Droit international général

The programme of the 2018 edition of the International Seminar on Private International Law organized by Prof. Fernández Rozas and Prof. De Miguel Asensio, has been released and is available here. In this occasion, the Seminar is jointly organized with Prof. Moura Vicente and is to be held at the Law Faculty of the University of Lisbonne on 13-14 September 2018. The Seminar, which is closely connected to the legal journal Anuario Español de Derecho internacional privado, will be structured in five sections: Family and Successions; International Commercial Arbitration: International Business Law; Private International Law and IT Law; and Codification of PIL with a special focus on Latin America. The Conference will bring together around fifty speakers from more than twelve countries. Additional information about the seminar is available here.

Thanks to Héloïse Meur, Lilia Aït Ahmed and Estelle Gallant for this post.

On June 21, 2018 a full-day colloquium will take place in Paris on the protection of unaccompanied minors at the former Courthouse.

The colloquium will see the participation of high-hand speakers from institutions facing the issue of unaccompanied minors :

• French public authorities (French authority to protect human rights and civil liberties, French national consultative committee on human rights), • French Supreme Court, • The Paris Bar, • Major civil associations (GISTI, ECPAT, La Cabane juridique), • French and Belgian professors and Phd candidates in law and geography.

The speakers will discuss the root causes of the migration flows of unaccompanied minors, the limits of their treatment by French authorities, the difficulties to coordinate with other EU member States, and envisage the possible room for improvements, notably vis-à-vis what is done abroad, and especially in Belgium.

The program is available here. For registration send an email to colloquemna@gmail.com.

 

Even Advocate-General Bobek has not managed to turn jurisdictional issues re prospectus liability into the prosaic type of analysis which many of us have become fond of. His Opinion in C-307/17 Löber v Barclays is a lucid, systematic and pedagogic review of the CJEU’s case-law on (now) Article 7(2)’s jurisdiction for tort in the context of ‘prospectus liability’ aka investment misrepresentation. Starting with the direct /indirect damage distinction; and focusing of course on the determination of pure economic loss.

Ms Helga Löber invested in certificates in the form of bearer bonds issued by Barclays Bank Plc. In order to acquire those certificates, the corresponding amounts were transferred from her current (personal) bank account located in Vienna, Austria to two securities accounts in Graz and Salzburg. Payment was then made from those securities accounts for the certificates at issue.

Note immediately that the jurisdictional discussion is a result of Article 7(2) not just identifying a Member State: it identifies specific courts within that Member State. Here: claimant brought her claim before a court in Vienna, the place of her domicile. This is also where her current bank account is located, from which she made the first transfer in order to make the investment. The first- and second-instance courts in Vienna however decided that they did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The case is now pending before the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court, Austria). That court is asking, in essence, which of the bank accounts used, if any, is relevant to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear the claim at issue.

Close reference is made to Kolassa. In my posting on that case at the time, I noted that the many factual references which the Court built in in its decision, gave it dubious precedent value. Bobek AG in Löber necessarily therefore distinguishes many factual situations. The almost sole focus lies on 7(2): unlike in Kolassa, contracts neither consumer contracts are an issue.

Here are a few things of note:

First, in his review of the existing case-law the AG at 38 points out like I did at the time of the judgment, that the CJEU’s finding in CDC that locus damni for a pure economic loss, in the case of a corporation, is the place of its registered office, is at odds with precedent (he made the same remark in flyLAL).

Next, on locus delicti commissi, the AG suggests that despite Article 7(2)’s instruction, a single ldc within the Member State cannot be determined. The relevant point in his view is the moment from which the prospectus can, by operation of law, start influencing the investment behaviour of the relevant group of investors. In the present case, and considering the national segmentation of the capital market regulation at issue, that relevant group is made up of investors on secondary markets in Austria. At 65:  once it became possible to offer the certificates on the Austrian secondary market, that possibility was immediately available for the whole territory of Austria. ‘The nature of the tort of misrepresentation at issue does not allow for the identification of a location within the national territory because once the author of the tort is allowed to influence the given national territory, that influence immediately covers the whole territory, irrespective of the actual means used for the publication of a specific prospectus.’ As we know from CDC, the Court does not readily accept that a single ldc cannot be determined.

