Flux européens

Il Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche dell’Università di Verona, unitamente all’Ordine degli Avvocati e alla Camera Minorile di Verona, organizza per il giorno 11 febbraio 2016 un incontro formativo dal titolo Il minore nel contesto giuridico internazionale: responsabilità genitoriale, giurisdizione e legge applicabile, riconoscimento ed esecuzione delle decisioni.

L’incontro, che si terrà presso la sede del Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche, sarà coordinato da Ernesto D’Amico (Trib. Verona) e vedrà susseguirsi le relazioni di Maria Caterina Baruffi e di Francesca Ragno (entrambe Univ. Verona).

Per maggiori informazioni si veda qui.

Con sentenza 1° febbraio 2016, n. 1863, la Corte di cassazione si è pronunciata sul ricorso di un uomo contro la decisione con cui la Corte di appello di Firenze aveva accordato all’ex moglie un assegno di mantenimento, all’esito di un autonomo procedimento,  successivo a quello di scioglimento del matrimonio svoltosi nella Repubblica Ceca.

Con il primo motivo di ricorso l’uomo lamentava la falsa applicazione degli articoli 5 e 9 della legge 1° dicembre 1970 n. 898 sulla disciplina dei casi di scioglimento del matrimonio. L’art. 5, comma 6, di tale legge, stabilisce che con la sentenza che pronuncia lo scioglimento, il tribunale – tenuto conto delle condizioni dei coniugi – “dispone l’obbligo per un coniuge di somministrare periodicamente a favore dell’altro un assegno quando quest’ultimo non ha mezzi adeguati o comunque non può procurarseli per ragioni oggettive”. L’art. 9 disciplina invece i casi di revisione (successivi, dunque, al divorzio) delle disposizioni concernenti l’affidamento dei figli e di quelle relative alla misura e alla modalità dei contributi economici.

Sulla base di tale disciplina, l’uomo riteneva che la donna non potesse avviare in Italia un procedimento autonomo rispetto a quello di divorzio, avente ad oggetto l’assegno (tra l’altro, ella aveva già presentato una richiesta di assegno in sede di procedimento di divorzio dinanzi a un giudice ceco, ma tale domanda non era stata ritenuta proponibile in quella sede, prevedendo la legislazione ceca la possibilità di proporre un separato giudizio per le questioni di carattere economico).

Con il secondo motivo di ricorso, l’ex marito rilevava inoltre che, poiché ai sensi dell’art. 21 del regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 relativo alla competenza, al riconoscimento e all’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e di responsabilità genitoriale (Bruxelles II bis), la sentenza di divorzio pronunciata nella Repubblica Ceca doveva essere riconosciuta automaticamente in Italia, questa dovesse essere equiparata ad una decisione italiana e, pertanto, assoggettata alle medesime preclusioni processuali che impediscono l’accertamento del diritto all’assegno divorzile.

La Corte ha sottolineato come la pronuncia contestuale dello scioglimento del matrimonio (o della cessazione degli effetti civili del matrimonio) e delle statuizioni relative ai figli e alle condizioni economiche “non risponde a un principio costituzionale che imponga la regolamentazione contestuale dei diritti e dei doveri scaturenti da un determinato status”, portando ad esempio la sentenza non definitiva di divorzio che si pronuncia sullo status e rinvia al successivo corso del giudizio per l’adozione dei provvedimenti conseguenti.

La Corte ha inoltre stabilito che la richiesta di corresponsione dell’assegno divorzile di cui all’art. 5 della l. 898/1970 si configura “come domanda (connessa ma) autonoma rispetto a quella di scioglimento del matrimonio”: pertanto, la parte che non l’abbia avanzata nel corso del procedimento di divorzio, ben può proporla successivamente senza che a ciò sia ostacolo la sopravvenuta pronuncia di scioglimento del vincolo di coniugio.

