Droit international général

Djakhongir Saidov, Conformity of Goods and Documents, Hart Publishing, 2015, ISBN 9781849461559, pp. 318, GBP 75.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – This book provides a detailed examination of the issue of conformity of goods and documents under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG). This issue lies at the heart of sales law and is one of the most frequently litigated. The book explores the Convention’s requirements as to quality, quantity, description and packaging of the goods (conformity); the requirements flowing from the need for the goods to be free from rights or claims of third parties; and the questions of what documents the seller must deliver to the buyer and what constitutes a ‘good’ document under the CISG. The book engages extensively with a substantial body of cases decided under the CISG and academic commentary. It systematises the Convention’s experience to date with a view to turning it into an integrated, comprehensive and distinctive CISG legal regime on conformity of goods and documents. The analysis is comparative and draws on the experience of some major domestic legal systems, such as English and US law. The focus is both analytical and practical. The book will be of interest to legal practitioners, academic lawyers and students with an interest in international and comparative sales, commercial and contract law.

Ulteriori informazioni sull’opera sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.

Last fall, the University of Missouri Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution convened an international symposium entitled “Judicial Education and the Art of Judging: From Myth to Methodology.” Panelists included judges, academics and judicial education experts from the United States, Canada and Australia.

The symposium arose out of the recognition that although there is a large and ever-increasing body of literature on matters relating to judicial appointments, judicial independence, judicial policy making and the like, there is an extremely limited amount of information on how someone learns to be a judge. The conventional wisdom in the common law world holds that judges arrive on the bench already equipped with all the skills necessary to manage a courtroom and dispense justice fully, fairly and rapidly. However, many judges have written about the difficulties they have had adjusting to the demands of the bench, and social scientists have identified a demonstrable link between judicial education and judicial performance. As a result, it is vitally important to identify and improve on best practices in judicial education.

The symposium sought to improve the understanding of judicial education by considering three related issue: (1) what it means to be a judge and what it is about judging that is different than other sorts of decision-making; (2) what the goal of judicial education is or should be; and (3) how judges can and should be educated. While most of the discussion took place within the context of common law legal systems, much of the material is of equal relevance to civil law systems.

Articles from this symposium are freely available here. The table of contents shows below.

Judicial Education and Regulatory Capture: Does the Current System of Educating Judges Promote a Well-Functioning Judiciary and Adequately Serve the Public Interest? S.I. Strong
What Judges Want and Need: User-Friendly Foundations for Effective Judicial Education Federal Circuit, Judge Duane Benton and Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman
Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge, Kathleen Mahoney
International Arbitration, Judicial Education, and Legal Elites, Catherine A. Rogers
Towards a New Paradigm of Judicial Education, Chief Justice Mary R. Russell
Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: A Guide for Novice, Experienced, and Foreign Judges S.I. Strong
Judging as Judgment: Tying Judicial Education to Adjudication Theory, Robert G. Bone
Of Judges, Law, and the River: Tacit Knowledge and the Judicial Role, Chad M. Oldfather
Educating Judges—Where to From Here?, Livingston Armytage
Judicial Education: Pedagogy for a Change, T. Brettel Dawson

This post has been written by Martina Mantovani.

On 10 September 2015, Advocate General Wahl delivered his opinion in Case C-350/14, Florin Lazar, regarding the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II). Pursuant to this provision, a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort is governed, as a general rule, by the law of “the place where the damage occurred”, irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred “and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur”.

The case concerns a fatal traffic accident occurred in Italy.

Some close relatives of the woman who died in the accident, not directly involved in the crash, brought proceedings in Italy seeking reparation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses personally suffered by them as a consequence of the death of the woman, ie the moral suffering for the loss of a loved person and the loss of a source of maintenance. Among the claimants, all of them of Romanian nationality, some were habitually resident in Italy, others in Romania.

Before the Tribunal of Trieste, seised of the matter, the issue arose of whether, for the purposes of the Rome II Regulation, one should look at the damage claimed by the relatives in their own right (possibly to be localised in Romania) or only at the damage suffered by the woman as the immediate victim of the accident. Put otherwise, the question was whether the prejudice for which the claimants were seeking reparation could be characterised as a “direct damage” under Article 4(1), or rather as an “indirect consequence of the event”, with no bearing on the identification of the applicable law.

According to AG Wahl, a “direct damage” within the meaning of Article 4(1) does not cover the losses suffered by family members of the direct victim.

