Conflictoflaws

Geert van Calster has just published the third edition of the book titled “European Private International Law: Commercial Litigation in the EU” with Hart.

The blurb reads as follows:

This classic textbook provides a thorough overview of European private international law. It is essential reading for private international law students who need to study the European perspective in order to fully get to grips the subject.
Opening with foundational questions, it clearly explains the subject’s central tenets: the Brussels I, Rome I and Rome II Regulations (jurisdiction, applicable law for contracts and tort). Additional chapters explore the Succession Regulation, private international law and insolvency, freedom of establishment, and the impact of PIL on corporate social responsibility. The new edition includes a new chapter on the Hague instruments and an opening discussion on the impact of Brexit.
Drawing on the author’s rich experience, the new edition retains the book’s hallmarks of insight and clarity of expression ensuring it maintains its position as the leading textbook in the field.

The purpose of the book is to serve as an introductory text for students interested in EU Private International Law. The book can also be appreciated by non-EU students interested in EU Private International Law since it serves as an introductory text. It contains seven core chapters including the introduction. The full table of contents and introduction are provided free to readers and can be accessed respectively here and here

From what I have read so far in the introduction, this book is highly recommended. It brings the subject of EU Private International Law to the doorstep of the uninitiated and refreshes the knowledge of any expert on Private International Law (“PIL”). Though the core foundation of the book is on EU PIL, it contains some comparisons to other systems of PIL especially in the common law, in order to illustrate. Importantly, the introduction ends with the implications of Brexit for EU PIL and some interesting speculations.

More information on the book can be found here

The third issue of the Journal of Private International Law for 2020 features the following articles:

M Teo, “Public law adjudication, international uniformity and the foreign act of state doctrine”

Should courts, when applying foreign law, assess the validity or legality of foreign legislative or executive acts therein? The foreign act of state doctrine answers that question in the negative, but is often criticised as lacking a sound theoretical basis. This article argues, however, that the doctrine remains defensible if reconceptualised as a rule of private international law, which furthers the modest goal of international uniformity within the choice-of-law process. Assessing the validity or legality of foreign legislative and executive acts necessarily requires courts to address questions of foreign public law. Given the fact-specific and flexible nature of public law adjudication, courts cannot answer these questions, and thus cannot carry out such assessments, in a manner that loyally applies foreign law. The doctrine, then, makes the best of a bad situation, by sidestepping that problem with a clear rule of refusal which, if consistently applied, furthers international uniformity.

G Laganière, “Local polluters, foreign land and climate change: the myth of the local action rule in Canada”

This article addresses the jurisdiction of Canadian courts over transboundary pollution. It argues that a tort lawsuit brought by foreign victims of climate change against local greenhouse gas emitters could overcome jurisdictional obstacles, notably the local action rule, and proceed in Canada. The local action rule provides that Canadian courts have no jurisdiction to hear a claim involving foreign land, even when the claim lies solely in tort. It is thought to be a significant jurisdictional obstacle in transboundary environmental disputes involving foreign land. This assumption is misleading. A growing corpus of soft law instruments supports the notion of equal access to the courts of the state of origin for all victims of transboundary pollution. The courts of Canadian provinces have jurisdiction over pollution originating in the province, and the case law is more divided than generally assumed over the effect of the local action rule in tort litigation. The conclusions of this article have important implications for transboundary environmental disputes in Canada and other top greenhouse gas-producing countries. They also highlight a modest but potentially meaningful role for private international law in our global response to climate change.

S Khanderia, “Practice does not make perfect: Rethinking the doctrine of “the proper law of the contract” – A case for the Indian courts”

An international contract calls for the identification of the law that would govern the transaction in the event of a dispute on the matter between the parties. Indian private international law adopts the doctrine of “the proper law of contract” to identify the legal system that will regulate an international contract. In the absence of any codification, the interpretation of the doctrine has been left to the courts. The judiciary adopts the common law tripartite hierarchy, viz., the “express choice”, “implied choice” and “the closest and most real connection” test to determine the proper law. However, the existing case law demonstrates the diverse interpretations given to each of these factors in India in the post-colonial era. The paper examines the manner in which the blind adoption of the decisions of the English courts has considerably hindered the development of Indian private international law. In this regard, the author suggests some plausible solutions to render India more amenable to international trade and commerce – such as the adoption of mechanisms similar to those formulated by its continental counterpart.

KD Voulgarakis, “Reflections on the scope of “EU res judicata” in the context of Regulation 1215/2012”

It is now established in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that the law pursuant to which the effects of a recognised judgment are determined is that of the Member State where the judgment was rendered. In Case C-456/11 (Gothaer), however, the CJEU deviated from this rule and developed an autonomous (EU) concept of res judicata. The potential for this concept to extend to other jurisdictional determinations by Member State courts has therefore created additional layers of complexity in the area of recognition of judgments. This article seeks to shed light on this topic by drawing conclusions from the Court’s rationale in Gothaer and considering whether a more broadly applicable autonomous concept of res judicata can be consistent with the general system of Regulation 1215/2012 and the CJEU’s previous case law.

K Tan, “All that glisters is not gold? Deconstructing Rubin v Eurofinance SA and its impact on the recognition and enforcement of foreign insolvency judgments at common law”

It was Lord Hoffmann who once spoke of a “golden thread” of modified universalism running throughout English Insolvency Law since the eighteenth century. However, after the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Rubin v Eurofinance SA, that golden thread seems to have lost its lustre. This paper critiques the main premise of the Rubin decision by questioning whether the Supreme Court was correct in holding that there can be no separate sui generis rule for recognising and enforcing foreign insolvency judgments. This article also explores the possible solutions, either through statute or the common law, that could be used to remedy the post-Rubin legal lacuna for recognising and enforcing foreign insolvency judgments.

B Alghanim, “The enforcement of foreign judgments in Kuwait”

This article provides an overview of the rules in Kuwait regarding the enforcement of foreign judgments. This issue is significant due to the fact that foreign litigants still experience significant challenges in successfully enforcing foreign judgments – particularly as such parties have a limited understanding of the manner in which the Kuwaiti courts will interpret the conditions required to enforce such judgments.