La Corte ha osservato infine come il riferimento al regime del riconoscimento automatico di cui al regolamento n. 2201/2003 corrobori questa interpretazione: esso comporta la ricezione nel nostro ordinamento del contenuto specifico della decisione ceca, che si è limitata ad accertare le condizioni per lo scioglimento del matrimonio ed a pronunciarlo, lasciando aperta la possibilità di far valere le pretese economiche in un separato procedimento.

Alla decisione ceca, infatti, per il Supremo Collegio, non può attribuirsi “il contenuto di un accertamento implicito sulla insussistenza delle condizioni per il riconoscimento di un assegno divorzile e neanche quello di un giudicato costituente una preclusione processuale alla proposizione di una successiva domanda di assegno divorzile basata sulle condizioni economiche degli ex coniugi anche se coincidenti con quelle esistenti al momento della pronuncia di divorzio”.

In Ranza v Nike, the Court of Appeal for the ninth circuit confirmed the high hurdle to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations in the US, following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Kiobel and Bauman /Daimler. Trey Childress has good summary here and I am happy largely to refer.

Loredana Ranza is a US citisen, resident in the EU (first The Netherlands; Germany at the time of the court’s decision). She seeks to sue against her Dutch employer, Nike BV, and its parent corporation, Nike inc. for alleged violation of federal laws prohibiting sex and age discrimination. The Dutch equality Commission had earlier found the allegations unfounded under Dutch law.

Of particular interest are the Court’s views on the attributability test /piercing the corporate veil following Daimler and Kiobel. The Court held (p.15 ff) that prior to Daimler, personal jurisdiction over the mother company could be established using either the agency or the alter ego test, with the former now no longer available following Daimler. Under the Agency test, effectively a type of abus de droit /fraus /fraud, plaintiff needed to show that the subsidiary performed services which were sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation’s own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services. Daimler, the Court suggested in Ranza, held that the agency test leads to too broad a jurisdictional sweep. That leaves the alter ego test: effectively, whether the actions prima facie carried out by the subsidiary, are in fact carried out by the mother company for it exercises a degree of control over the daughter which renders that daughter the mother’s alter ego. Not so here, on the facts of the case: Nike Inc, established in Oregon, is heavily involved in Nike BV’s macromanagement, but not so ‘enmeshed’ in its routine management of day-to-day operation, that the two companies should be treated as a single enterprise for the purposes of jurisdiction.

For good measure, the Court also confirmed application of dismissal of jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens.

Geert.

Rendón Marín
Citoyenneté européenne
Selon l’avocat général Szpunar, un ressortissant non UE qui a la garde exclusive d’un citoyen mineur de l’UE ne saurait être expulsé d’un État membre ou se voir refuser un permis de séjour du seul fait de ses antécédents pénaux

C & J Clark International
Relations extérieures
Le règlement instituant un droit antidumping sur les importations dans l’Union européenne de certaines chaussures en cuir originaires de Chine et du Viêt Nam est partiellement invalide

Ince
SERV
Le droit de l’Union peut s’opposer à ce que l’intermédiation transfrontalière de paris sportifs effectuée sans autorisation en Allemagne soit sanctionnée

Barclays v ENPAM has been travelling in my briefcase for some time – apologies. Reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Alexandros, and the High Court in Nomura , Blair J in October 2015 employed national courts’ room under Article 27/28 of the Brussels I Regulation (the lis alibi pendens and related actions rules) to refuse a stay of English proceedings in favour of proceedings in (of course) Italy. Litigation like this will be somewhat less likely now that the Brussels I Recast applies. As readers will be aware, the current version of the Regulation has means to protect choice of court agreements against unwilling partners (see however below).

Claimant, Barclays Bank PLC, is an English bank. The defendant, Ente Nazionale di Previdenza ed Assistenza dei Medici e Degli Odontoiatri (“ENPAM”) is an Italian pension fund. A dispute has arisen between them as to a transaction entered into by way of a Conditional Asset Exchange Letter from ENPAM to Barclays dated 21 September 2007 by which ENPAM exchanged fund assets for securities which were in the form of credit-linked notes called the “Ferras CDO securities”. ENPAM’s claim is that it incurred a major loss in the transaction, and that it is entitled in law to look to Barclays to make that loss good.

