Droit international général

The provisions of the Brussels I bis Regulation on insurance matters (Articles 10-16) are complex and often misunderstood. Now the CJEU has clarified their scope in an important judgment.

A British domiciliary, BT, had an accident on a Spanish property. He brought a suit in Britain against not only the Spanish insurer of the property (Seguros Catalana Occidente), but also against the insured landlord (BE). BE, being domiciled in the Republic of Ireland, objected to the jurisdiction of the British courts.

Incidentally, this was one of the last preliminary references submitted by a British court before Brexit. The County Court at Birkenhead sought clarification on the meaning of Art 13(3) Brussels Ibis, which gives parallel jurisdiction over the injured party and the insured where the applicable law allows the latter to be joined as a party (which apparently English law does).

Disputes over liability in insurance matters usually involve three parties: the victim (the “injured party” in the terminology of Section 3 of the Brussels I bis Regulation), the tortfeasor (the “insured person” in the terminology of the same section), and the tortfeasor’s insurer. Hence, the issue in the present case was whether Article 13(3) Brussels I bis allows the injured party to sue the insured party and the insurer in the same court under the special jurisdiction rules of Section 3.

The CJEU’s answer is negative. It ruled that the insured person could not be joined to the claim brought by the injured party against the insurer in the court conferred special jurisdiction in a matter relating to insurance. That meant that the County Court at Birkenhead did not have jurisdiction over BT’s claim against BE, but only over BT’s claim against Seguros Catalana Occidente.

This scission of jurisdiction between the dispute against the insured party and the insurer may seem surprising at first, as it appears inefficient and at odds with the principle of the sound administration of justice. Yet the decision of the CJEU is to be applauded.

As the CJEU correctly points out, Section 3 of the Brussels I bis Regulation only deals with “Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance”, as indicated by its heading. The action of BT against EB is not an insurance suit, but rather a typical claim in contract or tort, which is governed by the special jurisdiction rules in Section 2 of the Regulation. This approach of the CJEU draws upon classic arguments arising from the Regulation’s text and structure.

Second, the Court also makes a teleological or purposive argument by stressing that the rules of Section 3 seek to correct a certain imbalance in power between either the injured and/or the insured as the weaker party, and the insurer as the supposedly stronger party. Such imbalance does not exist where neither party to the action is an insurer, like in the case of BT’s claim against BE.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the CJEU had recourse to the legislative history: According to the Jenard Report (p. 32), Article 13(3) of the Brussels I bis Regulation was enacted to give the insurer the possibility of joining the insured as a third party to proceedings between the insurer and the injured person. It was not intended to give the injured person the right to join the insured party to a suit against the insurer. The latter will usually be brought in the home jurisdiction of the injured person, which is allowed under Article 13(2) in conjunction with Article 11(1)(b) of Brussels I bis (see CJEU Case C-463/06 FBTO Schadeverzekeringen NV v. Jack Odenbreit). The CJEU is correct to stress that allowing the injured person to join the claim against the insured person would open the doors to all sorts of manipulation. For instance, the party injured by a tort could bring an action against the insurer and join the tortfeasor to the dispute instead of using the rules on general and on special jurisdiction (Articles 4, 7(2) of Brussels I bis).

In sum, injured persons cannot join insured persons to direct claims they bring against the insured person’s insurer. They have to bring the two actions separately, and possibly in different courts. BT would thus have to sue EB either in Ireland, EB’s country of domicile (Article 4(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation), or in Spain as the place where the alleged harm occurred (Article 7(2)). This seems correct as EB is not an insurer and should thus not be subject to the special jurisdiction rules for matters relating to insurance.

— Many thanks to Amy Held, Felix Krysa and Verena Wodniansky-Wildenfeld for their comments on the draft post.

ARE THE CHAP 2 GENERAL PROTECTIONS IN THE AUSTRALIAN CONSUMER LAW MANDATORY LAWS?

Carlos Santaló Goris, Researcher at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law and Ph.D. candidate at the University of Luxembourg, offers an analysis of the Spanish statistics on the European Small Claims Procedure.

Until 2017, the annual number of European Small Claims Proceedings (“ESCP”) in Spain was relatively small, with an average of 50 ESCPs per year. With some exceptions, this minimal use of the ESCP fits the general trend across Europe (Deloitte Report). However, from 2017 to 2018 the number of ESCPs in Spain increased 286,6%. Against the 60 ESCPs issued in 2017, 172 were issued in 2020. In 2019, the number of ESCPs continued climbing to 492 ESCPs.  This trend reversed in 2020, when there were just 179 ESCPs.

The use of the Regulation establishing the European Payment Order (“EPO Regulation”) experienced a similar fluctuation between 2018 and 2020. Since its entry into force, the EPO Regulation was significantly more prevalent among Spanish creditors than the ESCP Regulation. Between 2011 to 2020, there were an average of 940 EPO applications per year. Nonetheless, from 2017 to 2019, the number of EPO applications increased 4.451%: just in 2019, 29,151 EPOs were issued in Spain. In 2020, the number of EPOs decreased to 21,636. the massive boost in EPO applications results from creditors’ attempts to circumvent EU consumer protection standards under the Spanish domestic payment order.

From Banco Español de Crédito to Bondora

After the CJEU judgment C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito, the Spanish legislator amended the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure to impose on courts a mandatory review of the fairness of the contractual terms in a request for a domestic payment order. Creditors noticed that they could circumvent such control through the EPO. Unlike the Spanish payment order, the EPO is a non-documentary type payment order. For an EPO, standard form creditors only have to indicate “the cause of the action, including a description of the circumstances invoked as the basis of the claim” as well as “a description of evidence supporting the claim” (Article 7(2) EPO Regulation). Moreover, the Spanish legislation implementing the EPO states that courts have to reject any other documentation beyond the EPO application standard form. Creditors realized that in this manner there was no possible way for the court to examine the fairness of the contratual terms in EPOs against consumers. Consequently, the number of EPO applications between 2017 and 2019 increased remarkably.