An analysis of case law in this area highlights that the reciprocity condition is usually the most significant hurdle for applicants when seeking the enforcement of foreign judgments. Such difficulties have catalysed the Kuwaiti Parliament to introduce an exception to the general rule regarding the reciprocity condition; reform which this article heavily criticises.

PN Okoli, “The fragmentation of (mutual) trust in Commonwealth Africa – a foreign judgments perspective”

Mutual trust plays an important role in facilitating the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The 2019 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments also reflects some degree of mutual trust, although not explicitly. Commonwealth African countries seem to be influenced by mutual trust but have not yet adopted any coherent approach in the conflict of laws. This incoherence has impeded the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments especially in Africa. This article seeks to understand the principle of mutual trust in its EU context and then compare it with the subtle application of mutual trust in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Commonwealth Africa. The article illustrates this subtle and rather unarticulated application of mutual trust primarily through decided cases and relevant statutory provisions in the Commonwealth African jurisdictions considered. The article then considers how the subtle application of mutual trust has sometimes resulted in parallel efforts to promote the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and how a proliferation of legal regimes can undermine legal clarity, certainty and predictability. A progressive application of mutual trust will help to ensure African countries maximise the benefits of a global framework on foreign judgments.

A Moran & A Kennedy, “When considering whether to recognise and enforce a foreign money judgment, why should the domestic court accord the foreign court international jurisdiction on the basis that the judgment debtor was domiciled there? An analysis of the approach taken by courts in the Republic of South Africa”

The Roman-Dutch common law of the Republic of South Africa states that a foreign judgment is not directly enforceable there. In order to have a foreign money judgment recognised and enforced, the judgment creditor must, inter alia, demonstrate that the foreign court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter (ie that it had “international jurisdiction”). South African courts have held that the judgment debtor’s being domiciled, at the time of commencement of the proceedings, within the territory of the foreign court confers the said international jurisdiction on that foreign court. This position has been criticised. This paper assesses the validity of that criticism.

RF Oppong, “The dawn of the free and fair movement of foreign judgments in Africa?”

A new book on foreign judgment enforcement in Nigeria and South Africa seeks to ground their foreign judgment enforcement regimes – and perhaps other African countries – on a new theoretical foundation and inform judicial decisions in new directions. In a quest to promote the free movement of judgments, judges are urged to presumptively enforce foreign judgments subject to narrowly defined exceptions. This review article examines the new theory of qualified obligation and some selected issues arising from the discussion, recommendations, and findings of the book.

On a personal note, it is a delight to see three articles on the subject of Private International law in Africa published in this issue!

Iacyr de Aguilar Vieira, Gustavo Cerqueira (Eds.), The Vienna Convention in America. 40th anniversary of the United Nation Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods / La Convention de Vienne en Amérique. 40eanniversaire de la Convention des Nations Unies sur les contrats de vente internationale des marchandises, Paris : Société de législation comparée, 2020, 408 p. (available in hard copy and e-book)

To celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the Latin American section of the Société de législation comparée has published this book to present the Convention’s current state of application in different American countries, as well as to evaluate its influence on domestic sales laws.

This book seeks to provide a better understanding of how the Convention is being applied in American countries and by doing so, supports the efforts towards its uniform application. Concerning the more specifics private international law issues, the numerous analyses relating to the applicability of the Convention and to the subsidiary application of national law offer very interesting insights into the conflict of laws systems of Contracting States in this part of the world. A comparative approach concludes the volume.

This book offers the perfect opportunity to compare the Vienna Convention’s implementation in American States and to benefit from the view of American scholars on this universal instrument for the uniformization of sales of goods.

Among the contributors are Maria Blanca Noodt Taquela, Alejandro Garro, Franco Ferrari, Lauro Gama Jr., Jose Antonio Moreno Rodríguez, Cecilia Fresnedo de Aguirre, Ana Elizabeth Villalta Vizcarra and Claudia Madrid Martínez.

This publication is meant for both scholars and lawyers in the field of international trade.

On 27 January 2021 ERA (Academy of European Law) will host an online seminar to discuss practical implications of using digital technology in family law cases that often involve vulnerable parties and will therefore need special attention within the digitalisation of justice.

Among the key topics addressed in this event are:

• Legal Tech in family law – and how it affects the lawyer’s work
• Digitalisation of family courts, paperless systems and remote hearings
• Online divorce and ODR
• e-codex and the digitalisation of justice systems
• Artificial intelligence in family matters
• Experiences abroad

Additional information about this event is available here.

Maria Campo Comba just published a book titled: “The Law Applicable to Cross-border Contracts involving Weaker Parties in EU Private International Law” with Springer.  The abstract reads as follows:

This book provides answers to the following questions: how do traditional principles of private international law relate to the requirements of the internal market for the realisation of the EU’s objectives regarding the protection of weaker parties such as consumers and employees? When and how should private international law ensure the applicability of EU directives concerning the protection of weaker parties? Are the EU’s current private international law, rules on conflict of laws, and private international law approach sufficient to ensure the realisation of its objectives regarding weaker contracting parties, or is a different approach to private international law called for? The book concludes with several proposed amendments, mainly regarding the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations, as well as suggestions on the EU’s current approach to private international law. 

This book is primarily intended for an academic audience and to help achieve better regulation in the future. It also seeks to dispel certain lingering doubts regarding the current practice of EU private international law.

More information on the book can be found here

The right of children to receive adequate information in civil proceedings involving them represents a cornerstone of child participation, as well as a fundamental right of the child. The contact of children with the judicial system represents one of the most delicate situations where the child’s best interests and wellbeing should be of special attention. In particular, the child should receive information before, during and after the judicial proceedings, in order to have a better understanding of the situation and to be prepared either for his or her audition by the judicial authority, or for the final decision that will be taken. This aspect – as an important component of the child’s fundamental rights – should acquire (and is acquiring) importance also within the European Union, more and more oriented towards the creation of a child-friendly justice. It is a current reality that the implementation of the fundamental rights of the child influences the correct application of the EU instruments in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters.