On 18 May 2015, Barclays issued a summary judgment application on the basis that there is no defence to its claim that the Milan proceedings fall within contractual provisions giving exclusive jurisdiction to the English courts. ENPAM began proceedings against Barclays and others in Milan on 23 June 2014. Barclays says that this was in breach of provisions in the contractual documentation giving exclusive jurisdiction to the English courts. It issued the proceedings reviewed here seeking a declaration to that effect and other relief on 15 September 2014. On 20 April 2015, ENPAM applied pursuant to Article 27 or Article 28 of the Brussels I Regulation for an order that the English court should not exercise its jurisdiction in these proceedings on the basis that Milan court was first seised.

The High Court refused. Reference is best made to the judgment itself, for it is very well drafted. Read together with e.g. the aforementioned Alexandros and Nomura judgments, it gives one a complete view of the approach of the English courts viz lis pendens under the Regulation. (E.g. Blair J has excellent overview of the principles of Article 27 (Article 29 in the Recast) under para 68).

Discussion of what exactly Barclays could recover from the English cq Italian proceedings, was an important consideration of whether these two proceedings were each other’s mirror image. (see e.g. para 82 ff). This is quite an important consideration for litigators. Statements of claims are an important input in the lis pendens analysis. Be careful therefore what you ask for. Restraint in the statement of claims might well serve you very well when opposed with recalcitrant opposing parties, wishing to torpedo your proceedings. (Let’s face it: the likelihood of such opposition is quite high in a litigious context).

Finally, it is often assumed that precedent value of the case discussed here and other cases with it, has diminished drastically following the Brussels I Recast. It instructs all courts not named in a choice of court agreement, to step back from jurisdiction in favour of the court named (Article 31(2)). Yet what is and what is not caught by a choice of court agreement (starting with the issue of non-contractual liability between the parties) depends very much on its wording and interpretation. Article 31(2) is not the be all and end all of litigation between contracting parties.

Geert.

Affum
Espace de liberté, sécurité et justice
Selon l’avocat général Szpunar, un ressortissant étranger, qui n’est pas intercepté lors du franchissement irrégulier d’une frontière extérieure de l’espace Schengen, ne peut pas être mis en prison au seul motif de son entrée irrégulière sur le territoire d’un État membre

On 11 February 2016, the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) will host an event titled International Protection of Adults – the Current Legal Framework Under Scrutiny.

[From the website of the Institute] – Despite the 2000 Hague Convention, practical problems arise in cross-border scenarios, involving public policy and human rights considerations. On a practical level, private mandates are not accepted by financial institutions and there is no mechanism for enforcement. Speakers will discuss strengths and weaknesses of the current legal framework, prospects for future ratification of the 2000 Hague Convention, and initiatives of the European Parliament and Council of Europe to improve matters for European citizens.

Speakers include Philippe Lortie, Adrian Ward, Claire Van Overdijk, Richard Frimston and Alex Ruck Keene.

More information available here.

I have reported before on the narrow possibility, within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, for refusal of recognition of judgments from fellow national courts in the EU (Diageo; Trade Agency). The High Court confirmed the exceptional character of the exercise in Smith v Huertas. Following conviction in a criminal court, Dr Smith had been instructed by the French courts to pay Huertas a considerable sum following fraudulent payments made by a new insolvent company, of which Dr Smith was a director. The argument on ordre public grounds was made viz alleged bias and hostility in one particular court hearing; the long duration of the trial; and one or two alleged procedural inadequacies (in particular, the refusal to interview Dr Smith on a number of occasions).

Most if not all of the complaints were taken by Dr Smith to the ECtHR, which decided not to proceed with the case (such decisions are made in summary manner and one therefore has to guess whether either the claims were found to be manifestly unfounded, or not of a nature as having actually put the applicant at a disadvantage).

