Droit international général

Issue 2/2022 of RabelsZ has just been published. It contains the following contributions:

Ralf Michaels: Peter Mankowski *11.10.1966 †10.2.2022, Volume 86 (2022) / Issue 2, pp. 323–326, DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2022-0028

 

Katharina Pistor: Rechtsvergleichung zwischen Rechts- und politischer Ökonomie: am Beispiel des Unternehmensrechts, Volume 86 (2022) / Issue 2, pp. 327–363, DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2022-0029

Legal and Political Economics in Comparative Perspective: the Case of Corporate Law. – Hardly another area of the law has seen as much interest in comparative analysis as corporate law, in particular the publicly traded corporation. The dialogue among legal academics from different legal systems was facilitated by the use of a non-legal language – that of transaction economics. It offered a unified standard for analyzing the pros and cons of different legal rules and models of corporate governance. Legal details remained largely under the radar. More recently, political scientists have discovered the corporation as an object of analysis and have emphasized the political economy that is represented by the establishment, development and function of the “corporation as a legal person”. This literature pays closer attention to the role of the state in corporate law but has neglected questions of comparative law. This paper argues that comparative law could and should assert itself between these two social sciences as a field that is devoted to describing and explaining the similarities and differences of legal institutions as a part of social systems.

 

Stefan Grundmann: Pluralistische Privatrechtstheorie – Prolegomena zu einer pluralistisch-gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Rechtstheorie als normativem Desiderat (»normativer Pluralismus«), Volume 86 (2022) / Issue 2, pp. 364–420, DOI:  10.1628/rabelsz-2022-0030

Pluralist Private Law Theory: Prolegomena to a Pluralist and Social Science Oriented Legal Theory as a Normative Desideratum (“Normative Pluralism”). – Just how legal scholarship and legal practice should address the social sciences and other fields of inquiry is a vital question whose answer is informed by concerns of innovation, logic, and an understanding of law and jurisprudence. Law and economics is an efficient vehicle in this regard, an approach that in the USA is perhaps even dominant. The present article distinguishes between a monist interdisciplinary openness – vis-à-vis a neighbouring discipline that may indeed already have a particular goal and benchmark in mind – and a pluralist interdisciplinary openness. It identifies in the latter a disproportionately greater heuristic potential (in terms of all societal views). In a pluralist society, one that moulds pluralism into a constitutional requirement, the author sees a pluralist interdisciplinary openness as, above all, normatively superior and even mandated. It also seems better suited to the logic of jurisprudence: a discipline seeking balance in society. The article also addresses the biggest “drawback” of the approach, the unanswered and difficult question of how to determine hierarchizations. Adopting a value-tracking approach, the author proposes a mechanism embracing constitutionality and democracy as guiding legal principles.

 

Rolf Stürner: The ELI / UNIDROIT Model European Rules of Civil Procedure – An Introduction to Their Basic Conceptions, Volume 86 (2022) / Issue 2, pp. 421–472, DOI:  10.1628/rabelsz-2022-0031

This contribution introduces the basic conceptions of the Model European Rules of Civil Procedure, which were affirmed by the European Law Institute, Vienna, and by UNIDROIT, Rome, in 2020. In its first part it describes the prior history of the project (ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure, Storme Commission) and the history of the emergence of the Model Rules between 2013 and 2020. The following parts depict the organization and coordination of the common work in the various groups, an analysis of methodological questions arising in the context of harmonization of procedural law, a detailed presentation of important results of harmonization in fields of far-reaching convergence of national procedural laws, considerations about strong future trends of procedural design and their significance for different areas of civil procedure, and finally some remarks on innovative procedural developments taken into account by the Model Rules, with important examples in fields like collective proceedings and the financing of proceedings, or in the use of modern means of communication or artificial intelligence. The contribution also contains some cautious remarks on internal conditions associated with the emergence of the Model Rules that may have influenced its results.

Igor Adamczyk, Jakob Fortunat Stagl: Der Eigentumserwerb an Fahrnis im polnischen Recht, Volume 86 (2022) / Issue 2, pp. 473–501, DOI: 10.1628/rabelsz-2022-0032

Transfer of Ownership in Movable Property under Polish Law. – This essay deals with the transfer of ownership under Polish law. The main question is whether Poland simply adheres to one of the classical models historically significant for this country – that of Austria, Germany, or France – or whether its system can be considered an original solution. The authors are convinced that one cannot analyse the transfer of ownership without considering the underlying contract. In particular, the passing of risk has to be considered in unison with the rules for the passing of ownership. These rules as a whole may seem syncretistic or “mixed”, yet they have to be understood as a genuine – Polish – system for the transfer of ownership.

 

Guido Westkamp (Queen Mary Intellectual Property Research Institute) has posted In it for the Money? Academic Publishing, Open Access and the Authors’ Claim to Self-Determination in Private International Law on SSRN.

The abstract reads:

Open access research platforms are increasingly becoming the target of academic publishers claiming copyright infringement. Applicable law considerations are pivotal in such circumstances. The law governing the initial publishing agreement decides, ultimately, the extent to which rights have been transferred and the degree to which courts can exercise judicial control. Academic publishing differ significantly from standard copyright contracts. Academic authors remain customarily unremunerated and concurrently are expected to transfer all rights on an exclusive basis. Exclusivity thus eradicates the proliferation of open access platforms altogether. The article discusses the most relevant concerns that arise in private international contract law under the Rome I-Regulation as a matter of material justice. German substantive copyright contract law and the general principles affording protection to authors underpinning it, most importantly as regards the fundamental principle of equitable remuneration and its limits. The article dismisses the conventional approach as regards both contractual choices of law and the closest connection analysis and proposes, based on more subtle considerations of material justice as a relevant factor in modern EU private international, the application of special conflict rules so as to alleviate the problematic effects of uninhibited contractual freedom of contract, as a mechanism to avoid the designation of, particularly, a common law copyright jurisdiction imposed by way of predetermined terms governs the agreement. The article demonstrates, ultimately, that author’s claims to self-determination must outweigh the commercial interests of publishers, inadvertently providing open access platforms with legal certainty and freedom to republish.

Further to my last post, I omitted to include a book review by Professor Gilles Cuniberti in the second issue of ICLQ for 2022 which is focused on essays written in honour of Emeritus Professor Adrian Briggs (QC), and the latest edition of his (Briggs’) book on Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements.

The Ravenna Campus of the Department of Juridical Sciences of the University of Bologna (Italy) has organised in Ravenna (and online), between 18-23 July 2022, a Summer School on Transnational litigation: between substance and procedure.

The program of the School looks at cross-border litigation from a wide perspective, embracing not only civil and commercial matters but also matter as diverse as family law, succession law and climate change litigation. At the core of the program lies the European space of justice, with its private and procedural international law regulations; the comparative and international perspectives are also considered, with several lecturers from Third States. The approach is both theoretical and practical: as a matter of fact, the whole Saturday 23 July session is dedicated to workshops which will involve the participants in the solution of cases and problems.

