The Max Planck Institute Luxembourg is accepting applications for the 2016 Summer School on Approaches to Procedural Law: The Pluralism of Methods, organised in collaboration with the International Association of Procedural Law under the direction of Loïc Cadiet (Université Paris 1 – Sorbonne) and Burkhard Hess (MPI Luxembourg).
The Summer School will take place at the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg between 10 and 13 July 2016. Up to 20 places will be available for applicants having procedural law and/or dispute resolution mechanisms as their main field of academic interest.
The deadline for applications is 31 January 2016.
[From the press release] – The first IAPL-MPI Summer School at the premises of the Max Planck Institute in Luxembourg in July 2014 was a successful experience, recently crowned by the publication of the collective book Procedural Science at the Crossroads of Different Generations (Nomos 2015). This success has encouraged the organization of a second edition in 2016. The second edition of IAPL-MPI Post-Doctoral Summer School aims like the first one to bring together outstanding young post-doc researchers of any nationality dealing with European and comparative procedural law, as well as with other relevant dispute mechanisms for civil controversies. Researchers at the very ending stage of their PhD project are also invited to apply. The School will give them an opportunity to openly share and discuss their current project of research with other young colleagues, but also with experienced law professors and practitioners. In this regard, Luxembourg is presently for many reasons one of the most interesting venues in Europe, where many opportunities for exchanges between procedural theory and practice are offered.
Further details can be found here
The Polish Yearbook of International Law has issued a call for unpublished papers addressing, inter alia, private international law topics, to be included in its next volume.
The deadline for submissions is 31 January 2016.
Further information can be found here.
In my posting on Lutz I flagged the increasing relevance of Article 13 of the Insolvency Regulation. This Article neutralises the lex concursus in favour of the lex causae governing the act between a person (often a company) benefiting from an act detrimental to all the creditors, and the insolvent company. Classic example is a payment made by the insolvent company to one particular creditor. Evidently this is detrimental to the other creditors, who are confronted with reduced means against which they can exercise their rights. Article 13 reads
Detrimental acts. Article 4(2)(m) shall not apply where the person who benefited from an act detrimental to all the creditors provides proof that: – the said act is subject to the law of a Member State other than that of the State of the opening of proceedings, and – that law does not allow any means of challenging that act in the relevant case.
In the case at issue, C-310/14, Nike (incorporated in The Netherlands) had a franchise agreement with Sportland Oy, a Finnish company. This agreement is governed by Dutch law (through choice of law). Sportland paid for a number of Nike deliveries. Payments went ahead a few months before and after the opening of the insolvency proceedings. Sportland’s liquidator attempts to have the payments annulled, and to have Nike reimburse.
Under Finnish law, para 10 of the Law on recovery of assets provides that the payment of a debt within three months of the prescribed date may be challenged if it is paid with an unusual means of payment, is paid prematurely, or in an amount which, in view of the amount of the debtor’s estate, may be regarded as significant. Under Netherlands law, according to Article 47 of the Law on insolvency (Faillissementswet), the payment of an outstanding debt may be challenged only if it is proven that when the recipient received the payment he was aware that the application for insolvency proceedings had already been lodged or that the payment was agreed between the creditor and the debtor in order to give priority to that creditor to the detriment of the other creditors.
Nike first of all argued, unsuccessfully in the Finnish courts, that the payment was not ‘unusual’. The Finnish courts essentially held that under relevant Finnish law, the payment was unusual among others because the amount paid was quite high in relation to the overall assets of the company. Nike argues in subsidiary order that Dutch law, the lex causae of the franchise agreement, should be applied. Attention then focussed (and the CJEU held on) the burden of proof under Article 13, as well as the exact meaning of ‘that law does not allow any means of challenging that act in the relevant case.‘
Firstly, the Finnish version of the Regulation seemingly does not include wording identical or similar to ‘in the relevant case‘ (Article 13 in fine). Insisting on a restrictive interpretation of Article 13, which it had also held in Lutz, the CJEU held that all the circumstances of the cases need to be taken into account. The person profiting from the action cannot solely rely ‘in a purely abstract manner, on the unchallengeable character of the act at issue on the basis of a provision of the lex causae‘ (at 21).
