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Views and News in Private International Law
Updated: 2 hours 36 min ago

Out now: Talia Einhorn, Private International Law in Israel, 3rd edition

Tue, 01/24/2023 - 08:44

It is my pleasure to recommend to the global CoL community a real treat: Talia Einhorn’s “Private International Law in Israel”, an analysis of the country’s private international law of no less than almost 900 pages, now in its third edition. This monograph forms part of and is a reprint from the International Encyclopedia of Laws/Private International Law amongst a large series of country reports on which the “General Section” by Bea Verschraegen, the editor of the entire series, builds.

According to the Encyclopedia’s structure for country reports, the text covers all conceivable aspects of a national private international law, from “General Principles (Choice of Law Techniques)” in Part I, including the sources of PIL, the technical and conceptual elements of choice of law rules (“determination of the applicable law”) as well as “basic terms”. Part II unfolds a fascinating tour d’horizon through the “Rules of Choice of Law” on persons, obligations, property law, intangible property rights, company law, corporate insolvency and personal bankruptcy, family law and succession law. Part III covers all matters of international civil procedure, including jurisdictional immunities, international jurisdiction, procedure in international litigation, recognition and enforcement and finally international arbitration.

The analyses offered seem to be extremely thorough and precise, including in-depth evaluations of key judgments, which enables readers to grasp quickly core concepts and issues beyond basic information and the mere black letter of the rules. For example, Chapter 4 of Part III on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments explains that Israel is a State Party to only one rather specific convention, the UN Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance 1956 (apparently operated without any implementing legislation, see para. 2434). Further, Israel entertains four bilateral treaties (with Austria, Germany, Spain and the UK) that provide generally for recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. These four treaties, however, seem to differ substantially from each other and from the domestic statutory regime under the Israeli Foreign Judgments Enforcement Law (“FJEL”), see para. 2436. These differences are spelled out down to the level of decisions of first instance courts of the respective foreign State Party, see e.g. footnote 1927 with reference to recent jurisprudence (of the German Federal Court of Justice and) of the local court of Wiesbaden on Article 8(2) of the bilateral treaty with Germany stipulating, according to these courts’ interpretation, a far-reaching binding effect to the findings of the first court. This is contrasted with case law of the Israeli Supreme Court rejecting recognition and enforcement of a German judgment, due to the lack of a proper implementation of the Treaty in Israeli domestic law, see paras. 2437 et seq. – a state of things criticized by the author who also offers an alternative interpretation of the legal constellation that would have well allowed recognition and enforcement under the Treaty, see para. 2440. Additionally, interpretation of the domestic statutory regime in light of treaty obligations of the State of Israel, irrespective of a necessity of any specific implementation measures, is suggested, para. 2447. On the level of the domestic regime, the FJEL, in § 3 (1), prescribes as one out of a number of cumulative conditions for enforcement that “the judgment was given in a state, the courts of which were, according to its laws, competent to give it”, see para. 2520. Indeed, “the first condition is puzzling”, para. 2526, but by no means unique and does even appear in at least one international convention (see e.g. Matthias Weller, RdC 423 [2022], at para. 251, on Art. 14(1) of the CEMAC 2004 Agreement and on comparable national rules). At the same time, and indeed, controlling the jurisdiction of the first court according to its own law appears hardly justifiable, all the more, as there is no control under § 3 FJEL of the international jurisdiction according to the law of the requested court / State, except perhaps in extreme cases under the general public policy control in § 3 (3) FJEL. Additionally, on the level of domestic law, English common law seems to play a role, see paras. 2603, but the relation to the statutory regime seems to pose a question of normative hierarchy, see para. 2513, where Einhorn proposes that the avenue via common law should only be available as a residual means. In light of this admirably clear and precise assessment, one might wonder whether Israel should considering participating in the HCCH 2019 Judgments Convention and the reader would certainly be interested in hearing the author’s learned view on this. The instrument is not listed in the table of international treaties dealt with in the text, see pp. 821 et seq., nor is the HCCH 2005 Choice of Court Agreements Convention. Of course, these instruments do not (yet?) form part of the Israeli legal system, but again, the author’s position whether they should would be of interest.

As this very brief look into one small bit of Einhorn’s monograph shows, this is the very best you can expect from the outsider’s and a PIL comparative perspective, probably as well from the insider’s perspective if there is an interest in connecting the own with the other. Admirable!

“Law in the Age of Modern Technologies”, 10 February 2023, University of Milan (hybrid)

Mon, 01/23/2023 - 17:08

The University of Milan, on behalf of the DIGinLaw consortium (consisting of partners: the Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, the University of Aberdeen, and the University of Zagreb – University Computing Centre (SRCE)), is organising an international conference on Law in the Age of Modern Technologies, taking place in Milan on 10 February 2023.

Digitalization strongly affects society, science, and the transfer of knowledge. While taking advantage of modern technologies, the DIGinLaw Project aims to raise awareness of digital demands in higher education and research in law and fosters the creation of digital literacy and digital competence that is needed in the law labour market. The Project aims to create an open and inclusive society of legal knowledge and to open access to the scientific areas dealing with the effects of digitalization on law and legal education.

The Conference is the culmination of scientific research on the digitalization of legal education and the digitalization of law. It provides a venue for the presentation and discussion of scientific research focusing on such and related themes. The full program of the event is available here.

The conference will be held in a hybrid format. Participation is free of charge, but registration is required.

Return of the anti-suit injunction: parallel European proceedings and English forum selection clauses

Mon, 01/23/2023 - 14:57

Written by Kiara van Hout. Kiara graduated from the Law Tripos at the University of Cambridge in 2021 (St John’s College). She is currently an Associate to a Judge at the Supreme Court of Victoria.

 

In two recent English cases, the High Court has granted injunctive relief to restrain European proceedings in breach of English forum selection clauses. This article compares the position on anti-suit injunctive relief under the Brussels I Regulation Recast and the English common law rules, and the operation of the latter in a post-Brexit landscape. It considers whether anti-suit injunctions to protect forum selection clauses will become the new norm, and suggests that there is Supreme Court authority militating against the grant of such injunctive relief as a matter of course. Finally, it speculates as to the European response to this new English practice. In particular, it questions whether the nascent European caselaw on anti anti-suit injunctions foreshadows novel forms of order designed to protect European proceedings.

 

Anti-suit injunctions under the Brussels I Regulation Recast

In proceedings commenced in the English courts before 1 January 2021, it is not possible to obtain an anti-suit injunction to restrain proceedings in other EU Member States.

In Case 159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565, the Full Court of the European Court of Justice found that it was inconsistent with the Brussels I Regulation to issue an anti-suit injunction to restrain proceedings in another Convention country. That is so even where that party is acting in bad faith in order to frustrate existing proceedings. The Court stated that the Brussels I Regulation enacted a compulsory system of jurisdiction based on mutual trust of Contracting States in one another’s legal systems and judicial institutions:

It is inherent in that principle of mutual trust that, within the scope of the Convention, the rules on jurisdiction that it lays down, which are common to all the courts of the Contracting States, may be interpreted and applied with the same authority by each of them… Any injunction prohibiting a claimant from bringing such an action must be seen as constituting interference with the jurisdiction of the foreign court which, as such, is incompatible with the system of the Convention.

In the subsequent Case 185/07 Allianz v West Tankers [2009] ECR I-00663, the question arose as to whether it was inconsistent with the Brussels I Regulation to issue an anti-suit injunction to restrain proceedings in another Convention country on the basis that such proceedings would be contrary to an English arbitration agreement. In its decision, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice found that notwithstanding that Article 1(2)(d) excludes arbitration from the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, an anti-suit injunction may have consequences which undermine the effectiveness of that regime. An anti-suit injunction operates to prevent the court of another Contracting State from exercising the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Brussels I Regulation, including its exclusive jurisdiction to determine the very applicability of that regime to the dispute. The decision in Allianz v West Tankers represents an extension of Turner v Grovit insofar as it prohibits the issue of anti-suit injunctions in support of English arbitration as well as jurisdiction agreements.

 

Anti-suit injunctions under the common law rules

The Brussels I Regulation Recast rules govern proceedings commenced in the English courts before 1 January 2021. The regime governing jurisdiction in proceedings commenced after 1 January 2021 comprises the Hague Choice of Court Convention and, more pertinently for present purposes, the common law rules.

At common law, a more flexible approach to parallel proceedings is taken. Anti-suit injunctions may be deployed to ensure the dispute is heard in only one venue. Section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 empowers courts to grant an anti-suit injunction where it appears just and convenient to do so. The ordinary justification for injunctive relief is protection of the private rights of the applicant by preventing a breach of contract. Where parties have agreed to a forum selection clause, either in the form of a jurisdiction or arbitration agreement, anti-suit injunctions may be available to prevent a breach of contract.

In two recent cases, the English courts have granted injunctive relief to restrain European proceedings in breach of English forum selection clauses. These cases demonstrate clearly the change of position as compared with Allianz v West Tankers and Turner v Grovit, respectively.

Proceedings in violation of English arbitration agreement

In QBE Europe SA/NV v Generali España de Seguros Y Reaseguros [2022] EWHC 2062 (Comm), a yacht allegedly caused damage to an underwater power cable which resulted in hydrocarbon pollution. The claimant had issued a liability insurance policy to the owners in respect of the yacht. That policy contained a multi-faceted dispute resolution and choice of law clause, which provided inter alia that any dispute arising between the insurer and the assured was to be referred to arbitration in London.

The defendant had issued a property damage and civil liability insurance policy with the owners of the underwater power cable. The defendant brought a direct claim against the claimant in the Spanish courts under a Spanish statute. The claimant responded by issuing proceedings in England, and applied for an anti-suit injunction in respect of the Spanish proceedings brought by the defendant.

The court found that the claims advanced by the defendant in the Spanish proceedings were contractual in nature, as the Spanish statute provided the defendant with a right to directly enforce the contractual promise of indemnity created by the insurance contract. The matter therefore concerned a so-called ‘quasi-contractual’ anti-suit injunction application, as the defendant was not a party to the contractual choice of jurisdiction in issue. Nevertheless, the right which the defendant purported to assert before the Spanish court arose from an obligation under a contract (the claimant’s liability insurance policy) to which the arbitration agreement is ancillary, such that the obligation sued upon is said to be ‘conditioned’ by the arbitration agreement.

That the defendant was seeking to advance contractual claims without respecting the arbitration agreement ancillary to that contract provided grounds for granting an anti-suit injunction. As such, the position under English conflict of laws rules is that the court will ordinarily exercise its discretion to restrain proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement unless the defendant can show strong reasons to refuse the relief (see Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64). The defendant advanced several arguments, which were dismissed as failing to amount to strong reasons against the grant of relief. Therefore, the court found that it was appropriate to grant the claimant an anti-suit injunction restraining Spanish proceedings brought by the defendants.

 

Proceedings in violation of exclusive English jurisdiction agreement

In Ebury Partners Belgium SA/NV v Technical Touch BV [2022] EWHC 2927 (Comm), the defendants were interested in receiving foreign exchange currency services from the claimant company. The claimant submitted that the parties had entered into two agreements in early 2021.

The first agreement was a relationship agreement entered into by the second defendant Mr Berthels as director of the first defendant Technical Touch BV. Mr Berthels completed an online application form for currency services, agreeing to the claimant’s terms and conditions. These terms and conditions were available for download and accessible via hyperlink to a PDF document, though in the event Mr Berthels did not access the terms and conditions by either method. The terms and conditions included an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour of the English courts.

The second agreement was a personal guarantee and indemnity given by Mr Berthels in respect of the defendant company’s obligations to the claimant. This guarantee also included an exclusive English jurisdiction agreement.

