Droit international général

This post was contributed by Thomas Mastrullo, who is a lecturer at the Sorbonne Law School (Paris 1)

On 31 March 2021, the Legal High Committee for Financial Markets of Paris (“Haut Comité juridique de la Place Financière de Paris” – HCJP) has published a report on the applicable law to companies  (Rapport sur le rattachement des sociétés – see here). This report is of great interest for those who are interested in the evolution of international company law.

Context

For several years, there has been a reflection in France about the conflict-of-law rule in corporate matters.

We know that two theories coexist in international company law: the theory of incorporation, which consists in applying to the company the law of the State where it was incorporated and where its registered office, or statutory seat, is located; the real-seat theory, which submits the company to the law of the State where its head office, or central administration, is localised.

In French law, the conflict-of-law rule in corporate matters is laid down in unilateralist terms, with almost the same drafting, in Article 1837 of the Civil Code (see here) and in Article L. 210-3 of the Commercial Code (see here).

The doctrine is divided on the interpretation of these texts, which have been bilateralized by French Cour de cassation (e.g. Com. 9 mars 1993, n° 91-11.003, Bull. civ. IV, n° 94 ; see here). The traditional view among French writers is that the connecting factor is in principle the real seat, because the statutory seat is not enforceable against third parties in case of dissociation of the registered office and the head office. But the modern view is that the connecting factor is in principle the statutory seat, considering that third parties have an option between the registered office and the head office in case of dissociation.

In this context, by letter dated 18 February 2020, the HCJP was jointly seized by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Economy with a request for a study on the “Opportunity, feasibility and conditions of turning to the theory of incorporation”. This initiative takes place in an environment of increased economic and legal competition: the adoption of the theory of incorporation might strengthen the legal attractiveness and economic influence of France. But the referral letter does not ignore that such a liberal conflict-of-law rule might also encourage opportunistic behaviors by economic actors and departure of French companies abroad.

Several questions were therefore raised in the referral letter: Consequences of adopting the theory of incorporation in terms of attractiveness? Experience of other EU Member States? Compatibility with EU law? Risks of forum and law shopping? Consequences for matters related to company law?

Finally, the letter requested that “the necessary legislative and regulatory changes” be proposed.To meet this demand, a working group was set up under the chairmanship of Professor Hervé Synvet, composed of academics and legal practitioners.

The result of the working group’s reflection is the report under consideration, which is divided into two parts.

Impact of a New Conflict-of-law Rule in Corporate Matters on Other Matters

In the first part, the HCJP studies the impact that the evolution of the French connecting factor in corporate matters would have on other branches of law. Several matters are taken into consideration: tax law, insolvency law, social law, capital market law, regulation of foreign investments, banking and financial law. The conclusion is that the adoption of the theory of incorporation would have little impact on these different branches of the law, and in any case no negative effects likely to prevent a reform. Indeed, these different disciplines have their own conflict-of-law rules and the connecting categories are quite clearly defined in French private international law. In addition, each of these matters has a specific approach to the company seat.

Proposed Reform

In the second part, the working group argues in favor of an evolution of the French conflict-of-law rule. More precisely, it proposes to adopt a new connecting factor relying exclusively on the statutory seat – or registered office, and to abandon any reference to the real seat.

Arguments in favor of the adoption of the connecting criterion by the statutory seat

Several arguments are advanced in support of this proposition.

Firstly, this conflict-of-law rule would be simpler and, as a consequence, more favorable to legal certainty. Indeed, on the one hand, it would eliminate the touchy question of the place of the real seat and, on the other hand, it would guarantee respect for the operators’ choice of the law to rule their company or even their group of companies. Thus, France’s attractiveness might be reinforced. Secondly, the solution is inspired by the comparative private international law (German, Irish, Luxembourg, Dutch, British, Swiss and Delaware law are studied) which reveals a strong tendency towards the generalization of the theory of incorporation or connecting criterion by the registered office. Thirdly, the solution is presented as more suited to the development of EU law which, through the jurisprudence of the CJEU – and in particular the Centros, Uberseering, Inspire Art and Polbud judgments – and some regulations – such as European Regulation n° 2157/2001 on SE (see here), tends to favor the registered office as a connecting factor.

Although it is not unaware of the risk of law shopping, the HCJP considers that this risk should not be overestimated since the laws of the EU’s Member States have “a common base” because of the European directives adopted on corporate matters, which is likely to prevent a “race to the bottom”. Moreover, the transfer of registered office from one Member State to another is still difficult, which is an obstacle to law shopping.

Proposed new texts

The HCJP recommends amending the Civil Code, and in particular Article 1837, and repealing Article L. 210-3 of the Commercial Code.

The new bilateral conflict-of-law rule, applicable to all companies with legal personality, is set out in Article 1837, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code. It provides that the company would be governed by the law of the State in which it has its statutory seat – or registered office. Rather than a reference to the company’s incorporation, this formulation is chosen because it would ensure terminological continuity with the current Article 1837 and would model the French conflict-of-law rule on that of the European Regulation on the SE.

Besides, the HCJP devotes paragraph 2 of Article 1837 to companies without statutory seat. For these companies, the conflict-of-law rule would be inspired from the solutions provided by the Rome 1 Regulation: the applicable law would be the law chosen by the partners or, in the absence of choice, the law of the country with which the company is most closely connected.

The proposed Article 1837 reads:

Article 1837 du Code civil

La société est régie par la loi de l’État dans lequel elle a son siège statutaire.

À défaut de siège statutaire, la société est régie par la loi choisie par ses associés ou, à défaut de choix, par la loi de l’État avec lequel elle présente les liens les plus étroits.  

The HCJP proposes also to introduce a new article 1837-1 of Civil Code devoted to the lex societatis’ scope of application, inspired from Swiss law. The aim is to increase the readability and, as a result, the attractiveness of French law. A list of questions falling within the scope of lex societatis would be drawn, this list being non-exhaustive as suggested by the use of the French adverb “notamment” (which can be translated by “in particular”).

The proposed Article 1837-1 reads:

Article 1837-1 du Code civil

La loi applicable à la société en vertu de l’article précédent régit notamment : a) la nature juridique de la société ; b) la capacité juridique de la société ; c) la dénomination ou la raison sociale ; d) la constitution de la société ; e) la nullité de la société, ainsi que celle des délibérations sociales ; f) la dissolution et la liquidation de la société ; g) les opérations emportant transmission universelle de patrimoine et le transfert du siège statutaire ; h) l’interprétation et la force obligatoire des statuts ; i) la modification des statuts, en particulier la transformation de la société ; j) l’organisation et le fonctionnement de la société, ainsi que sa représentation ; k) les droits et obligations des associés ; l) la preuve, l’acquisition et la perte de la qualité d’associé ; m) la détermination des titres susceptibles d’être émis par la société ; n) la détermination des personnes responsables des dettes sociales et l’étendue de leur responsabilité ; o) la responsabilité civile encourue en cas de violation des règles gouvernant la constitution, le fonctionnement ou la liquidation des sociétés, ou d’obligations statutaires. 

In addition, the HCJP considers the introduction of an Article 1837-2 which includes a substantive rule aiming at protecting “French” contracting parties of foreign companies. More precisely, the legal or statutory restrictions on the capacity or the powers of the representatives of a company under foreign law, which would produce effect in external relations according to the foreign law, would be unenforceable against “French” co-contractors, as long as they are of good faith. This rule aims mainly to protect the co-contractors of companies incorporated outside EU – such as American companies which apply the ultra vires doctrine ; the risk is indeed lower in EU, thanks to the protective regime of directive 2017/1132/UE (see here).