Importantly, Cooke J emphasises the responsibility of applicant (seeking refusal of recognition) to raise matters which might conceivably lead to a refusal of recognition, in the Member State of origin: at 21:

Where the factors relied on as being contrary to public policy in England are factors which the court has already considered in the foreign jurisdiction or are factors which could have been raised by way of objection in that jurisdiction, it appears to me self-evident that the foreign jurisdiction must be treated as the best place for those arguments to be raised and determined. To do otherwise would be contrary to the spirit of the Convention and, where issues of unfairness are raised which are capable of being the subject of appeal in the foreign jurisdiction, the court in the enforcing jurisdiction would be much less able to assess them than the original court which was familiar with its own forms of procedure. It is plain that an enforcing court will have much more difficulty in understanding the overall foreign system and its procedures for ensuring that justice is done than the appeal court of the original jurisdiction itself. There is moreover a highly unattractive element in a defendant not raising points which he could have raised in the original jurisdiction, by way of appeal against the judgment and only seeking to raise those matters when the judgment is exported to an enforcing jurisdiction under the Convention as matters of public policy for that court.

Dr Smith’ task therefore was to (at 26) not only … show an exceptional case of an infringement of a fundamental principle constituting a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order in this country or of a right recognised as being fundamental within it but that the system of legal remedies in France did not afford a sufficient guarantee of his rights. Dr Smith must overcome the strong presumption that the procedures of the courts of France, another Contracting State, are compliant with Article 6…

A task which in the end Dr Smith failed to accomplish and summary judgment for recognition and enforcement was issued. Review by Cooke J may seem lengthy to some however CJEU case-law emphasises the ad hoc nature of the ordre public exception: that requires some case-specific assessment, of course.

Geert.

 

L’Istituto Ellenico di diritto internazionale e straniero ha comunicato attraverso il suo sito, il 28 gennaio 2016, la decisione di sospendere, per ragioni finanziarie, la pubblicazione della Revue hellénique de droit international.

Fondata nel 1948, la Revue hellénique ha rappresentato il principale veicolo di diffusione della dottrina greca nel campo del diritto internazionale pubblico e privato, oltre che nel campo del diritto dell’Unione europea, in lingua francese e inglese.

Rispetto alle tematiche internazionalprivatistiche, la rivista ha ospitato, oltre a numerose cronache della giurisprudenza greca, molti contributi scientifici importanti, di studiosi greci e non (le coordinate bibliografiche degli scritti apparsi sulla rivista sono reperibili a questo indirizzo).

La sospensione delle pubblicazioni della Revue hellénique, se non dovesse essere solo temporanea, costituirebbe una perdita significativa per la comunità scientifica degli internazionalisti europei. Essa in ogni caso riflette le condizioni di straordinaria difficoltà in cui sono costretti a lavorare gli studiosi greci, dopo la drammatica crisi che ha colpito il loro paese.

Dorota Leczykiewicz, Human Rights and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Immigration, Criminal Justice and Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters, available here through on SSRN.

[Abstract] – The chapter considers the rich acquis of the EU falling within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice from the perspective of human rights. It starts by looking at human rights issues arising from EU asylum and migration law and moves on to the EU’s prevention of crime measures, where it focuses on the judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It finishes by considering the human rights issues arising in the context of judicial cooperation in civil matters. The chapter explains the double role of human rights in the AFSJ – as a policy objective realised through legislative measures and a standard of review of acts adopted as part of this EU activity. It also explains why so many human rights issues arise in the AFSJ and investigates the way in which they have been addressed by the Court of Justice of the EU. The chapter argues that the Court’s case law exhibits an extreme version of utilitarianism, which is incompatible with a corrective justice conception of human rights, underlying the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It concludes that the Court of Justice is far from usurping a human rights jurisdiction for itself and that the full potential of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights to infuse EU law in the AFSJ with content inspired by human rights has not yet been realised. Instead, the chapter observes, the Court is often using the argument of effectiveness to resist arguments of human rights, which, as a result, are protected in the AFSJ only in so far as they are recognised and codified in secondary law.