The Faculty of the Summer School is composed of experts from different jurisdictions with very diverse professional backgrounds. The Director of the School is Prof. Michele Angelo Lupoi, who teaches Civil Procedural Law and European Judicial Cooperation at the University of Bologna. The Vice-Director of the School is Marco Farina, Adjunct Professor of Civil Procedural Law at LUISS University of Rome.

The Summer School is aimed at law students as well as law graduates and law practitioners who want to obtain a specialised knowledge in this complex and fascinating area of international civil procedure. The lectures will be held in a blended way, both in presence and online. In order to download the pre-registration form, please refer to here. An application will be made to the Bar Association of Ravenna to grant formative credits to Italian lawyers who participate in the Summer School.

The Summer School program is available here and includes as speakers Apostolos Anthimos, Caterina Benini, Giovanni Chiapponi, Michael S. Coffee, Elena D’Alessandro, David Estrin, Marco Farina, Francesca Ferrari, Pietro Franzina, Albert Henke, Priyanka Jain, Melissa Kucinski, Claudio Pezzi, Emma Roberts and Anna Wysocka-Bar.

It is possible to register until 2 July 2022. The registration fee is 200,00 €. For further info, please refer here or write and email to micheleangelo.lupoi@unibo.it. 

Paul Beaumont and Jayne Holliday have edited A Guide to Global Private International Law. The book has just been published by Hart / Bloomsbury in its Studies in Private International Law.

The guide provides a substantial overview of the discipline of private international law from a global perspective. It is divided into four sections: (i) Theory; (ii) Institutional and Conceptual Framework Issues; (iii) Civil and Commercial Law (apart from Family Law); (iv) Family Law.

Each chapter addresses specific areas/aspects of private international law and considers the existing global solutions and the possibilities of improving/creating them.

The authors are experts coming from Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania, and include – in addition to the editors – Ardavan Arzandeh, Maria Caterina Baruffi, Giacomo Biagioni, Ron Brand, Janeen M Carruthers, Carmen Otero García-Castrillón, Adeline Chong, Giuditta Cordero-Moss, Mihail Danov, Nadia de Araujo, Albert Font i Segura, Pietro Franzina, Francisco Garcimartín Alférez, Richard Garnett, David Goddard, Chiara Goetzke, Ignacio Goicoechea, Susanne L. Gössl, Uglješa Grušic, Jonathan Harris, Trevor Hartley, Michael Hellner, Paul Herrup, Maria Hook, Costanza Honorati, Mary Keyes, Ruth Lamont, Matthias Lehmann, Jan Lüttringhaus, Brooke Marshall, Lucian Martinez, Laura Martínez-Mora, David McClean, Johan Meeusen, Ralf Michaels, Reid Mortensen, Máire Ní Shúilleabháin, Marta Pertegás, Marta Requejo Isidro, Nieve Rubaja, Verónica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Sara Sánchez, Rhona Schuz, Symeon C. Symeonides, Koji Takahashi, Zheng Sophia Tang, Paul Torremans, Karen Vandekerckhove, Lara Walker, Brody Warren, Matthias Weller and Abubakri Yekini.

For more details, see here.

The book entitled Lessons on Private International Law published by DIKAIA is the result of a collective effort of some of the speakers who presented at a course organised by the Mexican Consejo de la Judicatura Federal (Council of the Federal Judiciary) and the Mexican Escuela Federal de Formación Judicial (Federal School of Judiciary Training) in 2021.

Basically, this book puts into writing some of the presentations relating to the general topics on Private International Law given at the course. It should be noted that this book has seen the light of day thanks to the devoted work of professors Jorge Alberto Silva Silva and Nuria González Martín, who were the editors / coordinators.

This book explains the basic and general concepts of Private International Law, in particular those concerning the Mexican legal system. In addition, this book deals with innovative and fairly unknown topics to the Mexican doctrine, such as extension rules and the concept of lex loci factum. A full table of contents is provided below. The book ends with an analysis of the case of Antenor Patiño vs. María Cristina de Borbón, which although a bit “ancient” (1955 – a divorce case), it reflects the problems which arise regarding conflicts of jurisdiction and conflicts of laws in a high-profile case.

This book is accessible online and may be purchased here.

AUTHORS

Elí Rodríguez Martínez

Francisco José Contreras Vaca

Jorge Alberto Silva Silva – Coordinator

Jorge Cicero Fernández

Karl August Prinz von Sachsen Gessaphe

Ligia Claudia González Lozano

Mario de la Madrid

Nuria González Martín – Coordinator

Rolando Tamayo y Salmorán

Rosa Elvira Vargas Baca

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CAPÍTULO 1

INTRODUCCIÓN AL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO / Jorge Alberto Silva Silva

1. PRELIMINARES
2. Conjunto normativo
3. Un orden jurídico de la comunidad internacional
4. Subordinación de todos los conjuntos jurídicos de la comunidad internacional a uno solo
5. ENTRAMADO DE NORMAS Y ORDENAMIENTOS JURÍDICOS

III. RELACIONES ENTRE LOS CONJUNTOS NORMATIVOS DE LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL

1. Conjuntos disjuntos
2. Conjuntos subordinados
3. Intersección de conjuntos
4. Vinculación unilateral de conjuntos
5. En resumen
6. LEX LOCI FACTUM
7. FUNCIÓN DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
8. PROBLEMAS DE TRÁFICO JURÍDICO INTERNACIONAL

VII. NATURALEZA Y CONTENIDO DEL DERECHO EXTRANJERO

VIII. MÉTODOS PARA RESOLVER PROBLEMAS DE TRÁFICO JURÍDICO INTERNACIONAL

1. Normas de aplicación inmediata o autolimitadas
2. Normas materiales o sustantivas
3. Normas de extensión
4. Normas de conflicto
5. Pasos o secuenciación en la elección del derecho designado
6. RAZONES PARA RECHAZAR O TOMAR EN CUENTA UN ORDEN JURÍDICO EXTRANJERO
7. Razones en contra
8. Razones a favor
9. Ejemplos de resoluciones mexicanas rechazando derecho extranjero
10. Ejemplos de resoluciones mexicanas aceptando el derecho extranjero
11. Tesis del universalismo multicultural

BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 2

SISTEMA CONFLICTUAL TRADICIONAL / Jorge Alberto Silva Silva

1. NORMA DE CONFLICTO TRADICIONAL
2. HACIA UN CONCEPTO DE LA NORMA DE CONFLICTO TRADICIONAL

III. ESTRUCTURA SINTÁCTICA DE LA NORMA DE CONFLICTO

1. Supuesto normativo
2. Orden jurídico por identificar
3. Punto de contacto o de conexión
4. LA NORMA CONFLICTUAL EN LA REVOLUCIÓN CONFLICTUAL
5. DIFERENCIA ENTRE UNA NORMA DE CONFLICTO Y UNA NORMA INCORPORANTE
6. PROBLEMAS QUE SURGEN CON EL ORDEN JURÍDICO DESIGNADO
7. Proceso de bilateralización
8. Falso conflicto

