Flux européens

The University of Messina and ILSA, the International Law Students Association, organise a series of seminars on current problems of international law. Two seminars will be devoted to private international law issues. They are scheduled to take place on 26 April 2017 (Marcella Distefano will address surrogate motherhood) and on 11 May 2017 (Livio Scaffidi will speak of registered partnerships). See here for more information.

L’Università di Messina organizza assieme a ILSA, la International Law Students Association, un ciclo di seminari dedicati a questioni attuali del diritto internazionale. Due seminari riguardano tematiche internazionalprivatistiche e sono programmati rispettivamente per il 26 aprile 2017 (Marcella Distefano parlerà di maternità surrogata) e per l’11 maggio 2017 (Livio Scaffidi si occuperà di unioni civili). Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.

 

The Special Commission convened by the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to prepare a preliminary draft convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters will meet between 16 and 24 February 2017. Discussions will be based on the draft text that resulted from the first meeting, held in 2016. The agenda of the meeting is available here. For further information on the Judgments Project, see here.

La Commissione speciale istituita dal Consiglio sugli affari generali della Conferenza dell’Aja di diritto internazionale privato per predisporre un progetto di convenzione sul riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale si riunirà fra il 16 e il 24 febbraio 2017. La base dei lavori è rappresentata dal testo sortito dal primo incontro della Commissione, svoltosi nel 2016. L’ordine del giorno dell’incontro si trova qui. Ulteriori informazioni sul Judgments Project a questo indirizzo.

Avis au titre de l'article 218, paragraphe 11, TFUE
Droit institutionnel
Le traité de Marrakech sur l’accès des déficients visuels aux œuvres publiées peut être conclu par l’Union seule

Many thanks Michael Verhaeghe  (whom I have the pleasure with jointly to be representing a client) for alerting me to Lodi Trading in which the Belgian Supreme Court applied (and distinguished) Kolassa. Lodi Trading is registered in The Netherlands and seemingly had been duped into transferring funds to a gang of fraudsters.  As always, the judgment is very very scant on factual reference, and I have not been able to find the Court of Appeals’ judgement: if anyone can: Court of Appeal Gent, 8 December 2015.

Like the CJEU itself did clearly in Universal Music, the Hof van Cassatie distinguished Kolassa (although it does not refer to Universal Music in this part of the judgment) by insisting there be circumstances specific to the case, over and above the simple presence of a bank account, which point to the damage occurring in that State.

In Universal Music the CJEU had emphasised the need for case-specific facts for bank accounts to be a relevant factor in determining jurisdiction, by holding that ‘it is only where the other circumstances specific to the case also contribute to attributing jurisdiction to the courts for the place where a purely financial damage occurred, that such damage could, justifiably, entitle the applicant to bring the proceedings before the courts for that place.’ (emphasis added).

What seems (but again: see the joint caveat of the Supreme Court’s judgment being scant and the Court of Appeal’s judgment being untraceable) to be specific to this case is that the Court of Appeal had held in favour of the location of the bank account of recipient of the funds being locus damni, given that ‘internal law’ (by which I take it reference is made to Belgian, not Dutch law) determines that the time of payment is determined by the moment of accreditation of the funds to the beneficiary’s account: not (the alternative reading; but again I am assuming for the judgment’s 10 brief paras do invite speculation) the time of the funds leaving the account holder’s account.

It could well be therefore that the Supreme Court is rebuking the Court of Appeal for having Belgian law enter the equation, given the need for autonomous interpretation of European civil procedure. But I am not entirely sure.

Geert.

(Handbook of) European private international law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Headings 2.2.11.2, 2.2.11.2.7

The president and Mrs Trump keep on exercising the courts. In Melania Trump v Webster Tarpley and Mail Media, Inc., the circuit court for Montgomery County, Maryland, accepted jurisdiction against the former, who is resident in Maryland, but rejected it against the latter, who is resident at New York. (It is registered there and also has its head office there). The second defendant is most likely the owner of the website dailymail.com and dailymail.co.uk. Whether that was really the case was left in the middle though for the Daily Mail group (whom Wikipedia today confirmed as no longer accepting as a source of facts), wanted the judge to rule on the merits of jurisdiction rather than on a possibly wrongly identified defendant.

