La giurisprudenza italiana sui regolamenti europei in materia civile e commerciale e di famiglia, edited by / a cura di Stefania Bariatti, Ilaria Viarengo, Francesca Clara Villata, Cedam, 2016, pp. 527, ISBN 9788813358686, EUR 55
Il volume che si licenzia rappresenta l’opera conclusiva delle attività svolte da un gruppo di ricerca dell’Università degli Studi di Milano nell’ambito del progetto internazionale di ricerca “Cross-border litigation in Europe: Private International Law – Legislative framework, national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union” – EUPILLAR, finanziato dalla Direzione generale Giustizia e consumatori della Commissione europea, iniziato il 1° ottobre 2014 e conclusosi il 30 settembre 2016. Oggetto dell’indagine sono stati alcuni regolamenti dell’Unione europea in materia di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, adottati nel settore della cooperazione giudiziaria in materia civile, e la relativa giurisprudenza italiana, anche sotto il profilo di un proficuo dialogo dei giudici nazionali con la Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea. L’indagine è stata condotta in parallelo dai partner del consorzio di ricerca, vale a dire, accanto all’Università degli Studi di Milano, nelle sue due componenti del Dipartimento di Diritto pubblico italiano e sovranazionale e del Dipartimento di Studi internazionali, giuridici e storico-politici, l’Università di Aberdeen (Scozia), che ha coordinato il progetto, le Università di Anversa (Belgio), Breslavia (Polonia), Friburgo (Germania), Leeds (Inghilterra) e Madrid (Universidad Complutense, Spagna).
There is as yet no EU harmonisation on amino acids, in so far as they have a nutritional or physiological effect and are added to foods or used in the manufacture of foods. A range of EU foodlaws therefore do not apply to national action vis-a-vis amino acids, in particular Regulation 1925/2006 – the food supplements Regulation. In the absence of specific EU law rules regarding prohibition or restriction of the use of other substances or ingredients containing those ‘other substances’, relevant national rules may apply ‘without prejudice to the provisions of the Treaty’.
In C-282/15 Queisser Pharma v Germany, moreover there were no transboundary elements: Articles 34-36 TFEU therefore do not in principle apply.
No doubt food law experts may tell us whether these findings are in any way unusual, however my impression is that the Court of Justice in this judgment stretches the impact of the ‘general principles of EU food law’ as included in Regulation 178/2002. Indeed the Court refers in particular to Article 1(2)’s statement that the Regulation lays down the general principles governing food and feed in general, and food and feed safety in particular, at EU and national level (my emphasis). Article 7 of the Regulation is of particular relevance here. That Article gives a definition of the precautionary principle, and consequential constraints on how far Member States may go in banning foodstuffs, as noted in the absence of EU standards and even if there is no cross-border impact.
Article 7 Precautionary principle
1. In specific circumstances where, following an assessment of available information, the possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty persists, provisional risk management measures necessary to ensure the high level of health protection chosen in the Community may be adopted, pending further scientific information for a more comprehensive risk assessment.
2. Measures adopted on the basis of paragraph 1 shall be proportionate and no more restrictive of trade than is required to achieve the high level of health protection chosen in the Community, regard being had to technical and economic feasibility and other factors regarded as legitimate in the matter under consideration. The measures shall be reviewed within a reasonable period of time, depending on the nature of the risk to life or health identified and the type of scientific information needed to clarify the scientific uncertainty and to conduct a more comprehensive risk assessment.
Germany on this point is probably found wanting (‘probably’, because final judgment on the extent of German risk assessment is left to the national court) – reference is best made to the judgment for the Court’s reasoning. It is clear to me that the way in which the Regulation defines precaution, curtails the Member States considerably. Further ammunition against the often heard, and wrong, accusation that the EU is trigger happy to ban substances and processes in the face of uncertainty.
Geert.
A quick note on second-hand goods and VAT. For my review of Bot AG’s Opinion in C-471/15 Sjelle Autogenbrug, see here. The Court held yesterday and defined (at 32) second-hand goods essentially as follows: in order to be characterised as ‘second-hand goods’, it is only necessary that the used property has maintained the functionalities it possessed when new, and that it may, therefore, be reused as it is or after repair.
The Court does not refer to EU waste law yet the impact on that area of EU law is clear.
Geert.
Handbook of EU Waste Law, second ed. 2016, Chapter 1.
Regulation (EU) n. 655/2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order (EAPO) procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters is applicable as of today, 18 January 2017. The relevant section of the European e-Justice Portal has been updated: the application forms can be completed online.