VII. NORMATIVIDAD MEXICANA

BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 3

FUENTES DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO / Rosa Elvira Vargas Baca

1. CONSIDERACIONES PREVIAS
2. FUENTES DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
3. Derecho de fuente interna relacionado con el Derecho Internacional Privado

III. FUENTES DE DERECHO EXTRANJERO RELACIONADOS CON EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO

1. Conferencias Diplomáticas y Congresos
2. Tratados
3. Jurisprudencia internacional
4. Costumbre internacional
5. Doctrina Internacional
6. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 4

FOROS INTERNACIONALES / Rosa Elvira Vargas Baca

1. ASPECTOS PRELIMINARES DE LOS FOROS INTERNACIONALES
2. Conferencia de La Haya
3. Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para el Derecho Mercantil Internacional
4. Instituto Internacional para la Unificación del Derecho Internacional Privado
5. Conferencias Interamericanas de Derecho Internacional Privado
6. Mecanismos de trabajo de los foros internacionales
7. FOROS NACIONALES
8. Seminario Nacional de Derecho Internacional Privado y Comparado
9. Talleres de cooperación procesal internacional

III. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 5

CALIFICACIÓN DEL SUPUESTO NORMATIVO / Mario de la Madrid Andrade

1. CONSIDERACIONES PRELIMINARES
2. EL CONCEPTO DE CALIFICACIÓN JURÍDICA

III. EL PROCESO DE CALIFICACIÓN Y SU RESULTADO

1. EL CONFLICTO DE CALIFICACIONES
2. LOS MÉTODOS DE CALIFICACIÓN
3. La calificación lex fori
4. La calificación lex causae
5. El método comparativo
6. LA CALIFICACIÓN EN MÉXICO

VII. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 6

CUESTIÓN ADYACENTE, PREVIA O INCIDENTAL. PLURALIDAD DE SUPUESTOS NORMATIVOS / Ligia Claudia González Lozano y Nuria González Martín

1. CONCEPTO, CUESTIONAMIENTOS Y ORÍGEN
2. IDENTIFICACIÓN DE LA CUESTIÓN PRINCIPAL U ORIGINAL Y DE LA ADYACENTE

III. SISTEMAS DE RESOLUCIÓN DE LA CUESTIÓN ORIGINAL Y ADYACENTE

1. Independencia o autonomía de la cuestión previa
2. Absorción o dependiente
3. Armonización y mayor proximidad
4. PROBLEMAS Y ARGUMENTOS
5. ¿Subsunción o autonomía?
6. Posibilidades argumentativas a tomarse en cuenta
7. POSIBLES ESCENARIOS SEGÚN MÉTODO QUE SE APLIQUE
8. REGLAMENTACIÓN MEXICANA

VII. CONCLUSIÓN

VIII. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 7

EL REENVÍO Y SU REGULACIÓN EN EL DERECHO CIVIL MEXICANO / Francisco José Contreras Vaca

1. INTRODUCCIÓN
2. ORIGEN DEL REENVÍO

III. CONCEPTO DE REENVIO

1. TRATAMIENTODEL REENVÍO EN LA LEGISLACIÓN CIVIL FEDERAL MEXICANA Y LA APLICABLE EN LA CIUDAD DE MÉXICO.
2. CRITICAS A LA REGULACIÓN DEL REENVIO EN MÉXICO.
3. CONCLUSIONES

VII. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 8

VULNERACIÓN DEL ORDEN PÚBLICO / Elí Rodríguez Martínez

1. INTRODUCCIÓN
2. UN VISTAZO RÁPIDO A LA HISTORIA

III. CONCEPTO

1. EL ORDEN PÚBLICO EN EL “DERECHO PÚBLICO” Y EN EL “DERECHO PRIVADO”
2. El orden público en el derecho público
3. El orden público en el derecho privado
4. CONCEPTOS SIMILARES
5. Leyes de orden público
6. Normas de orden público
7. Excepción de orden público
8. CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL ORDEN PÚBLICO INTERNACIONAL

VII. EFECTOS DEL ORDEN PÚBLICO INTERNACIONAL

1. Efectos con respecto a la ley aplicable
2. Efectos con relación el grado de incompatibilidad con las normas del foro

VIII. EL ORDEN PÚBLICO Y LAS NORMAS DE POLICÍA

1. EL ORDEN PÚBLICO INTERNACIONAL EN EL DERECHO MEXICANO
2. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 9

INSTITUCIONES IDÉNTICAS, ANÁLOGAS Y DESCONOCIDAS / Karl August Prinz von Sachsen Gessaphe

1. INTRODUCCIÓN
2. INTERPRETACIÓN DEL ART. 14 Fracc. III CCFED
3. Aplicabilidad de la norma
4. Carácter de la norma

III. INSTITUCIONES O PROCEDIMIENTOS DESCONOCIDOS

1. Instituciones desconocidas
2. Procedimientos desconocidos
3. INSTITUCIONES O PROCEDIMIENTOS ANÁLOGOS
4. Método funcional
5. Aplicación a ejemplos
6. IMPEDIMENTO AL FALTAR INSTITUCIONES ANÁLOGAS
7. RESUMEN
8. Instituciones y procedimientos desconocidos
9. Instituciones análogas en derecho mexicano
10. Consecuencia al faltar instituciones análogas
11. Delimitación de la contrariedad al orden público

VII. CONCLUSIÓN

VIII. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 10

FRAUDE A LA LEY / Nuria González Martín

1. ELEMENTOS PRELIMINARES
2. MANIPULACIÓN DE LOS PUNTOS DE CONTACTO

III. PRECISIÓN DEL CONCEPTO DE FRAUDE A LA LEY

1. Fraude como delito
2. Simulación
3. Vulneración del orden público
4. ELEMENTOS CARACTERÍSTICOS DEL FRAUDE A LA LEY
5. ELEMENTOS ESPECIALES A TOMAR EN CUENTA
6. Evasión artificiosa
7. Evasión de los principios fundamentales del orden jurídico
8. Determinar la intención fraudulenta
9. SANCIÓN PARA QUIEN DEFRAUDE A LA LEY
10. Nulidad del acto extranjero
11. No reconocimiento de efectos

VII. EJEMPLOS ILUSTRATIVOS

1. Caso Bauffremont-Bibescu
2. Divorcios al vapor

VIII. REGLAMENTACIÓN MEXICANA

A MODO DE CONCLUSIÓN

BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 11

DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO Y DERECHOS HUMANOS. CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE SU INTERACCIÓN A FAVOR DE LA PERSONA, LA NIÑEZ Y LA FAMILIA / Jorge Cicero Fernández

1. INTRODUCCIÓN
2. LOS TRATADOS SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS

1 Su naturaleza y alcances

2. Derechos protegidos y deberes estatales

III. TRATADOS DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO “CONCERNIENTES A LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS”

