Droit international général

The Polish periodical Problemy Współczesnego Prawa Międzynarodowego, Europejskiego i Porównawczego (Review of International, European and Comparative Law – PWPM) launched an international competition for original papers in the field of international law, European law or comparative law, written in English by scholars aged 35 or less.

The deadline for submissions is 15 November 2020.

The winning papers will be published on the journal  and the authors of the two best articles will receive cash prizes of 500 and 300 Euros, respectively. 

On a more general note, the journal is currently calling for paper from any scholars to be published in  volume XVIII (2020), which will be out in Spring 2021. Here, again, the deadline is 15 November 2020. 

PWPM is one of the leading legal periodicals in Poland. It is a peer-reviewed, open-access academic journal based at the Institute of European Studies of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. While focuses on international, European and comparative law, the journal also covers other areas of law, including private international law.

More details on the competition and the journal are available here.

An action brought between parties to a contract in a scenario where the consent to at least some of the contractual terms was allegedly expressed by the plaintiff only on account of the dominant position of the defendant is to be considered as falling within the concept of ‘matters relating to contract’ [Article 7(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation] or within the concept of ‘matters relating to delict or quasi-delict’ [Article 7(2) of the Regulation]?

In his Opinion delivered last Thursday, 10 September 2020, Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe addresses that question for the purposes of the reference for a preliminary ruling in the case C-59/19, Wikingerhof.

Legal and factual context

A company established under German law and operating a hotel in this Member State, Wikingerhof GmbH & Co KG, signs a contract with Booking.com BV, a company which its registered office in the Netherlands that operates a hotel reservation platform. On the basis of the contract, the hotel is to be listed on that platform. The general terms and conditions that are supposed to apply to the contract contain a clause according to which the place of jurisdiction for all disputes arising from that contract, with the exception of payment and invoice disputes, is Amsterdam.

Wikingerhof brings and action for cessation against Booking.com before German courts and argues that it expressed its consent to at least to some of the contractual terms only on account of the dominant position of the defendant. The plaintiff views some of the practices of the defendant in connection with hotel reservation intermediation as an infringement of competition law. It seeks an order restraining the defendant from carrying on with these practices.

The defendant objects, inter alia, to the jurisdiction of the courts seised in the matter. The first instance court agrees and rules the action inadmissible. It considers that the parties have concluded an agreement conferring jurisdiction and as a consequence the action should have been brought before the courts in Amsterdam.

The second instance court dealing with an appeal brought by the plaintiff also views the action as inadmissible, yet on the different grounds.

It considers that the German courts do not have jurisdiction under Articles 7(1) and (2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. For the second instance court, the action seeks to change the content of the contract and to alter the defendant’s practices. The action in question should therefore receive a contractual qualification, yet ‘the place of performance’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Regulation is not situated in Germany. For that court, the question of whether an effective agreement conferring jurisdiction was entered into is therefore irrelevant. It seems that this court considers that under no circumstances the German courts hold jurisdiction over the action brought by the plaintiff.

Ultimately, the case comes before the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof). The latter considers that the parties have not entered into an effective agreement conferring jurisdiction. The requirements relating to the form of such agreement, set in Article 25(1)(a) and (2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation have not been met. However, the Federal Court of Justice refers a preliminary question relating to the characterization of the action brought by the plaintiff:

‘Is Article 7(2) of [the Brussels I bis Regulation] to be interpreted as meaning that jurisdiction for matters relating to tort or delict exists in respect of an action seeking an injunction against specific practices if it is possible that the conduct complained of is covered by contractual provisions, but the applicant asserts that those provisions are based on an abuse of a dominant position on the part of the defendant?’

Opinion of Advocate General

According to the Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, a civil liability action based on a breach of competition law falls within the scope of ‘matters relating to delict or quasi-delict’ within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, also when the plaintiff and the defendant are parties to a contract and the alleged anticompetitive conduct materializes itself in their contractual relationship.

The analysis that precedes this conclusion begins with an observation that the action brought by the plaintiff in the main proceedings is ‘based’ on the violation of the rules of German law prohibiting, like Article 102 TFEU, abuse of dominant position (point 19).

Next, the Opinion acknowledges that while it results from the case-law that the actions on anticompetitive conducts – including those constituting an infringement under Article 102 TFEU – fall within the scope of Article 7(2) of the Regulation, the particularity of the proceedings at hand stem from the fact that the alleged anticompetitive conduct occurred within the context of a contractual relationship (point 26).

After that, a reminder of case-law on Article 7(1) and (2) of the Regulation leads the AG to the judgments in Kalfelis and Brogsitter. Concerning the latter, he considers that two interpretations of the judgment are a priori possible (point 68). First, which the AG describes as ‘maximalist’, would imply that an action based on delict falls under the concept of ‘matter relating to contract’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) if the action concerns a harmful event that could (also) constitute a breach of a contractual obligation. In other terms, a national court would have to verify whether an action could also have been brought on the basis of breach of a contractual obligation. For the AG, that interpretation would imply that the contractual characterisation of a claim prevails over its characterisation as a matter relating to delict (point 69).

The AG rejects such ‘maximalist’ interpretation. First, an analysis allowing to establish a potential breach of a contractual obligation would be too burdensome at the stage where the jurisdiction is determined and could require consideration of the substance of the case (point 76). Next, under the Regulation, no hierarchy exists between the rules on jurisdiction provided for in Articles 7(1) and (2) (point 79). In this context, the AG resorts to an argument based on the idea that the solution adopted in relation to the rules on jurisdiction would have to be followed in relation to the conflict-of-laws rules of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations: the contractual characterisation would have to prevail also under these Regulations (points 81 and 82).

As a consequence, the AG pronounces himself in favour of a second interpretation of the judgment in Brogsitter that he describes as a ‘minimalist’ one. Here, an action would fall within the scope of Article 7(1) of the Regulation where ‘the interpretation of the contract […] is indispensable to establish the lawful or, on the contrary, unlawful nature of the conduct complained of against the [defendant] by the [plaintiff]’ (point 70).

At points 90 et seq., the AG describes the method of characterisation that results from his ‘minimalist’ interpretation of the judgment in Brogsitter. He discusses the cases where a plaintiff invokes rules of substantive law in his submission of action and where he or she does not – according to the AG, in the latter scenario, his method does not change fundamentally. He argues that on the basis of other elements of the submission of action, a judge has to identify the ‘obligation’ relied on by the plaintiff (point 96).

At points 100 and 101, the AG furtherly explains and recaps the method: where the plaintiff invokes, in his submission of an action, rules of substantive law imposing a duty on everyone and it does not appear ‘indispensable’ to establish the content of a contract in order to assess the lawful or unlawful nature of the conduct alleged against the defendant, the action is based on a non-contractual obligation (the Opinion uses the term ‘obligation délictuelle’) and therefore falls within the scope of ‘matters relating to delict or quasi-delict’ within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. However, where, irrespective of the rules of law relied on, a judge can assess the legality of the conduct only by reference to a contract, the action is essentially based on a ‘contractual obligation’ and therefore falls within the scope of ‘matters relating to a contract’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the Regulation.

