pounds and Euros for a shareholding in a company incorporated here to develop business in the UK and Europe.”

[33] the conclusion on applicable law is

In my judgment, the claimant’s submissions on this point are to be preferred. Under Article 4(1) the damage relied upon occurred in this jurisdiction. Although some of the facts relied upon arose in Taiwan, as indicated above, it is not the case that the fraud was manifestly more closely connected with Taiwan within the meaning of Article 4(3). Accordingly the applicable law is that of England and Wales.

Most cases concerning fraudulent misrepresentation concern subsequent acting upon the fraud: see eg Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank Pjsc v Shetty & Ors: In the case of a misrepresentation or fraud, the locus damni is held to be the place where that misrepresentation is acted upon; or Avonwick Holdings: not so much for the (poor) A4(1) analysis in that judgment but rather the A4(3) displacement, and to some degree the potential for the lex contractus (of the contract said to have been missed) to play a role.

I feel there is more to be said about both the A4(1) and 4(3) application than succinctly touched upon in the judgment, in cases where the misrepresentation leads to missed opportunities, rather than to regretted action.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 4th ed, 2024, 2.443.

Ia applicable law in a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation
Article 4 Rome II

Vegesentials Ltd & Anor v Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank Ltd [2024] EWHC 7 (Ch)https://t.co/VNEe3qGd95

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) January 8, 2024

Veerle Van Den Eeckhout (working at the CJEU) has published a short article on recent CJEU case law in Private International Law matters.

The paper is entitled “CJEU case law. A few observations on recent CJEU case law.” It has been published as a contribution to the fifth volume in the series of the Dialog Internationales Familienrecht. The article sets the scene and contextualizes the findings detailed in the presentation given by the author on April 29, 2023 at the Dialog Internationales Familienrecht 2023 at the University of Münster. See also previously here on the presentation.

In essence, while presenting case law of the CJEU in PIL matters, the Author explored selected methodological aspects of reasoning employed by the Court of Justice, including deductive arguments and those aiming to ensure “consistency” within the whole system.

The Author focuses on case law of the CJEU regarding international family law but, adopting sometimes also a wider perspective, attempts to draw some considerations of relevance for EU private international law in general. Thus, also PIL dynamics unfolding outside the field of international family law were taken into account. For example, case law of the CJEU regarding the notion “cross-border” following the joined cases Parking and Interplastics (C-267/19 and C-323/19) was pointed out.

Moreover, attention was not only paid to case law of the CJEU interpreting PIL-regulations. The Author proves that issues of (international) family law may come to the CJEU in many shapes and forms. In fact, one may say that various roads lead to Luxembourg. Looking from this perspective and attempting to position case law of the CJEU in a wide context, the Author did not only include case law of the CJEU interpreting a PIL-regulation such as the Brussels II bis regulation, but also pointed out case law of the CJEU such as the Coman case (C-673/16) and the Pancharevo case (C-490/20), as well as case law of the CJEU regarding the law on names. Adopting a broad view, also some aspects of the case Belgische Staat (Réfugiée mineure mariée), Case C-230/21, regarding a right to family reunification based on Directive 2003/86, were considered in the analysis  – this case itself giving rise to the formulation of some observations regarding the interaction of (international) family law and migration law (in the broad sense of the word).

The PowerPoint of the presentation in Münster is available here. A version of this PowerPoint including also an extended version thereof is available here.

On SSRN, working versions of the paper are available in Dutch and in English.

Any view expressed in this presentation or in the paper discussed above is the personal opinion of the Author.

 

On 20 December 2023, the English Court of Appeal gave private international lawyers interested in the relationship between private and public international law a small Christmas treat. It delivered a unanimous judgment (Vos MR, with Popplewell and Phillips LLJ agreeing) in UK P&I Club NV v Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela. This judgment addresses the question, within the context of a state immunity dispute, of whether an anti-suit injunction is part of the court’s adjudicatory or enforcement jurisdiction.

The court first found that:

there is no widespread, representative and consistent practice of states, accepted as a legal obligation, regarding injunctions, such as to constitute a rule of international law. Specifically, there is no rule of customary international law that classifies injunctions or anti-suit injunctions as part of a state’s adjudicative jurisdiction. That means that there is no rule of customary international law to the effect that states are not immune to injunctions. Different states have different approaches… The UK is not an outlier in adopting section 13(2)(a) [of the State Immunity Act 1978]. Moreover, an anti-suit injunction is not such a special a type of injunction that puts it into any special category such as to place it within the restrictive doctrine. ([48])

The court further concluded that:

an injunction granted by a court in England and Wales is indeed a coercive order. It threatens potential criminal and financial penalties for non-compliance. That is so whether or not the order is accompanied by a warning in the form of a penal notice. No sensible injunction could be granted if the order were to make clear that there would be no criminal or financial consequences for non-compliance. That demonstrates why an anti-suit injunction is indeed coercive unlike an order for damages. An order for damages has no coercive effect until an enforcement process is initiated. An injunction has a coercive effect immediately it is ordered, because it says to the defendant that it will incur penalties if it takes any step in contravention of it. ([50])

The conclusion that anti-suit injunctions were part of the courts’ enforcement jurisdiction meant that they did not fall within the restrictive doctrine of state immunity, applicable to adjudicatory jurisdiction as part of customary international law. Instead, section 13(2)(a) of the 1978 Act (“relief shall not be given against a State by way of injunction or order for specific performance or for the recovery of land or other property”) fell “within the range of possible rules consistent with international practices”. As a result, it was not contrary to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

This post is part of a series regarding Colonialism and the general structure of (German) Private International Law, based on a presentation I gave in spring 2023. See the introduction here.