Further, for locus damni, the AG suggests (at 78) ‘The place where…a legally binding investment obligation is factually assumed… The exact location of such a place is a matter for the national law considered in the light of available factual evidence. It is likely to be the premises of a branch of the bank where the respective investment contract was signed, which may correspond, as in the Kolassa case, to the place where the bank account is held.‘ That in my view first of all is not a warranted outcome. The investor in Löber is not a consumer within the protected categories of the Regulation. Suggesting the place of conclusion of the obligation leaves room for the claimant to manipulate the forum of any future suit in tort. This is exactly what the Court objected to in Universal Music. Moreover, note the reference to ‘the national law’. It is quite unusual to suggest such a role for lex fori in light of the principle of autonomous interpretation. Unless the AG in fact means the ‘lex contractus’, presumably to be determined applying Rome I.

In summary there are quite a few open questions here – not something of course which I would necessarily object to.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.7

 

In Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, the Canadian Supreme Court as I reported at the time confirmed the country’s flexible approach to the jurisdictional stage of recognition and enforcement actions. Following that ruling both parties files for summary judgment, evidently advocating a different outcome.

The Ontario Court of Appeal have now held in 2018 ONCA 472 Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation that there are stringent requirements for piercing the corporate veil (i.e. by execution on Chevron Canada’s shares and assets to satisfy the Ecuadorian judgment) and that these are not met in casu.

Of particular note is Hourigan JA’s argument at 61 that ‘the appellants’ proposed interpretation of the [Canadian Corporation’s] Act would also have a significant policy impact on how corporations carry on business in Canada. Corporations have stakeholders. Creditors, shareholders, and employees, among others, rely on the corporate separateness doctrine that is long-established in our jurisprudence and that is a deliberate policy choice made in the [Act]. Those stakeholders have a reasonable expectation that when they do business with a Canadian corporation, they need only consider the liabilities of that corporation and not the liabilities of some related corporation.’

Blake, Cassels and Graydon have further review here. Note that the issue is one of a specific technical nature: it only relates to veil piercing once the recognition and enforcement of a foreign ruling is sought.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 8.

 

 

 

Today the fourth meeting of the Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments concluded in The Hague. Further information (incl. a revised Draft Convention text) will be uploaded on the Hague Conference website soon (< www.hcch.net >). Please check this website for the latest updates.

A background document related to the Treatment of Intellectual Property-Related Judgments under the November 2017 draft Convention was published this month by the Hague Conference (HCCH). It was drafted by the co-Rapporteurs of the draft Convention (Professors Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain and Geneviève Saumier, McGill University, Canada) and the Permanent Bureau. This document will be discussed at the Diplomatic Session (a high-level negotiation meeting with a view to adopting a final text – envisaged to take place in mid-2019) and was not meant to be discussed at this Special Commission.

For those of you who are interested in the interaction between intellectual property rights and the Judgments Project, please refer to the above-mentioned background document (instead of the Revised Preliminary Explanatory Report as this will be further revised to reflect the content of this document).

In Platinum Partners, Chapman J held that foreign discovery laws should be considered
for comity concerns, yet they are not determinative of whether discovery should be
permitted under United States law.

Foreign Representatives sought access to documents from US audit firms concerning investment funds that were debtors in Cayman Islands liquidation proceedings recognized under Chapter 15 as foreign main proceedings. Jacob Frumkin has excellent insight and I am happy to refer.

Section 1521(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, upon recognition of a foreign main proceeding, a bankruptcy court may, “at the request of a foreign representative, grant any appropriate relief” … “where necessary to effectuate the purpose of [chapter 15] and to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors.”  The first main argument of the auditors was that Cayman law does not permit the discovery of audit work papers or materials that are not a debtor’s property and, if the Court were to grant the motion, its interests and the interests of comity would not be protected.

The Court dismissed this argument, noting that

“it is well-established that comity does not require that the relief available in the United States be identical to the relief sought in the foreign bankruptcy proceeding; it is sufficient if the result is comparable and that the foreign laws are not repugnant to our laws and policies.” and that

“requiring this Court to ensure compliance with foreign law prior to granting relief sought pursuant to chapter 15 would require the Court to engage in a full-blown analysis of foreign law each and every time a foreign representative seeks additional relief in the United States, which may result in differing interpretations of U.S. law depending on where the foreign main proceeding was pending.”

Comity considerations surface in the most technical of corners.

Geert.

 

The School of Law of the University of Bologna is organizing the III Edition of the Summer School on European and Comparative Environmental Law, to be held in Ravenna, July 9-13, 2018.

For more information click here.

You can also get directly in touch with Prof. Lupoi [micheleangelo.lupoi@unibo.it].