The proposed Article 1837-2 reads:

Article 1837-2 du Code civil  

Les restrictions légales ou statutaires à la capacité juridique ou aux pouvoirs des représentants d’une société de droit étranger concluant un acte juridique en France qui, selon la loi régissant la société, produiraient effet dans ses relations externes, sont inopposables au cocontractant ayant légitimement ignoré ces restrictions. 

In conclusion, the HCJP’s “Report on the connecting factor of companies” appears to be a stimulating contribution for the modernisation of French international company law.

Written by the Asian Business Law Institute and the Permanent Bureau of the HCCH

It was reported previously that the Asian Business Law Institute (ABLI) and the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) were to co-host a webinar titled HCCH 1970 Evidence Convention and Remote Taking of Evidence by Video-link on 1 June.

The session has since been successfully held. The organisers would like to share the summary and key takeaways of the session with readers of this blog. Readers who are interested in learning more about the session and requesting access to the video recording may contact ABLI at info@abli.asia.

On 1 June 2021, the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) and the Singapore-based Asian Business Law Institute co-hosted webinar HCCH 1970 Evidence Convention and Remote Taking of Evidence by Video-link, welcoming attendees from 30 different jurisdictions, including representatives of Central Authorities, HCCH Members, private practitioners, international public service officers and business professionals.

Dr Christophe Bernasconi, Secretary General of the HCCH, opened the webinar with a welcoming address where he underscored that the success of the 1970 Evidence Convention was attributable to not only its simplified transmission procedures and its flexibility to accommodate the needs of different legal traditions, but also the technology-neutral approach adopted by drafters, which has allowed the Convention to remain fit for purpose in the 21st century. Specifically, Dr Bernasconi highlighted that the Convention, with 63 Contracting Parties representing every major legal tradition, facilitated the transmission of thousands of requests for taking of evidence every year and allowed the use of video-link technology in the taking of evidence abroad.

Professor Yun Zhao, Representative of the HCCH Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, was next to speak where he gave an overview of the operation of the Evidence Convention. He explained how the Convention provided, in Chapter I, a main channel of transmission under which a judicial authority in a requesting State may send a Letter of Request directly to a Central Authority in the requested State, before elaborating that the Convention also provided, in Chapter II, a streamlined process for the direct taking of evidence by commissioners or consuls, to which Contracting Parties may object upon or after accession. Professor Zhao pointed to the recently published Guide to Good Practice on the Use of Video-Link under the 1970 Evidence Convention and outlined a plethora of ways in which video-link technology may be used to take evidence abroad, e.g. to facilitate the presence of the parties and their representatives by video-link at the execution of a request or to permit a commissioner located in the State of Origin to take evidence by video-link in the State of Execution.

Following Professor Zhao’s presentation, Mr Alexander Blumrosen, Partner at Polaris Law (Paris), provided a historical account of the use of the Evidence Convention in the United States and the significance of the landmark Supreme Court decision Aérospatiale. He went on to explain in detail, and by reference to his practical experience, how evidence located in France but needed for U.S. civil or commercial proceedings may be taken through a Letter of Request (under Chapter I) or more swiftly through a commissioner (under Chapter II). Mr Blumrosen highlighted that the execution of a Chapter I Letter of Request in France usually took between six weeks and three months, and that under Article 9 of the Convention, foreign counsel may be allowed to participate in the direct or cross examination of witnesses by video-link provided that such participation was expressly requested in the Letter of Request and allowed by local law and practice as it is in France. Mentioning that the taking of evidence by commissioner under Chapter II could be even faster and more flexible, Mr Blumrosen added that once the Central Authority had authorized a commissioner – which could take between one to ten days, depending on the matter – the evidence may be taken immediately either in person in conference room facilities or using video-link, without needing any further intervention or participation by a local judge. He mentioned the increased use of Chapter II discovery in requests from the U.S. over the last ten years, and applauded the qualified Article 23 reservation adopted by France to the Convention that allows for pre-trial discovery but requires requests to be “enumerated limitatively” and to be relevant to the underlying dispute in order to avoid overly broad “fishing expeditions”.

Turning attendees’ attention from France to Singapore was Mr Edmund Kronenburg, Managing Partner of Braddell Brothers LLP, who presented a brief overview of the operation of the Evidence Convention in Singapore by looking at the country’s legal framework. In his view, the popularity of the Convention was likely to increase in the coming years in tandem with Singapore’s efforts to reinforce its dispute resolution hub status. Mr Kronenburg then moderated a lively panel discussion among all panelists, including Mr Blumrosen, Justice Anselmo Reyes of the Singapore International Commercial Court, Dr João Ribeiro-Bidaoui, First Secretary at the HCCH and Professor Zhao.

To conclude the session, Dr Ribeiro-Bidaoui spoke of the salient benefits and main features of another HCCH instrument, the 1965 Service Convention, highlighting that the Service Convention, with 78 Contracting Parties, was accessible to almost 70% of the global citizenship who represents more than 80% of the world’s GDP.?

The Permanent Bureau of the HCCH and ABLI are heartened by the positive feedback received after the webinar. Some Singaporean practitioners who were in the midst of preparing for virtual hearings found the session especially timely. One attendee from the business community commented that although not legally trained, he found the discussions useful in understanding the difficulties involved in multi-jurisdictional legal processes from the perspective of running a multinational business. Attendees joining from outside of Singapore said they benefited most from learning about the implementation of the Evidence Convention in places other than their home jurisdictions. Specifically, Matthijs Kuijpers and Sofja Goldstein from Amsterdam-based law firm Stibbe shared that they found it extremely valuable for their international litigation practice to have judges, practitioners and academics from various jurisdictions exchange and discuss experiences and best practices. In particular, they very much appreciated that the organisers actively engaged practitioners during the session as such engagement helped overcome issues that would inevitably rise over time given that the methods of taking evidence today differ significantly from how it was envisioned when the Convention was drafted.

The organisers thank all attendees for their active participation and warm reception and look forward to having more such opportunities for exchange of ideas and sharing of experiences.

The full version of the key panel discussion takeaways can be read here.

The Young Research Network of the European Association of Private International Law (EAPIL) has just launched its latest research project, which is being led by Tobias Lutzi, Ennio Piovesani, and Dora Rotar. The project will focus on the national rules on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters over non-EU defendants, in light of the report envisioned in Article 79 Brussels Ia Regulation.

As the project will primarily be based on national reports describing the situation in each Member State (structured by a detailed questionnaire), the organizers are currently still looking for participants who would be interested in providing a national report for one of the following Member States: Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden.

The full Call for Participants can be found here.

The EAPIL’s Young Research Network has just launched its latest research project, which is being led by Tobias Lutzi, Ennio Piovesani, and Dora Rotar. The project will focus on the national rules on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters over non-EU defendants, in light of the report envisioned in Article 79 Brussels Ia Regulation.

As the project will primarily be based on national reports describing the situation in each Member State (structured by a detailed questionnaire), the organizers are currently looking for participants who would be interested in providing a national report for one of the following Member States: Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden.

The full Call for Participants can be found here.

If you are a junior researcher (below full professor) or practitioner under the age of 45 and would like to receive information about similar projects before they are posted publicly, you can join the EAPIL Young Research Network by simply filling out this form.

Xu Huang, Wuhan University Institute of International Law

1. Background
On 10 June 2021, China’s Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (hereinafter “NPC”) issued “Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People’s Republic of China” (hereinafter “CAFSL”), which entered into force on the date of the promulgation. This is a reaction in response to the current tension between China and some western countries, in particular, the US and the EU that have imposed a series of sanctions on Chinese officials and entities. For example, in August 2020, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on 11 individuals for undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy and restricting the freedom of expression or assembly of the citizens of Hong Kong. In June 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14032 to amend ban on US persons purchasing securities of certain Chinese companies. In March 2021, the EU imposed unilateral sanctions on relevant Chinese individuals and entity, based on the human rights issues in Xinjiang. China has responded by imposing counter sanctions, which were issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as administrative orders. The Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law provides the legal basis for China’s further action and counter measures. This law was enacted after only two reading rather than normal three demonstrating China’s urgent need to defend itself against a growing risk of foreign hostile measures.