In some cases, a claim’s cross-border dimension was even fabricated to access the EPO Regulation. The EPO, like the ESCP, is only applicable in cross-border claims, which means that “at least one of the parties is domiciled or habitually resident in a Member State other than the Member State of the court seised”(Article 3 EPO Regulation). Against this background, creditors assigned the debt to a creditor abroad (in many cases, vulture funds and companies specialized in debt recovery) in order to transform a purely internal claim into a cross-border one.

The abnormal increase in the number of EPOs did not go unnoticed among Spanish judges. Three Spanish courts decided to submit preliminary references to the CJEU, asking, precisely, whether it is possible to examine the fairness of the contractual terms in an EPO application requested against a consumer. Two of these preliminary references led to the judgment Joined Cases C?453/18 and C?494/18, Bondora, where the CJEU replied positively, acknowledging that courts can examine the fairness of the contractual terms  (on this judgment, see this previous post). The judgment was rendered in December 2019. In 2020, the number of EPOs started to decrease. It appears that after Bondora the EPO became less attractive to creditors.

The connection between the EPO and the ESCP Regulation

At this point one needs to ask how the increase in the use of the EPO Regulation has had an impact on the use of the ESCP Regulation. The answer is likely found in the 2015 joint reform of the EPO and ESCP Regulations (Regulation (EU) 2015/2421). Among other changes, this reform introduced an amendment in the EPO Regulation which allows, once the creditor lodges a statement of opposition against an EPO, for an automatic continuation of proceedings under the ESCP (Article 17(1)(a) EPO Regulation). For this to happen, creditors simply need to state their intention by making use of a code in the EPO application standard form. It appears that, in Spain, many of those creditors who applied for an EPO in order to circumvent consumer protection standards under the domestic payment order found in the ESCP a subsdiary proceeding if debtors opposed the EPO.

An isolated Spanish phenomenon?

Statistics in Spain show that, at least in this Member State, the connection between the EPO and ESCP Regulations functions and gives more visibility to the ESCP. The lack of awareness about the ESCP Regulation was one of the issues that the Commission aimed to tackle with the 2015 reform. One might wonder if a similar increase in the use of the ESCP could be appreciated in other Member States. Available public statistics in Portugal, Lithuania, and Luxembourg do not reveal any significant change in the use of the ESCP after 2017, the year the amendment entered into force. In Lithuania, the number of ESCPs even decreased from 2018 to 2019.

Conversely, in Germany, statistics reveal a steady growth over those years. Against the 478 ESCPs issued in Germany in 2017, 2380 ESCP were issued in 2020, standing for an increase of 498%. Perhaps, after an unsuccessful start, the ESCP Regulation is finally bearing fruit.

In C-595/20 Sharewood, the CJEU last week held on the extent of Rome I’s rei sitae exception to consumer contracts. In essence, as a result of Article 6 Rome I, for consumer contracts, choice of law is free (in the case at issue this lex voluntatis was Swiss law) except the consumer may always fall back on the mandatory laws of his habitual residence (here, Austrian law).

For a limited selection of contracts, including (A6(4)c) ‘a contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of immovable property other than a contract relating to (timeshares)’, party  autonomy is restored in full under the terms of Articles 3 and 4 Rome I, hence the consumer loses his protection.

The contract at issue is a tree purchase, lease and service agreement. The trees at issue are grown in Brasil. The ground rent for the lease agreement, which granted the right to grow the trees in question, was included in the purchase price of those trees. The service agreement provided that ShareWood would manage, administer, harvest and sell the trees and would remit the net return on the timber to UE, the (anonymised) consumer. The difference compared to the gross return, expressed as a percentage of the return, was retained by ShareWood as its fee for the provision of those services.

The question in the case at issue is essentially how intensive the link to (foreign) soil needs to be for it to fall under the rei sitae carve-out for consumer contracts. The CJEU does refer to some of its Brussels Ia case-law, including Klein and Kerr, for the ‘tenancy’ element of the question, but not for the ‘rights in rem’ part of the discussion, where it more straightforwardly concludes on the basis of the contractual arrangements that the trees [28]

must be regarded as being the proceeds of the use of the land on which they are planted. Although such proceeds will, as a general rule, share the same legal status as the land on which the trees concerned are planted, the proceeds may nevertheless, by agreement, be the subject of personal rights of which the owner or occupier of that land may dispose separately without affecting the right of ownership or other rights in rem appertaining to that land. A contract which relates to the disposal of the proceeds of the use of land cannot be treated in the same way as a contract which relates to a ‘right in rem in immovable property’, within the meaning of Article 6(4)(c) of the Rome I Regulation

and [37]

the main purpose of the contract at issue in the main proceedings is not the use, in the context of a lease, of the land on which the trees concerned are planted, but… to generate income from the sale of the timber obtained following the harvest of those trees. As is apparent from the order for reference, the lease provided for in that agreement, which includes only the right to allow those trees to grow and has no purpose other than the acquisition of those trees, is intended merely to enable the sales and services elements provided for in the contract to be carried out.

Not caught therefore by the rei sitae exception.

I often refer my students to Harry, in A Bug’s Life, to make the point that both for jurisdictional and for applicable law purposes, the mere presence of real estate does not lead to the rei sitae jurisdictional and governing law implications being triggered. CJEU Sharewood is a good illustration of same.

Geert.