When a dispute arose in April 2021 as to the first defendant’s failure to pay a margin call made by the claimant under the terms of the relationship agreement, the defendants initiated proceedings in Belgium seeking negative declaratory relief and challenging the validity of the two agreements under Belgian law. The claimant responded by issuing proceedings in England, and applied for an interim anti-suit injunction in respect of Belgian proceedings brought by the defendants. The claimant submitted that the Belgian proceedings were in breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements in favour of the English court.

An issue arose as to whether there was a high degree of probability that the English jurisdiction agreement was incorporated into the relationship agreement, and which law governed the issue of incorporation. It is not within the scope of this article to consider this choice of law issue in depth. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the court decided that it was not unreasonable to apply English law to the issue of incorporation, and that on this basis, there was a high degree of probability that the clause was incorporated into the relationship agreement.

As in QBE Europe, the court approached the discretion to award injunctive relief on the basis that the court will ordinarily restrain proceedings brought in breach of a jurisdiction agreement unless the defendant can show strong reasons to refuse the relief. No sufficiently strong reasons were shown. Therefore, the court found that it was appropriate to grant the claimant an anti-suit injunction restraining the Belgian proceedings.

Anti-suit injunctions to protect forum selection clauses: the new norm?

It is plainly important to the status of London as a litigation hub in Europe that English forum selection clauses maintain their security and enforceability. The Brussels I Regulation Recast provided one means of managing parallel proceedings contrived to circumvent such clauses. Absent the framework provided by the Brussels I Regulation Recast; the English courts appear to be employing anti-suit injunctions as an alternative means of protecting English forum selection clauses. This ensures that litigants are still equipped to resist parallel proceedings brought to ‘torpedo’ English proceedings.

Proceedings in which there is an exclusive English forum selection clause represent among the most compelling circumstances in which the court might grant an anti-suit injunction. In those circumstances, the court is likely to grant injunctive relief to protect the substantive contractual rights of the applicant. The presence of an exclusive forum selection clause is a powerful ground for relief which tends to overcome arguments as to comity and respect for foreign courts. As noted in the joint judgment of Lord Hamblen and Lord Leggatt (with whom Lord Kerr agreed) in Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi A.S. v OOO Insurance Company Chubb [2020] UKSC 38, citing Millett LJ in Aggeliki Charis Cia Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA (The Angelic Grace) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87, a foreign court is unlikely to be offended by the grant of an injunction to restrain a party from invoking a jurisdiction which he had promised not to invoke and which it was its own duty to decline.

Nevertheless, it is not to be assumed that injunctive relief will always be granted to enforce English forum selection clauses. As Lord Mance (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption and Lord Toulson agreed) stated in Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] UKSC 35, at paragraph [61]:

In some cases where foreign proceedings are brought in breach of an arbitration clause or exclusive choice of court agreement, the appropriate course will be to leave it to the foreign court to recognise and enforce the parties’ agreement on forum. But in the present case the foreign court has refused to do so, and done this on a basis which the English courts are not bound to recognise and on grounds which are unsustainable under English law which is accepted to govern the arbitration agreement. In these circumstances, there was every reason for the English courts to intervene to protect the prima facie right of AESUK to enforce the negative aspect of its arbitration agreement with JSC.

It is too early to say whether anti-suit injunctions will be granted as a matter of course in circumstances such as those in QBE Europe and Ebury Partners. The judgment of Lord Mance indicates that there is a residual role for comity and respect for foreign courts even in cases of breach of a forum selection clause. The English court should not necessarily assume that its own view as to the validity, scope and interpretation of a forum selection clause is the only one. In some instances, it will be appropriate to allow a foreign court to come to its own conclusion, and consequently to refuse injunctive relief. It is clear, at least, that anti-suit injunctions have returned to the toolbox.

The European response: anti anti-suit injunctions?

It seems likely that English anti-suit injunctions will be met with resistance by European courts who find their proceedings obstructed by such orders. As a matter of theory, it is now possible for European courts to issue anti-suit injunctions to restrain English proceedings: the inapplicability of Allianz v West Tankers and Turner v Grovit vis-à-vis England cuts both ways. However continental European legal systems have traditionally regarded anti-suit injunctions as being contrary to international law on the basis that they operate extraterritorially and impinge on the sovereignty of the State whose legal proceedings are restrained.

It is more plausible that European courts would deploy anti anti-suit injunctions to unwind offending English orders. Assuming that the grant of anti-suit injunctions becomes a regular practice of the English courts in these circumstances, this could provide the impetus for legal developments in this direction across the Channel. In recent years both French and German courts have issued orders of this kind in the context of patent violation. In a December 2019 judgment, the Higher Regional Court of Munich issued an anti anti-suit injunction to prevent a German company from making an application in US proceedings for an anti-suit injunction (see Continental v Nokia, No. 6 U 5042/19). In a March 2020 judgment, the Court of Appeal of Paris issued an anti anti-suit injunction ordering various companies of the Lenovo and Motorola groups to withdraw an application for an anti-suit injunction in US proceedings (see IPCom v Lenovo, No. RG 19/21426).

However, neither decision endorses the general availability of anti anti-suit injunctions outside of the specific circumstances in which relief was sought in those cases. It remains to be seen whether European courts will be willing to utilise anti anti-suit injunctions in circumstances wherein parties have agreed to English forum selection clauses. At this stage, it can only be said that there is a possibility of an undesirable tussle of anti-suit injunctions and anti anti-suit injunctions. This would expose litigants to increased litigation costs, wasted time and trouble, uncertainty as to which court will ultimately hear their case, and the spectre of coercive consequences in the event of non-compliance. Furthermore, a move towards relief of this kind would have a profound impact on the security of English jurisdiction and arbitration agreements. Developments in this area should be watched with interest.

Yegiazaryan v. Smagin, Civil RICO, and the Enforcement of Foreign Awards in the United States

Wed, 01/18/2023 - 15:45

Thanks to Alberto Pomari, JD Candidate at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, for his assistance with this post.

Two cases slated for Supreme Court’s 2024 term could boost the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the United States. On Friday January 13, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases of Yegiazaryan v. Smagin and CMB Monaco v. Smagin. Both present the question of when an injury is foreign or domestic for purposes of RICO civil applicability. Beyond this statutory issue, however, the Supreme Court’s decision will have consequences for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards too.

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) enables private individuals injured by a racketeering violation to bring a civil suit and recover treble damages if he was “injured in his business or property.” In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the federal presumption against extraterritoriality to limit RICO’s private right of action to only those injuries that are “domestic” in their nature. However, no definition or test was provided to draw a bright line between domestic and foreign injuries.

In Yegiazaryan v. Smagin, the defendant (Yegiazaryan) is a Russian businessman living in California. The plaintiff (Smagin) commenced arbitration proceedings against him in London and was awarded $84 million. In 2014, Smagin successfully filed to recognize and enforce the award against Yegiazaryan in the U.S. district court where Yegiazaryan now resides. In 2020, Smagin filed a RICO action against Yegiazaryan alleging that he and various associates attempted to conceal $198 million from Smagin, which inevitably “injured in his business or property.” Specifically, Smagin alleged that his U.S. judgment confirming this prior foreign arbitral award against Yegiazaryan is intangible property located in the United States, thus making any injury thereto eligible for a RICO civil claim even though he lives abroad.

As to the location of intangible property for purposes of RICO injuries, circuits have split. The Seventh Circuit adopted the residency test, according to which an injury to intangible property must occur in the place where the plaintiff has its residence. Accordingly, a foreign-resident plaintiff like Smagin always suffers foreign injuries to intangible property and cannot recover under RICO. The Third Circuit rejected the residency test in favor of a holistic, six-factor test, with particular emphasis on where the plaintiff suffers the effect of the injurious activity. The Ninth Circuit in the Smagin cases adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances test similar to the Third Circuit’s one, yet with a particular emphasis on the defendant’s conduct. Indeed, the court concluded that Smagin had pleaded a domestic injury because much of the defendant’s alleged misconduct took place in California and the U.S. judgment confirming the foreign award could be executed against the defendant only in California.

The case also has implications for the enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards in the United States. If a U.S. judgment recognizing a foreign judgment or confirming a foreign arbitral award are considered property in the United States, then RICO violations committed in the process of trying to avoid enforcement of the U.S. judgment may give rise to civil liability.

Ferrari, Rosenfeld & Kotuby, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Concise Guide to the New York Convention’s Uniform Regime

Tue, 01/17/2023 - 18:54

With my co-authors Professor Franco Ferrari and Friedrich Rosenfeld, I am pleased to announce the publication of my newest work, “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Concise Guide to the New York Convention’s Uniform Regime.” It is available for order here.

This incisive book is an indispensable guide to the New York Convention’s uniform regime on recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Framing the Convention as a uniform law instrument, the book analyses case law from major arbitration jurisdictions to explain its scope of application, the duty to recognize arbitral agreements and awards as well as their limitations, and the procedure and formal requirements for enforcing arbitral awards.

Combining insight from arbitration practice with perspectives from private international law, the book underlines the importance of the Convention’s foundation in a treaty of international law, arguing that this entails a requirement to interpret the key concepts it sets forth based on international law rules of interpretation. However, it also demonstrates where municipal laws are relevant and discusses the private international law principles through which these instances can be identified.

Addressing one of the core treaties of international arbitration, this will be crucial reading for legal practitioners and judges working in the field. It will also prove valuable to scholars and students of commercial and private international law, particularly those focused on cross-border disputes and arbitration.

Third Issue for Journal of Private International Law for 2022

Tue, 01/17/2023 - 12:19

The third issue for the Journal of Private International Law for 2022 was published today. It contains the following articles:

K Takahashi, “Law Applicable to Proprietary Issues of Crypto-Assets”

Crypto-assets (tokens on a distributed ledger network) can be handled much in the same way as tangible assets as they may be held without the involvement of intermediaries and traded on a peer-to-peer basis by virtue of the blockchain technology. Consequently, crypto-assets give rise to proprietary issues in the virtual world, as do tangible assets in the real world. This article will consider how the law applicable to the proprietary issues of crypto-assets should be determined. It will first examine some of the cases where restitution was sought of crypto-asset units and consider what issues arising in such contexts may be characterised as proprietary for the purpose of conflict of laws. Finding that the conventional connecting factors for proprietary issues are not suitable for crypto-assets, this article will consider whether party autonomy, generally rejected for proprietary issues, should be embraced as well as what the objective connecting factors should be. GV Calster, Lis Pendens and Third States: the Origin, DNA and Early Case-Law on Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ia Regulation and its “forum non conveniens-light” Rules” The core European Union rules on jurisdiction have only in recent years included a regime which allows a court in an EU Member State temporarily or definitively to halt its jurisdiction in favour of identical, or similar proceedings pending before a court outside the EU. This contribution maps the meaning and nature of those articles, their application in early case-law across Member States, and their impact among others on business and human rights litigation, pre and post Brexit. F Farrington, “A Return to the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens after Brexit and the Implications for Corporate Accountability” On 1 January 2021, the European Union’s uniform laws on jurisdiction in cross-border disputes ceased to have effect within the United Kingdom. Instead, the rules governing jurisdiction are now found within the Hague Convention 2005 where there is an exclusive choice of court agreement and revert to domestic law where there is not. Consequently, the doctrine of forum non conveniens applies to more jurisdictional issues. This article analyses the impact forum non conveniens may have on victims of human rights abuses linked to multinational enterprises and considers three possible alternatives to the forum non conveniens doctrine, including (i) the vexatious-and-oppressive test, (ii) the Australian clearly inappropriate forum test, and (iii) Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The author concludes that while the English courts are unlikely to depart from the forum non conveniens doctrine, legislative intervention may be needed to ensure England and Wales’ compliance with its commitment to continue to ensure access to remedies for those injured by the overseas activities of English and Welsh-domiciled MNEs as required by the United Nation’s non-binding General Principles on Business and Human Rights. A Kusumadara, “Jurisdiction of Courts Chosen in the Parties’ Choice of Court Agreements: An Unsettled Issue in Indonesian Private International Law and the way-out”

Indonesian civil procedure law recognises choice of court agreements made by contracting parties. However, Indonesian courts often do not recognise the jurisdiction of the courts chosen by the parties. That is because under Indonesian civil procedure codes, the principle of actor sequitur forum rei can prevail over the parties’ choice of court. In addition, since Indonesian law does not govern the jurisdiction of foreign courts, Indonesian courts continue to exercise jurisdiction over the parties’ disputes based on Indonesian civil procedure codes, although the parties have designated foreign courts in their choice of court agreements. This article suggests that Indonesia pass into law the Bill of Indonesian Private International Law that has provisions concerning international jurisdiction of foreign courts as well as Indonesian courts, and accede to the 2005 HCCH Choice of Court Agreements Convention. This article also suggests steps to be taken to protect Indonesia’s interests.