1. EL CONSEJO DE EUROPA

1 Desarrollos normativos

2. La Jurisprudencia del TEDH
3. LA JURISPRUDENCIA Y LA PRÁCTICA JUDICIAL MEXICANAS

CONCLUSIÓN

BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA […]

CAPÍTULO 12

APLICACIÓN ARMÓNICA Y ADAPTACIÓN DE ORDENAMIENTOS INTERPRETACIÓN ENANTEOTÉLICA E INTERPRETACIÓN EQUITATIVA / Rolando Tamayo y Salmorán

I PRELIMINARIA

1. Prudentia y prudentia iuris

III. LA PROFESIÓN JURÍDICA

1. ¿CÓMO SE CONOCE EL DERECHO?
2. Genesis iurisprudentiæ
3. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 13

INTERPRETACIÓN Y REFORMULACIÓN DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO / Jorge Alberto Silva Silva

1. INTRODUCCIÓN
2. RESUMIENDO LOS CAPÍTULOS ANTERIORES

III. EXPRESIONES Y CONCEPTOS

1. LA TAREA DEL JUEZ
2. EL DIPR ES UNA DISCIPLINA DIFÍCIL
3. LA LEGISLACIÓN COMO UN CAOS FENOMÉNICO

VII. PROBLEMAS DE APLICACIÓN Y DECISIÓN

VIII. UN ACERCAMIENTO A LA ACTIVIDAD REFORMULATORIA

1. PROCESO INTELECTUAL
2. Reformulación a partir de textos legislados
3. Reformulación a partir de ausencia de textos legislados
4. MANIPULACIÓN CONFLICTUAL
5. CONCLUSIONES

XII. BIBLIOHEMEROGRAFÍA

CAPÍTULO 14

EXÉGESIS DEL DERECHO CONVENCIONAL INTERNACIONAL. CONVENIOS EN VIGOR RELACIONADOS CON LA PARTE GENERAL DEL DIPr / Nuria González Martín

1. NOTA PRELIMINAR
2. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE NORMAS GENERALES DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO

III. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE DOMICILIO DE LAS PERSONAS FÍSICAS EN EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO

1. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE CONFLICTOS DE LEYES EN MATERIA DE ADOPCIÓN DE MENORES
2. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE PERSONALIDAD Y CAPACIDAD DE LAS PERSONAS JURÍDICAS EN EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
3. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE CONFLICTOS DE LEYES EN MATERIA DE LETRAS DE CAMBIO, PAGARÉS Y FACTURAS

VII. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE CONFLICTO DE LEYES EN MATERIA DE SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES

VIII. CONVENCIÓN INTERAMERICANA SOBRE PRUEBA E INFORMACIÓN ACERCA DEL DERECHO EXTRANJERO

APÉNDICE

ANÁLISIS DEL CASO ANTENOR PATIÑO VS. MARIA CRISTINA DE BORBÓN: UNA RELECTURA / Francisco José Contreras Vaca

1. INTRODUCCIÓN
2. PLANTEAMIENTO DE LA CONTROVERSIA.

III. ESTUDIO DE LA LITIS

1. El problema de reconocimiento de validez y ejecución de sentencias dictadas por tribunales extranjeros.
2. El problema de la litispendencia y conexidad en la esfera internacional.
3. Consideraciones generales.
4. CONCLUSIÓN

 

A conference on the location of damage in private international law will be held at Paris Cité University on 30 and 31 May 2022.

The conference is convened by Olivera Boskovic and Caroline Kleiner. Speakers include Laurence Idot, Ugljesa Grusic, Aline Tenenbaum, Dmitriy Galuschko, Etienne Farnoux, Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Ludovic Pailler, Symeon C. Symeonides, Tristan Azzi, Zhengxing Huo, Yuko Nishitani, Yves El Hage, Matthias Lehmann, Sandrine Clavel, François Mailhé, Cyril Nourissat, Sarah Laval, Maud Minois and Pascal de Vareilles-Sommières.

The conference is structured in two parts. The first will be dedicated to the location of damage in specific field of the law (competition law, financial law, personality rights, environment, etc.). The second will address general topics such as party autonomy or cyber torts

The full programme of the conference and details about location and registration can be found here.

Under the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, maintenance obligations are governed by the law of the State of habitual residence of the creditor, save where the Protocol itself provides otherwise [Article 3(1)]. Echoing the issues pertaining to the so-called conflit mobile, the Protocol provides also that in the case of a change in the habitual residence of the creditor, the law of the State of the new habitual residence is to apply as from the moment when the change occurs [Article 3(2)].

If the creditor is a child, does a wrongful removal – followed by an order commanding to return the child to the State in which he/she habitually resided immediately prior to the wrongful removal – constitute an obstacle to the acquisition of a new place of habitual residence by the creditor? This is the legal issue that the Court addresses in its judgment handed down this Thursday in the case W.J., C-644/20.

The Court decided to answer the preliminary question without first requesting its Advocate General to present an Opinion. It did so in a negative: the fact that a court of a Member State has ordered, in separate proceedings, the return of that child to the State in which he/she was habitually resident immediately before his/her wrongful removal is not sufficient to prevent that child from acquiring new habitual residence in the Member State to which the child was removed.

In brief, its reasoning may be summarized as follows:

• also for the purposes of the Hague Protocol, the notion of ‘habitual residence’ calls for it autonomous interpretation (paragraph 62);

  interestingly, while the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the Protocol and does so with a binding effect with regards to the Member States, the Protocol is also binding for non-Member States; that being said, the plead for autonomous interpretation seems justified also from the perspective of extra-EU parties to the Protocol, although it is yet to be seen whether they will align with the interpretation provided for by the Court, its methods of said interpretation and references to Charter).

• the habitual residence of the maintenance creditor is that of the place where on the facts his or her habitual centre of life is located, taking into account his or her family and social environment (paragraph 66),
• as a connecting factor for determination of law applicable to maintenance obligations, the notion of ‘habitual residence’ is heavily factual – it is the presence with a territory of a particular State that matters the most; as a consequence, it is only in the context of an assessment of all the circumstances of the case before it that, while taking into due consideration the best interests of that child, the national court hearing the case may find it necessary to take into account the potentially wrongful nature of the removal or retention of that child and conclude that the degree of stability of presence within the territory of a Member State does not allow to conclude that the child habitual resides in that State (paragraph 73).

The judgment is available here, in French. A press release in English can be found here.

Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter has been a divisive event. Commenting on the response on Twitter and elsewhere, Musk tweeted:

The extreme antibody reaction from those who fear free speech says it all

>

By “free speech”, I simply mean that which matches the law.

I am against censorship that goes far beyond the law.

If people want less free speech, they will ask government to pass laws to that effect.

Therefore, going beyond the law is contrary to the will of the people.

Ralf Michaels quote-tweeted perceptively: ‘But which law?’

