Party Autonomy in European Private (and) International Law, vol. 1, a cura di Bettina Heiderhoff e Ilaria Queirolo, Aracne, 2015, vol. 1, pp. 308, ISBN: 9788854876958, Euro 20; vol. 2, a cura di Maria Elena De Maestri e Stefano Dominelli, Aracne , 2015, vol. 2, pp. 296, ISBN: 9788854876965, Euro 18.
[Dal sito dell’editore] – By bringing together PhD candidates from different EU Member States to attend four seminars of advanced learning in a Programme in European Private Law for Postgraduates (PEPP), the PEPP is playing an active role in moulding law practitioners and scholars with an international and comprehensive approach. This tome comprises contributions from PhD candidates who participated in the 2013-2014 PEPP Session (held in Münster, Wroclaw, Leuven and Imperia-Genoa). The works of the Authors focus on their own research topics, connected to contract law, international and EU commerce, private international law and the protection of human rights in the European Union.
Ulteriori informazioni, compresi gli indici dei due volumi, sono disponibili, rispettivamente, qui e qui.
La Corte d’Appello di Varsavia ha di recente sollecitato la Corte di Giustizia a chiarire in via pregiudiziale l’interpretazione del regolamento n. 2201/2003 concernente la competenza, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e di responsabilità genitoriale (Bruxelles II bis).
Il procedimento pregiudiziale, iscritto nel ruolo della Corte come causa C-294/15 (Edyta Mikołajczyk c. Marie Louise Czarnecka e Stefan Czarnecki), interessa in modo specifico l’applicabilità (e, se del caso, l’applicazione) del regolamento a un giudizio di annullamento del matrimonio promosso da un soggetto estraneo alla coppia dopo la morte di uno dei coniugi.
Benché l’avviso pubblicato nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea non fornisca molti dettagli in merito alle circostanze del giudizio principale, è plausibile che, nella specie, il ricorrente abbia chiesto l’annullamento del matrimonio invocando l’esistenza di legami di sangue fra i coniugi o lo stato non libero di uno di essi (ringrazio Michał Wojewoda dell’Università di Łódź per avermi fornito una breve illustrazione delle norme polacche in tema di annullamento del matrimonio).
In sostanza, il giudice del rinvio chiede alla Corte di Giustizia di precisare se il regolamento Bruxelles II bis — che ai sensi dell’art. 1, par. 1, lett. a), si applica “al divorzio, alla separazione personale e all’annullamento del matrimonio” — includa nella propria sfera applicativa anche la particolare ipotesi di annullamento ora descritta.
Per il caso in cui la risposta sia affermativa, il giudice a quo chiede di sapere se nelle cause di annullamento che siano state promosse, come nella specie, da un soggetto diverso da uno dei coniugi, sia possibile fare riferimento, per quanto riguarda la giurisdizione, ai criteri contemplati dall’art. 3, par. 1, lett. a), quinto e sesto trattino, del regolamento, incentrati sulla residenza abituale dell’attore.
Case-law on Rome II (the law applicable to non-contractual obligations) is only slowly picking up so almost anything coming out of the CJEU is met with excitement. Like Ergo Insurance (so far only the AG’s Opinion), Prüller-Frey concerns insurance contracts. In this case, direct action against an insurer, by the victim of an air traffic accident.
The victim sues in Austria, on the basis of Article 6 or, alternatively, 11 of the Brussels I Regulation (old: Regulation 44/2001). Applicability or not of the Montreal Convention (for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air) and the EU’s implementation of same, is less relevant for this posting. At stake was mostly Article 18 of the Rome II Regulation, which reads
The person having suffered damage may bring his or her claim directly against the insurer of the person liable to provide compensation if the law applicable to the non-contractual obligation or the law applicable to the insurance contract so provides.
The lex contractus is German law. This was so chosen by the insured, Norbert Brodnig, and the insurance company, Axa Versicherung AG. German law does not provide for such direct action. But Spanish law, the lex locus damni (which applies between Prüller-Frey and Brodnig), does. The insurance company calls upon the absence of the action in German law, to reject Prüller-Frey’s action. Szpunar AG and the CJEU itself simply point to the clear language of Article 18: this is not a conflict of laws rule that determines the law applicable between victim and insurer: the insurance company’s obligations will continue to be subject to the lex contractus. Article 18 is simply an alternative connecting factor for the very possibility of direct action against the insurer. Spanish law is the law applicable to the non-contractual obligation and if Spanish law allows for such direct action, then that is enough for there to be one.