CJEU last week In Share Wood on lex rei sitae, applicable law A6 Rome I.
Contract of sale, including lease and service agreement, re trees planted on leased land for sole purpose of being harvested for profit, is not a contract relating to a right in remhttps://t.co/tlKVHl2xYX

— Geert Van Calster (@GAVClaw) February 14, 2022

Arbitral proceedings are confidential, and this confidentiality is one of the biggest assets of arbitration. Arbitral awards usually must not be published without prior consent of the parties. However, as we all know, this confidentiality makes it difficult for parties to predict outcomes in a concrete case and the public is kept from learning about lines of case law and from innovative developments in the practice of arbitral tribunals. This problem is particularly relevant in relation to M&A disputes that hardly ever occur in state court litigation. This is the reason why a working group of the German Arbitration Institute (DIS) analysed more than 100 awards from DIS arbitrations, and these awards of course often relate to international disputes. The question is anyway a fundamental one of transnational commercial law and dispute resolution in general. The results are presented by a distinguished panel.

Programme:

Dr Reinmar Wolff, member of the board of the DIS and University of Marburg: Welcome and Introduction

Part I

Karl Pörnbacher, Hogan Lovells International LLP, Munich: Violation of pre-contractual information duties

Professor Dr Siegfried Elsing, LL.M., Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Düsseldorf: Disputes in connection with price adaptation / earn out

Dr Günter Pickrahn, LL.M., Baker McKenzie Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH, Frankfurt, Calculation of damages after violation of balance sheet warranties

Discussion

Johanna Wirth, LL.M., Hengeler Mueller Partnerschaft von Rechtsanwälten mbB, Berlin: Moderation

Part II

Prof Dr Gerhard Wagner, LL.M., Humboldt University Berlin: Predictability v. Confidentiality: What is the right balance?

Dr Elmar Schweers, RWE Power AG, Essen: Response

Discussion

Johanna Wirth, LL.M., Hengeler Mueller Partnerschaft von Rechtsanwälten mbB, Berlin: Moderation

The language of the online event is German.

For more information see here: https://255310.seu2.cleverreach.com/c/68157384/58a830d933b-r7cad2.

Please register by 1 March 2022 here (or via the link in the Programme): https://255310.seu2.cleverreach.com/c/68157385/58a830d933b-r7cad2.

You have questions? Email to: events@disarb.org.

Giesela Rühl (Humboldt University of Berlin) has posted on SSRN a preview of her chapter on ‘Cross-Border Protection of Human Rights: The 2021 German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act’. The paper is forthcoming in 2022 in a German edited volume in honour of Jonathan Fitchen, who passed away last year (see here).

The abstract reads as follows:

In the summer of 2021, after long and heated debates, the German legislature has adopted the Act on Corporate Due Diligence Obligations for the Prevention of Human Rights Violations in Global Supply Chains, also known as the Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (Lieferkettensorg-faltspflichtengesetz – LkSG). Following the footsteps of other European countries, notably France, the new law establishes mandatory human rights due diligence obligations and, hence, requires German companies – for the first time – to protect human rights in their supply chains. The Act has, therefore, rightly been described as a “milestone”.

However, in addition to praise the new law has also attracted a lot of criticism and not only by opponents of mandatory human rights due diligence obligations, but also by supporters: While they welcome the establishment of a legally binding framework to better protect human rights in global supply chains, they argue that the reach of the Act is too limited. In particular, they be-moan that the Act relies on public enforcement mechanisms only and refrains from imposing any civil liability on companies for violations of the newly established due diligence obligations.

The following chapter takes this criticism – and the adoption of the German Supply Chain Act more broadly – as an occasion to take a closer look at the newly created obligations to better protect human rights in global supply chains. In particular, it sheds light on the effects of the Act under private law and discusses whether private international law may (or may not) help to effectuate the new provisions in a cross-border context.

The book Direct Jurisdiction is the second thematic volume in the series Studies in Private International Law – Asia. It considers the situations in which the courts of 15 key Asian states are prepared to hear a case involving cross-border elements. For instance, will the courts of an Asian state accept jurisdiction in a dispute that has only some, little or no connection with an Asian state, and (if so) on what conditions? As a comprehensive survey across multiple jurisdictions and areas of law, the book suggests that enacting suitable rules of direct jurisdiction requires an Asian state to strike a delicate balance between affording certainty and protecting its nationals. It involves sometimes difficult policy considerations and is not just about drawing up lists of jurisdictional grounds and exceptions to them.

In this webinar, the editors and contributors will summarise the practical and theoretical findings in the book. It will consider the possibility of a multilateral convention or soft law instrument articulating principles of direct jurisdiction for Asia. It will also discuss possible trajectories that Asian states may be taking in respect of direct jurisdiction in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the political tensions currently besetting the world. The editors and contributors will also talk about the process of putting the book together, especially in the face of lockdowns and other restrictions imposed in various jurisdictions.

There will be ample time for Q&A.

• Professor Anselmo Reyes, Singapore International Commercial Court; Doshisha University, Editor of Direct Jurisdiction
• Wilson Lui, University of Hong Kong; University of Oxford, Editor of Direct Jurisdiction
• Dr Nobumichi Teramura, University of Brunei Darussalam; University of Sydney, Contributor of Direct Jurisdiction

Time: Thursday 17 February, 6pm AEDT

This is a free online event. You will receive a reminder notification with the Zoom link closer to the date.

Time: Thursday 17 February, 6pm AEDT

This is a free online event. You will receive a reminder notification with the Zoom link closer to the date.

CPD Points: 1

Register here

This event is presented by the Sydney Centre for International Law at the University of Sydney.

Image credit: Canva

It is with great sadness that we share the news that Professor Peter Mankowski, one of Germany’s eminent private international law scholars, died on 10 February 2022 at the age of 55.

Until his death Peter Mankowski was a Professor of Private International Law at the University of Hamburg. He was the editor of several commentaries as well as the author of several monographs, a 2-volume textbook and (literally) countless law review articles covering the full range of private international law. His productivity, originality and creativity were unparalleled. But above all he was an inspiring person and a great colleague (and mentor).

His untimely death is an incredible loss for the private international law community.

Our thoughts are with his family.