In the opinion, the Advocate General begins by acknowledging that, under the domestic rules of some countries, the close relatives of the victim are allowed to seek satisfaction in their own right (iure proprio) for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses they suffered as a consequence of the fatal (or non-fatal) injury suffered by the victim, and that, in these instances, a separate legal relationship between such relatives and the person claimed to be liable arises and co-exists with the one already set in place between the latter and the direct victim.

In the Advocate General’s view, however, domestic legal solutions on third-party damage should not have an impact on the interpretation of the word “damage” in Article 4(1), which should rather be regarded as an autonomous notion of EU law. The latter notion should be construed having due regard, inter alia, to the case law of the ECJ concerning Article 5(3) of the 1968 Brussels Convention and of the Brussels I Regulation (now Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation), in particular insofar as it excludes that consequential and indirect (financial) damages sustained in another State by either the victim himself or another person, cannot be invoked in order to ground jurisdiction under that provision (see, in particular, the judgments in Dumez and Tracoba, Marinari and Kronhofer).

That solution, the Advocate General concedes, has been developed with specific reference to conflicts of jurisdictions, on the basis of considerations that are not necessarily as persuasive when transposed to the conflicts of laws. The case law on Brussels I, with the necessary adaptation, must nevertheless be treated as providing useful guidance for the interpretation of the Rome II Regulation.

Specifically, AG Wahl stresses that the adoption of the sole connecting factor of the loci damni in Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation marks the refutation of the theory of ubiquity, since, pursuant to the latter provision, torts are governed by one law. The fact of referring exclusively to the place where the damage was sustained by the direct victim, regardless of the harmful effects suffered elsewhere by third parties, complies with this policy insofar as it prevents the splitting of the governing law with respect to the several issues arising from the same event, based on the contingent circumstance of the habitual residence of the various claimants.

The solution proposed would additionally favour, he contends, other objectives of the Regulation. In particular, this would preserve the neutrality pursued by the legislator who, according to Recital 16, regarded the designation of the lex loci damni to be a “fair balance” between the interests of all the parties involved. Such compromise would be jeopardised were the victim’s family member systematically allowed to ground their claims on the law of the place of their habitual residence. The preferred reading would moreover ensure a close link between the matter and the applicable law since, while the place where the initial damage arose is usually closely related to the other components of liability, the same cannot be said, generally, as concerns the domicile of the indirect victim.

In the end, according to AG Wahl, Article 4(1) of Regulation No 864/2007 should be interpreted as meaning that the damages suffered, in their State of residence, by the close relatives of a person who died as a result of a traffic accident occurred in the State of the court seised constitute “indirect consequences” within the meaning of the said provision and, consequently, the “place where the damage occurred”, in that event, should be understood solely as the place in which the accident gave rise to the initial damage suffered by the direct victim.

On 10 September 2015, Advocate General Wahl delivered his opinion in Case C-350/14, Florin Lazar, regarding the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II). Pursuant to this provision, a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort is governed, as a general rule, by the law of “the place where the damage occurred”, irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred “and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur”.

The case concerns a fatal traffic accident occurred in Italy.

Some close relatives of the woman who died in the accident, not directly involved in the crash, brought proceedings in Italy seeking reparation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses personally suffered by them as a consequence of the death of the woman, ie the moral suffering for the loss of a loved person and the loss of a source of maintenance. Among the claimants, all of them of Romanian nationality, some were habitually resident in Italy, others in Romania.

Before the Tribunal of Trieste, seised of the matter, the issue arose of whether, for the purposes of the Rome II Regulation, one should look at the damage claimed by the relatives in their own right (possibly to be localised in Romania) or only at the damage suffered by the woman as the immediate victim of the accident. Put otherwise, the question was whether the prejudice for which the claimants were seeking reparation could be characterised as a “direct damage” under Article 4(1), or rather as an “indirect consequence of the event”, with no bearing on the identification of the applicable law.

According to AG Wahl, a “direct damage” within the meaning of Article 4(1) does not cover the losses suffered by family members of the direct victim.

In the opinion, the Advocate General begins by acknowledging that, under the domestic rules of some countries, the close relatives of the victim are allowed to seek satisfaction in their own right (iure proprio) for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses they suffered as a consequence of the fatal (or non-fatal) injury suffered by the victim, and that, in these instances, a separate legal relationship between such relatives and the person claimed to be liable arises and co-exists with the one already set in place between the latter and the direct victim.