It is yet to be seen to what extent the importance of the rules of substantive law invoked by a plaintiff will play a role in the future judgment of the Court. In any case, on the basis of these findings, the AG concludes that the contractual characterisation of the action brought by the plaintiff before the German courts should be rejected.

The Opinion can be found here (no English version yet).

On a side note…

The lecture of the Opinion presented above raises a point that could on its own inspire an interesting discussion. It seems that, for the AG, what is true under the Brussels regime, should also stand as true under the Rome I and II Regulation. In fact, an argument relating to the consistency between the solutions adopted with regards to the Brussels I bis and Rome I/II Regulations is invoked in the Opinion in order to reject the interpretation which, for the AG, would imply the priority of contractual characterisation over non-contractual characterisation (see points 81 and 82).

Against this background, in his Opinion in Bosworth and Hurley (points 91 to 103), AG Saugmandsgaard Øe seemed to consider that the contractual characterisation of an action should be favoured over the non-contractual characterisation where an individual contract of employment is at stake. That consideration was made in relation to the rules of jurisdiction and more precisely – to Article 18 of Lugano II Convention. As it was not necessary to answer the preliminary question that inspired the aforementioned considerations of the AG, the Court did not have an opportunity to clarify in its Judgment whether such preference of contractual characterisation does indeed occur.

Yet, if that is the case and the argument on the consistency of solutions adopted under the Regulations is valid, should the Rome I and II Regulations be read as implying a priority (or even exclusivity) of a contractual characterisation also for the conflict-of-laws purposes in a situation where a harmful conduct concerns employee – employer scenario?

The Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb will hold a conference on Applicable Law in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings on 18 and 19 September 2020. Those interested in attending the conference may do so either in person or online.

Speakers include Paul Omar (INSOL Europe), Ignacio Tirado (Secretary-General UNIDROIT), Miha Žebre (European Commission), Andreas Piekenbrock (University of Heidelberg), Jasnica Garašić (University ofZagreb), Francisco Garcimartín (Autonomous University of Madrid), Edward Janger (Brooklyn Law School), John Pottow (University of Michigan), Bartosz Groele (Tomasik & Pakostewicz & Groele), Zoltan Fabok (DLA Piper Posztl, Nemescsói, Györfi-Tóth & Partners), Miodrag Đorđević (Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia), Leif M. Clark (former US Bankruptcy Judge), Simeon Gilchrist (Edwin Coe LLP), Renato Mangano (University of Palermo), Rodrigo Rodriguez (University of Lucerne) and Gerry McCormack (University of Leeds).

The International Commercial Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Paris (France) delivered a few days ago (8 September 2020) a decision (RG 19/06635) on jurisdiction clauses.

Summary / Resumé: “This case involved a company incorporated under Belgian law and a company incorporated under Emirati law. The latter signed a letter of guarantee for its Gabonese subsidiary in favor of the Belgian company, thereby securing the performance of a telecommunications services contract signed between the Gabonese subsidiary and the Belgian company. This contract stipulated a jurisdiction clause in favor of the Paris courts. Although the Emirati company (the guarantor) did not sign the contract containing the jurisdiction clause, the International Commercial Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Paris decided that the French court had jurisdiction, considering that the said clause was enforceable against it in respect of the warranty action brought by the Belgian company.

The ICCP-CA held that the agreements, although distinct, were intimately linked, as one conditioned the second and vice versa. As a result, it found that both agreements constituted “the Agreement”, so that their existence and performance were only justified by the overall scheme of the operations. It considered that these two acts could be qualified as an indivisible contractual whole, as the parties had intended to include the two contracts in a single transaction, thus rendering the jurisdiction clause stipulated in the Agreement enforceable against the guarantor, which had, furthermore, expressly agreed to the “terms and conditions” and had therefore been aware of it ».

The decision (in French) is attached to this post. 

Saugmandsgaard AG opined yesterday in C-59/19 Wikingerhof v Booking.com (no English version of the Opinion at the time of writing). At issue is whether allegations of abuse of dominant position create a forum contractus (Article 7(1) Brussels Ia) or a forum delicti (A7(2) BIa).

I published on jurisdiction and applicable law earlier this year and I am as always genuinely humbled with the AG’s (three) references to the handbook.  Wikingerhof submits inter alia that it only ever agreed to Booking.com’s general terms and conditions (‘GTCs’) because Booking.com’s dominant position leaves it no choice. And that it had most certainly not agreed to updates to the GTCs, effected via amendments on the ‘Extranet’, which is the portal via which the hotel may update its information and retrieve reservations.

At 16 of its referral, the Bundesgerichtshof holds acte clair and therefore without reference to the CJEU that there is no durable record of the alleged consent by Wikingerhof of the amended GTCs, including choice of court. Booking.com claimed these amounted to a ‘form which accords with practices which the parties have established between themselves’ pursuant to Article 25(1)(b). This finding echoes the requirements of housekeeping which I signalled yesterday.

In my 2020 paper I point out (p.153) inter alia that in the context of Article 25’s choice of court provisions, the CJEU in C-595/17 Apple v eBizcuss suggested a fairly wide window for actions based on Article 102 TFEU’s prohibition of abuse of dominant position to be covered by the choice of court. At 28 in Apple v eBizcuss: ‘the anti-competitive conduct covered by Article 102 TFEU, namely the abuse of a dominant position, can materialise in contractual  relations that an undertaking in a dominant position establishes and by means of contractual terms’. The AG as I note below distinguished Apple on the facts and applicable rule.

In the request for preliminary ruling of the referring court, CJEU C-548/12 Brogsitter features repeatedly. The Bundesgerichtshof itself is minded to hold for forum delicti, given that (at 24 of its reference)

‘ it is not the interpretation of the contract that is the focus of the legal disputes  between the parties, but rather the question of whether the demand for specific contractual conditions or the invoking of them by a company with an — allegedly — dominant market position is to be regarded as abusive and is therefore in breach of provisions of antitrust law.

In fact on the basis of the request, the court could have held acte clair. It referred anyway which gives the AG the opportunity to write a complete if  to begin with concise précis on the notion of ‘contract’ and ‘tort’ in BIa. At 38, this leads him to conclude inter alia that despite the need strictly to interpret exceptions to the A4 actor sequitur forum rei rule, these exceptions including the special jurisdictional fori contractus ut delicti, must simply be applied with their purpose in mind.

He calls it an application ‘assouplie’, best translated perhaps as ‘accommodating’ (readers may check this against the English version when it comes out) (viz tort, too, the AG uses the term assouplie, at 45, referring eg to CJEU C-133/11 Folien Fisher).