 

Mohammad Aljarallah, “The Proof of Foreign Law before Kuwaiti Courts: The way forward”

The Kuwaiti Parliament issued Law No. 5/1961 on the Relations of Foreign Elements in an effort to regulate the foreign laws in Kuwait. It neither gives a hint on the nature of foreign law, nor has it been amended to adopt modern legal theories in ascertaining foreign law in civil proceedings in the past 60 years. This study provides an overview of the nature of foreign laws before Kuwaiti courts, a subject that has scarcely been researched. It also provides a critical assessment of the law, as current laws and court practices lack clarity. Furthermore, they are overwhelmed by national tendencies and inconsistencies. The study suggests new methods that will increase trust and provide justice when ascertaining foreign law in civil proceedings. Further, it suggests amendments to present laws, interference of higher courts, utilisation of new tools, reactivation of treaties, and using the assistance of international organisations to ensure effective access and proper application of foreign laws. Finally, it aims to add certainty, predictability, and uniformity to Kuwaiti court practices.

 

CZ Qu, “Cross Border Assistance as a Restructuring Device for Hong Kong: The Case for its Retention”

An overwhelming majority of companies listed in Hong Kong are incorporated in Bermuda/Caribbean jurisdictions. When these firms falter, insolvency proceedings are often commenced in Hong Kong. The debtor who wishes to restructure its debts will need to have enforcement actions stayed. Hong Kong does not have a statutory moratorium structure for restructuring purposes. Between 2018 and 2021, Hong Kong’s Companies Court addressed this difficulty by granting cross-border assistance, in the form of, inter alia, a stay order, to the debtor’s offshore officeholders, whose appointment triggers a stay for restructuring purposes. The Court has recently decided to cease the use of this method. This paper assesses this decision by, inter alia, comparing the stay mechanism in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency. It concludes that it is possible, and desirable, to continue the use of the cross-border assistance method without jeopardising the position of the affected parties.

 

Z Chen, The Tango between the Brussels Ia Regulation and Rome I Regulation under the beat of directive 2008/122/EC on timeshare contracts towards consumer protection

Timeshare contracts are expressly protected as consumer contracts under Article 6(4)(c) Rome I. With the extended notion of timeshare in Directive 2008/122/EC, the question is whether timeshare-related contracts should be protected as consumer contracts. Additionally, unlike Article 6(4)(c) Rome I, Article 17 Brussels Ia does not explicitly include timeshare contracts into its material scope nor mention the concept of timeshare. It gives rise to the question whether, and if yes, how, timeshare contracts should be protected as consumer contracts under Brussels Ia. This article argues that both timeshare contracts and timeshare-related contracts should be protected as consumer contracts under EU private international law. To this end, Brussels Ia should establish a new provision, Article 17(4), which expressly includes timeshare contracts in its material scope, by referring to the timeshare notion in Directive 2008/122/EC in the same way as in Article 6(4)(c) Rome I.

 

Review Article

CSA Okoli, The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters in Asia

Many scholars in the field of private international law in Asia are taking commercial conflict of laws seriously in a bid to drive harmonisation and economic development in the region. The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is an important aspect of private international law, as it seeks to provide certainty and predictability in cross-border matters relating to civil and commercial law, or family law. There have been recent global initiatives such as The Hague 2019 Convention, and the Commonwealth Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments. Scholars writing on PIL in Asia are making their own initiatives in this area. Three recent edited books are worthy of attention because of their focus on the issue of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Asia. These three edited books fill a significant gap, especially in terms of the number of Asian legal systems surveyed, the depth of analysis of each of the Asian legal systems examined, and the non-binding Principles enunciated. The central focus of this article is to outline and provide some analysis on the key contributions of these books.

Open call for abstracts: European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2023

Mon, 01/16/2023 - 13:15

The editors of the European Yearbook of International Economic Law (EYIEL) welcome abstracts from scholars and practitioners at all stages of their career for the EYIEL 2023. This year’s focus section will be on European and International (Public) Procurement and Competition Law. Next to this, in Part II the EYIEL will consider Current Challenges, Developments and Events in European and International Economic Law.

For the Focus Section, abstracts may cover any topic relating to (public) procurement and competition law in the field of European and international economic law, though preference is given to topics focusing on the international perspective. We particularly welcome contributions addressing the following aspects:

  • the WTO (Internal) Procurement Regime, 
  • the UN Procurement Regime,
  • the EU Procurement Regime,
  • General International (Public) Procurement,
  • the EU Competition Law Regime,
  • the International Competition Law Regime.

For the General Section, abstracts shall address topics which are currently of relevance in the context of European and International Economic Law. Similarly, reviews of case-law or practices and developments in the context of international organisations are encouraged.

Abstracts should not exceed 500 words. They should be concise and clearly outline the significance of the proposed contribution. Abstracts together with a short bio note maybe submitted until 28 February 2023 via e-mail to eyiel@leuphana.de.

Successful applicants will be notified at the latest by 1 April 2023, that their proposal has been accepted. They are expected to send in their final contribution by 31 July 2023.

Final submissions will under go peer review prior to publication. Given that submissions are to be developed on the basis of the proposal, that review will focus on the development of the paper’s central argument.

Submissionsaddressingparticularregionalandinstitutionaldevelopmentsshould be analytical and not descriptive. Due to its character as a yearbook, the EYIEL will not publish articles which will lose their relevance quickly. Submissions should not exceed 12,000 words(including footnotes and references), though preference may be given to shorter submissions. They should include an abstract and a biographical note. Submissions need to be in conformity with the EYIEL style guidelines.

The editors of the EYIEL welcome informal enquiries about any other relevant topic in the field of international and European economic law. In case you have an idea or proposal, please submit your enquiry via e-mail to eyiel@leuphana.de.

New rules on service outside Australia for the Federal Court of Australia

Mon, 01/16/2023 - 07:18

The Federal Court Legislation Amendment Rules 2022 (Cth) (‘Amendment Rules’) came into force on 13 January 2023. Among other things, they amend the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (‘FCR’) by repealing division 10.4, which dealt with service outside Australia. The Amendment Rules replace the old division 10.4 with a new one, which brings the Federal Court’s approach to service outside Australia into alignment with all other Australian jurisdictions, except for Western Australia and the Northern Territory.[1]

The previous approach to service outside Australia in the Federal Court

Historically, Australia’s superior courts have not been uniform in their approach to service outside the jurisdiction and outside Australia. The Federal Court’s approach was somewhat unique. Unlike the position in some of the State Supreme Courts,[2] leave to serve outside Australia[3] was required before service (FCR r 10.43(2)). Nonetheless, if leave was not obtained beforehand, service could be confirmed after the fact if sufficiently explained (FCR r 10.43(6)–(7)).

Leave to serve turned on three conditions: the court had subject matter jurisdiction, the claim was of a kind mentioned in the rules, and the party had a prima facie case for any or all of the relief claimed: FCR r 10.43(4). Even if those elements were satisfied, the court may have refused leave to serve in exercise of a ‘residual discretion’: Tiger Yacht Management Ltd v Morris (2019) 268 FCR 548, [100].

The second element, that the claim is of a kind mentioned in the rules, directed attention to FCR r 10.42. That rule set out pigeonholes or connecting factors that are familiar grounds of direct jurisdiction. For example, service may be permitted for a proceeding based on a cause of action arising in Australia (item 1), or where the defendant has submitted to the jurisdiction (item 19).

Some of the connecting factors might be described as exorbitant. For example, service may have been permitted where the proceeding was ‘based on, or seeking the recovery of, damage suffered wholly or partly in Australia caused by a tortious act or omission (wherever occurring)’ (item 5). Reid Mortensen, Richard Garnett and Mary Keyes commented, ‘[i]n effect, [this ground of service] allows service outside Australia merely because of the plaintiff’s personal connection—usually be reason of residence—with the forum, despite the complete absence of any connection between the events or the defendant on the one hand, and the forum on the other’.[4]

Combined with Australian courts’ unique approach to forum non conveniens (see Puttick v Tenon Ltd (2008) 238 CLR 265), the FCR provided plenty of room for establishing personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants in matters with foreign elements, even where those matters had strong connections to foreign jurisdictions. That position continues under the new approach effected by the Amendment Rules in the amended FCR.

The new approach

The Amendment Rules provide in a note to the new div 10.4: ‘t]his Division contains rules that have been harmonised in accordance with the advice of the Council of Chief Justices’ Rules Harmonisation Committee’. Those rules have been in force in New South Wales and other Australian jurisdictions for a some years. When the rules changed in New South Wales in late 2016, Vivienne Bath and I explained the significance for that State: Michael Douglas and Vivienne Bath, ‘A New Approach to Service Outside the Jurisdiction and Outside Australia under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules’ (2017) 44(2) Australian Bar Review 160.

As regards the Federal Court, considering the previous approach, some of the notable changes include the following.

First, in most cases, leave is not required before service, provided that the case comes within the scope of (new) defined grounds of direct jurisdiction: FCR r 10.42.

Second, the grounds of direct jurisdiction have changed: FCR r 10.42. Many of the changes seemingly involve a simple a re-wording or a re-structure rather than anything radical, although I am sure that the case law will tease out differences of substance in coming months.

One of the new grounds is worth highlighting. The new FCR r 10.42(j) provides:

(j)  if the proceeding arises under a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, and:

(i)  any act or omission to which the proceeding relates was done or occurred in Australia; or

(ii)  any loss or damage to which the proceeding relates was sustained in Australia; or

(iii)  the law applies expressly or by implication to an act or omission that was done or occurred outside Australia in the circumstances alleged; or

(iv)  the law expressly or by implication confers jurisdiction on the Court over persons outside Australia (in which case any requirements of the law relating to service must be complied with);

FCR r 10.42(j)(iii) could provide a basis for jurisdiction over subject matter with very limited connection to Australia, provided an Australian legislature has sufficiently extended the territorial operation of a statute. This pigeonhole could give rise to some more interesting questions about the proper approach to identification of the applicable law where forum statutes are involved in the Australian context.[5]

Third, even if the proceeding does not come within one of the grounds of direct jurisdiction, service outside Australia may still be permitted with leave: FCR r 10.43. Leave requires the Court to be satisfied that the proceeding has a real and substantial connection with Australia, Australia is an appropriate forum for the proceeding, and in all the circumstances the Court should exercise jurisdiction: FCR r 10.43(4)(a)–(c).