Twitter and the conflict of laws

By their very nature, digital platforms like Twitter present a variety of conflict of laws issues.

‘Twitter’ is not a monolithic entity. The functionality of the social media platform with which readers would be familiar is underpinned by a transnational corporate group. Twitter, Inc is incorporated in Delaware, and has various subsidiaries around the world; Twitter International Company, for example, is incorporated in Ireland and responsible as data controller for users that live outside of the United States. The business is headquartered in San Francisco but has offices, assets, and thousands of staff around the world.

The platform is populated by 400 million users from all over the world. After the US, the top 5 countries with the most Twitter users are comprised of Japan, India, the UK and Brazil. The tweets and retweets of those users may be seen all over the world. Users have wielded that functionality for all sorts of ends: to report on Russia’s war in real-time; to coordinate an Arab Spring; to rally for an American coup d’état; to share pictures of food, memes, and endless screams; and to share conflict of laws scholarship.

Disputes involving material on Twitter thus naturally include foreign elements. Where disputes crystallise into litigation, a court may be asked to consider what system of law should determine a particular issue. When the issue concerns whether speech is permissible, the answer may be far from simple.

Free speech in the conflict of laws

The treatment of freedom of speech in the conflict of laws depends on the system of private international law one is considering, among other things. (The author is one of those heathens that eschews the globalist understanding of our discipline.)

Alex Mills has written that the balance between free speech and other important interests ‘is at the heart of any democratic political order’.[1] Issues involving free speech may thus engage issues of public policy, or ordre public,[2] as well as constitutional considerations.

From the US perspective, the ‘limits of free speech’ on Twitter is likely to be addressed within the framework of the First Amendment, even where foreign elements are involved. As regards private international law, the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage (SPEECH) Act 28 USC 4101- 4105 (‘SPEECH Act’) is demonstrative. It operates in aid of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and provides that a US ‘domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation unless the domestic court determines that’ the relevant foreign law would provide the same protections for freedom of speech as would be afforded by the US Constitution.[3]

Other common law jurisdictions have approached transnational defamation issues differently, and not with explicit reference to any capital-c constitutional rights. In Australia, the High Court has held that the lex loci delicti choice-of-law rule combined with a multiple publication rule means that defamation is determined by the law of the jurisdiction in which a tweet is ‘available in comprehensible form’: the place or places it is downloaded.[4] In contrast, where a claim concerns a breach of confidence on Twitter, an Australian court is likely to apply the equitable principles of the lex fori even if the information was shared into a foreign jurisdiction without authorisation.[5] In either case, constitutional considerations are sidelined.

The balance to be struck between free speech on the one hand, and so-called ‘personality rights’ on the other, is a controversial issue within a legal system, let alone between legal systems. So for example, the choice-of-law rule for non-contractual obligations provided by the Rome II Regulation does not apply to personality rights, as a consensus could not be reached on point.[6] Similarly, defamation and privacy are excluded from the scope of the HCCH Judgments Convention by Art 2(1)(k)–(l).

There is a diversity of approaches to choice of law for cross-border infringements of personality rights between legal systems.[7] But the ‘law applicable to free speech on Twitter’ is an issue that goes far broader than personality rights. It touches on as many areas of law as there are aspects of human affairs that are affected by the Twitter platform. For example, among other things, the platform may be used to:

• spread misrepresentation about an election, engaging electoral law;
• influence the price of assets, engaging banking and finance law; or
• promote products, engaging consumer law.

Issues falling into different areas of law may be subject to different choice-of-law rules, and different systems of applicable law. What one system characterises as an issue for the proper law of the contract could be treated as an issue for a forum statute in another.

All of this is to say: determining what ‘the law says’ about certain content on Twitter is a far more complex issue than Elon Musk has suggested.

The law applicable to online dignity

Key to the divisiveness of Musk’s acquisition is his position on content moderation. Critics worry that a laissez-faire approach to removing objectionable content on the platform will lead to a resurgence of hate speech.

Musk’s vision for a freer Twitter will be subject to a variety of national laws that seek to protect dignity at the cost of free speech in various ways. For example, in April, the European Parliament agreed on a ‘Digital Services Act’, while in the UK, at the time of writing, an ‘Online Safety Bill’ is in the House of Commons. In Australia, an Online Safety Act was passed in 2021, which provided an ‘existing Online Content Scheme [with] new powers to regulate illegal and restricted content no matter where it’s hosted’. That scheme complements various other national laws, like our Racial Discrimination Act 1975, which outlaws speech that is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of people, and was done because of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of the person or group.

When a person in the United States posts content about an Australian that is permissible under US law, but violates Australian statute, the difficulty of Musk’s position on the limits of censorship becomes clear. Diverse legal systems come to diverse positions on the appropriate balance between allowing online freedom and protecting human dignity, which are often struck with mandatory law. When your platform is frequented by millions of users all over the world, there is no single ‘will of the people’ by which to judge. Perhaps Musk will embrace technological solutions to give effect to national standards on what sort of content must be censored.

A host of other conflicts issues

Musk-era Twitter is likely to pose a smorgasbord of other issues for interrogation by conflict of laws enthusiasts.

For example: legal systems take diverse approaches to the issue of whether a foreign parent company behind a platform like Twitter can be imposed with liability, or even criminal responsibility, for content that is on the platform. While conservatives in America consider the fate of s 230 of the Communications Decency Act—a provision that means that Twitter is not publisher of content they host—other countries take a very different view of the issue. Litigation involving the companies behind Twitter is likely to engage courts’ long-arm jurisdiction.

Perhaps the thorniest conflicts problem that may emerge on Musk’s Twitter is the scope of national laws that concern disinformation. In an announcement on 25 April, Musk stated:

‘Free speech is the bedrock of a functioning democracy, and Twitter is the digital town square where matters vital to the future of humanity are debated’.

Recent years have shown that the future of humanity is not necessarily benefited by free speech on social media. How many lives were lost as a result of vaccine-scepticism exacerbated by the spread of junk science on social media? How many democracies have been undermined by Russian disinformation campaigns on Twitter? The extraterritorial application of forum statutes to deal with these kinds of issues may pose a recurring challenge for Musk’s vision.[8] I look forward to tweeting about it.

Michael Douglas is Senior Lecturer at UWA Law School and a consultant in litigation at Bennett + Co, Perth.

 

[1] Alex Mills, ‘The Law Applicable to Cross-border Defamation on Social Media: Whose Law Governs Free Speech in “Facebookistan”?’ (2015) 7 Journal of Media Law 1, 21.

[2] See, eg, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 19(3).

[3] SPEECH Act s 3; United States Code, title 28, Part VI, § 4102. See generally Lili Levi, ‘The Problem of Trans-National Libel’ (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 507.

[4] Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575.

[5] But see Michael Douglas, ‘Characterisation of Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Tort in Private International Law’ (2018) 41 UNSW Law Journal 490.