 

In 4A_417/2017 (litigants’ names per usual unnecessarily anonimysed; Ganzoni reveal it to be Swatch AG) the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (at 2) first of all correctly reminds us that neither the Lugano Convention nor Brussels I (or indeed the Recast) capture the procedural interest required for a party to request a negative declaration (of liability; in tort, contract or otherwise). In C-113/11 Folien Fischer the CJEU held that negative declarations are covered by Article 7(2); the national court can, indeed must examine its jurisdiction under that provision (and the corresponding one in Lugano) but that does not say anything about standing requirements vis-a-vis interest. (As far as I am aware there is no similar judgment viz 7(1) but the rule must be the same).

Such negative declarations are often part of the race to court; via the lis alibi pendens rules they undercut the forum which the counterparty might have preferred.

As Walderwyss summarise, Hitherto the Swiss Supreme Court had a rather strict approach to the interest required for a negative declaration. Race to court (or ‘forum running’ as the SC calls it) alone was not a sufficient reason. With the March 2018 judgment, that has now been relaxed: Swatch Group AG’s interest in securing a Swiss forum  in a dispute against an English counterparty, was considered sufficient to grant it interest: at 5.4: ‘Zusammenfassend ist festzustellen, dass jedenfalls im internationalen Verhältnis das Interesse einer Partei, bei einem bevorstehenden Gerichtsverfahren einen ihr genehmen Gerichtsstand zu sichern, als genügendes Feststellungsinteresse zu qualifizieren ist.‘

With race to court following Swatch no longer hindered by a restrictive approach to standing, the Swiss surely must have an advantage in this time-sensitive part of international litigation. (Not a great pun, I realise. But I am nearing the end of yet another long working week).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2.6.

Thanks to Horatia Muir Watt and Hélène van Lith (Sciences Po) for this post

Moving from Paris to The Hague for the PAX MOOT Finals – Moot Court Conflict of Laws/Droit International Privé – 6th Edition
Sciences Po – Law School / école de droit

The PAX Moot Eliminatory Round took place last Tuesday in Paris with 8 universities mooting the cross border climate change moot case which addressed a number of complex transnational legal questions in Private International Law and was generously hosted by the ICC (see also our previous post).
The four winning teams who made it to the finals are Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Heidelberg, Paris I Sorbonne and Sciences Po.
The Panel of the PAX Moot Court Judges consisted of the following members:

Hans van Loon – Former Secretary General of the HCCH (The Hague)
Agnès Maitrepierre – Cour de cassation (Paris)
Daan Lunsingh Scheurleer –Nauta Dutilh (Amsterdam)/ Christine Lecuyer- Thieffry (Paris)
Clément Dupoirier – Herbert Smith Freehills (Paris)
Patrick Thieffry – Environmental Lawyer and Associate Professor. (Paris)
Alexis Foucard – Clifford Chance (Paris)
Michal Chajdukowski and Vasili Rotaru (PAX moot winning team 2017)
The PAX Moot Finals will be held on 1 June at the Peace Palace – hence the name – in The Hague, paying tribute to the city as the “legal capital of the world” and home of The Hague Conference of Private International Law, which also marks its 125th anniversary.

The winning Mooters and best pleaders will be rewarded with an internship at international commercial litigation departments of renowned law firms Nauta Dutilh in Amsterdam and Herbert Smith in Paris.
The concept and goal of the PAX Moot is to study and apply private international law for the resolution of cross border disputes through a concrete problem “the Case” and to train law students and practitioners of tomorrow in arguing and analysing complex global legal questions in international litigation.

The inter-university PAX Moot organized by Sciences Po Law School is a pleading competition addressing issues of Private International Law and this year’s 6th edition has gone global to include teams from universities in Europe and beyond. The organizers thank the following institutions for their support and willingness to open the competition to their students: Sorbonne University Paris I, London School of Economics, HEC, Heidelberg University, Luxembourg University, Cambridge University, University College London (UCL), King’s College London, University of Antwerp, Erasmus University, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Sciences Po Law School and Statale University of Milan. Participation was also open to US exchange students from Harvard, Columbia, Duke, Northwestern, Northeastern, Duke and Penn law schools.