Related to this issue the referring court had actually quoted the Virgos Schmit report, which reads in relevant part (at 137) ‘By “any means” it is understood that the act must not be capable of being challenged using either rules on insolvency or general rules of the national law applicable to the act’. This interpretation evidently reduces the comfort zone for the party who benefitted from the act. It widens the search area, so to speak. It was suggested, for instance, that Dutch law in general includes a prohibition of abuse of rights, which is wider than the limited circumstances of the Faillissementswet, referred to above.
The CJEU surprisingly does not quote the report however it does come to a similar conclusion: at 36: ‘the expression ‘does not allow any means of challenging that act …’ applies, in addition to the insolvency rules of the lex causae, to the general provisions and principles of that law, taken as a whole.’
Attention then shifted to the burden of proof: which party is required to plead that the circumstances for application of a provision of the lex causae leading to voidness, voidability or unenforceability of the act, do not exist? The CJEU held on the basis of Article 13’s wording and overall objectives that it is for the defendant in an action relating to the voidness, voidability or unenforceability of an act to provide proof, on the basis of the lex causae, that the act cannot be challenged. Tthe defendant has to prove both the facts from which the conclusion can be drawn that the act is unchallengeable and the absence of any evidence that would militate against that conclusion (at 25).
However, (at 27) ‘although Article 13 of the regulation expressly governs where the burden of proof lies, it does not contain any provisions on more specific procedural aspects. For instance, that article does not set out, inter alia, the ways in which evidence is to be elicited, what evidence is to be admissible before the appropriate national court, or the principles governing that court’s assessment of the probative value of the evidence adduced before it.‘
‘(T)he issue of determining the criteria for ascertaining whether the applicant has in fact proven that the act can be challenged falls within the procedural autonomy of the relevant Member State, regard being had to the principles of effectiveness and equivalence.’ (at 44)
The Court therefore once again bumps into the limits of autonomous interpretation. How ad hoc, concrete (as opposed to ‘in the abstract’: see the CJEU’s words, above) the defendant has to be in providing proof (and foreign expert testimony with it), may differ greatly in the various Member States. Watch this space for more judicial review of Article 13.
Geert.
The programme of the the Fifth Biennial Conference of the Asian Society of International Law, that will take place in Bangkok on 26 and 27 November 2015 under the title International Law and the Changing Economic & Political Landscape in Asia, is now available.
Some of the conference panels will deal with private international law issues. In particular, one panel will be devoted to Conflict of Laws Issues Relating To Family, Marriage & Children and will host presentations by Ornella Feraci (University of Florence), The Impact of the Best Interests of the Child on the Recognition of Civil Status Lawfully Acquired Abroad Following International Surrogacy Arrangements (ISAs); M.Z. Ashraful (Metropolitan University, Sylhet, Bangladesh), Conflict of Laws Complexities Arising from the International Surrogacy Agreement: A Study on South Asian Countries; Monica Chawla (Indian Society of International Law), Conflicts of Laws Arising Due to Inter-country Adoptions – An Analysis; Andrea Susanne Büchler (University of Zurich), Divided Motherhood Across the Globe: Surrogacy and Legal and Cultural Encounters between Europe and Asia.
The whole programme is available here. The abstracts of the presentations may be found here and here.
For more information see here.
One night this week I was teaching a taster class to final year secondary school students (17-18yr olds). I decided I should make it challenging enough. This, I surmised, would help all those present. Either they would now run a mile from Law School, never to look back (thus taking away all doubt). Or their curiosity would be tickled enough for them to want to learn more (thus for them, too, taking away all doubt). I settled on CSR and conflicts: the Shell Nigeria case, with links to Kiobel (and Adam Smith, David Ricardo; special purpose vehicles; and the impending merger between Leuven’s AB Inbev and SAB Miller. All very exciting stuff!, in an allocated tome slot of 30 minutes). I hope readers will agree that conflict of laws does just the trick referred to above: scare off the doubters; pull in the doubters.