2. The main content

Competent Authority: All relevant departments under the State Council have been authorized to involve in issuing the anti-sanction list and anti-sanction measures (Art. 4 and Art. 5). The “Ministry of Foreign Affairs” and “other relevant departments under the State Council” are authorized to issue orders of announcement (Art. 9). Reviewing from the current practice of China’s response to foreign sanctions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has always issued sanctions lists against foreign individuals and organizations, so it is likely that the China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs will still lead the movement of announcing and countering the foreign sanctions. However, other departments now also have the authority to sanction relevant individuals and entities. This provides flexibility if the foreign sanctions relate to a particular issue that is administrated by the particular department and when it is more efficient or appropriate for the particular department to handle it directly.

Targeted measures: Circumstances under which China shall have the right to take corresponding anti-sanction measures are as follows: (1) a foreign country violates international law and basic norms of international relations; (2) contains or suppresses China on various pretexts or in accordance with its own laws; (3) adopts discriminatory restrictive measures against any Chinese citizen or organization; (4) meddles in China’s internal affair (Art. 3).The CAFSL does not expressly specify whether the circumstances should be satisfied simultaneously or separately. From the perspective of legislative intent, it is obvious that the full text of the CAFSL is intended to broaden legal authority for taking anti-sanctions measures in China, so it may not require the fulfilment of all four conditions.

It does not clarify the specific meanings of “violates international law and the basic norms of international relations”, “contains or suppresses”, and “meddles in China’s internal affairs”, which vary in different states and jurisdictions. But considering the sanctions issued by China and answers by the NPC spokesman, the key targeted circumstances are meddling China’s internal affairs. It is reasonable to assume that these circumstances mainly aimed at unilateral sanctions suppressing China under the pretexts of so-called sea-based, epidemic-based, democracy-based and human rights-based issues in Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Therefore, other issues may not be included.

Art. 3 aims against the sanctions imposed by foreign states, for example the US and the EU. But from the text of the law, the concept of “sanctions” is not used, instead the concept of “discriminatory restrictive measures” is adopted, which isvery vague and broad. Discriminatory restrictive measures can be interpreted as foreign unilateral sanctions directly targeting Chinese individuals and organizations, which are the so-called “primary sanctions”, different from the “secondary sanctions” restricting Chinese parties from engaging in normal economic, trade and related activities with directly sanctions third state’s parties. In a press conference, the NPC spokesman stated that “the main purpose of the CAFSL is to fight back, counter and oppose the unilateral sanctions against China imposed by foreign states.” It should only apply to tackle the primary sanctions against China.

Targeted entities: The targeted entities of anti-sanction list and anti-sanction measures are vague and broad. The targeted entities of anti-sanctions list include individuals and organizations that are directly involved in the development, decision-making, and implementation of the discriminatory restrictive measures (Art. 4). What means involvement in the development or decision-making or implementation is ambiguous. And the indirect involvement is even vaguer, which may broaden the scope of the list. Besides, following entities may also be targeted: (1) spouses and immediate family members of targeted individuals; (2) senior executives or actual controllers of targeted organizations; (3) organizations where targeted individuals serve as senior executives; (4) organizations that are actually controlled by targeted entities or whose formation and operation are participated in by targeted entities (Art. 5).

Anti-sanction measures: The relevant departments may take four categories of anti-sanction measures: (1) travel ban, meaning that entry into China will not be allowed and deportation will be applied;(2) freezing order, namely, all types of property in China shall be seized, frozen or detained; (3) prohibited transaction, which means entities within the territory of China will not be allowed to carry out transactions or other business activities with the sanctioned entities; (4) the other necessary measures, which may include measures like “arms embargoes” or “targeted sanctions” (Art. 6). Former three anti-sanction measures have been taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in practice. For example, on 26 March 2021, China decided to sanction relevant UK individuals and entities by prohibiting them from entering the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of China, freezing their property in China, and prohibiting Chinese citizens and institutions from doing business with them.

Relevant procedure: The decisions made by the competent authorities shall be final and not subject to judicial review(Art. 7).The counterparty shall not file an administrative lawsuit against anti-sanction measures and other administrative decisions. The counterparty can change the circumstance causing anti-sanction measures, and request the relevant department for the modification and cancellation of anti-sanction measures. If any change in the circumstances based on which anti-sanction measures are taken happens, the competent authorities may suspend, change or cancel the relevant anti-sanction measures (Art. 8). The transparency requirement stipulates the relevant orders shall be announced (Art. 9).

A coordination mechanism for the anti-foreign sanctions work shall be established by the state to coordinate the relevant work. Coordination and cooperation, and information sharing among various departments shall be strengthened. Determination and implementation of the relevant anti-sanction measures shall be based on their respective functions and division of tasks and responsibilities (Art. 10).

Legal consequences of violation: There are two types of legal consequences for violating the obligation of “implementation of the anti-sanction measures”. Entities in the territory of China will be restricted or prohibited from carrying out relevant activities (Art. 11). Any entities, including foreign states’ parties, will be held legally liable (Art. 14).
Besides, a party suffering from the discriminatory restrictive measures may be entitled to bring a civil action against the entities that comply with the foreign discriminatory measures against China (Art. 12). The defendant, in theory, includes any entities in the world, even entities that are the nationals or residents of the country imposing sanctions against China. It is curious how this can be enforced in reality. In particular, if a foreign entity has no connections with China, it is hard for a Chinese court to claim jurisdiction, and even taking jurisdiction, enforcing judgments abroad can also be difficult, if not impossible. Because enforcement jurisdiction must be territorial, without assets and reputation in China, a foreign state’s party may disregard the Chinese anti-sanction measure.

3. Impact of the CAFSL

The CAFSL is a higher-level legislation in Chinese legal system than the relevant departmental rules, such as the Chinese Blocking Rules and “unreliable entity list” . It is a much more powerful legal tool than former departmental rules as it directly retaliates against the primary sanction on China. It provides a legal basis and fills a legal gap. However, it may not be good news for international businesses that operate in both the US and China. Those companies may have to choose between complying with foreign sanctions or Chinese laws, which may probably force some enterprises to make strategic decision to accept risk of penalty from one country, or even to give up the Chinese or US market. The CAFSL is vaguely drafted and likely to create unpredictable results to the commercial transaction and other interests. The application and enforcement of the CAFSL and Chinese subsequent rules and regulations may give detailed interpretation to clarify relevant issues to help parties comply with the CAFSL. However, to China, the CAFSL serves apolitical purpose, which is more important than the normal functioning of a law. It is a political declaration of China’s determination to fight back. Therefore, the most important matter for Chinese law-makers is not to concern too much of the detailed rules and enforcement to provide predictability to international business, but to send the warning message to foreign countries. International businesses, at the same time, may find themselves in a no-win position and may frequently face the direct conflict of overriding mandatory regulations in China and the US. By placing international businesses in the dilemma may help to send the message and pressure back to the US that may urge the US policy-makers to reconsider their China policy. After all, the CAFSL is a counter-measure, which serves defensive purposes, and would not be triggered in the absence of sanctions against Chinese citizens and entities.

The Hague Academy of International Law is holding its Summer Courses on Private International Law for the first (and perhaps last) time online from 26 July to 13 August 2021. Registration is open until Sunday 27 June 2021 at 23:59 The Hague time. More information is available here.