Inquiries can be addressed to Dr. Hélène van Lith by email at helene.vanlith@sciencespo.fr

In [2018] EWHC 1230 (Comm) St Vincent v Bruce Roberston et al Males J set aside a worldwide freezing order in summary judgment but that is not the trigger for this blog post. Rather, consider paras 33 and 34:

1. St Vincent (and two associated companies) attempted to stop the sale [of a chunk of assets by commencing proceedings in Cyprus against 19 defendants, including Mr Robinson, Winterbourne Pte and the other defendants to these proceedings and also HHL and HDP. On 5 August 2013 the District Court of Nicosia granted an injunction, purporting to restrain any dealings with HDP’s assets. [GAVC: for the jurisdiction of the Cypriot courts: see 12: The Shares Pledge was governed by the law of Cyprus and provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of that country]
2. Notwithstanding the Cyprus order, on 30 September 2013 the creditors of HDP approved the sale to KFTP. The arrangement was then approved by the District Court of Gliwice on 24 October 2013. The Polish court did not regard the order of the Cyprus court as an impediment to the sale, taking the view that it had exclusive jurisdiction over a Polish company under its supervision and was not required to recognise the Cypriot order in accordance with the provisions of the Brussels Regulation. The court did not rule on any issue whether the proposed sale to KFTP was at market value and was not asked to do so.

I have tried to locate the Polish judgment but have failed to do so (which is where assistance from Polish readers would be appreciated). Presumably however the Polish courts argued that Article 24(2) Brussels I Recast was engaged, and then either per Weber ignored lis alibi pendens (were it to have found the case was still pending in Cyprus), or applied Article 45(1) e ii to ignore the Cypriot findings. In either case, the relevant point is how widely the Polish courts seem to have interpreted Article 24(2).

Come to think of it this would have been good exam material and I have one or two of those coming up (although there is plenty in the ‘exam material’ ledger).

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.6.5, Heading 2.2.16.

 

The 2017 Hague Lecture of Professor Burkhard Hess has been published in Recueil des Cours, vol. 388, pg. 49-266.

The Lecture addresses dispute resolution in international cases from the classical perspective of the private-public divide. This distinction is known in almost all legal systems of the world, and it operates in both domestic and in international settings. The main focus of the Lecture relates to overlapping remedies available under private international and public international law; it maps out the growing landscape of modern dispute resolution, where a multitude of courts and arbitral tribunals operating at different levels (domestic, international and transnational) is accessible to litigants in cross-border settings. Today, a comprehensive study of these developments is still missing. This Lecture does not aim to provide the whole picture, but focusses instead on some basic structures, revealing three main areas where the distinction between private and public disputes remains applicable today:

First, the divide delimitates the jurisdiction of domestic courts in cases against foreign states and international organisations (immunities); it equally limits the possibilities of foreign and international public entities to enforce public law claims in cross-border settings. As a matter of principle, public law claims cannot be brought before civil domestic courts of other states. However, this rule has been challenged by recent developments, especially by the private enforcement of (public) claims and by the cross-border cooperation of public authorities. Moreover, the protection of human rights and the implementation of the rule of law in cross-border constellations entail a growing need for a judicial control of acta iure imperii – even if only by the courts of the defendant state.

The second area of application of the divide relates to the delineation between domestic and international remedies. In this field, the distinction has lost much of its previous significance because nowadays individual commercial actors may bring their claims directly (often assisted by experienced actors like litigation funders) before international arbitral tribunals, claims commissions and human rights courts. In this area of law, individuals’ access to international dispute resolution mechanisms has been considerably reinforced. Here, Prof. Hess argues that it would be misleading to qualify parts of the current dispute resolution system as purely “commercial” and other parts as purely “public or administrative”. There are revolving doors between the systems and the same procedures are often applied; what really matters is the proper delineation of  different remedies which functionally protect the same interests and rights.

The third area relates to the privatization of dispute settlement, especially in the context of private ordering. At present, powerful stakeholders often regulate their activities vis à vis third parties (including public actors) by globalized standard terms. Pertinent examples in this respect are financial law (i.e. ISDA), the organization of the internet (i.e. ICANN) and sports law (i.e. CAS). In this context, there is a considerable danger that the privatization of law-making and of the corresponding dispute settlement schemes does not sufficiently respect general interests and the rights of third parties. A residual judicial control by independent (state) courts is therefore needed. Data protection in cyberspace is an interesting example where the European Union and other state actors are regaining control in order to protect the interests of affected individuals.

Finally, the Lecture argues that the private-public divide still exists today and – contrary to some scholarly opinions – cannot be given up. At the same time, one must be aware that private and public international law have complementary functions in order to address adequately the multitude of disputes at both the cross-border and the international level. In this context the private-public divide should be understood as an appropriate tool to explain the complementarity of private and public international law in the modern multilevel legal structure of a globalized world.

A pocket book of the Hague Lecture will be available in the coming months.