Further, the AG notes that in deciding whether the claim is one in contract, necessarily the claimant’s cause of action has an impact, per CJEU C-274/16 Flightright (at 61 of that judgment, itself refering to C‑249/16 Kareda which in turn refers to 14/76 De Bloos). The impact of claimant’s claim form evidently is a good illustration of the possibility to engineer or at least massage fora and I am pleased the AG openly discusses the ensuing forum shopping implications, at 58 ff. He starts however with signalling at 53 ff that the substantive occurrence of concurrent liability in contract and tort is subject to the laws of the Member States and clearly differs among them, making a short comparative inroad e.g. to English law, German law and Belgian /French law. (Michiel Poesen recently wrote on the topic within the specific context of the employment section).

The AG’s discussion of CJEU authority eventually brings him to Brogsitter. He he firmly supports a minimalist interpretation.  This would mean that only if the contractual context is indispensable for the judge to rule on the legality or not of the parties’ behaviour, is forum contractus engaged. This is similar to his Opinion in Bosworth, to which he refers. He rejects the maximalist interpretation. This approach puts forward that contractual qualification trumps non-contractual (arguably, a left-over of CJEU Kalfelis; but as the AG notes at 81: there is most certainly not such a priority at the applicable law level between Rome I and II) hence the judge regardless of the claimant’s formulation of claim, must qualify the claim as contractual when on the facts a link may exist between the alleged shortcomings of the other party, and the contract.

The maximum interpretation, at 76 ff, would require the judge to engage quite intensively with the merits of the case. That would go against the instructions of the CJEU (applying the Brussels Convention (e.g. C-269/95 Benincasa)), and it would (at 77) undermine a core requirement of the Brussels regime which is legal certainty. That the minimalist approach might lead to multiplication of trials seeing as not all issues would be dealt with by the core forum contractus, is rebuked at 85 by reference to the possibility of the A4 domicile forum (an argument which the CJEU itself used in Bier /Mines de Potasse to support the Mozaik implications of its ruling there) and by highlighting the Regulation’s many instances of support for forum shopping.

The AG then discusses abusive forum shopping following creative claim formulation at 88 ff. This  is disciplined both by the fact that as his comparative review shows, the substantive law of a number of Member States eventually will not allow for dual characterisation and hence reject the claim in substance. Moreover clearly unfounded claims will be disciplined by lex fori mechanisms (such as one imagines, cost orders and the like). This section confuses me a little for I had understood the minimalist approach to lay more emphasis on the judge’s detection of the claim’s DNA (along the lines of Sharpston AG in Ergo) than on the claim’s formulation.

The AG then continues with further specification of the minimalist approach, including at 112 a rejection, correct in my view (for the opposite would deny effet utile to A7(2), of the suggestion to give the A7(1) forum contractus the ancillary power to rule of over delictual (A7(2)) issues closely related to the contractual concerns.

Applying the minimalist test to the case at issue the AG concludes that it entails forum delicti, referring in support to CDC and distinguishing Apple v eBizcuss (which entails choice of court and relies heavily on textual wording of the clause).

It will be interesting to see which of the two possible interpretations of Brogsitter the CJEU will follow and whether it will clarify the forum shopping implications of claim formulation.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2, Heading 2.2.11.2.9.

An online roundtable addressing the coordination between the Brussels Ia Regulation and other instruments of EU law will take place next 24 September, 3 p.m., on Teams channel.

The event is part of the EU co-financed “EN2BRIa” Project and scheduled within the PEPP Programme (Programme in European Private Law for Postgraduates). EN2BRIa mainly aims to shed light on how the relationship between the Brussels Ia Regulation and other EU law instruments is to be handled. The upcoming roundtable will showcase and discuss the preliminary results of the investigation conducted by the Partners of the Project, namely the Universities of Genoa, Nice, Valencia, and Tirana. Chaired by Chiara E. Tuo (Univ. Genoa), the roundtable features as speakers Jean-Sylvestre Bergé (Univ. Nice), Guillermo Palao Moreno (Univ. Valencia), Giulio Cesare Giorgini (Univ. Nice), Rosario Espinosa Calabuig (Univ. Valencia), Rosa Lapiedra Alcami (Univ. Valencia), Isabel Reig Fabado (Univ. Valencia), and Stefano Dominelli (Univ. Genoa).

Participation is free; more info, specially about the access to the Teams channel, may be found here.

In the context of the 2020 Annual Conference of the European Law Institute, the feasibility study on EU Conflict of Laws for Companies: The Acquis and Beyond will be presented by Chris Thomale (proposer), Luca Enriques, Jessica Schmidt and Georg Kodek (Chair) today, 11 September 2020, from 15:15 until 16:15 CET.

International company mobility as well as regulatory competition of company laws depend on clearly cut out rules designating the applicable substantive company law. It would thus seem an integral part of a functioning internal market to provide such conflict of laws rules. Regrettably, however, a ‘Rome IV’ Regulation, ie an EU conflict of laws code for companies, despite manifold initiatives, has not been adopted yet. Instead, the stage has been left to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which in well-rehearsed case law from the Daily Mail (C-81/87) until the Polbud (C-106/16) decisions has developed a certain framework for corporate mobility, culminating, of late, in Directive 2019/2121 on cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions. One big shortcoming of the European status quo is that the piecemeal harmonisation acquired through these developments still leaves a fundamental question unanswered: which company law regime by default is applicable to a given company?

This feasibility study will aim at laying the foundations for a prospective project that fully restates EU law on the matter implicit in conflict of laws legislation on adjacent topics like contract, tort, successions, insolvency and capital markets. Further, it will aim at foundations that go beyond CJEU case law and include national adjudicative practice and academic research into the picture. Based upon this acquis communautaire, the project of a future Rome IV Regulation can be investigated, notably putting to use techniques of private international law in order to address Member State reticence towards such an instrument as expressed hitherto.

To register for the webinars free of charge, please contact the ELI Secretariat at secretariat@europeanlawinstitute.eu.

An interesting exchange with fellow practitioners on Twitter yesterday reminded me of this post which I have had in the draft folder since some time in June.  Back in February, the  Dutch SC confirmed the approach of the lower courts and the Court of Appeal on the correct approach to e-mail evidence and the existence of specific dispute resolution clauses. Here: an agreement to arbitration. The result is that a London-issued arbitral award cannot be enforced in The Netherlands.

When I flagged the case on Linked-in in June I observed there were two approaches to the judgment. Some emphasise the Courts’ refusal to recognise the validity of the agreement to arbitrate made by e-mail, in the face of what is common and very informal practice in the shipping industry /charterparty; others point more practically to parties having to be prepared to prove the authenticity of electronic correspondence.

Defendant did not enter an appearance but the lower Court in earlier ruling was alarmed by the print-out of e-mails allegedly containing the ‘agreement’ in the charterparty looking dodgy (there were for instance various white blots). It proprio motu pursued originality research. In subsequent rulings confirmed and completed by the Court of Appeal, the courts were not satisfied by the originality research, among others because the claimant’s ‘independent’ expert was an ICT employee with the law firm involved in the case.