As you may remember, we announced in a previous post that the 2020 Summer Courses were postponed and that the only prior time that the courses were cancelled was World War II.

This year’s general course will be delivered by NYU Professor Linda Silberman and is entitled The Counter-Revolution in Private International Law in the United States: From Standards to Rules. The special courses will be given by José Antonio Moreno Rodríguez, Mary Keyes, Pietro Franzina (former editor of Conflictoflaws.net), Sylvain Bollée, Salim Moollan, Jean-Baptiste Racine and Robert Wai. The inaugural lecture will be delivered by Alexis Mourre, President of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC. The poster is available here.

The holding of the Summer Courses in times of the Covid-19 pandemic attests to the perseverance of the Hague Academy, which has organised two live broadcasts per day to cater to people living in different time zones.

Please note that “no certificate of attendance will be delivered upon completion of the courses. Instead, each attendee will receive an electronic certificate of enrolment at the end of the session.”

If you are interested in a more full-fledged experience, you may consider registering for the Winter Course, which appears to be an in-person course. Registration for the Winter Courses 2022 is open since 1 June 2021 and will end 31 July (scholarships) and 29 September 2021 (full fee). For more information, click here.

 

The first issue of 2021 of the Netherlands Journal of Private International Law (Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht – NIPR) has been published. More information about the review is available here.

The following articles are included in the issue:

R. Vriesendorp, W. van Kesteren, E. Vilarin-Seivane and Sebastian Hinse on Automatic recognition of the Dutch undisclosed WHOA procedure in the European Union

On 1 January 2021, the Act on Court Confirmation of Extrajudicial Restructuring Plans (‘WHOA’) was introduced into the Dutch legal framework. It allows for extrajudicial debt restructuring outside of insolvency proceedings, a novelty in the Netherlands. If certain requirements – mostly relating to due process and voting – are met, court confirmation of the restructuring plan can be requested. A court-confirmed restructuring plan is binding on all creditors and shareholders whose claims are part of that plan, regardless of their approval of the plan. WHOA is available in two distinct versions: one public and the other undisclosed. This article assesses on what basis a Dutch court may assume jurisdiction and if there is a basis for automatic recognition within the EU of a court order handed down in either a public or an undisclosed WHOA procedure.

T. Arons, Vaststelling van de internationale bevoegdheid en het toepasselijk recht in collectieve geschilbeslechting. In het bijzonder de ipr-aspecten van de Richtlijn representatieve vorderingen (in English, Determination of international jurisdiction and applicable law in collective dispute resolution. In particular, the PIL aspects of the Representative Actions Directive)

The application of international jurisdiction and applicable law rules in collective proceedings are topics of debate in legal literature and in case law. Collective proceedings distinguish in form between multiple individual claims brought in a single procedure and a collective claim instigated by a representative entity for the benefit of individual claimants. The ‘normal’ rules of private international law regarding jurisdiction (Brussel Ibis Regulation) and the applicable law (Rome I and Rome II Regulations) apply in collective proceedings. The recently adopted injunctions directive (2020/1828) does not affect this application. Nonetheless, the particularities of collective proceedings require an application that differs from its application in individual two-party adversarial proceedings. This article focuses on collective redress proceedings in which an entity seeks to enforce the rights to compensation of a group of individual claimants. Collective proceedings have different models. In the assignment model the individual rights of the damaged parties are transferred to a single entity. Courts have to establish its jurisdiction and the applicable law in regard of each assigned right individually. In the case of a collective claim brought by an entity (under Dutch law, claims based on Art. 3:305a BW) the courts cannot judge on the legal relationships of the individual parties whose rights are affected towards the defendant. The legal questions common to the group are central. This requires jurisdiction and the applicable law to be judged at an abstract level.

C. Bright, M.C. Marullo and F. J. Zamora Cabot, Private international law aspects of the Second Revised Draft of the legally binding instrument on business and human rights

Claimants filing civil claims on the basis of alleged business-related human rights harms are often unable to access justice and remedy in a prompt, adequate and effective way, in accordance with the rule of law. In their current form, private international law rules on jurisdiction and applicable law often constitute significant barriers which prevent access to effective remedy in concrete cases. Against this backdrop, the Second Revised Draft of the legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises has adopted a number of provisions on private international law issues which seek to take into account the specificities of such claims and the need to redress the frequent imbalances of power between the parties. This article analyses the provisions on jurisdiction and applicable law and evaluate their potential to ensure effective access to remedy for the claimants.

B. Van Houtert, Jurisdiction in cross-border copyright infringement cases. Rethinking the approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union (dissertation, Maastricht University, 2020): A summary

The starting point of this research are the three rulings in the Pinckney, Hi Hotel, and Pez Hejduk in which the CJEU particularly focused on the interpretation of ‘the place where the damage occurred or may occur’ – the Erfolgsort – for determining jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) Brussels Ibis. The Court developed three criteria for jurisdiction in cross-border copyright infringements cases: (1) the state of the court seised should protect the copyright relied on, the so-called locus protectionis criterion, (2) the ‘likelihood of damage’ criterion which means that it should be likely that the damage may occur in the state where the court is located, and (3) court’s jurisdiction will be territorially limited to assess the damage caused within the forum state. The dissertation proceeds to demonstrate the need to rethink the CJEU’s approach to jurisdiction in cross-border copyright infringement cases. Based on common methods of interpretation, the author examines the leeway that the CJEU has regarding the interpretation of Article 7(2) Brussels Ibis in cross-border copyright infringement cases. She also examines alternative approaches to jurisdiction in cross-border copyright infringement cases adopted by scholars and courts of EU Member States and states of the United States of America distilling three main approaches: the ‘copyright holder’s centre of interests’ approach; the ‘substantial damage’ approach; and the ‘directed activities’ approach. The last part of the dissertation suggests that a combined approach to jurisdiction can be adopted in the recast of the Brussels Ibis Regulation or a future EU Copyright Regulation. Van Houtert considers that the proposals can also be adopted at the international level as they satisfy common principles of private international law and copyright law. Additionally, several global issues are considered in the analysis carried out such as copyright havens, online piracy, the cross-border flow of information, international trade, and the trend of competing jurisdictional claims.

N. Touw, The Netherlands: a forum conveniens for collective redress? (Conference Report)

On the 5th of February 2021, the seminar ‘The Netherlands: a Forum Conveniens for Collective Redress?’ took place. The starting point of the seminar is a trend in which mass claims are finding their way into the Dutch judicial system. To what extent is the (changing) Dutch legal framework, i.e. the applicable European instruments on private international law and the adoption of the new Dutch law on collective redress, sufficiently equipped to handle these cases? And also, to what extent will the Dutch position change in light of international and European developments, i.e. the adoption of the European directive on collective redress for consumer matters, and Brexit? In the discussions that took place during the seminar, a consensus became apparent that the Netherlands will most likely remain a ‘soft power’ in collective redress, but that the developments do raise some thorny issues. Conclusive answers as to how the current situation will evolve are hard to provide, but a common ground to which the discussions seemed to return does shed light on the relevant considerations. When legal and policy decisions need to be made, only in the case of a fair balance, and a structural assessment thereof, between the prevention of abuse and sufficient access to justice, can the Netherlands indeed be a forum conveniens for collective redress.