Alleged libel concerns reports published by Mr Tarpley, a blogger, and the Daily Mail, relating to remarks, later retracted by both defendants, on alleged past racy activities of Mrs Trump. At issue was whether the courts at Maryland have personal jurisdiction over Mail Media. Mrs Trump’s legal team suggest publication of defamatory material in a publication with significant circulation in the forum state, suffices for jurisdiction. This, they argue, is compounded by targeted interactivity between the Daily Mail and readers in Maryland. Mail Media suggest there is no direct connection between Maryland and the Mail Article at issue and that even if the court were to accept such connection, jurisdiction should be refused on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The court accepted the first defence and did not therefore entertain the second. P.7: operating a website, even one that is popular and makes money from advertising, is not ‘purposeful availment’ under precedent rule: the publication has to intentionally enter the forum market: the MAil’s influence in the US is on a national (federal) basis.

Note to class: compare the court’s approach with that of European courts under the Brussels I Recast Regulation.

Mrs Trump has now refiled in New York, where both her and second defendant are resident.

Geert.

 

Une publicité comparative des prix entre des magasins de format et de taille différents n’est pas licite dans certaines circonstances

X et X
DFON
Selon l’avocat général Mengozzi, les États membres doivent délivrer un visa humanitaire lorsqu’il existe des motifs sérieux et avérés de croire qu’un refus exposera des personnes en quête de protection internationale à la torture ou à des traitements inhumains ou dégradants

The Dieselgate: A Legal Perspective, edited by / a cura di Marco Frigessi di Rattalma, Springer, 2017, ISBN 9783319483221, pp. X+218, EUR  145,59.

This book explains, compares and assesses the legal implications of Dieselgate within a range of selected jurisdictions and at the EU, international and comparative law level.The book analyses the US EPA-VW $14.7 billion dollar settlement of 2016, one of the largest civil settlements in the history of environmental law. As it shows, the Dieselgate affair has raised a host of issues concerning corporate and social responsibility, tort liability, environmental liability, contractual defective products, warranty, and false environmental claims in a range of jurisdictions. Issues like repurchasing or retrofitting cars from consumers and making direct payments to consumers through car buy-backs and compensation are analysed. Further, the book relates how Dieselgate has also contributed to the discussion about the introduction of more effective collective measures of redress for consumers, such as class actions, in Germany, France, Italy and the UK.The book subsequently reviews the criminal offences Volkswagen is currently confronted with in Germany, France and Italy, i.e. fraud and manipulation of capital markets (by belatedly providing shareholders with essential information relevant for the share value), and, potentially, environmental crimes. It demonstrates how Dieselgate has sparked new debates in Germany, Italy, France and the UK about the need to introduce enterprise liability for organised crimes, lack of compliance and control structures, and intentional violations of the law.Lastly, the book discusses how EU law has sought to respond to Dieselgate and thus investigates the controversial EU Regulation No. 2016/646 introducing a “temporary conformity factor” of 2.1 (equivalent to a 110% increase on the current limit) to be applied for NOx in the new RDE testing cycle, and the works of the EU committee of inquiry into Emissions Measurements in the Automotive Sector (EMIS).

On 2 February 2017 the European Parliament adopted a resolution urging the EU Commission to propose rules aimed at facilitating the recognition of ‘domestic’ adoptions, i.e. in cases where the adopters and the adopted child are resident in the same country. It is worth noting that the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoptions requires automatic recognition of adoptions between contracting States, which include all EU Member States, but applies only to cases in which the parents and the adopted child are from different countries. The resolution further suggests creating a European Certificate of Adoption and calls for common minimum standards for adoption, in the form of ‘best practice’ guidelines. The resolution is accompanied by a study drawn up by the European Parliamentary Research Service, with a contribution by Ruth Cabeza, Claire Fenton-Glynn and Alexander Boiché.