Geert.
Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 6a ed., Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 944, ISBN 9780198744870, GBP 175.
[Dal sito dell’editore] This leading commentary on international commercial arbitration, now in its sixth edition, is an essential guide for arbitrators and lawyers worldwide. Based on the authors’ extensive experience as counsel and arbitrators, it provides an updated explanation of all elements of the law and practice of arbitration. This pack includes the hardback and an ebook version. This text provides an authoritative guide to the international arbitral process, from the drafting of the arbitration agreement to the enforcement of arbitral awards. The sixth edition has been updated to incorporate reference to the latest significant developments in the field such as the new LCIA, ICC and UNCITRAL Rules and new IBA Guidelines. There will also be an increased reference to international arbitral authority and practice from beyond Europe (China, India, and the US). Following the chronology of an arbitration, the book covers applicable laws, arbitration agreements, the establishment and powers of a tribunal, the conduct of proceedings and the role of domestic courts. In addition, it provides an in-depth examination of the award itself, and comments on the special considerations applying to arbitrations brought under investment treaties. It draws on examples of the rules and practice of arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International Arbitration, the American Arbitration Association, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
Maggiori informazioni a questo indirizzo.
Thank you for the team at Dechert to remind us of the potential that BITs may be used to pursue proactive, rather than just reactive environmental litigation. A word of explanation: Bilateral Investment Treaties, in particular their investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, are currently under a lot of pressure following the public outcry over the TTIP negotiations. Allowing private investors to sue countries that roll out regulation, using vague principles of protection of property, is seen by many as a form of corporate bullying.
Dechert’s briefing however reminds us firstly, specifically vis-a-vis stubborn air pollution in the Indonesia area, that States may carry responsibility in line with Trail Smelter’s nec utere tuo principle. The possibility for individuals (as opposed to neighbouring States) suing on that basis, is of course complicated by the mechanism of (absence of) direct effect of huge chunks of international environmental law. That is where investor-state can come in handily. Such as in Allard v Barbados at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Dechert’s summary of that case reads ‘the Canadian owner of an eco-tourist facility in Barbados is currently suing the Government of Barbados for an alleged breach of the full protection and security provision (among other provisions) in the Canada- Barbados bilateral investment treaty. Peter Allard argues in his claim that Barbados breached its treaty obligations by failing to enforce its domestic environmental laws, which he alleges led to the environment being spoilt and a loss of tourist revenues at his eco-resort’.
A timely reminder of the good BITs can do, just before I am to speak (again) tomorrow on TTIP and why EU citisens are so suspicious of it.
Geert.
A conference on Security Rights and the New European Insolvency Regulation will take place in Erice on 19 October 2015 at the Ettore Majorana Foundation and Centre for Scientific Culture.
The conference will consist of four sessions: The Regulation 848/2015 and the endorsed policy on security rights; The Regulation 848/2015 and its ex post impact on security rights (avoidance rules and moratorium); Regulation 848/2015, security rights and third states; Suggestions for a better regulation.
[From the poster of the conference] – This conference examines EU Regulation 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings and, in particular, focuses on its prescriptions regarding security rights in rem and those regulatory devices, such as set-off and reservation of title clause, which in actual fact perform the same function as security rights. EU Regulation 2015/848 reformed – or, to be more precise, recast – EC Regulation 1346/2000, and is a significant improvement on EC Regulation 1346/2000. Nevertheless, EU Regulation 2015/848 did not change the regulation on security rights and quasi-security rights (except for what is laid down by Art. 2.9). This choice of policy, which was endorsed by EU Regulation 2015/848, cannot be said to be satisfactory and is at the core of a lively debate. The conference, which is organized as part of the SREIR Project (http://sreir.eu/), aims to analyse the key points of this topic, to compare the most suitable strategies for a better regulation and, in short, to make an active and useful contribution to the debate.
The conference program is available here. Information regarding fees, accommodation and registration can be found here.
The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements enters into force today, 1 October 2015, for the European Union and Mexico.
Pursuant to Article 16, it shall apply to choice of court agreements concluded after its entry into force for the State of the chosen court, and shall not apply to proceedings instituted before its entry into force for the State of the court seised.
In essence, the purpose is the Convention — which applies to exclusive choice of court agreements concluded “in civil or commercial matters”, with the exclusion of consumer contracts, employment contracts and a few more matters — is to ensure the effectiveness of forum selection clauses relating to international commercial transactions, thereby creating a climate more favourable to trade and investment.