Fourth, once a person is served outside Australia, that person may apply to stay or dismiss the proceeding, or set aside service: FCR r 10.43A(1). The Court may make an order to that effect if satisfied service of was not authorised by these Rules, Australia is an inappropriate forum for the proceeding, or the claim has insufficient prospects of success to warrant putting the person served outside Australia to the time, expense and trouble of defending it: FCR r 10.43A(2)(a)–(c). This mechanism is introduced with the title, ‘Court’s discretion whether to assume jurisdiction’.

The second ground, that Australia is an inappropriate forum, turns on application of the ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test of the Australian forum non conveniens doctrine: Chandrasekaran v Navaratnem [2022] NSWSC 346, [5]–[8]; Sapphire Group Pty Ltd v Luxotico HK Ltd [2021] NSWSC 589, [77]–[80]; Studorp Ltd v Robinson [2012] NSWCA 382, [5], [62].

Fifth, if service on a person outside Australia in accordance with the new provisions was not successful, the party may apply to serve the person substituting another method of service: FCR r 10.49(a). This may prove particularly useful for applicants chasing rogues who have absconded overseas. It might allow for service on a person outside Australia by email or even social media, contrary to historical practice: see  Yemini v Twitter International Company [2022] FCA 318, [5].

Comment

I expect that the Amendment Rules will be welcomed by litigators who frequent the Federal Court of Australia. Doing away with the need to seek leave in advance will increase efficiency and save some costs. Lawyers on the east and south coasts may appreciate not having to be across substantive differences as regards long-arm jurisdiction between the Federal Court and State Supreme Courts. (Those in glorious Western Australia continue to be in a different / superior position.)

Private international law scholars may be less enthusiastic. Writing on the 2016 equivalent reforms in New South Wales, Andrew Dickinson lamented the tenuous connection that could justify long-arm jurisdiction under the amended Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). Among other things, he noted that the ‘service without leave’ approach means that considerations of forum non conveniens might only arise if an application is brought by a person served contesting jurisdiction (under the equivalent of the new FCR r 10.43A(1)), costing them time and cost with respect to a matter with minimal connection to the forum.[6] That would be a fair objection to the new position in the Federal Court. I would argue, however, that the Federal Court’s new approach to long-arm service is a sensible innovation to better equip the Court to deal with the realities of modern commercial life (see Abela v Baadarani [2013] 1 WLR 2043, [53]). Australian courts are increasingly called on to deal with matters with a foreign element—their rules should adapt accordingly.

One of the more significant impacts of the Amendment Rules will concern a case that is currently before the High Court of Australia: Facebook Inc v Australian Information Commissioner & Anor (Case S 137/2022). Jeanne Huang and I previously blogged other decisions that have ultimately led to this appeal. Among other things, the American company behind Facebook (now Meta Platforms Inc) is challenging its service outside Australia in a proceeding brought by Australia’s privacy regulator in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal. The rules on which the appeal depends are no longer in force. If the High Court’s previous grant of special leave to appeal is maintained, the forthcoming decision will be a new leading authority on long-arm jurisdiction in Australia.

Dr Michael Douglas is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Western Australia and a Consultant at Bennett, a litigation firm in Western Australia

 

[1] Civil Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) div 6.8.9; Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) div 10; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) pt 4 div 2; Supreme Court (General Civil Proceedings) Rules 2015 (Vic) O 7 pt 1; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) pt 7 div 1; Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) pt 11, sch 6..

[2] Leave to serve is still required in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. See Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) Order 10. See further M Davies, AS Bell, PLG Brereton and M Douglas, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 20th ed, 2020) ch 3.

[3] Except with respect to service in New Zealand. See Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth).

[4] Reid Mortensen, Richard Garnett and Mary Keyes, Private International Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2019) 63–4.

[5] See Michael Douglas, ‘Does Choice of Law Matter?’ (2023) Australian International Law Journal (forthcoming).

[6] Andrew Dickinson, ‘In Absentia: The Evolution and Reform of Australian Rules of Adjudicatory Jurisdiction’ in Michael Douglas, Vivienne Bath, Mary Keyes and Andrew Dickinson (eds), Commercial Issues in Private International Law (Hart, 2019) 13, 42.

Dutch Journal of PIL (NIPR) – issue 2022/4

Sun, 01/15/2023 - 17:01

The latest issue of the Dutch Journal on Private International Law (NIPR) has been published.

Editorial

M. Zilinsky / p. 629-630

 

Article

E.N. Frohn & I. Sumner, Protecting vulnerable adults across borders: where do we stand? / p. 631-649

Abstract

The first meeting of the Special Commission to review the practical operation of the 2000 Hague Convention took place from 9-11 November 2022, after writing this publication. In preparation for this meeting, a questionnaire was send to the Member States of the Conference. One of the questions addressed to the non contracting states of the 2000 Convention was of that state is considering joining the 2000 Convention. The Netherlands replied that there is no urgent need to become a contracting party, pointing out that the rules of the treaty are applied in practice.

This article concerns the Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults in relation to the Dutch standard practice of anticipating application of this Convention. Furthermore, this article will provide information on the European view regarding the international protection of vulnerable adults.

 

Case note

K.J. Krzeminski, Actio iudicati onder de Brussel I-bis Vo: een open deur of een geopend ‘achterdeurtje’? HvJ EU 7 april 2022, ECLI:EU:C:2022:264, NIPR 2022, 288 (J/H Limited) / p. 650-659

Abstract

In J v. H Limited, the CJEU has held that a decision rendered by an EU Member State court on the basis of a third country judgment (actio iudicati) may, under certain circumstances, qualify as a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Article 2(a) Brussel I-bis Regulation, thereby opening the door to EU-wide recognition and enforcement. This article explores the implications of the decision for cross-border enforcement, in particular of judgments rendered in Dutch proceedings on the basis of Article 431(2) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure.

Opinion of AG Emiliou on stay of enforcement of final return order in the case C-638/22 PPU

Fri, 01/13/2023 - 13:56

In the case Rzecznik Praw Dziecka and Others, C-638/22 PPU, a Polish court asks the Court of Justice in essence whether, in accordance with the Brussels II Regulation and The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, a Member State may provide for the possibility of an appeal in cassation (in practice: a third judicial instance) involving a stay of enforcement of a final return order on a simple application by one of the public entities entitled to lodge such an appeal.

AG Emiliou states from the outset that this question calls for a negative answer. His Opinion explains why this is the case.

A summary of the facts of the case reported here case has been already posted online by Marta Requejo Isidro so I am happy to refer to her contribution.

The urgency of the matter has compelled the Court to submit the case, at the request for the referring court, to the urgent preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.

I might add that the provision of national law that made the aforementioned stay of enforcement possible entered into force on 24 June 2022 and the request for a preliminary ruling has been brought before the Court of Justice already on 13 October 2022.

Concerning the preliminary question itself, in his Opinion, AG Emiliou recognizes that the 1980 Hague Convention and the Brussels II bis Regulation do not unify the procedural rules applicable to return applications based on that Convention. Those issues are left to the procedural law of the Member State where a request for a return order is made (point 52).

Nevertheless, the competence of the Member States has its limits. For AG Emiliou, those limits are not respected by the Polish provision in question.

Advocate General argues that by adopting the provision in question, the Polish legislator has exceeded the limits of its competence: he has rendered the return proceedings ineffective. Furthermore, in doing so, the legislator has also limited the fundamental right to respect for family life and the fundamental right to an effective remedy of the parent requesting the return, despite there being no compelling justification for such limitation and the negative consequences it entails (point 54).

All those aspects are addressed in a detailed manner in the Opinion, so there is still a lot to unpack.

The Opinion is available here (so far only in French).

Draft UNIDROIT Principles on Digital Assets and Private Law – Public Consultation

Thu, 01/12/2023 - 17:27

As part of the UNIDROIT Project on Digital Assets and Private Law, UNIDROIT has launched a Public Consultation to solicit comments and feedback on a set of Draft Principles and Commentary which have been prepared by its Working Group over the course of 7 sessions between 2020-2022. These Principles have been drafted to provide guidance to legislators, judges, practitioners, and the industry involved in the digital asset economy with regard to issues of private law. This includes issues regarding the definition of a digital asset, the importance of control, matters related to transfer of digital assets, custody relationships, conflicts of law, secured transactions, enforcement, and insolvency. The text contains a detailed introduction which explains what the Principles seek to do. UNIDROIT now looks for comments. All the relevant information can be found on this page. All comments should be provided using this online form. The Secretariat is seeking wide distribution of the consultation.

One Private International Law Article published in the First Issue of the International and Comparative Law Quarterly for 2023

Wed, 01/11/2023 - 19:42

One recent article on private international law was published today in International and Comparative Law Quarterly:

A Chong, “Characterisation and Choice of Law for Knowing Receipt”

Knowing receipt requires the satisfaction of disparate elements under English domestic law. Its characterisation under domestic law is also unsettled. These in turn affect the issues of characterisation and choice of law at the private international law level, as knowing receipt sits at the intersection of the laws of equity, restitution, wrongs and property. This article argues that under the common law knowing receipt ought to be considered as sui generis for choice of law purposes and governed by the law of closest connection to the claim. Where the Rome II Regulation applies, knowing receipt fits better within the tort rather than unjust enrichment category and the escape clause in Article 4(3) of the Regulation ought to apply.

 

 

Conference on PIL Aspects of the Digital Market Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA)

Wed, 01/11/2023 - 00:45

On Friday, January 20, 2023, the University of Strasbourg (France) will host a conference on the PIL aspects of the Digital Market Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA), organized by Etienne Farnoux, Nicolas Gillet, Kansu Okyay and Delphine Porcheron.

The conference is structured in two parts. The first will be dedicated to general presentation of the new regulations. The second will address specific topics in private international law.

Full Programme:

14h00 : Propos Introductif
Delphine Porcheron, Maître de conférences à l’Université de Strasbourg – CDPF
et Etienne Farnoux, Professeur à l’Université de Strasbourg – DRES

1re session – Présentation générale des règlements et étude du conflit de lois
Présidence : Delphine Porcheron, Maître de conférences à l’Université de Strasbourg – CDPF

14h10 : Présentation du règlement DMA
Frédérique Berrod, Professeure à Sciences Po Strasbourg – CEIE

14h30 : Présentation du règlement DSA
Stéphanie Carre, Maître de conférences HDR à l’Université de Strasbourg – CEIPI

14h50 : Scope of the regulations and conflicts of laws
Tobias Lutzi, Professeur à l’Université de Augsburg

15h10 : Questions et échange avec la salle

15h30 : Pause

2e session – Les règlements et le contentieux
Présidence : Etienne Farnoux, Professeur à l’Université de Strasbourg – DRES

16h00 : Le contentieux devant les juridictions étatiques
Yves El Hage, Maître de conférences à l’Université Lyon 3 – CREDIP

16h20 : Les modes extrajudiciaires de règlement des litiges
Nurten Kansu Okyay, Maître de conférences contractuelle à l’Université de Strasbourg – CEIE

16h50 : Conclusions
Delphine Porcheron, Maître de conférences à l’Université de Strasbourg – CDPF
Etienne Farnoux, Professeur à l’Université de Strasbourg – DRES

17h00 : Clôture

The conference will be held both in site and online. The full program and details about the location and registration can be found here.

Conference on the evaluation of the European Succession Regulation, 20 January 2023

Thu, 01/05/2023 - 11:31

Colleagues at the University of Heidelberg are organising this conference on 20 Januari 2023 at the

Auditorium of the Neue Universität at Heidelberg University, Universitätsplatz 1, 69117 Heidelberg.

Simultaneous interpretation will be provided in German, English and French.

Background:

The European Succession Regulation (Reg. 650/12) is due for evaluation ten years after its entry into force in August 2015 (Art. 82 Reg. 650/12).

The European Commission must submit its report on the application of the European Succession Regulation by 18 August 2025.