 

Autriche / Commission
Aide d'État
Le Tribunal confirme que la garantie accordée par l’Autriche à la BayernLB dans le cadre de sa restructuration en ce qui concerne les lignes de crédit de BayernLB en faveur de Hypo Group Alpe Adria constitue une aide d’État qui est toutefois compatible avec le droit de l’Union

Azarov / Conseil
Relations extérieures
Le Tribunal de l’UE annule le gel de fonds de cinq Ukrainiens dont MM. Mykola Yanovych Azarov et Sergej Arbuzov, anciens Premiers ministres de l’Ukraine, pour la période allant du 6 mars 2014 au 5 mars 2015

Laezza
Liberté d'établissement
Une réglementation nationale sur les jeux de hasard peut être contraire au principe de proportionnalité si elle impose au concessionnaire de céder gratuitement les équipements utilisés pour la collecte de paris

Éditions Odile Jacob / Commission
Concurrence
La Cour rejette le pourvoi d’Odile Jacob dans l’affaire du rachat de Vivendi Universal Publishing par Lagardère

The CJEU has held in Case C-521/14 Sovag that Article 6(2) Brussels I (Article 8(2) in the Recast) applies regardless of whether the proceedings are brought against (which is what inter alia the English language version suggests) or by a third party.

A, the victim of a traffic accident that took place in Germany, brought an action in Finland against SOVAG, with which the vehicle responsible for the damage was insured. That traffic accident also constituting a work accident under the Law on accident insurance, If, which is established in Finland, paid A compensation for the accident in accordance with that law. After A had brought the action against SOVAG, If itself sued SOVAG before the same court of first instance.

The national court in first instance held that, in accordance with Article 8 of Regulation 44/2001, in matters relating to insurance jurisdiction may be determined by the provisions of Section 3 of Chapter II of that Regulation alone. According to SOVAG, Article 6(2) of Regulation 44/2001 is indeed not applicable because Section 3 of Chapter II of the same Regulation establishes an autonomous system for the conferring of jurisdiction in matters of insurance. On this issue, the CJEU (at 30) reminded the national court of earlier case-law that where the action at issue in the main proceedings concerns relations between professionals in the insurance sector, and will not affect the procedural situation of a party deemed to be weaker, the insurance title does not apply. The objective of protecting a party deemed to be weaker being fulfilled once jurisdiction is established on the basis of Section 3 of Chapter II of Regulation 44/2001, subsequent procedural developments concerning only relations between professionals cannot fall within the ambit of that section.

Next, the wording of several of the language versions of Article 6(2), in particular the German, French, Finnish and Swedish versions, does not prevent the court before which the original proceedings are pending from having jurisdiction to hear and determine an action brought by a third party against one of the parties to the original proceedings.  However, other language versions of that provision, particularly the English language version, appear to restrict its scope to actions brought against third parties (‘a person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: … as a third party’).

While the CJEU acknowledged that the special jurisdictional rules need to be applied restrictively, ie not going beyond their purpose, here the purpose of Article 6(2) is the harmonious administration of justice, namely minimising the possibility of concurrent proceedings and ensuring that irreconcilable judgments will not be given in two Member States. Therefore Article 6(2) must also apply where the third party brings the proceedings, not just where it is drawn into those proceedings by others.

However, the Court also sanctioned the Finnish rule of civil procedure that the right of a third party to bring an action in connection with pending judicial proceedings, is contingent on that action being linked to the original proceedings. Given that Article 6(2) does not apply where the proceedings were brought ‘solely with the object of removing’ the party concerned from the jurisdiction of the court which would ordinarily have jurisdiction to hear the case,  the CJEU OK-ed the Finnish rule as being one that assist in helping to avoid abuse of the rule on joinders.

I would have thought the Court would have made that rule one of EU law, given its insistence on autonomous interpretation. (Rather than simply OK-ing a national rule). Whether there is such a European rule therefore must stay into the open a little longer.