In the Advocate General’s view, however, domestic legal solutions on third-party damage should not have an impact on the interpretation of the word “damage” in Article 4(1), which should rather be regarded as an autonomous notion of EU law. The latter notion should be construed having due regard, inter alia, to the case law of the ECJ concerning Article 5(3) of the 1968 Brussels Convention and of the Brussels I Regulation (now Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation), in particular insofar as it excludes that consequential and indirect (financial) damages sustained in another State by either the victim himself or another person, cannot be invoked in order to ground jurisdiction under that provision (see, in particular, the judgments in Dumez and Tracoba, Marinari and Kronhofer).

That solution, the Advocate General concedes, has been developed with specific reference to conflicts of jurisdictions, on the basis of considerations that are not necessarily as persuasive when transposed to the conflicts of laws. The case law on Brussels I, with the necessary adaptation, must nevertheless be treated as providing useful guidance for the interpretation of the Rome II Regulation.

Specifically, AG Wahl stresses that the adoption of the sole connecting factor of the loci damni in Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation marks the refutation of the theory of ubiquity, since, pursuant to the latter provision, torts are governed by one law. The fact of referring exclusively to the place where the damage was sustained by the direct victim, regardless of the harmful effects suffered elsewhere by third parties, complies with this policy insofar as it prevents the splitting of the governing law with respect to the several issues arising from the same event, based on the contingent circumstance of the habitual residence of the various claimants.

The solution proposed would additionally favour, he contends, other objectives of the Regulation. In particular, this would preserve the neutrality pursued by the legislator who, according to Recital 16, regarded the designation of the lex loci damni to be a “fair balance” between the interests of all the parties involved. Such compromise would be jeopardised were the victim’s family member systematically allowed to ground their claims on the law of the place of their habitual residence. The preferred reading would moreover ensure a close link between the matter and the applicable law since, while the place where the initial damage arose is usually closely related to the other components of liability, the same cannot be said, generally, as concerns the domicile of the indirect victim.

In the end, according to AG Wahl, Article 4(1) of Regulation No 864/2007 should be interpreted as meaning that the damages suffered, in their State of residence, by the close relatives of a person who died as a result of a traffic accident occurred in the State of the court seised constitute “indirect consequences” within the meaning of the said provision and, consequently, the “place where the damage occurred”, in that event, should be understood solely as the place in which the accident gave rise to the initial damage suffered by the direct victim.

The up-date version of two papers of Veerle Van Den Eeckhout has been published on SSRN.

The first up-dated paper, entitled “Choice and Regulatory Competion: Rules on Choice of Law and Forum”, analyzes the Rules of Private International Law from the perspective of “Choice and Regulatory Competition”. The up-dated version is to be found here.

The second up-dated paper, entitled “The “Right” Way to Go in International Labour Law – and Beyond”, discusses several current issues in international employment law. The up-dated version is to be found here.
The final papers will be published each in the books of the conferences in the context of which they have been written (a conference in Maastricht and in Antwerp respectively).

Si terrà a Trier il 10 e 11 dicembre 2015 un incontro di formazione organizzato da ERA – Academy of European Law, intitolato European Cross-border Procedures: How to Apply Them in Practice?

Il programma del workshop, specificamente rivolto ad avvocati, è disponibile qui.

Ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.

Il 23 ottobre 2015 si terrà presso l’Università di Verona un incontro su La gestazione per altri.

[Dalla presentazione dell’evento] – La giornata di studi prevede un attivo dialogo fra esperti di diversi settori, con brevi relazioni per area disciplinare in ciascuna delle sessioni di approfondimento e discussione a mo’ di tavola rotonda. L’evento intende favorire una ricostruzione sistemica del fenomeno e affrontare questioni che la dottrina non ha ancora considerato adeguatamente, quale la responsabilità dei diversi soggetti che possono essere coinvolti al di là dei committenti (legali, personale medico, ecc.), e le interazioni di un sistema multilivello, con particolare riguardo al contesto unionale e a quello euroconvenzionale.

Tra i relatori, Maria Caterina Baruffi (Univ. Verona), Davide Diverio (Univ. Milano),  Alexander Schuster (Univ. Trento), Cristiana Fioravanti (Univ. Ferrara).

Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

Nella sentenza resa il 6 ottobre 2015 nel caso Marie Matoušková (causa C‑404/14), la Corte di giustizia si è pronunciata sulla portata applicativa del regolamento n. 2201/2003 sulla competenza giurisdizionale e l’efficacia delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e di responsabilità genitoriale (Bruxelles II bis), in particolare per quanto concerne le misure concernenti la responsabilità genitoriale.

Nel caso di specie si trattava di stabilire se rientrasse nella sfera del regolamento l’approvazione, da parte delle autorità giudiziarie della Repubblica Ceca, di un accordo relativo alla divisione dell’eredità di uno dei genitori concluso dal curatore dei figli minori di quest’ultimo per loro conto.

I dubbi nascevano dal fatto che, per un verso, l’art. 1, par. 1, lett. b), del regolamento riconduce sotto la nozione di responsabilità genitoriale le questioni relative “all’attribuzione, all’esercizio, alla delega, alla revoca totale o parziale della responsabilità genitoriale”, ritenendo altresì applicabile il regolamento a “la tutela, la curatela ed altri istituti analoghi”, e che, per altro verso, ai sensi dell’art. 1, par. 3, lett. f), il regolamento non si applica “ai trust e alle successioni”.

La Corte è giunta alla conclusione che la misura in discorso costituisce, ai fini del regolamento Bruxelles II bis, una misura relativa all’esercizio della responsabilità genitoriale e ricade pertanto nell’ambito di applicazione di quest’ultimo, e non una misura relativa alle successioni.

A sostegno di tale ricostruzione, la Corte ha rilevato, innanzitutto, che l’approvazione di un accordo di divisione dell’eredità, nelle circostanze del caso di specie, è una misura adottata “in considerazione della capacità del minore, che mira a tutelare l’interesse superiore del minore e che è richiesta, ai sensi del diritto ceco, per gli atti giuridici relativi all’amministrazione dei beni che eccedono l’ordinaria amministrazione”.

Avuto riguardo agli interessi a cui è asservita, la misura in esame “riguarda direttamente la capacità della persona” e si inserisce in “un’azione finalizzata a soddisfare i bisogni di protezione e di assistenza dei figli minori”. La capacità e le questioni attinenti alla rappresentanza ad essa collegate, ha allora aggiunto la Corte, “devono essere valutate in base a criteri autonomi, e non devono essere trattate come questioni preliminari dipendenti dai relativi atti giuridici”: osservata da questa angolatura funzionale, la nomina di un curatore per i figli minori e il controllo dell’esercizio della sua attività “sono così strettamente legati che sarebbe inopportuno applicare regole di competenza differenti, che cambino a seconda della materia dell’atto giuridico considerato” (nel caso considerato, un atto concernente una successione mortis causa).

Per la Corte, l’esito interpretativo ora riferito trova conferma nella relazione di Paul Lagarde sulla Convenzione dell’Aia del 1996 concernente la competenza, la legge applicabile, il riconoscimento, l’esecuzione e la cooperazione in materia di responsabilità genitoriale e di misure di protezione dei minori, “il cui ambito di applicazione ratione materiae corrisponde, in materia di responsabilità genitoriale, a quello del regolamento n. 2201/2003″.

La lettura proposta — aggiunge la Corte — rinviene un riscontro anche nel regolamento n. 650/2012, relativo al diritto internazionale privato delle successioni, pur non applicabile ratione temporis nel procedimento principale. Quest’ultimo regolamento, infatti, a norma dell’art. 1, par. 2, lett. b), dichiara di non voler disciplinare la capacità delle persone fisiche, limitandosi a regolare gli aspetti specificamente correlati alla capacità di succedere, ai sensi dell’art. 23, par. 2, lett. c), nonché la capacità a compiere una disposizione a causa di morte, ai sensi dell’art. 26, par. 1, lett. a).

Da ultimo, la Corte di giustizia si sofferma sulla preoccupazione espressa dal giudice del rinvio circa il pericolo che l’interesse del minore possa risultare compromesso dalla ripartizione del processo decisionale in materia di successione tra due Stati membri differenti, ossia, da un lato, quello dell’apertura del procedimento di successione e, dall’altro, quello della residenza abituale del minore, investito della competenza in materia di responsabilità genitoriale ai sensi dell’art. 8, par. 1, del regolamento Bruxelles II bis.