[6] Art 4(1); see Andrew Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2008).

[7] See generally Symeon C Symeonides, Cross-Border Infringement of Personality Rights via the Internet (Brill, 2021) ch VI; Tobias Lutzi, Private International Law Online: Internet and Civil Liability in the EU (Oxford University Press, 2020) ch 4.

[8] See generally Matthias Lehmann, ‘New Challenges of Extraterritoriality: Superposing Laws’ in Franco Ferrari and Diego P Fernández Arroyo (eds), Private International Law: Contemporary Challenges and Continuing Relevance (Edward Elgar, 2019) ch 10.

Through a comfort letter, one party promises to indemnify a creditor if the latter’s debtor does not pay. This is a means for improving the credit of another party. Particularly widespread are comfort letters issued by a parent company for its subsidiary or vice versa.

But where can the creditor sue if the comfort letter is not honoured? And which law applies to these instruments?

These questions were addressed in a decision by the Court of Appeal of Brandenburg dated 25 November 2020 (reprinted in IPRax 2022, pp. 175 et seq., with a comment by Maximilian Pika, id. pp. 159 et seq.).

Facts

A company incorporated under Danish law and headquartered in Copenhagen had provided a comfort letter for one of its subsidiaries in Germany who operated an airport there. Subsequently, insolvency proceedings over the subsidiary were opened in Germany. The insolvency administrator sued the Danish parent company in a German court on the basis of the comfort letter.

In deciding whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case, the Court of Appeal of Brandenburg first discards the insolvency exception in Art 1(2)(d) Brussels I bis Regulation. It argues – quite correctly – that this exception only covers claims that are grounded in insolvency law, but not those under general civil and commercial law. The present claim was one under general civil and commercial law, independently of the fact that it was brought by the insolvency administrator, and thus fell inside the scope of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.

How to Characterise a Comfort Letter?

The Court toys with the idea to characterise the comfort letter as a contract for the “provision of services”, which could potentially lead to the Court’s jurisdiction under Art 7(1)(b) Brussels I bis. However, the Court underlines that in this case, the place of performance would not be in its district, but in that of the debtor’s domicile, as the obligation arising from the comfort letter would have to be paid there.

The same would be true, according to the Court, if the comfort letter were to be considered as a simple contract for payment, which would fall under Art 7(1)(a) Brussels Ibis. This provision requires to determine the place of performance under the applicable law (see on its forerunner, Article 5(1) Brussels Convention, CJEU, Tessili, para. 15).

In this context, the Court takes the view that the comfort letter, regardless of whether it is seen as a unilateral declaration of the creditor or a contract, falls under the Rome I Regulation.

In the opinion of the court, the comfort letter had been submitted to German law, as clearly demonstrated by the circumstances of the case, in particular the choice of the German language, the fact that it was issued for the benefit of a German debtor, and that it was submitted to German air traffic authorities to maintain the license of the debtor. Under German substantive law (sec. 269 German Civil Code), payment obligations have to be performed at the creditor’s domicile. Hence, Danish and not German courts would have jurisdiction under Art 7(1)(a) Brussels I bis as well.

Assessment

Under an autonomous European interpretation, the notion “contracts of services” has to be defined broadly. The Court could have been courageous and just applied Art 7(1)(b) Brussels Ibis. This would have made things much simpler.

However, there is little to quarrel with the result the court has reached. Comfort letters are performed at the domicile of the issuer, or one of the three places mentioned in Art 63(1) Brussels Ibis in case of a company as an issuer, and actions based on them have to be brought there.

This result will be little comfort for those who have received a comfort letter. They should make sure that the letter states a suitable place of performance. Even better is to insist on the insertion of a choice-of-forum clause.

This is the first in a series of posts on the French draft code of private international law of March 2022.

The draft code of private international law contains one single provision on renvoi.

The Proposed Rule

Article 8 of the draft code reads:

Unless provided otherwise in this code, the designation of foreign law includes its rules of private international law. However, French courts and authorities have the obligation to apply those rules only if one party requests it.

The explanatory report explains that the working group debated whether to “maintain” renvoi. The doubts of the working group were based on “comparative law” and the facts that the Hague conventions typically exclude renvoi. Nevertheless, the report explains, it was decided to maintain renvoi, because the Cour de cassation has recently applied it, and because the doctrine has benefits when it leads to the application of a law which is easier to apply for French courts (the explanatory report then gives the example of art 34 of the Succession Regulation).

Assessment

According to the explanatory report, the working group considered that the purpose of its work was to improve accessibility and intelligibility of the law. Article 8 is not fully satisfactory in this respect.

Article 8 suggests that French courts should always apply foreign choice of law rules. It does not explain whether this should only be the case where the foreign choice of law rule refers to the law of the forum, and, when it does not, whether the law of the third state designated by the foreign choice of law rule should accept renvoi.  In other words, Article 8 does not distinguish between first degree renvoi and second degree renvoi, and does not clarify whether whether second degree is allowed even if it is third or fourth degree renvoi. In fact, a literary interpretation of Article 8 could lead to the conclusion that the provision introduces the English foreign court theory where foreign choice of law rules are applicable without any further requirement.

The explanatory report suggests that the working group conducted a comparative study which revealed that renvoi is typically excluded. It is true that some modern PIL legislations have excluded it, such as Article 15 of the Belgian Code of Private International Law. Yet, many other legislations in the civil law world allow renvoi broadly. If the working group was going to maintain renvoi, maybe it would have been useful to take a look at these other legislations and see with which precision they regulate the issue.

To only take one example, the working group could have looked at the Italian 1995 Private International Law Act, which allows renvoi, and defines its regime much more precisely.

Article 13 Renvoi

1 Whenever reference is made to a foreign law in the following articles, account shall be taken of the renvoi made by foreign private international law to the law in force in another State if:

a) renvoi is accepted under the law of that State.

b) renvoi is made to Italian law.

2 Paragraph 1 shall not apply: a) to those cases in which the provisions of this law make the foreign law applicable according to the choice of law made by the parties concerned; b) with respect to the statutory form of acts; c) as related to the provisions of Chapter XI of this Title.

3 In the cases referred to in Articles 33, 34 and 35, account shall be taken of the renvoi only if the latter refers to a law allowing filiation to be established.

4 Where this law makes an international convention applicable in any event, the solution adopted in the convention in matters of renvoi shall always apply.

Article 34 of the Succession Regulation is also much more detailed than the draft provision of the French code. Whether it was the perfect example to justify the adoption of first degree renvoi is unclear, however, since Article 34 does not require that the law of a third state refers back to the law of the forum, but to the law of another Member State, and that it will not always be easier for a French court to apply the law of another Member State (say Finland) than the law of a third state (say Switzerland).

Aldricus – Warna rambut yang cocok dan sesuai dengan warna kulit dapat membantu wajah menjadi lebih berseri dan segar. Untuk kulit wanita Indonesia, memilih warna-warna lembut seperti coklat adalah salah satu pilihan yang paling banyak diminati. Diantara sekian banyak variasi warna coklat untuk pewarna rambut, ada variasi cat rambut coklat yang paling glamor dan membuat tampilan lebih trendy.