In [2018] EWHC 1041 (Ch) MX1 and SES v Fardad Farahzad (defendant’s appeal for summary judgment) claimants are domiciled in Israel and Luxembourg respectively. Their action results from some 57 tweets published by a Twitter account going under the title “@MX1 Leaker”. The Tweets make various allegations of bribery and corruption against the First Claimant. Claimants suggest a conspiracy between the defendant and former employees (for the Tweet seemed furnished with internal information which the defendant would not have had access to).

Defendant’s domicile is not specified but for the purposes of the litigation is not relevant: for jurisdiction is seemingly undisputed and even if this were not based on the Brussels I Recast, the English courts have to apply Rome II to determine applicable law.

Defendant’s request for summary dismissal is based inter alia on the argument that if and to the extent the Claimants or either of them have suffered loss or damage as a result of the Conspiracy, the place of that loss or damage was not England. The applicable law identified by the Rome II Regulation – according to the Defendant: Israeli law – did not recognize the ‘lawful means conspiracy’ pleaded by the Claimants as a cause of action.

Arguments centred around Article 4(1) Rome II: neither 4(2) or (3) were engaged by counsel. Damage pleaded by the Claimants is as follows: (paras refer to the Particulars of Claim)

“23. Unless restrained by the court, the Defendant will cause damage to the business of the Claimants in England and Wales and elsewhere by publishing or facilitating the publication of harmful tweets pursuant to the Conspiracy.

24. Further, unless the Defendant is ordered by the court to delete the Tweets, the Claimants will suffer damage to its business in the future by reason of the continued public existence of the Tweets.

25. By reason of the matters aforesaid, the Claimants have suffered loss and damage. The best particulars which the Claimants can currently give are that: (a) The Claimants have incurred the costs of investigating the Conspiracy in approximately the sum of US$350,000 including costs of at least £100,000 incurred in England in respect of the services of Kroll and of the Claimants’ lawyers which are not recoverable as part of the costs of this claim; (b) The Claimants have also incurred additional costs investigating the allegations made in the Tweets.”

It is the £100K which Smith J at 39 ff applies Article 4(1) to, and he does so with harmonious interpretation (‘resonance’) between Brussels I Recast’s Article 7(2) and Rome II in mind.

Smith J held that the costs of investigating the conspiracy were incurred when the claimants entered into the agreements with investigators and lawyers to have the conspiracy investigated, and therefore in England. It is irrelevant that those costs were not the claimants’ predominant loss (paras 40, 46). The case will undoubtedly lead to Mozaik (‘fragmentation’), but that too is resonant with Brussels I Recast (Shevill).

A good starter introduction to Rome II.

Geert.

(Handbook of) EU Private International Law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 4, Heading 4.4.

 

 

The International Conference “Pluralism or Universalism in International Copyright Law” is to be held in May 31-June 1, 2018 at the University of Cyprus. The conference is organized by Associate Professor Tatiana Eleni Synodinou.

You can check the programme and the speakers here and here. More information available here.

 

This call for papers can also be found on the TDM website here
https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news.asp?key=1707

We are pleased to announce a forthcoming Transnational Dispute Management (TDM, ISSN 1875-4120, www.transnational-dispute-management.com) Special Issue on “Cybersecurity in International Arbitration.”

International arbitration has the advantage over litigation of allowing parties to resolve their disputes privately and confidentially if desired.  In our increasingly digitized world, attention to cybersecurity in individual arbitration matters is required in order to maintain that advantage and the confidence of parties in the integrity of the arbitral process.

International arbitration typically involves multiple participants in multiple locations, the storage and transmission of significant amounts of confidential, sensitive and commercially valuable digital data and numerous electronic communications.   Even where the proceeding is public or non-confidential in part, certain aspects, such as arbitrator deliberations and party internal communications and work product, almost always must remain confidential to protect the integrity of the process.

In a world where businesses, law firms, government entities, educational institutions and other large data custodians are under threat or already have been breached, international arbitration obviously is not immune.  There are already a few documented instances where the process has been compromised and anecdotal evidence of attempted intrusion into proceedings and data held by various participants.

There is a manifest need for the international arbitration community to begin to develop a shared understanding of the scope of the threat and the appropriate response.  There is an emerging consensus that cybersecurity is an important consideration that should be addressed early in the international arbitration process and that reasonable cybersecurity measures should be adopted.  Nonetheless, questions abound, including, to cite just a few examples, the specific responsibilities of the various participants in the process, the scope of measures that should be adopted, the scope of party autonomy to determine such measures, the availability of resources and concerns that cybersecurity requirements may increase the expense of arbitration and create a resource gap that could disadvantage less-resourced participants.