Procureur Generaal Vlas with the Hoge Raad in his Opinion in December 2019, discussed the slight differences between the 1958 New York Convention and the Dutch law on the evidence required (with the Dutch rules in fact being more relaxed), and the nature and content of guidelines issued for the interpretation of the Convention. He advised to follow the lower court’s approach not because of some grand statement in principle but rather because he could not see fault in the courts’ factual observation of lack of independent and objective proof of authenticity. The Supreme Court followed in the most succinct of ways, without justifying rejection of the appeal. It is entitled to do so in cases where its findings have no impact on the unity in application of the law, indicating that the factual observations swayed the SC.

‘Before e-mail’ (my kids would respond to that ‘yes dad, when you got to work on horse and cart’) printers and warehouse assistants where a key link in the chain of general terms and conditions – GTCs. They needed to ensure the right content ended up on the right printed, blank order forms, and ended up with the right wholesalers, sales agents etc. – to be repeated every single time these GTCs were amended; and many a litigation has begun with sales agents continuing to use old forms ‘because it would be a shame to throw all that paper’. Fast forward to electronic correspondence, and website managers and general ICT staff have now assumed that role. In the context of any dispute resolution, they need to ensure everyone has the right e-mail footer, properly functioning link to the right version of the GTCs on the website, etc. They also need to have protocols in place to ensure authentication is thought of proactively. Lack of such proper electronic housekeeping leads to results no different than when sales agents continued to use the old paper forms.

Geert.

A new monograph written in German deals with cross-border insurance brokerage in the Single Market (Christian Rüsing, Grenzüberschreitende Versicherungsvermittlung im Binnenmarkt, 2020). The monograph is aimed at practitioners, national and European supervisory authorities as well as academics dealing with private international law, its relationship to international supervisory law and insurance law.

This book complements studies on the single market in insurance, which the EU has strived to establish for decades. EU institutions have primarily facilitated cross-border business of insurers by implementing rules on international supervisory law in the Solvency II Directive and on private international law for insurance contracts in Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation. The study focuses on intermediaries, such as insurance brokers and agents.

While intermediaries play a vital role in the cross-border distribution of insurance products, clear conflict-of-law rules for insurance intermediation are missing. The Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD), which intends to promote cross-border activities of intermediaries, focuses on the harmonisation of the substantive law on insurance intermediation, apart from provisions on international administrative cooperation. Furthermore, it has not fully harmonised national laws. Insurance intermediaries providing services in other countries are therefore still required to be aware of the relevant national regulatory requirements and private laws they have to comply with.

With regard to international supervisory law, the author analyses where intermediaries have to be registered and which regulatory requirements they have to meet when exercising activities in another member state by using freedom to provide services or the freedom of establishment. One of the key findings is that although the IDD is partly based on the country of origin principle, intermediaries must comply with stricter national provisions protecting general interests of the host member state, irrespective of whether they serve consumers or professionals as policyholders.

Concerning private international law, the author analyses the intermediaries’ relationships with customers and insurers. A comparative legal analysis reveals that these relationships are based on contract in some member states and on tort in others. Therefore, it is even unclear whether the Rome I or the Rome II Regulation has to be applied. The author calls for an autonomous interpretation of the regulations’ scope of application, which also solves the problem of concurring claims. He suggests that the Rome I Regulation must be applied irrespective of whether the intermediary is an agent or a broker.

Applying the Rome I Regulation to the relationship between intermediaries and customers leads to further difficulties. On the one hand, it is unclear whether the conflicts rule for insurance contracts in Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation can be applied to intermediation services. On the other hand, it is also uncertain whether Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the Rome I Regulation are applicable without modification given that the IDD uses different connecting factors with regard to international supervisory law rules. The author argues that certain IDD “flexibility clauses” constitute special conflict-of-law rules in the sense of Article 23 of the Rome I Regulation and therefore partially supersede Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the same Regulation.

With regard to the relationship between intermediaries and insurers, the author analyses whether Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation can be used to apply the law governing the insurance contract or the relationship between intermediaries and customers. He stresses that the parties must be aware of the customs they have to comply with and of certain mechanisms protecting insurance agents, which might include mandatory provisions.

This is a complex area, and the author has to be complemented for having taken a broad perspective, which combines international supervisory law and private international law. The study concludes with an assessment of the extent to which the current state of the law promotes cross-border activities of intermediaries. Particular attention is paid to the importance and legal framework of digital insurance intermediaries, which are also dealt with separately in each chapter.

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:

D. Coester-Waltjen: Some Thoughts on Recital 7 Rome I Regulation and a Consistent and Systematic Interpretation of Jurisdictional and Choice of Law Rules.

Decisions of the ECJ in recent years have cast some new light on recital 7 of the Rome I Regulation. These decisions will be analysed regarding the limits of and the guiding principles for a consistent and systematic interpretation of the rules in the Brussels Ibis Regulation on the one hand and the Rome I Regulation on the other. The analysis proves that the understanding of a term in the jurisdictional framework need not necessarily influence the interpretation for private international purposes.

U.P. Gruber/L. Möller: Brussels IIbis Recast

After complicated negotiations, the Council of the EU has finally adopted a recast of the Brussels IIbis-Regulation. The amendments focus primarily on parental responsibility. As far as the enforcement of foreign judgements is concerned, the new regulation provides for a delicate balance between different positions of the Member States. While the new regulation abolishes exequatur, it also introduces new reasons which can be invoked against the enforcement of foreign decisions. At first, the reform did not aim at changes in the field of divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment. However, in the course of the legislative procedure, new provisions allowing for the recognition of extra-judicial agreements on legal separation and divorce were added.

C. Kohler: Mutual trust and fundamental procedural rights in the framework of mutual assistance between EU Member States and beyond

In case C-34/17, Donnellan, the ECJ ruled that the recovery of a fine by way of mutual assistance between EU Member States pursuant to Directive 2010/24 may be refused by the requested authority if the decision of the applicant authority imposing the fine was not properly notified to the person concerned, so that the person’s right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has been infringed. The Court restricts the principle of mutual trust which, pursuant to Opinion 2/13, prevents the requested authority in principle to check whether the applicant Member State has infringed a fundamental right of Union law. The ECJ’s ruling takes into account the case-law of the ECtHR and, by admitting a “second look”, strengthens the protection of fundamental rights in the internal market and within the framework of the judicial cooperation in civil matters.