The upcoming evaluation gives an opportunity to reflect on various questions in light of the practical experience gained so far. Although the European Succession Regulation has proven successful in practice, there are many open questions which the ever-growing body of European Court of Justice case-law has not yet answered. These questions fuel a lively debate, both internationally and within the Member States. Hence, the outcome of the evaluation process is not predictable and the German view is only one of many that will contribute to the political decision-making process. Contrasting national views must be reconciled.

The first findings of a pan-European study on the experiences and expectations of legal practice with regard to Reg. 650/12 are now available. The study (MAPE Successions) is carried out by the Council of the Notariats of the European Union (C.N.U.E.) with the cooperation of the German Federal Chamber of Notaries (Bundesnotarkammer).

This study is an opportunity to map out the future objectives of the discussion on the evaluation of Reg. 650/12 from the perspective of academia and legal practice. At the same time, the conference provides a broad circle of legal practitioners with the opportunity to feed their experiences and insights into the reform process and discuss with renowned stakeholders.

Participation is free, but registration is required by 5 January 2023: notareg@igr.uni-heidelberg.de

 

Programme:

1 p.m. Welcome reception with lunchtime snack

2.15 p.m. Welcoming address and introduction

Prof. Dr. Christian Baldus, Heidelberg

 

2.30 p.m. The European Succession Regulation in the System of European Private International and Procedural Law: More “Brussels-Rome 0” after the Revision?

Prof. Dr. Martin Gebauer, Tübingen, Judge at the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart

 

3.15 p.m. Presentation of the MAPE Successions study: What do practitioners expect from the revision of the European Succession Regulation?

Notary Christian Schall, LL.M. (Edinburgh), Marktheidenfeld

 

4 p.m. Questions and discussion

4.15 p.m. Coffee break

 

4.45 p.m. The European Succession Regulation in German judicial practice

Dr. Carl-Friedrich Nordmeier, Judge at the Regional Court of Frankfurt

5.30 p.m. Panel discussion followed by questions from the audience: European experiences with the application of the European Succession Regulation

Presenter: Notary Dr. Thomas Raff, Ludwigshafen

France, Maître de conférences HDR Paul Klötgen, Nancy

Luxembourg, Notary Anja Holtz, Esch-sur-Alzette

Poland, Notary Tomasz Kot, Krakow, Vice President of the Polish Chamber of Notaries (Krajowa Rada Notarialna)

Portugal, Notary Prof. Sofia Henriques, Lisbon

Sweden, Attorney Ulf Bergquist, Stockholm

Spain, Notary Dr. Isidoro Calvo Vidal, A Coruña

7 p.m.Closing remarks

Notary Dr. Andrea Stutz, Konstanz, Vice President of the Chamber of Notaries of Baden-Württemberg

7.15 p.m. End of conference

The Discernable Move to Accept the Principle of Reciprocity by the Ministry of Justice of the United Arab Emirates

Thu, 01/05/2023 - 02:00

By: Naimeh Masumy (Swiss International School) naimehmasoomy@gmail.com

 

Following the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Lenkor Energy Trading DMCC v Puri[ 2021] EWCA Civ 770, in which the Court of Appeal upheld the enforcement of the Dubai court’s judgment concerning a dishonored cheque, the Ministry of Justice Issued a letter, urging the Dubai courts to enforce judgments of the English courts under the principle of reciprocity.

Background: The evolving nature of enforcing a foreign judgment in the UAE

Whether a foreign judgment can be enforced in the UAE depends on the jurisdiction that the judgment was issued and the nature of the respective judgment.  Generally, the enforcement of foreign judgments in the UAE is governed by statutory regimes.  Under UAE Law, the enforcement of foreign judgments is governed by Cabinet Decision No. 57/2018 on the Regulations of Federal Law No. 11/1992 on the Civil Procedure Code (as amended).

Article 85(2) of the Cabinet Resolution sets out a few requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments.  In particular, Article 85(2) of the Cabinet Resolution provides, amongst other things, the following conditions:

  • Finality: The Article explicitly mentions that the judgments need to be final and conclusive, as well as consistency with the law of that foreign state;
  • Inconsistency of judgments with domestic judgments: The second requirement is that the enforced judgment and/or order does not conflict with a judgment previously issued by the UAE Courts;
  • No violation of public policy or morality: Additional common requirement stipulated under Article 85 (2) is that the foreign judgment should not involve anything that potentially violates public order or morality.

Additionally, the UAE is a party to a number of treaties facilitating the reciprocal enforcement of judgments.  The most relevant are the GCC Convention for the Execution of Judgments, Delegations and Judicial Notifications 1996 ( GCC Convention). The UAE has also entered into bilateral treaties for the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, including treaties with India, China, and France.  However, in the absence of a treaty between the UAE and England for the mutual recognition of civil judgments, the Dubai Courts of Cassations demonstrated proclivities so far to decline to enforce a civil judgment from English Courts.  A cogent example is the Ruling of No. 269 of 2006, wherein the UAE Court of Cassation refused to enforce a civil judgment from English Courts.  Similarly, the English Courts were reluctant to enforce UAE Court Judgments.

However, there has been a discernable shift in the existing legal framework of the UAE, particularly in relation to the foreign judgments issued in the common law jurisdictions.  As discussed, the enforcement of foreign judgments in the UAE are only governed by the statutory regime and the bilateral agreement; thus the common law principles such as reciprocity did not historically play a vital role in the enforcement of foreign judgment.  However, the recent decision of the English High Court propelled a shift in the legal approaches adopted by the UAE domestic courts.  The decision of the Lenkor Energy Trading DMCC v Puri [ 2021] EWCA Civ 770 reinforced the UAE Ministry of Justice to issue a Directive, confirming that in the absence of a treaty for mutual recognition of judgments, the Lenkor decision has established the principle of reciprocity required for enforcement of an English Court judgment in the UAE.

Implications of the Directive

This directive can be regarded as a welcome development in the enforcement of English Court judgments in the UAE.  Further, the Directive will potentially enhance the confidence of parties that seek to resolve their disputes in an English Court where the counterparty might be located in the UAE or has some tangible asset in the UAE.  Finally, the Directive facilitates the enforcement of arbitration awards rendered by foreign jurisdictions in the UAE.

Virtual Workshop on January: Guangjian Tu on China’s Ambition to Build up the Highland for International Commercial Litigation

Tue, 01/03/2023 - 16:30

On Tuesday, January 10, 2022, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute will host its 29th monthly virtual workshop Current Research in Private International Law at 11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m. (CET). Guangjian Tu (University of Macau) will speak, in English, about the topic

China’s Ambition to Build up the Highland for International Commercial Litigation: Some Recent Attempts.

The presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome. More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de.

A Major Amendment to Provisions on Foreign-Related Civil Procedures Is Planned in China

Tue, 01/03/2023 - 05:34

Written by NIE Yuxin and LIU Chang, Wuhan University Institute of International Law

  1. Background

The present Civil Procedure Law of China (hereinafter “CPL”) was enacted in 1990 and has been amended four times. All amendments made no substantive adjustments to the foreign-related civil procedure proceedings. In contrast with legislative indifference, foreign-related cases in the Chinese judicial system have been growing rapidly and call for modernization of the foreign-related civil procedure law. On 30 December 2022, China’s Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress issued the “Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (amendment draft)”. Amendments are proposed for 29 articles, 17 of which relate to special provisions on foreign-related civil procedures, including rules on the jurisdiction, service abroad, taking of evidence abroad and recognition and enforcement of judgements.

 

  1. Jurisdiction

Special jurisdiction: Present special jurisdiction rules apply to “disputes concerning contract or other property rights or interests”. The literal interpretation may suggest non-contractual or non-propertary disputes are excluded. The amendment draft extends special jurisdiction rules to cover “disputes relating to property right or interest, and right or interest other than property” (Art. 276, para. 1). The amendment draft provides proceedings may be brought before the courts “where the contract is signed or performed, the subject matter of the action is located, the defendant has any distrainable property, the tort or harmful event occurred, or the defendant has any representative office” (Art. 276, para. 1). Furthermore, “the Chinese court may have jurisdiction over the action if the dispute is of other proper connections with China” (Art. 276, para. 2).

 

Choice of court agreement: A special provision on the choice of court agreement is inserted in the foreign-related procedure session (Art. 277), which states: “If the place actually connected to dispute is not within the territory of China, and the parties have agreed in written that courts of China are to have jurisdiction, Chinese courts may exercise jurisdiction. The competent court shall be specified according to provisions on hierarchical jurisdiction and exclusive jurisdiction of this law and other laws of China.” In contrast to Art. 35 on choice of court agreement in purely domestic cases, Art. 277 partly partially abolished the constraint prescribed in Art. 35, which requires the chosen forum to have practical connection to the dispute. When the party chose Chinese court to exercise jurisdiction, there will be no requirement for actually connection between the dispute and chosen place. But it does not state whether Chinese court should stay jurisdiction if a foreign court is chosen, and whether the chosen foreign court must have practical connections to the dispute. This is an obvious weakness and uncertainty.

 

Submission to jurisdiction: Art. 278 inserted a new provision on submission to jurisdiction: “Where the defendant raises no objection to the jurisdiction of the courts of China and responds to the action by submitting a written statement of defence or brings a counterclaim, the court of China accepting the action shall be deemed to have jurisdiction.”

 

Exclusive jurisdiction: The draft article expands the categories of disputes covered by exclusive jurisdiction (Art. 279), including disputes arising from: “(1) the performance of contracts for Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures or Chinese-foreign cooperative exploration and exploitation of natural resources in China; (2) the formation, dissolution, liquidation and effect of decisions of legal persons and other organizations established within the territory of China; (3) examining the validity of intellectual property rights which conferred within the territory of China.” Not only matters relating to Chinese-foreign contractual cooperation, but the operation of legal persons and other organizations and the territoriality of intellectual property rights are deemed key issues in China.

 

Jurisdiction over consumer contracts: The proposal inserts protective jurisdiction rule for consumer contracts (Art. 280). paragraph 1 of this article provides “(w)hen the domicile of consumer is within the territory of China but the domicile of operator or its establishment is not”, which permits a Chinese consumer to sue foreign business in China. Paragraph 2 restricts the effect of standard terms on jurisdiction. It imposed the operator the “obligation to inform or explicate reasonably” the choice of court clause, otherwise the consumer may claim the terms are not part of the contract. Furthermore, even if consumers are properly informed of the existence of a choice of court clause, if it is “obviously inconvenient for the consumer” to bring proceedings in the chosen court, the consumer may claim the terms are invalid. In other words, the proposal pays attention to the fairness of a choice of court clause in consumer contracts both in procedure and in substance.

 

Jurisdiction over cyber torts: With regard to cyber torts, Art. 281 of the draft states: action for cyber torts may be instituted in the Chinese court if: (1) “computer or other information device locates in the territory of China”; (2) “the harmful event occurs in the territory of China”; (3) “the victim domiciles in the territory of China”.

 

3. Conflict of Jurisdiction, Lis pendens and Forum Non Conveniens

Parallel litigation and exclusive jurisdiction agreements: Art. 282 states: “If one party sues before a foreign court and the other party sues before the Chinese court, or if one party sues before a foreign court as well as the Chinese court, for the same dispute, the Chinese court having jurisdiction under this law may exercise jurisdiction. If the parties have agreed in writing on choosing a foreign court to exercise jurisdiction exclusively, and that choice does not violate the provisions on exclusive jurisdiction of this law or involve the sovereignty, security or social public interests of China, the Chinese court may dismiss the action.” The first part of this article deals with parallel litigation. It allows the Chinese court to exercise jurisdiction over the same dispute pending in a foreign court. The second part of this article provides exception to exclusive jurisdiction agreements. Although Chinese courts are not obliged to stay jurisdiction in parallel proceedings, they should stay jurisdiction in favour of a chosen foreign court in an exclusive jurisdiction clause, subject to normal public policy defence.