The Court of Justice delivered last Thursday (17 June) its judgment in case C-800/19 (Mittelbayerischer Verlag KG v SM), which is about Brussels I bis. The judgment is currently available in all EU official languages (save Irish), albeit not in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

« L’article 7, point 2, du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 […] doit être interprété en ce sens que la juridiction du lieu où se trouve le centre des intérêts d’une personne prétendant que ses droits de la personnalité ont été violés par un contenu mis en ligne sur un site Internet n’est compétente pour connaître, au titre de l’intégralité du dommage allégué, d’une action en responsabilité introduite par cette personne que si ce contenu comporte des éléments objectifs et vérifiables permettant d’identifier, directement ou indirectement, ladite personne en tant qu’individu ».

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=243103&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1427608

At issue in  Khalifeh v Blom Bank S.A.L. [2021] EWHC 1502 (QB) is inter alia whether an anti-suit injunction is available to  a claimant who purports to have the protection of Section 4 of the Brussels Ia Regulation. That is the section which protects consumers by granting them a forum actoris and by limiting suits against them to, in principle (limited extensions are possible) their place of domicile. The contract is one in the banking sector, for the opening of 2 USD accounts. Defendant is a Lebanon-incorporated bank. The proceedings which are to be restrained, take place in Lebanon. Current order concerns anti-suit only. Other issues, including applicable law per Rome I (where of course the consumer title also plays a role) are not addressed.

The case is part of my essay questions in a conflicts exam at Leuven today. I would expect students to refer to the discussions in Gray v Hurley and to any reasons for EU courts to exercise, or not, judicial muscle-power in upholding the jurisdiction of courts in the EU as against that of courts outside it.

Claimants calls in support upon Samengo-Turner v J & H Marsh [2007] EWCA Civ 723 and Petter v EMC Europe Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 828. In those cases, concerning employees, anti-suit was employed viz employers’ potential action outside the EU. Defendant doubts the authority of both (and in particular of Samengo-Turner, a first instance judgment). It refers to both scholarly criticism of the position, and to the Court of Appeal’s recent finding in Gray v Hurley, referred to the CJEU but unfortunately (for reasons of legal certainty) since dropped.

At [38] Freedman J holds he need not make a ‘binary’ decision at this stage, and refuses the application for anti-suit, leaving the discussion for full debate at trial. Part of his reason for doing so is defendant’s commitment not to take the case in Lebanon any further at this stage (no commitment has been made of it to be dropped). At that trial, the ATI debate may continue (this, one imagines, will depend on defendant’s actions in Lebanon), as of course will the applicability of Rome I’s protected categories of consumers.

A trial to look out for.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, para 2.24.

Khalifeh v Blom Bank [2021] EWHC 1502 (QB)
Echoes of Gray v Hurley
Whether anti-suit injunction may be issued, targeting Lebanese proceedings, to protect rights as a consumer under Brussels Ia
Analysis forthcoming on the bloghttps://t.co/9fX1ecn2SZ

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 14, 2021

On 14 June 2021, the Research Service of the European Parliament released a briefing paper related to the proposal for a regulation on a computerised system for communication in cross-border civil and criminal proceedings (e-CODEX system), authored by Rafał Mańko (EP Research Service).

The abstract reads:

The e-CODEX system is the digital backbone of EU judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters. e-CODEX comprises a package of software products that allow the setting up of a network of access points for secure digital communication between courts and between citizens and the courts, while also enabling the secure exchange of judicial documents.

The project, which was launched in 2010 with EU grant funding, is managed by a consortium of Member States and other organisations and is coordinated by the Ministry of Justice of the German Land of North Rhine-Westphalia. Even though it is currently used by 21 Member States, e-CODEX lacks a clear, uniform and EU-wide legal basis. To remedy this situation, on 2 December 2020 the Commission put forward a proposal for an e-CODEX legal instrument (a regulation) to formally establish the e-CODEX system at EU level. The management of the project would be entrusted to eu-LISA (the EU Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice).

Within the European Parliament, the LIBE and JURI committees are jointly in charge of the file, and the draft report is expected shortly.

The Briefing can be freely downloaded here.

Thanks to Jorg Sladic for the tip-off.

I reviewed the AG’s Opinion in C-800/19 Mittelbayerischer Verlag KG v SM here. The CJEU held yesterday (no English version yet at the time of posting). Tobias Lutzi already has analysis up here.

As I reported at the time, the AG suggested that despite the need for restrictive interpretation of the special jurisdictional rules, in the case at issue there was foreseeability of many a Pole’s centre of interests as a tort gateway, given the predictable fall-out of protest among Poles given the contents and context of the article (please refer to earlier post for detail): an ‘objective foreseeability test’.

The CJEU however restricts the availability of the centre of interests gateway further:  [46]

article 7, point 2, du règlement no 1215/2012 doit être interprété en ce sens que la juridiction du lieu où se trouve le centre des intérêts d’une personne prétendant que ses droits de la personnalité ont été violés par un contenu mis en ligne sur un site Internet n’est compétente pour connaître, au titre de l’intégralité du dommage allégué, d’une action en responsabilité introduite par cette personne que si ce contenu comporte des éléments objectifs et vérifiables permettant d’identifier, directement ou indirectement, ladite personne en tant qu’individu.

The aggrieved needs to be identifiable, at the time of publication, as an individual, not as belonging to an abstract group of offended persons.

With Gtflix TV pending, the CJEU will have a further opportunity to clarify the A7(2) gateway for defamation.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, Heading 2.2.12.2.5, and para 2.598 in fine.

 

 

Judgment just out in Mittelbayerischer Verlag: jurisdiction in online defamation cases
For my review of AG Opinion see https://t.co/2d2Fjp70KT
Court takes a strict line of foreseeability, insists on nominatim or in abstracto identification of the victimhttps://t.co/EqSmpCeVol

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) June 17, 2021

AG Bobek delivered today his opinion in case C‑55/20 (Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości joined parties: Pierwszy Zastępca Prokuratora Generalnego, Prokurator Krajowy, Rzecznik Dyscyplinarny Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie), which is about the Rule of Law in Poland.

Context: “  In July 2017, the Prokurator Krajowy – Pierwszy Zastępca Prokuratora Generalnego […] (‘the National Prosecutor’) requested the Rzecznik Dyscyplinarny Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie (Disciplinary Agent of the Bar Association in Warsaw, Poland) […] to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer of the former President of the European Council, Donald Tusk. In the view of the National Prosecutor, the statements made by that lawyer when publicly commenting on the possibility of his client being charged with a criminal offence amounted to unlawful threats and disciplinary misconduct. Twice, the Disciplinary Agent either refused to initiate such proceedings or decided to discontinue them. Twice, the Sąd Dyscyplinarny Izby Adwokackiej w Warszawie (Disciplinary Court of the Bar Association in Warsaw, Poland) […], following an appeal lodged by the National Prosecutor or the Minister of Justice, overturned those decisions and remitted the case back to the Disciplinary Agent.

2. The present request for a preliminary ruling has been made in a third ‘round’ of those proceedings, within which the Disciplinary Court is examining the decision of the Disciplinary Agent to discontinue once more the disciplinary inquiry against that lawyer, following an appeal lodged again by the National Prosecutor and the Minister of Justice. The referring court seeks to know whether Directive 2006/123/EC (‘the Services Directive’) (2) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) are applicable to disciplinary proceedings pending before it. However, it appears that the crux of the matter before the referring court lies elsewhere: what concrete consequences, in procedural terms, is the referring court to draw from the Court’s judgment in A. K. and Others, (3) in view of the fact that its ruling might be subsequently appealed before the Izba Dyscyplinarna Sądu Najwyższego (Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, Poland)? How can that court, in specific and practical terms, ensure compliance with EU law?”

The suggested decision (Extract): “On the basis of the primacy of EU law:

–  A national court is required to set aside the provisions of national law which reserve jurisdiction to rule on cases to a court which is not an independent and impartial tribunal, so that those cases may be examined by a court which meets the requirements of independence and impartiality and which, were it not for those provisions, would have jurisdiction.