As mentioned in the introduction, this series does not intent to automatically pass judgment on a norm or method influenced by colonialism as inherently negative. Instead, the aim is to reveal these influences and to initiate a first engagement with and awareness of this topic and to stimulate a discussion and reflection.

The first post (after the introduction) dealt with classic PIL and colonialism. This second considers structures and values inherent in German or European law, implicitly resonating within the PIL and, thus, expanding those values to people and cases from other parts of the world. This reflects a form of universalist legal understanding that should be foreign to the PIL, yet already echoes in Savigny’s approach. This is particularly evident in the lex fori approach of characterization and the specification of habitual residence.

1. Characterization and Influence of the lex fori

Characterization is the assignment of the connecting object (Anknüpfungsgegenstand) to a conflict of laws norm. The debate on characterization methods, particularly in the first half of the 20th century, has since been resolved with the predominance of “autonomous” or “functional” characterization, integrating elements of lex fori, lex causae, and comparative  methods. The conflict rules are generally interpreted from the perspective of lex fori but with an international private law viewpoint, extending the interpretation of terms in conflict rules beyond their substantive counterparts. Nonetheless, they remain systematically rooted in domestic law, centering on the values of lex fori. This can lead to friction when system concepts from foreign law stem from entirely different value systems. Additionally, methodologically, each connecting factor has only one conflict rule, thereby being excluding concerning other connecting factors.

This can be well illustrated with a family law example. The German Civil Code (BGB) and the PIL Act (EGBGB) are based on a family concept derived from Western Christian traditions, in recent years moving away from most patriarchal values. The core family typically comprises married or cohabiting parents and their child(ren), with special forms recognized but mostly aligned or approximated to this ideal. This understanding of the nuclear family is reflected in conflict rules. Articles 13 EGBGB onwards begin with marriage and its consequences as the traditional starting point of the family. Article 17b then encompasses modern non-traditional marital forms (registered partnerships, same-sex marriage, marriage with at least one non-binary spouse). Articles 19 onwards regulate questions about parentage, parent-child relationships, and adoption as a specialized form of establishing such relationships.

Frictions may arise with fundamentally different family concepts. A striking example is the Avunculat, expressing a unique kinship between the mother’s brother and a child, which can be socially and legally equated with or even surpass or replace the relationship with the biological father. German conflict rules do not account for such kinship as Article 19 EGBGB (parentage) only covers the “natural parentage,” i.e., descent from – usually – biological parents. Potentially, the uncle-child relationship could be subsumed under Article 24 EGBGB (guardianship), given an apparent caretaking relationship. However, this results in a different connecting factor than Article 19 EGBGB, which specifies an alternative connection that potentially leads to a parentage relationship. The Avunculat illustrates that a foreign family form, not aligning with the Christian-based nuclear family, is treated differently under conflict law, despite possibly holding the same status in its culture as the nuclear family does in German law. The characterization, starting with lex fori, endeavors to assimilate foreign family forms into our value framework.

2. Habitual Residence

Traditionally, the determination of the applicable law (personal statute) for an individual is based on nationality. However, in recent decades, the connection to nationality has been increasingly replaced by the concept of habitual residence, particularly influenced by EU regulations and recent international agreements, prompting a reconsideration even within German law. Habitual residence is autonomously defined depending on the legal source, but it is generally understood as the person’s center of life, which must be of a certain duration. In Germany, it is primarily determined factually, with subjective elements playing a subordinate role.

According to prevailing doctrine in Germany and recent EU Court of Justice rulings on EU law, a person can only have one habitual residence. It is assumed that a person can have only one “actual” center of life, necessitating the determination of the “real” habitual residence in case of doubt. This approach is grounded in the societal and familial notion that a person settles with their family in one place, occasionally leaving for another place—a representation of a sedentary lifestyle. However, this contradicts lifestyles such as those of nomadic tribes, particularly outside the “Global North,” and the emerging phenomenon of “digital nomads” in the whole world. This understanding of habitual residence underscores the phenomenon, as hinted at in the Avunkulat context, that the prevalent lifestyle in Germany and Europe/the Global North is considered the standard, requiring other lifestyles to somehow fit into it.

3. Assessment

a) Characterization

Western or German world views are also imposed on foreign legal phenomena if the characterization, as is often the case, regards the lex fori not only as the starting point but at the same time as an implicit limit. Nevertheless, the key to integrating foreign legal phenomena more autonomously lies precisely in the characterization and the dispute over its method. Characterization has the starting point that the conflict rules under which the connecting factor is to be subsumed originate from the German legislator  and are therefore interpreted methodically in the same way as the (German) lex fori. However, teleological interpretation offers the possibility of moving further away from the lex fori: It involves the interpretation of the function conflict-of-law rules. Function and objective is to cover foreign legal phenomena in the same way as domestic ones. Thus, a lex fori limit is by no means as mandatory as it appears to be. Instead, a broad understanding of the system concepts of the conflict rules is possible and intended.

With regard to legal phenomena that are still little researched and little known in jurisprudence, such as the avunculat, it is advisable for courts to proceed with particular caution. If the status of the maternal uncle actually replaces that of the father, consideration should be given to understand the avunculate as part of “parentage” in Article 19 EGBGB. If his legal status complements that of the father, Art. 24 EGBGB could be more useful. Other categories, such as adoption, might also to be considered. It would be desirable if more anthropological and comparative law work and research were carried out in order to support the courts in making such determinations.

b) Habitual Residence

As far as the understanding of habitual residence in PIL is concerned, in extreme cases such as those of (digital or traditional) nomads, but also cross-border commuters, which are becoming increasingly common, it would be possible to deviate from the principle that there is only one centre of life and thus one habitual residence. If two habitual residences were affirmed as the starting point in these cases, the next step would be to ask whether the specific rule requires only one habitual residence. Such a need can be affirmed, for example, in the case of jurisdiction rules in Article 3 Brussels IIter Regulation. In this case, preference should be given to the habitual residence that is even more “closely” linked to the connecting factor. This corresponds to the judgement to find only “the” habitual residence of the majority.