Sul punto, la Corte si limita a rilevare che il rischio così paventato può essere mitigato utilizzando il meccanismo di proroga della competenza giurisdizionale previsto dall’art. 12 del regolamento Bruxelles II bis. In pratica, là dove siano soddisfatte le condizioni previste da tale disposizione, l’approvazione dell’atto di divisione dell’eredità potrebbe essere convogliata nella competenza dell’autorità giurisdizionale adita in materia di successione ancorché tale autorità non sia quella della residenza abituale del minore.

The official program for the November 2 event in Washington DC can be found here, as well as the online RSVP link.

The event will feature remarks by Dean William Treanor, Georgetown University Law Center, an Opening Presentation by Christophe Bernasconi, Secretary General, Hague Conference on Private International Law, and a Keynote speech by the Hon. Rimsky Yeun, Hong Kong Secretary of Justice. The day will also feature panels concerning the operation of the Conventions in theory And practice, the work of the national Central Authorities, comparative insights from both common law and civil law lawyers, and consideration of the critical challenges that will face the Conventions over the next half-century.

The conference will be held on the campus of Georgetown University Law Center, 600 New Jersey Ave., NW, Washington D.C., on the 12th floor of the Gewirz Building.

The sponsor of this event is the Center on Transnational Business and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The event is co-sponsored by the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the American Branch of the International Law Association, the American Society of International Law, the ABA Section of International Law and the International Law Institute. Contributing co-sponsors include: Covington & Burling LLP, Jones Day, and Winston & Strawn

The fourth edition of the EU-Zivilprozessrecht: EuZPR by Prof. Peter Schlosser and Prof. Burkhard Hess, updated and thoroughly reworked, has just been released.

The book is an answer to a well-known fact : in a ever-closer European Union mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments in the individual Member States is becoming increasingly important. In this very timely published, easy to handle commentary, the essential elements of the EU Zivilprozessrechts to date are comprehensively commented, with a look to the practice. The following  instruments are to be found therein,  annotated provision by provision:   the Brussles I bis Regulation; the Regulation on the European enforcement order; the Regulation on the European order for payment; the small claims Regulation; the Regulation establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure; the Regulation on the service of documents; the Regulation on the taking of evidence; the Hague Convention on the service of documents, as well as the one on the taking of evidence.

The book approach makes of it a very valuable tool for lawyers and notaries with an international-oriented practice, judges and other judicial authorities. Of course, also for academics.

Data sheet: in German; 623 pp. Format (B x L): 12,8 x 19,4 cm

ISBN 978-3-406-65845-7

For further information on the book and to order it on line click here.

Party Autonomy in European Private (and) International Law, vol. 1, a cura di Bettina Heiderhoff e Ilaria Queirolo, Aracne, 2015, vol. 1, pp. 308, ISBN: 9788854876958, Euro 20; vol. 2, a cura di Maria Elena De Maestri e Stefano Dominelli, Aracne , 2015, vol. 2, pp. 296, ISBN: 9788854876965, Euro 18.

[Dal sito dell’editore] – By bringing together PhD candidates from different EU Member States to attend four seminars of advanced learning in a Programme in European Private Law for Postgraduates (PEPP), the PEPP is playing an active role in moulding law practitioners and scholars with an international and comprehensive approach. This tome comprises contributions from PhD candidates who participated in the 2013-2014 PEPP Session (held in Münster, Wroclaw, Leuven and Imperia-Genoa). The works of the Authors focus on their own research topics, connected to contract law, international and EU commerce, private international law and the protection of human rights in the European Union.

Ulteriori informazioni, compresi gli indici dei due volumi, sono disponibili, rispettivamente, qui e qui.

La Corte d’Appello di Varsavia ha di recente sollecitato la Corte di Giustizia a chiarire in via pregiudiziale l’interpretazione del regolamento n. 2201/2003 concernente la competenza, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e di responsabilità genitoriale (Bruxelles II bis).

Il procedimento pregiudiziale, iscritto nel ruolo della Corte come causa C-294/15 (Edyta Mikołajczyk c. Marie Louise Czarnecka e Stefan Czarnecki), interessa in modo specifico l’applicabilità (e, se del caso, l’applicazione) del regolamento a un giudizio di annullamento del matrimonio promosso da un soggetto estraneo alla coppia dopo la morte di uno dei coniugi.