However, the transposition of the principles and standards set at the international and regional level are not always easy to implement at the local level: despite the acknowledgement that the availability and accessibility of information is the crucial starting point for a child-friendly justice, more efforts are still to be done to effectively grant this right. International standards need to find their way into policies, legislation and daily practice.

The MiRI project (co-funded by the European Union Justice Programme 2014-2020, JUST-JCOO-AG-2018 JUST 83160) is undertaking a research on seven member States on children’s right to information in cross-border civil proceedings. The project consortium wishes to invite researchers in the field of private international family law to submit abstracts for an upcoming edited volume on the topic.

The abstract should focus on one or more of the following topics:

• The right of the child to receive adequate information in civil proceedings (such as parental responsibility, international child abduction, maintenance, etc.) as an autonomous and fundamental right: the reconstruction of rules, principles and standards of international law.
• The fundamental rights of the child in the European Union: the autonomous relevance of the right of the child to be informed in civil proceedings concerning him or her and its relevance for the creation of a EU child-friendly justice.
• The relevance of children’s right to information for the EU instruments in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters (such as Regulation EC No. 2201/2003 and its recast Regulation EU No. 2019/1111, with reference to parental responsibility and international child abduction; Regulation EC No. 4/2009): how international human rights standards should influence the correct application of the aforementioned instruments? Are there common best practices in this regard among EU member States? What should be done in order to build those common best practices?
• Rules, case law and practices currently existing in EU member States as concerns the fundamental right of the child to be informed in civil proceedings.

Abstracts should be no longer than 500 words and should be submitted by 15th March 2021 to francesca.maoli@edu.unige.it

The selection criteria will be based 1) on the relevance of the analysis in the field of EU judicial cooperation in civil matters, 2) quality of the contribution and 3) its originality. Those whose abstract will be accepted, will be notified by 30th March 2021 and will be asked to submit the full draft of the chapter (approx. between 8000-12000 words) by 30th June 2021.

Contributions will be subject to blind peer-review prior publishing. Selected authors will also be invited to present their findings during the final conference of the MiRI project in June-July 2021. More information about this event will be distributed after acceptance of the abstract.

Written by Catherine Shen, Project Manager, Asian Business Law Institute

1. The ConflictofLaws.net previously published a short update on the Asian Principles for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Adeline Chong ed, Asian Business Law Institute, 2020) which was released in September 2020.
2. Starting in November 2020, ABLI has been following up that publication with a series of concise handbooks written in no-frills languages called “Where in Asia” to address practical questions such as where in Asia judgments from a particular jurisdiction are entitled to be, have been and cannot be, recognised and enforced in other jurisdictions. The jurisdictions considered are Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam, which corresponds to those discussed in the two flagship ABLI publications on judgments recognition and enforcement: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Asia (Adeline Chong ed, Asian Business Law Institute, 2017) and the Asian Principles.
3. For example, included in this “Where in Asia” series is a Quantitative Analysis of the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China (as of December 2020) which is based on a list on China’s cases on recognition of foreign judgments (List) being maintained by China Justice Observer (CJO).
4. While CJO’s List looks at both applications to recognise and enforce foreign judgments in China as well as those to recognise and enforce Chinese judgments in foreign jurisdictions, ABLI’s analysis focuses specifically on the former category of applications.
5. Based on the List, ABLI identified an uptick in the number of such applications from 2015 to 2020, compared to the previous two decades, with Europe being the region that has exported the most judgments to China.
6. Further, there are two routes for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in China: either pursuant to a bilateral agreement (or “treaty”) between China and the country of the foreign court for the reciprocal enforcement of each other’s judgments, or under China’s domestic Civil Procedure Law (CPL) in the absence of such an agreement or treaty. Through its analysis, ABLI found that almost three in every five applications to enforce foreign judgments in China were unsuccessful, which is hardly surprising considering that more than half of all applications were made under the CPL route where applicants are required to demonstrate reciprocity. Under Chinese law currently, de facto reciprocity is required ie it has to be established that the foreign court whose judgment is before the Chinese court had previously enforced a Chinese judgment.
7. Other key insights revealed by the analysis include the percentage of applications that failed due to lack of reciprocity, the percentage of applications that were unsuccessful on procedural grounds, the percentage of applications that came from Belt and Road countries, etc.
8. The other handbooks available in the “Where in Asia” series include where in Asia can judgments from Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam be enforced in the Asia Pacific. Of particular interest may be the position in relation to Indonesian and Thai judgments. Since these two countries generally do not allow the recognition and enforcement of any foreign judgment, how is this stance affecting the exportation of their own judgments abroad? For example, the Indonesia handbook specifically discusses the case of Paulus Tannos v Heince Tombak Simanjuntak ([2020] SGCA 85, [2020] 2 SLR 1061) where the Singapore Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s decision last year and refused to recognise Indonesian bankruptcy orders on the ground of breach of natural justice.
9. The “Where in Asia” series is available here. ABLI is delighted to offer readers of ConflictofLaws.net an exclusive discount off its entire judgments book collection. Please write to catherine_shen@abli.asia for more information and your unique coupon code.

Since the summer, the Hamburg Max Planck Institute has hosted monthly virtual workshops on current research in private international law. That series, so far held in German, has proven very successful, with sometimes more than 1oo participants.

Starting in January, the format will be expanded. In order to broaden the scope of potential participants, the series will alternate between English and German presentations. The first English language speaker promises to be a highlight: Attorney-General Maciej Szpunar, author of the opinions in the landmark cases Google v CNIL (C-507/17) and Glawischnig-Pieschzek v Facebook Ireland Limited (C-18/18), as well as numerous other conflict-of-laws cases, most recently X v Kuoni (C-578/19). Szpunar will speak about questions of (extra-)territoriality, a topic of much interest for private international lawyers and EU lawyers since long ago, and of special interest for UK lawyers post-Brexit.

AG Maciej Szpunar
“New challenges to the Territoriality of EU Law”
Wednesday (!), 13 January 2021, 11:00-12:30 (Zoom)

As usual, the presentation will be followed by open discussion. All are welcome.

More information and sign-up here.

If you want to be invited to these events in the future, please write to veranstaltungen@mpipriv.de

JM Scherpe and E Bargelli have just published an edited book titled: “The Interaction between Family Law, Succession Law and Private International Law” with Intersentia.