However, if the rule does not have a particular need for there to be only one habitual residence, both residences should count equally. If, for example, a rule is intended to express a common connection between two spouses to a legal system, as is often the case in international family law (e.g. Art. 5, 8 Rome III Regulation; Art. 22, 26 Brussels I Regulation; Art. 14 I and II EGBGB), the habitual residence of both spouses at one of the relevant connecting factors can easily be used as a basis, be it in a case of party autonomy, be it in a case of objective connecting factors.

by Patrick Ostendorf (HTW Berlin)

The principle of party autonomy gives the parties to a contract the opportunity to determine the applicable substantive (contract) law themselves by means of a choice-of-law clause – and thus to avoid (simple) mandatory rules that would otherwise bite. According to EU Private International law, however, the choice of the applicable contract law requires a genuine international element: in purely domestic situations, i.e. where “all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice” are located in a single country, all the mandatory rules of this country remain applicable even if the parties have chosen a foreign law (Art. 3 (3) Rome I Regulation).

In the absence (for the time being) of relevant case law from the European Court of Justice, the precise requirements of this threshold are not yet settled. However, in a recent judgment, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) has – seemingly for the first time – considered the requirements for a sufficient international element in this respect.

The decision concerned a lease agreement for an apartment in Berlin which was rented out by the embassy of a foreign state (the embassy acting on behalf of the foreign ministry of that state, which was the owner of the apartment). The lease contained a choice-of-law clause in favor of the law of that state and was drafted in the language of that state.

As the lease was entered into for a fixed term, the landlord informed the tenant shortly before the expiry of the lease that it would not be renewed and asked them to vacate the premises accordingly. The tenant in turn invoked section 575(1) of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB), according to which a fixed-term lease agreement is deemed to have been concluded for an indefinite period of time if the landlord has failed to inform the tenant in writing of the reasons for the fixed term at the time the lease was concluded.

The Bundesgerichtshof concludes that these facts constitute a purely domestic situation within the meaning of Art. 3 (3) of the Rome I Regulation; therefore section 575 BGB (a mandatory provision of the German Civil Code) applies notwithstanding the governing law clause in the contract providing otherwise. Accordingly, the request by the claimant to grant eviction has to be rejected.

As a starting point for its analysis, the Court emphasised that the genuine international element required for a choice of law must be of some significance and weight for the specific transaction in question (based on the principles of the applicable conflict-of-laws rules, in particular the connections with a foreign state referred to in Art. 4 Rome I Regulation), whereas subjective references to a foreign law based solely on the agreement of the parties will generally not suffice.

Even the fact that a foreign state was a party to the lease agreement does not, in the view of the Court, change this, since the embassy, acting both as the agent of the foreign state and as the institution responsible for the further implementation of the lease agreement, constitutes a branch within the meaning of Art. 19(2) of the Rome I Regulation (“If the contract is concluded in the course of the business of a branch, agency or other establishment, or if, under the contract, performance is the responsibility of such a branch, agency or establishment, the place where the branch, agency or establishment is situated shall be treated as the place of habitual residence”). It follows that not only the tenant’s but also the landlord’s habitual residence is deemed to be in Germany. Finally, according to the Court, the fact that the apartment in question was primarily used for the accommodation of embassy staff (although not in the present case), that the contract was concluded in a foreign language and that the tenant was (also) a foreign national is not sufficient to establish a genuine international element as well.

Although the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof is undoubtedly well reasoned, it reaches the opposite conclusion to recent English case law: in particular, the English Court of Appeal has (even before Brexit) taken the contrary view that the use of a foreign contractual language or a standard form contract tailored to international transactions would even on a standalone basis be sufficient to constitute a relevant international element – and accordingly allow the parties to escape the restrictions stipulated by Art. 3(3) Rome I Regulation (Dexia Crediop SpA v Comune di Prato [2017] EWCA Civ 428, discussed here).

Further guidance from the European Court of Justice on the interpretation of Art. 3(3) Rome I Regulation would therefore be desirable.

The external activity of the Court of Justice resumes on 8 January 2024. On 11 January, Advocate General M. Szpunar will publish his opinion on C-632/22 (Assignation au siège d’une filiale de la défenderesse). I reported on the case on the occasion of the hearing, which took place last October. The Spanish Supreme Court has sent to Luxembourg these two questions in relation to service of process and the right to a due process in a competition case involving companies with seat in different Member States.

1. In the circumstances surrounding the litigation relating to the trucks cartel, described in this order, is it possible to interpret Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in conjunction with Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in such a way that service of process on a parent company against which an action for damages for the harm caused by a restrictive trade practice has been brought is considered to have been properly effected when such service was effected (or attempted) at the place of business of the subsidiary company established in the State in which the legal proceedings were brought, while the parent company, which is established in another Member State, has not entered an appearance in the proceedings and has remained in default?
2. If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, is that interpretation of Article 47 of the Charter compatible with Article 53 of the Charter, in the light of the case-law of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court) on the service of process on parent companies established in another Member State in disputes relating to the trucks cartel?

A hearing on case C-187/23 Albausy, will take place at the very end of the month, on Wednesday 31. Faced with an application to grant a European certificate of succession by a (presumptive) heir, with other (equally presumptive) beneficiaries to the estate contesting the will, the Amstgericht Lörrach (Germany) asks several questions on Article 67 of the Succession Regulation (Regulation 650/2012):

(a)     Must point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 67(1) of the Succession Regulation be interpreted as meaning that it also refers to challenges raised in the procedure for issuing the European Certificate of Succession itself, which the court is not permitted to examine, and that it does not refer only to challenges raised in other proceedings?