On 5 April 2021, the Greek Supreme Court issued a judgment relating to a dispute between two German companies. The case revolved around the interpretation of Article 14 of the Service Regulation, according to which “Each Member State shall be free to effect service of judicial documents directly by postal services on persons residing in another Member State by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt or equivalent”. The document introducing the proceedings had been served by mail by the lawyer of the appellant. The Supreme Court ruled that a certificate of the Greek post authority is an equivalent document for the purposes of Article 14. The Court referred to the judgment of the CJEU in Andrew Marcus Henderson v Novo Banco SA. A closer look at the facts reveals however some flaws.

It is not common for litigation to occur in Greece between parties that are all based outside Greece. The following circumstances explain why this happened. The appellant was originally the defendant in proceedings  brought by a Greek company in Thessaloniki. In the course of the proceedings, the defendant – a German company – filed an action on a warranty against another German company in accordance Article 6(2) of the Brussels I Regulation (now Article 8(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation). The latter company challenged the jurisdiction of the seised court on the ground that it had entered into a choice of court agreement with the Greek whereby jurisdiction had been conferred on the courts of Cologne. The court upheld the choice of court and dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction (Court of First instance Thessaloniki 2063/2010, published in: Armenopoulos 2014, pp. 785 et seq).

The case was later abandoned by the Greek company, not by the German company. An appeal on a point of law (which in Greece is known as αναίρεση, i.e., cassation) was then lodged before the Supreme Court. The appellee did not appear in the hearing.

Before entering into the examination of the grounds of cassation, the court chose to verify the propriety of notification to Germany. The court referred for this to the judgment of the CJEU in Henderson, stating the following:

The service of a document instituting proceedings by post is valid, even if the acknowledgment of receipt of the registered letter was replaced by another document, however, upon the condition that such document provides equivalent guarantees as regards information provided and evidence.

On the facts, the Supreme Court ruled that:

By virtue of the receipt of the registered letter, dated from 15-07-2019, issued by the post office (in Thessaloniki), the petition, dated from 22-11-2019, to trace the acknowledgment of receipt, and the reply of the Hellenic Post, dated from 17-12-2019, which certifies that the registered letter was delivered to the recipient on the 19 July 2019, and to which a copy of the recipient’s signature is attached, it is evidenced that a true copy of the appeal, duly translated in the German language, and to which a summons is attached, has been duly and timely served by post to the appellee.

In Henderson, the CJEU was confronted with almost the same facts; the sole difference concerned the nature of the recipient, which in the case at hand was a legal entity, not a natural person. The CJEUD was called on to interpret Article 14 of the Service Regulation, and focused on three aspects: the equivalence of the document produced; the person receiving the document, other than the recipient; the gravity of the standard form set out in Annex II of the Service Regulation.

I will attempt to juxtapose the interpretation given by the CJEU to the findings of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled that service was good, based mainly on the confirmation letter issued by the Hellenic Post. Indeed, the latter gave clear information with respect to the document served, and the place and time it was served. However, no reference is made to the person receiving the document.

The CJEU ruled in this respect the following:

… a registered letter allows tracing of the various stages of its route to the addressee. As regards the acknowledgment of receipt, which is completed when that addressee, or, where appropriate, his representative, receives the letter, it indicates the date of delivery, the place of the delivery and the qualities and signature of the person who received that letter … (para 76).

It added:

In those circumstances, if a third party can validly accept a judicial document in the name and on behalf of the addressee, that possibility must nevertheless be reserved for clearly defined situations, to ensure that the rights of the defence of that addressee are observed as fully as possible (para 93).

Hence, an equivalent document lacking any reference to the capacity under which a person received the document on behalf of the party, is no good service. Even more, when the defendant is a legal entity, a sheer reference that the document was served to the recipient, is again no good service: it is impossible to serve directly to the company. The equivalent document must have been received by a person, whose name is stated in the document, acting as an authorized representative.

The Supreme Court ruled that service was good, without confirming that the standard form under Annex II was handed over to the recipient, or included in the file. It did mention though, that the appeal was translated in German.

The CJEU ruled in this respect the following:

As regards the scope which must be given to that standard form, the Court has already held that Regulation No 1393/2007 does not contain any exceptions to its use (para 55).

It went on to say:

From that consideration and the aim pursued by the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007…, the Court has inferred that the receiving agency is required, in all circumstances and without it having a margin of discretion in that regard, to inform the addressee of a document of his right to refuse to accept that document, by using systematically for that purpose that standard form (para 56).

It concluded:

Consequently, the lack of information resulting from that omission can only be validly remedied by the delivery, as soon as possible and in accordance with the provisions of Regulation No 1393/2007, of the standard form set out in Annex II thereto (para 65).

Hence, the non-production of the standard form by the appellant should have led to a stay of proceedings, until the Receiving Agency remedies the omission. This was not taken into account by the Supreme Court, which presumably considered that the attached translation makes the standard form redundant.

The question has popped up more than 15 years ago, again in the course of Greek proceedings involving litigants domiciled in Germany. According to the prevailing view in Germany, postal service may only be effected by a Transmitting Authority declared officially by the Member State in question. Given that Greece has declared the courts as the sole Transmitting Authorities, postal service by a private person, most of the times the lawyer representing the claimant, is deemed to be improper. In addition, by allowing this kind of service, Article 15 of the Service Regulation would be circumvented, and direct service would be introduced to Germany through the backdoor (Germany opposed to this form of service).

The question led to contradicting rulings in Trier and Cologne courts. Burkhard Hess supported a more liberal view, by allowing postal service made by private persons. The issue was finally solved by pertinent legislation. However, the new wording in Article 18 of the Service Recast Regulation nr. 2020/1784 is expected to change the scene: The reference to each Member State has been deleted.