Anyways, that class was at the back of my mind as I was reading up on Americold Logistics. I am not a US trained or US qualified lawyer hence this posting may not be howler-proof however I understand that one particular avenue to gain access to US federal courts (as opposed to State courts; and over and above the issue being an issue based on federal law), is so-called ‘diversity jurisdiction’. This means the federal courts can hear a case if the citisenship of the parties involved is diverse: i.e. of at least two different US States or one of them being foreign. I also understand that to determine corporate citisenship, reference is made to the principal place of business (not therefore generally co-inciding with place of incorporation).
But how about trusts? What identify does a trust have with a view to diversity jurisdiction? In Americold Logistics, the Tenth Circuit sua sponte queried whether there was full diversity of citizenship among the parties. In particular, the judges challenged whether the citizenship of Americold Realty Trust, a business trust, should be determined by reference to its trustees’ citizenship, or instead by reference to some broader set of factors. This issue has deeply split courts across the country. Joining the minority of courts, the Tenth Circuit held the jurisdictional inquiry extends, at a minimum, to the citizenship of a trust’s beneficiaries in addition to its trustees’ citizenship. In this case, doing so destroyed diversity of citizenship among the parties. The issue is disputed, following relevant (seemingly inconclusive) precedent, summarised by SCOTUS here. The USCC has now granted certiorari.
This judgment will be of quite some relevance to US legal (trust) practice. I think readers will agree that it was wise not to pick it, and the wider issue of trust identity, for lawyers in spe.
Geert.
Ad oltre due mesi di distanza dalla pubblicazione della legge n. 101 del 18 giugno 2015, di autorizzazione alla ratifica, l’Italia ha provveduto, il 30 settembre 2015, al deposito del proprio strumento di ratifica della Convenzione sulla competenza, la legge applicabile, l’efficacia delle decisioni e la cooperazione in materia di responsabilità genitoriale e di misure di protezione dei minori, fatta all’Aja il 19 ottobre 1996 (si veda da ultimo, sull’iter del processo di ratifica, questo post).
La Convenzione, come previsto dal suo art. 61, par. 2, lett. a), entrerà in vigore per l’Italia il 1° gennaio 2016.
La ratifica italiana è accompagnata da diverse dichiarazioni.
Innanzitutto, come gli altri Stati membri dell’Unione, l’Italia ha dichiarato – nei termini contemplati sin dalla decisione 2003/93/CE, del Consiglio, del 19 dicembre 2002 – che gli articoli 23, 26 e 52 della Convenzione concedono alle parti contraenti una certa flessibilità ai fini della semplicità e della rapidità del regime di riconoscimento ed esecuzione delle decisioni e che la normativa comunitaria prevede un sistema di riconoscimento ed esecuzione che è almeno altrettanto favorevole quanto le norme stabilite dalla Convenzione. Di conseguenza, prosegue la dichiarazione, una decisione emanante da un organo giurisdizionale di uno Stato membro dell’Unione su una questione relativa alla Convenzione è riconosciuta ed eseguita in Italia in applicazione delle pertinenti norme interne del diritto comunitario.
Avvalendosi della facoltà prevista all’art. 55 della Convenzione, l’Italia ha poi reso noto di riservare la competenza delle proprie autorità quanto all’adozione di misure volte alla protezione dei beni di un minore che si trovino sul territorio italiano. Ha inoltre dichiarato di riservarsi il diritto di non riconoscere una responsabilità genitoriale o una misura che potrebbe essere incompatibile con una misura adottata dalle sue autorità riguardo a tali beni.
Un’ulteriore dichiarazione resa dall’Italia contestualmente alla ratifica si riferisce all’art. 34, par. 1, della Convenzione. La norma ora ricordata stabilisce che, in previsione dell’adozione di una misura di protezione, le autorità competenti ai sensi della Convenzione possono domandare ad ogni autorità di un altro Stato contraente che detenga informazioni utili per la protezione del minore di comunicargliele. In forza della dichiarazione, tale richiesta, ove sia rivolta alle autorità italiane, potrà essere fatta – come consente l’art. 34, par. 2 – esclusivamente per il tramite dell’Autorità centrale italiana, identificata, ai sensi dell’art. 3 della legge n. 101/2015, nella Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri.