Il 2 febbraio 2017 il Parlamento europeo ha adottato una risoluzione che invita la Commissione a proporre regole che agevolino il riconoscimento delle adozioni fra uno Stato membro dell’Unione e l’altro nei casi in cui chi adotta e chi viene adottato risiedono nello stesso paese. Giova ricordare che la convenzione dell’Aja del 1993 sulle adozioni internazionali richiede il riconoscimento automatico delle adozioni in tutti gli Stati contraenti, fra cui rientrano tutti gli Stati membri, ma si applica solo quando gli adottanti e l’adottato risiedono in paesi differenti. La risoluzione suggerisce inoltre la creazione di un Certificato europeo di adozione e propone l’elaborazione di standard minimi comuni da seguire in caso di adozione, sotto forma di buone pratiche. La risoluzione è accompagnata da uno studio elaborato dal Servizio ricerca del Parlamento europeo, con un contributo di Ruth Cabeza, Claire Fenton-Glynn e Alexander Boiché.

Minority SafePack - one million signatures for diversity in Europe / Commission
Citoyenneté européenne
Le Tribunal annule la décision de la Commission refusant d’enregistrer la proposition d’initiative citoyenne européenne intitulée « Minority SafePack - one million signatures for diversity in Europe »

I have written this blog post with in my mind a rather bibliographical purpose: having collated all sources I would rather like finding them all back again. In [2017] EWHC 31 (Comm) Micula and others v Romania and the European Commission, the High Court effectively halted the enforcement of an ICSID award, pending a Court of Justice Ruling (in Case T-694/15) on the legality of an EC finding of State Aid. The Award arose out of the Romania-Sweden BIT and as such got caught up in the maelstrom (this could have been an intended pun however etymologically the word is Dutch, not Swedish) of discussions surrounding EU competencies in intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties (for background on that issue see here).

Not quite following the rabbit down the hole however nevertheless quite a wonderland of colliding legal regimes.

Geert.

Thank you Jonathan Cocker for flagging Ontario’s stakeholder consultation on renewable fuel standards, aka biofuels. Current thinking, outlined in the discussion paper, is to make the standards ‘performance based’: ie without pushing one or rather additive and exclusively focus on achieved (documented) reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

Biofuels are known to create international trade tension. Argentina and the EU are still formally in consultation over the EU’s approach. Various WTO dispute settlement concerns anti-dumping duties on biofuels. Finally one or two elements of WTO dispute settlement on support for renewable energy touch upon fuel standards.

With all that in mind one particular element of the Ontario regime caught my attention: the intention to regulate GHG emissions ‘well to wheel’: ie ‘to assess emissions performance across the fuel’s full well-to-wheel lifecycle, from extraction to processing, distribution and end-use combustion.’(p.6). Canada does that already for  diesel, with its 2014 greener diesel Regulation, employing what is known as the ‘GHGenius’ model.

What I have not been able to gauge from my admittedly limited research into that model: does it at all and if so how, apply to particularly extraction outside of Canada indeed outside Ontario? For the EU, much of the biofuel production (let alone biofuel imports) at some point or another involves extra-EU elements. How does a well to wheel method in such case work under WTO rules?

Geert.

Il diritto societario europeo e internazionale, edited by / a cura di M. Benedettelli, M. Lamandini, Utet, 2016, ISBN 9788859814733, 832 pp., EUR 90.

Pur non esistendo di fatto un diritto societario europeo codificato, la legislazione dell‘Unione prevede norme minime applicabili alle imprese in tutto il territorio. Due importanti strumenti legislativi adottati dal Consiglio hanno portato alla creazione della figura della “società europea” che avrebbe dovuto essere regolata da un diritto sovranazionale, mentre invece gli Stati membri continuano ad applicare norme societarie proprie, modificandole di tanto in tanto, per conformarsi alle direttive e ai regolamenti emanati. In un contesto economico nel quale società e imprese operano sempre più in differenti contesti, all’interno dell’Unione europea e non, l’opera rappresenta un importante strumento per l’approfondimento dei regimi normativi vigenti a livello comunitario e internazionale. 

 

Lounani
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Une demande d’asile peut être rejetée si le demandeur a participé aux activités d’un réseau terroriste

Where does one look first? : as I reported last week, Ms Kiobel is now taking her US case to The Netherlands (this case essentially involves human rights), at a time when Shell is still pursued in the Netherlands by Milieudefensie, in a case involving environmental pollution in Nigeria. That case now is being mirrored in the High Court in London. The dual proceedings are squarely a result of the split listing of Shell’s mother company, thus easily establishing jurisdiction in both The Netherlands and London, under Article 4 Brussels I Recast.