Benché l’avviso pubblicato nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea non fornisca molti dettagli in merito alle circostanze del giudizio principale, è plausibile che, nella specie, il ricorrente abbia chiesto l’annullamento del matrimonio invocando l’esistenza di legami di sangue fra i coniugi o lo stato non libero di uno di essi (ringrazio Michał Wojewoda dell’Università di Łódź per avermi fornito una breve illustrazione delle norme polacche in tema di annullamento del matrimonio).

In sostanza, il giudice del rinvio chiede alla Corte di Giustizia di precisare se il regolamento Bruxelles II bis — che ai sensi dell’art. 1, par. 1, lett. a), si applica “al divorzio, alla separazione personale e all’annullamento del matrimonio” — includa nella propria sfera applicativa anche la particolare ipotesi di annullamento ora descritta.

Per il caso in cui la risposta sia affermativa, il giudice a quo chiede di sapere se nelle cause di annullamento che siano state promosse, come nella specie, da un soggetto diverso da uno dei coniugi, sia possibile fare riferimento, per quanto riguarda la giurisdizione, ai criteri contemplati dall’art. 3, par. 1, lett. a), quinto e sesto trattino, del regolamento, incentrati sulla residenza abituale dell’attore.

Case-law on Rome II (the law applicable to non-contractual obligations) is only slowly picking up so almost anything coming out of the CJEU is met with excitement. Like Ergo Insurance (so far only the AG’s Opinion), Prüller-Frey concerns insurance contracts. In this case, direct action against an insurer, by the victim of an air traffic accident.

The victim sues in Austria, on the basis of Article 6 or, alternatively, 11 of the Brussels I Regulation (old: Regulation 44/2001). Applicability or not of the Montreal Convention (for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air) and the EU’s implementation of same, is less relevant for this posting. At stake was mostly Article 18 of the Rome II Regulation, which reads

The person having suffered damage may bring his or her claim directly against the insurer of the person liable to provide compensation if the law applicable to the non-contractual obligation or the law applicable to the insurance contract so provides.

The lex contractus is German law. This was so chosen by the insured, Norbert Brodnig, and the insurance company, Axa Versicherung AG. German law does not provide for such direct action. But Spanish law, the lex locus damni (which applies between Prüller-Frey and Brodnig), does. The insurance company calls upon the absence of the action in German law, to reject Prüller-Frey’s action. Szpunar AG and the CJEU itself simply point to the clear language of Article 18: this is not a conflict of laws rule that determines the law applicable between victim and insurer: the insurance company’s obligations will continue to be subject to the lex contractus. Article 18 is simply an alternative connecting factor for the very possibility of direct action against the insurer. Spanish law is the law applicable to the non-contractual obligation and if Spanish law allows for such direct action, then that is enough for there to be one.

Geert.

Last Thursday (1 October 2015), the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (the Convention) entered into force in 28 States (Mexico and all Members of the European Union, except Denmark). This results from Mexico’s accession to the Convention in 2007 and the recent approval of the Convention by the European Union. This momentum is set to encourage other States currently considering becoming a party to the Convention.

The Convention has been designed to provide more legal certainty and predictability in relation to choice of court agreements between parties to international commercial contracts. It ensures three things: a court chosen by the parties must, in principle, hear the case; any other court before which proceedings are brought must refuse to hear them; and the judgment rendered by the chosen court must be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States.

As consistently recognised by judges, practitioners and other key players within the international legal community, the application of the Convention will deliver adequate responses to the increasingly pressing need in international transactions for enforceable choice of court agreements and their resulting judgments.

For further information on the Convention click here.

Recent comments on the entering into force by Prof. Pedro de Miguel (Universidad Complutense, Madrid) can be seen here.

Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 6a ed., Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 944, ISBN 9780198744870, GBP 175.

[Dal sito dell’editore] This leading commentary on international commercial arbitration, now in its sixth edition, is an essential guide for arbitrators and lawyers worldwide. Based on the authors’ extensive experience as counsel and arbitrators, it provides an updated explanation of all elements of the law and practice of arbitration. This pack includes the hardback and an ebook version. This text provides an authoritative guide to the international arbitral process, from the drafting of the arbitration agreement to the enforcement of arbitral awards. The sixth edition has been updated to incorporate reference to the latest significant developments in the field such as the new LCIA, ICC and UNCITRAL Rules and new IBA Guidelines. There will also be an increased reference to international arbitral authority and practice from beyond Europe (China, India, and the US). Following the chronology of an arbitration, the book covers applicable laws, arbitration agreements, the establishment and powers of a tribunal, the conduct of proceedings and the role of domestic courts. In addition, it provides an in-depth examination of the award itself, and comments on the special considerations applying to arbitrations brought under investment treaties. It draws on examples of the rules and practice of arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International Arbitration, the American Arbitration Association, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.