Cokelat Gelap Untuk Kesan Natural

Warna rambut paling aman bagi mereka yang pertama kali mewarnai rambut adalah coklat tua. Selain lebih mudah diaplikasikan karena tidak membutuhkan bleaching sebelum diwarnai, dark brown juga cocok untuk semua warna kulit.

Anda dapat mencoba pilihan warna Dark Brown (3) dan Pearly Brown (4.2) dari L`oréal Paris Excellence Crème untuk mendapatkan warna cokelat tua yang cantik. Pilihan warna ini juga cocok untuk Anda yang ingin menutupi uban dan membuatnya terlihat lebih berkilau dan alami.

Cokelat Kemerahan Untuk Tampilan Menawan

Memilih cat rambut coklat kemerahan dapat membantu menambah nuansa pada wajah Anda. Warna ini akan menambah kesan mewah bagi pemilik kulit putih. Warna Light Auburn lebih disukai karena tidak berwarna tetapi memberikan cahaya merah yang mengejutkan saat terkena sinar matahari.

Pilihan warna L`oreal Paris Excellence Crème’s Chocolate Brown (5.35) dan Light Auburn (6.45) bisa menjadi pilihan Anda saat ingin mencoba tampilan berbeda dengan warna coklat kemerahan yang cantik.

Cokelat Terang Untuk Rambut Bergelombang

Jika Anda memiliki rambut bergelombang, warna coklat muda bisa menjadi pilihan warna rambut yang tepat. Warna rambut coklat muda yang dipadukan dengan tekstur rambut bergelombang menciptakan kesan wajah yang lebih hidup.

Pilihan warna ini cocok untuk Anda yang memiliki kulit putih atau cokelat karena akan memberikan kesan segar dan cerah pada wajah. Coba L`oréal Paris Excellence Crème Light Brown (5) untuk tampilan awet muda.

Cokelat Keunguan Untuk Tampilan Anggun

Cat rambut coklat coklat keunguan ini bisa menjadi pilihan jika Anda memiliki warna kulit cerah atau gelap dan ingin tampil lebih gaya namun dengan kesan yang berbeda. Pilihan warna ini sangat cocok untuk wanita dewasa yang tetap ingin terlihat sedikit playful tanpa menghilangkan tampilan dewasanya. Anda bisa mencoba pilihan L’Oreal Paris Excellence Crème’s Purple Brown (4.26) untuk mendapatkan warna rambut yang tepat.

The post Warna Cat Rambut Coklat yang Sedang Tren appeared first on Aldri Blog.

In July 2018, the French Minister of Justice invited Jean-Pierre Ancel, a former judge of the Cour de cassation (French supreme court for private and criminal matters) to establish a working group for the purpose of reflecting on the codification of French private international law.

In March 2022, the working group handed its work to the Ministry of Justice. It includes a draft code of private international law of 207 provisions, and an explanatory report.

The working group was essentially composed of judges and academics. It included very few members of the bar, and no corporate lawyers (whether from the bar or in house).

National Codification in a Context of EU Harmonisation

As all readers will know, the private international law of EU Member States is dominated by EU legislation. EU Regulations are of universal application in the field of choice law. They occupy a large part of the field of jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments.

Of course, the working group and the draft code recognise this fact, and the working group has abstained to propose rules on issues clearly regulated by EU law.

Nevertheless, one wonders whether it is really worth codifying private international law at national level, and whether it would not be more useful to promote codification at EU level (GEDIP has been reflecting on this for a while and EAPIL has also established a working group).

Interestingly, the Minister of Justice alluded to the issue in its letter inviting judge Ancel to establish the working group (reproduced in annex to the explanatory report). The Minister insisted that a French code would help promoting French law in European and international circles where, the Minister stated, more modern and accessible foreign legislations prevail. This likely explains why the explanatory report states that codification of French private international law will improve the attractiveness of French law.

Presentation of the Code

On 21 October 2022, the French Committee of Private International Law will organise a conference aimed at presenting the draft code.

In the coming weeks, the EAPIL Blog will publish presentations and commentaries of the most salient provisions of the draft code by French and European scholars. The Editors invite readers interested in contributing to this debate to contact them.

The Pax Moot Borrás Round of 2022 took place in Paris on 4 to 6 May. The preliminary rounds and semi-finals were held at the Universities of Sciences-Pio and Paris-Dauphine; the finals took place at the Commercial Court on the Quai de la Corse.

The University of Ljubljana won the oral rounds, with the University of Ghent as runner-up.

For the written memorials two teams share the winning position: the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano and the Universität Wien.

Santiago García Parga, from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid won the prize for the best pleader.

The European Commission co-funds the moot court.

A web conference regarding the role of the internet and other technologies within the EU and the international legal order will take place on 13 May 2022, organised by the editorial team of Lex & Forum, a quarterly on Private International Law and International Civil and Commercial Litigation.

Symeon Symeonides (Willamette University) will chair the conference. He will also deliver a presentation in English on the infringement of personality rights via the internet.

The conference will be opened by Dan Svantesson (Bond University) with a presentation on Private International Law and the Internet.

The remaining presentations, in Greek, will be delivered by Ioannis Delicostopoulos (University of Athens), on Personality infringements via internet publications within
the EU legal order, Ioannis Revolidis (University of Malta), on International Jurisdiction and the Blockchain – Time for new rules on international jurisdiction?, Nikolaos Zaprianos (Solicitor) on Smart contracts: Selected issues of civil and private international law, and Konstantinos Voulgarakis (Solicitor), on ICOs: Selected issues of jurisdiction and law applicable.

For registration, click here.

Dr Sophie Duroy and Dr Rishi Gulati, both presently members of the KFG Berlin Potsdam Research Group ‘The International Rule of Law – Rise or Decline?’, will be hosting a virtual half-day webinar titled “Global Security and the International Rule of Law: Interdisciplinary Perspectives” on 30 May 2022. The event is free to attend. A program and link to registration is below:

https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/global-security-and-the-international-rule-of-law-tickets-331724325387

Two recent private international law articles were published by International and Comparative Law Quarterly:

B Marshall, “Asymmetric Jurisdiction Clauses and the Anomaly created by Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation”

The English Court of Appeal and German Bundesgerichtshof recently decided that Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies to asymmetric jurisdiction clauses. This article contends that while this conclusion is sound, separating the ‘clause’ into two ‘agreements’ to reach it is not. This disaggregation prevents a solution to the anomaly that Article 31(2) creates for asymmetric clauses, where a lender sues under its option and the borrower subsequently sues in the anchor court. This article proposes a solution, based on a uniform characterisation of the clause as a whole, which protects the lender’s option and mitigates the risk of parallel proceedings

TD Grant, “Arbitration, Corruption and Post-Award Control in French and English Courts”

In September 2021, the French Cour de Cassation reversed the annulment that the Paris Cour d’appel earlier had granted in regard to an arbitral award in Alexander Brothers v Alstom on grounds of corruption. This brought French courts in line with their English counterparts, at least in that one case, the latter having accepted the Alexander Brothers award as enforceable. Noteworthy beyond the welcome consistency that the recent French judgment imparts in one case, that and other recent judgments cast light on several issues in international arbitration, including the arbitrability of allegations of fraud or corruption, the relevance of evidence of corruption ‘downstream’ from a contract, and the legal effects (if any) on third parties of internal compliance regimes that enterprises adopt in response to national regulatory and enforcement actions in respect of corruption.