 

First-seized court approach: If the same action is already pending before a foreign court, conflict of jurisdiction will happen. First-seized court approach encourages the latter seized court to give up jurisdiction. The draft implements this approach in China. Art. 283 states: “Where a foreign court has accepted action and the judgment of the foreign court may be recognized by Chinese court, the Chinese court may suspend the action with the party’s written application, unless: (1) there is choice of court agreement indicating to Chinese court between the parties, or the dispute is covered by exclusive jurisdiction; (2) it is obviously more convenient for the Chinese court to hear the case. Where foreign court fails to take necessary measures to hear the case, or is unable to conclude within due time, the Chinese court may remove the suspension with the party’s written application.” This provision is the first time that introduces the first-in-time or lis pendens rule in China. But the doctrine is adopted with many limitations. Firstly, the foreign judgment may be recognised in China. Secondly, Chinese court is not the chosen court. Thirdly, Chinese court is not the natural forum. The lis pendens rule is thus fundamentally different from the strict lis pendens rule adopted in the EU jurisdiction regime, especially it incorporates the consideration of forum conveniens. Furthermore, it is also necessary to reconcile the first-in-time provision with the article on parallel proceedings, which states Chinese courts, in principle, can exercise jurisdiction even if the dispute is pending in the foreign court.

 

Res judicata: Paragraph 3 of Art. 283 state: “Once the foreign judgment has been fully or partially recognized by Chinese court, and the parties institute an action over issues of the recognized content of the judgement, Chinese court shall not accept the action. If the action has been accepted, Chinese court shall dismiss the action.”

 

Forum non conveniens: Even if the conflict of jurisdiction has not actually arisen, the Chinese court may decline jurisdiction in favour of the more appropriate court of another country. The defendant should plead forum non conveniens or challenge jurisdiction. Applying forum non conveniens should meet four prerequisites. (1) “Since major facts of disputes in a case do not occur within the territory of China, Chinese court has difficulties hearing the case and it is obviously inconvenient for the parties to participate in the proceedings”. (2) “The parties do not have any agreement for choosing Chinese court to exercise jurisdiction”. (3) “The case does not involve the sovereignty, security or social public interests of China”. (4) “It is more convenient for foreign courts to hear the case” (Art. 284, para. 1). This article also provides remedy for the parties if the proceedings on foreign court do not work well. “Where foreign court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute, failed to take necessary measures to hear the case, or is unable to conclude within due time after Chinese court’s dismissal, the Chinese court shall accept the action which the party instituted again.” (Art. 284, para. 2).

 

4. Judicial Assistance

Service of process on foreign defendants: One of the amendment draft’s main focuses is to improve the effectiveness of foreign-related legal proceedings. In order to achieve this goal, the amendment draft introduces multiple mechanisms to serve process abroad.

Before the draft, the CPL has provided the following multiple service methods: (1) process is served in the manners specified in the international treaty concluded or acceded to by the home country of the person to be served and China; (2) service through diplomatic channels; (3) if the person to be served is a Chinese citizen, service of process may be entrusted to Chinese embassy or consulate stationed in the country where the person to be served resides; (4) process is served on a litigation representative authorized by the person to be served to receive service of process; (5) process is served on the representative office or a branch office or business agent authorized to receive service of process established by the person to be served within the territory of China; (6) service by post; (7) service by electronic means, including fax, email or any other means capable of confirming receipt by the person to be served; (8) if service of process by the above means is not possible, process shall be served by public notice, and process shall be deemed served three months after the date of public notice.[1]

Article 285 of the draft outlines two new methods to serve a foreign natural person not domiciled in China. First, if the person has a cohabiting adult family member in China, the cohabiting adult family member shall be served (Art. 285, para. 1(g)). Second, if the person acts as legal representative, director, supervisor and senior management of his enterprise established in the territory of China, that enterprise shall be served (Art. 285, para. 1(f)). Similarly, a foreign legal person or any other organization may be served on the legal representative or the primary person in charge of the organization if they are located in China (Art. 285, para. 1(h)). It is clear that by penetrating the veil of legal persons, the amendment draft increases the circumstances of alternative service between relevant natural persons and legal persons.

Amongst the amendments to the CPL, there are points relating to service by electronic means that are worthy of note. Compared to traditional ways of service, service by electronic means is usually more convenient and more efficient. The position in respect of service by electronic means, both before and after the amendment to the CPL, is that such service is permitted. A major innovation introduced by the amendment draft is that the service can now be conducted via instant messaging tools and specific electronic systems, if such means are legitimate service methods recognized in the state of destination (Art. 285, para. 1(k)). It meets the urgent demand of both sides in lawsuits by improving the delivery efficiency.

Party autonomy in service abroad is also accepted. The validity of service by other means agreed to by the person served is recognized, provided that it is permitted by the state of the person served (Art. 285, para. 1(l)).

If the above methods fail, the defendant may be served by public notice. The notice should be publicized for 60 days and the defendant is deemed served at the end of the period. Upon the written application of the party, the above methods and the way of service by public notice may be made at the same time provided that the service by public notice is not less than 60 days and the litigation rights of the defendant are not affected (Art. 285, para. 2).

 

Investigation and collection of evidence:

Prior to the draft, the CPL stipulated that Chinese and foreign courts can each request the other to provide judicial assistance in acquiring evidence located in the territory of the other country, in accordance with treaty obligations and the principle of reciprocity. Chinese courts can take evidence abroad generally via two channels. First, evidence overseas can be acquired according to treaty provisions. In the absence of treaties, foreign evidence can only be obtained through diplomatic channels based on the principle of reciprocity.[2]

Article 286 of the draft provides more varied methods to collect foreign evidence. Firstly, foreign evidence can be acquired according to the methods specified in the international treaties concluded or acceded to by both the country where the evidence is located and China. Secondly, the evidence can also be obtained through diplomatic channels. Thirdly, for a witness with Chinese nationality, the Chinese embassy or consulate in the country of the witness will be entrusted to take the evidence on behalf of the witness. Fourthly, via instant messenger tools or other means. Access to electronic evidence stored abroad faces the dilemma of inefficient bilateral judicial assistance, controversial unilateral evidence collection and inadequate functioning of multilateral conventions.[3] The application of modern information technology, such as video conferencing and teleconferencing, can overcome the inconvenience of distance, saving time and costs. It is the mainstream of international cooperation to apply modern technology in the field of extraterritorial evidence-taking. For example, in 2020, the EU Parliament and Council revised the EU Evidence Regulation. The most important highlight of the EU Evidence Regulation is the emphasis on the digitalization of evidence-taking and the use of modern information technology in the process of evidence-taking.[4] On this basis, the amendment draft proposes that the court may, with the consent of the parties, obtain evidence through instant messenger tools or other means, unless prohibited by the law of the country where the evidence is collected (Art. 286).

 

5. Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards

Grounds for non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign judgments: Recognition and enforcement shall not be granted if (1) the foreign court has no jurisdiction over the case in accordance with the provisions of Article 303; (2) the respondent has not been legitimately summoned or has not been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard or to argue, or the party who is incapable of litigation has not been properly represented; (3) the judgment or ruling has been obtained by fraud; (4) the court of China has issued a judgment or ruling on the same dispute, or has recognized and enforced a judgment or ruling issued by a court of a third country on the same dispute; (5) it violates the Chinese general principles of the law or sovereignty, national security or public interests of China (Art. 302).

After several amendments and official promulgation, the CPL has not significantly changed the requirements for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. In China, reciprocity as a prerequisite for recognition of foreign judgments continues to play a dominating role in China. The difficulty of enforcing foreign judgments is one of the major concerns in the current Chinese conflicts system when applying the principle of reciprocity, impeding the development of international cooperation in trade and commerce. The local judicial review process may become more transparent thanks to this new draft. However, the key concern, the reciprocity principle, is still left unaltered in this draft.

In addition, if the foreign judgment for which recognition and enforcement are sought involves the same dispute as that being heard by a Chinese court, the proceedings conducted by the Chinese court may be stayed. If the dispute is more closely related to China, or if the foreign judgment does not meet the conditions for recognition, the application shall be refused (Art. 304).

 

Lack of jurisdiction of the foreign court: One of the grounds for non-recognition and non-enforcement of foreign judgments is that the foreign court lacks jurisdiction (See Art. 302). Article 303 provides that the foreign courts shall be found to have no jurisdiction over the case in the following circumstances: (1) The foreign court has no jurisdiction over the case pursuant to its laws; (2) Violation of the provisions of this Law on exclusive jurisdiction; (3) Violation of the agreement on exclusive choice of court for jurisdiction; or (4) The existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties (Art. 303).

 

Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards: If the person sought to be enforced is not domiciled in China, an application for recognition and enforcement may be made to the Chinese intermediate court of the place of domicile of the applicant or of the place with which the dispute has an appropriate connection (Art. 306). The inclusion of the applicant’s domicile and the court with the appropriate connection to the dispute as the court for judicial review of the arbitration significantly facilitates the enforcement of foreign awards. A major uncertainty, however, is how “appropriate connection” is defined. The amendment draft remains silent on the criterion.

 

6. Conclusion

The amendment draft presents efforts to actively correspond to the trends in the internationalization of the civil process along with the massive ambition to build a fair, efficient, and convenient civil and commercial litigation system. It offers more comprehensive and detailed rules that apply to all proceedings involving foreign parties. The amendment draft is significant both in terms of its impact on foreign-related civil procedures and the continuing open-door policy. It demonstrates that China is growing increasingly law-oriented to provide more efficient and convenient legal services to foreign litigants and to safeguard the country’s sovereignty, security and development interests. On the other hand, the proposal also includes discrepancy and uncertainty, especially whether the practical connection for choice of foreign court is still required, what is the relationship between the first-in-time rule and the rule permitting parallel proceedings, whether reciprocity should be reserved for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It is also noted that although anti-suit injunction is used in Chinese judicial practice, the proposal does not include a provision on this matter. Hopefully, these issues may be addressed in the final version.

 

[1] The CPL, Art. 274.

[2] The CPL, Art. 284.

[3] Liu Guiqiang, ‘China’s Judicial Practice on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters: Current Situation, Problems and Solutions’ (2021) 1 Wuhan University International Law Review, 92, 97.

[4] Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters (Taking of Evidence Recast). Official Journal of the European Union [online], L 405, 2 December 2020.

The “Event Giving Rise to the Damage” under Art. 7 Rome II Regulation in CO2 Reduction Claims – A break through an empty Shell?

Mon, 01/02/2023 - 07:00

Written by Madeleine Petersen Weiner/Marc-Philippe Weller

In this article, we critically assess the question of where to locate the “event giving rise to the damage” under Art. 7 Rome II in CO2 reduction claims. This controversial – but often overlooked – question has recently been given new grounds for discussion in the much discussed “Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell” case before the Dutch district court in The Hague. In this judgment, the court had to determine the law applicable to an NGO’s climate reduction claim against Royal Dutch Shell. The court ruled that Dutch law was applicable as the law of the place where the damage occurred under Art. 4 (1) Rome II and the law of the event giving rise to the damage under Art. 7 Rome II as the place where the business decision was made, i.e., at the Dutch headquarters. Since according to the district court both options – the place of the event where the damage occurred and the event giving rise to the damage – pointed to Dutch law, this question was ultimately not decisive.