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Thank you for the team at Dechert to remind us of the potential that BITs may be used to pursue proactive, rather than just reactive environmental litigation. A word of explanation: Bilateral Investment Treaties, in particular their investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, are currently under a lot of pressure following the public outcry over the TTIP negotiations. Allowing private investors to sue countries that roll out regulation, using vague principles of protection of property, is seen by many as a form of corporate bullying.

Dechert’s briefing however reminds us firstly, specifically vis-a-vis stubborn air pollution in the Indonesia area, that States may carry responsibility in line with Trail Smelter’s nec utere tuo principle. The possibility for individuals (as opposed to neighbouring States) suing on that basis, is of course complicated by the mechanism of (absence of) direct effect of huge chunks of international environmental law. That is where investor-state can come in handily. Such as in Allard v Barbados at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Dechert’s summary of that case reads ‘the Canadian owner of an eco-tourist facility in Barbados is currently suing the Government of Barbados for an alleged breach of the full protection and security provision (among other provisions) in the Canada- Barbados bilateral investment treaty. Peter Allard argues in his claim that Barbados breached its treaty obligations by failing to enforce its domestic environmental laws, which he alleges led to the environment being spoilt and a loss of tourist revenues at his eco-resort’.

A timely reminder of the good BITs can do, just before I am to speak (again) tomorrow on TTIP and why EU citisens are so suspicious of it.

Geert.

A conference on Security Rights and the New European Insolvency Regulation will take place in Erice on 19 October 2015 at the Ettore Majorana Foundation and Centre for Scientific Culture.

The conference will consist of four sessions: The Regulation 848/2015 and the endorsed policy on security rights; The Regulation 848/2015 and its ex post impact on security rights (avoidance rules and moratorium); Regulation 848/2015, security rights and third states; Suggestions for a better regulation.

[From the poster of the conference] – This conference examines EU Regulation 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings and, in particular, focuses on its prescriptions regarding security rights in rem and those regulatory devices, such as set-off and reservation of title clause, which in actual fact perform the same function as security rights. EU Regulation 2015/848 reformed – or, to be more precise, recast – EC Regulation 1346/2000, and is a significant improvement on EC Regulation 1346/2000. Nevertheless, EU Regulation 2015/848 did not change the regulation on security rights and quasi-security rights (except for what is laid down by Art. 2.9). This choice of policy, which was endorsed by EU Regulation 2015/848, cannot be said to be satisfactory and is at the core of a lively debate. The conference, which is organized as part of the SREIR Project (http://sreir.eu/), aims to analyse the key points of this topic, to compare the most suitable strategies for a better regulation and, in short, to make an active and useful contribution to the debate.

The conference program is available here. Information regarding fees, accommodation and registration can be found here.

The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements enters into force today, 1 October 2015, for the European Union and Mexico.

Pursuant to Article 16, it shall apply to choice of court agreements concluded after its entry into force for the State of the chosen court, and shall not apply to proceedings instituted before its entry into force for the State of the court seised.

In essence, the purpose is the Convention — which applies to exclusive choice of court agreements concluded “in civil or commercial matters”, with the exclusion of consumer contracts, employment contracts and a few more matters — is to ensure the effectiveness of forum selection clauses relating to international commercial transactions, thereby creating a climate more favourable to trade and investment.

The Convention basically provides that the court designated by the parties under a choice of court agreement made in conformity with the Convention must in principle hear the case, whereas any court other than the chosen court must in principle decline jurisdiction. Judgments rendered by the chosen court must be recognised and enforced in all other Contracting States, except where recognition or enforcement is denied under one of the grounds enumerated by the Convention itself.

As regards the relationship with Regulation No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels Ia), the Convention provides, in Article 26(6), that “it shall not affect the application of the rules of a Regional Economic Integration Organisation that is a Party to this Convention”, ie the EU, (a) where none of the parties is resident in a Contracting State that is not a Member State of the EU; (b) as concerns the recognition or enforcement of judgments as between Member States of the EU.