The only preliminary issue which the High Court had to settle at this early stage was whether Shell’s holding company, established in the UK, can be used as anchor defendant for proceedings against Shell Nigeria. It held that it could not. The questions dealt with are varied and listed as follows:

1. Do the claimants have legitimate claims in law against RDS?

2. If so, is this jurisdiction the appropriate forum in which to bring such claims? This issue encompasses an argument by RDS that it is an abuse of EU law for the claimants to seek to conduct proceedings against an anchor defendant in these circumstances.

3. If this jurisdiction is the appropriate forum, are there any grounds for issuing a stay on case management grounds and/or under Article 34 of the Recast Regulation in respect of the claim against RDS, so that the claim against SPDC can (or should) proceed against SPDC in Nigeria?

4. Do the claims against SPDC have a real prospect of success?

5. Do the claims against SPDC fall within the gateway for service out of the jurisdiction under paragraph 3.1(3) of CPR Practice Direction 6B?

This issue requires consideration of two separate sub-issues, namely (a) whether the claims against RDS involve a real issue which it is reasonable for the Court to try; and (b) whether SPDC is a necessary or proper party to the claims against RDS.

6. Is England the most appropriate forum for the trial of the claims in the interests of all parties and for the ends of justice?

7. In any event, is there a real risk the Claimants would not obtain substantial justice if they are required to litigate their claims in Nigeria?

 

In detailed analysis, Fraser J first of all seems to accept case-management as a now established route effectively to circumvent the ban on forum non conveniens per Owuso (see Goldman Sachs and also reference in my review of that case, to Jong and Plaza). Over and above case-management he refers to potential abuse of EU civil procedure rules to reject the Shell Nigeria joinder. That reference though is without subject really, for the rules on joinders in Article 8 Brussel I recast only apply to joinder with companies that are domiciled in the EU – which is not the case for Shell Nigeria.

Of specific interest to this blog post is Fraser J’s review of Article 7 Rome II: the tailor made article for environmental pollution in the determination of lex causae for torts: in the case at issue (and contrary to the Dutch mirror case, which is entirely being dealt with under residual Dutch conflicts law) Rome II does apply to at least part of the alleged facts. See here for my background on the issue. That issue of governing law is dealt with at para 50 ff of the judgment.

For environmental pollution, plaintiff has a choice under Article 7 Rome II. Either lex damni (not appealing here: for Nigerian law; the judgment discusses at some length on the extent to which Nigerian law would follow the English Common law in issues of the corporate veil), or lex loci delicti commissi. This, the High Court suggest, can only be England if two questions are answered in the affirmative (at 79). The first is whether the parent company is better placed than the subsidiary to avoid the harm because of its superior knowledge or expertise. The second is, if the finding is that the parent company is better placed, whether it is fair to infer that the subsidiary will rely upon the parent. With reference to precedent, Fraser J suggest it is not enough for the parent company simply to be holding shares in other companies. (Notice the parallel here with the application of ATS in Apartheid).

The High Court eventually holds that there is no prima facie duty of care than can be established against the holding company, which would justify jurisdiction vis-a-vis the daughter. At 106, the Court mirrors the defendant’s argument: it is the Nigerian company, rather than the holding, that takes all operational decisions in Nigeria, and there is nothing performed by the holding company by way of supervisory direction, specialist activities or knowledge, that would put it in any different position than would be expected of an ultimate parent company. Rather to the contrary, it is the Nigerian company that has the specialist knowledge and experience – as well as the necessary licence from the Nigerian authorities – to perform the relevant activities in Nigeria that form the subject matter of the claim. … It is the specialist operating company in Nigeria; it is the entity with the necessary regulatory licence; the English holding company is the ultimate holding company worldwide and receives reports back from subsidiaries.