(b)     If the answer to Question (a) is in the affirmative: Must point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 67(1) of the Succession Regulation be interpreted as meaning that a European Certificate of Succession may not be issued even if challenges have been raised in the procedure for issuing the European Certificate of Succession, but they have already been examined in the proceedings for the issuance of a certificate of inheritance under German law?

(c)     If the answer to Question (a) is in the affirmative: Must point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 67(1) of the Succession Regulation be interpreted as covering any challenges, even if they have not been substantiated and no formal evidence is to be taken of that fact?

(d)         If the answer to Question (a) is in the negative: In what form must the court state the reasons that led it to reject the challenges and to issue the European Certificate of Succession?

At the time of registration, the second question seemed hypothetical as no other proceedings for the issuance of a national certificate were pending, nor is it for sure that the objections raised against the European certificate would be examined there. Further doubts on admissibility will certainly be discussed at the hearing. Should the Court of Justice answer on the merits, other provisions of the Succession regulation (i.e., not only its Article 67) will likely be interpreted as well for the Court to provide useful guidance to the national jurisdiction.

C-187/23 has been allocated to a chamber of five judges (E. Regan, Z. Csehi, M. Ilesic, I. Jarukauti, D. Gratsias). M. Campos Sánchez-Bordona will provide an opinion in due time.

No other requests directly concerning private international law are scheduled to be dealt with in January.

On a wider perspective, I would like to mention case C-4/23, Mirin. This Grand Chamber case, with judge M. Ilesic reporting and an opinion by J. Richard de la Tour, has been prompted by a change of gender (from female to male), followed by the change of the name and a number of documents, of a British national who had actually been born in Romania. The applicant identified as male, on 21 February 2017, by means of the Deed Poll procedure; on 29 June 2020, he obtained in the United Kingdom a Gender Recognition Certificate confirming the male gender identity. In May 2021, he contacted the competent Romanina authorities requesting, directly on the basis of the Deed Poll and the Gender Identity Certificate, that the change of gender and first name be entered in the birth certificate, that the appropriate change be made to the personal numeric code to reflect the male gender, and that a matching birth certificate be issued. He contested the negative to the application before the Judecătoria Sectorului 6 București (Court of First Instance, Sector 6, Bucharest), which is asking now the Court of Justice the following questions:

(1)     Does the fact that Article 43(i) and Article 57 of Legea nr. 119/1996 privind actele de stare civilă (Law No 119/1996 on civil status documents) do not recognise changes in civil status made in another Member State by means of the procedure for legal recognition of gender to entries concerning gender and first name by a transgender man who has dual nationality (Romanian and of another Member State) and require a Romanian citizen to bring, from the outset, separate judicial proceedings in Romania against the local Public Service for Personal Records and Civil Status – proceedings which have been held to lack clarity and foreseeability by the European Court of Human Rights (X and Y v. Romania, nos. 2145/16 and 20607/16, 19 January 2021) and which may lead to a decision contrary to that taken by the other Member State – constitute an obstacle to the exercise of the right to European citizenship (Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and/or the right of citizens of the Union to move and reside freely (Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) in conditions of dignity, equality before the law and non-discrimination (Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union; Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Articles 1, 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), respecting the right to private and family life (Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union)?

(2)     Does the departure of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union affect the answer to the above question, in particular where (i) the procedure for changing civil status was commenced before Brexit and was completed during the transition period, and (ii) the impact of Brexit means that the person cannot benefit from rights attached to European citizenship, including the right to free movement and residence, except on the basis of Romanian identity or travel documents in which that person appears with a female gender and first name, contrary to the gender identity that has already been legally recognised?

A hearing is scheduled on 23 January 2024.

By Du Tao* and Jingwei Qiu**

With the increasingly close personnel exchanges and deepening economic cooperation between Mainland China and Hong Kong, the number and types of legal disputes between the two regions have also increased. Against the backdrop of adhering to the “One Country, Two Systems” principle and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, the judicial and legal professions of the two regions have worked closely together and finally signed “the Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters by the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (hereinafter referred to as “REJ Arrangement”) in January 2019, which will come into effect in January 2024. REJ Arrangement aims to establish an institutional arrangement for the courts of the Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to recognize and enforce judgments in civil and commercial cases, achieve the “circulation” of judgments in civil and commercial cases, reduce the burden of repeated litigation, and save judicial resources in the two regions.

There are 31 articles in REJ Arrangement, which comprehensively and meticulously stipulate the scope and contents of mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial cases, the procedures and methods for applying for recognition and enforcement, the circumstances under which recognition and enforcement may not be recognized, and the remedies available. Articles 1, 2, and 4 are provisions that positively state the scope of recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments in the two regions; Articles 3, 5, 12, and 13 are provisions that clearly recognize and enforce the scope of civil and commercial judgments of the courts of the two regions. Articles 7 to 11 and 20 to 27 are procedural provisions. The remaining provisions deal with the entry into force, interpretation, and modification of REJ Arrangement.