The publisher’s blurb reads as follows:

There can be no doubt that both substantive family and succession law engage in significant interaction with private international law, and, in particular, the European Union instruments in the field. While it is to be expected that substantive law heavily influences private international law instruments, it is increasingly evident that this influence can also be exerted in the reverse direction. Given that the European Union has no legislative competence in the fields of family and succession law beyond cross-border issues, this influence is indirect and, as a consequence of this indirect nature, difficult to trace.

This book brings together a range of views on the reciprocal influences of substantive and private international law in the fields of family and succession law. It outlines some key elements of this interplay in selected jurisdictions and provides a basis for discussion and future work on the reciprocal influences of domestic and European law. It is essential that the choices for and within certain European instruments are made consciously and knowingly. This book therefore aims to raise awareness that these reciprocal influences exist, to stimulate academic debate and to facilitate a more open debate between European Institutions and national stakeholders.

More information can be found here

Written by Andrew Dickinson (Fellow, St Catherine’s College and Professor of Law, University of Oxford)

The belated conclusion of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement did not dampen the impact of the UK’s departure from the European Union on judicial co-operation in civil matters between the UK’s three legal systems and those of the 27 remaining Members of the Union. At the turn of the year, the doors to the UK’s participation in the Recast Brussels I Regulation and the 2007 Lugano Convention closed. With no signal that the EU-27 will support the UK’s swift readmission to the latter, a new era for private international law in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland beckons.

The path that the United Kingdom has chosen to take allows it, and its constituent legal systems, to shape conflict of laws rules to serve the interests that they consider important and to form new international relationships, unfettered by the EU’s legislative and treaty making competences. This liberty will need to be exercised wisely if the UK’s legal systems are to maintain their positions in the global market for international dispute resolution, or at least mitigate any adverse impacts of the EU exit and the odour of uncertainty in the years following the 2016 referendum vote.

As the guidance recently issued by the Ministry of Justice makes clear, the UK’s detachment from the Brussels-Lugano regime will magnify the significance of the rules of jurisdiction formerly applied in cases falling under Art 4 of the Regulation (Art 2 of the Convention), as well as the common law rules that apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments in the absence of a treaty relationship. This is a cause for concern, as those rules are untidy and ill-suited for the 21st century.

If the UK’s legal systems are to prosper, it is vital that they should not erase the institutional memory of the three decades spent within the EU’s area of justice. They should seek to capture and bottle that experience: to see the advantages of close international co-operation in promoting the effective resolution of disputes, and to identify and, where possible, replicate successful features of the EU’s private international law framework, in particular under the Brussels-Lugano regime.

With these considerations in mind, I began the New Year by suggesting on my Twitter account (@Ruritanian) ten desirable steps towards establishing a more effective set of conflict of laws rules in England and Wales for civil and commercial matters. Ralf Michaels (@MichaelsRalf) invited me to write this up for ConflictofLaws.Net. What follows is an edited version of the original thread, with some further explanation and clarification of a kind not possible within the limits of the Twitter platform. This post does not specifically address the law of Scotland or of Northern Ireland, although many of the points made here take a broader, UK-wide view.

First, a stand-alone, freshly formulated set of rules of jurisdiction replacing the antiquated service based model. That model (Civil Procedure Rules 1998, rr 6.36-6.37 (CPR) to be read with Practice Direction 6B) dates back to the mid-19th century and has only been lightly patched up, albeit with significant ad hoc extensions, since then. The new rules should demand a significant connection between the parties or the subject matter of the claim and the forum of a kind that warrants the exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction. In this regard, the Brussels-Lugano regime and the rules applied by the Scots courts (Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Sch 8) provide more suitable starting points than the grounds currently set out in the Practice Direction.

Taking this step would allow the rules on service to focus on the procedural function of ensuring that the recipient of a claim form or other document is adequately informed of the matters raised against it. It would enable the cumbersome requirement to obtain permission to serve a claim form outside England and Wales to be abolished, and with it the complex and costly requirement that the claimant show that England and Wales is the ‘proper place’ (ie clearly the appropriate forum) for the trial of the action. Instead, the claimant would need to certify that the court has jurisdiction under the new set of rules (as has been the practice when the rules of the Brussels-Lugano apply) and the defendant would need to make an application under CPR, Part 11 if it considers that the English court does not have or should not exercise jurisdiction. The claimant would bear the burden of establishing jurisdiction, but the defendant would bear the burden of persuading the court that it should not be exercised. This brings us to the second point.

Secondly, stronger judicial (or legislative) control of the expensive and resource eating Goffian forum conveniens model. Senior judges have repeatedly noted the excesses of the Spiliada regime, in terms of the time, expense and judicial resource spent in litigating questions about the appropriate forum (see, most recently, Lord Briggs in Vedanta Resources Plc v Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20, [6]-[14]), yet they and the rule makers have done little or nothing about it. In many ways, the model is itself to blame with its wide ranging evaluative enquiry and micro-focus on the shape of the trial. Shifting the onus to the defendant in all cases (see above) and an emphasis on the requirement that another forum be ‘clearly [ie manifestly] more appropriate’ than England would be useful first steps to address the excesses, alongside more pro-active case management through (eg) strict costs capping, a limit in the number of pages of evidence and submissions for each side and a greater willingness to require the losing party to pay costs on an indemnity basis.

Thirdly, a clipping of the overly active and invasive wings of the anti-suit injunction. English judges have become too willing to see the anti-suit injunction, once a rare beast, as a routine part of the judicial arsenal. They have succumbed to what I have termed the ‘interference paradox’ ((2020) 136 Law Quarterly Review 569): a willingness to grant anti-suit injunctions to counter interferences with their own exercise of jurisdiction coupled with an overly relaxed attitude to the interferences that their own orders wreak upon foreign legal systems and the exercise of constitutional rights within those systems. Moreover, the grounds for granting anti-suit injunctions are ill defined and confusing – in this regard, the law has travelled backwards rather than forwards in the past century (another Goffian project). Much to be done here.