Geert.

 

 

Sucesiones internacionales. Comentarios al Reglamento (UE) 650/2012, a cura di José Luis Iglesias Buigues e Guillermo Palao Moreno, Tirant lo Blanch, 2015, ISBN 9788490867891, pp. 276, € 89.

[Dal sito dell’editore] El 4 de julio de 2012 se aprobó el Reglamento N° 650/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, relativo a la competencia, la ley aplicable, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de las resoluciones, a la aceptación y la ejecución de los documentos públicos en materia de sucesiones mortis causa y a la creación de un certificado sucesorio europeo. La aplicación plena de este instrumento legislativo adoptado en el ámbito del Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia se producirá el 17 de agosto de 2015, momento a partir del cual nuestro modelo de Derecho internacional privado de sucesiones pasará a regirse por esta nueva norma, cuyo análisis pormenorizado, disposición a disposición, constituye el objeto de esta obra. El estudio que presentamos no es un trabajo exclusivamente académico, sino que se ha buscado ofrecer al profesional del Derecho un comentario de cada una de sus disposiciones en cuanto Derecho positivo, presidido por su confrontación con el Derecho español, con el fin de fundamentar la interpretación y aplicación en la práctica del Reglamento en España.

Maggiori informazioni, compreso l’indice del volume, sono disponibili qui.

Is the relationship between two insurers, having covered liability for a towing vehicle cq a trailer, each subrogated in their insured’s rights and obligations, one of them currently exercising a claim against the other in partial recovery of the compensation due to the victim, non-contractual? I reviewed Sharpston AG’s Opinion here. I believe the Court has confirmed her Opinion. However I am not entirely certain for the judgment is awkwardly phrased.

Like its AG, the CJEU dismisses a suggestion that Directive 2009/103 (relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability) includes a conflict of laws (applicable law) rule which is lex specialis vis-a-vis the Rome I Regulation. Indeed the Directive’s provisions do not indicate whatsoever that they can be stretched.

Then comes the core of the issue, the nature of the relationship underlying the claim. The AG had suggested this is contractual, using as I noted in my earlier posting, ‘centre of gravity’ (‘the centre of gravity of the obligation to indemnify is in the contractual obligation’); ‘rooted in’ (‘the recourse action by one insurer against the other…is rooted in the contracts of insurance’); and ‘intimately bound up’ (‘[the action] is intimately bound up with the two insurers’ contractual obligation‘). (at 62).

The Court did not repeat any of this terminology. It first suggests that the national court where the case is pending, needs to determine using Article 4 of Rome II (lex locus damni) whether the law so determined ‘provides for apportionment of the obligation to compensate for the damage’. This the AG had not expressly pondered, rather it may be implicit in her use of the conditional ‘where two or more insurers are jointly and severally liable’ ((only) used at 71 of her Opinion). Next, the Court holds, if there is such apportionment, the law applicable to the action for indemnity between the insurers of the tractor cq the trailer, needs to be determined using Article 7 of Rome I (which applies to insurance contracts).

The referring courts were looking I believe for more straightforward advice. Instead I fear the many conditions precedent expressed in the judgment may well leave plenty of room for counsel to further confuse these national courts. This arguably may have a knock-on effect given the repeated insistence by the CJEU that the provisions of Brussels I (Recast) on contract and tort, need to be applied in parallel with those of Rome I and II (not something I necessarily agree with but have come to accept as standing CJEU precedent).

Geert.

Anche quest’anno, la Società Italiana di Diritto Internazionale e di Diritto dell’Unione Europea (SIDI) indice il Premio di Laurea “Daniele Padovani” per la migliore tesi di laurea in materia di diritto internazionale privato e processuale.

L’ammissione al concorso è riservata ai candidati che abbiano conseguito una laurea specialistica o magistrale in giurisprudenza successivamente al 30 maggio 2014, con votazione non inferiore a 105.

Il termine per la presentazione delle domande è fissato al 4 marzo 2016.

Maggiori informazioni sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.