Compared with “the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters pursuant to choice of court agreements made between the parties concerned” (the first agreement reached between the two places on mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, hereinafter referred to as ‘Mainland-Hong Kong Mainland-Hong Kong Choice of Court Arrangement’)”, REJ Arrangement has significantly increased the types of cases to which it can be applied. Mainland-Hong Kong Choice of Court Arrangement is very limited in terms of the types of cases to be applied and only applies to civil and commercial cases where the parties have a written jurisdiction agreement, and there is a final monetary judgment. For example, in 2018, Zhongji Company filed an application with the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court of Zhejiang Province for recognition and enforcement of a civil judgment of a Hong Kong court[[1]], because a winding-up order made by a Hong Kong court is not a civil and commercial case according to parties’ agreement, and it cannot directly apply to the mainland court for recognition in accordance with the provisions of Mainland-Hong Kong Choice of Court Arrangement. In the 2010 case in which Chengxin Real Estate Company applied to the Xiamen Intermediate Court for confirmation of an effective judgment issued by the Hong Kong High Court[[2]], although the parties had signed a contract with a jurisdiction clause in writing since Mainland-Hong Kong Choice of Court Arrangement was only limited to the recognition of monetary judgments, the judgment of conveying the ownership of immovable property in the judgment could not be recognized and enforced because it was a non-monetary judgment. These two cases clearly illustrate the narrow scope of the Mainland-Hong Kong Choice of Court Arrangement. REJ Arrangement not only applies to monetary judgments but also includes non-monetary judgments. It also lists the types of cases that are not subject to REJ Arrangement for the time being. This method clarifies the types of cases to be applied, which is conducive to unifying judges’ understanding of the scope of application of REJ Arrangement in judicial practice and protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the people in the two places to the greatest extent.

REJ Arrangement removes the restriction on the level of the court of first instance. Mainland-Hong Kong Choice of Court Arrangement restricts the level of judgment rendered by the Mainland courts, which is limited to judgments rendered by courts at the level of the Mainland Intermediate Court and above, as well as some basic courts with foreign-related jurisdiction. However, REJ Arrangement does not restrict the level of courts in the Mainland where judgments are rendered, i.e. effective judgments issued by courts at all levels in various regions of the Mainland can be applied. For Hong Kong, the REJ Arrangement extends the scope to the effective judgments of the Labour Tribunal, the Small Claims Tribunal, and the Lands Tribunal. After REJ Arrangement comes into effect, together with the matrimonial and family arrangements that have been signed before, about 90% of civil and commercial judgments in the two places will be reciprocal recognition and the scope of application of enforcement will be expanded, [[3]]so that the cases involving each other can be recognized and enforced to the greatest extent, and to ensure that creditors in the two places can obtain the greatest judicial relief.

With regard to the revision of jurisdiction, on the one hand, new jurisdictional connection points have been added to the REJ Arrangement, filling the gap in the provisions of the Mainland-Hong Kong Choice of Court Arrangement in this regard. The new jurisdictional connection point of “the applicant’s domicile” is connected with the expansion of the scope of the application of REJ Arrangement. Since REJ Arrangement also includes the confirmation of legal relationships or legal facts in the scope of application, there is no enforceable content in such judgments themselves. The applicant only needs to apply to the Mainland court for recognition of this part of the legal relationship or facts. If REJ Arrangement does not add a new jurisdictional connection point of “the applicant’s domicile”, when the respondent has neither property nor domicile in the Mainland, a jurisdictional connection point cannot be established, resulting in no Mainland court accepting the application. Therefore, the addition of “the applicant’s domicile” as a jurisdictional connection point in this arrangement is of great practical significance, which greatly enhances the feasibility of the recognition of judgments.

On the other hand,  REJ Arrangement clarifies the criteria for the review of the jurisdiction of the court of first instance. Mainland-Hong Kong Choice of Court Arrangement stipulates that, according to the law of the requested party, if the requested court has exclusive jurisdiction over the case, it shall not recognize and enforce it, that is, adopt the “exclusive jurisdiction exclusion” model. For the first time, REJ Arrangement clearly stipulates the criteria for the review of the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment is rendered. Article 11 sets out the jurisdictional criteria for different types of cases by way of enumeration. The provisions on jurisdiction in REJ Arrangement are in fact based on the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention, and adopt the review model of “exclusive jurisdiction exclusion” plus “enumeration”. Under REJ Arrangement, if a Mainland judgment applies to the Hong Kong court for recognition and enforcement, the Hong Kong court can not only greatly reduce the workload of reviewing jurisdiction, but also reduce the number of defenses to jurisdictional issues, thereby increasing the success rate of recognition and enforcement of the judgment. Moreover, REJ Arrangement clearly unifies the criteria for determining the jurisdiction of the court of first instance, which can effectively reduce the occurrence of parallel litigation and enhance the predictability and stability of litigation. In addition, the wording of the provisions on jurisdiction in different circumstances in Article 11 of REJ Arrangement indicates that when examining whether the court of first instance has jurisdiction, it is only necessary to examine the jurisdiction of the jurisdiction of the jurisdiction in which the judgment was rendered.

In terms of content, REJ Arrangement takes a more open stance than the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention, strengthens the judicial protection of intellectual property rights, and clearly stipulates the jurisdictional standards for intellectual property cases. With the in-depth interaction of professional services related to intellectual property rights in the mainland and Hong Kong, the two regions have gradually reached a consensus on issues such as the determination of the validity of certain intellectual property rights and the protection system, which provides the possibility of adding new protection clauses related to intellectual property rights in the REJ Arrangement. The scope of intellectual property rights protected by REJ Arrangement mainly refers to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the General Provisions of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, and the Regulations on the Protection of Plant Varieties. For the first time, REJ Arrangement adds provisions on punitive damages for infringement of intellectual property rights and clarifies the punitive damages part of the monetary judgments in the four types of cases recognized and enforced by the requested court. In addition, based on the particularity of trade secret infringement disputes, non-monetary liability for infringement of trade secrets is stipulated.