– A national court must, if necessary, disregard the rulings of a higher court if it considers that they are incompatible with EU law, including situations in which incompatibility derives from the lack of independence and impartiality of that higher court”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=243109&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=14807561

The CJEU has just rendered its decision in Case C-800/19 Mittelbayerischer Verlag (currently only available in French). The Court held that the courts of the claimant’s ‘centre of interests’ have jurisdiction (on this basis) only if the content complained of contains ‘objective and verifiable elements allowing to identify, directly or indirectly, the claimant as an individual’ (para 46). Accordingly, a Polish Holocaust survivor could not sue a German publishing house over the use of the term ‘Polish extermination camp’ in an online article in Poland.

The factual and legal background of the case are described in some detail in our report on the AG Opinion – in a nutshell, the case is about whether a Polish survivor of the Holocaust can sue the publisher of a German newspaper in Poland for an alleged violation of his personality rights (including his national dignity) by an online article containing the phrase ‘Polish extermination camp’. As the claimant sought a range of remedies, at least some of which should only be available in a court with ‘full’ jurisdiction (as per the Court’s decision in Case C-194/16 Bolagsupplysningen, para 48), he needed to rely on the Court’s ‘centre of interests’ criterion to seize the Polish courts. Yet, both the referring court and AG Bobek had doubts if this criterion would not require some kind of limit to prevent the publisher of an online article to be sued in all member states in which a person potentially affected in their national dignity might have their centre of interests.

Upon a first reading of the decision, four aspects may be noted:

(1) The Court appears to have followed the AG’s proposition to adopt “a narrow and minimalist approach [to] this case” (Opinion, para 43). Thus, instead of a full reconsideration of the ‘centre of interests’ criterion, let alone of its interpretation of Art. 7(2) Brussels Ia with regard to personality rights as a whole (as Geert van Calster was hoping for), the Court has opted for its incremental readjustment.

(2) But the importance of the readjustment should not be underestimated. Despite giving access to the ‘full’ range of remedies, the Court has never had an opportunity to specify the exact requirements of ‘centre of interests’ jurisdiction as introduced in Joined Cases C-509/09 and C-161/10 eDate. Although clearly intended to protect the claimant (see eDate, para 47), para 50 of the decision certainly left room for additional requirements regarding the connection between the publication in question and the forum.

The CJEU now has indeed picked up this paragraph and argues that in a situation such as the present one, in which the claimant has – unlike in eDate and Bolagsupplysningen – not been directly targeted by the publication in question, it would hurt the aim of predictability if the claimant could sue for the entirety of the damage (and all injunctions) at their ‘centre of interests’, which the defendant could not reasonably predict (paras 35–38). In support, the Court also cites the need for a particularly close link between the case and the forum for special jurisdiction (para 40), as well as the aim to prevent a multiplication of grounds of jurisdiction (para 39 – a point not easily reconcilable with the Court’s continued adherence to the mosaic principle). On this basis, it formulates the rule cited above:

[46] article 7, point 2, du règlement no 1215/2012 doit être interprété en ce sens que la juridiction du lieu où se trouve le centre des intérêts d’une personne prétendant que ses droits de la personnalité ont été violés par un contenu mis en ligne sur un site Internet n’est compétente pour connaître, au titre de l’intégralité du dommage allégué, d’une action en responsabilité introduite par cette personne que si ce contenu comporte des éléments objectifs et vérifiables permettant d’identifier, directement ou indirectement, ladite personne en tant qu’individu.

(3) It is certainly a step forward that for once, the Court acknowledges the difficulties that its previous case law created for defendants of claims of alleged violations of personality rights through the internet (as to which see Lutzi, Private International Law Online, 2020, paras 4.75–83).

Yet, the Court does not go as far as proposed by AG Bobek, who, like AG Cruz-Villalón did before him, suggested the introduction of an objective foreseeability test, focusing on the relationship between the forum and the content in question (Opinion, paras 58–74; which would not necessarily have prevented the Polish courts from taking jurisdiction here). As a consequence, the new criterion introduced by the Court will raise many of the difficult questions of fact that AG Bobek warned against (Opinion, paras 45–57).

(4) The fact that the Court only considered ‘centre of interests’ jurisdiction may be seen as confirmation that at least some of the remedies sought by the claimant were ‘indivisible’ and therefore required ‘full’ jurisdiction. In this regard, the decision lends support to the reading of Bolagsupplysningen according to which most, if not all injunctions fall into this category (see Stadler, JZ 2018, 94, 95; Lutzi (2018) 34 LQR 208, 212).

With regard to the case at hand, the Court has been very clear that it does not pass the newly introduced threshold for ‘centre of interests’ jurisdiction (see also paras 36, 43, 45):

[44] Or, en l’occurrence, [le demandeur] n’est manifestement pas identifié en tant qu’individu, que ce soit directement ou indirectement, dans le contenu mis en ligne sur le site Internet de Mittelbayerischer Verlag […].

Accordingly, the Court did not need to engage with a number of follow-up questions raised obiter by AG Bobek (paras 75–87), including the potential role of the e-Commerce Directive.

Overall, it seems like the court has added another piece to the mosaic (pun intended) that is its case law on international jurisdiction for violations of personality rights through the internet. It appears not unlikely that the Court will continue to incrementally readjust individual pieces of this mosaic, rather than ever reconsidering it in its entirety – the next opportunity for which is just around the corner with Case C-251/20 Gtflix Tv.

Professor Jürgen Basedow does not need any introduction.

A volume published by Intersentia, titled EU Private Law. Anatomy of a Growing Legal Order, summarises, updates and completes studies he has published since the late 1980s. It exists as e-book (although this is not a book to read on the screen, but to hold in the hands).

EU law covers numerous sectors of private law and is still expanding. Due to its fragmentary nature, most legal literature addresses specific areas such as EU labour law, EU company law, EU private international law, EU consumer law, etc. In contrast, this book presents an innovative approach in its analysis of EU private law, considering its continuous expansion as an ongoing process and interrogating some central questions: What is private law in the framework of the EU? How does EU private law relate to traditional concepts of private law? What is the impact on horizontal relations of the law of the Union which was established with a view to the integration of peoples in Europe? Is the frequent reference to the policy orientation of EU law sufficient to overcome the differences between public and private law?

Like the growth rings of a tree the numerous acts and judgments of EU private law feed from the trunk and the roots, which developed in the vertical relations between the Union and the Member States. The foundations of EU law, which often have a background in legal history, comparative experience and public international law, impact upon horizontal relations in a manner previously unknown in national systems of private law.

Across ten parts grouped in four books devoted to foundations, principles, enforcement and implementation, respectively, as well as the external dimension, the author elaborates on the peculiarities of EU private law as compared to the traditional analysis of private law in any given national legal system. The author traces throughout the book the origins of legal principles and rules in comparative law, legal history and public international law and their application and development in EU private law instruments and the judgments of the CJEU. This comparison helps to strengthen our understanding of those peculiarities and paves the way for a comprehensive critical assessment of the state of EU private law today.

The table of contents is accessible at the website of Intersentia.

A book like this one is good news for academia.

The new issue of Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale (Volume 57, Issue 1/2021) is out.

It features three articles, two in Italian, the other in English, whose abstracts are provided below.