 

As announced on this blog, the Journal of Private International Law-Singapore Management University Virtual Conference on Conflicts of Jurisdiction will be held online on 23 to 24 June 2022 (6.00 pm to 10.20 pm Singapore time, 11.00 am to 3.20 pm British Summer Time on each day). The event is supported by the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH).

The conference is intended to support the ongoing work of the HCCH on Jurisdiction.

The speakers are leading private international law scholars and experts, many of whom are directly involved in the ongoing negotiations at the HCCH.

Attendance at the conference is complimentary for academics, government and international organisation officials, Journal of Private International Law Advisory Board members and students. Registration is required.

More information on the conference and the link to register can be found here.

The CJEU a little while back held in C‑498/20 ZK v BMA on the applicable law for the Dutch ‘Peeters Gatzen’ suit, for which I reviewed the AG Opinion here. The suit is  a tortious suit brought by a liquidator. In Nk v BNP Paribas the CJEU held at the jurisdictional level it is covered by Brussels Ia, not by the Insolvency Regulation.

A first issue of note, which I discuss at some length in my earlier post, is whether the liability is carved-out from Rome II as a result of the lex societatis provision. The CJEU confirms the AG’s contextual analysis, without repeating his general criterion, emphasises the need for restrictive interpretation, and specifically for the duty of care holds that liability resulting from a duty of care of a corporation’s bodies and the outside world, is covered by Rome II. This is important for business and human rights litigation, too: [55]

Pour ce qui concerne spécifiquement le manquement au devoir de diligence en cause au principal, il convient de distinguer selon qu’il s’agit du devoir spécifique de diligence découlant de la relation entre l’organe et la société, qui ne relève pas du champ d’application matériel du règlement Rome II, ou du devoir général de diligence  erga omnes, qui en relève. Il appartient à la seule juridiction de renvoi de l’apprécier.

The referring judge will have to decide whether the case engages the duty of care vis-a-vis the wider community (including the collectivity of creditors) however it would seem most likely that it does. If it does, locus damni is held, confirming the AG view, to be The Netherlands if the referring judge finds that the insolvent corporation’s seat is based there. The financial damage with the creditors is indirect only and does not establish jurisdiction.

[44] Should a judge decide that they do not have jurisdiction over the main claim, they also and necessarily have to relinquish jurisdiction over the warranty /guarantee claim against a third party under A8(2) BIa. CJEU Sovag is referred to in support.

Geert.

#CJEU this morning in ZK v BMA on jurisdiction and applicable law for the Peeters Gatzen #insolvency suit.

See my review of the Opinion AG here https://t.co/9eVzlPMQPX
Judgment herehttps://t.co/jtJJXerEld

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) March 10, 2022

Pal v Damen & Anor [2022] EWHC 4697 (QB) is another application (compare Clarke v Kalecinski) of Brussels Ia’s consumer section to cosmetic surgery contracts. Respectfully, the analysis is a botched job.

Claims are both in contract and in tort, as is usual in this type of litigation. Jurisdiction on the basis of the consumer title against the Belgium-based surgeon is undisputed, as is the lack of jurisdiction under Article 7(2)’s tort gateway against the clinic where the surgery was performed, locus damni (direct damage, CJEU Marinari) and locus delicti commissi both being in Belgium. The core question is whether there is a contract between surgeon and /or the clinic and the patient, and whether this is a consumer contract.

The second question needs to be determined first. The clinic essentially provides the hardware for the surgeon, but also ensures patient flow via its website http://www.wellnesskliniek.com which without a doubt meets with the  CJEU Pammer /Alpenhof criteria and therefore ‘directs its activities’ towards the UK. Its general terms and conditions, of which it is somewhat disputed that claimant ticked the relevant box, state ia that the clinic ‘is not party to the treatment agreement between the physician and the patient.’ 

The  expert evidence [25] ff centres around Belgian law. Expert for one of the defendants is their Belgian counsel, and Cook M dismisses his report [55] as not meeting relevant CPR requirements on expert evidence. On the basis of the remaining evidence, the judge finds [59]

the Claimant has established a good arguable case for the existence of a contract for medical treatment and /or medical services between her and the Surgeon and accordingly this Court has jurisdiction over that claim. The Claimant has failed to establish a good arguable case for the existence of a contract for medical treatment and /or medical services against the Clinic and accordingly the Court does not have jurisdiction over that claim.

With respect, the direction of analysis is entirely wrong. The first line of enquiry should have been whether there is a consumer contract with either or both of the Belgian parties, and if there is with one, whether the other party could have been caught in its jurisdictional slipstream. Á la Bonnie Lackey but then in the opposite direction: in Bonnie Lackey the question was whether persons in the immediate orbit of the undisputed ‘consumer’-claimant, may also sue under the consumer title. In current case, the question would be whether those in the immediate vicinity of the business-defendant, may be sued under the consumer title. The existence of a consumer contract is entirely an EU law question, not a Belgian law one.

Next, if the decision were taken that at least one of the parties is not caught by the consumer title, the existence of a ‘contract’ (for the provision of ‘services’) under Article 7(1) would be triggered, as would the forum contractus under Article 7(1)a, with an analysis of where the services were or should have been provided. This, too, is an analysis that requires EU law and EU law alone. [There is no trace in the judgment of a choice of court and /or law which for the former per A25 Brussels Ia may require Belgian law, with renvoi, a lex fori prorogati but even then only for the material ‘consent’ issue].

Belgian law does not come into this analysis at all, unless, potentially and most unlikely, one argues that the A7(1) analysis requires the conflicts method, should a contract for medical services not be caught by Article 7(1)’s ‘provision of services’: in that case, Rome I’s decision tree would be required to determine lex contractus and place of performance. Even then however it is not at all certain that Belgian law would be the outcome of Rome I’s matrix.

Geert.

EU Private International Law, 3rd ed. 2021, 2.222 ff, 2.385 ff.

Consumer contract re plastic surgery, jurisdiction
Whether contract exists with BE surgeon alone or also his clinic
Odd descent into BE substantive law
'Expert' reports largely held inadmissible
On the blog soon

Pal v Damen & Anor [2022] EWHC 4697 (QB) https://t.co/GgFEsYZrYP

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) May 5, 2022