Alla stessa Autorità centrale dovranno essere indirizzare le domande di cui agli articoli 8, 9 e 33 della Convenzione, provenienti dagli altri Stati contraenti. Le disposizioni ora citate riguardano, in sintesi, il trasferimento del caso a un’autorità meglio collocata per pronunciarsi su di esso (articoli 8 e 9), e il collocamento del minore in una famiglia di accoglienza o in un istituto (o la sua assistenza legale tramite kafala o istituto analogo), quando tale collocamento (o assistenza) avverrà in un altro Stato contraente (art. 33).
L’approssimarsi dell’entrata in vigore per l’Italia rende urgente l’adozione, nell’ordinamento interno, di quelle misure di attuazione e di coordinamento con le norme esistenti che il Parlamento non è stato in grado di elaborare assieme alla legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica e all’emanazione dell’ordine di esecuzione.
Il disegno di legge recante tali misure (atto Senato n. 1552 bis), stralciato dal disegno di legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica, è tuttora allo studio della Commissione Giustizia del Senato, che nella seduta del 21 luglio 2015 ha prospettato lo svolgimento di un ciclo di audizioni.
A lot of attention last week went to the CJEU’s annulment of the EC’s ‘Safe Harbour’ decision in Schrems v Facebook (aka Austrian student takes on internet giant). I will not detail that finding for I assume, for once, that readers will be au fait with that judgment. For those who are not: please refer to Steve Peers for excellent analysis as per usual. It is noteworthy though that the CJEU’s finding in Schrems is based in the main on a finding of ultra vires: often easily remedied, as those with a background in public law will know.
Schrems (held 6 October) confirmed the Court’s approach to the EU’s prescriptive jurisdiction in data protection laws, as in Google Spain. However the Thursday before, on 1 October, the Court took a more restrictive view on ‘executive’ or ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction in Case C-230/14 Weltimmo. Lorna Woods has the general context and findings over at EU Law analysis. The essence in my view is that the Court insists on internal limitations to enforcement. It discussed the scope of national supervisory authority’s power in the context of Directive 95/4, the same directive which was at issue in Google Spain. The Court held
Where the supervisory authority of a Member State, to which complaints have been submitted in accordance with Article 28(4) of Directive 95/46, reaches the conclusion that the law applicable to the processing of the personal data concerned is not the law of that Member State, but the law of another Member State, Article 28(1), (3) and (6) of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that that supervisory authority will be able to exercise the effective powers of intervention conferred on it in accordance with Article 28(3) of that directive only within the territory of its own Member State. Accordingly, it cannot impose penalties on the basis of the law of that Member State on the controller with respect to the processing of those data who is not established in that territory, but should, in accordance with Article 28(6) of that directive, request the supervisory authority within the Member State whose law is applicable to act.
In other words, the supervisory authority in a Member State can examine the complaints it receives even if the law that applies to the data processing is the law of another Member State. However the scope of its sanctioning power is limited by its national borders.
This finding (I appreciate there are caveats) has important implications for the discussion on the territorial reach of the so-called ‘righ to be forgotten’. It supports in my view, the argument that the EU cannot extend its right to be forgotten rule to websites outside the EU’s domain. I have a paper forthcoming which discusses the various jurisdictional issues at stake here and the impact of Weltimmo on same.
Geert.
On the occasion of the 35th Anniversary of the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), the Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb will host a conference, organised together with Uncitral, titled 35 Years of CISG – Present Experiences and Future Challenges.
The conference will take place on 1 and 2 December 2015.
The first day will be dedicated to the Present Experiences concerning the application of the CISG, focusing on the use of the Convention especially in Central and Eastern European countries. In particular, the main topics that will be touched by twenty national reporters relate to the personal and substantive scope of the CISG, reservations to the CISG and rights and obligations arising out of sales contracts.
The second day will be devoted to the Future Challenges of CISG. There will be panel discussions focusing on The extensive interpretation and application of the CISG beyond the contracts of sale, What the CISG would look like if it was drafted for adoption today?, The interplay between the CISG and other legal sources of contract law (or contract principles).