Fausto Pocar, Riflessioni sulla recente convenzione dell’Aja sul riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle sentenze straniere (Reflections on the Recent HCCH Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments)

The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters, concluded on 2 July 2019 in the framework of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, signifies a further, albeit partial, step in the context of the more ambitious project, initiated over twenty-five years ago, aimed at achieving a so-called “double” convention on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters. Through the careful consideration of the salient features of the Convention – some of which appear to be innovative in character, whereas others evoke more solutions – as well as of the interactions that the Convention’s adoption (and possible entry into force) entails in the existing multilateral treaty landscape, including the 2005 HCCH Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, the Author offers a dynamic and contextualized reading of the new instrument, emphasizing its lights and shadows, and illustrating the underlying interests surrounding the Convention’s possible ratification by the European Union.

Federica Favuzza, Riflessioni in margine all’entrata in vigore del c.d. SOFA dell’Unione Europea (Reflections on the Entry into Force of the EU SOFA)

On 1 April 2019, the 2003 Status of Forces Agreement between the EU Member States finally entered into force. This international agreement applies within the territory of the EU and aims to define the legal status of individuals and entities involved in the preparation and execution of the tasks referred to in Art. 42 TEU, i.e. in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). After examining its scope of application, the Author provides an overview of some of the main legal issues that the Agreement raises in respect of the exercise of criminal and civil jurisdiction. The analysis highlights the drafters’ deference to the approach and wording of the NATO SOFA. This choice is understandable, especially considering that individuals and entities involved in the CSDP are often also deployed in NATO context. However, in the Author’s view, it risks reproducing in the context of the EU some known difficulties and critical issues arisen in nearly 70 years of practice in the interpretation and application of the NATO SOFA.

Caterina Benini, Remarks on the Commission’s Proposal on the Law Applicable to the Third-Party Effects of Assignment of Claims [in English]

The paper provides an overview of the European Commission’s proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of the assignment of claims. The Proposal, based on a sensitive balance between the interests of the factoring and the securitisation industries, fosters the foreseeability of the applicable law and the harmony of solutions. The combination of the law of the assignor as general rule with the law of the assigned claim as exception is consistent with the solution adopted at the international level and fits the property interests underlying the assignment of claims. Normative consistency with the Insolvency Regulation is depicted as one of the main goals of the Proposal. However, due to the mismatches between the connecting factors adopted in the two instruments, such goal risks to remain only on paper. To avoid this, the present article suggests localising the assignor’s habitual residence at the company’s registered office under the COMI notion adopted under the Insolvency Regulation.

The issue also contains a review, by Francesca Clara Villata, of Felix M. Wilke’s A Conceptual Analysis of European Private International Law. The General Issues in the EU and its Member States.

The table of contents of the issue is available here.

In Greenaway v Parrish & Ors [2021] EWHC 1506 (QB) ( I signaled it a while ago but the case has only recently appeared on BAILII), Spencer J had to consider the practical implications of the impossibility of referrals to the Court of Justice of the EU, by UK judges. Plenty of pending cases were introduced before Brexit day. Moreover, an even larger number of cases will be subject to retained EU law.

In a specific conflict of laws sense, this raises the particular (procedural and substantive) issue of foreign law being fact and hence needing to be proven. Retained and /or previously applicable EU law, will not be foreign law as such, yet clearly it is law of a different nature than UK statutory and common law across the isles.

The practical implications of all this have now surfaced in Greenaway. Following CJEU CILFIT, EU law is (usually) equally authentic in 22 languages. In the case at hand, this centres upon the meaning of the word ‘stolen’, in the motor insurance Directive 2009/103. How should a judge inform her /himself of the meaning of the word in the 22 languages, and potentially also of the implementation of the Directive across the Member States. 12 King’s Bench Walk have analysis of the case here. As they note, Mr Justice Spencer granted permission to each party to adduce four foreign law experts reports in EU jurisdictions of their choosing, so that the relevant foreign language versions of the Directive could be understood. He also gave permission for those experts to give evidence as to the implementation of the Directive in those member states, that material being part of the context in which the point at issue had to be decided.

This is an important procedural point which no doubt will surface in a variety of shapes in years to come.

Geert.

Languages and retained EU law
Of much note indeed
Greenaway & Rocks v Covea Insurance ea
How should the E&W courts deal with the CILFIT principle of 22 authentic language versions (see https://t.co/TE7wheSbTP) viz 'stolen' in Dir 2009/103
paging @Prof_KMcA @stefaanvdjeught https://t.co/0XhfqUdIbL

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 18, 2021

The Minerva Centre for Human Rights at Tel Aviv University is organising an international socio-legal workshop that will explore the impact of the Covid-19 crisis and its regulation on cross-border families. Topics include issues of belonging, travel restrictions, civil rights, birth across borders, international child abduction and transnational homes in pandemic times.

The workshop will take place on 22 June 2021. The  full program and registration form are available.

For additional information, contact eynatmey@tauex.tau.ac.il

The author of this post is Estelle Gallant, professor of private law at the University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.

In a judgment of 27 January 2021 the French Supreme Court for civil and criminal matters (Cour de cassation) applied the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults (the ‘Adults Convention’) in a case concerned with a mandate in case of incapacity. More specifically, the issue was the content of the distinction between the conditions of validity of the mandate and its manner of exercise.

The Adults Convention

Currently applicable in 13 States (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Monaco, Portugal, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), the 2000 Hague Convention takes into consideration a particular mechanism enabling an adult to organise in advance his or her personal or property protection for the time when he or she is no longer able to provide it. This legal form of mandate in case of incapacity, which was well known in North America and not very widespread in Europe at the time the Convention was drafted, is now more common in Europe. It exists in French law in the form of the “future protection mandate” and in Swiss law in the form of the “mandate for incapacity”. The mandate in case of incapacity is governed in the Adults Convention by Articles 15 and 16.

Article 15 refers to “powers of representation granted by an adult, either under an agreement or by a unilateral act, to be exercised when such adult is not in a position to protect his or her interests”. The adult thus entrusts a person or an institution of his or her choice with powers of representation for the future in the event that he or she is unable to protect his or her interests. Such mandate may take the form of an agreement, but also of a unilateral legal act. It may concern the management of property and affairs, but also the protection of the person, his or her care or the decisions to be taken at the end of life, in order to put an end to over-treatment for example. Generally speaking, the legislation establishing this mandate in case of incapacity makes the starting point of the mandate’s effects depend on a judicial and/or medical finding of incapacity.

Article 15(1) of the Convention designates the law of the adult’s habitual residence at the time the instrument is drawn up as applicable to mandates in case of incapacity. Article 15(2) also offers the adult the possibility of choosing the applicable law among three: a) his or her national law, b) the law of a former habitual residence, c) the law of the place where his or her property is located. Irrespective of how it is designated, the applicable law applies to “the existence, extent, modification and extinction of powers of representation” granted by the adult. However, the manner of exercise the powers conferred by the mandate is governed by the law of the State where it is exercised, according to Article 15(3). It follows that whenever the mandate is to be implemented in a State other than the one whose law is applicable, the manner of exercise the mandate will be governed by a different law than the one governing the mandate.

The Ruling – Distinguishing between Validity and Exercise of Mandates

This was the issue raised by the case before the Cour de cassation. A mandate in case of incapacity had been established in Switzerland, where the adult had his habitual residence, before moving to France. As he wished to implement the mandate in France, one of his sons obtained that the mandate be verified formally and “stamped” by an officer of the court (visé par le greffier du Tribunal) in accordance with French procedure. However, another son of the grantor brought proceedings to challenge the implementation of the mandate. He won before the court of appeal of Pau, which annulled the clerk’s stamping on the grounds that it should not have been granted because the mandate did not include any means of controlling the representative of the adult.

The son who had obtained the stamping appealed to the Cour de cassation, which allowed the appeal. The Court held that by requiring that the clerk’s stamping be granted only if the mandate expressly provided any arrangements with respect to the control of the representative, the court of appeal had actually imposed conditions which were not concerned with the implementation of the mandate, but with its validity.