However, we argue that it is worth taking a closer look at the question of where to locate the event giving rise to the damage for two reasons: First, in doing so, the court has departed from the practice of interpreting the event giving rise to the damage under Art. 7 Rome II in jurisprudence and scholarship to date. Second, we propose another approach that we deem to be more appropriate regarding the general principles of proximity and legal certainty in choice of law.

1. Shell – the judgment that set the ball rolling (again)

The Dutch environmental NGO Milieudefensie and others, which had standing under Dutch law before national courts for the protection of environmental damage claims, made a claim against the Shell group’s parent company based in the Netherlands with the aim of obliging Shell to reduce its CO2 emissions. According to the plaintiffs, Shell’s CO2 emissions constituted an unlawful act. The Dutch district court agreed with this line of reasoning, assuming tortious responsibility of Shell for having breached its duty of care. The court construed the duty of care as an overall assessment of Shell’sobligations by, among other things, international standards like the UN Guiding Principles of Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses, the right to respect for the private and family life under Art. 8 ECHR of the residents of the Wadden region, Shell’s control over the group’s CO2 emissions, and the state’s and society’s climate responsibility etc. This led the district court to ruling in favor of the plaintiffs and ordering Shell to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 45% compared to 2019.

In terms of the applicable law, the court ruled that Dutch law was applicable to the claim. The court based its choice of law analysis on Art. 7 Rome II as the relevant provision. Under Art. 7 Rome II, the plaintiff can choose to apply the law of the event giving rise to the damage rather than the law of the place where the damage occurred as per the general rule in Art. 4 (1) Rome II. The court started its analysis by stating that “climate change, whether dangerous or otherwise, due to CO2 emissions constitutes environmental damage in the sense of Article 7 Rome II”, thus accepting without further contemplation the substantive scope of application of Art. 7 Rome II.

The court went on to find that the adoption of the business policy, as asserted by the plaintiffs, was in fact “an independent cause of the damage, which may contribute to environmental damage and imminent environmental damage with respect to Dutch residents and the inhabitants of the Wadden region”. The court thereby declined Shell’s argument that Milieudefensie’s choice pointed to the law of the place where the actual CO2 emissions occurred, which would lead to a myriad of legal systems due to the many different locations of emitting plants operated by Shell.

2. The enigma that is “the event giving rise to the damage” to date

This line of reasoning marks a shift in the way “the event giving rise to the damage” in the sense of Art. 7 Rome II has been interpreted thus far. To date, there have been four main approaches: A broad approach, a narrower one, one that locates the event giving rise to the damage at the focal point of several places, and one that allows the plaintiff to choose between several laws of events which gave rise to the damage.

(1.) The Dutch district court’s location of the event giving rise to the damage fits into the broad approach. Under this broad approach, the place where the business decision is made to adopt a policy can qualify as a relevant event giving rise to the damage. As a result, this place will usually be that of the effective headquarters of the group. On the one hand, this may lead to a high standard of environmental protection as prescribed by recital 25 of the Rome II Regulation, as was the case before the Dutch district court, which applied the general tort clause Art. 6:162 BW. On the other hand, this may go against the practice of identifying a physical action which directly leads to the damage in question, rather than a purely internal process, such as the adoption of a business policy.

(2.) Pursuant to a narrower approach, the place where the direct cause of the violation of the legal interest was set shall be the event giving rise to the damage. In the case of CO2 reduction claims, like Milieudefensie et al. v. Shell, that place would be located (only) at the location of the emitting plants. This approach – while dogmatically stringent – may make it harder to determine responsibility in climate actions as it cannot necessarily be determined which plant led to the environmental damage, but rather the emission as a whole results in air pollution.

(3.) Therefore, some scholars are in favor of a focal point approach, according to which the event giving rise to the damage would be located at the place which led to the damage in the most predominant way by choosing one focal point out of several events that may have given rise to the damage. This approach is in line with the prevailing opinion regarding jurisdiction in international environmental damage claims under Art. 7 Nr. 2 Brussels I-bis Regulation. In practice, however, it may sometimes prove difficult to identify one focal point out of several locations of emitting plants.

(4.) Lastly, one could permit the victim to choose between the laws of several places where the events giving rise to the damage took place. However, if the victim were given the option of choosing a law, for example, of a place that was only loosely connected to the emissions and resulting damages, Art. 7 Rome II may lead to significantly less predictability.

3. Four-step-test: A possible way forward?

Bearing in mind these legal considerations, we propose the following interpretation of the event giving rise to the damage under Art. 7 Rome II:

First, as a starting point, the laws of the emitting plants which directly lead to the damage should be considered. However, in order to adequately mirror the legal and the factual situations, the laws of the emitting plants should only be given effect insofar as they are responsible for the total damage.

If there are several emitting plants, some of which are more responsible for greenhouse gas emissions than others, these laws should only be invoked under Art. 7 Rome II for the portion of their responsibility regarding the entire claim. This leads to a mosaic approach as adopted by the CJEU in terms of jurisdiction for claims of personality rights. This would give an exact picture of contributions to the environmental damage in question and would be reflected in the applicable law.

Second, in order not to give effect to a myriad of legal systems, this mosaic approach should be slightly moderated in the sense that courts are given the opportunity to make estimations of proportions of liability in order not to impose rigid calculation methods. For example, if a company operates emitting plants all over the world, the court should be able to roughly define the proportions of each plant’s contribution, so as to prevent potentially a hundred legal systems from coming into play to account for a percentile of the total emissions.

Third, as a fall-back mechanism, should the court not be able to accurately determine each plant’s own percentage of responsibility for the total climate output, the court should identify the central place of action in terms of the company’s environmental tort responsibility. This will usually be at the location of the emitting plant which emits the most CO2 for the longest period of time, and which has the most direct impact on the environmental damage resulting from climate change as proclaimed in the statement of claim.

Fourth, only as a last resort, should it not be possible to calculate the contributions to the pollution of each emitting plant, and to identify one central place of action out of several emitting plants, the event giving rise to the damage under Art. 7 Rome II should be located at the place where the business decisions are taken.

This proposal is discussed in further detail in the upcoming Volume 24 of the Yearbook of Private International Law.

A few developments on the modernisation of the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents and the taking of evidence in the European Union

Thu, 12/22/2022 - 10:19

Written by Mayela Celis

This year has been marked by the high number of EU instruments that have been adopted (and entered into force) or that have started to apply in the European Union, which are directly or indirectly related to the modernisation of the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents and the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters.

These developments include three (full-fledged) regulations and two Commission implementing regulations. In addition, two Commission implementing decisions were adopted on 20 December 2022 concerning a related topic (i.e. e-CODEX). We have previously reported on this here and here. While the great number of EU instruments in this field and their interrelationship can be daunting to a non-European, they seem to provide a smooth and flexible way forward for EU Member States.

Undoubtedly, such legislative efforts attest to the commitment of EU institutions to modernise this area of Private International Law, in particular by making the electronic transmission of requests for service and the taking of evidence, as well as other communications, a reality at least from 2025 onwards (for more information, see below).

In my view, this goes beyond anything that currently exists among States (at any level) regarding judicial cooperation as the electronic transmission of requests for both service and the taking of evidence is usually done in a piecemeal approach or lacks the necessary security safeguards, including data protection.

On 1 July 2022 two recast Regulations started to apply in the European Union:

  1. Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents) (recast). See, in particular, Articles 5 (means of communication), 6, 19 (electronic service), 25, 27 and 28;
  2. Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters (taking of evidence) (recast). See, in particular, Articles 7 (transmission), 8, 12(4), 19 (direct taking of evidence), 20 (videoconferencing), 25, 27 and 28.

These two regulations modernise this field in two distinctive ways.

First and foremost these regulations contain provisions dealing with the means of communication to be used by transmitting agencies, receiving agencies, courts and central bodies through a secure and reliable decentralised IT system. This primarily intends to replace the cumbersome paper transmission of requests and other documents and in this way, speed up proceedings.

For those of you who are wondering what a “decentralised IT system” is, please note that it has been defined in both recast versions as a “network of national IT systems and interoperable access points, operating under the individual responsibility and management of each Member State, that enables the secure and reliable cross-border exchange of information between national IT systems”.

Secondly, these regulations provide for the actual service by electronic means and the taking of evidence by videoconferencing or other distance communications technology. The Service Regulation has included a provision regarding electronic service of documents by allowing this to take place by means of qualified electronic registered delivery services (see EU Regulation (EU) 910/2014) or by email, both requiring (thankfully and rightfully, I must note) the prior express consent of the addressee; on the other hand, the Evidence Regulation provides for the direct taking of evidence by videoconferencing or other distance communication technology.

With respect to the implementation of the decentralised IT system, two Commission Implementing Regulations were adopted and entered into force in 2022:

  1. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/423 of 14 March 2022 laying down the technical specifications, measures and other requirements for the implementation of the decentralised IT system referred to in Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 of the European Parliament and of the Council;
  2. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/422 of 14 March 2022 laying down the technical specifications, measures and other requirements for the implementation of the decentralised IT system referred to in Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

It should be noted that the decentralised IT system as an obligatory means of communication to be used for the transmission and receipt of requests, forms and other communication will start applying from 1 May 2025 (the first day of the month following the period of three years after the date of entry into force of the Commission Implementing Regulations above-mentioned).

Interestingly, Recital 3 of the Commission Implementing Regulations indicates that “[t]he decentralised IT system should be comprised of the back-end systems of Member States and interoperable access points, through which they are interconnected. The access points of the decentralised IT system should be based on e-CODEX.” Designating e-CODEX as the system on which access points should be based is in my view a breakthrough, given the apparent ambivalent feelings of some regarding such system.

The Annexes of these Commission Implementing Regulations provide more information as to the specificities of the system and indicate that:

  • “The Service of Documents (SoD) exchange system is an e-CODEX based decentralised IT system that can carry out exchanges of documents and data related to the service of documents between the different Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2020/1784. The decentralised nature of the IT system would enable data exchanges exclusively between one Member State and another, without any of the Union institutions being involved in those exchanges.”

  • “The Taking of Evidence (ToE) exchange system is an e-CODEX based decentralised IT system that can carry out exchanges of documents and messages related to the taking of evidence between the different Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2020/1783. The decentralised nature of the IT system would enable data exchanges exclusively between one Member State and another, without any of the Union institutions being involved in those exchanges.”

This takes us to the new EU instruments relating to e-CODEX.

As a matter of fact, a brand-new Regulation on e-CODEX has entered into force this year:

  • Regulation (EU) 2022/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on a computerised system for the cross-border electronic exchange of data in the area of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters (e-CODEX system), and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 (Text with EEA relevance).

This regulation explains e-CODEX in detail and specifies that the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA) will take over the administration of e-CODEX.

In particular, I would like to highlight Recitals 7 and 8 of the Regulation (EU) 2022/850, which explain what e-CODEX is and which read as follows:

“(7) The e-CODEX system is a tool specifically designed to facilitate the cross-border electronic exchange of data in the area of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters. In the context of increased digitalisation of proceedings in civil and criminal matters, the aim of the e-CODEX system is to improve the efficiency of cross-border communication between competent authorities and to facilitate citizens’ and businesses’ access to justice. Until the handover of the e-CODEX system to the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the e-CODEX system will be managed by a consortium of Member States and organisations with funding from Union programmes (the ‘entity managing the e-CODEX system’).”

“(8) The e-CODEX system provides an interoperable solution for the justice sector to connect the IT systems of the competent national authorities, such as the judiciary, or other organisations. The e-CODEX system should therefore be viewed as the preferred solution for an interoperable, secure and decentralised communication network between national IT systems in the area of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters.”

As previously indicated, two Commission Implementing Decisions have been adopted this week:

The Annexes of the Commission Implementing Decisions are particularly interesting as they provide all the specificities of the system and its handover.