È applicabile da oggi, 18 gennaio 2017, il regolamento (UE) n. 655/2014 che istituisce una procedura per l’ordinanza europea di sequestro conservativo (OESC) su conti bancari al fine di facilitare il recupero transfrontaliero dei crediti in materia civile e commerciale. La sezione del Portale europeo della giustizia elettronica relativa al regolamento è stata aggiornata: i relativi moduli possono essere completati online.
The issue under consideration in Citysprint was whether claimant, Ms Dewhurst, a cycle courier, was an employee of Citysprint or rather, as defendant would have it, a self-employed contractor. I am not a labour lawyer but I do have an interest in the ‘gig economy’, peer to peer etc. [Note Google defines (or conjures up a definition of) the gig economy as a labour market characterized by the prevalence of short-term contracts or freelance work as opposed to permanent jobs].
I also have an interest in language and the law. After an employment tribunal in Uber blasted the company’s use of byzantine language, in Citysprint, too, (in particular at 64 ff) the tribunal looks beyond the fog of legalese to qualify the contract for what it really is. A great development.
Geert.
DOOR PHILIPPE NYS. “Wie willen we de volgende keer uitnodigen? Angela Merkel misschien, via een eredoctoraat van de KU Leuven?” Het was een lachende opmerking, net na de Ekonomikalezing van Guy Ver…
Source: Oog in oog met Angela Merkel, leider van de vrije wereld
Hooley [Hooley v The Victoria Jute Company Ltd and others [2016] CSOH 14] has been sitting in my in-box for a few months. It concerns the liquidation (particularly: selling of companies’ assets by liquidators under Scots law) of companies incorporated in Scotland but with COMI (centre of main interests) outside the EU. In particular, India.
Given the presence of COMI outside the EU, the Insolvency Regulation does not apply. Indeed the Court of Session (Lord Tyre) does not refer to it at all.Findings would have been very different were the Regulation to apply: place of incorporation has to give way to COMI, where these two do not coincide, in which circumstance the place of incorporation at best may open secondary proceedings.
At issue was among others (and for the first time in a Scots court, I understand) the consideration of ‘modified universalism’: ie what is the practical impact of there being a company incorporated in Scotland, given Scots courts and administrators jurisdiction over the insolvencies, when the companies’ business is mainly carried out abroad and when proceedings are also pending abroad.
Per Rubin v Eurofinance, Universalism” means the “administration of multinational insolvencies by a leading court applying a single bankruptcy law.” The principle of modified universalism was stated by Lord Sumption in Singularis Holdings Ltd v Pricewaterhouse Coopers [2015] AC 1675 (PC) at para 15 as being that “the court has a common law power to assist foreign winding up proceedings so far as it properly can” (see also Lord Collins at paragraph 33 and Lord Clarke of Stone‑cum‑Ebony at paragraph 112).
Essentially Lord Tyre had to decide whether the Scottish administrators’ powers were only exercisable to the extent that their exercise was recognised as legally valid by the law of the relevant non-UK jurisdiction. He held (at 36) that the proceedings taking place in India were ancillary to the administration proceedings in Scotland. The powers of a validly appointed administrator to a Scottish company were therefore not limited by the Indian winding up.
As often of course this judgment is but one side of the coin. Indian courts are at liberty to disregard the Scots findings. Any purchasers of Hooley assets therefore will have a compromised title. One assumes this has an impact on price.
Geert.
(Handbook of) EU private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 5, Heading 5.1, Heading 5.5.
Reinhard Bork, Principles of Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Intersentia, 2017, ISBN 9781780684307, 290 pp., EUR 94.
The thesis of this book is that cross-border insolvency rules of all kinds (e.g. European Insolvency Regulation, UNCITRAL Model Law, ALI Principles for the NAFTA States, national laws such as Chapter 15 US Bankruptcy Code or Sch. 1 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation 2006) are founded on, and can be traced back to, basic values and that they aim to pursue and enforce such standards. Furthermore, several principles can be identified, distinguished and sorted into three groups: conflict of laws principles (e.g. unity, universality, equality, mutual trust, cooperation and communication, subsidiarity, proportionality), procedural principles (e.g. efficiency, transparency, predictability, procedural justice, priority) and substantive principles (e.g. equal treatment of creditors, optimal realisation of the debtor’s assets, debtor protection, protection of trust (for secured creditors or contractual partners), social protection (for employees or tenants)). Using the principle-oriented approach, the book will have a significant impact for both deciding cases and shaping cross-border insolvency law. It offers both legislators and courts new substantive and methodological support in making decisions, for example where the treatment of secured creditors, support for foreign insolvency practitioners or even harmonisation of cross-border insolvency laws is at stake.