It is hoped that papers submitted for the Special Issue will advance the conversation by addressing some of the questions described here and potentially identifying issues the international arbitration community will need to consider.

Suggestions for possible paper topics include:

• Commentary on the Draft ICCA-CPR-New York City Bar Association Protocol for Cybersecurity in Arbitration (available here)
• Cybersecurity best practices for different participants in the arbitral process, including institutions, counsel, arbitrators, parties, and experts, and suggestions as to model language to be used in procedural orders, stipulations, expert engagement letters, etc. For example, what factors should parties considering using a third-party platform to share and store arbitration-related information take into account? An article on the arbitrator’s responsibility to protect the integrity of the process is linked here and here.
• What can and should be done on a systemic basis to address cybersecurity in international arbitration? Should cybersecurity be the subject of soft law, for instance? If so, in what form and who should lead?
• How should tribunals resolve party conflicts about reasonable security measures, breach notification obligations, and related costs?
• How should cybersecurity breaches or failures to implement required cybersecurity measures in the arbitral process be addressed? For example, should there be a default presumption regarding the admissibility of evidence attained from a data breach? Should arbitrators entertain applications for damages and/or sanctions?
• Are there limits to party autonomy to determine the cybersecurity measures to be applied in individual matters?  Are there institutional or tribunal interests that may in some circumstances override the parties’ agreement? If so, how are these interests defined and where does the power derive to apply them?
• What is the correct liability standard for cybersecurity breaches? Should there be a safe harbor?
• What is the correct standard to test the adequacy of cybersecurity measures? Is a reasonableness standard adequate to protect the process?
• Comparative analysis of ethical rules and obligations governing the conduct of lawyers around the globe in relation to cybersecurity and conclusions as to implications for international arbitration proceedings and the existence of either transnational norms or conflicts
• How do considerations of fairness and equality relate to the implementation of cybersecurity measures in international arbitrations? For instance, how should differences in infrastructure and party resources be taken into account in assessing the appropriate level of cybersecurity measures in individual matters?  Is there a minimum level of security required to protect the integrity of arbitration process that should be implemented in all arbitrations?
• How do data privacy regimes relate to cybersecurity and what are the implications for international arbitration proceedings?
• Arbitration of business-to-business data breaches

This special issue will be edited by independent arbitrators Stephanie Cohen and Mark Morril.

The Mexican Academy of Private International and Comparative Law (AMEDIP) will be hosting its XLI Seminar entitled “Towards the Unification of Private International Law Principles in Mexican Procedural Law” at the Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro (Mexico) from 14 to 16 November 2018.

The seminar will focus in particular on the New National Code of Civil and Family Procedure, which will contain PIL provisions. This is a significant development given that at present each Mexican state (32) has its own procedural law.

Potential speakers are invited to submit a paper in Spanish, English, or Portuguese by 17 September 2018. Papers must comply with the criteria established by AMEDIP and will be evaluated accordingly. Selected speakers will be required to give their presentations preferably in Spanish as there will be no interpretation services but some exceptions may be made by the organisers upon request.

The final programme of the seminar will be made available at the end of October.

For more detailed information (incl. convocation), see www.amedip.org.  Any queries, as well as registration requests, may be directed to asistencia@amedip.org.

 

The 60th Seminar of Comparative and European Law in Urbino (Italy) has already been announced. It will take place from August 20, to September 1. The program includes presentations on many different topics, some of them of direct interest for private international lawyers and scholars.  The whole program is available here, together with information on  enrollment, accommodation, and how to get to Urbino.

 

The latest issue of the Zeitschrift für Europäische Privatrecht has just been released. It contains the following articles:

Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, Die Einführung der gleichgeschlechtlichen Ehe in ausgewählten Rechtsordnungen

The introduction of same-sex marriage in German law has given rise to many discussions in society and politics. However, since the beginning of this millennium many states have accepted marriage as a union of two persons of different or of the same sex. Frequently these reforms have caused discussion on constitutional issues, especially on the prominent features of marriage and on the avoidance of any discrimination.

Juan Pablo Murga Fernández, Payment of descedents´ debts in succession law: “effects” and “defects” of the German and Spanish legal systems

The transfer of the deceased’s debts is a common consequence that arises from the phenomenon of succession in both Civil and Common Law legal systems. In this respect, a number of conflicting interests are at stake: namely, the interest of the heir that needs to be balanced against the interest of the different groups of creditors. This paper analyses the legal solutions given to these matters under the Spanish and German legal systems, pointing out their common and particular effects and defects.