The panels will feature the participation of Siniša Petrović (University of Zagreb), Joseph Lookofsky (Copenhagen Center for Commercial Law, University of Copenhagen), Loukas Mistelis (Queen Mary University of London), Kasper Steensgaard (Aarhus University), Azar Aliyev (Kiel Center for Eurasian Economic Law, Kiel University), Pilar Perales Viscasillas (Carlos III University of Madrid), Ingeborg Schwenzer (University of Basel/Swiss International Law School ), Harry M. Flechtner (University of Pittsburgh Law School), Ulrich G. Schroeter (University of Mannheim), Cyril Emery (UNCITRAL), Renaud Sorieul (the Secretary of UNCITRAL), Marta Pertegás (Hague Conference on Private International Law), Mikolaj Zaleski (EU Commission), José Angelo Estrella Faria (Secretary General Unidroit), Jelena Perović (University of Belgrade).
The official program of the conference can be found here.
For the on-line registration form and the registration fees, see here.
Information regarding accommodation is available here.
Djakhongir Saidov, Conformity of Goods and Documents, Hart Publishing, 2015, ISBN 9781849461559, pp. 318, GBP 75.
[Dal sito dell’editore] – This book provides a detailed examination of the issue of conformity of goods and documents under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG). This issue lies at the heart of sales law and is one of the most frequently litigated. The book explores the Convention’s requirements as to quality, quantity, description and packaging of the goods (conformity); the requirements flowing from the need for the goods to be free from rights or claims of third parties; and the questions of what documents the seller must deliver to the buyer and what constitutes a ‘good’ document under the CISG. The book engages extensively with a substantial body of cases decided under the CISG and academic commentary. It systematises the Convention’s experience to date with a view to turning it into an integrated, comprehensive and distinctive CISG legal regime on conformity of goods and documents. The analysis is comparative and draws on the experience of some major domestic legal systems, such as English and US law. The focus is both analytical and practical. The book will be of interest to legal practitioners, academic lawyers and students with an interest in international and comparative sales, commercial and contract law.
Ulteriori informazioni sull’opera sono disponibili a questo indirizzo.
On 10 September 2015, Advocate General Wahl delivered his opinion in Case C-350/14, Florin Lazar, regarding the interpretation of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II). Pursuant to this provision, a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort is governed, as a general rule, by the law of “the place where the damage occurred”, irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred “and irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur”.
The case concerns a fatal traffic accident occurred in Italy.
Some close relatives of the woman who died in the accident, not directly involved in the crash, brought proceedings in Italy seeking reparation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses personally suffered by them as a consequence of the death of the woman, ie the moral suffering for the loss of a loved person and the loss of a source of maintenance. Among the claimants, all of them of Romanian nationality, some were habitually resident in Italy, others in Romania.
Before the Tribunal of Trieste, seised of the matter, the issue arose of whether, for the purposes of the Rome II Regulation, one should look at the damage claimed by the relatives in their own right (possibly to be localised in Romania) or only at the damage suffered by the woman as the immediate victim of the accident. Put otherwise, the question was whether the prejudice for which the claimants were seeking reparation could be characterised as a “direct damage” under Article 4(1), or rather as an “indirect consequence of the event”, with no bearing on the identification of the applicable law.
According to AG Wahl, a “direct damage” within the meaning of Article 4(1) does not cover the losses suffered by family members of the direct victim.
In the opinion, the Advocate General begins by acknowledging that, under the domestic rules of some countries, the close relatives of the victim are allowed to seek satisfaction in their own right (iure proprio) for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses they suffered as a consequence of the fatal (or non-fatal) injury suffered by the victim, and that, in these instances, a separate legal relationship between such relatives and the person claimed to be liable arises and co-exists with the one already set in place between the latter and the direct victim.
In the Advocate General’s view, however, domestic legal solutions on third-party damage should not have an impact on the interpretation of the word “damage” in Article 4(1), which should rather be regarded as an autonomous notion of EU law. The latter notion should be construed having due regard, inter alia, to the case law of the ECJ concerning Article 5(3) of the 1968 Brussels Convention and of the Brussels I Regulation (now Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation), in particular insofar as it excludes that consequential and indirect (financial) damages sustained in another State by either the victim himself or another person, cannot be invoked in order to ground jurisdiction under that provision (see, in particular, the judgments in Dumez and Tracoba, Marinari and Kronhofer).