Fourthly, steps to accede to the Hague Judgments Convention and to persuade others to accede to the Hague Choice of Court Convention. Although the gains from acceding to the Judgments Convention may be small, at least in the short term, it would send a strong signal as to the UK’s wish to return to centre stage at the Hague Conference, and in the international community more generally, and may strengthen its hand in discussions for a future Judgments Convention. By contrast, the success of the Hague Choice of Court Convention is of fundamental importance for the UK, given that it wishes to encourage parties to choose its courts as the venue for dispute resolution and to have judgments given by those courts recognised and enforced elsewhere.

Fifthly, a review of the common law rules for the recognition and enforcement of judgments, which are in places both too broad and too narrow. These rules have been little changed since the end of the 19th century. They allow the enforcement of foreign default judgments based only on the defendant’s temporary presence in the foreign jurisdiction at the time of service, while treating as irrelevant much more substantial factors such as the place of performance of a contractual obligation or place of commission of a tort (even in personal injury cases). Parliamentary intervention is likely to be needed here if a satisfactory set of rules is to emerge.

Sixthly, engagement with the EU’s reviews of the Rome I and II Regulations to test if our choice of law rules require adjustment. The UK has wisely carried forward the rules of applicable law contained in the Rome Regulations. Although not perfect, those rules are a significant improvement on the local rules that they replaced. The EU’s own reviews of the Regulations (Rome II currently underway) will provide a useful trigger for the UK to re-assess its own rules with a view to making appropriate changes, whether keeping in step with or departing from the EU model.

Seventhly, statutory rules governing the law applicable to assignments (outside Rome I) and interests in securities. The UK had already chosen not to participate in the upcoming Regulation on the third party effects of assignments, but will need to keep a close eye on the outcome of discussions and on any future EU initiatives with respect to the law applicable to securities and should consider legislation to introduce a clear and workable set of choice of law rules with respect to these species of intangible property. These matters are too important to be left to the piecemeal solutions of the common law.

Eighthly, a measured response to the challenges presented by new technology, recognising that the existing (choice of law) toolkit is fit for purpose. In December 2020, the UK Law Commission launched a consultation on Smart Contracts with a specific section (ch 7) on conflict of laws issues. This is a welcome development. It is hoped that the Law Commission will seek to build upon existing solutions for offline and online contracts, rather than seeking to draw a sharp distinction between ‘smart’ and ‘backward’ contracts.

Ninthly, changes to the CPR to reduce the cost and inconvenience of introducing and ascertaining foreign law. The English civil procedure model treats foreign law with suspicion, and places a number of obstacles in the way of its effective deployment in legal proceedings. The parties and their legal teams are left in control of the presentation of the case, with little or no judicial oversight. This approach can lead to uncertainty at the time of trial, and to the taking of opportunistic points of pleading or evidence. A shift in approach towards more active judicial case management is needed, with a move away from (expensive and often unreliable) expert evidence towards allowing points of foreign law to be dealt with by submissions in the same way as points of English law, especially in less complex cases.

Tenthly, measures to enhance judicial co-operation between the UK’s (separate) legal systems, creating a common judicial area. It is a notable feature of the Acts of Union that the UK’s constituent legal systems stand apart. In some areas (notably, the recognition and enforcement of judgments – Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Sch 6 and 7), the rules operate in a way that allows the recognition of a single judicial area in which barriers to cross-border litigation have been removed. In other respects, however (for example, the service of documents, the taking of evidence and the ascertainment of foreign law), the UK’s legal systems lack the tools that would facilitate closer co-operation and the more effective resolution of disputes. The UK’s legal systems should consider what has worked for the EU, with its diverse range of legal systems, and for Commonwealth federal States such as Australia and work together to adopt comprehensive legislation on a Single UK Judicial Area.

Symeon Symeonides, without doubt the doyen of US conflict of laws, just published what he says is the last of his annual surveys of American Choice of Law. (The series will be continued by John F. Coyle, William S. Dodge, Aaron D. Simowitz, and Melissa L.Tatum, suggesting it takes four of our most eminent scholars to replace Symeonides.)

As everyone in our discipline knows, reliably, at the end of the year, Symeon has posted his survey of conflict-of-laws decisions rendered over the year, according to Westlaw. He would assemble the most important decisions (of which he finds a lot), organize them around themes, and comment on them, always with (sometimes admirable) restraint from criticism. Anyone who has ever tried to survey the case law of an entire year in a jurisdiction knows how much work that is. (We at Max Planck, with IPRspr, certainly do.)

The service rendered to the discipline is invaluable. Conflict-of-laws opinions are hard to track, not least because courts themselves do not always announce them as such, and because they cover all areas of the law. Moreover, conflict of laws in the United States remains disorganized, with different states following different methods. (Symeon helpfully provides a table listing each state’s methodological approach.) Of course, Symeonides also compiled his superb knowledge of the case law in his Hague Lectures on the past, present, and future of the Choice-of-Law Revolution (republished as a book) and his book on (US) choice of law in the series of Oxford Commentaries.

Incredibly, this is Symeon’s 30th survey in 34 years. In this one, he uses the occasion to ruminate about what the 30 years have taught him: reading all the cases, and not missing the forest for the trees, enabled him (and thereby us) to gain a truer view of the conflicts landscape.( Of course, Symeonides also compiled his superb knowledge of the case law in his Hague Lectures on the past, present, and future of the Choice-of-Law Revolution (republished as a book) and his book on (US) choice of law in the series of Oxford Commentaries.) Such surveying shows that some of our assumptions are dated, as he showed in two special surveys on product liability and more generally cross-border torts. And it shows, as he beautifully puts it, that judges are not stupid, just busy.  Which is one of the reasons why the practice of conflicts owes such an amount of gratitude for these surveys.

Our discipline has seen a theoretical revival over the last ten or so years. A discipline once viewed as overly technical, doctrinal and untheoretical (a “dismal swamp”, in Dean Prosser’s much-cited words) is now being analyzed with newly-found theoretical and interdisciplinary interest – from economic analyses to political theory, philosophy, and even gender theory. The risk of such work is always to disentangle from the actual practice of the discipline, and thereby to lose what is arguably one of conflicts’ greatest assets: the concrete case. Symeonides (himself no enemy to methodological and sometimes theoretical discussions) has, with his annual surveys, made sure that such theories could always remain tied to the actual practice. For this, he deserves gratitude not only from practice but also from theory of private international law. His oeuvre is, of course, much much richer than the surveys. But even if he had written nothing beyond the surveys (and truth be told, it is not fully clear how he ever managed to write so much beyond them), his stature would have been earned.