The Convention basically provides that the court designated by the parties under a choice of court agreement made in conformity with the Convention must in principle hear the case, whereas any court other than the chosen court must in principle decline jurisdiction. Judgments rendered by the chosen court must be recognised and enforced in all other Contracting States, except where recognition or enforcement is denied under one of the grounds enumerated by the Convention itself.
As regards the relationship with Regulation No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels Ia), the Convention provides, in Article 26(6), that “it shall not affect the application of the rules of a Regional Economic Integration Organisation that is a Party to this Convention”, ie the EU, (a) where none of the parties is resident in a Contracting State that is not a Member State of the EU; (b) as concerns the recognition or enforcement of judgments as between Member States of the EU.
In practice, the Convention will affect the application of the Brussels Ia Regulation if at least one of the parties is resident in a State bound by the Convention, and will prevail over the rules of jurisdiction in the Regulation except if both parties are EU residents or come from third states, not Contracting Parties to the Convention. As to the recognition and enforcement of judgments, the Regulation will apply where the court that rendered the judgment and the court in which recognition and enforcement is sought are both located in the EU.
The Explanatory Report by Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi may be found here. For a bibliography on the Convention, see here.
Con un decreto dell’11 marzo 2015, il Tribunale di Milano si è occupato dello scioglimento di un matrimonio contratto in Tunisia.
Nella specie, la moglie intendeva far valere l’ipotesi di cui all’art. 3, n. 2, lett. c), della legge 1° dicembre 1970 n. 898 sul divorzio, che prevede la possibilità di richiedere lo scioglimento o la cessazione degli effetti civili del matrimonio laddove “l’altro coniuge, cittadino straniero, ha ottenuto all’estero l’annullamento o lo scioglimento del matrimonio o ha contratto all’estero nuovo matrimonio”. Il marito, infatti, aveva già ottenuto dinanzi ad un tribunale tunisino lo scioglimento del matrimonio per volontà unilaterale, con affidamento dei due figli minori alla madre.
Il Tribunale di Milano rileva dapprima come la decisione resa dal giudice tunisino non sia stata contestata, non essendo stato promosso il procedimento di cui all’art. 30 del decreto legislativo n. 150/2011, richiamato all’art. 67, comma 1-bis, della legge 31 maggio 1995 n. 218, di riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato. Senonché, osserva il Tribunale, lo stesso art. 67 della legge n. 218/1995, al comma 3, prevede la possibilità di accertare d’ufficio ed incidentalmente la riconoscibilità di una decisione straniera “con efficacia limitata al giudizio”.
Il giudice milanese osserva innanzitutto, a questo riguardo, che se la decisione fosse efficace in Italia, le parti risulterebbero avere già acquistato lo stato libero (anche in assenza di trascrizione nei registri dello stato civile, che non ha efficacia costitutiva). Il ricorso sarebbe allora inammissibile per mancanza di interesse ad agire ai sensi dell’art. 100 del codice di procedura civile.
Solo nel caso in cui la pronuncia fosse in contrasto con l’ordine pubblico italiano, il giudice dovrebbe applicare l’art. 3, n. 2, lett. c), della legge n. 898/1970, da interpretarsi peraltro nel senso di “ammettere il divorzio c.d. diretto nei casi in cui il coniuge cittadino italiano abbia ‘subito’ la scelta unilaterale del coniuge straniero di liberarsi dal vincolo matrimoniale ricorrendo al giudice straniero ed applicando la legge quivi vigente (da taluni definito in termini di ‘fenomeno delle c.d. vedove bianche’)”.
Di contro, laddove il coniuge italiano abbia partecipato al giudizio straniero (vale a dire esercitando i diritti e beneficiando delle garanzie previste dalla normativa straniera), il ricorso di cui all’art. 3, n. 2, lett. c), della legge n. 898/1970 dovrebbe considerarsi inammissibile.
Poiché nel caso di specie la moglie era stata effettivamente coinvolta nel procedimento dinanzi al tribunale tunisino (dalla sentenza si evince come la notifica dell’atto di citazione si fosse correttamente perfezionata e la donna avesse nominato un avvocato di fiducia), il Tribunale di Milano, ex officio, solleva la questione relativa all’inammissibilità della domanda ai sensi dell’art. 101 del codice di procedura civile, assegnando ai coniugi un termine per presentare memoria difensive e fissando una nuova udienza.
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