That solution, the Advocate General concedes, has been developed with specific reference to conflicts of jurisdictions, on the basis of considerations that are not necessarily as persuasive when transposed to the conflicts of laws. The case law on Brussels I, with the necessary adaptation, must nevertheless be treated as providing useful guidance for the interpretation of the Rome II Regulation.
Specifically, AG Wahl stresses that the adoption of the sole connecting factor of the loci damni in Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation marks the refutation of the theory of ubiquity, since, pursuant to the latter provision, torts are governed by one law. The fact of referring exclusively to the place where the damage was sustained by the direct victim, regardless of the harmful effects suffered elsewhere by third parties, complies with this policy insofar as it prevents the splitting of the governing law with respect to the several issues arising from the same event, based on the contingent circumstance of the habitual residence of the various claimants.
The solution proposed would additionally favour, he contends, other objectives of the Regulation. In particular, this would preserve the neutrality pursued by the legislator who, according to Recital 16, regarded the designation of the lex loci damni to be a “fair balance” between the interests of all the parties involved. Such compromise would be jeopardised were the victim’s family member systematically allowed to ground their claims on the law of the place of their habitual residence. The preferred reading would moreover ensure a close link between the matter and the applicable law since, while the place where the initial damage arose is usually closely related to the other components of liability, the same cannot be said, generally, as concerns the domicile of the indirect victim.
In the end, according to AG Wahl, Article 4(1) of Regulation No 864/2007 should be interpreted as meaning that the damages suffered, in their State of residence, by the close relatives of a person who died as a result of a traffic accident occurred in the State of the court seised constitute “indirect consequences” within the meaning of the said provision and, consequently, the “place where the damage occurred”, in that event, should be understood solely as the place in which the accident gave rise to the initial damage suffered by the direct victim.
Si terrà a Trier il 10 e 11 dicembre 2015 un incontro di formazione organizzato da ERA – Academy of European Law, intitolato European Cross-border Procedures: How to Apply Them in Practice?
Il programma del workshop, specificamente rivolto ad avvocati, è disponibile qui.
Ulteriori informazioni sono reperibili a questo indirizzo.
Il 23 ottobre 2015 si terrà presso l’Università di Verona un incontro su La gestazione per altri.
[Dalla presentazione dell’evento] – La giornata di studi prevede un attivo dialogo fra esperti di diversi settori, con brevi relazioni per area disciplinare in ciascuna delle sessioni di approfondimento e discussione a mo’ di tavola rotonda. L’evento intende favorire una ricostruzione sistemica del fenomeno e affrontare questioni che la dottrina non ha ancora considerato adeguatamente, quale la responsabilità dei diversi soggetti che possono essere coinvolti al di là dei committenti (legali, personale medico, ecc.), e le interazioni di un sistema multilivello, con particolare riguardo al contesto unionale e a quello euroconvenzionale.
Tra i relatori, Maria Caterina Baruffi (Univ. Verona), Davide Diverio (Univ. Milano), Alexander Schuster (Univ. Trento), Cristiana Fioravanti (Univ. Ferrara).
Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.
Nella sentenza resa il 6 ottobre 2015 nel caso Marie Matoušková (causa C‑404/14), la Corte di giustizia si è pronunciata sulla portata applicativa del regolamento n. 2201/2003 sulla competenza giurisdizionale e l’efficacia delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e di responsabilità genitoriale (Bruxelles II bis), in particolare per quanto concerne le misure concernenti la responsabilità genitoriale.
Nel caso di specie si trattava di stabilire se rientrasse nella sfera del regolamento l’approvazione, da parte delle autorità giudiziarie della Repubblica Ceca, di un accordo relativo alla divisione dell’eredità di uno dei genitori concluso dal curatore dei figli minori di quest’ultimo per loro conto.