The last twenty of Symeonides’ surveys have been compiled in a three volume edition published by Brill, a flyer allows for a 25% discount. While you wait for delivery (or maybe for approval of the loan you need to afford the books), you may want to download his lates survey, read Symeonides’ own thirty-year retrospective in the beginning, and marvel.

MF Moscati, M Palmer, and M Roberts just published a book titled “Comparative Dispute Resolution.”

The blurb reads as follows:

Comparative Dispute Resolution offers an original, wide-ranging, and invaluable corpus of chapters on dispute resolution. Enriched by a broad, comparative vision and a focus on the processes used to handle disputes, this study adds significantly to the discourse around comparative legal studies.

From a comparative perspective, this Research Handbook analyses the field of dispute processing, generally and across a broad range of legal systems and their legal cultures. It explores the nature of disputes and the range of basic processes used in their resolution, examining emerging issues in theory and practice and analysing differing traditions of dispute resolution and their ‘modernization’. Offering a balanced combination of theory and praxis, chapters present new understandings of theoretical, comparative and transnational dimensions of the manner in which societies and their legal systems respond to difficulties in social relations.

Showcasing opportunities for new research and debate, Comparative Dispute Resolution will be helpful to practitioners and others engaged in the practice of handling disputes. Students and scholars in disciplines such as law, sociology, politics and psychology will also find this topical Research Handbook useful in their understanding of the theory and practice of disputing and dispute management, legal reform and enhanced access to justice.

More information on the book can be found here

The latest amendments to the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) Arbitration Rules enter into force today, providing for a restyling to the 2012 rules (as earlier amended in 2017). The restyling aims to fine-tune the current rules by increasing flexibility, efficiency and transparency of the ICC arbitrations and taking in the practice that the International Court of Arbitration (“Court”) has meanwhile developed and consolidated.

This post briefly lists the main novelties.

1.Multi-party disputes (and disputes arising out of multi-tier contracts) will profit from an improved joinder and consolidation regime. The new rules entitle the tribunal, once constituted and upon request of a party addressed to the Secretariat, to join third parties after considering “all the relevant circumstances”, provided that the additional parties accept the constitution of the tribunal and agree to the Terms of Reference, where applicable (Article 7 (5)). Among the circumstances to be taken into account, the tribunal shall assess prime facie its jurisdiction over the additional party, the timing of the request for joinder, possible conflicts of interest and the impact of the joinder on the proceedings. As regards consolidation, it is also available in the case of two or more ICC arbitrations in which the disputed claims are made under multiple arbitration agreements (Article 10 (b)).

2.Yesterday a year closed which saw arbitration increasingly making use of virtual hearings and electronic filings, thereby experiencing a process of digitalization against the backdrop of the pandemic. Many benefits for the “good administration of arbitration” easily came into light, compared with the difficulties for arbitrators, parties and staff to personally meet.

Admittedly, the ongoing efforts to make arbitration resilient in these dramatic days should result in getting it more efficient (and cheaper) also in the upcoming post-pandemic era.

In this vein, the new ICC rules allow the tribunal to decide, after consulting the parties, that hearings can be conducted remotely (Article 26 (1)), thereby easing the proceedings conduct and adding to efficiency in the light of the circumstances of the case. The option for electronic submission is acknowledged for the Request for Arbitration, the Answer and any written communication.

3.Any revision, even the slightest, in the realm of arbitration always attempts to strengthen transparency, equality of parties, and enforceability of the awards.

Article 11 (7) compels parties to disclose any third-party funder (referred to as “any non-party which has entered into an arrangement for the funding of claims or defences and under which it has an economic interest in the outcome of the arbitration”). This will assist arbitrators in complying with their duties of impartiality and independence, while lessening the deal of information that parties habitually keep confidential. The aim to reinforce transparency, impartiality and independence also marks the contents of Article 17 (2) and Article 13 (6). The first empowers the tribunal to “take any measure necessary to avoid a conflict of interest” stemming from a change in party representation. The tribunal will act so only after giving an opportunity to the parties to comment in writing within a suitable period of time. Article 13 (6) takes care of impartiality and independence in the appointment of arbitrators in investment arbitration, requiring the prospected arbitrators not to have the same nationality of any party.

Transparency also underpins the amendment of Appendices I and II, which respectively gather the Statute and the Internal Rules of the Court. Particularly, Appendix II features new Article 5, which governs the communication from the Court of the reasons of its decisions. Only exceptionally may the Court refuse such communication.

With the view to protecting the equality of parties and the validity of the award, the Court may exceptionally appoint each member of the tribunal (Article 12 (9)). This power aims to discourage practices which threaten the validity of the tribunal constitution, such as drafting arbitration agreements with one-sided clauses for the appointment of the members.

4.A clarification has been inserted as to the tribunal’s power to render “additional awards” in case of claims that it “omitted to decide” (Article 36 (3)). Parties have to apply to the Secretariat for an additional award only in respect of “claims made in proceedings”.

5.Finally, fast track arbitration will be open to more transactions as the maximum dispute value to trigger expedited procedures raises from 2 to 3 US$ million for arbitration agreements concluded as of today. The chance to opt-in for applying the expedite procedure to higher-value disputes remains, as it does the opt-out and the Court’s assessment, upon request of a party, that the expedite procedure is inappropriate in the circumstances.

In the light of foregoing, it is apparent that, even if no full-blown revision unfolds to the arbitration community’s eyes, the listed “adjustments” are designed to benefit parties, arbitral tribunal and staff in the short and long term.

Membership

On 4 December 2020, Mongolia was issued with a certificate confirming an affirmative vote in favour of its admission as a Member of the HCCH, following a six-month voting period which ended on 3 December 2020. Mongolia has now been invited to deposit an instrument of acceptance of the HCCH Statute to become a Member of the HCCH.