Dirk Heirbaut, The sleeping beauty awakens: Belgium’s new law of inheritance as a first step in the greatest recent recodification program in Western Europe

In the summer of 2017 the Belgian parliament voted a new law of inheritance, which is only a small part of larger program of recodification, announced on 6 December 2016 by minister of justice Koen Geens, and which includes, inter alia, a new civil code. This article explains why, after Napoleon, drafts of new codes failed in Belgium and why this may actually be one of the reasons, which make it possible that the recent recodification efforts may bear fruit very soon.

Martin Zwickel, Die Einführung der obligatorischen Schlichtung in Frankreich

In the context of the major judicial reform, France introduced mandatory conciliation as of 18 November 2016. In certain cases, it is now necessary to undertake a prior effort at finding agreement with a court-ordered conciliator. This article explains and evaluates this requirement

 

 

Ross Denton at Baker & McKenzie has a gem of a briefing on the EU’s ‘blocking Regulation’ and what it would mean in light of the US’ mooted sanctions on Iran. Steptoe had earlier also pondered the impact of the US withdrawal from the ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’ or JCPOA, on the Regulation.

Regulation 2271/96 provides essentially for protection against, and counteracts the effects of the extra-territorial application of the laws of third States. WTO lawyers will remember it mostly from the days of Helms-Burton. As Ross points out, the European Commission now have delegated power to populate the Annex to the list (which details the sanctions the Regulation acts against).

Potentially extra-territorial are in particular US ‘secondary’ sanctions: i.e. those against non-US individuals (or companies) for actions undertaken outside the US.

Of particular interest to readers of the blog – including researchers I would imagine, are Articles 4, 5 and 6, which I have copy-pasted in full below. They deal with recognition and enforcement, co-operation with foreign courts, and recovery of expenses. These Articles are a rare instance where the EU adopt a harmonised approach to recognition and enforcement of judgments originating ex-EU (awaiting the potential Hague Judgments project). [Update 22 May 11:30 AM. As Enio Piovezani comments below, the GDPR, too, includes a relevant rule: See Article 48: ‘Transfers or disclosures not authorised by Union law. Any judgment of a court or tribunal and any decision of an administrative authority of a third country requiring a controller or processor to transfer or disclose personal data may only be recognised or enforceable in any manner if based on an international agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty, in force between the requesting third country and the Union or a Member State, without prejudice to other grounds for transfer pursuant to this Chapter.’]

 

As Ross points out, however, the proverbial US rock is harder than the equally proverbial EU stone, hence in practice many companies choose to abide by the US sanctions, anyways.

My fingers are itching to launch yet another interesting PhD topic on this issue…Takers?

Geert.

 

Article 4

No judgment of a court or tribunal and no decision of an administrative authority located outside the Community giving effect, directly or indirectly, to the laws specified in the Annex or to actions based thereon or resulting there from, shall be recognized or be enforceable in any manner.

Article 5

No person referred to in Article 11 shall comply, whether directly or through a subsidiary or other intermediary person, actively or by deliberate omission, with any requirement or prohibition, including requests of foreign courts, based on or resulting, directly or indirectly, from the laws specified in the Annex or from actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.

Persons may be authorized, in accordance with the procedures provided in Articles 7 and 8, to comply fully or partially to the extent that non-compliance would seriously damage their interests or those of the Community. The criteria for the application of this provision shall be established in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 8. When there is sufficient evidence that non-compliance would cause serious damage to a natural or legal person, the Commission shall expeditiously submit to the committee referred to in Article 8 a draft of the appropriate measures to be taken under the terms of the Regulation.

Article 6

Any person referred to in Article 11, who is engaging in an activity referred to in Article 1 shall be entitled to recover any damages, including legal costs, caused to that person by the application of the laws specified in the Annex or by actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.

Such recovery may be obtained from the natural or legal person or any other entity causing the damages or from any person acting on its behalf or intermediary.

The Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters shall apply to proceedings brought and judgments given under this Article. Recovery may be obtained on the basis of the provisions of Sections 2 to 6 of Title II of that Convention, as well as, in accordance with Article 57 (3) of that Convention, through judicial proceedings instituted in the Courts of any Member State where that person, entity, person acting on its behalf or intermediary holds assets.