All in all this looks very promising to the long-awaited modernisation of this field in the European Union.

 

Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 1/2023: Abstracts

Mon, 12/19/2022 - 12:12

The latest issue of the „Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax)“ features the following articles:

(These abstracts can also be found at the IPRax-website under the following link: https://www.iprax.de/en/contents/)

 

R. Wagner: European account preservation orders and titles from provisional measures with subsequent account attachments

The enforcement of a claim, even in cross-border situations, must not be jeopardised by the debtor transferring or debiting funds from his account. A creditor domiciled in State A has various options for having bank accounts of his debtor in State B seized. Thus, he can apply for an interim measure in State A according to national law and may have this measure enforced under the Brussels Ibis Regulation in State B by way of attachment of accounts. Alternatively, he may proceed in accordance with the European Account Preservation Order Regulation (hereinafter: EAPOR). This means that he must obtain a European account preservation order in State A which must be enforced in State B. By comparing these two options the author deals with the legal nature of the European account preservation order and with the subtleties of enforcement under the EAPOR.

 

H. Roth: The „relevance (to the initial legal dispute)“ of the reference for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU

The preliminary ruling procedure under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) exists to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of EU law. The conditions under which national courts may seek a preliminary ruling are based on the established jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) and are summarised in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU. One such condition is that the question referred to the court must be applicable to the decision in the initial legal dispute. Any future judgement by the referring court must thereafter be dependant on the interpretation of Union law. When cases are obviously not applicable, the European Court dismisses the reference for a preliminary ruling as inadmissible. The judgement of the CJEU at hand concerns one of these rare cases in the decision-making process. The sought-after interpretation of Union law was not materially related to the matter of the initial legal dispute being overseen by the referring Bulgarian court.

 

S. Mock/C. Illetschko: The General International Jurisdiction for Legal Actions against Board Members of International Corporations – Comment on OLG Innsbruck, 14 October 2021 – 2 R 113/21s, IPRax (in this issue)

In the present decision, the Higher Regional Court of Innsbruck (Austria) held that (also) Austrian courts have jurisdiction for investors lawsuits against the former CEO of the German Wirecard AG, Markus Braun. The decision illustrates that the relevance of the domicile of natural persons for the jurisdiction in direct actions for damages against board members (Art 4, 62 Brussels Ia Regulation) can lead to the fact that courts of different member states have to decide on crucial aspects of complex investor litigation at the same time. This article examines the decision, focusing on the challenges resulting from multiple residences of natural persons under the Brussels Ia Regulation.

 

C. Kohler: Lost in error: The ECJ insists on the “mosaic solution” in determining jurisdiction in the case of dissemination of infringing content on the internet

In case C-251/20, Gtflix Tv, the ECJ ruled that, according to Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, a person, considering that his or her rights have been infringed by the dissemination of disparaging comments on the internet, may claim, before the courts of each Member State in which those comments are or were accessible, compensation for the damage suffered in the Member State of the court seized, even though those courts do not have jurisdiction to rule on an application for rectification and removal of the content placed online. The ECJ thus confirms the “mosaic solution” developed in case C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising, and continued in case C-194/16, Bolagsupplysningen, for actions for damages for the dissemination of infringing contents on the internet. The author criticises this solution because it overrides the interests of the sound administration of justice by favouring multiple jurisdictions for the same event and making it difficult for the defendant reasonably to foresee before which court he may be sued. Since a change in this internationally isolated case law is unlikely, a correction can only be expected from the Union legislator.

 

T. Lutzi: Art 7 No 2 Brussels Ia as a Rule on International and Local Jurisdiction for Cartel Damage Claims

Once again, the so-called “trucks cartel” has provided the CJEU with an opportunity to clarify the interpretation of Art. 7 No. 2 Brussels Ia in cases of cartel damage claims. The Court confirmed its previous case law, according to which the place of damage is to be located at the place where the distortion of competition has affected the market and where the injured party has at the same time been individually affected. In the case of goods purchased at a price inflated by the cartel agreement, this is the place of purchase, provided that all goods have been purchased there; otherwise it is the place where the injured party has its seat. In the present case, both places were in Spain; thus, a decision between them was only necessary to answer the question of local jurisdiction, which is also governed by Art. 7 No. 2 Brussels Ia. Against this background, the Court also made a number of helpful observations regarding the relationship between national and European rules on local jurisdiction.

 

C. Danda: The concept of the weaker party in direct actions against the insurer

In its decision T.B. and D. sp. z. o. o. ./. G.I. A/S the CJEU iterates on the principle expressed in Recital 18 Brussels I bis Regulation that in cross-border insurance contracts only the weaker party should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules. In the original proceedings – a joint case – the professional claimants had acquired insurance claims from individuals initially injured in car accidents in Poland. The referring court asked the CJEU (1) if such entities could be granted the forum actoris jurisdiction under Chapter II section 3 on insurance litigation against the insurer of the damaging party and (2) if the forum loci delicti jurisdiction under Art. 7(2) or 12 Brussels I bis Regulation applies under these conditions. Considering previous decisions, the CJEU clarified that professional claimants who regularly receive payment for their services in form of claim assignment cannot be considered the weaker party in the sense of the insurance section and therefore cannot rely on its beneficial jurisdictions. Moreover, the court upheld that such claimants may still rely on the special jurisdiction under Art. 7(2) Brussels I bis Regulation.

 

C. Reibetanz: Procedural Consumer Protection under Brussels Ibis Regulation and Determination of Jurisdiction under German Procedural Law (Sec. 36 (1) No. 3 ZPO)

German procedural law does not provide for a place of jurisdiction comparable to Article 8 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation, the European jurisdiction for joinder of parties. However, according to Sec. 36 ZPO, German courts can determine a court that is jointly competent for claims against two or more parties. In contrast to Art. 8 (1) Brussels Ibis Regulation, under which the plaintiff has to choose between the courts that are competent, the determination of a common place of jurisdiction for joint procedure under German law is under the discretion of the courts. Since EU law takes precedence in its application over contrary national law, German courts must be very vigilant before determining a court at their discretion. The case is further complicated by the fact that the prospective plaintiff can be characterised as a consumer under Art. 17 et seq. Brussels Ibis Regulation. The article critically discusses the decision of the BayObLG and points out how German judges should approach cross-border cases before applying Sec. 36 ZPO.

 

M.F. Müller: Requirements as to the „document which instituted the proceedings“ within the ground for refusal of recognition according to Art 34 (2) Brussels I Regulation

The German Federal Court of Justice dealt with the question which requirements a document has to comply with to qualify as the “document which instituted the proceedings” within the ground for refusal of recognition provided for in Art 34 (2) Brussels I Regulation regarding a judgment passed in an adhesion procedure. Such requirements concern the subject-matter of the claim and the cause of action as well as the status quo of the procedure. The respective information must be sufficient to guarantee the defendant’s right to a fair hearing. According to the Court, both a certain notification by a preliminary judge and another notification by the public prosecutor were not sufficiently specific as to the cause of action and the status quo of the procedure. Thus, concerning the subject matter of the claim, the question whether the “document which instituted the proceedings” in an adhesion procedure must include information about asserting civil claims remained unanswered. While the author approves of the outcome of the case, he argues that the Court would have had the chance to follow a line of reasoning that would have enabled the Court to submit the respective question to the ECJ. The author suggests that the document which institutes the proceedings should contain a motion, not necessarily quantified, concerning the civil claim.

 

B. Steinbrück/J.F. Krahé: Section 1032 (2) German Civil Procedural Code, the ICSID Convention and Achmea – one collision or two collisions of legal regimes?

While the ECJ in Achmea and Komstroy took a firm stance against investor-State arbitration clauses within the European Union, the question of whether this will also apply to arbitration under the ICSID Convention, which is often framed as a “self-contained” system, remains as yet formally undecided. On an application by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Berlin Higher Regional Court has now ruled that § 1032 (2) Civil Procedural Code, under which a request may be filed with the court to have it determine the admissibility or inadmissibility of arbitral proceedings, cannot be applied to proceedings under the ICSID Convention. The article discusses this judgment, highlighting in particular that the Higher Regional Court chooses an interpretation of the ICSID Convention which creates a (presumed) conflict between the ICSID Convention and German law, all the while ignoring the already existing conflict between the ICSID Convention and EU law.

 

L. Kuschel: Copyright Law on the High Seas

The high seas, outer space, the deep seabed, and the Antarctic are extraterritorial – no state may claim sovereignty or jurisdiction. Intellectual property rights, on the other side, are traditionally territorial in nature – they exist and can be protected only within the boundaries of a regulating state. How, then, can copyright be violated aboard a cruise ship on the high seas and which law, if any, ought to be applied? In a recent decision, the LG Hamburg was confronted with this quandary in a dispute between a cruise line and the holder of broadcasting rights to the Football World Cup 2018 and 2019. Unconvincingly, the court decided to circumnavigate the fundamental questions at hand and instead followed the choice of law agreement between the parties, in spite of Art. 8(3) Rome II Regulation and opting against the application of the flag state’s copyright law.

 

T. Helms: Validity of Marriage as Preliminary Question for the Filiation and the Name of a Child born to Greek Nationals in Germany in 1966

The Higher Regional Court of Nuremberg has ruled on the effects of a marriage on the filiation and the name of a child born to two Greek nationals whose marriage before a Greek-orthodox priest in Germany was invalid from the German point of view but legally binding from the point of view of Greek law. The court is of the opinion that – in principle – the question of whether a child’s parents are married has to be decided independently applies the law which is applicable to the main question, according to the conflict of law rules applicable in the forum. But under the circumstances of the case at hand, this would lead to a result which would be contrary to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on names lawfully acquired in one Member State. Therefore – as an exception – the preliminary question in the context of the law of names has to be solved according to the same law which is applicable to the main question (i.e. Greek law).

 

K. Duden: PIL in Uncertainty – failure to determine a foreign law, application of a substitute law and leaving the applicable law open

A fundamental concern of private international law is to apply the law most closely connected to a case at hand – regardless of whether this is one’s own or a foreign law. The present decision of the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court as well as the proceedings of the lower court show how difficult the implementation of this objective can become when the content of the applicable law is difficult to ascertain. The case note therefore first addresses the question of when a court should assume that the content of the applicable law cannot be determined. It examines how far the court’s duty to investigate the applicable law extends and argues that this duty does not seem to be limited by disproportionate costs of the investigative measures. However, the disproportionate duration of such measures should limit the duty to investigate. The comment then discusses which law should be applied as a substitute for a law whose content cannot be ascertained. Here the present decision and the proceedings in the lower court highlight the advantages of applying the lex fori as a substitute – not as an ideal solution, but as the most convincing amongst a variety of less-than-ideal solutions. Finally, the note discusses why it is permissible as a matter of exception for the decision to leave open whether German or foreign law is applicable.

 

M. Weller: Kollisionsrecht und NS-Raubkunst: U.S. Supreme Court, Entscheidung vom 21. April 2022, 596 U.S. ____ (2022) – Cassirer et al. ./. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation

In proceedings on Nazi-looted art the claimed objects typically find themselves at the end of a long chain of transfers with a number of foreign elements. Litigations in state courts for recovery thus regularly challenge the applicable rules and doctrines on choice of law – as it was the case in the latest decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Cassirer. In this decision, a very technical point was submitted to the Court for review: which choice-of-law rules are applicable to the claim in proceedings against foreign states if U.S. courts ground their jurisdiction on the expropriation exception in § 1605(3)(a) Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The lower court had opted for a choice-of -aw rule under federal common law, the U.S. Supreme Court, however, decided that, in light of Erie and Klaxon, the choice-of-law rules of the state where the lower federal courts are sitting in diversity should apply.

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