The CJEU delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑595/20 (UE v ShareWood Switzerland AG, VF), which is about Rome I :

« Article 6(4)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome I’) must be interpreted as meaning that a contract of sale, including a lease agreement and a service agreement, relating to trees planted on leased land for the sole purpose of being harvested for profit, does not constitute a ‘contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of immovable property’ within the meaning of that provision ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=253728&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2334998

The CJEU delivered yesterday its judgment in case C‑522/20 (OE v VY), which is about Article 18 TFEU and Brussels II bis :

« The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, enshrined in Article 18 TFEU, must be interpreted as not precluding a situation in which the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in the territory of which the habitual residence of the applicant is located, as provided for in the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of [Brussels II bis] is subject to the applicant being resident for a minimum period immediately before making his or her application which is six months shorter than that provided for in the fifth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of that regulation on the ground that the person concerned is a national of that Member State ».

Source : https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=253726&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2334783

The Internationaal Juridisch Instituut in The Hague, an institute providing legal opinions on private international law and foreign law,  is recruiting a senior legal counsel. The candidate will work in the fields of international family law and international succession law. They must be fluent in Dutch and English, and have a good working knowledge of German; additional language skills appreciated).

On 2 and 3 March 2022, the INSOL Europe Academic Forum’s (IEAF) annual conference takes place in Dublin (Ireland). The IEAF is looking forward to meet again in person for the first time in two years. The overall theme of the academic conference will be: “The Emerging New Landscape of European Restructuring and Insolvency”.

The legal development have not stopped with the pandemic, in fact it has set in motion many new developments. The programme will touch upon this by discussing among others:

1. Current developments in corporate preventive restructuring,
2. Fresh start and other topics related to individual debtors,
3. Design issues in restructuring and insolvency law, and
4. Cross-border and EU law restructuring and insolvency.

Programme and registration details

For an overview of the speakers and further details on the programme, please find the conference brochure here.

To conference will be in person in Dublin on 2 and 3 March 2022. To register for this academic conference, please click here: https://www.insol-europe.org/academic-forum-events

Gilles Cuniberti (University of Luxembourg) and Sara Migliorini (University of Macau) have published a commentary in French on Regulation 655/2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order (EAPO).

The book offers a comprehensive article per article commentary of the EAPO Regulation with a focus on its implementation and operation in the three French speaking Members States of the EU, Belgium, France and Luxembourg. Some aspects of the implementation of the Regulation are addressed by implementing legislation, which the book reproduces and discusses.

On certain issues, the implementation of the Regulation has varied a great deal in these three countries (and more widely in the EU).

An interesting example is the information gathering remedy which Article 14 of the EAPO Regulation requires all Member States to establish. Each Member State is meant to offer a procedure for finding information on bank accounts that the debtor might hold in the relevant Member State. France already had such procedure that it simply made applicable in the context of the EAPO Regulation. In contrast, no such procedure existed in Luxembourg and Belgium. Luxembourg established one for the purpose of the Regulation. So did Belgium, but it did not limit the scope of the said procedure to request made under Article 14 and has introduced a new remedy in Belgian law available outside the scope of the EAPO Regulation.

More information on the book can be found here. The table of contents is available here.

The EU Commission’s Proposal of 1 December 2021 outlines, in its introductory Recitals:

“Efficient cross-border judicial cooperation requires secure, reliable and time-efficient communication between courts and competent authorities. Moreover, this cooperation should be carried out in a way that does not create a disproportionate administrative burden and is resilient to force majeure circumstances. These considerations are equally important for individuals and legal entities, as getting effective access to justice in a reasonable time is a crucial aspect of the right to a fair trial, as enshrined in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter).

To protect their rights, both individuals and legal entities should be able to rely on effective remedies. Mere access to judicial authorities does not automatically constitute effective access to justice. For this reason, it is important to find ways to facilitate the conduct of procedures and reduce practical difficulties as much as possible. Individuals and legal entities should be able to exercise their rights and comply with their obligations in a swift, cost-efficient and transparent way.

At EU level, there exists a comprehensive set of instruments designed to enhance judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal cases. Many of these govern the communication between authorities, including in certain cases with the EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies and bodies, and between authorities and individuals or legal entities. However, most instruments do not provide for engaging in such communication through digital means. Even where they do, other gaps may exist, such as a lack of secure and reliable digital communication channels or non?recognition of electronic documents, signatures and seals. This deprives judicial cooperation and access to justice of using the most efficient, secure and reliable channels of communication available.

In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that force majeure events may severely affect the normal functioning of Member States’ justice systems. During the crisis, in many cases national courts have been unable to maintain normal operations due to the spread of the virus. Member States were forced to take a number of measures ranging from full lockdowns to treating certain priority cases only. At the same time, the use of digital technologies (e.g. email, videoconference, etc.) helped to limit disruption. However, many of the technical solutions employed were developed in an ad hoc manner, and did not necessarily satisfy security and fundamental rights standards to the full. Judicial cooperation and access to justice in EU cross-border cases have been similarly affected, and the COVID-19 pandemic has underlined the need to ensure the resilience of communication.

Against this background, the rules on digitalisation set out in this proposal aim at improving access to justice and the efficiency and resilience of the communication flows inherent to the cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities in EU cross-border cases.”

The Commission further summarises its important Proposal as follows (copied from here):

“1. Digitalisation of cross-border judicial cooperation

What are the main elements of the proposal?

This initiative aims to modernise EU cross-border judicial cooperation:

• It proposes digitalising communication between judicial and other authorities in cross-border judicial cooperation procedures in civil (including family), commercial and criminal matters.
• In addition, it gives individuals and businesses the option to communicate with judicial and other authorities through electronic means in cross-border cases.
• It will ensure electronic communication from individuals, businesses and legal practitioners are accepted, and have legal certainty – namely through the compulsory recognition of electronic signatures and seals and the legal admissibility of electronic documents.
• In cross-border cases, the proposal will make it possible to conduct oral hearings in civil and criminal procedures through videoconferencing.
• Parties to civil and commercial cases with cross-border implications will be able to pay court fees electronically.