Sarah Laval, Le tiers et le contrat – Étude de conflit de lois, Larcier, 2016, pp. 458, ISBN: 9782804491000, EUR 110.
En droit international privé, le principe d’autonomie désigne la possibilité pour les parties à un contrat international de choisir la loi applicable. Reconnu par une immense majorité d’États, de règlements et de conventions internationales, ce principe répond aux objectifs de prévisibilité, de souplesse et de sécurité propres au droit du commerce international. S’il satisfait les prévisions et les intérêts des parties, le principe d’autonomie risque cependant de heurter les prévisions des tiers intéressés au contrat. Les créanciers ou débiteurs des parties, leurs ayants cause, les titulaires de droits concurrents, se trouvent tributaires d’un choix auquel ils sont étrangers et qui risque de leur porter préjudice. La lecture des principaux instruments conventionnels et règlementaires relatifs aux solutions du conflit de lois en matière contractuelle témoigne d’une absence de prise en considération des intérêts des tiers au contrat. Pourtant, la multiplication des contentieux liés aux mécanismes tripartites, comme les cessions de créances, les groupes de contrats, ou encore les sûretés réelles et personnelles, révèle l’importance des intérêts des tiers et la nécessité corrélative de les intégrer dans les solutions du conflit de lois en matière contractuelle. C’est à cette problématique que la présente thèse se consacre. En s’appuyant sur les outils traditionnels du droit international privé, comme la distinction des règles de conflit de lois générale et spéciale, la qualification des questions de droit ou, encore, la méthode des lois de police, elle propose non seulement d’opérer une distinction entre les différents types de contrats selon la nature de leurs liens avec les tiers, mais encore, et plus essentiellement, de modifier les solutions du conflit de lois applicables aux contrats qui intéressent par nature les tiers en remettant en cause le principe d’autonomie. Pour les autres contrats, elle suggère d’adapter les solutions du conflit de lois par le recours à des correctifs.
Thank you Bob Wessels for alerting me to ADO Den Haag v United Vansen (of China). ADO Den Haag NV (the corporate vehicle of a Dutch Premier League club) domiciled at The Hague, sue United Vansen International Sports Co. Ltd, domiciled at Beijing, essentially for the latter to pay a deposit on the premium due for the shares it acquired in the club. Vansen did not appear.
First of all, were Vansen properly summoned in accordance with the Hague Service Abroad Convention (which both China and The Netherlands have ratified)? The court holds that it cannot yet decide that this has actually happened (relevant steps taken via the Dutch judicial authorities only recently having taken place) however it applies Article 15(3)’s provisions for extreme urgency: ‘Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs the judge may order, in case of urgency, any provisional or protective measures.‘
Next up: do the Dutch courts have jurisdiction? Given the defendant’s domicile outside of the EU and the non-applicability of any of Brussel I’s rules where domicile is irrelevant, the Court applied Dutch residual rules of private international law. These grant it jurisdiction essentially in respect of urgent proceedings of attachment.
Of more interest to this blog is the court’s consideration of applicable law, which the Court conducts with reference to Rome I. The share purchase agreement seemingly did not contain choice of law, either implicit or explicit: at 2.15, the court suffices with a mere observation of the absence of choice of law. None of the standard contracts of Article 4(1) Rome I applies [there is some discussion in scholarship whether share purchase is covered by Article 4(1)a’s ‘contract for the sale of goods’], hence the relevance of Article 4(2)’s ‘characteristic performance’ test. Here, the Court declared unequivocally (and most probably correctly) that the characteristic performance is the transfer of the share premium. The habitual residence of the party required to carry out that performance is the relevant connecting factor. In casu therefore, Chinese law in principle is the applicable law.
However the Dutch court finally settles for Dutch law after all, employing Article 4(3)’s escape clause. It holds that all circumstances of the case indicate that Dutch law is more closely connected: at 2.15: the agreement originated in The Netherlands; the performance has to be carried in The Netherlands (transfer of the sums into a Dutch bank account), and the transfer of the premium will benefit a Dutch company. Although the judgment does not give much detail on the contract, its origins etc., it would seem that in finally opting for Dutch law, the court does make proper application of the rather strict conditions of Article 4(3).
A good illustration of Article 4’s waterfall /cascade.
Geert.
(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 3, Heading 3.2.6.
Andrea Lista, International Commercial Sales: The Sale of Goods on Shipment Terms, Routledge, 2017, ISBN: 9780415702829, pp. 528, GBP 220.