S. Huber: Broad Interpretation of the European Rules on Jurisdiction over Consumer Contracts

The jurisdiction rules for consumer contracts established in Articles 17 to 19 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and 15 to 17 of the Lugano Convention respectively lead to the question whether the trader has directed his professional activities to the jurisdiction in which the consumer is domiciled. The German Federal Court of Justice had to decide on this question in the context of several similar cases where Swiss solicitors had concluded a contract with several persons living in Germany. The crucial point was a document that the Swiss solicitors had sent to these persons via their German solicitors. The question was whether this document was a sufficiently clear expression of the Swiss solicitors’ intention to conclude contracts with consumers domiciled in Germany. In this context, the German Federal Court of Justice (cf., for example, the case IX ZR 9/16) held that the intention to conclude contracts with consumers living abroad could not only be expressed by general forms of advertising addressed to the public abroad, but also  y documents that are sent to individual consumers. The line of reasoning of the Court reveals a certain sympathy for the position that even one single document sent to one individual consumer in a foreign jurisdiction might constitute a sufficient expression of the trader’s intention to conclude contracts with consumers of that jurisdiction – but this was of no relevance in the cases at hand where the document had been sent to a group of 60 to 100 persons. Whether the document is sent on the initiative of the trader or at the request of the consumer seems to be of no importance. In addition, the court argued that the acts of the German solicitors were to be attributed to their Swiss colleagues as both law firms had cooperated with the aim of permitting the Swiss solicitors to conclude contracts with clients from Germany. Finally, the court was confronted with the question whether in case of a reorganisation of the trader’s business, a consumer can bring a claim against the newly created company in the courts of its domicile. The Court answered this question in the affirmative even for the situation in which the trader’s entity that had concluded the consumer contract remained liable besides the new company. The analysis of the Court’s decisions shows that the Court has formulated guidelines which are based on the case law of the European Court of Justice and allow the lower courts to apply the rules on jurisdiction over consumer contracts in a way which implements the idea of consumer protection and at the same time takes into account the traders’ interests under the general principles of procedural fairness. The clarifying guidelines have enhanced legal certainty and might thus contribute to reducing time and cost-intensive discussions about jurisdiction issues.

K. Duden: Amazon Dash Buttons and Collective Injunctive Relief in E-Commerce: Ju-risdiction and Preliminary Questions

The decision of the Munich Court of Appeals relates to a preventive action brought by a consumer protection association against the so-called Amazon Dash Buttons. The decision is guided by the 2016 ECJ decision in Amazon (C-191/15), which it develops further. The Munich decision contains far-reaching statements that are of vital importance to e-commerce and the internet of things. On a substantive level the Court of Appeals finds the Dash Buttons to be an infringement of consumer protection laws. This finding has already led to Amazon’s withdrawal of Dash Buttons from the German market. On the level of conflict of laws and international civil procedure, which this paper focusses on, the court starts by rightfully declaring a nationwide jurisdiction under article 7(2) Brussels Ibis-Regulation for preventive actions brought by consumer protection associations. Since the associations pursue the collective interests of all consumers the place where the harmful event may occur is, after all, any place where a potential consumer might be injured. In determining the applicable law, the court distinguishes between the main question of a claim to injunctive relief and the preliminary question of an infringement of consumer protection laws. In doing so it qualifies the pre-contractual obligations of § 312j BGB as part of the law applicable to consumer contracts, even though a qualification under Art. 12 Rome II-Regulation would be more convincing. Because of the potential importance of the content of the decision to the business model of Amazon it can be assumed that Amazon will pursue this case further and try for its reversal.

L. Kuschel: Blocking orders against host providers: Content and territorial scope under the E-Commerce-Directive

In its recent decision (C-18/18) on hosting provider liability, the ECJ set out guidelines on the substantial extent and territorial reach of court orders in cases of online personality rights violations under the E-Commerce Directive. The court held that a hosting provider can be ordered to remove not only identical but also information that is equivalent to the content which has been declared unlawful. Moreover, the E-Commerce Directive does not preclude a court from ordering a hosting provider to remove information worldwide. The article examines critically the broad substantial scope of potential takedown orders and in particular the possibility of worldwide court orders. As to the latter, the article argues that there is neither a contradiction to the ECJ’s previous decision in Google v. CNIL nor a conflict with European jurisdiction law, namely the Brussels Ibis Regulation. A national court should, however, take into consideration the highly differing views among jurisdictions on what content is unlawful and what is protected as free speech, before issuing a global take-down order. The article thus pleads for a nuanced treatment of the subject matter by courts and legislators.

L. Colberg: Damages for breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement

In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Justice (“FCJ”) decided for the first time that the violation of a choice-of-court agreement can give rise to damages claims. The question had previously been the subject of intense discussions in German academic literature. In the case before the FCJ, a US party violated a jurisdiction clause in favor of the courts of Bonn, Germany by bringing a claim in a US District Court. Based on the valid and unambiguous choice-of-court agreement, the US court held it lacked jurisdiction. As US courts do not award costs to the winning party, the German party, however, had to bear its own lawyers’ fees. When the US party brought the same claim in Germany, the German party counter-claimed for damages. The FCJ decided that parties who are sued abroad despite the existence of a choice-of-court agreement in principle have a right to damages. However, some uncertainty remains as to the exact terms under which courts will award damages. The academic debate therefore is likely to continue.

J.D. Lüttringhaus: Jurisdiction and the Prohibition of Abuse of Rights

Does the Lugano Convention allow for an abuse of rights exception? A recent decision by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe draws upon the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights in order to disregard the defendant’s attempt to challenge jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 24 Lugano Convention. The Court found the defendant’s contesting of jurisdiction in the main proceedings irreconcilable with his pre-trial application for independent proceedings for the taking of evidence in the same jurisdiction. This reasoning does, however, not take into account that jurisdiction for independent proceedings for the taking of evidence may well differ from jurisdiction for the main proceedings. Against this backdrop, the article provides a critical analysis of the abuse of rights exception under both, the Lugano Convention and the Brussels Ibis Regulation.

F. Maultzsch: International Jurisdiction and Service of Process in Cross-Border Investment Torts under the Lugano Convention 2007/Brussels Ibis Regulation

The Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic of Austria (OGH) had to deal with issues of international jurisdiction for cross-border investment torts. Besides general problems of jurisdiction under Art. 5 No. 3 of the Lugano Convention 2007/Art. 7 No. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the case touched upon the relation between service of process and possible jurisdiction by way of submission according to Art. 24 of the Lugano Convention 2007/Art. 26 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The OGH has decided that jurisdiction by way of submission may not be inhibited by a preceding denial of service of process. This article outlines the state of discussion under Art. 5 No. 3 of the Lugano Convention 2007/Art. 7 No. 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation concerning problems in investment torts (in particular regarding the location of the place in which pure economic loss occurs) and agrees with the OGH’s account of the relation between service of process and jurisdiction by way of submission. This account is consistent with the concept of jurisdictional submission as being akin to an ex post choice of court agreement.

J. Rapp: The recovery of erroneously paid insurance benefits under the Brussels Recast Regulation

In what is probably one of the last judgments of the UK Supreme Court on the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the Court addressed three fundamental questions on Article 10 et seq., 25: Is an assignee and loss payee bound by an exclusive choice of court agreement in an insurance contract between the insurer and the policyholder? And is the insurer’s claim for the recovery of erroneously paid insurance benefits against the assignee a “matter relating to insurance” within chapter II, section 3 of the Regulation? If so, is the assignee entitled to rely on section 3 even if he cannot be regarded as the economically weaker party vis-à-vis the insurer? In the given judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that the assignee is usually not bound by a choice of court agreement between the insurer and the policyholder; rather, pursuant to Article 14 of the Regulation, he can only be sued in the courts of the member state in which he is domiciled, even if the protection of the economically weaker party as basic concept enshrined in Art. 10 et seq. of the Regulation does not apply to him.