How will this initiative improve the way in which authorities communicate?

The proposal establishes a dedicated and secure decentralised IT system. This system will be composed of the IT systems of the Member States and of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies and bodies, which will be interconnected through interoperable access points (based on the e-CODEX system). Where Member States do not have existing national IT systems, they will have the choice to use, free of charge, a Commission-developed reference implementation solution.

Alternative means of communication between authorities will be allowed only in case of disruption of the system, or in other specific circumstances where the use of the decentralised IT system is not appropriate.

How will the proposal benefit individuals and businesses involved in EU cross-border judicial procedures?

To ensure smooth access to courts or other judicial authorities, individuals, businesses and legal practitioners will be able to use electronic means of communication to file claims and otherwise communicate with the authorities in EU cross-border civil law cases (for instance, under the European Small Claims procedure).

Where national IT portals for electronic communication in EU civil law matters exist, they can continue to be used. In parallel, the Commission will develop a European access point hosted on the European e-justice Portal. Each person will be able to log in, create an account and file all types of submissions, claims, requests, and standardised forms, both to national judicial authorities and to those of other Member States. The use of the European access point will be free of charge.

Individuals, businesses and legal practitioners will not be obliged to use electronic means of communication with courts and authorities, and may continue to use paper or other types of traditional communication.

What will the cost for Member States for implementing the IT systems be?

Member States will have to bear the cost related to the decentralised IT system. The Commission will provide funding opportunities to support Member States in setting up the necessary infrastructure, if needed.

The Commission expects that the “access points” of the decentralised IT system will be based on e-CODEX that can be used free of charge. However, national IT systems need to be developed so that they may be connected through e-CODEX.

The Commission will finance creation, maintenance and future development of a software, which Member States may decide to use instead of developing national IT systems.

How will personal data be protected?

The digitalisation of existing data exchanges will not introduce any new personal data categories compared to what is already exchanged today, nor will it affect the existing data processing arrangements.

The security of personal data processing is essential to protect data subjects. e-CODEX was designed specifically for the justice area, and uses encryption to ensure security. Using e-CODEX for cross-border exchanges will increase security and thereby mitigate the risk of security breaches. e-CODEX is therefore clearly an improvement compared to present exchanges using paper or unsecure e-mails.

2. Digital information in cross-border terrorism cases

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the Bataclan concert hall in Paris 2015, the necessity to identify links between and coordinate cross-border terrorist investigations and prosecutions early on became evident. Learning from this experience, Eurojust established the European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register to reinforce the judicial response in Member States to terrorist threats and to improve security for citizens.

However, the data processing environment at Eurojust is outdated and exchange of information with national competent authorities is not structurally digitalised. This makes information exchange cumbersome, leading to suboptimal results in the exchange of information.

What are the main elements of the proposal?

• It will modernise Eurojust‘s information system. It will integrate in it the European Judicial Counter Terrorism Register and its functionalities, in order to improve the capacities of link identification.
• It will set-up secure digital communication channels between national authorities and Eurojust.
• It will introduce a digital communication tool to facilitate digital exchange of structured data and to automate processes.
• It will introduce a clear legal basis in the Eurojust Regulation for cooperation with non-EU liaison prosecutors.

What exactly is the European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register?

The European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register is a unique EU-wide database for judicial proceedings relating to terrorist offences. The authorities of the Member States provide information on these cases to Eurojust where it is cross-checked with information on other cases relating to terrorism, but also relating to other cases of serious crime.

Once a potential link – such as the same or similar name of a suspect – is established, the National Members at Eurojust follow up to see if this potential link can be validated. Once it is clear that a link exists, Eurojust informs the national authorities involved in the case. Eurojust also provides further support to such investigations.

How will the proposal improve the European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register?

Digitalising data exchange will enable national authorities to send more information to Eurojust. It will be quick and secure. At Eurojust, the new information management system will identify many links automatically and require much less manual intervention to identify links.

Thereby Eurojust will be able to give faster and better feedback to national authorities and support them in the follow-up. This will enable the national authorities to have a better understanding of the full extent of the criminal activities, to prosecute terrorist offences and serious cross-border crimes more efficiently and not stop the investigations at their own Member State’s borders.

How will the proposal benefit the general public?

The European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register and the follow-up through judicial cooperation in criminal matters is essential to effectively combat terrorism and thus ensure security of citizens across the EU. The European Judicial Counter-Terrorism Register may also contribute to respecting fundamental rights; the communication and cooperation of national judicial authorities may reveal links between cases and therefore prevent multiple prosecutions and convictions of transnational crimes. Thus, it will ensure the right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence (Article 50 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union).

3. Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) collaboration platform

Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) are set up by two or more States for specific criminal investigations with a cross border impact and for a limited period of time. This framework allows the competent judicial and law enforcement authorities involved to organise and coordinate their actions jointly and investigate efficiently even in very complex cases such as organised crime activities not bound by any borders.

Although JITs have proven to be one of the most successful tools for cross-border investigations and prosecutions in the EU, practice shows they have been facing several technical difficulties preventing them from gaining the highest possible efficiency. The main difficulties concern secure electronic exchange of information and evidence (including large files), secure electronic communication with other JIT members and JIT participants, such as Eurojust, Europol and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), as well as a joint daily management of a JIT.

The JIT collaboration platform will solve these problems and deliver the technical support that has been missing so far.

What are the main elements of the proposal?

• Establish a Joint Investigation Teams collaboration platform – The platform will be a highly secure online collaboration tool aiming to facilitate exchanges and cooperation within JITs throughout their duration.
• Provide technological support to those involved in JITs to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cross-border investigations and prosecutions conducted by them.
• Ensure that those involved in JITs can more easily share information and evidence collected in the course of the JIT activities, by enabling them to more easily and more safely communicate with each other, and by facilitating the joint daily management of a JIT.