According to the Cour de Cassation, the implementation in France of a Swiss mandate in case of incapacity could not be subject to a condition of validity of French law that was not imposed by Swiss law. The provisions of the Adults Convention are thus perfectly respected: they imply making a distinction between conditions of validity and manner of exercise of mandates in case of incapacity.

The Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) delivered today its decision in case C‑645/19 (Facebook Ireland Ltd, Facebook Inc., Facebook Belgium BVBA, v Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit), which is about the cross-border processing of personal data:

“1. Article 55(1), Articles 56 to 58 and Articles 60 to 66 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 […] on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data […] read together with Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that a supervisory authority of a Member State which […] has the power to bring any alleged infringement of that regulation to the attention of a court of that Member State and, where necessary, to initiate or engage in legal proceedings, may exercise that power in relation to an instance of cross‑border data processing even though it is not the ‘lead supervisory authority’, within the meaning of Article 56(1) of that regulation, with respect to that data processing, provided that that power is exercised in one of the situations where Regulation 2016/679 confers on that supervisory authority a competence to adopt a decision finding that such processing is in breach of the rules contained in that regulation and that the cooperation and consistency procedures laid down by that regulation are respected.

2. Article 58(5) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of cross-border data processing, it is not a prerequisite for the exercise of the power of a supervisory authority of a Member State, other than the lead supervisory authority, to initiate or engage in legal proceedings, within the meaning of that provision, that the controller with respect to the cross-border processing of personal data against whom such proceedings are brought has a main establishment or another establishment on the territory of that Member State.

3. Article 58(5) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that the power of a supervisory authority of a Member State, other than the lead supervisory authority, to bring any alleged infringement of that regulation to the attention of a court of that Member State and, where appropriate, to initiate or engage in legal proceedings, within the meaning of that provision, may be exercised both with respect to the main establishment of the controller which is located in that authority’s own Member State and with respect to another establishment of that controller, provided that the object of the legal proceedings is a processing of data carried out in the context of the activities of that establishment and that that authority is competent to exercise that power, in accordance with the terms of the answer to the first question referred.

4. Article 58(5) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a supervisory authority of a Member State which is not the ‘lead supervisory authority’ […] has brought a legal action, the object of which is an instance of cross-border processing of personal data, before 25 May 2018, that is, before the date when that regulation became applicable, that action may, from the perspective of EU law, be continued on the basis of the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC […] on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, which remains applicable in relation to infringements of the rules laid down in that directive committed up to the date when that directive was repealed. That action may, in addition, be brought by that authority with respect to infringements committed after that date, on the basis of Article 58(5) of Regulation 2016/679, provided that that action is brought in one of the situations where, exceptionally, that regulation confers on a supervisory authority of a Member State which is not the ‘lead supervisory authority’ a competence to adopt a decision finding that the processing of data in question is in breach of the rules contained in that regulation with respect to the protection of the rights of natural persons as regards the processing of personal data, and that the cooperation and consistency procedures laid down by that regulation are respected, which it is for the referring court to determine.

5. Article 58(5) of Regulation 2016/679 must be interpreted as meaning that that provision has direct effect, with the result that a national supervisory authority may rely on that provision in order to bring or continue a legal action against private parties, even where that provision has not been specifically implemented in the legislation of the Member State concerned”.

Source: https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=242821&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=14254177

Aldricus – Makanan ialah zat yang dikonsumsi oleh makhluk hidup untuk memperoleh gizi yang selanjutnya dibuat jadi energi. Karbohidrat, lemak, protein, vitamin, dan mineral sebagai nutrien pada makanan yang diperlukan oleh badan. Cairan yang digunakan untuk tujuan ini kerap disebutkan minuman, tapi kata ‘makanan’ bisa juga digunakan. Makanan yang dimakan oleh manusia disebutkan pangan, sedang makanan yang dimakan oleh hewan disebutkan pakan.

Kualitas satu makanan bisa dipandang dari energi makanan dan usia taruh yang dipunyainya. Mengonsumsi makanan secara tidak pas atau kurang cukup akan mengakibatkan malnutrisi, yang bisa berbuntut pada beragam masalah kesehatan.

Disamping itu, beberapa macam makanan dapat memacu munculnya alergi makanan saat dimakan oleh pribadi yang peka. Bahan makanan dibuat jadi beragam sajian yang berbeda dan jadi keunikan satu kebudayaan atau warga di lokasi geografis tertentu. Makanan sebagai subyek yang didalami dalam beragam pengetahuan, seperti pengetahuan pangan, pengetahuan nutrisi atau gizi, dan gastronomi.

2017 itu trendingnya makanan sehat . Maka, untuk kamu yang ingin ngikutin trend saat ini, mulai seringkali dech searching resep makanan sehat. Satu diantaranya alpukat yang menjadi bahan makan harus buat trend makanan sehat tahun 2017 ini. Yuk lihat resepnya!

1. Avocado Toast

Jika kamu umumnya makan pagi dengan toast dan selai, coba saat ini tukar menu sarapanmu dengan toast dan alpukat. Sama gampangnya dan rasanya juga lebih nikmat dan sehat. Triknya mudah, mengambil daging buah alpukat dan remukin kasar dengan memakai sendok, jadi dech seperti selai kasar. Jika kamu ingin menambah rasa, kamu dapat taburin chili powder di atasnya.

2. Avocado Steak

Alpukat pas sekali lho buat jadi rekan makan steak. Jika umumnya kamu cicipin dengan sauce barbecue, saat ini kamu punyai rekomendasi lain yakni sauce alpukat. Triknya sama gampangnya seperti buat selai alpukat untuk toast-mu barusan.

3. Avocado Salsa

Sukai makan nachos gunakan sambal salsa? Nach, saat ini kamu dapat tambahin akar alpukat dalam sauce salsa itu. Dengan kombinasi tomat, bawan bombay dan alpukat, ditanggung kesan makan nachos gunakan sauce salsamu menjadi lebih terasa.

4. Avocado Tacos

Siapa ngomong goreng-gorengan tidak sehat? Jika bahan intinya alpukat, tentu masih sehat, donk? Nach, buat alternatif daging-dagingan, kamu dapat buat fried avocado buat jadi isian Tacos ini. Tambahin dengan sauce salsa atau irisan tomat dan paprika, Tacos a la kamu tentu lebih nikmat!

5. Baked Avocado

Alpukat bisa juga kamu jadiin makanan fancy lho dengan memadukannya dengan rebusan telur 1/2 masak di atasnya. Trus, untuk sentuhan akhir, kamu dapat kasih taburan keju parmesan atau chili powder dech. Hm, nikmat!

6. Pea dan Avocado Pizza

Saat ini, style makan pizza dapat semakin sehat kembali dengan menukar topping-nya. Jika umumnya kamu pakai sauce barbecue, saat ini kamu dapat tukar dengan sauce alpukat dengan potongan tipis dan potongan buah-buahan yang lain. Tidak kalah menarik dech visualnya seperti pizza komersial yang lain!

7. Avocado Soup

Sukai malas makan buah? Jus saja! Dengan percampuran beragam bahan buah-buahan dan makanan jadi sup, tentu kamu menjadi lebih nikmat melahapnya. Kasih topping buah-buahan lain yang lebih fresh seperti mangga.

8. Salmon Avocado Sauce

Salmon dan sauce alpukat sebagai salah satunya kombinasi yang tidak ada yang dapat menyaingi. Dengan memakai alpukat yang telah diblender secara lembut, tentu rasa Baked Salmonmu menjadi lebih nikmat dan sehat. Ingin mencoba?

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