C. Madrid Martínez: The political situation in Venezuela and the Conventions of the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law of the OAS

The government of Nicolás Maduro withdraws Venezuela from the OAS and it has an impact on the Venezuelan system of Private International Law, particularly in the application of Inter-American conventions. In this article, we want to show the erratic way the Case Law has taken and the dire consequences that a political decision has had on the Venezuelan Private International Law.

The new issue of the Revue Critique de Droit International Privé (2/2020) is out. It contains three articles and numerous case notes.

In the first article, Sabine Corneloup (University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas) and Thalia Kruger (University of Antwerp) give a comprehensive overview of the new Brussels II ter Regulation (Le règlement 2019/1111, Bruxelles II : la protection des enfants gagne du ter(rain))

After a long legislative process, Regulation 2019/1111 or “Brussels II ter” has replaced the Brussels II bis Regulation (n° 2201/2003). The new Regulation will only become fully applicable on 1 August 2022. This article gives an overview of the most important changes even though it is impossible to discuss all of them. In the domain of parental responsibility Brussels II ter brings more clarity on choice of forum and lis pendens. It insertsa general obligation to respect the child’s right to be heard. For child abduction cases, the second chance procedure is retained but its scope is limited. The legislator places emphasis on mediation. The Regulation brings a general abolition of exequatur, similar to that of the Brussels I Regulation (n° 1215/2012). However, decisions concerning visitation and the second chance procedure (for which Brussels II bis already abolished exequatur) retain their privileged character and slightly different rules apply. Brussels II ter moreover harmonises certain aspects of the actual enforcement procedure. A final important change, especially for France, is a new set of rules on the recognition and enforcement of authentic instruments and agreements, such as private divorces. The legislator did not tackle the bases for jurisdiction for divorce, which is a pity. The authors conclude that, even though it is not perfect and certain issues still need the legislator’s attention, Brussels II ter has brought many welcome improvements, particularly in protecting the rights of children involved in cross-border family disputes.

In the second article, Christine Bidaud (University of Lyon 3) addresses the issue of the international circulation of public documents under French law from a critical perspective (La transcription des actes de l’état civil étrangers sur les registres français. Cesser de déformer et enfin réformer…)

Although the transcription of foreign civil-status records in french registers has long been qualified as a publicity operation, distortions of this notion has been made by the legislator and the case law. A reform in this field is imperative in order to guarantee the coherence of the system of reception in France of foreign civil-status records and, beyond that, of the international circulation of personal status.

Finally, the third article explore the theme of international circulation of personal status from a different perspective. Sylvain Bollée (University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) and Bernard Haftel (University of Sorbonne Paris Nord) discuss the sensitive topic of international surrogacy under the light of the recent case law of the French Supreme Court in civil and criminal matters.

In two judgments handed down by its First Civil Chamber on 18 December 2019, the Court of Cassation seems to have concluded a particularly spectacular case law saga relating to the reception in France of surrogate motherhood processes occurred abroad. Its position has evolved from a position of extreme closure to one that is diametrically opposed, now accepting full and almost unconditional recognition, out of step not only with its recent case-law, but also with domestic law that maintains a firm opposition to any surrogate motherhood process. This evolution is to be considered from the perspective of concrete solutions and, more fundamentally, of the place that the Court of Cassation intends to give in this area to its own case-law within the sources of law.

The full table of contents is available here.

The most recent issue of the German Journal of Comparative Law (Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft) features three articles on private international and comparative law.

The abstracts read:

• Katharina Beckemper: Bestechung und Bestechlichkeit im geschäftlichen Verkehr – Die gegenläufige Umsetzung des EU-Rahmenbeschlusses 2003/568/JI in Spanien und Deutschland, ZVglRWiss 119 (2020), 277-313

Criminal law on corruption is largely determined by Union law. This can make a comparison of the national law of two Member States interesting if there have been different implementations in detail as Union law leaves room for interpretation. However, the German legislator did not see any such room for interpretation when, in 2015, it reorganized the facts of bribery and corruption in business dealings. Rather, he felt compelled to introduce the so-called business owner model. Meanwhile, Spain removed a comparable regulation from the relevant facts in the same year. This raises the question of whether European law offers more scope for implementation than the German legislator assumed or whether the Spanish legislator violated the requirements.

• Patrick Hell: Die Shareholder Proposal Rule des US-amerikanischen Kapitalmarktrechts als Instrument des nachhaltigkeitsorientierten Aktionärsaktivismus, ZVglRWiss 119 (2020), 314-338

Environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues play a major role on both sides of the Atlantic in the current discussion in corporate and capital market law. Investors are increasingly developing their own ESG standards and are trying to influence ESG issues through direct dialogue with their companies and through voting. This sustainability-oriented shareholder activism has a long tradition in the United States. The Shareholder Proposal Rule enables non-binding decisions initiated by shareholders. This has led to a significant increase in sustainability-oriented shareholder proposals in recent years. In the following article, this rule will be presented from a historical, dogmatic and functional perspective in order to take a comparative look at German stock corporation law.

• Frederick Rieländer: Der Schutz von Geschäftsgeheimnissen im europäischen Kollisionsrecht, ZVglRWiss 119 (2020), 339-368

Whilst the Directive (EU) 2016/943 ensures that there is a consistent level of civil redress in the internal market in the event of trade secret violations, the determination of the law applicable to non-contractual claims arising out of trade secret violations raises several unresolved questions. As will be shown hereafter, non-contractual obligations flowing from infringements of trade secrets within the meaning of the Directive ought to be governed by the lex loci protectionis principle as enshrined in Art.?8(1) Rome II Regulation. Nevertheless, the law of the country in which the market is distorted applies in so far as claims are based on trade secret violations by means of ”unfair competition” within the meaning of Art.?6(1) Rome II Regulation.

The Journal can be accessed here (no open access)

By Francisco Javier Zamora Cabo

Despite the progress made towards its prevention and resolution, contemporary history continues to show us examples of human-induced catastrophes, such as the genocides in Rwanda and the Balkans or, in our days, the one that afflicts the Rohingya ethnicity.

These are events that impact the conscience of humanity and that, unlike linear explanations, are usually based on a set of causes that are not always easily discernible. For instance, this is the case of the Rohingya Conflict, which, in its various phases, has generated a great deal of information and evidence, among which it is necessary to glean with a critical spirit, so as to fix the problem and, consequently, proceed to its much-needed denounce and to the pursuit of a path to a solution. To this end, and from the performance of the sciences, interdisciplinary approaches are required, the only ones that can give a full measure of the magnitude of such conflicts and of the means that must be prepared to address them.