This book comprehensively examines the entire legal process of the international sale of goods, beginning with the creation of the contract and continuing through to either the fulfilment of the sale, or the termination of the contract. Every day goods are globally traded between sellers and buyers in different countries and different jurisdictions. The distances between the parties involved in such transactions, and the relative risks related to that, are a key issue in international commercial sales. Sales of goods carried by sea, thus, differ quite drastically from domestic sales; the goods will be normally shipped at a port very distant from the buyer, preventing his physical presence at the port of loading. Further, the goods will travel in the custody of a carrier, a party normally quite independent from either trader. Finally, transactions concluded on shipment terms are normally irreversible, in the sense that shipping the goods back to the seller represents an unlikely option for the buyer. Traders around the world very frequently choose English law to govern their contracts, with disputes to be resolved through London arbitration or litigation. The basis of that law is to be found in the English Sale of Goods Act 1979, and the book consequently also includes an examination of the fundamental principles of that Act, as well as considering use of the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods.
The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law seeks a temporary legal assistant to work in the areas of international family law and child protection. The vacancy is advertised here.
Il Permanent Bureau della Conferenza dell’Aja di diritto internazionale privato intende assumere un collaboratore giuridico a tempo determinato che lavori nel settore della famiglia e della protezione dei minori. Maggiori dettagli a questo indirizzo.
Constance Castres Saint-Martin, Les conflits d’intérêts en arbitrage commercial international, L’Harmattan, 2016, ISBN: 9782343101965, pp. 454, EUR 45.
Le conflit d’intérêts est un sujet passionnant notamment en raison de son omniprésence dans l’actualité. Cette expression s’est récemment diffusée en France dans le monde des affaires et au sein du jargon médiatique. Néanmoins, il n’existe en l’état actuel du droit positif français aucune réglementation spécifique de ces conflits d’intérêts. L’auteur s’interroge donc sur la définition et la valeur opératoire de cette notion et le régime juridique qui pourrait lui être réservé.
In the flurry of judgments issued by the European Court of Justice on Super Wednesday, 21 December, spare a read for C-618/15 Concurrence /Samsumg /Amazon: Cybercrime, which dealt with jurisdiction for tort under the Brussels I Recast Regulation and the location of locus damni in the event of online sales. The foreign suffix of the website was deemed irrelevant.
To fully appreciate the facts of the case and the Court’s reasoning, undoubtedly it would be best to read Wathelet AG’s Opinion alongside the Court’s judgment.
Concurrence is active in the retail of consumer electronics, trading through a shop located in Paris (France) and on its online sales website ‘concurrence.fr’. It concluded with Samsung a selective distribution agreement (covering France) for high-end Samsung products, namely the ELITE range. That agreement included, in particular, a provision prohibiting the sale of the products in question on the internet. Exact parties to the dispute are Concurrence SARL, established in France, Samsung SAS, also established in France, and Amazon Services Europe Sàrl, established in Luxembourg. Amazon offered the product range on a variety of its websites, Amazon.fr, Amazon.de, Amazon.co.uk, Amazon.es and Amazon.it.
Concurrence sue variously for a lift of the ban on internet sales (claiming the ban was illegal) and alternatively, an end to the offering for sale of the elite products via Amazon. The French courts suggest they lack jurisdiction over the foreign Amazon websites (excluding amazon.fr) because the latter are not directed at the French public. Concurrence suggest there is such jurisdiction, for the products offered for sale on those foreign sites are dispatched not only within the website’s country of origin but also in other European countries, in particular France, in which case jurisdiction, they suggest, legitimately lies with the French courts.
Pinckney figures repeatedly in Opinion and Judgment alike. Amazon submit that the accessibility theory for jurisdiction should not be accepted, since it encourages forum shopping, which, given the specific nature of national legal systems, might lead to ‘law shopping’ by contamination. Amazon seek support in Jaaskinen’s Opinion in Pinckney. Wathelet AG first of all notes (at 67 of his Opinion) that this argument of his colleague was not accepted by the CJEU. Moreover, he finds it exaggerated: the national court can award damages only for loss occasioned in the territory of the Member State in which it occurs: this limitation serves as an important break on plaintiffs simply suing in a State per the locus damni criterion ‘just because they can’.
The Court agrees (at 32 ff) but in a more succinct manner (one may need therefore the comfort of the Opinion for context):
With this judgment national courts are slowly given a complete cover of eventualities in the context of jurisdiction and the internet.
Geert.
(Handbook of) European private international law, 2nd ed. 2016, Chapter 2, Heading 2.2.11.2
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