Meetings & Events

On 3 December 2020, the HCCH and ASADIP co-hosted an International Conference on the 2019 Judgments Convention. A full recording of the event, held in Spanish, is available on the HCCH Facebook Page and the HCCH YouTube Channel.

On 11 December 2020, the HCCH and UNCITRAL co-hosted a Virtual Colloquium on Applicable Law in Insolvency Proceedings. More information, including documentation and audio recordings, is available here.

From 14 to 17 December 2020, the Administrative Cooperation Working Group on the 2007 Child Support Convention met via videoconference. The Group provided guidance in relation to the development of a standard statistical report under the Child Support Convention, including the use of the iSupport case management system, and other matters such as recommended forms and country profiles. More information is available here.

Publications & Documentation

On 22 December 2020, the Permanent Bureau announced the publication of the 4th Edition of the Practical Handbook on the Operation of the Evidence Convention (Evidence Handbook). This edition commemorates the 50th anniversary of the Convention and is complemented by the Guide to Good Practice on the Use of Video-Link released earlier this year. More information is available here.

These monthly updates are published by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), providing an overview of the latest developments. More information and materials are available on the HCCH website.

The Brexit deal (officially the [draft] EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement) was agreed upon, finally, on December 24. Relief in many quarters (except Universities participating in the Erasmus program, which is discontinued in the UK).

But private international lawyers worry what happened to judicial cooperation in civil matters: is there any agreement at all? Peter Bert provides a detailed analysis of all available documents and finds almost no mention, which leads him to think we are facing  a sectoral hard brexit. Other experts on social media do not know more. The Law Society also seems worried. There seems to be no new information on the UK application to join the Lugano Convention, let alone any of the other areas of judicial cooperation. Given the intense discussion on these matters since the day of the Brexit vote, this can hardly be an oversight, but on the other hand it seems strange that such a core issue remained unaddressed.

Any further information or analysis in the comments is welcome.

The case

In a recent decision published October 30th, 2020 (ordinanza 24110/2020) the Italian Supreme Court has applied two provisions of the Brussels Ia Regulation, namely art. 8 n. 1, and art. 7 n. 2, in a context of multiple actions for fraud started by the Italian investors against a number of defendants. The first being a UK based bank for alleged breaches of its duties of control over financial experts who collected money from investors. The others being a UK based financial company and a financial expert who were supposed to invest the collected money by way of establishing trust. As emerges from the order of the Supreme Court, all investments collected in Italy were spent in gambling houses in Italy.

Proceedings were collectively started in Italy against all defendants, who challenged the Italian jurisdiction before the court of first instance, which thus requested the Supreme Court to settle the issue.

Last known domicile of one of the defendants

Following a logical order, the Italian Supreme Court seeks to determine in the first place if one of the defendants is domiciled in Italy. In this regard, the solution of the Court is interesting in that it focuses on the last known domicile of the financial expert, whose actual whereabouts have become unknown. According to the Court, the simple fact that current domicile of the party is unknown, and that consequently service of documents has followed domestic rules for unknown residents, is per se not sufficient to argue that that person is no longer domiciled in Italy. To some extent, even though this decision is not clearly mentioned in the order of the Italian Supreme Court, this conclusion seems consistent with the ratio expressed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Hypotecní banka a.s. v Lindner (case C-327/10), where it was argued that defendants with unknown domicile are domiciled at their last known domicile for the purpose of the Brussels I(a) Regulation (see para. 42 ff).

Art. 8 n. 1 Brussels Ia Regulation

Having established that Italian jurisdiction exists under art. 4 Brussels Ia Regulation at least in respect to one of the defendants (i.e. the financial expert cooperating with the British financial company who should have been appointed as trustee for the management of the investments), the Italian Supreme Court turns to the analysis of Italian jurisdiction over the UK investment company and the UK Bank under art. 8 n. 1 Brussels Ia Regulation.

The Supreme Court concedes that the special head of jurisdiction is subject to a restrictive interpretation and should not be applied when the different proceedings have different petitum and causa petendi, or where there is no subordination between the actions with no risk of incompatible judgments – the mere ‘inconsistency’ between decisions being insufficient to trigger art. 8 n. 1 Brussels Ia Regulation and derogate from art. 4.

In the case at hand, however, even though the action against the UK bank was contractual in nature for alleged violation of its control duties, and non-contractual in nature against the other parties, the Italian Supreme Court notes how the non-contractual liability of those who have collected the money to unlawfully spend it in gambling houses in Italy is strictly interconnected and intertwined with the contractual conduct of the bank – as proper ex ante controls by this subject might have avoided the investment in favor of companies who had unclear bank operations incompatible with investment activities. Moreover, damaged parties have started proceedings seeking damages collectively against all parties for solidary liability – in the Court’s eye, this renders it fundamental to unitarily address all conducts even though these are grounded on different titles. Again, a solution that appears to be consistent with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Freeport plc v Olle Arnoldsson, case C-98/06, para. 41).

For these reasons, the Italian Supreme Court argues that the Italian jurisdiction extends from that of the Italian domiciled also to both the British investment company and the British bank.

Art. 7 n. 2 Brussels Ia Regulation

The Italian Supreme Court also addresses the existence of the Italian jurisdiction under art. 7 n. 2 Brussels Ia Regulation. The Court does not however determine at this stage local competence – referring the issue to the court of first instance.

The case deals in concreto with damages following investment frauds – in this sense the only ‘damage’ for the purposes of the provision at hand is financial in nature. The Italian Supreme Court quotes the decision of the European Court of Justice in Volkswagen AG (Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Volkswagen AG, case C-343/19) to support the idea that the place of financial loss might ground the existence of Italian international jurisdiction, as in Italy the investors transferred their sums (thus lost their money).

The Supreme Court additionally argues that the ‘conduct’ can be localized in Italy as well – thus Italian jurisdiction follows. In Italy the sums were allegedly fraudulently collected from investors, and in Italy such sums were allegedly fraudulently used in Italian gambling houses (contrary to contractual indications). With a brief passage, the Court gives a strong value to this specific head of jurisdiction, the place of the ‘harmful conduct’, as it can be used by the plaintiffs to ground their actions superseding uncertainties that could follow the application of art. 8 n. 1 Brussels Ia.