In this order, and complemented by contributions from other branches of knowledge, international law, both public and private, constitutes an essential element to face the aforementioned conflict, by arbitrating mechanisms that enable its control and also necessarily opening ways for the remedy of victims and the punishment of those responsible for a calamity of such caliber, which affects more than a million human beings of the ethnic group mentioned above, which currently is the most persecuted on the planet and is also exposed to suffer in a special way the effects of the pandemic that afflicts the world.

The Rohingya conflict thus constitutes a field of choice at the interface between public international law and private international law, in which, for instance, actions are complemented according to the institutional channels established by the international community or, with the technical resources provided by the conflict of laws, through state-based international litigation or the implementation of elements belonging to its body of laws and with an imperative nature, such as international sanctions. Based on this, we then propose, on the occasion of the aforementioned conflict, a private international law in accordance with world governance and mobilized towards the achievement of peace, which is the ultimate foundation on which it coincides with the law of nations.

We have focused our modest contribution to the study and solution of the Rohingya conflict on these ideas, after exploring its actors, causes, and ominous results, from a wide range of sources. Written in Spanish, it is accessible here: http://www.rivistaoidu.net/sites/default/files/2_FZamora%20Cabot%20%20Marullo.pdf. Its abstract in English can be accessed here: http://www.rivistaoidu.net/sites/default/files/Abstract%20Zamora%20Cabot%20Marullo.pdf.

Profesor Dr. Francisco Javier ZAMORA CABOT,
Catedrático de Derecho Internacional Privado
(Chair Professor of Private International Law)
Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Económicas
Universitat Jaume I de Castellón

In Stephenson Harwood LLP v Medien Patentverwaltung AG & Ors [2020] EWHC 1889 (Ch), proceedings were triggered by funding arrangements and alleged success fee entitlements following patent infringement proceedings. MPV is Swiss-based.

The action is an ‘interpleader’ one, now called a ‘stakeholder’ action: as Lenon DJ at 34 described, it is a ‘means by which a court (at the request of claimant, who typically holds property on behalf of one of the parties, GAVC) compels competing claimants to the subject matter of the application to put forward their claims and have them adjudicated on, thereby enabling the stakeholder to drop out of the picture.’

In the English residual private international law, stakeholder actions ground jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant’s property being present there. This is the kind of assets- based jurisdiction which the EC, but not the other Institutions, had wanted to introduce in Brussels Ia. As a result of the Brussels Convention’s Article 3 (materially the same as Article 3 Lugano), these actions became part of residual rules which could no longer be invoked against EU /Lugano States based defendants.  In the Schlosser report on the UK’s accession to the Brussels Convention, to which the judge refers at 40, it was said

“Interpleader actions (England and Wales) … are no longer permissible in the United Kingdom in respect of persons domiciled in another Member State of the Community, in so far as the international jurisdiction of the English or Scottish courts does not result from other provisions of the 1968 Convention. This applies for example, to actions brought by an auctioneer to establish whether ownership of an article sent to him for disposal belongs to his customer or a third party claiming the article.”

An alternative jurisdictional gateway therefore needs to be found. The discussion turned to submission (aka voluntary appearance) and CJEU C-150/80 Elefanten Schuh GmbH v Pierre Jacqmain. In particular, MPV completed the acknowledgment of service form indicating that it intended to contest Stephenson Harwood’s claim, did not tick the box saying that it intended to dispute jurisdiction and set out its own claim for payment of the Monies which it intended to pursue in the stakeholder application and stating its intention to exchange evidence. It then served and filed two witness statements in support of that claim addressing the merits and rebutting Mr Kagan’s claim. As the judge notes at 49,

MPV’s case that it has not submitted to the jurisdiction depends on the Court accepting the premise that it is open to MPV to distinguish for jurisdictional purpose between Stephenson Harwood’s claim (in relation to which MPV has raised no jurisdictional dispute) and Mr Kagan’s claim made as part of the stakeholder proceedings (in relation to which MPV does dispute jurisdiction). It is on this basis that MPV simultaneously asks the Court to order payment of the Monies to itself, as a disposal of the stakeholder application, while disputing the jurisdiction of the Court to determine Mr Kagan’s claim to the Monies.

However Lenon DJ holds that appearance was entered, as Mr Kagan’s claim is part and parcel of the stakeholder application and cannot be separately rejected at the level of jurisdiction. The level of engagement with the claim amounts to voluntary appearance viz both parties. At 53 obiter discussion of other gateways is pondered but not further entertained for lack of proper discussion by the parties.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 1, Heading 1.3.1,

Albert Henke (University of Milan) has been awarded the EU-funded Jean Monnet Module on ‘Multilevel, Mutiparty and Multisector Cross-Border Litigation in Europe’. The three-year teaching and research project will run from 2021 to 2023 and will focus on three main areas: relations and conflicts between national courts, European courts and international tribunals; cross-border collective redress; procedural issues arising out of litigating cross-border commercial, financial, competition, IP, labour, consumers and family law disputes.

Civil litigation in a cross-border dimension presents greater complexity than domestic litigation, due to differences in legal traditions and regimes, as well as in cultural and social values among jurisdictions. A recent EU Study (JUST/2014/RCON/PR/CIVI/0082) shows that EU Member States’ procedural law regimes are still far from being harmonized, what negatively impacts on free circulation of judgments, equivalence and effectiveness of procedural protection and the functioning of the internal market.

The module is proposed to Italian and foreign under- and postgraduate students, as well as to practitioners. It will identify the main procedural issues deriving from a lack of harmonization among EU jurisdictions, contribute to the academic debate at national and European level, produce a series of academic outputs and set the basis for future academic cooperation, also in view of international joint research projects.

The teaching staff includes Alan Uzelac (University of Zagreb), Diego P. Fernández Arroyo (Sciences Po, Paris), Gilles Cuniberti (University of Luxembourg), Fernando Gascón-Inchausti (Complutense University of Madrid), Maria Teresa Carinci (University of Milan), Francesco Rossi dal Pozzo (University of Milan), Stefaan Voet (Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven), Francesca Marinelli (University of Milan), Pietro Ortolani (Radboud University, Njimegen) and Apostolos Anthimos (European University, Cyprus).

For information, please contact Prof. Albert Henke at albert.henke@unimi.it.

On 3 September 2020, the Court of Justice delivered its Judgment in the case that had sparked considerable scholarly interest in recent months, namely in the case Supreme Site and Others, C-186/19.

Back in June, due to the courtesy of María Barral Martínez, we presented an analysis of the case itself and of the Opinion issued by AG Saugmandsgaard Øe.

Preliminary questions and their context

As a reminder, in the background of this case is a contractual dispute over the payment of fuels supplied by companies to an international organisation, in the context of a military operation carried out by the latter.

The legal question at stake concerns, primarily, the applicability and/or the scope of application of the Brussels I bis Regulation in the context of a case where the international organisation brings an action to, firstly, lift an interim garnishee executed in another Member State by the opposing parties, and, secondly, prohibit the opposing parties from levying, on the same grounds, an interim garnishee in the future and all that on the basis of an immunity of execution that this international organisation allegedly enjoys.