In practice, the Convention will affect the application of the Brussels Ia Regulation if at least one of the parties is resident in a State bound by the Convention, and will prevail over the rules of jurisdiction in the Regulation except if both parties are EU residents or come from third states, not Contracting Parties to the Convention. As to the recognition and enforcement of judgments, the Regulation will apply where the court that rendered the judgment and the court in which recognition and enforcement is sought are both located in the EU.

The Explanatory Report by Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi may be found here. For a bibliography on the Convention, see here.

Con un decreto dell’11 marzo 2015, il Tribunale di Milano si è occupato dello scioglimento di un matrimonio contratto in Tunisia.

Nella specie, la moglie intendeva far valere l’ipotesi di cui all’art. 3, n. 2, lett. c), della legge 1° dicembre 1970 n. 898 sul divorzio, che prevede la possibilità di richiedere lo scioglimento o la cessazione degli effetti civili del matrimonio laddove “l’altro coniuge, cittadino straniero, ha ottenuto all’estero l’annullamento o lo scioglimento del matrimonio o ha contratto all’estero nuovo matrimonio”. Il marito, infatti, aveva già ottenuto dinanzi ad un tribunale tunisino lo scioglimento del matrimonio per volontà unilaterale, con affidamento dei due figli minori alla madre.

Il Tribunale di Milano rileva dapprima come la decisione resa dal giudice tunisino non sia stata contestata, non essendo stato promosso il procedimento di cui all’art. 30 del decreto legislativo n. 150/2011, richiamato all’art. 67, comma 1-bis, della legge 31 maggio 1995 n. 218, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato. Senonché, osserva il Tribunale, lo stesso art. 67 della legge n. 218/1995, al comma 3, prevede la possibilità di accertare d’ufficio ed incidentalmente la riconoscibilità di una decisione straniera “con efficacia limitata al giudizio”.

Il giudice milanese osserva innanzitutto, a questo riguardo, che se la decisione fosse efficace in Italia, le parti risulterebbero avere già acquistato lo stato libero (anche in assenza di trascrizione nei registri dello stato civile, che non ha efficacia costitutiva). Il ricorso sarebbe allora inammissibile per mancanza di interesse ad agire ai sensi dell’art. 100 del codice di procedura civile.

Solo nel caso in cui la pronuncia fosse in contrasto con l’ordine pubblico italiano, il giudice dovrebbe applicare l’art. 3, n. 2, lett. c), della legge n. 898/1970, da interpretarsi peraltro nel senso di “ammettere il divorzio c.d. diretto nei casi in cui il coniuge cittadino italiano abbia ‘subito’ la scelta unilaterale del coniuge straniero di liberarsi dal vincolo matrimoniale ricorrendo al giudice straniero ed applicando la legge quivi vigente (da taluni definito in termini di ‘fenomeno delle c.d. vedove bianche’)”.

Di contro, laddove il coniuge italiano abbia partecipato al giudizio straniero (vale a dire esercitando i diritti e beneficiando delle garanzie previste dalla normativa straniera), il ricorso di cui all’art. 3, n. 2, lett. c), della legge n. 898/1970 dovrebbe considerarsi inammissibile.

Poiché nel caso di specie la moglie era stata effettivamente coinvolta nel procedimento dinanzi al tribunale tunisino (dalla sentenza si evince come la notifica dell’atto di citazione si fosse correttamente perfezionata e la donna avesse nominato un avvocato di fiducia), il Tribunale di Milano, ex officio, solleva la questione relativa all’inammissibilità della domanda ai sensi dell’art. 101 del codice di procedura civile, assegnando ai coniugi un termine per presentare memoria difensive e fissando una nuova udienza.

International Succession, 4a ed., a cura di Louis Garb and John Wood, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 992, ISBN 9780198727262, GBP 195.

[Dal sito dell’editore] This new edition has been extended to include chapters on Poland, Russia, Singapore, and US – Illinois, making this the most comprehensive analysis of succession laws available. Each country analysis is based on a similar set of questions to ensure that all issues are tackled for every jurisdiction and to enable the reader to make easy comparisons between the countries included. The book also considers the law at regional level in the European Union explaining the effect of recent EU legislation with regard to harmonization, and considering the impact of the European Succession Regulation post-implementation. Now covering 53 jurisdictions, this work is an invaluable reference source for those advising on matters of international succession, especially in cases where there are cross-border elements.

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