 

Plaintiffs have been given permission to appeal. Their lawyers have indicated to rely heavily on CJEU precedent, particularly T-343/06 Shell v EC. This case however concerns competition law, which as I have reported before, traditionally has had a theory on the corporate veil more easily pierced than in other areas. Where appeal may have more chance of success, I believe is in the prima facie character of the case against the mother company. There is a thin line between preliminary assessment with a view to establishing jurisdiction, and effectively deciding the case on the merits. I feel the High Court’s approach here strays too much into merits territory.

Geert.

 

 

Le code marocain de famille en Europe – Bilan comparé de dix ans d’application, edited by / a cura di Marie-Claire Foblets, La charte, 2017, ISBN 9782874034312, 720 pp., EUR 80.

Dans cet ouvrage sont regroupés les résultats d’une recherche comparée qui s’est penchée sur l’application concrète du Code dans cinq pays d’Eu¬rope (la France, les Pays-Bas, l’Espagne, l’Italie et la Belgique) ainsi qu’au Maroc, en portant un intérêt particulier pour les situations de familles de MRE résidant dans ces pays. La recherche couvre deux volets, d’une part, sont étudiées les principales questions que soulevaient depuis 2004 les dossiers et litiges impliquant des MRE vivant en Europe et la manière dont ceux-ci sont traités non seulement par les tribunaux et les administrations publiques, mais également par les services consulaires marocains ; d’autre part, comment sont reçus en droit interne marocain, les décisions judiciaires ainsi que les actes délivrés par les autorités compétentes en matières civiles et familiales dans les pays de résidence de MRE en Europe. À ce jour, très peu est su à propos de cette réception. Ce qui rend cet ouvrage si précieux et utile est la démonstration qui est faite, à travers les diverses contributions, de la difficulté majeure qui – plus de dix années à compter depuis l’entrée en vigueur du Code – continue à se poser pour les autorités administratives et judiciaires des deux rives de la Méditerranée et qui consiste à savoir comment correctement appréhender la manière dont en Europe, d’une part, et au Maroc, de l’autre, est conçue la famille et la manière de réguler les relations, tant entre partenaires, qu’entre parents et leurs enfants.

Aloys F. Dornbracht / Commission
Concurrence
La Cour rejette la plupart des pourvois formés par les sociétés ayant participé à l’entente sur le marché des installations sanitaires pour salles de bains

Manlio Frigo, Circulation des biens culturels, détermination de la loi applicable et méthodes de règlement des litiges, Brill, 2016, ISBN: 9789004321298, 552 pp., EUR 18.

La pratique internationale des différends concernant la circulation des biens culturels est devenue très riche pendant les dernières années, grâce à la prolifération de normes internationales applicables et à la multiplication de juridictions compétentes à saisir les litiges. La recherche des liens entre biens culturels et collectivité humaine et territoriale et de l’intérêt protégé à la lumière de l’expérience directe en matière de différends et de négociations, conduisent l’auteur à examiner les critères de rattachement utilisés, aussi bien que la question de la loi matérielle applicable par rapport à l’issue des différends. Les problèmes sont abordés soit par rapport à la spécificité des biens culturels vis-à-vis des règles ordinaires en matière de circulation des meubles, soit en fonction de la recherche du rattachement à l’ordre juridique d’origine des biens concernés. Cet ouvrage évalue les inconvénients découlant de l’application des règles générales édictées par les principaux systèmes de droit international privé en matière de circulation de biens et de constitution de droits réels. L’analyse est conduite aussi à l’égard de la validité des solutions proposées, sur le plan du droit international privé et du droit uniforme, notamment en cas de revendication, de retour ou de restitution de biens culturels, ainsi que de la vérification de l’efficacité des réponses données par la jurisprudence et la doctrine concernant les règles nationales et internationales applicables.

I am happy to post here the link to the statement which I signed together with 62 colleagues from various walks of (trade) life, on the EU’s modus operandi for the signature of trade agreements.  Post-CETA, we strongly believe that current procedures, when properly implemented, ensure democratic legitimacy for the EU’s international agreements at multiple levels. The statement is available in English, French and German: EU noblesse oblige.

Geert.

 

Vilkas
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Les autorités chargées d’exécuter un mandat d’arrêt européen doivent, en cas de force majeure avérée, fixer une troisième date de remise lorsque les deux premières tentatives de remise ont échoué en raison de la résistance opposée par la personne recherchée