Subsequently, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 24(5) of the Brussels I bis Regulation is to be interpreted as meaning that the action for interim relief falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in which the interim garnishee order was executed.

Judgment of the Court and its consideration of the questions referred

In relation to the question of the applicability/scope of application of the Brussels I bis Regulation, the Court begins its analysis by affirming, at paragraph 54 of the Judgment, that the interim measures in question should be considered as the ‘provisional measures’ within the meaning of the Article 35 of the Regulation. The inclusion of these measures in the scope of the Regulation is determined by the nature of the rights that they serve to protect.

Next, at point 55, the Court acknowledges the two sets of criteria used in its case-law in order to characterize whether or not an action is covered by the concept of ‘civil or commercial matter’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. These are ‘the elements which characterise the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the dispute or the subject matter thereof’ and – as the Court puts it – ‘alternatively’, ‘the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of the action’. Both sets of criteria are afterwards applied in relation to the case at hand, at paragraphs 65 to 67. It may seem that the first set of criteria is used in order to determine the nature of rights that the provisional measure serves to protect, while the check of the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of the action (second set of criteria) is done in order to ensure that the request for the measure does not consist on exercise of public powers and as such could potentially exclude the measure from the scope of the Regulation (Cf. paragraph 62 of the Court’s Judgment in case C-73/19, Movic and Others).

Interestingly, in relation to ‘the elements which characterise the nature of the legal relationships between the parties to the dispute or the subject matter thereof’ (first set of criteria), the Court seems to be taking the view that the purpose of the contract on the supply of fuel is not of a decisive importance. As under public international law the purpose of a transaction may arguably have some significance in determining whether that transaction was performed iure gestionis and is therefore not covered by the immunity, it is worth noticing that the Court indicates that the criteria for the determination of a ‘civil and commercial’ character are established for the purpose of the application of EU law (see paragraph 68: ‘neither the legal relationship between the parties to an action such as that in the main proceedings nor the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of that action can regarded as showing the exercise of public powers for the purposes of EU law‘; see also paragraph 69 as well as in the operative part 1 of the Judgment: ‘action in question is not pursued under public powers, within the meaning of EU law‘).

Finally, at paragraph 74, the Court indicates that the fact that an international organisation relied on the immunity from execution in support of its action for interim relief does not preclude examination by the court of its international jurisdiction under the Brussels I bis Regulation. For the Court, the issue of whether that immunity is a bar to the court seised having jurisdiction to hear and determine such an action arises at a later stage, after the international jurisdiction of that court has been determined.

On these grounds, the Court considers that:

Article 1(1) of [the Brussels I bis Regulation] is to be interpreted as meaning that an action for interim relief brought before a court of a Member State in which an international organisation invokes its immunity from execution in order to obtain both the lifting of an interim garnishee order executed in a Member State other than that of the forum and a prohibition on levying such an order in the future on the same grounds, brought in parallel with substantive proceedings concerning a claim arising from alleged non-payment for fuel supplied for the purposes of a peacekeeping operation carried out by that organisation, is covered by the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’, in so far as that action is not pursued under public powers, within the meaning of EU law, which is a matter for the assessment of the referring court.

In relation to the question on the interpretation of Article 24(5) of the Regulation, the Court takes, as observed by one commentator, a restrictive view: it seems that only proceedings that concern per se the enforcement of judgments fall within the scope of that provision.

The Judgment itself can be consulted here.

On 27 September 1968, the (then) six member States of the European Communities signed the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of this milestone, the European Court of Justice and the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg held an international conference on the most important developments, achievements and challenges in European civil procedural law since that date.

A book collecting most of the presentations, edited by Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Burkhard Hess and Prof. Dr. Koen Lenaerts, with Dr. Vincent Richard as coeditor, has just been published by Nomos Verlag, in the Studies of the Max Planck Institute for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law series.

The book includes contributions on the Brussels regime authored by members of the European Court of Justice, established academics and young researchers, illustrating the dialogue between the Court of Justice and the national courts on the interpretation of European civil procedural law, and how it has impacted on the Europeanization of private international law. Moreover, it reflects on the future of European civil procedural law and on the suitability of the Brussels regime today.

The Court of Justice delivered on Thursday (3 September 2020) its judgment in case C‑186/19 (Supreme Site Services GmbH, and alii v Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) which is about Article 1 and 24 Brussels I bis (along with Article 35) in the context of an action brought by an international organisation based on immunity from execution seeking to have an interim garnishee order lifted and a prohibition on new orders being levied on the same grounds.

Background: “The request has been made in the course of proceedings between, on one hand, Supreme Site Services GmbH, established in Switzerland, Supreme Fuels GmbH & Co KG, established in Germany, and Supreme Fuels Trading Fze, established in the United Arab Emirates (together, ‘the Supreme companies’) and, on the other hand, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (‘SHAPE’ [NATO]), established in Belgium, concerning the lifting of an interim garnishee order”.

Decision: “1. Article 1(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] is to be interpreted as meaning that an action for interim relief brought before a court of a Member State in which an international organisation invokes its immunity from execution in order to obtain both the lifting of an interim garnishee order executed in a Member State other than that of the forum and a prohibition on levying such an order in the future on the same grounds, brought in parallel with substantive proceedings concerning a claim arising from alleged non-payment for fuel supplied for the purposes of a peacekeeping operation carried out by that organisation, is covered by the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’, in so far as that action is not pursued under public powers, within the meaning of EU law, which is a matter for the assessment of the referring court.

2. Article 24(5) of Regulation No 1215/2012 is to be interpreted as meaning that an action for interim relief brought before a court of a Member State in which an international organisation invokes its immunity from execution in order to obtain both the lifting of an interim garnishee order executed in a Member State other than that of the forum and a prohibition on levying such an order in the future on the same grounds, does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in which the interim garnishee order was executed”.

Source: here

As mentioned earlier this summer, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg will host the third conference for young German-speaking scholars in private international law (“IPR-Nachwuchstagung”) in March 2021. The conference will focus on the theme of PIL for a better world: Vision – Reality – Aberration? and will include a keynote by Angelika Nußberger, former judge at the European Court of Human Rights, and a panel discussion between Roxana Banu, Hans van Loon, and Ralf Michaels.

The organisers are inviting contributions that explore any aspect of the conference theme, which can be submitted until 20 September 2020. The call for papers and further information can be found on the conference website.

Although the conference will mainly be held in German, English proposals and presentations are also most welcome.

Of course, the organizers are mindful of the current Corona pandemic and will adjust the planning accordingly.

The DIRECTORATE-GENERAL JUSTICE AND CONSUMERS of the Commission has recently published a further notice on the EU-Brexit saga in the field of civil justice and private international law.

The notice covers core aspects, such as international jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement, specific European procedures (EPO, ESCP), judicial cooperation instruments (Service and Evidence Regulations), insolvency, ans other pertinent issues (public documents, legal aid, mediation).

The full text of the notice may be retrieved here.