I dubbi nascevano dal fatto che, per un verso, l’art. 1, par. 1, lett. b), del regolamento riconduce sotto la nozione di responsabilità genitoriale le questioni relative “all’attribuzione, all’esercizio, alla delega, alla revoca totale o parziale della responsabilità genitoriale”, ritenendo altresì applicabile il regolamento a “la tutela, la curatela ed altri istituti analoghi”, e che, per altro verso, ai sensi dell’art. 1, par. 3, lett. f), il regolamento non si applica “ai trust e alle successioni”.
La Corte è giunta alla conclusione che la misura in discorso costituisce, ai fini del regolamento Bruxelles II bis, una misura relativa all’esercizio della responsabilità genitoriale e ricade pertanto nell’ambito di applicazione di quest’ultimo, e non una misura relativa alle successioni.
A sostegno di tale ricostruzione, la Corte ha rilevato, innanzitutto, che l’approvazione di un accordo di divisione dell’eredità, nelle circostanze del caso di specie, è una misura adottata “in considerazione della capacità del minore, che mira a tutelare l’interesse superiore del minore e che è richiesta, ai sensi del diritto ceco, per gli atti giuridici relativi all’amministrazione dei beni che eccedono l’ordinaria amministrazione”.
Avuto riguardo agli interessi a cui è asservita, la misura in esame “riguarda direttamente la capacità della persona” e si inserisce in “un’azione finalizzata a soddisfare i bisogni di protezione e di assistenza dei figli minori”. La capacità e le questioni attinenti alla rappresentanza ad essa collegate, ha allora aggiunto la Corte, “devono essere valutate in base a criteri autonomi, e non devono essere trattate come questioni preliminari dipendenti dai relativi atti giuridici”: osservata da questa angolatura funzionale, la nomina di un curatore per i figli minori e il controllo dell’esercizio della sua attività “sono così strettamente legati che sarebbe inopportuno applicare regole di competenza differenti, che cambino a seconda della materia dell’atto giuridico considerato” (nel caso considerato, un atto concernente una successione mortis causa).
Per la Corte, l’esito interpretativo ora riferito trova conferma nella relazione di Paul Lagarde sulla Convenzione dell’Aia del 1996 concernente la competenza, la legge applicabile, il riconoscimento, l’esecuzione e la cooperazione in materia di responsabilità genitoriale e di misure di protezione dei minori, “il cui ambito di applicazione ratione materiae corrisponde, in materia di responsabilità genitoriale, a quello del regolamento n. 2201/2003″.
La lettura proposta — aggiunge la Corte — rinviene un riscontro anche nel regolamento n. 650/2012, relativo al diritto internazionale privato delle successioni, pur non applicabile ratione temporis nel procedimento principale. Quest’ultimo regolamento, infatti, a norma dell’art. 1, par. 2, lett. b), dichiara di non voler disciplinare la capacità delle persone fisiche, limitandosi a regolare gli aspetti specificamente correlati alla capacità di succedere, ai sensi dell’art. 23, par. 2, lett. c), nonché la capacità a compiere una disposizione a causa di morte, ai sensi dell’art. 26, par. 1, lett. a).
Da ultimo, la Corte di giustizia si sofferma sulla preoccupazione espressa dal giudice del rinvio circa il pericolo che l’interesse del minore possa risultare compromesso dalla ripartizione del processo decisionale in materia di successione tra due Stati membri differenti, ossia, da un lato, quello dell’apertura del procedimento di successione e, dall’altro, quello della residenza abituale del minore, investito della competenza in materia di responsabilità genitoriale ai sensi dell’art. 8, par. 1, del regolamento Bruxelles II bis.
Sul punto, la Corte si limita a rilevare che il rischio così paventato può essere mitigato utilizzando il meccanismo di proroga della competenza giurisdizionale previsto dall’art. 12 del regolamento Bruxelles II bis. In pratica, là dove siano soddisfatte le condizioni previste da tale disposizione, l’approvazione dell’atto di divisione dell’eredità potrebbe essere convogliata nella competenza dell’autorità giurisdizionale adita in materia di successione ancorché tale autorità non sia quella della residenza abituale del minore.
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