What will the key functionalities of the platform be?

• Allow secure non-traceable communication to be stored locally on the devices of the users, including a communication tool offering an instant messaging system, a chat feature, audio/video-conferencing and a functionality replacing regular emails.
• Allow the exchange of operational information and evidence, including large files, through an upload/download system designed to store the data centrally only for a limited period of time necessary for a technical transfer of the data. As soon as all addresses downloaded the data, the data will be automatically deleted from the platform.
• Allow evidence traceability – an advanced logging mechanism allowing to keep a trace of who did what and when regarding all evidence exchanged through the platform, and, consequently, supporting the need to ensure admissibility of evidence in front of a court.

What will the cost of the platform be?

The Regulation establishing the platform is envisaged to incur the following costs:

• Development of the platform – the one-off cost incurred for eu-LISA – around €10 million.
• Technical maintenance and operation of the platform – the recurring cost incurred for eu-LISA – around €3 million per year.

For Member States, no technical costs are considered because the centralised component of the platform is web-based. It will not require any adaptions of the national technical infrastructure. The same pertains to the communication software, which will simply need to be downloaded on each device of the JIT platform’s users. Access to the platform for the competent Union bodies, offices and agencies, such as Eurojust, Europol the EPPO and OLAF, will be driven by the same principles and will not incur any costs.

How will personal data be protected?

The platform itself will not change nor will the underlying legal frameworks for conducting a JIT and as such the already existing obligation of Member States to comply with data protection rules for the exchange of personal data. The platform is a secure and reliable technical addition to allow for a better, swifter and safer way of conducting these communications and exchanges. Additionally, the JIT collaboration platform will fully comply with the EU data legislation.”

Under the title IPR für eine bessere Welt: Vision – Realität – Irrweg?, the volume published by Mohr Siebeck contains the contributions to the Third German-Speaking Conference for Young Scholars in PIL, which took place virtually on 18 and 19 March 2021 at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg.

Angelika Nussberger’s keynote paper on the role of the European Convention on Human Rights vis-à-vis Private International Law is followed by up by nine contributions (one of which in English) by younger scholars engaging with different aspects of the conference theme, such as the extraterritoriality of data protection law, corporate liability for human-rights violations, the potential of uniform law fo further sustainability or the unilateralist approach of EU PIL to cases involving non-EU member states. The volume also includes the papers from, and a transcript of, the (English) panel discussion between Ralf Michaels, Roxana Banu, and Hans van Loon.

The table of contents is available on the publisher’s website.

Today, in the case of OE ./. VY, C-522/20 (no Opinion was delivered in these proceedings), the ECJ decided on a fundamental point: whether nationality as a (supplemental) connecting factor for jurisdiction according to Article 3 lit. a indent 6 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation (2201/2003) concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility is in conformity with the principal prohibition of discrimination against nationality in the primary law of the European Union (Art. 18 TFEU).

Article 18 TFEU reads: “Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. …”.

Art. 3 lit. a Brussels IIbis Regulation reads: “In matters relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, jurisdiction shall lie with with the courts of the Member State:”; indent 5 reads: “in whose territory the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least a year immediately before the application was made, or”, according to indent 6: “the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months immediately before the application was made and is either a national of the Member State in question …”.

The case emerged from a request in proceedings between OE and his wife, VY, concerning an application for dissolution of their marriage brought before the Austrian courts (paras. 9 et seq.):

“On 9 November 2011, OE, an Italian national, and VY, a German national, were married in Dublin (Ireland). According to the information provided by the referring court, OE left the habitual residence the couple shared in Ireland in May 2018 and has lived in Austria since August 2019. On 28 February 2020, that is, after residing in Austria for more than six months, OE applied to the Bezirksgericht Döbling (District Court, Döbling, Austria) for the dissolution of his marriage with VY. OE submits that a national of a Member State other than the State of the forum is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of that latter State under the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003, on the basis of observance of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, after having resided in the territory of that latter State for only six months immediately before making the application for divorce, which is tantamount to disregarding the application of the fifth indent of that provision, which requires a period of residence of at least a year immediately before the application for divorce is made. By order of 20 April 2020, the Bezirksgericht Döbling (District Court, Döbling) dismissed OE’s application, taking the view that it lacked jurisdiction to hear it. According to that court, the distinction made on the basis of nationality in the fifth and sixth indents of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 is intended to prevent the applicant from forum shopping. By order of 29 June 2020, the Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien (Regional Court for Civil Matters, Vienna, Austria), hearing the case on appeal, upheld the order of the Bezirksgericht Döbling (District Court, Döbling). OE brought an appeal on a point of law against that order before the referring court, the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria).”

The Court reiterated, inter alia, that (paras. 18 et seq.) the principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment require that comparable situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way, “unless such treatment is objectively justified”, further that the comparability of different situations must be assessed having regard to all the elements which characterise them, and thirdly that the (EU) legislature has a broad discretion in this respect. “Thus, only if a measure adopted in this field is manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objectives which the competent institutions are seeking to pursue can the lawfulness of such a measure be affected”.

Against this background the Court held (paras 25 et seq.) that, first, Article 3 meets “the need for rules that address the specific requirements of conflicts relating to the dissolution of matrimonial ties”, secondly that while the first to fourth indents of Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation expressly refer to the habitual residence of the spouses and of the respondent as criteria, the fifth and sixth indents of Article 3(1)(a) permit the application of the jurisdiction rules of the forum actoris, and thirdly that “it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the rules on jurisdiction laid down in Article 3 of Regulation No 2201/2003, including those laid down in the fifth and sixth indents of paragraph 1(a) of that article, seek to ensure a balance between, on the one hand, the mobility of individuals within the European Union, in particular by protecting the rights of the spouse who, after the marriage has broken down, has left the Member State where the couple had their shared residence and, on the other hand, legal certainty, in particular that of the other spouse, by ensuring that there is a real link between the applicant and the Member State whose courts have jurisdiction to give a ruling on the dissolution of the matrimonial ties concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 October 2016, Mikolajczyk, C-294/15, EU:C:2016:772, paragraphs 33, 49 and 50, and of 25 November 2021, IB (Habitual residence of a spouse – Divorce), C-289/20, EU:C:2021:955, paragraphs 35, 44 and 56).“ And the fact that typically there is such a real link if there is nationality sufficed to justify distinguishing between indent 5 and indent 6, all the more as this cannot be a surprise to the other spouse.