Without prejudice to other means available and in accordance with applicable law, the recovery could take the form of seizure and sale of assets held by those persons, entities, persons acting on their behalf or intermediaries within the Community, including shares held in a legal person incorporated within the Community.

By Guillaume Croisant (Université Libre de Bruxelles)

In October 2017, as already reported in a previous post, the Belgian Government announced its intention to set up a specialised English-speaking court with jurisdiction over international commercial disputes, the Brussels International Business Court (“BIBC”). An update versionof the text has finally been submitted to Parliament on 15 May 2018, after that the Government’s initial draft faced criticisms from the High Council of Justice (relating to the BIBC’s independence and impartiality, its source of funding and its impact on the ordinary courts) and was subject to the review of the Conseil d’Etat.

In the wake of Brexit, the Belgian Government aims at establishing a specialised business court able to position Brussels as a new hub for international commercial disputes, in line with its international status as de factocapital of the EU and seat of many international institutions and companies. Similar projects are ongoing in several jurisdictions throughout the EU, including France, the Netherlands and Germany (see previous post).

The BIBC will have jurisdiction over disputes:

• which are international in nature, i.e. where (i) the parties have their establishment in different jurisdictions, (ii) a substantial part of the commercial relationship must be performed in a third country, or (iii) the applicable law to the dispute is a foreign law. In addition, another language than French, Dutch or German (Belgium’s official languages, which are already used before ordinary courts) must have been used frequently by the parties during their commercial relationship;
• among “enterprises” (i.e. every entity pursuing an economic purpose, including public enterprises which provide goods and services on a market basis); and
• provided that the parties have agreed to the BIBC’s jurisdiction before or after the crystallisation of their dispute.

Subject to potential amendments in Parliament, the main procedural hallmarks of the BIBC can be summarised as follows:

• the procedure will be conducted in English (notices and submissions, evidence, hearings, judgments, etc.);
• while the BIBC remains a State court, the procedure will be based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on international arbitration, which means that the parties will be offered greater flexibility and room to organise the conduct of the proceedings;
• the cases will be heard by ad hocchambers of three judges, one professional and two lay judges (appointed by the president of the BIBC on the basis of a panel of Belgian and international experts in international business law), with the assistance of the Registrar of the Brussels Court of Appeal;
• the BIBC will be granted the power to issue provisional and protective measures (including upon ex parterequests);
• no appeal will be open against the BIBC’s decision (with the exception of an opposition/tierce opposition before the BIBC for absent parties/interested third parties, and a pourvoi en cassation on points of law before the Supreme Court);
• the BIBC should be self-financing and the court fees are therefore going to be significantly increased (to around € 20,000/case).

The Belgian Government aims to have the BIBC up and running by 1 January 2020.

 

The most recent issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal (available here) is a special issue, guest edited by Janet Walker, Gerard Kennedy and Sagi Peari, considering the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act.  This statute governs the taking of jurisdiction and both staying and transferring proceedings in civil and commercial matters in three Canadian provinces: British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan.

The abstract to the introductory article states: “In 2016, the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (“CJPTA”) marked its tenth year in force.  Promulgated by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, and adopted in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, the CJPTA was developed to clarify and advance the law of judicial jurisdiction.  In a symposium hosted by Osgoode Hall Law School, ten leading scholars were invited to present papers on specific questions in order to assess the promise of the CJPTA to meet the needs of Canadians in the years ahead and to provide leadership for the law in other parts of Canada.  This article provides an overview of the issues discussed in the symposium; it places the papers that were presented in the larger context of developments in the law of judicial jurisdiction in Canada and internationally; and it summarizes in an appendix the drafting reforms that might be made to the Act.”

The articles about the CJPTA are:

Judicial Jurisdiction in Canada: The CJPTA—A Decade of Progress (Janet Walker)

Six of One, Half a Dozen of the Other? Jurisdiction in Common Law Canada (Stephen G.A. Pitel)

Jurisdiction Motions and Access to Justice: An Ontario Tale (Gerard J. Kennedy)

Has the CJPTA readied Canada for the Hague Choice of Court Convention? (Geneviève Saumier)

General Jurisdiction over Corporate Defendants under the CJPTA: Consistent with International Standards? (Catherine Walsh)

Residual Discretion: The Concept of Forum of Necessity under the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (Michael Sobkin)

Three Objections to Forum of Necessity: Global Access to Justice, International Criminal Law, and Proper Party (Sagi Peari)

Cross-Border Transfers of Court Proceedings (Vaughan Black)

The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act and the Hague Conference’s Judgments and Jurisdiction Projects (Joost Blom)