In terms of the finality of the recognition and enforcement of judgments, REJ Arrangement has made a major breakthrough. Hong Kong is a common law country and has a habit of following precedent when it comes to finality. In 1996, in the case of Chiyu Banking Corporation Limited’s application for recognition and enforcement of a Mainland judgment (hereinafter referred to as the Chiyu case)[[4]], Judge Cheung Chak Yau of the Hong Kong Court made the following judgment on the issue of the finality of the judgment: The judgment of a foreign court must be final and irrevocable, and because of the existence of a retrial system in Chinese mainland, the original trial court has the right to change the original judgment in the retrial, because the judgment made by the original trial court can be changed, and this system makes the mainland judgment not final. As a result, the Mainland judgment was ruled by the Hong Kong court not to be recognized and enforced. The criterion of finality established by this case had a profound and long-lasting impact on the recognition and enforcement of mainland judgments by Hong Kong courts, and the Chiyu case has been repeatedly cited as a precedent by the Hong Kong side. Even later, in the 2001 TayCuanv. NgChi case[[5]], the issue of finality was raised again, and the Hong Kong side rejected the application on the same grounds, resulting in a further strengthening of the criterion of finality of judgment. However, Mainland-Hong Kong Choice of Court Arrangement only avoids the use of the word “finality” and does not explicitly stipulate “enforceable judgments”, which cannot really solve the problem. Subsequently, the Mainland Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordinance enacted by Hong Kong under Mainland-Hong Kong Choice of Court Arrangement deviated from the original intention of Mainland-Hong Kong Choice of Court Arrangement and still adopted the expression “final and conclusive” on the issue of finality. As such, the Mainland-Hong Kong Choice of Court Arrangement has a very limited role in coordinating the finality of judgments between the two places.

Under REJ Arrangement, “the judgment is final and inconclusive” no longer needs to be “final and conclusive” for mainland civil and commercial judgments to be recognized and enforced in Hong Kong. The phrase “final judgment with enforceable effect” has been changed to “effective judgment”, and the meaning of “effective judgment” has been clarified, referring to “first-instance judgments and second-instance judgments that are not allowed to be appealed in accordance with the law or have not been appealed within the statutory time limit, as well as the above-mentioned judgments made through retrial procedures”. REJ Arrangement has undergone substantial changes in the legislative provisions on the issue of finality of judgments, and Hong Kong has abandoned its long-standing insistence on the criteria of “certainty” and “inconclusiveness”. Moreover, the clear elaboration of the “effective judgment” enables the subsequent judicial practice to apply the law more accurately. When hearing a case of recognition and enforcement of a Mainland judgment, the Hong Kong court only needs to conduct a formal review to determine whether the type of judgment is in accordance with REJ Arrangement.

However, the breakthrough of REJ Arrangement on the issue of finality of judgments does not represent a fundamental change in Hong Kong’s attitude towards the recognition and enforcement of extraterritorial judgments, which can only be confirmed after the transformation of Hong Kong’s local legislation and subsequent judicial practice. At least on the surface, this provision resolves the historic obstacle that has been preventing the recognition and enforcement of Mainland judgments in Hong Kong courts. From a more in-depth perspective, Hong Kong will treat mainland judgments differently from foreign judgments, so that judgments from the two places can truly be circulated.

At present, the development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is in the ascendant, and the signing of REJ Arrangement has provided new opportunities for the future development of the two places. This is not only the endpoint of the basic and comprehensive coverage of the judicial assistance arrangements for civil and commercial matters between the two places, but also the starting point for colleagues in the legal circles of the two places to move towards a higher and farther goal[[6]]. This means that Mainland China and Hong Kong will have a broader space for development and better prospects in the field of mutual recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments. In the new era and new context of continuing to adhere to the principle of “one country, two systems” in the future, the legal culture and legal system of Mainland China and Hong Kong will be gradually integrated, and an integrated system of civil and commercial judicial assistance will be successfully established.

 

Authors

*Dr. Du Tao, Professor at the East China University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai, China, waiguofa@126.com

**Jingwei Qiu, Graduate student of East China University of Political Science and Law, 2194621508@qq.com.

[1] See (2018) Zhe 01 Zhigang No. 2. On 12 November 2018, the applicant, Zhongji Company, filed an application with the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court for recognition of the High Court’s winding-up order No. 132 of 2018 in the High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. https://wenshu.court.gov.cn/website/wenshu/181107ANFZ0BXSK4/index.html?docId=JseWE2JCpafgJrx5lyT46GkmFgQc7VGra0V1/ugltMMOZ2S3LUQMq7fWnudOoarTTYdhHuJEwBempXeLhxTPMm90fL3cvEPOqfJQ2Xb051xu6I6RfcuEPyM36peDZ1lY

[2] See (2009) Xiamin Zhizi No. 124. In 2009, Chengxin Real Estate sued Hong Kong Guoyuan Investment Co., Ltd. in Hong Kong, demanding that it deliver the housing involved in the lawsuit and repay the money.

legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=67107&QS=%24%28HCA2231%2F2007%2C?%29&TP=JU

[3] The Mainland and Hong Kong signed an arrangement on mutual recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters, and continuously improved the inter-regional judicial assistance system with Chinese characteristics: An interview with the person in charge of the Research Office of the Supreme People’s Court[EB/OL].?2019-01-18?.https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2017/06/id/2903940.shtml.

[4] Chiyu Banking Corp Ltd v. Chan Tin Kwun?1996?HKCFI 418; (1996)2 HKLRD 395;HCA 11186/1995.legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=30726&QS=%2B%7C%28HCA%2C11186%2F1995%29&TP=JU

[5] Tan Tay Cuan v.Ng Chi Hung,HCA 5477/2000.5/2/2001.legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=21647&QS=%2B%7C%28HCA%2C5477%2F2000%29&TP=JU

[6] The Mainland and Hong Kong signed an arrangement on mutual recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters, and continuously improved the inter-regional judicial assistance system with Chinese characteristics: An interview with the person in charge of the Research Office of the Supreme People’s Court[EB/OL].?2019-01-18?.https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2017/06/id/2903940.shtml.