Therefore the Court came to the conclusion:

“The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, enshrined in Article 18 TFEU, must be interpreted as not precluding a situation in which the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in the territory of which the habitual residence of the applicant is located, as provided for in the sixth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, is subject to the applicant being resident for a minimum period immediately before making his or her application which is six months shorter than that provided for in the fifth indent of Article 3(1)(a) of that regulation on the ground that the person concerned is a national of that Member State.”

The most important take away seems to be that PIL legislation using nationality as a supplemental connnecting factor is still in conformity with Article 18 TFEU as long as it appears “not manifestly inappropriate” (para. 36). Therefore, and reconnecting to older case law (para. 39), legislation is still valid “with regard to a criterion based on the nationality of the person concerned, … although in borderline cases occasional problems must arise from the introduction of any general and abstract system of rules” so that “there are no grounds for taking exception to the fact that the EU legislature has resorted to categorisation, provided that it is not in essence discriminatory having regard to the objective which it pursues (see, by analogy, judgments of 16 October 1980, Hochstrass v Court of Justice, 147/79, EU:C:1980:238, paragraph 14, and of 15 April 2010, Gualtieri v Commission, C-485/08 P, EU:C:2010:188, paragraph 81).”

by José Antonio Briceño Laborí, Professor of Private International Law at the Universidad Central de Venezuela and Universidad Católica Andrés Bello

To celebrate the 25th anniversary of its launching, the Master’s Program in Private International Law and Comparative Law is inviting all authors that would like to publish a paper in the fourth edition of its Yearbook.

The central topic of this edition is “Private International Law in Action” (“Derecho Internacional Privado en Acción”). Therefore, all papers should focus on the analysis or commentary of the practice of Private International Law, both in judicial and arbitral venues.

All those interested must send their papers to the following email address: cmadridmartinez@yahoo.es. The deadline for receiving the papers is March 30, 2022. All papers must comply with our editorial and publishing guidelines, which are available on our website: https://bit.ly/30cqnvl.

Finally, we invite all those interested in the developments of Private International Law in Venezuela to follow us on our social networks: Instagram, Twitter, Facebook and Linkedin, as well as to visit our YouTube channel where we have available more than 20 conferences from our “Master Classes” and “Jurisprudential Dialogue” cycles.

Impartiality is key to any kind of production of justice and probably one of the very few principles of “justice” recognized universally, see e.g. Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, Chapter 5: “Impartiality and Objectivity”, pp. 114 et seq. with references also to non-Western traditions, see also e.g. Leviticus 19:15 (New International Version): “Do not pervert justice; do not show partiality to the poor or favoritism to the great, but judge your neighbor fairly.”; see also e.g. IBA Rules of Ethics, rule 1: “Arbitrators shall … remain free from bias”. Thus, there cannot be put enough emphasis and thought on how to implement this command, for acting arbitrators as well as parties and reviewing state courts, when they ask themselves in countless greyish constellations how to behave or judge in order to avoid even the slightest perception of bias but also to abstain from unproductive “due process paranoia”. The PhD thesis by Angoura, supervised by Burkhard Hess and published in the Luxembourg Max Planck Institute’s series “Successful Dispute Resolution”, offers solid information and thorough analysis on a comparative basis – highly recommended.

Francesco Parisi (Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, Law School and a Professor of Economics at the University of Bologna), Daniel Pi (Assistant Professor at University of Maine School of Law) and Alice Guerra (Assistant Professor at the University of Bologna) wrote an interesting article using a law and economics approach to compare access to evidence in the US and EU. The article, entitled Access to Evidence in Private International Law, is forthcoming in 2022 in volume 23 of Theoretical Inquiries in Law.

The authors focus their analysis on how a misalignment of the burden of proof and evidentiary rules can frustrate the production of evidence and undermine care incentives when these are applied cross-border tort cases.

The abstract reads as follows:

This Article analyzes the interaction between the burden of proof and evidentiary discovery rules. Both sets of rules can affect incentives for prospective injurers to invest in evidence technology (i.e., ex ante investments that increase the quantity and quality of evidence in case an accident occurs). This interaction becomes acutely important in the private international law setting, where jurisdictions are split on the question whether the burden of proof should be treated as a substantive or procedural matter. When a tort occurs in Europe, but the case is litigated in American courts, treating the burden of proof as a procedural matter preserves the complementarity of incentives created by the burden of proof and evidentiary rules. Conversely, treating the burden of proof as a substantive matter creates a mismatch in incentives created by the burden of proof and evidentiary rules.

The article is structured in three parts. The first part of the article provides a theoretical insight into the interaction of presumptions and discovery rules using an economic approach. The second part offers a short overview of the way American and European law deal with the burden of proof and evidentiary discovery. In the third part the authors discuss how dissonant incentives can arise when tort cases are adjudicated in American courts using European legal rules. The various case law of American jurisdictions are split on the question whether the burden of proof should be regarded as substantive or procedural. The authors ultimately suggest that the US should treat presumption of negligence as a procedural rule to promote efficient incentives. They conclude that such a rule counterintuitively results in better outcomes in cases of private international law tort cases where, with a proper alignment of presumptions and discoverability rules, defendants would face incentives to invest in evidence technology even when knowing that the evidence could be used against them.