Arbitration community lacked a comprehensive guide in English to move through the multiple and multifaceted connections between arbitration and the Italian legal system: International Arbitration in Italy fills in this gap, addressing both international commercial and investment arbitration.

The book deeply depicts said connections, raising interpretative problems and providing solutions with the view to building a coherent system against the backdrop of the author’s thought about the phenomenon of the arbitration taken as a whole.

This approach qualifies the entire analysis elaborated on in 12 Chapters, which start with the focus on what international arbitration is and what its grounds are, then moving on how arbitration “dialogues” with the different sources of Italian law, and what the principles for the right interpretation of this law are.

The book proceeds on “traditional” topics pertaining to a handbook of international commercial arbitration (the interplay between arbitration and national courts, the arbitration agreement, the arbitral tribunal, the arbitral proceedings, the provisional measures, the law applicable to the merits, the costs of arbitration, the different awards, related challenges, recognition and enforcement) with a closing attention to investment arbitration.

International Arbitration in Italy also includes three useful appendices which gather the main provisions of Italian law on arbitration (1), the rules of arbitration of the Milan Chamber of Arbitration (2) and the list of the Bilateral Investment Treaties in force for Italy (3).

Given its well-balanced theoretical and practical approach, the book will stimulate the scientific debate while helping practitioners to handle even the trickiest cases featuring interactions between international arbitration and Italian law.

Today, the English High Court in Owen v Galgey [2020] EHWC 3546 (QB) delivered a thorough and interesting decision on Article 4(3) of Rome II Regulation, which is the general escape clause for Rome II. For a complete reading of the decision see here

The European Commission on 3 December presented the European Democracy Action Plan. The Press Release explains that: “Standing up to challenges to our democratic systems from rising extremism and perceived distance between people and politicians, the Action Plan sets out measures to promote free and fair elections, strengthen media freedom and counter disinformation.”

With regard to the aim of strengthening media freedom, the Commission “will propose in 2021 a recommendation on the safety of journalists, drawing particular attention to threats against women journalists, and an initiative to curb the abusive use of lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).”

The Commission is seeking to establish an Expert Group against Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP). The Call defines SLAPP as “groundless or exaggerated lawsuits, initiated by state organs, business corporations or powerful individuals against weaker parties who express, on a matter of public interest, criticism or communicate messages which are uncomfortable to the litigants.”

The Call further explains: “Whilst most SLAPP appear to be national lawsuits, they can be made more complex, thus more costly to defend, when they are deliberately brought in another jurisdiction and enforced across borders, or when they exploit other aspects of national procedural and private international law. Most SLAPP suits are based on defamation claims, but there are cases based on other grounds, including data protection, blasphemy, tax laws, copyright, trade secret breaches, and similar concepts.”

Interested persons can find the call in the Register of Commission Expert Groups.

In his Opinion delivered last Thursday, AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona presents his take on determination of the place where the damage occurred (‘Erfolgsort’) under Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation in the context of a collective action for declaration of liability in connection with investments in securities. The Opinion provides further clarification in relation to the case law established by the Court of Justice in the cases Kolassa, Universal Music International Holding and Löber.

An oil and gas company established in United Kingdom, whose ordinary shares are listed on the stock exchanges in that State and in Germany, leases an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico. In 2010, an explosion occurs on this oil rig, causing serious environmental damage.

Before the courts in the Netherlands, an association established in this Member State brings a collective action for a declaratory judgment against the oil and gas company on behalf of all persons who bought, held or sold the ordinary shares through an investment account in the Netherlands. It argues that the oil and gas company acted unlawfully towards its shareholders inasmuch as it made incorrect, incomplete and misleading statements about the circumstances pertaining to, inter alia, the aforementioned explosion resulting in an oil spill.

The first instance court considers that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on the action in question. The second instance court upholds this decision.

The association lodges an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, which refers questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.

It is worth noting at the outset that the Opinion of 17 December 2020 does not address all the questions referred to the Court. As it states at its point 17, the Opinion elaborates only on two first questions of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, relating to, firstly, the determination of the place where the damage occurred in the context of the action in the main proceedings and, secondly, the potential impact of the collective nature of that action on such determination.

As a consequence, the third and fourth questions on international and internal territorial jurisdiction to hear subsequent individual claims of the investors are not covered by the Opinion.

In relation to the first question, the Opinion explains, in essence, that the location of the investment account (in which the fall in the value of the shares of a company listed on stock exchanges has been reflected/’recorded’) in a Member State is not sufficient to confer on the courts of this Member State jurisdiction to rule on the action in matters of non-contractual liability in connection with investments in securities. It then goes on to analyse whether other circumstances, combined with the location of the investment account, could justify a different outcome.

Ultimately, it concludes at point 96:

[For the purposes of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation] it is not a sufficient connecting factor for attributing international jurisdiction to the courts of a Member State that a fall in the value of the shares of a company listed on stock exchanges in other Member States is recorded in investment accounts located in that Member State or in investment accounts of a bank or investment firm established in that Member State, where the damage is the result of decisions taken by investors on the basis of allegedly incorrect, incomplete and misleading information distributed globally by the listed company;

the existence of a settlement between the defendant company and some shareholders in a third State which has not been offered to the applicants in the main proceedings and the fact that some applicants are consumers are [also] not relevant specific circumstances for the purposes of attributing international jurisdiction pursuant to Article 7(2) of [the Brussels I bis Regulation]. Nor is the fact that the relevant information was distributed worldwide by the defendant company.

Here, it is worth noting that, at points 68 to 71, the Opinion discusses the question whether it is always necessary to ensure the applicant the option of bringing an action in a place where damage is said to have occurred. It does not seem to be the case, as the Opinion explains it.

Concerning the second question, the Opinion contends that the exercise of a collective action in accordance with national rules of procedure by an association representing the interests of the holders of the securities who suffered the damage does not alter the interpretation of Article 7(2) of the Brussels I bis Regulation presented for the purposes of the first question.

The Opinion can be consulted here.