Technology is challenging private international law as many other areas of law. Difficulties raised by cryptocurrency transfers on blockchain are particularly significant because private international law techniques are relying on localisation, as well as on concepts such as internationality and characterisation that are not easy to identify in this case. Cryptocurrency transfers through blockchain are not relying on intermediation services as applicable in traditional forms of financial transactions. This makes it difficult to idetermine the service provider or the characteristic performer and pinpoint them to a real-world location or to concentrate the connections related to a transaction to a particular place. Further, pseudonymity on the blockchain makes it difficult to identify the participants to the system and their locations.

Burcu Yüksel Ripley (Senior Lecturer at the University of Aberdeen) is addressing these aspects and the ways in which the law applicable to transfers of cryptocurrencies can be determined in a paper she made available on SSRN. The paper is entitled The Law Applicable to (Digital) Transfer of Digital Assets: The Transfer of Cryptocurrencies via Blockchains and is forthcoming in Fogt, M. M. (ed.) Private International Law in an Era of Change with Edward Elgar.

The abstract reads as follows:

Transfer of digital assets including cryptocurrencies gives raise to various important legal questions. One of them is the law applicable to their transfers via blockchains. Traditional concepts and techniques of private international law are challenged by blockchain in the determination of the applicable law. Disintermediation makes it difficult to identify a service provider or characteristic performer in the systems underpinned by blockchain. The distributed nature of the ledger raises issues with ascribing the ledger or blockchain and an asset digitally recorded on it to a real-world location and also gives rise to the lack of concentration of connections with a particular place. Pseudonymity in the systems underpinned by blockchain poses problems with the identification of the system participants as well as their locations. The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the key issues concerning the law applicable to (digital) transfer of digital assets by focusing on cryptocurrency transfers via blockchain. These issues include internationality, characterisation and determination of the applicable law under the unitary approach (leading to the application of a single law) and the segmented approach (resulting in splitting the applicable law). In its analysis, this chapter utilises an analogy to electronic funds transfers (EFTs) and funds transfer systems in order to offer an alternative way of thinking to find solutions to the problems concerning cryptocurrency transfers via blockchains. It also aims to contribute to the current academic discourse as well as ongoing law reform projects in the area with a new perspective.

The authors of this post are Chukwuma Okoli, Assistant Professor in Commercial Conflict of Laws at the University of Birmingham, and Senior Research Associate at the University of Johannesburg; and Abubakri Yekini, Lecturer in Conflict of Laws at the University of Manchester.

 

On December 21, 2023, the Nigerian Senate in line with Section 231(2) of the 1999 Constitution, confirmed the appointment of Honourable Justice Habeeb A.O. Abiru (“Justice Abiru”), alongside ten other justices, to the Nigerian Supreme Court, following the recommendation of the National Judicial Council and the Nigerian President. This appointment fills the vacancy created by recent retirements or deaths of some justices.

Justice Abiru’s appointment is particularly significant for conflict of laws enthusiasts. Our research suggests that he is the first Nigerian Supreme Court Justice in recent times who is a specialist on conflict of laws. Initially appointed as a judge at the Lagos State High Court in 2001, Justice Abiru was later elevated to the Court of Appeal in 2012.

Justice Abiru briefly served as a law academic at the Lagos State University before his judicial appointment. He equally studied conflict of laws during his LLM at the University of Ife from 1986 to 1987. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that Justice Abiru’s expertise is limited to conflict of laws, nor that other Nigerian judges do not possess expertise in conflict of laws. The point being made is that his Lordship’s prominence as a judicial expert in conflict of laws in Nigeria is noteworthy.

Given recent criticisms of judgments from Nigerian appellate courts concerning conflict of laws, Justice Abiru’s background is pivotal. Various scholars (Okoli and Oppong, Yekini, and Bamodu) have raised concerns about the quality of judgments from appellate courts regarding conflict of laws. These concerns arise, especially due to the position taken by the Nigerian Supreme Court (and the Court of Appeal) in several cases, stating that, by the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution, the jurisdiction of each State High Court and the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, is restricted to matters that occur within their respective territory. (see for example, Capital Bancorp Ltd v Shelter Savings and Loans Ltd (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1020) 148; Dairo v Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 640) 99). Okoli and Oppong argue that: “This approach is wrong; there is no provision of the Nigerian Constitution that circumscribes the jurisdiction of the State High Court and the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory to matters that occur within its territory, provided the defendant is present or resident in the jurisdiction or is willing to submit to it. In essence, these appellate decisions ignore the principle of conflict of laws which is part of Nigeria’s common law legal system.” (See also Yekini, and Bamodu).

During his tenure at the Nigerian Court of Appeal, Justice Abiru consistently drew attention to the importance of addressing conflict of laws issues, often overlooked by legal practitioners and judges.. While dealing with the issue of territorial jurisdiction in Muhammed v Ajingi ((2013) LPELR-20372(CA), his Lordship notes that: “the concept of territorial jurisdiction is one of the most misunderstood concepts. This has always been due to lack of appreciation of the approach to dealing with the concept. The first step in the approach to dealing with a question of territorial jurisdiction of a Court is to always understand that where there is a dispute as to the proper venue of hearing a matter that has inter-State elements, it is an issue of conflict of laws or what is called private international law.” Needless to say, Ajingi’s case is one of the recent instances where the courts got the question of territorial jurisdiction right. In addition, his dissenting opinion in Niger Aluminium Manufacturing Co. Ltd v Union Bank (2015) LPELR-26010(CA) 32-36 highlights his commitment to addressing conflict of laws situations even when the majority view falls short.

Justice Abiru has contributed extra-judicially to critiques of the state of conflict of laws in Nigeria. (see here and here). In his foreword to Okoli and Oppong’s “Private International Law in Nigeria” (2020), he submitted that: “The legal practitioners and the Courts in Nigeria have over time struggled with the resolution of legal actions which have such foreign elements. The law reports are replete with decisions showing clear evidence of the struggle. The reason for the struggle has been the failure of the lawyers and Courts to appreciate that it is the rules of private international law that are applicable to these situations.”

The addition of Justice Abiru to Nigeria’s Supreme Court is a positive development that strengthens Nigeria’s bench. While acknowledging that a strong bench is not the sole criterion for a developed conflict of laws system, it undoubtedly contributes to building trust in Nigeria’s judicial system, both locally and internationally. As stressed elsewhere, if Nigerian and African courts and arbitral panels want to compete favourably with other countries, especially in attracting litigation and arbitration business, Nigeria’s judiciary needs ongoing institutional reforms, addressing issues like infrastructure, legal system quality, funding, delays, regular training, and corruption.

In conclusion, Justice Abiru’s appointment to the Nigerian Supreme Court is a step in the right direction for the development of Nigerian conflict of laws.

The second issue of 2023 of the Journal of Private International Law is out. It contains the following articles:

Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Symeon C. Symeonides, Cross-border internet defamation conflicts and what to do about them: Two proposals

Conflicts of laws in cross-border defamation cases are politically and culturally sensitive and their resolution has always been difficult. But the ubiquity of the internet has increased their frequency, complexity, and intensity. Faced with the realities of the online environment—including the virtual disappearance of national borders—several countries have acted unilaterally to preserve their values and protect their interests. Some countries enacted laws favouring consumers or other potential plaintiffs, while other countries took steps to protect potential defendants, including publishers and internet service providers. As a result, these conflicts are now more contentious than ever before. We believe there is a better way—even-handed multilateral action rather than self-serving unilateral action. In this article, we advance two proposals for multilateral action. The first is a set of soft law principles in the form of a resolution adopted by the Institut de Droit International in 2019. The second is a proposed Model Defamation Convention. After presenting and comparing these two instruments, we apply them to two scenarios derived from two leading cases (the first and one of the latest of the internet era) decided by courts of last resort. The first scenario is based on Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick, which was decided by the High Court of Australia in 2002. The second is based on Gtflix Tv v. DR, which was decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union at the end of 2021. We believe that these two instruments would produce more rational solutions to these and other cross-border defamation conflicts. But if we fail to persuade readers on the specifics, we hope to demonstrate that other multilateral solutions are feasible and desirable, and that they are vastly superior to a continuing unilateral “arms race.” In any event, we hope that this article will spur the development of other proposals for multilateral action.

Gerard McCormack, Conflicts in insolvency jurisdiction

The Hague Judgments Convention 2019 contains an insolvency exception. The paper suggests that the proposed Hague Jurisdiction Convention should contain an insolvency exception that mirrors that contained in the existing Hague Judgments Convention. It is also submitted that international instruments in the field of insolvency, and related matters, are best dealt with by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

Leon Theimer, Protection against the breach of choice of court agreements: A comparative analysis of remedies in English and German courts.

In fixing the place and provider for the resolution of disputes in advance, choice of court agreements increase procedural legal certainty and the predictability of litigation risks. Hence, their protection is crucial. This article undertakes a functional comparison of the remedies for breach of exclusive choice of court agreements in English and German courts, painting a picture of different approaches to a common problem. English courts, now no longer constrained by EU law, employ an entire arsenal of remedies, most strikingly the anti-suit injunction and damages effectively reversing a foreign judgment. In contrast, German courts exercise greater judicial restraint, even though damages for the breach of a choice of court agreement have recently been awarded for the first time. Against this backdrop, two distinct but interrelated reasons for the diverging approaches are identified and analysed, the different conceptions of choice of court agreements and the different roles of comity and mutual trust.

Vera Shikhelman, Enforcement of foreign judgments – Israel as a case study

This article shows how enforcement of foreign judgments in Israel works in practice. Using an original hand-coded dataset, the article seeks to determine empirically which factors increase the likelihood of a foreign judgment being enforced by Israeli courts. To do so the article makes use of two major theories about enforcement of foreign judgments – international comity and vested rights. Also, the article hypothesises that enforcement can be influenced by specific characteristics of the Israeli court and the foreign judgment.
The article finds that the best predictor of foreign judgment enforcement in Israel is the specific characteristics of the foreign judgment and of the Israeli court – cases with a contractual-commercial nature, and cases brought before one of the central districts of Israel are more likely to be enforced. Additionally, the volume of trade between the issuing country and Israel might also be a certain predictor of enforcement. Finally, the article finds that the due process in individual cases might have some influence on the enforcement decision.

Diego Zannoni, How to balance respect for diversity and the rights of the vulnerable? (Non-)recognition of forced and underage marriage under the lens of the European Convention on Human Rights

Partly in view of the migratory phenomenon to which Europe is exposed, forced and underage marriages nowadays deserve careful consideration both as social phenomena and as legal institutions. This paper aims to verify whether and to what extent forced and underage marriages should be recognised in Europe. On the one hand, recognising the validity of these acts could arguably clash with fundamental values and rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence. On the other hand, it is not possible to a priori exclude that a flat refusal to recognise a marriage validly established abroad might entail a violation of further rights of the spouses and ultimately have detrimental consequences for the parties that the refusal aims to protect. The aim is to assess whether private international law tools and techniques can offer a proper balance between respect for the fundamental values of reception societies and protection of the rights and interests of the parties involved.